While in the Western Approaches on May 23, however, a calamity occurred. Oehrn fired five torpedoes-all with the improved magnetic pistols-and all five failed. Oehrn broke radio silence to report the failures: two prematures, two non-detonators, and one erratic runner.

Donitz was dismayed and Furious Furious. He immediately barred use of magnetic pistols and refused again to authorize their use until they had been fixed beyond any shadow of doubt. He ordered Oehrn and all other skippers to switch to impact pistols, which had recently been improved. At the same time, he demanded that work on copying the British impact pistol recovered from the captured Seal Seal be carried forward with utmost urgency. be carried forward with utmost urgency.

The switch to the improved impact pistols produced immediate returns for Oehrn. In the days following, he sank three ships by torpedo, including the 10,500-ton French freighter Brazza Brazza. He went on to sink another five ships and a trawler: one by demolition, four by gun, and one by a combination of gun and torpedo. His victims included the 7,400-ton British tanker Telena Telena.

One of the sinkings was to become controversial: the 5,000-ton British freighter Sheaf Sheaf Mead Mead, sunk in the afternoon of May 27, off Cape Finisterre, with the loss of thirty-one men. Before shooting, Oehrn observed that the freighter was armed and painted warship gray: Several guns were on the stern and perhaps another concealed under a canvas structure amidships. Having been warned by Donitz to expect armed British auxiliary cruisers in this area (off Vigo, Spain), Oehrn convinced himself that Sheaf Sheaf Mead Mead was one, and therefore, when he surfaced, he made no attempt to help the survivors. He logged: was one, and therefore, when he surfaced, he made no attempt to help the survivors. He logged: A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crews have saved themselves on wreckage and capsized boats. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head, "Nix-name." A young boy in the water calls, "Help, help, please." The others are very composed; they look damp and somewhat tired and have a look of cold hatred on their faces. Then on to the old course.*

Having exhausted his torpedoes and ammo, Oehrn returned U-37 U-37 to Wilhelmshaven after a mere twenty-six days at sea. Donitz was ecstatic. Oehrn had achieved the objective, reopening the Atlantic U-boat war with resounding successes. In all, Oehrn put down ten confirmed ships for 41,207 tons. This was a record first patrol in numbers of ships sunk and only 700 tons shy of Schuhart's record 41,905 tons sunk in a single patrol. to Wilhelmshaven after a mere twenty-six days at sea. Donitz was ecstatic. Oehrn had achieved the objective, reopening the Atlantic U-boat war with resounding successes. In all, Oehrn put down ten confirmed ships for 41,207 tons. This was a record first patrol in numbers of ships sunk and only 700 tons shy of Schuhart's record 41,905 tons sunk in a single patrol.

The other three boats followed U-37 U-37 into the hunting area by about a week. Neither into the hunting area by about a week. Neither U-29 U-29 (Schuhart) nor (Schuhart) nor U-43 U-43 (Ambrosius) had any luck. But Fritz Frauenheim, making his first Atlantic patrol in the VIIB (Ambrosius) had any luck. But Fritz Frauenheim, making his first Atlantic patrol in the VIIB U-101 U-101, sank three British freighters for 14,200 tons in the Western Approaches. Thereafter the boats patrolled Iberian waters where, if necessary, they could clandestinely refuel in Spanish ports.

Near Lisbon on June 6, Frauenheim in U-101 U-101 came upon a magnificent target, identified as a huge Greek passenger liner. Frauenheim surfaced, approached, and ordered the captain to abandon ship within ten minutes. The ship was not a Greek, but rather the 24,000-ton United States passenger liner Washington, bound from Lisbon to Galway, Ireland, jammed with American men, women, and children fleeing the war zone. On close inspection, Frauenheim discovered his error and shouted to the captain: "Sorry. Mistake. Proceed." No harm was done, but what was perceived as a very close call caused a great public uproar. Berlin at first attempted to cover up, charging (a la came upon a magnificent target, identified as a huge Greek passenger liner. Frauenheim surfaced, approached, and ordered the captain to abandon ship within ten minutes. The ship was not a Greek, but rather the 24,000-ton United States passenger liner Washington, bound from Lisbon to Galway, Ireland, jammed with American men, women, and children fleeing the war zone. On close inspection, Frauenheim discovered his error and shouted to the captain: "Sorry. Mistake. Proceed." No harm was done, but what was perceived as a very close call caused a great public uproar. Berlin at first attempted to cover up, charging (a la Athenia Athenia) that the submarine was British, but finally conceded that the submarine was German and that it had stopped Washington Washington in error. in error.*

GREAT B BRITAIN AT R RISK.

France ingloriously collapsed. On June 10, as German forces closed on Paris, Hitler's ally, Benito Mussolini, seeking easy spoils, declared war on France and Great Britain. A doddery, eighty-four-year-old French military hero, Marshal Henri Petain, who replaced Paul Reynaud as chief of state, entered into armistice negotiations with Hitler. The terms of the treaty left France divided: the northern half occupied by Germany; the southern half, or "Vichy France," unoccupied. Fiercely loyal Frenchmen who escaped to England rallied to General Charles de Gaulle, who proclaimed himself head of Free French forces.

The surrender of France and the entry of Italy into the war posed grave new naval threats to Great Britain. Under one clause of the treaty, Germany gained uncontested access to all French naval bases and seaports on the English Channel and on the Atlantic coastline (Bay of Biscay) as far south as Bordeaux, flanking the British Isles as well as her sea-lanes from the Mediterranean. Under another clause, Hitler gave his solemn word that the French fleet, neutralized in nonoccupied (or "Free Zone") bases in France and North Africa, would not be seized by Germany. But Churchill judged Hitler's word to be worthless. At any time the Fuhrer might order the Vichy government to launch the entire French fleet against Britain. Moreover, in the absence of France as an ally, the hostile Italian fleet in the Mediterranean had to be met by a substantial diversion of British naval power to that theater.

The commander of the French Navy, Admiral Franois Darlan, assured Churchill privately that the French Navy would never fall into Hitler's hands; Darlan had, in fact, secretly issued orders to all French naval commanders that should Hitler go back on his word and attempt to seize the Navy, all French ships were to be instantly scuttled. But Churchill did not trust Darlan any more than he trusted Hitler: Darlan had all too eagerly joined the traitorous Vichy government in the high post of Minister of Marine. If Hitler so decreed, Darlan might well order the French fleet to attack the Royal Navy and/or to reinforce the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine for what was assumed to be Hitler's next step, an invasion of the British Isles. for what was assumed to be Hitler's next step, an invasion of the British Isles.

Churchill therefore insisted to the War Cabinet that the French fleet had to be destroyed. It was the most "hateful" and "unnatural and painful" course of action he had ever recommended, he wrote later. The War Cabinet approved and the Admiralty issued orders for a surprise strike to be carried out on the morning of July 3. The senior British admirals entrusted with the task greeted the orders with a mixture of disbelief, dismay, and distaste. Nonetheless, they complied. At the French anchorage Mers-el-Kebir near Oran, Algeria, British naval forces sank the old French battleship Bretagne Bretagne and severely damaged another old battleship, and severely damaged another old battleship, Provence Provence, as well as the modern battle cruiser Dunkerque Dunkerque and a super-destroyer, killing a total of 1,297 French sailors. At the British naval base in Alexandria, Egypt, British naval forces disarmed and immobilized the old battleship Lorraine, four cruisers, and three destroyers without a fight. At the French naval base at Dakar, British forces damaged the gunned but uncompleted battleship and a super-destroyer, killing a total of 1,297 French sailors. At the British naval base in Alexandria, Egypt, British naval forces disarmed and immobilized the old battleship Lorraine, four cruisers, and three destroyers without a fight. At the French naval base at Dakar, British forces damaged the gunned but uncompleted battleship Richelieu Richelieu. In the British Isles, Royal Marines and other infantry boarded and captured about 200 French ships, including two old battleships, Paris Paris and and Courbet Courbet, eight destroyers, the monster-submarine Surcouf Surcouf, and six other submarines, then "interned" about 12,000 French sailors in miserable concentration camps.

