Donitz had deployed three oceangoing boats in Vest Fjord, the outer approach to Narvik: Sohler's U-47 U-47, Knorr's U-51 U-51, and the unsteady, big U-25 U-25 (Schutze). The VIIBs (Schutze). The VIIBs U-47 U-47 and and U-51 U-51 had been on patrol since March 11, almost a full month. Both boats were low on fuel; the crews were tired and tense. The had been on patrol since March 11, almost a full month. Both boats were low on fuel; the crews were tired and tense. The U-25 U-25 was fresh from Germany. was fresh from Germany.

Narvik was a difficult area for submarines. The Arctic "nights" in April were only four or five hours long. To remain concealed, the boats had to run submerged for nineteen or twenty hours a day. This prolonged submergence badly fouled the interior air, made breathing difficult, dulled alertness, and drained the storage batteries. The "nights" were barely long enough to fully charge the batteries. To do so the boats either had to make a long, time-consuming, and risky run to open water, hide in a snowstorm or fog, or creep into small, uncharted fjords branching off the main fjords. The water in the fjords was shallow in places and there was little room to evade and escape a depth-charge attack.

On D day the Admiralty ordered five destroyers to investigate rumors of a German landing at Narvik. Patrolling the outer Vest Fjord, Knorr in U-51 U-51 saw the inbound destroyers. He mounted two separate attacks, but scored no hits. Later he surfaced and flashed a warning report intended for the German destroyers in Narvik, but his message was ambiguous and when the British destroyers reached Narvik, the Germans were not prepared. In the savage battle that ensued, the British destroyers sank two German destroyers and severely damaged four others; the Germans rallied to sink two British destroyers and damage a third. saw the inbound destroyers. He mounted two separate attacks, but scored no hits. Later he surfaced and flashed a warning report intended for the German destroyers in Narvik, but his message was ambiguous and when the British destroyers reached Narvik, the Germans were not prepared. In the savage battle that ensued, the British destroyers sank two German destroyers and severely damaged four others; the Germans rallied to sink two British destroyers and damage a third.

The three U-boats in Vest Fjord were waiting to intercept the three withdrawing British destroyers. The U-46 U-46 (Sohler) did not see them but (Sohler) did not see them but U-25 U-25 (Schutze) and (Schutze) and U-51 U-51 (Knorr) did, and each attacked with electric torpedoes with magnetic pistols. But something went drastically wrong. Schutze, who fired two torpedoes, reported no observed results. Knorr, who fired four torpedoes at close range, reported two premature explosions and two misses. (Knorr) did, and each attacked with electric torpedoes with magnetic pistols. But something went drastically wrong. Schutze, who fired two torpedoes, reported no observed results. Knorr, who fired four torpedoes at close range, reported two premature explosions and two misses.

Fearing a disastrous reversal at Narvik, Hitler directed every available oceangoing U-boat to converge there, both to repel follow-up Royal Navy attacks and to transport supplies to the 2,000 German shock troops that had landed there. In response, Donitz ordered six more oceangoing boats to Narvik, including the Atlantis Atlantis escort, escort, U-37 U-37. However, owing to a shortage of lube oil, Hartmann in U-37 U-37 could not comply. Upon learning that, Donitz directed Hartmann to substitute for could not comply. Upon learning that, Donitz directed Hartmann to substitute for U-64 U-64, which was escorting Orion Orion, and although the brand-new U-64 U-64 was merely a few days into its first patrol, he sent it to Narvik in place of was merely a few days into its first patrol, he sent it to Narvik in place of U-37 U-37, along with her equally green sister ship, U-65 U-65. At the same time, Donitz directed four boats in German ports to load army supplies and take them to Narvik: U-26 U-26 (Scheringer), (Scheringer), U-29 U-29 (Schuhart), (Schuhart), U-43 U-43 (Ambrosius), and the duck (Ambrosius), and the duck U-61 U-61 (Oesten). These orders committed twelve oceangoing boats to Narvik: nine in attack roles, three in supply roles. (Oesten). These orders committed twelve oceangoing boats to Narvik: nine in attack roles, three in supply roles.

Rushing to Narvik on April 11, Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48 ran across big ships of the Home Fleet that were out looking for ran across big ships of the Home Fleet that were out looking for Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst: three battleships, several heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and five destroyers. He boldly mounted two separate submerged attacks against three heavy cruisers, firing a total of six torpedoes with magnetic pistols. Four of the six torpedoes prematured; none hit. Later Schultze surfaced to report the task force and the torpedo failures.

Donitz was gravely concerned. Three boats (U-25, U-48 U-48, U-51 U-51) had shot a total of twelve torpedoes, and six to eight torpedoes had prematured or malfunctioned, a failure rate of 50 to 66 percent. What was causing this latest torpedo calamity? The weakening of the earth's magnetic field in extreme northern latitudes? The iron content in the Norwegian mountains? Something else?

The new chief of the Torpedo Directorate, Oskar Kummetz, was away on detached duty, commanding the Oslo invasion forces. In his absence, Donitz conferred by telephone with the "Torpedo Dictator," Dr. Cornelius, and other technicians. They expressed doubt that the earth's magnetic field or the iron ore in Norwegian soil could be causing the failures, but they could offer no help or advice.

What to do? Donitz believed that he should order all boats to deactivate magnetic pistols and rely only on impact (or contact) pistols. However, owing to the deep-running defect (not yet fixed), this order would rule out shooting at shallow-draft ships, such as destroyers, an unthinkable restriction. It was finally decided-and ordered-that boats operating north of 62 degrees latitude were to adopt a mixture of magnetic and impact pistols. They were to load the four forward tubes with three torpedoes fitted with impact pistols and one with a magnetic pistol. When shooting at deep-draft ships (cruisers and larger), only contact pistols were to be used. When shooting at shallow-draft ships (destroyers, etc.), two torpedoes were to be fired, one with an impact pistol and the other with a magnetic pistol. To avoid the possibility that a premature in the magnetic pistol might detonate the torpedo with the contact pistol, an interval of eight seconds between torpedoes was to be observed.

By April 12, there were nine oceangoing attack boats in or converging on Narvik. These included four big, unwieldy boats, entirely unsuitable for these confined waters: the Type I U-25 U-25, the Type IX U-38 U-38, and two brand-new Type IXBs, U-64 U-64 and and U-65 U-65. Some of these boats refueled from the disabled German destroyers or merchant ships at Narvik. Even though operating in very shallow and dangerous waters, all boats carried Enigmas with naval rotors in order to keep in touch with Donitz and one another.

There were two important Enigma messages from Donitz that day. The first contained the new-and very complicated-orders for torpedo shooting: impact pistols only against large ships, a combination of impact and magnetic pistols against destroyers. The second message ordered a redeployment. Based on B-dienst B-dienst intercepts, an Allied landing was expected at the next large fjord to the north, Vaags. Four of the nine Atlantic boats assigned to Narvik- intercepts, an Allied landing was expected at the next large fjord to the north, Vaags. Four of the nine Atlantic boats assigned to Narvik-U-38 (Liebe), (Liebe), U-47 U-47 (Prien), (Prien), U-49 U-49 (von Gossler), and the LXB (von Gossler), and the LXB U-65 U-65-were to shift north to Vaags Fjord to interdict the landing. The five boats left at Narvik were positioned as follows: U-25 U-25 (Schutze) and (Schutze) and U-51 U-51 (Knorr) in the outer Vest Fjord; (Knorr) in the outer Vest Fjord; U-46 U-46 (Sohler), (Sohler), U-48 U-48 (Schultze), and IXB (Schultze), and IXB U-64 U-64 in the inner Ofot Fjord. in the inner Ofot Fjord.