French naval personnel were justifiably outraged and embittered. As a consequence, the Free French Navy (Forces Navales Franaises Libres), which was formed in the British Isles, grew grew only slowly. Many of the French sailors seized by the British were eventually repatriated and reported to the Vichy French Navy (the damaged battle cruiser only slowly. Many of the French sailors seized by the British were eventually repatriated and reported to the Vichy French Navy (the damaged battle cruiser Dunkerque Dunkerque, her undamaged sister ship Strasbourg Strasbourg, numerous cruisers, destroyers, and submarines), which had escaped to Toulon, in southern France.

With the French Navy gutted and/or neutralized in Toulon, the Royal Navy still had to confront the Italian Navy. It consisted of four small (23,000-ton) older battleships, nineteen cruisers, fifty-nine destroyers, and 115 submarines. Only two of the four battleships, Cavour Cavour and and Cesare Cesare, were war-ready; the other two were undergoing modernization.*

On paper, the Italian submarine force, consisting of 115 commissioned boats, represented a great threat to the Royal Navy. It was then twice the size of the German U-boat arm. Of the 115 boats, thirty-nine were big "oceangoing" boats (900 to 1,500 tons), and sixty-nine were "Mediterranean boats" (600 to 900 tons). When Italy declared war, about eighty-four of the boats were war-ready; fifty-four of these deployed to war stations in the Atlantic and Indian oceans and Mediterranean and Red seas.

This first combat sortie of the Italian submarine force was a fiasco. Within three days over half (twenty-eight) of the fifty-four boats were forced to abort. Fieramosca Fieramosca suffered a battery explosion. suffered a battery explosion. Guglielmotti Guglielmotti and and Macalle Macalle ran aground; the former was salvaged, the latter scuttled. The engines on Ferraris failed. British air and surface forces promptly sank seven boats ( ran aground; the former was salvaged, the latter scuttled. The engines on Ferraris failed. British air and surface forces promptly sank seven boats (Diamante, Liuzzi, Uebi Scebeli, Rubino, Argonauta, Torricelli, Galvani Liuzzi, Uebi Scebeli, Rubino, Argonauta, Torricelli, Galvani) and captured another, Galileo, which yielded valuable intelligence documents. The Free French sloop Curieuse Curieuse sank another, sank another, Provana Provana.

Italian submariners returned to their bases thoroughly shaken. In all, ten of the fifty-four submarines and about 400 men were lost in the first twenty days of operations. Part of the loss could be attributed to the poor design and quality of Italian submarines; part to unrealistic peacetime training; part to reckless bravado. These heavy losses induced a. caution in the Italian submarine force which, with few exceptions, was to characterize all its future operations.

The submarine disaster led in part to a decision in Rome to change the naval' codes. On July 5 and July 17, respectively, the Italians introduced entirely new submarine and surface-ship codes. These changes, together with previously directed changes in the Italian Army and Air Force codes, came as a "great shock" to British codebreakers at Bletchley Park, who, until then, had been reading Italian military codes currently and fluently. Thereafter, except for a brief period in 1941, the British were unable to break Italian naval codes.

The sudden and inglorious collapse of France plus Italy's entry into the war, leaving Britain standing alone, stunned most Americans. Notwithstanding Churchill's stirring rhetoric and the strength of the RAF and Royal Navy, the defeat of Great Britain seemed inevitable and unavoidable. A widespread fear arose that Hitler's next step after the assumed invasion and conquest of the British Isles would be the conquest of Latin America by diplomacy, trickery, or force of arms, posing a dire strategic threat to the United States. The defense of the Western Hemisphere thus became an overriding concern in Washington.

That concern, as much as the fate of Great Britain, spurred a drive for increased military mobilization in the United States in the early summer of 1940. As the Roosevelt administration viewed the situation, the most urgent military requirement was to accumulate massive new naval and air power. Should Great Britain go the way of France-oust Churchill and other hawks and reappoint an appeasing and pro-German government-the Royal Navy, like the French Navy, might fall under Hitler's control. A combined and refurbished German, Italian, French, and British Navy* would give Hitler incontestable mastery of the oceans. Against that superiority in sea power, the United States would be hard-pressed to prevent a military occupation of Latin America or, later, an invasion of its own shores. would give Hitler incontestable mastery of the oceans. Against that superiority in sea power, the United States would be hard-pressed to prevent a military occupation of Latin America or, later, an invasion of its own shores.

A further complication and grave threat to America's strategic interests was posed by Japan. More aggressively expansionist than ever and rapidly growing in naval strength, with the connivance of the new Vichy government Japan had established a military foothold in French Indochina. This bold and arrogant thrust flanked and imperiled the Philippine Islands, a key United States military base in the Far East, which was an essential asset in the Navy's plan to defeat Japan in the event of war. To help deter further Japanese expansion, President Roosevelt had based the bulk of the Navy's fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, leaving the Atlantic area very weak in naval power.

Upon the expiration of the London Naval Treaty in 1937, the U.S. Navy had embarked upon a substantial buildup (660,000 new tons) in capital ships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and other vessels. When the war in Europe erupted, Roosevelt had proposed an increase of 25 percent in carrier, cruiser, and submarine tonnage. On the day Paris fell, June 14, Congress approved this increase. However, in view of the possible naval threat Hitler could pose to the Americas and that posed by Japan in the Far East, and a further threat posed by a possible alliance of German-controlled and Japanese naval forces, on June 17 Roosevelt proposed that Congress approve a $4 billion appropriation for the purpose of creating a "Two Ocean Navy," an increase in naval construction by 1,325,000 tons over that already approved. Congress passed the bill with scant debate and Roosevelt signed it into law, launching the United States on a warship-building program of awesome scope.

At this time, domestic politics dominated Washington. The big question was whether President Roosevelt would seek an unprecedented third term, running against the Republican favorite, Wendell L. Willkie. The answer, which came at the Democratic Party's Chicago convention in July 1940, was yes. Partly to undermine Willkie's growing support and partly to infuse his cabinet with internationalists who favored support for the British, Roosevelt named two distinguished Republicans to head America's military forces. Millionaire newspaper publisher Frank Knox (Alf Landon's running mate in 1936) replaced the inventor's son, Charles Edison, as Secretary of the Navy; Henry L. Stimson replaced Henry H. Woodring as Secretary of War.

The growing concern over hemispheric defense led Roosevelt to reconsider a long-standing request from Churchill for the "loan" of "forty or fifty old destroyers." Roosevelt secretly wrote Churchill that he would attempt to gain public and congressional approval for this transaction, provided Churchill would guarantee that no part of the Royal Navy would ever be turned over to Germany or scuttled; and that Britain would sell or lease to the United States for 99 years military base rights in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana (Guyana), to be used to deter "an attack on the American hemisphere by any non-American nation."

"HAPPY T TIME": THE J JUNE S SLAUGHTER In the chaotic days of June 1940, during the collapse of France and the Allied counterinvasion of Norway, the Royal Navy was stretched to the breaking point. It had to simultaneously evacuate Allied forces from France and Norway, gear up for the attack on the French Navy in North African bases, confront the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean and Red seas and the Indian Ocean, pursue the German merchant ship raiders Atlantis Atlantis and and Orion Orion in the south Atlantic, and prepare for a probable invasion of the British Isles. Because of these commitments-and the loss of fifteen destroyers sunk and twenty-seven damaged during the Norway operation and Dunkirk evacuation-the escort of convoys and other ASW measures in home waters had to be cut to the bone. in the south Atlantic, and prepare for a probable invasion of the British Isles. Because of these commitments-and the loss of fifteen destroyers sunk and twenty-seven damaged during the Norway operation and Dunkirk evacuation-the escort of convoys and other ASW measures in home waters had to be cut to the bone.

As it happened, the reduction of British convoy escort and ASW forces coincided with the implementation of Donitz's plan to reopen the Atlantic U-boat war with a maximum commitment of force over a wide area, a plan that had been unavoidably delayed from May to June. Moreover, the U-boat crews were well rested from the ordeal in Norway. Faith in the torpedoes had been restored by the successes of Oehrn in U-37 U-37 and Frauenheim in and Frauenheim in U-101 U-101, employing impact pistols only.

On June 1 there were twenty-four oceangoing boats in commission, including the ex-Turk U-A U-A-three less than the day the war began. Two (the VIIB U-100 U-100 and the IXB and the IXB U-123 U-123) were brand-new and still in workup. One, U-37 U-37, was inbound from patrol. Three, U-29 U-29, U-43 U-43, and U-101 U-101, were still on patrol in Iberian waters. The other eighteen sailed from Germany in June, bringing the total deployed to twenty-one boats, the largest number committed to the North Atlantic at one time since September 1939.

Raeder and the OKM directed an all-out effort to trap and destroy the Allied forces withdrawing from Norway. In early June Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst sailed for that purpose. They found-and sank-the old carrier Glorious and her two destroyer escorts, but in this action, one of the British destroyers, sailed for that purpose. They found-and sank-the old carrier Glorious and her two destroyer escorts, but in this action, one of the British destroyers, Acasta Acasta, hit Scharnhorst Scharnhorst with one torpedo, inflicting damage sufficient to force with one torpedo, inflicting damage sufficient to force Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst to break off further operations and run into Trondheim. to break off further operations and run into Trondheim.

At the request of the OKM, Donitz diverted five outgoing U-boats to form a trap in the Orkneys to intercept other Allied ships retreating from Norway. One of the five, U-65 U-65, was forced to abort to Bergen with mechanical problems; the other four, U-A U-A, U-25 U-25, U-51 U-51, and U-52 U-52, had no luck. When released from the trap, U-A U-A, commanded by Hans Cohausz, age thirty-two, went on to the Faeroes-Iceland area to attack the line of British auxiliary cruisers of the Northern Patrol and sank one, the 14,000-ton Andania Andania. The other boats, including U-65 U-65, which resailed from Bergen, went to the Western Approaches. En route, the cranky U-25 U-25, commanded by a new skipper, Heinz Beduhn, age thirty-two, from the duck U-23 U-23, missed a battle cruiser (Renown or or Repulse Repulse) but hit and sank the 17,000-ton auxiliary cruiser Scotstoun Scotstoun (ex- (ex-Caledonia).

Nine boats converged in the lightly defended Western Approaches. These included Prien in U-47 U-47, who had rescued three downed Luftwaffe Luftwaffe crewmen in the Orkneys, and Liebe in crewmen in the Orkneys, and Liebe in U-38 U-38, who had diverted to Dingle Bay, Ireland, to land another Abwehr Abwehr agent. agent.* In a matter of a few days these nine boats, employing torpedoes with impact pistols, inflicted an amazing slaughter. In all, eight of the nine boats in the Western Approaches sank thirty-one ships for about 162,500 tons. In a matter of a few days these nine boats, employing torpedoes with impact pistols, inflicted an amazing slaughter. In all, eight of the nine boats in the Western Approaches sank thirty-one ships for about 162,500 tons.

* Prien in U-47 U-47 sank seven ships for 36,000 tons, including the 13,000-ton British tanker San Fernando and the 2,580-ton Dutch tanker sank seven ships for 36,000 tons, including the 13,000-ton British tanker San Fernando and the 2,580-ton Dutch tanker Leticia Leticia.

* Liebe in U-38 U-38 sank six for 30,400 tons, including the 10,000-ton Norwegian tanker sank six for 30,400 tons, including the 10,000-ton Norwegian tanker Italia Italia.

* Hans Jenisch in U-32 U-32 sank five for 16,000 tons, including the 9,000-ton Norwegian tanker sank five for 16,000 tons, including the 9,000-ton Norwegian tanker Eli Knudsen Eli Knudsen.

* Dietrich Knorr in U-51 U-51 sank three for 22,200 tons, including the 12,000-ton British tanker sank three for 22,200 tons, including the 12,000-ton British tanker Saranac Saranac.

* Gunter Kuhnke in U-28 U-28 sank three for 10,300 tons. sank three for 10,300 tons.

* Otto Salmann in U-52 U-52 sank three for 9,400 tons. sank three for 9,400 tons.

* Von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65 sank two for 29,300 tons, including the big 28,124-ton French liner sank two for 29,300 tons, including the big 28,124-ton French liner Champlain Champlain, damaged by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe.

* Fritz-Julius Lemp in U-30 U-30 sank two for 8,900 tons. sank two for 8,900 tons.

* Beduhn in the clumsy U-25 U-25 made a submerged attack on a tanker, but a following ship rammed the boat and forced her to abort with bent periscopes and a damaged conning tower. made a submerged attack on a tanker, but a following ship rammed the boat and forced her to abort with bent periscopes and a damaged conning tower.

After exhausting their torpedoes, six of these nine boats followed the crippled U-25 U-25 back to Germany. While passing North Channel submerged in the early hours of July 2, Prien, who had one supposedly "defective" torpedo left, encountered the 15,500-ton British ocean liner back to Germany. While passing North Channel submerged in the early hours of July 2, Prien, who had one supposedly "defective" torpedo left, encountered the 15,500-ton British ocean liner Arandora Arandora Star, outbound to Canada. When she zigzagged toward Star, outbound to Canada. When she zigzagged toward U-47 U-47, Prien saw guns on her bow and stern and deemed her to be fair game. He shot the supposedly defective torpedo at a range of one mile. It hit directly amidships-a perfect bull's-eye. Since it was daylight, Prien did not stick around to see the outcome.

Unknown to Prien, the Arandora Arandora Star was jam-packed with 1,299 male Germans and Italians who were being shipped to detention camps in Canada. There were 565 Germans, of which eighty-six were military POWs of "bad character" and 479 "civilian internees," deemed a threat to internal security. The 734 Italians were all civilian internees. The Germans and Italians were guarded by 200 British Army personnel. Including the Star was jam-packed with 1,299 male Germans and Italians who were being shipped to detention camps in Canada. There were 565 Germans, of which eighty-six were military POWs of "bad character" and 479 "civilian internees," deemed a threat to internal security. The 734 Italians were all civilian internees. The Germans and Italians were guarded by 200 British Army personnel. Including the Arandora Star Arandora Star's crew of 174, there were 1,673 people on the ship. She was not marked with a red cross or other signs to indicate her special category nor had the Admiralty requested "free passage" for her.

Fatally holed and flooding, the Arandora Star Arandora Star remained afloat about one hour. During that time the ship got off an remained afloat about one hour. During that time the ship got off an SOS SOS and launched ten lifeboats and scads of rafts. The prisoners and guards-all mixed together-and lastly the crew abandoned ship but, the official Admiralty reports stated, many Italians refused to leave. In response to the and launched ten lifeboats and scads of rafts. The prisoners and guards-all mixed together-and lastly the crew abandoned ship but, the official Admiralty reports stated, many Italians refused to leave. In response to the SOS SOS, a Sunderland appeared overhead and dropped packets of emergency supplies, and the Canadian destroyer St. Laurent St. Laurent, which was eighty-four miles away screening the battleship Nelson Nelson, raced to the rescue.

Guided by the Sunderland, the St. Laurent St. Laurent reached the scene in early afternoon. She rescued the hundreds of survivors from the ten lifeboats, then sent the lifeboats and her own boats to collect other survivors from the rafts and wreckage. Rushing the rescue so that she herself would not become a victim of the U-boat, within a mere thirty-five minutes the crews had fished every survivor in sight from the sea. When a British destroyer, reached the scene in early afternoon. She rescued the hundreds of survivors from the ten lifeboats, then sent the lifeboats and her own boats to collect other survivors from the rafts and wreckage. Rushing the rescue so that she herself would not become a victim of the U-boat, within a mere thirty-five minutes the crews had fished every survivor in sight from the sea. When a British destroyer, Walker Walker, arrived to assist, she scoured the area but could find no sign of life-or of the U-boat.

In this remarkable operation, St. Laurent St. Laurent rescued over half of those on board rescued over half of those on board Arandora Star Arandora Star when Prien's torpedoes struck. Those saved included 322 Germans, 243 Italians, 163 military guards, and 119 crew. A total of 826 perished, including 713 Germans and Italians. It was by far the greatest loss of life in a noncombatant-ship sunk by a U-boat thus far in the war. when Prien's torpedoes struck. Those saved included 322 Germans, 243 Italians, 163 military guards, and 119 crew. A total of 826 perished, including 713 Germans and Italians. It was by far the greatest loss of life in a noncombatant-ship sunk by a U-boat thus far in the war.