To soften up Narvik for the Allied landing and to wipe out the remaining German destroyers, on the morning of April 13 the Admiralty sent the old but modernized battleship Warspite Warspite and nine destroyers into Vest and Ofot fjords. and nine destroyers into Vest and Ofot fjords.

En route to Vaags Fjord, the new U-65 U-65, commanded by Hans-Gerrit von Stock-hausen, age thirty-two, ran, across this task force, which was reported as "ten destroyers." Although U-65 U-65 had not completed her workups and torpedo practices, and had been at sea merely five days on her first war patrol, von Stockhausen unhesitatingly attacked two destroyers. As prescribed, he fired two torpedoes (one magnetic pistol, one contact pistol) spaced at eight-second intervals at each destroyer. The destroyers pounced on had not completed her workups and torpedo practices, and had been at sea merely five days on her first war patrol, von Stockhausen unhesitatingly attacked two destroyers. As prescribed, he fired two torpedoes (one magnetic pistol, one contact pistol) spaced at eight-second intervals at each destroyer. The destroyers pounced on U-65 U-65, hurling depth charges, which damaged the boat. In the noise, von Stockhausen was not able to tell if his torpedoes hit or not. None did.

Unharmed, the British task force entered Vest Fjord, where the U-25 U-25 (Schutze) and (Schutze) and U-51 U-51 (Knorr) patrolled. Schutze in (Knorr) patrolled. Schutze in U-25 U-25 saw the task force coming in and closed to attack. Like von Stockhausen, he chose two near destroyers for his targets, firing the prescribed mixture of torpedoes with magnetic and contact pistols. Nothing happened. No hits. As the British task force nosed deeper into the fjords, the commander catapulted an aged Swordfish floatplane from saw the task force coming in and closed to attack. Like von Stockhausen, he chose two near destroyers for his targets, firing the prescribed mixture of torpedoes with magnetic and contact pistols. Nothing happened. No hits. As the British task force nosed deeper into the fjords, the commander catapulted an aged Swordfish floatplane from Warspite Warspite to scout ahead. The air crew radioed back valuable information on German destroyer dispositions. Then, astonishingly, the airmen reported a U-boat on the surface at anchor in the north end of Herjangs Fjord, a tributary of Ofot Fjord, close to the town of Narvik. to scout ahead. The air crew radioed back valuable information on German destroyer dispositions. Then, astonishingly, the airmen reported a U-boat on the surface at anchor in the north end of Herjangs Fjord, a tributary of Ofot Fjord, close to the town of Narvik.

This was the other newly arrived IXB, U-64 U-64, commanded by Georg-Wilhelm Schulz, age thirty-four, from the duck U-10 U-10. Commissioned in December 1939, the U-64 U-64 had been icebound at a pier in Kiel and, like her sister ship had been icebound at a pier in Kiel and, like her sister ship U-65 U-65, had not completed workup. Schulz, like Prien, was a onetime merchant marine captain and a crack seaman, but the Swordfish caught Schulz unalert and unprepared.

The Swordfish dived at U-64 U-64 and dropped two 100-pound ASW bombs. One hit and dropped two 100-pound ASW bombs. One hit U-64 U-64's bow, opening a great gash in the hull. U-64 U-64 sank almost instantly in 114 feet of water-the second U-boat (after sank almost instantly in 114 feet of water-the second U-boat (after U-31 U-31) to be sunk by an aircraft. Unassisted by surface ships, Schulz and about a dozen others who were topside floundered into the icy water. Another thirty-odd men got out of the sunken boat using the often rehearsed escape procedures. German soldiers putting out from shore in small boats rescued the shocked and freezing survivors, all of whom eventually returned to Germany by train and ship. Eight men of U-64 U-64 died in the sinking. died in the sinking.

The battleship Warspite Warspite and nine destroyers reached Ofot Fjord in the early afternoon of April 13, supported by ten Swordfish from the carrier and nine destroyers reached Ofot Fjord in the early afternoon of April 13, supported by ten Swordfish from the carrier Furious Furious, standing well offshore. Warned by the Swordfish that had sunk U-64 U-64 to expect other U-boats, the destroyers were on full alert and itching for kills. to expect other U-boats, the destroyers were on full alert and itching for kills.

Yet another close and savage naval battle erupted in the tight confines of Ofot Fjord that afternoon. The powerful British force confronting eight German destroyers in various stages of readiness inflicted a perfect slaughter, sinking all. Out-manned and outgunned, the Germans fought valiantly to the bitter end. They severely damaged three British destroyers but the three escaped to fight again.

Two VIIBs patrolled inside Ofot Fjord that afternoon: U-46 U-46 (Sohler) and (Sohler) and U-48 U-48 (Schultze). With nine destroyers in the narrow fjords and what appeared to be an endless stream of aircraft overhead, it was a nightmarish time. Sohler in (Schultze). With nine destroyers in the narrow fjords and what appeared to be an endless stream of aircraft overhead, it was a nightmarish time. Sohler in U-46 U-46 maneuvered beneath the destroyer screen and set up on maneuvered beneath the destroyer screen and set up on Warspite Warspite. As he was ready to shoot, the boat hit and rode up on an uncharted rock, exposing the entire length of the bow. Fortunately for Sohler and his men, all the British ships were intent on sinking the German destroyers and did not see this mishap. Later in the day, however, the destroyers found and depth charged U-46 U-46 so severely that Sohler believed the boat could not survive and he ordered that the Enigma and all secret papers be destroyed. Schultze in so severely that Sohler believed the boat could not survive and he ordered that the Enigma and all secret papers be destroyed. Schultze in U-48 U-48 surfaced to exchange information with what he believed to be a German destroyer but which turned out to be British. He crash-dived to escape, but the destroyer pounded surfaced to exchange information with what he believed to be a German destroyer but which turned out to be British. He crash-dived to escape, but the destroyer pounded U-48 U-48 with thirteen depth charges, all close. In the narrow fjord the explosions seemed to be magnified; they were deafening and nerve-shattering, but not fatal. with thirteen depth charges, all close. In the narrow fjord the explosions seemed to be magnified; they were deafening and nerve-shattering, but not fatal.

The U-48 U-48 closed on closed on Warspite Warspite and at point-blank range shot a full bow salvo-three torpedoes with impact pistols, one with a magnetic pistol. Nothing happened. Schultze then mounted attacks on two destroyers. No hits. A crewman in and at point-blank range shot a full bow salvo-three torpedoes with impact pistols, one with a magnetic pistol. Nothing happened. Schultze then mounted attacks on two destroyers. No hits. A crewman in U-48 U-48, Horst Hofman, remembered these times as "unmitigated hell." He went on: Every day and every hour of every day we were attacking destroyers or finding ourselves trapped in the destroyers' clutches. Day in, day out, night after night ... we scurried up and down and round and round the fjord, submerged. And the nights were short, far too short to allow us to charge our batteries and to maintain the boat ready for action. Sleep was out of the question-we hardly found time to get something to eat.... We used up the air in our oxygen flasks to the very last drop.... One after another we fired all our magnetic [sic] torpedoes. Not one of them exploded.... Try as we would all our efforts remained completely fruitless....