When U-47 U-47 reached Wilhelmshaven, Donitz, as yet unaware of the tragedy, praised Prien to the high heavens. He was credited with sinking ten ships for 68,587 tons, far and away the best performance by any skipper in the war. In the postwar accounting, the sinkings were to be reduced to eight ships for 51,483 tons. Even so, it was the best single patrol in confirmed tonnage sunk to that time. The fact that his torpedoes killed 713 Germans and Italians on reached Wilhelmshaven, Donitz, as yet unaware of the tragedy, praised Prien to the high heavens. He was credited with sinking ten ships for 68,587 tons, far and away the best performance by any skipper in the war. In the postwar accounting, the sinkings were to be reduced to eight ships for 51,483 tons. Even so, it was the best single patrol in confirmed tonnage sunk to that time. The fact that his torpedoes killed 713 Germans and Italians on Arandora Star Arandora Star was concealed from the Axis public. was concealed from the Axis public.

The VIIBs U-46 U-46 and and U-48 U-48 were under orders to join the three boats already in Iberian waters ( were under orders to join the three boats already in Iberian waters (U-29, U-43 U-43, U-101 U-101) to form a pack off Cape Finisterre. The pack, to be controlled by Hans Rosing, the new skipper of the famous U-48 U-48, was to intercept an inbound troop convoy that included the giant ocean liners Queen Mary (81,000 tons) and Mauritania (36,000 tons), bringing 25,000 Australian soldiers to the British Isles.

Southbound to the rendezvous, both Rosing and the new skipper of U-46 U-46, Englebert Endrass, ran across innumerable ships. Rosing in U-48 U-48 sank three and damaged another. Endrass in sank three and damaged another. Endrass in U-46 U-46 sank four, including the 20,277-ton British auxiliary cruiser sank four, including the 20,277-ton British auxiliary cruiser Carinthia Carinthia, and severely damaged an 8,700-ton British tanker. Both boats arrived at the rendezvous low on torpedoes.

While proceeding to the rendezvous, Frauenheim in U-101 U-101, who had already sunk three ships, sank three more (one British, two Greek), the last on June 14, to the west of Cape Finisterre, on the day before the scheduled rendezvous. This sinking may have alerted the Queen Mary Queen Mary convoy and caused it to veer well out to sea. Whatever the case, the pack rendezvous proved to be fruitless. None of the five boats spotted the convoy. convoy and caused it to veer well out to sea. Whatever the case, the pack rendezvous proved to be fruitless. None of the five boats spotted the convoy.

When this failure was realized, Donitz released the five boats for independent patrol. With his last torpedoes Frauenheim sank the 13,200-ton British steamer Wellington Star Wellington Star and went home to high praise. His total bag-seven ships for 42,022 tons-slightly topped that of Otto Schuhart, making it the second best patrol in confirmed tonnage sunk after Prien's. Rosing in and went home to high praise. His total bag-seven ships for 42,022 tons-slightly topped that of Otto Schuhart, making it the second best patrol in confirmed tonnage sunk after Prien's. Rosing in U-48 U-48 sank four more ships, including the 7,500-ton Dutch tanker sank four more ships, including the 7,500-ton Dutch tanker Moerdrecht Moerdrecht, bringing his confirmed total on this first patrol to seven ships for 31,500 tons sunk. Endrass in U-46 U-46 fired three torpedoes at the carrier fired three torpedoes at the carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal, en route to join British forces for the attack on the French Navy, but he missed. Before returning home he sank one more ship, bringing his confirmed total for his first patrol as skipper to five ships for 35,300 tons. Berlin propagandists gave Frauenheim, Rosing, and Endrass the full publicity treatment, inflating the tonnages sunk (that of Endrass to 54,000 tons).

The return of the seven boats from the Western Approaches and the three from Iberian waters, and a decision to send U-A U-A on a pioneer cruise to the African coast, left only four boats ( on a pioneer cruise to the African coast, left only four boats (U-29, U-30 U-30, U-43 U-43, U-52 U-52) to carry on the Atlantic war, pending the arrival of the last five boats outbound from Germany. Inasmuch as all four boats still had plenty of torpedoes (neither U-29 U-29 nor nor U-43 U-43 had yet sunk a ship), Donitz ordered all four to refuel in Spanish ports. Schuhart in had yet sunk a ship), Donitz ordered all four to refuel in Spanish ports. Schuhart in U-29 U-29, Ambrosius in U-43 U-43, and Lemp in U-30 U-30 sneaked into Vigo on June 19, 21, and 25, respectively, to refuel from the German freighter Bessel; Salmann in sneaked into Vigo on June 19, 21, and 25, respectively, to refuel from the German freighter Bessel; Salmann in U-52 U-52 put into El Ferrol on July 2 to refuel from the put into El Ferrol on July 2 to refuel from the Max Albrecht Max Albrecht.

After refueling, these four boats patrolled independently. Schuhart in U-29 U-29 sank four ships for 25,000 tons, including the 9,000-ton British tanker sank four ships for 25,000 tons, including the 9,000-ton British tanker Athellaird Athellaird, but his attack periscope broke and he was forced to abort to Germany. Ambrosius in U-43 U-43 also sank four ships (for 29,000 tons), including the 13,400-ton British liner also sank four ships (for 29,000 tons), including the 13,400-ton British liner Avelona Star Avelona Star and the 8,600-ton British tanker and the 8,600-ton British tanker Yarraville Yarraville. Ambrosius then returned to Germany, arriving after ten weeks at sea, a new endurance record. Lemp in U-30 U-30 was credited four more ships for 17,500 tons, bringing his total for the patrol to six. Salmann in was credited four more ships for 17,500 tons, bringing his total for the patrol to six. Salmann in U-52 U-52 sank one more, making his total four. sank one more, making his total four.

Meanwhile, the last five boats to sail from Germany in June arrived in the Atlantic. These were the clumsy U-26 U-26, the VII U-34 U-34, two new Type VIIBs on first patrols, U-99 U-99 and and U-102 U-102, and the new Type IXB, U-122 U-122, which had made one supply trip to Norway. The U-26 U-26, commanded by Heinz Scheringer, reached the Western Approaches in late June with serious engine problems. Despite the deficiencies, Scheringer patrolled aggressively, sinking three freighters* and damaging another, the British and damaging another, the British Zarian Zarian, in convoy. One of the convoy escorts, the new Flower Flower-class corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus, pounced on U-26 U-26 in favorable sonar conditions, dropping thirty-six of her forty-one depth charges set at 350 to 500 feet. in favorable sonar conditions, dropping thirty-six of her forty-one depth charges set at 350 to 500 feet.

The charges badly pounded U-26 U-26, causing leaks but not fatal damage. In the early hours of July 1, Scheringer surfaced to charge his depleted batteries and to escape in the fog. By that time, the British sloop Rochester Rochester and a Sunderland of Coastal Command's Australian Squadron 10, piloted by W. M. ("Hoot") Gibson, had come on the scene in response to and a Sunderland of Coastal Command's Australian Squadron 10, piloted by W. M. ("Hoot") Gibson, had come on the scene in response to Gladiolus Gladiolus's alert. Seeing U-26 U-26 surface, surface, Rochester Rochester commenced a high-speed run to ram. Had the commenced a high-speed run to ram. Had the U-26 U-26's diesels and motors been working properly and had Scheringer been able to charge batteries, the boat might have escaped. But with Rochester Rochester (believed to be a "destroyer") bearing down firing her forward gun and the Sunderland overhead, he was forced under again. (believed to be a "destroyer") bearing down firing her forward gun and the Sunderland overhead, he was forced under again.

The Sunderland saw the "swirl," or disturbed water, where U-26 U-26 had submerged and ran in for an attack. Hoot Gibson dropped four 250-pound antisubmarine bombs, which exploded very close and rocked the boat. The bombs did no real damage, but Scheringer had no battery charge left and the boat was still leaking in the stern as a result of the depth-charge attack from Gladiolus. Fearing had submerged and ran in for an attack. Hoot Gibson dropped four 250-pound antisubmarine bombs, which exploded very close and rocked the boat. The bombs did no real damage, but Scheringer had no battery charge left and the boat was still leaking in the stern as a result of the depth-charge attack from Gladiolus. Fearing U-26 U-26 would be fatally damaged by the apporaching "destroyer," Scheringer surfaced, intending to scuttle. When the boat appeared, the Sunderland dropped four more bombs, but by then would be fatally damaged by the apporaching "destroyer," Scheringer surfaced, intending to scuttle. When the boat appeared, the Sunderland dropped four more bombs, but by then U-26 U-26's chief engineer had set in motion scuttling procedures and the crew was leaping into the water.

The U-26 U-26 went down quickly with all hatches open. went down quickly with all hatches open. Rochester Rochester came up with guns trained. After allowing the survivors to swim a while in order to scare them into talking more freely, came up with guns trained. After allowing the survivors to swim a while in order to scare them into talking more freely, Rochester Rochester fished all forty-eight men from the water. There were no casualties, but the scare tactic did not work. The fished all forty-eight men from the water. There were no casualties, but the scare tactic did not work. The U-26 U-26 crew was one of the most reticent to be captured, British intelligence reported. crew was one of the most reticent to be captured, British intelligence reported.

That same day, July 1, the brand-new VIIB, U-102 U-102, commanded by Harro von Klot-Heydenfeldt, age twenty-nine, from the duck U-20 U-20, was only a few miles away, lying in wait for a convoy inbound from Freetown, Sierra Leone. Von Klot-Heydenfeldt found a straggler from the convoy, the coal-burning 5,219-ton British freighter Clearton Clearton, loaded with wheat, and he sank her with two torpedoes.* The blast killed eight of her crew; the other twenty-six abandoned in lifeboats. The blast killed eight of her crew; the other twenty-six abandoned in lifeboats.

In response to Clearton Clearton's distress signal, the British destroyer Vansittart Vansittart, on patrol in the area, raced to the scene. An hour later Vansittart Vansittart got a good sonar return on got a good sonar return on U-102 U-102 and made two runs, dropping eleven depth charges set for 350-500 feet. After that, and made two runs, dropping eleven depth charges set for 350-500 feet. After that, Vansittart Vansittart could not regain contact. She recovered the Clearton survivors and returned to the scene, where she found a huge oil slick. She remained in the area, hunting, until evening of the following day, July 2, noting a continuous rising of oil. From that evidence could not regain contact. She recovered the Clearton survivors and returned to the scene, where she found a huge oil slick. She remained in the area, hunting, until evening of the following day, July 2, noting a continuous rising of oil. From that evidence Vansittart Vansittart concluded she had sunk the U-boat, but this was not sufficiently convincing to confirm a kill. However, in postwar years, when both German and British records could be compared, Admiralty historians concluded that concluded she had sunk the U-boat, but this was not sufficiently convincing to confirm a kill. However, in postwar years, when both German and British records could be compared, Admiralty historians concluded that Vansittart Vansittart had indeed sunk the had indeed sunk the U-102 U-102 with the loss of all hands, merely nine days out on her first patrol. with the loss of all hands, merely nine days out on her first patrol.

The new IXB, U-122 U-122, commanded by onetime Weddigen Flotilla chief Hans Gunther Looff (Rosing's brother-in-law), age thirty-four, sank one 5,100-ton ship on June 20 and, the next day, broadcast a weather report for the benefit of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe. Nothing further was ever heard from the boat. Unable to match her loss with any Allied attack, Admiralty authorities for years listed the cause of her demise as "unknown." After a reinvestigation in recent years, Admiralty historians concluded the loss was due to an "accident"-perhaps an error committed by one of her green crewmen. She was about sixteen days out on her first patrol.

Donitz soon learned through the Red Cross that U-26 U-26 was lost and that all hands had been rescued. The loss of this onetime flagship of the U-boat arm was a sentimental wrench, but no surprise; her sister ship, was lost and that all hands had been rescued. The loss of this onetime flagship of the U-boat arm was a sentimental wrench, but no surprise; her sister ship, U-25 U-25, had been rammed and nearly lost in the same waters only three weeks earlier. Neither of these unsafe, unreliable boats should have been sent to operate in the Western Approaches. However, far worse in terms of military effectiveness was the disappearance without trace of the new boats U-102 U-102 and and U-122 U-122.

The last two boats to sail from Germany in June were the old Type VII U-34 U-34, commanded by Wilhelm Rollmann, and the new VIIB U-99 U-99, commanded by Otto Kretschmer, age twenty-eight, from the duck U-23 U-23, who had sunk six and a half confirmed ships for 22,500 tons, including the British destroyer Daring. For good luck, Kretschmer had welded horseshoes on both sides of the conning tower, but he got off to an unlucky start. Outbound, one of his men fell ill and had to be landed in Bergen. This diversion took U-99 U-99 into the path of the damaged into the path of the damaged Scharnhorst Scharnhorst, homebound from Trondheim. Mistaking U-99 U-99 for a British submarine, one of for a British submarine, one of Scharnhorst Scharnhorst's scout planes bombed her and forced Kretschmer to return to Germany for repairs.

The U-34 U-34 and and U-99 U-99 reached the Western Approaches in early July. Over the next ten days both skippers found good hunting. Rollmann in reached the Western Approaches in early July. Over the next ten days both skippers found good hunting. Rollmann in U-34 U-34 sank an impressive eight ships for 22,400 tons, including the British destroyer Whirlwind and the 2,600-ton Dutch tanker sank an impressive eight ships for 22,400 tons, including the British destroyer Whirlwind and the 2,600-ton Dutch tanker Lucretia Lucretia. Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 sank four confirmed ships for 13,800 tons and claimed another (which could not be verified) for 3,600 tons. He also took a prize, the 2,100-ton Estonian Merisaar, which, however, was sunk by the sank four confirmed ships for 13,800 tons and claimed another (which could not be verified) for 3,600 tons. He also took a prize, the 2,100-ton Estonian Merisaar, which, however, was sunk by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe en route to Bordeaux. During one of these attacks, British escorts found en route to Bordeaux. During one of these attacks, British escorts found U-99 U-99 and delivered a punishing depth-charge attack (Kretschmer counted 127 explosions) that kept the boat down for eighteen grueling hours and forced it to the unprecedented and terrifying depth of 700 feet. and delivered a punishing depth-charge attack (Kretschmer counted 127 explosions) that kept the boat down for eighteen grueling hours and forced it to the unprecedented and terrifying depth of 700 feet.

The loss of U-26 U-26, U-102 U-102, and U-122 U-122 left only four oceangoing boats in the Atlantic in early July: Lemp in left only four oceangoing boats in the Atlantic in early July: Lemp in U-30 U-30 and Salmann in and Salmann in U-52 U-52, who had refueled in Spain, Rollmann in U-34 U-34 and Kretschmer in and Kretschmer in U-99 U-99, who was out of or low on torpedoes. But these four boats were the first to benefit from an astonishingly swift and efficient move on Donitz's part to capitalize on the German occupation of northern France.

Mere hours after the Franco-German armistice had been signed, Donitz flew to western France to scout locations for U-boat bases on the French Atlantic coast. He chose five sites: Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Pallice (abutting La Rochelle), and Bordeaux. Meanwhile, his staff loaded a special train with torpedoes, spare parts, and other gear and sent it to Paris. From there the train was routed to Lorient, where an advance party of staff and technicians established the first U-boat base.

Lorient had been a French naval base. Undamaged by the war, it was, in the words of one of the German staffers, "a typically unlovely provincial Breton town." The better homes were hidden behind high walls shaded by palm trees; all the rest were "huddled together in dirty, narrow, gray streets" and "badly in need of repair." The staff set up operational headquarters and an officers' mess in the French Naval Prefecture. Arrangements were made to billet U-boat officers in the Hotel Pigeon Blanc, the enlisted men in the Hotel Bleu Sejour, each of which provided laundry service. Being a navy town, Lorient had numerous cafes and bars and a red-light district.

The four boats left in the Atlantic were directed to put into Lorient. Lemp in U-30 U-30 arrived first, on July 7. Salmann in arrived first, on July 7. Salmann in U-52 U-52 arrived next. Then Rollmann in arrived next. Then Rollmann in U-34 U-34, on July 18, and Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 on July 21. They were followed by two ducks, on July 21. They were followed by two ducks, U-56 U-56 and and U-58 U-58, which had patrolled over from Bergen.