The British force withdrew through Vest Fjord, where U-25 U-25 (Schutze) and (Schutze) and U-51 U-51 (Knorr) were patrolling. Schutze got in two attacks, one on (Knorr) were patrolling. Schutze got in two attacks, one on Warspite Warspite, one on a destroyer. Nothing happened. There were no hits in either attack.

At the Admiralty, First Lord Churchill urged that the Allied invasion force land directly at shattered Narvik on the evening of April 13. But as B-dienst B-dienst had learned, the British Army commander preferred an indirect attack, to be staged from Vaags Fjord, the next inlet north of Narvik. had learned, the British Army commander preferred an indirect attack, to be staged from Vaags Fjord, the next inlet north of Narvik.

On the morning of April 15, the main British assault force for Narvik approached Vaags Fjord. That morning four boats were off Vaags Fjord: U-38 U-38 (Liebe), (Liebe), U-47 U-47 (Prien), (Prien), U-49 U-49 (von Gossler), and (von Gossler), and U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen). Liebe, Prien, and von Gossler had not yet fired any torpedoes. (von Stockhausen). Liebe, Prien, and von Gossler had not yet fired any torpedoes.

The Type IX boats, U-38 U-38 and the damaged, green and the damaged, green U-65 U-65, positioned at the entrance to the fjord, got in the first licks. Liebe in U-38 U-38 boldly attacked the battleship boldly attacked the battleship Valiant Valiant and the cruiser and the cruiser Southampton Southampton. Not one of Liebe's torpedoes hit. Next in line, von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65, attacked a big Polish liner, Batory Batory, which had been pressed into service as a troopship. No hits.

Two VIIBs, U-47 U-47 (Prien) and (Prien) and U-49 U-49 (von Gossler), were inside Vaags Fjord, submerged. Earlier in the day some Norwegians had seen (von Gossler), were inside Vaags Fjord, submerged. Earlier in the day some Norwegians had seen U-49 U-49 on the surface just north of the island of Andorja and reported the sighting to the British. When the convoy entered Vaags Fjord, the British sent two destroyers, on the surface just north of the island of Andorja and reported the sighting to the British. When the convoy entered Vaags Fjord, the British sent two destroyers, Fearless Fearless and and Brazen Brazen, directly to the reported position of U-49 U-49. Fearless Fearless got a good sonar contact and attacked, dropping five depth charges set for 150, 250, and 350 feet. One charge exploded close to the conning tower, causing the boat to "leap." The lights went out; the boat began to flood. One other charge exploded close on the stern. got a good sonar contact and attacked, dropping five depth charges set for 150, 250, and 350 feet. One charge exploded close to the conning tower, causing the boat to "leap." The lights went out; the boat began to flood. One other charge exploded close on the stern.

The previous November U-49 U-49 had sustained one of the worst depth-charge attacks of the war and escaped. Perhaps the memories of that terrible experience still haunted her captain. According to a British after-action report, von Gossler "seemed to have lost his head." He apparently panicked and blew ballast tanks. Almost instantly after the first salvo of depth charges, the had sustained one of the worst depth-charge attacks of the war and escaped. Perhaps the memories of that terrible experience still haunted her captain. According to a British after-action report, von Gossler "seemed to have lost his head." He apparently panicked and blew ballast tanks. Almost instantly after the first salvo of depth charges, the U-49 U-49 popped to the surface, close to popped to the surface, close to Fearless Fearless and and Brazen Brazen. German crewmen ran on deck apparently to man the gun, but Fearless Fearless and and Brazen Brazen discouraged this by firing a "few rounds," one of which hit the conning tower. Von Gossler gave orders to scuttle and all of discouraged this by firing a "few rounds," one of which hit the conning tower. Von Gossler gave orders to scuttle and all of U-49 U-49's crew except von Gossler and a petty officer leaped into the calm but frigid water, "screaming wildly and crying for help," the British reported.

Still on the bridge of the scuttled boat, von Gossler and the petty officer were feverishly stuffing confidential papers into a bag. Seeing this, Fearless Fearless opened fire with machine guns, driving both Germans into the water, where they lost the bag, which had not yet been weighted. By then, both opened fire with machine guns, driving both Germans into the water, where they lost the bag, which had not yet been weighted. By then, both Fearless Fearless and and Brazen Brazen had launched boats to fish out the survivors. British sailors in one of the boats grabbed the bag before it sank. Others pulled forty-one of forty-two survivors from the water, including one wounded, then finally the body of one man who had been killed by gunfire. The bag contained German secret grid charts showing the deployment of the U-boats assigned to Norway and other documents, but to the great disappointment of the naval codebreakers at Bletchley Park, who were still struggling fruitlessly with naval Enigma, there was nothing in the bag to help them. had launched boats to fish out the survivors. British sailors in one of the boats grabbed the bag before it sank. Others pulled forty-one of forty-two survivors from the water, including one wounded, then finally the body of one man who had been killed by gunfire. The bag contained German secret grid charts showing the deployment of the U-boats assigned to Norway and other documents, but to the great disappointment of the naval codebreakers at Bletchley Park, who were still struggling fruitlessly with naval Enigma, there was nothing in the bag to help them.

Prien in U-47 U-47 was nearby in Vaags Fjord when was nearby in Vaags Fjord when U-49 U-49 was sunk. Recently Donitz had notified him that his wife had had a second daughter. was sunk. Recently Donitz had notified him that his wife had had a second daughter.* Probing the waterways that evening, he ventured stealthily into a tributary, Bygden Fjord, leading to the town of Elvenes, the objective of the main British ground forces. There he saw a heart-stopping sight: "Three large transports, each of 30,000 tons and three more, slightly smaller, escorted by two cruisers." All eight ships were lying at anchor in the narrow south end of Bygden Fjord, disembarking troops into fishing boats. The ships, Prien logged, were "just clear of each other and in some cases, slightly overlapping." Probing the waterways that evening, he ventured stealthily into a tributary, Bygden Fjord, leading to the town of Elvenes, the objective of the main British ground forces. There he saw a heart-stopping sight: "Three large transports, each of 30,000 tons and three more, slightly smaller, escorted by two cruisers." All eight ships were lying at anchor in the narrow south end of Bygden Fjord, disembarking troops into fishing boats. The ships, Prien logged, were "just clear of each other and in some cases, slightly overlapping."

Here was an opportunity for Prien to eclipse his triumph at Scapa Flow: sink in a single blow at least 150,000 tons of enemy shipping, including two heavy cruisers, and thwart the British counterattack on Narvik. He and his first watch officer, Engelbert Endrass, huddled to plan the attack with exacting care. They decided to fire four bow torpedoes (as prescribed by Donitz, three with impact pistols, one with a magnetic pistol) from a submerged position at four different ships, reload the forward tubes during the ensuing chaos, surface so they could escape at maximum speed, then fire the four bow tubes again at the other four ships.