These U-boat crews preferred basing in Germany, close to families and friends and familiar haunts in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, but they quickly adjusted to the new life in a foreign country. They gorged themselves on French food and alcoholic beverages (wine, champagne, cognac) and enjoyed the company of young French women, many of whom willingly consorted with their conquerors. They traded their reeking heavy winter clothing and oilskins for clean British khakis, which the evacuating Tommies had left behind. Meanwhile, Donitz arranged for special, luxury railway cars to transport U-boat crews to and from Germany, which were to be available when the facilities in Occupied France were ready to carry out major refits or overhauls.

Counting the four oceangoing boats that reached the Atlantic in May and the sixteen in June, these twenty boats sank ninety-one confirmed ships for about 477,409 tons, including ten tankers. This was an overall average of about 4.3 ships and about 23,000 tons per boat per patrol, far and away the best results in the war to date, the beginning of a brief period the German submariners called "Happy Time."

Donitz could be very well pleased with the results of the resumption of the U-boat war in the North Atlantic. Three boats had been lost, but only two of those (the new U-102 U-102 and and U-122 U-122) were militarily significant. For each boat lost, about thirty Allied ships had been sunk, an "exchange" rate comparable to the best months of World War I.

The all-out commitment of the U-boat force in June, however, left Donitz with no oceangoing boats to sail in July except the four at Lorient, two of which, U-30 U-30 and and U-52 U-52, had reported major engine problems. He was therefore compelled to rely to an unprecedented extent on Bergen-based ducks to patrol the Atlantic approaches to the British Isles.

The May-June slaughter deeply shocked American naval officers in London who were closely observing the U-boat war. Although the overwhelming majority of the merchant ships sunk were sailing alone-unescorted-the Americans, who were unaware of this fact at that time, concluded that to sail merchant ships in thinly escorted convoys was unwise or even foolish. As the U-boat slaughter in the Western Approaches continued into the fall of 1940, the American observers became ever more convinced of this conclusion, a view that was concurred in by the Navy Department in Washington.

Even though these U-boat successes clearly established a need for large numbers of convoy escorts in the event America entered the war, Washington failed to respond to this particular naval challenge. President Roosevelt and the new Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, rejected specific proposals from the Chief of Naval Operations, Harold R. Stark, for a force of suitable escort vessels-even the construction of a prototype. Roosevelt and Knox believed, mistakenly, that when the need actually arose, American industry could quickly mass-produce small, cheap convoy escorts on demand.

FIRST P PATROLS FROM L LORIENT.

The swift collapse of France had caught Hitler and his military advisers by surprise. Contrary to the general belief, they had no master plan and had made no provisions for an invasion of the British Isles. Still believing that Great Britain could be pressured into an accommodation, Hitler, in fact, was looking the other way-east, toward the Soviet Union. In Hitler's view, Stalin had exceeded the spirit of the Russo-German pact by a military occupation of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and the Balkan provinces of Bessarabia and North Bukovina, which greatly strengthened Stalin's hold on the east Baltic and placed Soviet forces perilously close to the rich Rumanian oil fields, Germany's chief energy source.

In his meetings with Hitler, Admiral Raeder sought to deflect the Fuhrer's growing concern over Soviet moves and to stress the perils posed by the Royal Navy. It would be a grave mistake, Raeder insisted, to turn about and attack the Soviet Union before Great Britain had been neutralized by treaty or thoroughly defeated. That would replicate the Kaiser's great mistake of 1914 and create the worst of all possible situations: a two-front war. Rather than go east, Raeder suggested, Germany should go south to the Mediterranean and with Spain's connivance, capture the British naval base at Gibraltar. That would effectively put an end to British naval dominance in the Mediterranean and decisively assist Mussolini's forces, which were attacking out of Libya toward Egypt to seize Cairo, the Suez Canal, and the other big British naval base at Alexandria. Absolute Axis control of the Mediterranean Basin would place Germany in a favorable position to exploit the oil reserves of the Middle East as well as the limitless raw materials of Africa.

As Hitler viewed it, the situation was not analogous to 1914. The main continental enemy, France, was already beaten and occupied. Norway was occupied as well. Great Britain was flanked on the east and south-isolated and just barely hanging on. She had no foothold on the continent nor any hope of obtaining one. The British naval blockade of Germany was no longer a factor: Germany controlled Norway and the entire French Atlantic coast from the channel to Bordeaux. This time Italy and Japan were allies, not enemies.* Japan posed a threat to the Soviet Union in the Far East, which would freeze significant Soviet forces in that sphere. The Soviet Army and Air Force were nothing-a collection of ill-equipped rabble. The Japan posed a threat to the Soviet Union in the Far East, which would freeze significant Soviet forces in that sphere. The Soviet Army and Air Force were nothing-a collection of ill-equipped rabble. The Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe could utterly crush the Soviet Union in a matter of six to eight weeks. could utterly crush the Soviet Union in a matter of six to eight weeks.

No master plan emerged from these discussions. After the fall of France, Hitler more or less improvised German operations week to week. The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe and all available forces of the and all available forces of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine were to mount maximum pressure against British air and maritime assets, with the aim of forcing Great Britain to the negotiating table. If psychological pressure failed to get the job done, as a last resort the were to mount maximum pressure against British air and maritime assets, with the aim of forcing Great Britain to the negotiating table. If psychological pressure failed to get the job done, as a last resort the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht might consider an invasion of the British Isles. Meanwhile, Hitler secretly drew plans for the conquest of the Soviet Union to take place in the spring of 1941. might consider an invasion of the British Isles. Meanwhile, Hitler secretly drew plans for the conquest of the Soviet Union to take place in the spring of 1941.

Raeder and the OKM adamantly opposed a Wehrmacht Wehrmacht invasion of the British Isles. The invasion of the British Isles. The Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine was in no position to mount a major amphibious assault. Most of its big surface forces had been sunk, damaged, or worn out in the Norway operation. Only one heavy cruiser, was in no position to mount a major amphibious assault. Most of its big surface forces had been sunk, damaged, or worn out in the Norway operation. Only one heavy cruiser, Hipper Hipper, was combat-ready. Besides that, the Navy had no landing craft, no means of transporting troops, tanks, artillery, trucks, ammo, and other impedimenta across the channel. Nonetheless, the OKM drew up a contingency plan (Operation Sea Lion), which envisioned the use of hundreds of European river barges for landing craft.

There was one-and only one-possible way to assure a successful invasion of England. That was to first commit the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe to the destruction of the RAF and the Royal Navy. When the to the destruction of the RAF and the Royal Navy. When the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe achieved absolute mastery of the air and seas, the barges-and even big passenger ships such as achieved absolute mastery of the air and seas, the barges-and even big passenger ships such as Bremen Bremen-could cross the North Sea and English Channel with confidence. The channel could be sealed at both ends by minefields and cordons of U-boats to block Allied submarine attacks-or surface ship attacks at night by remnants of the Royal Navy. But an invasion, Raeder continued to insist, should only be attempted "as a last resort."

The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe chief, Hermann Goring, was not keen on an invasion either. But he welcomed the opportunity to mount a full-scale air war against the RAF and Great Britain. He believed the chief, Hermann Goring, was not keen on an invasion either. But he welcomed the opportunity to mount a full-scale air war against the RAF and Great Britain. He believed the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe could wipe out the RAF in about three weeks and that denied this last line of defense, Britain would capitulate and sue for peace. He accordingly mobilized virtually the entire resources of the could wipe out the RAF in about three weeks and that denied this last line of defense, Britain would capitulate and sue for peace. He accordingly mobilized virtually the entire resources of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe for the task. Air Fleet 2 occupied bases in the Low Countries; Air Fleet 3 occupied bases in northern France; and Air Fleet 5 occupied bases in Norway and Denmark. Total resources: about 2,800 aircraft, of which about 1,600 were bombers or dive bombers and about 1,200 were fighters and reconnaissance planes. for the task. Air Fleet 2 occupied bases in the Low Countries; Air Fleet 3 occupied bases in northern France; and Air Fleet 5 occupied bases in Norway and Denmark. Total resources: about 2,800 aircraft, of which about 1,600 were bombers or dive bombers and about 1,200 were fighters and reconnaissance planes.

Hitler made a final attempt to persuade the British people to lay down their arms in a speech to the Reichstag Reichstag on July 19. Ridiculing Churchill's defiant oratory, he said: "I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favor, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on." Within one hour the answer was transmitted by BBC in London: Great Britain would not negotiate and it would never surrender. on July 19. Ridiculing Churchill's defiant oratory, he said: "I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favor, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on." Within one hour the answer was transmitted by BBC in London: Great Britain would not negotiate and it would never surrender.

The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe air assault against the British Isles-the "Battle of Britain"-began on July 10. That day the RAF had about 2,000 aircraft in its inventory, of which about 1,200 were assigned to Bomber Command and Coastal Command and about 800 to Fighter Command. Since the air assault against the British Isles-the "Battle of Britain"-began on July 10. That day the RAF had about 2,000 aircraft in its inventory, of which about 1,200 were assigned to Bomber Command and Coastal Command and about 800 to Fighter Command. Since the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe bombers and dive bombers were vulnerable and required escorting fighters, what counted most were the 700-odd Spitfires and Hurricanes of Fighter Command. The future of Britain depended upon the ability of these planes and pilots to knock out the 1,100-odd bombers and dive bombers were vulnerable and required escorting fighters, what counted most were the 700-odd Spitfires and Hurricanes of Fighter Command. The future of Britain depended upon the ability of these planes and pilots to knock out the 1,100-odd Luftwaffe Luftwaffe fighters and get at the bombers. fighters and get at the bombers.

Although Fighter Command had fewer fighters, it had the advantage of the Chain Home radar network and a highly efficient command-and-control organization. Thus the Hurricanes and Spitfires could be husbanded and shifted about to meet the greatest threat of the moment. Goring was aware of the British radar network, but having overwhelmed a similar French radar network with ease, he did not regard the British network as a serious threat nor did he even inform his pilots of its existence. Goring's failure to knock out the British radar net-and the RAF command-and-control stations-was to be a fatal error.

The British had another intelligence advantage: Enigma codebreaking. Due to a procedural change on May 10 when Germany invaded France, the codebreakers lost Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Red. However, in an amazing intelligence feat, within twelve days-by May 22-Bletchley Park had recovered Red and could read it consistently and currently. Red. However, in an amazing intelligence feat, within twelve days-by May 22-Bletchley Park had recovered Red and could read it consistently and currently. Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Red yielded substantial-and valuable-strategic intelligence, such as the organization and administration of the Red yielded substantial-and valuable-strategic intelligence, such as the organization and administration of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe. It did not, however, provide what was needed most: tactical intelligence, such as how many German aircraft were to strike where and when.

The chief tactical items obtained from Red Enigma were to be occasional references to "Knickebein" ("Dog leg" or "Crooked leg") and "X-Great" ("X-Apparatus"). The brilliant young civilian chief of RAF scientific intelligence, R. V. Jones, correctly guessed these were radio-beam navigational systems for night or foul-weather bombing. Put on the scent by Red Enigma and helped by POW interrogations and the recovery of hardware from a downed German plane, Jones confirmed this deduction. In due course he and RAF electronic technicians were able to predict probable targets from the beam settings recovered from Enigma and to devise clever methods of "jamming" (or "bending") these beams, leading some German bombers to wrong and harmless targets. But that came later.

The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe commenced the Battle of Britain with intense bombing attacks on British merchant-ship convoys in the Western Approaches and the English Channel. The main purpose of these attacks was to draw Fighter Command aircraft into combat and whittle them down in circumstances which favored the Germans. In the process, during July the German pilots sank thirty-three ships for about 70,000 tons. These losses and the threat of even greater shipping losses to German air attack led the Admiralty to divert convoys to more northerly routes into the British Isles, in effect closing down the Western and Southwestern approaches and complicating the task of the U-boats. commenced the Battle of Britain with intense bombing attacks on British merchant-ship convoys in the Western Approaches and the English Channel. The main purpose of these attacks was to draw Fighter Command aircraft into combat and whittle them down in circumstances which favored the Germans. In the process, during July the German pilots sank thirty-three ships for about 70,000 tons. These losses and the threat of even greater shipping losses to German air attack led the Admiralty to divert convoys to more northerly routes into the British Isles, in effect closing down the Western and Southwestern approaches and complicating the task of the U-boats.

The new U-boat base at Lorient was ideally situated for attacks on British shipping, but Donitz was unable to contribute significantly to the pressures on Great Britain in the month of July. Most of the oceangoing boats had returned to Germany for refits; only four oceangoing boats could sail from Lorient in July.

About the time the first of these, U-30 U-30, arrived at Lorient, B-dienst B-dienst provided Donitz with information about the attack by the Royal Navy on the French Navy at Oran and Dakar. Believing that further specific information from provided Donitz with information about the attack by the Royal Navy on the French Navy at Oran and Dakar. Believing that further specific information from B-dienst B-dienst might enable U-boats to intercept some of the British capital ships, Donitz ordered Lemp to sail might enable U-boats to intercept some of the British capital ships, Donitz ordered Lemp to sail U-30 U-30 south to the vicinity of the Strait of Gibraltar, and the U-cruiser south to the vicinity of the Strait of Gibraltar, and the U-cruiser U-A U-A, which was patrolling off the African coast, to close on Dakar.

Although U-30 U-30 and and U-A U-A had reported engine malfunctions, both attempted to carry out the missions. Lemp sailed from Lorient on July 13-the first U-boat into Lorient and the first to leave from there on patrol-but he was dogged by further engine trouble. After sinking a small ship-his seventh credited sinking since leaving Germany-Lemp was forced by engine malfunction to abort and return to Lorient. Northbound to Dakar from Freetown, Sierra Leone, Hans Cohausz in had reported engine malfunctions, both attempted to carry out the missions. Lemp sailed from Lorient on July 13-the first U-boat into Lorient and the first to leave from there on patrol-but he was dogged by further engine trouble. After sinking a small ship-his seventh credited sinking since leaving Germany-Lemp was forced by engine malfunction to abort and return to Lorient. Northbound to Dakar from Freetown, Sierra Leone, Hans Cohausz in U-A U-A sank his third ship, a 5,800-ton Norwegian freighter, but he, too, reported an engine breakdown and requested permission to abort and come home. Donitz refused Cohausz permission, directing him to rendezvous with the German merchant raider sank his third ship, a 5,800-ton Norwegian freighter, but he, too, reported an engine breakdown and requested permission to abort and come home. Donitz refused Cohausz permission, directing him to rendezvous with the German merchant raider Pinguin Pinguin for repairs, refueling, and joint operations. for repairs, refueling, and joint operations.

Meanwhile, B-dienst B-dienst had provided Donitz new information on North Atlantic convoys. Two significant changes in procedure had occurred: the shift to the northerly routes in reaction to the had provided Donitz new information on North Atlantic convoys. Two significant changes in procedure had occurred: the shift to the northerly routes in reaction to the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe attacks and creation of U-boat bases in France, and an extension of surface and air escort to 17 degrees west longitude, a line nearly 360 miles west of the British Isles. This put the likely rendezvous area northwest or west of Rockall Bank, which, with safe Atlantic routing, was about equidistant (about 1,000 miles) from Wilhelmshaven or Lorient. Hence, the advantages of mounting patrols against North Atlantic convoys from Lorient had been substantially reduced. The chief remaining advantage of Lorient over Wilhelmshaven in the war against North Atlantic convoys was the elimination of the slow, tedious voyage in and out of the confined, mined waters of the North Sea, which required running submerged in daytime to avoid enemy air and submarine patrols. attacks and creation of U-boat bases in France, and an extension of surface and air escort to 17 degrees west longitude, a line nearly 360 miles west of the British Isles. This put the likely rendezvous area northwest or west of Rockall Bank, which, with safe Atlantic routing, was about equidistant (about 1,000 miles) from Wilhelmshaven or Lorient. Hence, the advantages of mounting patrols against North Atlantic convoys from Lorient had been substantially reduced. The chief remaining advantage of Lorient over Wilhelmshaven in the war against North Atlantic convoys was the elimination of the slow, tedious voyage in and out of the confined, mined waters of the North Sea, which required running submerged in daytime to avoid enemy air and submarine patrols.