At 2242 Prien, manning the periscope, commenced the attack. The stationary enemy ships, he logged, "stretched in a solid wall before me." He fired the four bow torpedoes at eight-second intervals, set to run at twelve and fifteen feet. The chosen targets, left to right, were: cruiser, large transport, large transport, cruiser. The ranges were short: 750 to 1,500 yards. The crew waited tensely, counting off the seconds. But nothing happened. No explosions. The torpedoes had either run under the targets or the pistols had failed. "Result nil," Prien logged bitterly.

Fortunately for Prien, there was no indication that the enemy had been alerted. Therefore a second attack was possible. Prien ordered the four bow tubes reloaded. Per instructions, three torpedoes were fitted with contact pistols, one with a magnetic pistol. Prien, Endrass, and the torpedomen carefully checked all the torpedoes; Prien and Endrass reviewed the firing data. Just after midnight Prien surfaced, prepared to shoot again and run.

In the second attack, Prien shot the four bow tubes at the same stationary targets (cruiser-transport-transport-cruiser) with the same depth settings and at the same ranges. But again there were no results-no hits on the targets. One torpedo swerved off course, struck a distant cliff and exploded. Prien thought that explosion would alert the enemy and bring a counterattack, but there was no reaction.

Prien and his crew were dismayed and outraged. Eight torpedoes (six contact, two magnetic) had failed against sitting ducks. He still had one torpedo in his stern tube and prepared to fire it as they commenced a run on the surface. But this plan could not be carried out. Heading toward Vaags Fjord at full speed, U-47 U-47 ran aground and stuck fast on an uncharted sand bar well within range of the cruisers' guns. ran aground and stuck fast on an uncharted sand bar well within range of the cruisers' guns.

All efforts were then directed toward refloating U-47 U-47. Prien backed the diesel engines at emergency turns and blew the forward ballast tanks dry. When that failed to get the boat off the bar, he ordered all available men topside to "sally ship." They ran madly back and forth on the deck, rocking the boat. Finally U-47 U-47 broke free. But at that instant, the starboard diesel cracked from the strain of emergency turns. Shifting that shaft to electric power, Prien sent the men below and raced toward Vaags Fjord. When he reached deep water he dived and crept out to sea. Later that night he surfaced and got off a brief report to Donitz on the torpedo failures and the engine failure. The engine could not be repaired; Prien was compelled to abort the patrol. broke free. But at that instant, the starboard diesel cracked from the strain of emergency turns. Shifting that shaft to electric power, Prien sent the men below and raced toward Vaags Fjord. When he reached deep water he dived and crept out to sea. Later that night he surfaced and got off a brief report to Donitz on the torpedo failures and the engine failure. The engine could not be repaired; Prien was compelled to abort the patrol.

Upon receiving Prien's report, Donitz was also dismayed and outraged. "To have missed these ships, lying motionless and overlapping each other, would have been quite impossible," he wrote. "Either, therefore, the torpedoes must have been [running] at a far greater depth than that anticipated by the technical personnel, or the pistols had failed to function. And so we found ourselves with a torpedo which refused to function in northern waters either with contact or with magnetic pistols.... To all intents and purposes, then, the U-boats were without a weapon."

That same day-April 16-Donitz put through an urgent telephone call to Admiral Raeder. The submarine torpedo situation, Donitz declaimed, was scandalous. There could be no question of crew failure. The top aces and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders, Prien and Schultze, shooting in highly favorable conditions, had been denied major targets (a battleship, heavy cruisers, large transports). The torpedoes obviously did not work at all in northern latitudes and they failed too often in southern latitudes. It was criminal-or worse-to send U-boats to sea with these torpedoes. Emergency measures were required to correct the faults. Raeder hastened to agree. He would again appoint a technical committee to reexamine the torpedoes from top to bottom. holders, Prien and Schultze, shooting in highly favorable conditions, had been denied major targets (a battleship, heavy cruisers, large transports). The torpedoes obviously did not work at all in northern latitudes and they failed too often in southern latitudes. It was criminal-or worse-to send U-boats to sea with these torpedoes. Emergency measures were required to correct the faults. Raeder hastened to agree. He would again appoint a technical committee to reexamine the torpedoes from top to bottom.

Notwithstanding an order from Hitler to fight to the death for Narvik, Donitz insisted that all U-boats be withdrawn from Vest, Ofot, and Vaags fjords. Raeder agreed to that as well. Accordingly, that night Donitz ordered the four Narvik boats to withdraw. U-46 U-46 (Sohler), and (Sohler), and U-51 U-51 (Knorr), on patrol since March 11, and (Knorr), on patrol since March 11, and U-48 U-48 (Schultze), out of torpedoes, were to return to Germany. The (Schultze), out of torpedoes, were to return to Germany. The U-25 U-25 (Schutze), which still had ample fuel and torpedoes, was to patrol well offshore. Three boats were to remain off the entrance to Vaags Fjord: (Schutze), which still had ample fuel and torpedoes, was to patrol well offshore. Three boats were to remain off the entrance to Vaags Fjord: U-38 U-38 (Liebe), (Liebe), U-49 U-49 (von Gossler), and (von Gossler), and U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen). But unknown to Donitz, (von Stockhausen). But unknown to Donitz, U-49 U-49 was lost, leaving only two boats at Vaags Fjord. was lost, leaving only two boats at Vaags Fjord.

Relying on magnetic pistols, the boats in the Narvik area experienced further torpedo failures on April 18 and 19. Von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65 fired three torpedoes at a light cruiser coming out of Vaags Fjord. The torpedoes prematured after a run of twenty-two seconds. Liebe in fired three torpedoes at a light cruiser coming out of Vaags Fjord. The torpedoes prematured after a run of twenty-two seconds. Liebe in U-38 U-38 shot at a light cruiser. No success. Knorr in shot at a light cruiser. No success. Knorr in U-51 U-51 fired at a heavy cruiser. No hits. Homebound, Prien in fired at a heavy cruiser. No hits. Homebound, Prien in U-47 U-47 came upon the battleship came upon the battleship Warspite Warspite, escorted by two destroyers. He shot two torpedoes with magnetic pistols at Warspite Warspite from 900 yards. Neither hit. One exploded at the end of its run, alerting the destroyers, which pounced on from 900 yards. Neither hit. One exploded at the end of its run, alerting the destroyers, which pounced on U-47 U-47, Prien logged, "from all directions," creating an "awkward predicament."

Still homebound, April 19, Prien came upon a big convoy composed of ten transports and numerous destroyers. He still had four torpedoes left, but he had so little faith in them that he refused to attack. Later, explaining his refusal, he told Donitz that he "could hardly be expected to fight with a dummy rifle." Notwithstanding his engine problem, Prien doggedly and expertly shadowed the convoy, radioing position reports. The three boats in the area responded to Prien's signals: U-25 U-25 (Schutze), (Schutze), U-38 U-38 (Liebe), and (Liebe), and U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen). All attacked the convoy in heavy weather. None got a hit. Unable to keep up with only one engine, Prien broke off and headed home, as did Liebe in (von Stockhausen). All attacked the convoy in heavy weather. None got a hit. Unable to keep up with only one engine, Prien broke off and headed home, as did Liebe in U-38 U-38, who was low on lube oil.