The extension of convoy escort to 17 degrees west longitude presented Donitz with two major problems. First, in order to repeatedly attack an inbound convoy before it picked up its escort or an outbound convoy after it left its escort, U-boats had to operate well west of 17 degrees west longitude. Since this was beyond "British waters" where the unrestricted U-boat rules applied, Donitz had to petition Hitler through Raeder and the OKM for a further relaxation of the rules. Second, operations so far to the west imposed restrictions on the use of Type VII boats, which had only half the fuel capacity of the VIIBs. In a prolonged convoy battle requiring high-speed running, even the VIIBs would be stretched. Hence fuel availability was to become a critical factor in most convoy battles.

With this new information in hand, Donitz flew to Lorient on July 22 to confer with the skippers of the four oceangoing boats: Lemp (U-30), Rollmann (U-34), Salmann (U-52), and Kretschmer (U-99). After inspections and conferences, it was clear that U-30 U-30, U-34 U-34, and U-52 U-52-all plagued with mechanical difficulties-would have to be used with the greatest care. Only Kretschmer's new VIIB, U-99 U-99, was in good enough condition to mount a patrol from Lorient and return to Lorient. The other three would have to patrol home to Germany, perhaps to sail no more to the Atlantic.

Rollmann in U-34 U-34 left first, on July 23. Capitalizing on left first, on July 23. Capitalizing on B-dienst B-dienst information, he intercepted inbound convoy Halifax 58 near Rockall Bank. Although some torpedoes malfunctioned or missed, he sank four ships for 29,300 tons, including the 10,400-ton British tanker. Thiara and the 9,300-ton British freighter Accra. Home-bound to Germany, he sank the 700-ton British submarine information, he intercepted inbound convoy Halifax 58 near Rockall Bank. Although some torpedoes malfunctioned or missed, he sank four ships for 29,300 tons, including the 10,400-ton British tanker. Thiara and the 9,300-ton British freighter Accra. Home-bound to Germany, he sank the 700-ton British submarine Spearfish Spearfish off Norway with his last torpedo, and recovered one lucky survivor from the wreckage. off Norway with his last torpedo, and recovered one lucky survivor from the wreckage.

Donitz was ecstatic. Those five sinkings, added to the eight on the outbound leg of U-34 U-34's patrol in June, gave Rollmann a total bag of thirteen ships for (it was believed) 74,300 tons. Including prior successes, Rollmann had sunk twenty-four ships for 121,900 tons, elevating him to number-one U-boat "ace" in ships and tonnage. This achievement earned Rollmann a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz (the fifth such award to German submariners) and the full Berlin propaganda treatment. But it was the end for (the fifth such award to German submariners) and the full Berlin propaganda treatment. But it was the end for U-34 U-34. Hopelessly plagued with mechanical problems, U-34 U-34 was sent to the Baltic under a school skipper. Rollmann joined the training command. was sent to the Baltic under a school skipper. Rollmann joined the training command.

Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 sailed next. Hugging the coast of the British Isles, Kretschmer went up to North Channel and over a three-day period he sank four ships for 32,300 tons, including the 13,200-ton liner sailed next. Hugging the coast of the British Isles, Kretschmer went up to North Channel and over a three-day period he sank four ships for 32,300 tons, including the 13,200-ton liner Auckland Star Auckland Star. In return, Kretschmer received another terrific pasting (fifty close depth charges) from escorts. Undamaged-and undeterred-he got on the trail of an outbound convoy and attacked three large tankers in ballast, firing one torpedo at each. Kretschmer claimed all three tankers had sunk-reporting seven ships sunk for 56,000 tons in a mere six days-but the tankers were only damaged. Although Donitz knew from B-dienst B-dienst that the claims were exaggerated, he liked Kretschmer's aggressive style and, perhaps for propaganda purposes, upped Kretschmer's bag to 65,137 tons, which gave him a total of 100,000 tons, qualifying him for a that the claims were exaggerated, he liked Kretschmer's aggressive style and, perhaps for propaganda purposes, upped Kretschmer's bag to 65,137 tons, which gave him a total of 100,000 tons, qualifying him for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. When Kretschmer pulled into Lorient after a patrol of but twelve days-the shortest torpedo patrol on record-Raeder and Donitz were standing on the dock to present the medal.*

Lemp in U-30 U-30 and Salmann in and Salmann in U-52 U-52 sailed last from Lorient. Homebound, Lemp sank two ships for 12,400 tons, but engine problems forced him to abort and go directly to Germany. Lemp's confirmed bag, including sailed last from Lorient. Homebound, Lemp sank two ships for 12,400 tons, but engine problems forced him to abort and go directly to Germany. Lemp's confirmed bag, including Athenia Athenia, was sixteen sinkings for 80,232 tons-plus damage to the battleship Barham Barham-deemed sufficient for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, which was awarded while U-30 U-30 was still at sea. Upon arrival in Germany, the boat was retired to the Baltic; Lemp and many of the was still at sea. Upon arrival in Germany, the boat was retired to the Baltic; Lemp and many of the U-30 U-30 crew were assigned to commission a new IXB. Homebound, Salmann in crew were assigned to commission a new IXB. Homebound, Salmann in U-52 U-52 sank three British freighters for 17,100 tons and incurred heavy battle damage from a depth-charge attack, which kept the boat in the yards for the next four months. sank three British freighters for 17,100 tons and incurred heavy battle damage from a depth-charge attack, which kept the boat in the yards for the next four months.

By this time the eighteen surviving Type II and IIB ducks had been assigned to full-time duty at the burgeoning submarine school. The seven surviving Type IIC ducks of the Emsmann Flotilla (U-56 to to U-62 U-62), basing in Bergen, patrolled in the Atlantic, terminating the short voyages in Bergen or Lorient. In nine patrols mounted in July off the heavily defended North Channel, the ducks sank twelve ships for 64,600 tons, including the 7,000-ton British tanker Scottish Minstrel Scottish Minstrel. Otto Harms in U-56 U-56 sank the biggest vessel: the 17,000-ton British auxiliary cruiser sank the biggest vessel: the 17,000-ton British auxiliary cruiser Transylvania Transylvania.

These duck patrols were useful for indoctrinating skippers and crews to combat, for diverting the enemy's slim ASW forces away from the oceangoing boats, for spotting outbound convoys, and for creating fear and confusion by the occasional sinking in British home waters. But, owing to the crush of students at the submarine school, the OKM ruled that commencing on October 1, the ducks of the Emsmann Flotilla (U-56 to to U-62 U-62) were to be assigned to the training command, together with most of the sixteen brand-new Type IID ducks (U-137 to to U-152 U-152) and two Type HBs (U-120, U-121 U-121) originally intended for export. These diversions were to virtually close down duck patrols in British home waters.

THE A AUGUST S SLAUGHTER.

While the RAF and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe fought the air Battle of Britain in August 1940, thirteen oceangoing boats sailed from Germany to continue the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic. These included two new boats, the VIIB fought the air Battle of Britain in August 1940, thirteen oceangoing boats sailed from Germany to continue the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic. These included two new boats, the VIIB U-100 U-100, commanded by Joachim Schepke, age twenty-eight, who had sunk eleven ships for 18,000 tons while commanding the ducks U-3 U-3 and and U-19 U-19, and the IXB U-124 U-124, commanded by Georg-Wilhelm Schulz and manned by other survivors of his U-64 U-64, sunk in the fjord at Narvik. All thirteen boats were to patrol the northerly hunting grounds near Rockall Bank, then put into Lorient. One IXB, U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen), was to first land two (von Stockhausen), was to first land two Abwehr Abwehr agents in Ireland. agents in Ireland.

Since the British were transfixed by the air battle or preparing for the supposed German invasion, Donitz anticipated another low-risk slaughter like that of June. In response to his petition, Hitler had authorized unrestricted submarine warfare to 20 degrees west longitude as of August 17.* Moreover, Moreover, B-dienst B-dienst was operating at peak efficiency, providing Donitz a wealth of specific information on convoy routing and escort rendezvous, which offered the possibility of a resumption of pack attacks. was operating at peak efficiency, providing Donitz a wealth of specific information on convoy routing and escort rendezvous, which offered the possibility of a resumption of pack attacks.