These departures left but two boats in far northern waters: U-25 U-25 (Schutze) and (Schutze) and U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen). Believing their remaining torpedoes might function in more southerly latitudes and to remove them from the intense Allied ASW measures in Norway, Donitz directed both boats to patrol west of the Shetlands and Orkneys. The (von Stockhausen). Believing their remaining torpedoes might function in more southerly latitudes and to remove them from the intense Allied ASW measures in Norway, Donitz directed both boats to patrol west of the Shetlands and Orkneys. The U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen) encountered a battleship and heavy cruiser but she was not able to gain a shooting position. The (von Stockhausen) encountered a battleship and heavy cruiser but she was not able to gain a shooting position. The U-25 U-25 (Schutze) found no targets. In due course, both returned to Germany, (Schutze) found no targets. In due course, both returned to Germany, U-25 U-25 unexpectedly early with yet more mechanical problems. The four U-boats en route to Narvik with supplies were diverted to other Norwegian ports. unexpectedly early with yet more mechanical problems. The four U-boats en route to Narvik with supplies were diverted to other Norwegian ports.

The nine attack boats deployed to Narvik had in no way alleviated the crisis. Not one boat sank any enemy ship of any kind. Two of the nine boats (U-49, U-64 U-64) were lost. The British forces, staging from Vaags Fjord, slogged south in hip-deep snow and, in due course, forced the German troops, reinforced by the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine destroyer survivors, out of Narvik; but the victory was only temporary. destroyer survivors, out of Narvik; but the victory was only temporary.

Farther south, Allied forces landed north and south of Trondheim, intending to envelop the Germans at Trondheim in a pincer. Donitz deployed four oceangoing boats to interdict the Allied landings: U-30 U-30 (Lemp) and (Lemp) and U-50 U-50 (Bauer) in Namsos Fjord, north of Trondheim; (Bauer) in Namsos Fjord, north of Trondheim; U-34 U-34 (Rollmann) and (Rollmann) and U-52 U-52 (Salmann) in Romsdals Fjord, south of Trondheim. En route to Namsos Fjord on April 10, Bauer's (Salmann) in Romsdals Fjord, south of Trondheim. En route to Namsos Fjord on April 10, Bauer's U-50 U-50 was found and sunk by the British destroyer hero, with the loss of all hands, leaving only Lemp in was found and sunk by the British destroyer hero, with the loss of all hands, leaving only Lemp in U-30 U-30 to repel the Allies. All three boats at Namsos and Romsdals fjords found targets and attacked, but ASW measures were intense and the torpedoes malfunctioned. Only one boat got a hit: Rollmann in to repel the Allies. All three boats at Namsos and Romsdals fjords found targets and attacked, but ASW measures were intense and the torpedoes malfunctioned. Only one boat got a hit: Rollmann in U-34 U-34, who torpedoed the beached Norwegian minelayer Froya Froya.

Donitz ordered two homebound boats, U-46 U-46 (Sohler) and (Sohler) and U-51 U-51 (Knorr), to temporarily reinforce the boats at Namsos and Romsdals fjords. Sohler shot at the French super-destroyer (Knorr), to temporarily reinforce the boats at Namsos and Romsdals fjords. Sohler shot at the French super-destroyer Albatros Albatros. No hits. Knorr attacked a British heavy cruiser. No hits. Rollmann in U-34 U-34 attacked a destroyer and a cruiser. No hits. Upon learning of these torpedo failures, Donitz withdrew all the boats from the Trondheim area as well, ordering attacked a destroyer and a cruiser. No hits. Upon learning of these torpedo failures, Donitz withdrew all the boats from the Trondheim area as well, ordering U-46 U-46 and and U-51 U-51 home and home and U-30 U-30, U-34 U-34, and U-52 U-52 to patrol the Orkneys and Shetlands. to patrol the Orkneys and Shetlands.* There Rollmann intercepted the 20,000-ton ocean liner There Rollmann intercepted the 20,000-ton ocean liner Franconia Franconia, but he again experienced torpedo failure.

Thereafter, Donitz restricted the oceangoing U-boats to resupply missions. The first three supply boats (U-26, U-29 U-29, and U-43 U-43), which set out for Narvik, diverted to Trondheim (and the duck U-61 U-61 to Bergen). Three other oceangoing boats rushed aviation gasoline to Trondheim: the U-cruiser to Bergen). Three other oceangoing boats rushed aviation gasoline to Trondheim: the U-cruiser U-A U-A, the U-32 U-32, and the brand-new VIIB, U-101 U-101. En route, leaking gasoline fumes very nearly incapacitated the crew of En route, leaking gasoline fumes very nearly incapacitated the crew of U-32 U-32. As a result, Donitz canceled plans for any more "gasoline" missions. On the return trip to Germany, U-26 U-26 (Scheringer) torpedoed and sank the 5,200-ton British freighter (Scheringer) torpedoed and sank the 5,200-ton British freighter Cedarbank Cedarbank, loaded with supplies for British troops in Romsdals Fjord. Cedarbank Cedarbank was the only Allied ship sunk by any of the thirteen was the only Allied ship sunk by any of the thirteen oceangoing boats committed to the Norwegian invasion. oceangoing boats committed to the Norwegian invasion.

Four additional ducks were committed to Norway operations, bringing the total number engaged to twenty-two. Most patrolled in the waters of southern Norway or the lower North Sea, but some patrolled off northeast Scotland and the Orkneys. The twenty-two ducks sank three enemy vessels for 8,100 tons. One of these was the 1,100-ton British submarine Thistle Thistle, sunk with the loss of all hands off Stavanger by U-4 U-4, commanded by Hans-Peter Hinsch, age twenty-five. Thistle Thistle was the first Allied submarine confirmed as sunk by a U-boat and the only enemy warship sunk by U-boats during the Norwegian campaign. One duck was lost with all hands: was the first Allied submarine confirmed as sunk by a U-boat and the only enemy warship sunk by U-boats during the Norwegian campaign. One duck was lost with all hands: U-1 U-1, commanded by Jurgen Deecke, age twenty-seven. Initially the kill was credited to the British submarine Porpoise, but after further analysis, the Admiralty concluded U-1 U-1 hit a mine. hit a mine.

On April 26, while the land battles still raged near Narvik and Trondheim, the OKM released the U-boat arm from Norway operations owing to the torpedo failures. Including the six supply missions, twenty of the twenty-three commissioned oceangoing boats had participated* and twenty-two of the twenty-six commissioned ducks. The forty-two U-boats sank, in total, eight ships for 32,522 tons in April-over half the tonnage by Hartmann in and twenty-two of the twenty-six commissioned ducks. The forty-two U-boats sank, in total, eight ships for 32,522 tons in April-over half the tonnage by Hartmann in U-37 U-37, who was well out of the invasion zones. Against that meager return, another four boats had been lost: two VIIBs, U-49 U-49 and and U-50 U-50, the IXB U-64 U-64, and the duck U-1 U-1. Thus the first commitment of an entire submarine force to a major combined air-sea-land operation was an utter failure.

Donitz and his submariners angrily blamed the U-boat failure on defective torpedoes. They had ample justification to do so, but the furor over the torpedo failures obscured a larger doctrinal point. The role change from merchant-ship killer to warship killer had not worked. Submarines were not very effective against heavily armored and armed warships, escorted by aircraft and sonar-equipped destroyers, primed to expect submarine attacks. This was especially true in the case of submarines operating in confined and shallow waters and in Arctic latitudes in the months when the nights were short. The decision to halt the war on commerce in order to commit the U-boat arm to support the conquest of Norway was thus a mistake, but since it was partially obscured by the torpedo furor, it was not fully grasped in Berlin and it was to be repeated.

* Donitz had no way of knowing it, but torpedo failures had led to the detection and destruction of both Donitz had no way of knowing it, but torpedo failures had led to the detection and destruction of both U-27 U-27 and and U-39 U-39 of the September group. of the September group.

* Weighted hulks, which were sunk to the bottom and held in place by cables anchored on land. Weighted hulks, which were sunk to the bottom and held in place by cables anchored on land.

* The Home Fleet aircraft carriers The Home Fleet aircraft carriers Ark Royal Ark Royal and the old and the old Hermes Hermes, together with the battleship Renown Renown, had been detached for convoy escort or to chase down the "pocket" battleship Admiral Graf Spee Admiral Graf Spee in the South Atlantic, leaving only one aircraft carrier, the in the South Atlantic, leaving only one aircraft carrier, the Furious Furious, sister ship of the Courageous Courageous, in the Home Fleet.

* The British recovered one or more of these intact electrics with magnetic pistols. The British recovered one or more of these intact electrics with magnetic pistols.

Upon investigation, it was learned that another blockship to close the gap in Kirk Sound had been delayed. It arrived in Scapa Flow the next day, October 15. Upon investigation, it was learned that another blockship to close the gap in Kirk Sound had been delayed. It arrived in Scapa Flow the next day, October 15.

* Nonetheless, Schuhart's 41,950 tons sunk in a single patrol still stood as the record to beat. Nonetheless, Schuhart's 41,950 tons sunk in a single patrol still stood as the record to beat. Royal Oak Royal Oak, at 30,000 tons, did not do it, but it elevated Prien's total for two brief patrols to four ships for 38,000 tons.

* Newfoundland rejected incorporation into the Canadian confederation in 1869. Not until 1948 did it become a Canadian province. Newfoundland rejected incorporation into the Canadian confederation in 1869. Not until 1948 did it become a Canadian province.

* Outbound convoys designated OA and OG sailed directly to West African ports and Gibraltar, respectively. Convoys bound to the British Isles from ports in West Africa gathered at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and were designated SL. Those bound to the British Isles (or "Home") from Gibraltar were designated Home Gibraltar or HG. Outbound convoys designated OA and OG sailed directly to West African ports and Gibraltar, respectively. Convoys bound to the British Isles from ports in West Africa gathered at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and were designated SL. Those bound to the British Isles (or "Home") from Gibraltar were designated Home Gibraltar or HG.

* In peacetime such tethered emergency buoys were standard equipment on submarines of all nations. The British were impressed with the quality of the buoy but surprised that the Germans had not removed it and the labels from the escape apparatus in order to conceal the identity of the U-boat. In peacetime such tethered emergency buoys were standard equipment on submarines of all nations. The British were impressed with the quality of the buoy but surprised that the Germans had not removed it and the labels from the escape apparatus in order to conceal the identity of the U-boat.

* The sinking of The sinking of U-45 U-45 was erroneously credited to the French destroyer was erroneously credited to the French destroyer Sirocco Sirocco.

* The Submarine Protocol remained in force for neutral shipping that was not in convoy or not blacked out. If deemed to be carrying contraband, neutrals could be sunk, but the safety of the crew had to be assured. Ships of Germany's friends or allies-Italy, Japan, Spain, Ireland, Russia-and the United States were not to be molested. The Submarine Protocol remained in force for neutral shipping that was not in convoy or not blacked out. If deemed to be carrying contraband, neutrals could be sunk, but the safety of the crew had to be assured. Ships of Germany's friends or allies-Italy, Japan, Spain, Ireland, Russia-and the United States were not to be molested.

* Helped by this rare eyewitness testimony from the trawler survivors, the prosecutors at Nuremberg cited the Helped by this rare eyewitness testimony from the trawler survivors, the prosecutors at Nuremberg cited the Arne Kjode Arne Kjode as one example of a U-boat "atrocity." Perhaps forgetting that Hitler had specifically loosened the rules on sinking neutral tankers, or not wishing to mention it, Donitz, in his defense, stated the sinking had been "a mistake," that Mugler had "confused" (i.e., misidentified) the ship as a British tanker inbound to England. "If one or two instances of mistakes are found in the course of five and one-half years of clean submarine warfare," Donitz testified, "it proves nothing." Mugler's rescue of the British trawler survivors, all on the same day, was entered in Donitz's defense, effectively offsetting this alleged "atrocity." as one example of a U-boat "atrocity." Perhaps forgetting that Hitler had specifically loosened the rules on sinking neutral tankers, or not wishing to mention it, Donitz, in his defense, stated the sinking had been "a mistake," that Mugler had "confused" (i.e., misidentified) the ship as a British tanker inbound to England. "If one or two instances of mistakes are found in the course of five and one-half years of clean submarine warfare," Donitz testified, "it proves nothing." Mugler's rescue of the British trawler survivors, all on the same day, was entered in Donitz's defense, effectively offsetting this alleged "atrocity."

* Far beyond normal air capacity. However, the air inside a U-boat could be crudely purified by blowing it through CO Far beyond normal air capacity. However, the air inside a U-boat could be crudely purified by blowing it through CO2 scrubbing devices employing caustic potash cartridges, located in each compartment. In addition, the boats were supplied with individual CO scrubbing devices employing caustic potash cartridges, located in each compartment. In addition, the boats were supplied with individual CO2-absorbing respirators with five-pound canisters of soda time, which the men could wear like gas masks. To conserve the air supply, men not on duty were required to lie in their bunks.

* As well as the Type VII, As well as the Type VII, U-36 U-36, with the loss of all hands, on her second patrol in the North Sea. She was sunk by the British submarine Salmon Salmon, commanded by E. O. Bickford, who went on to severely damage the German light cruisers Leipzig Leipzig and and Nurnberg Nurnberg.

For numbers of principal inbound convoys and losses, see Plate 10. For a list of confirmed sinkings by ducks, see For numbers of principal inbound convoys and losses, see Plate 10. For a list of confirmed sinkings by ducks, see Appendix 7 Appendix 7.

* The sinking of these two small ships-the 57-ton tugboat in particular-were further indications that the mine settings were overly sensitive, but the Germans remained unaware. The sinking of these two small ships-the 57-ton tugboat in particular-were further indications that the mine settings were overly sensitive, but the Germans remained unaware.

* Including all ships sunk in later months. Including all ships sunk in later months.

* The origin of the name bomba is obscure. Some Poles say it was adopted because the idea for the machine occurred when Rejewski was eating an ice cream dessert: bomba loosely translates as ice cream. Others say it was adopted because the machine made a noise somewhat like the ticking of a bomb. The origin of the name bomba is obscure. Some Poles say it was adopted because the idea for the machine occurred when Rejewski was eating an ice cream dessert: bomba loosely translates as ice cream. Others say it was adopted because the machine made a noise somewhat like the ticking of a bomb.

* Ernst Weber-Drohl, a sixty-one-year-old former acrobat, and Wilhelm Preetz, a former ship's steward. Ernst Weber-Drohl, a sixty-one-year-old former acrobat, and Wilhelm Preetz, a former ship's steward.

Which took refuge in Montevideo, Uruguay, and was scuttled on December 17. Which took refuge in Montevideo, Uruguay, and was scuttled on December 17.

* Donitz wrongly believed Donitz wrongly believed U-54 U-54 had reached the Atlantic and that she was sunk by the French destroyer had reached the Atlantic and that she was sunk by the French destroyer Simoun Simoun.

* A total of five TMC fields, comprising forty mines, were laid by A total of five TMC fields, comprising forty mines, were laid by U-28 U-28, U-31 U-31, U-32 U-32, U-34 U-34, and U-48 U-48. Only one sinking-by U-34 U-34's field at Falmouth-resulted. The mines were mislaid or planted too deep, or the pistols were faulty.

The OKM had forbidden minelayers to carry Enigma. Why one was on board The OKM had forbidden minelayers to carry Enigma. Why one was on board U-33 U-33 is not known. is not known.

* Owing to the acute shortage of escorts, and other factors, on February 12, the Admiralty discontinued "Fast" Halifax convoys (HX-F) and standardized the speed of Halifax convoys at 9 knots. Owing to the acute shortage of escorts, and other factors, on February 12, the Admiralty discontinued "Fast" Halifax convoys (HX-F) and standardized the speed of Halifax convoys at 9 knots.

* See See Appendix 17 Appendix 17.

* These ships were the first of many German merchant raiders to sail. Each was powerfully armed with six 5.9" guns and four to six torpedo tubes, and each carried a supply of magnetic mines. Their mission was similar to that of These ships were the first of many German merchant raiders to sail. Each was powerfully armed with six 5.9" guns and four to six torpedo tubes, and each carried a supply of magnetic mines. Their mission was similar to that of Admiral Graf Spee: Admiral Graf Spee: to raid enemy shipping in the South Atlantic, drawing off warships of the Royal Navy. The Type IX to raid enemy shipping in the South Atlantic, drawing off warships of the Royal Navy. The Type IX U-37 U-37 escorted escorted Atlantis Atlantis; the first of the new Type IXBs, U-64 U-64, escorted Orion Orion.

* Donitz playfully radioed: " Donitz playfully radioed: "Ein U-boot ohne Sohgrohr ist heute angekomman." Roughly, "A submarine without a periscope arrived today."

* On May 3, Lemp in On May 3, Lemp in U-30 U-30 aborted his patrol to rescue thirteen survivors of the Swedish neutral Hagar, which had hit a British mine. While she was approaching Trondheim, the heavy cruiser aborted his patrol to rescue thirteen survivors of the Swedish neutral Hagar, which had hit a British mine. While she was approaching Trondheim, the heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper mistakenly shelled mistakenly shelled U-30 U-30.

U-101 U-101 was originally numbered was originally numbered U-71 U-71. Her number (and those of sister ships) was inflated as part of a German scheme to disguise the glacial U-boat production rate.

The other boat in the initial deployment, The other boat in the initial deployment, U-37 U-37 (Hartmann), assigned first to escort (Hartmann), assigned first to escort Atlantis Atlantis, then Orion Orion, did not get into Norway operations. After completing the escort service near the Faeroes and Shetlands, Hartmann missed a British heavy cruiser but sank three ships for 18,715 tons, including the 9,100-ton Swedish tanker Sveaborg Sveaborg. The shortage of lube oil forced Hartmann to abort.

* The Type VIIs The Type VIIs U-28 U-28 and and U-31 U-31 were in overhaul, and the Type IXB were in overhaul, and the Type IXB U-122 U-122, commissioned March 30, did not sail.

THREE.

RETURN TO THE N NORTH A ATLANTIC.

While the fighting in Norway was still in progress, on May 10 Hitler launched the long-postponed offensive against the West. The German blitzkrieg smashed through Belgium and northern France, splitting the Allied ground forces. The Chamberlain government fell; Winston Churchill moved up to the post of Prime Minister. Churchill attempted to reinforce and to rally the dispirited and defeatist French, but it was a lost cause. France was doomed.

Having been badly roughed up in Norway, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine was not in shape to contribute much to the offensive in France. Owing to the loss of five oceangoing U-boats in the Norway operation and the need to refit the others and to give the combat-weary crews a rest, Donitz deployed none during the early stages of the blitzkrieg. Submarine support was restricted to patrols by eight ducks in the North Sea. Three ducks sank six ships for 17,400 tons, including the French submarine Doris and the British destroyer was not in shape to contribute much to the offensive in France. Owing to the loss of five oceangoing U-boats in the Norway operation and the need to refit the others and to give the combat-weary crews a rest, Donitz deployed none during the early stages of the blitzkrieg. Submarine support was restricted to patrols by eight ducks in the North Sea. Three ducks sank six ships for 17,400 tons, including the French submarine Doris and the British destroyer Grafton Grafton, the latter while evacuating British troops at Dunkirk. The British sloop Weston Weston trapped one duck, trapped one duck, U-13 U-13, commanded by Max Schulte, age twenty-four, forced it to scuttle, and captured its crew.*

In truth, the U-boat arm had not much heart to resume the fight. "Faith in the torpedo had been completely lost," Donitz wrote. "I do not believe that ever in the history of war men have been sent against the enemy with such a useless weapon. These brave, enterprising [U-boat] crews, who had proved their worth during the previous months of the war, had been plunged into a state of dismal depression ... a slough of despond."

In the days immediately following Norway, Donitz collected and meticulously analyzed the torpedo-firing data. The skippers had carried out a total of thirty-eight attacks: four against battleships, fourteen against cruisers, ten against destroyers, and ten against transports. Discounting marginal attacks from long range at highspeed targets in poor light or other unfavorable conditions, Donitz concluded that had the torpedoes not failed, "certain hits" (and probably sinkings or severe damage) would have occurred in one of the attacks on the battleships, seven on the cruisers, seven on the destroyers, and five on the transports. In summary, he calculated that about twenty enemy warships and transports had escaped almost certain destruction because of torpedo failures.

Donitz used this damning data to mobilize internal political pressures against the torpedo bureaucrats, and he won over Admiral Raeder and the OKM. Upon receipt of Donitz's "shattering summary," the OKM diarist commented that the "continual failure of the torpedoes, resulting from catastrophic technical deficiencies, must be regarded as a calamity ... a failure of historical significance in German naval warfare at a time which is of decisive importance...." Admiral Raeder declared that the correction of submarine torpedo defects was the Navy's "most urgent problem" and hastened to assure Donitz and his men that "the defects are known and being put right" with the highest possible priority.

Donitz devoted a large share of his working hours to seeking a solution to the torpedo defects-but not happily. "It is monstrous," he wrote in his log, "that I should have to be burdened with lengthy discussions and investigations of the causes of torpedo failures and their remedy. This is the business of the technical directorates and departments. But as long as these authorities are slow to do what is necessary, I am forced to take action myself."

By this time Donitz had lost all confidence in the magnetic pistol. It was too complicated and too sensitive. Furthermore, he (rightly) believed that the British had perfected a way of reducing the magnetic fields of their ships-probably by degaussing, he thought-rendering the magnetic pistol less effective. He therefore urged that highest priority be assigned to correcting the depth-keeping defect and other suspected defects in the impact pistol.

With the return of good weather to the Baltic, the "Torpedo Dictator," Dr. Cornelius, had been carrying out intensive tests of the impact pistol. The results, presented about May 1, were "staggering" and "criminal," as Donitz put it in his diary. Cornelius reported "a high rate of failure" owing to a poor, overly complex, and "clumsy" design. The weakness had not been detected theretofore because the torpedo technicians had not tested the pistol adequately in peacetime.

A few days after Cornelius revealed these test results, on May 5, the Germans captured the British submarine Seal Seal; a 1,500-ton minelayer. When the Germans towed Seal Seal to Germany, it was found that she carried twelve torpedoes (six in the tubes, six reloads) fitted with contact pistols. After Donitz and his staffers had closely examined the pistols, Donitz declared them to be "very sound" and "efficient" and he insisted that they be "copied." Cornelius concurred, and by this means the Germans were able to produce a reliable contact pistol in a very short time. to Germany, it was found that she carried twelve torpedoes (six in the tubes, six reloads) fitted with contact pistols. After Donitz and his staffers had closely examined the pistols, Donitz declared them to be "very sound" and "efficient" and he insisted that they be "copied." Cornelius concurred, and by this means the Germans were able to produce a reliable contact pistol in a very short time.

Meanwhile, Cornelius had some encouraging news. On May 11 he pronounced that the depth-keeping defect had been fixed. Torpedoes could be relied upon to run within a foot and a half of the depth setting. Furthermore, he asserted, "improved firing" of the magnetic pistol had been achieved.

The depth-keeping defect had not, in fact, been completely fixed. Nor would it be for another two years. There was another as-yet-undetected fault. The rudder shaft of the torpedo passed through the balance chamber, where the hydrostatic valve controlling the depth setting was located. The chamber was not airtight. As a result, when the boats ran submerged for prolonged periods (as in Norway) and the internal air pressure rose, the air pressure in the balance chamber likewise rose. This confused the hydrostatic valve, which was designed to operate at sea (or atmospheric) level, and caused it to set the torpedoes to run deeper. Since the latest testing had been carried out at sea level from surface craft or U-boats that had not remained submerged for very long, the leak in the balance chamber had no adverse effects on the hydrostatic valve, and so this flaw remained undetected.

Donitz and his staff agonized over what to do: resume the U-boat war in the Atlantic or wait for improved torpedoes? His chief of staff, Eberhard Godt, Donitz remembered, was of the "emphatic opinion" that the U-boat arm should not be committed to battle until all the torpedo defects had been eliminated. But Donitz believed that any delay would do "incalculable harm" to the morale and efficiency of his men. Notwithstanding prematures and other failures, the Atlantic boats, employing magnetic pistols, had achieved considerable success in February. Dr. Cornelius had pronounced the depth-keeping defect fixed and some "improvement" in the magnetic pistol. As long as there was "even a slender prospect of success," Donitz believed, the U-boat war in the Atlantic should be resumed.

Before that could happen, the men had to be reassured and encouraged. Admiral Raeder did his part with cheer-up visits and by awarding a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz to Donitz. Donitz, in turn, secured a to Donitz. Donitz, in turn, secured a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for Werner Hartmann, who had sunk nineteen ships to exceed the leading ace Herbert Schultze, and one for Otto Schuhart, who had sunk the carrier for Werner Hartmann, who had sunk nineteen ships to exceed the leading ace Herbert Schultze, and one for Otto Schuhart, who had sunk the carrier Courageous Courageous in the early days of the war. in the early days of the war.* Donitz personally visited every flotilla staff and U-boat to exhort his men. Donitz personally visited every flotilla staff and U-boat to exhort his men.

Donitz also made some important command and staff changes. He relieved three skippers: Hundius Flotilla commander Werner Hartmann in U-37 U-37, Herbert Sohler in U-46 U-46, who had returned from Norway in a state of "nervous exhaustion," and Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48, who was ill and had to be hospitalized with a serious stomach or kidney disorder. Donitz named Hartmann to be his first staff officer, replacing Viktor Oehrn, age thirty-two, who replaced Hartmann in U-37 U-37. He named Sohler commanding officer of the Wegener Flotilla, replacing Hans-Rudolf Rosing, who replaced Schultze in U-48 U-48. Prien's able first watch officer, Engelbert Endrass, age twenty-nine, replaced Sohler in U-46 U-46.

In resuming the U-boat war in the Atlantic, Donitz planned to replicate the opening assault of September 1939: a maximum commitment of force across the broadest possible front. But this plan was frustrated by Hitler and by the jam-up in the shipyards. The Fuhrer insisted that the U-boat arm continue hauling supplies to the beleaguered German ground forces in Norway. In response, the OKM directed Donitz to assign one-third of the oceangoing force (seven boats) to these supply missions. On appeal, Donitz was able to reduce the supply missions to merely two (U-26, U-122 U-122), but the reconversion of the other five boats from supply back to attack configuration delayed their availability. The jam-up in the shipyards delayed the refits of other boats. As a consequence, Donitz was compelled to postpone the opening blow-the maximum commitment of force-to June.

Six oceangoing boats sailed in May to reopen the Atlantic U-boat war. Infuriatingly, mechanical problems compelled two boats, U-28 U-28 (Kuhnke) and (Kuhnke) and U-48 U-48 (Rosing), to abort while still in the North Sea. The other four, (Rosing), to abort while still in the North Sea. The other four, U-29 U-29 (Schuhart), (Schuhart), U-37 U-37 (Oehrn), (Oehrn), U-43 U-43 (Ambrosius), and the new VIIB (Ambrosius), and the new VIIB U-101 U-101, commanded by Fritz Frauenheim, age twenty-eight, from the duck U-21 U-21, reached the Atlantic. To enhance their chances for success, Donitz had obtained from Hitler another relaxation in the rules, which, in effect, permitted unrestricted submarine warfare in British and French waters. Commencing May 24, U-boats were allowed to sink without warning any any ship, including unescorted neutrals and passenger ships. ship, including unescorted neutrals and passenger ships.

Viktor Oehrn, new skipper of the famous U-37 U-37, led the way. Oehrn was very much aware that for internal political reasons and for rebuilding morale in the U-boat arm it was vital for U-37 U-37 to achieve a smashing success. He got off to a promising start, sinking a 5,000-ton Swede and severely damaging a 9,500-ton British freighter with his deck gun. to achieve a smashing success. He got off to a promising start, sinking a 5,000-ton Swede and severely damaging a 9,500-ton British freighter with his deck gun.