But a number of things went wrong in the initial foray of these nine boats. Sailing from Wilhelmshaven on August 1, the big, cranky U-25 U-25, commanded by Heinz Beduhn, blundered into a minefield and was lost with all hands. British air patrols caught and bombed Viktor Oehrn in U-37 U-37 and Dietrich Knorr in and Dietrich Knorr in U-51 U-51, inflicting so much damage that both boats had to abort to Lorient. The hit on U-51 U-51 was credited to a Sunderland of Coastal Command Squadron 210, piloted by Ernest Reginald Baker. As was credited to a Sunderland of Coastal Command Squadron 210, piloted by Ernest Reginald Baker. As U-51 U-51 was approaching Lorient in the early hours of August 20, the British minelaying submarine was approaching Lorient in the early hours of August 20, the British minelaying submarine Cachalot Cachalot, commanded by David Luce, torpedoed and sank her with the loss of all hands. Von Stockhausen in torpedoed and sank her with the loss of all hands. Von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65 was compelled to abort the landing of the two was compelled to abort the landing of the two Abwehr Abwehr agents in Ireland owing to the death of the senior agent. agents in Ireland owing to the death of the senior agent. Thereafter, Thereafter, U-65 U-65 incurred a mechanical breakdown and limped into Brest, seeking repairs. incurred a mechanical breakdown and limped into Brest, seeking repairs.

These misadventures left only five boats from Germany to patrol the convoy hunting grounds near Rockall Bank in early August. For the first ten days, all were beset by unseasonably stormy weather (as were the aircraft in the Battle of Britain). Nonetheless, Heinrich Liebe in U-38 U-38 sank two ships for 12,500 tons, including the 7,500-ton Egyptian liner sank two ships for 12,500 tons, including the 7,500-ton Egyptian liner Mohammed Ali-Kebir Mohammed Ali-Kebir, carrying 860 British troops to Gibraltar. About 320 troops perished, but about 540 were rescued by a British destroyer. These two sinkings raised Liebe's confirmed bag to eighteen ships for 87,000 tons. Counting two overclaims for 13,000 tons, he qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, which was awarded while he was still on patrol.

With clearing weather, the five boats near Rockall Bank had somewhat better luck.

* Engelbert Endrass in U-46 U-46 severely damaged two ships, a Dutch and a Greek. severely damaged two ships, a Dutch and a Greek.

* Hans Rosing in U-48 U-48 sank two ships, a Swede and a Belgian, for 9,900 tons. sank two ships, a Swede and a Belgian, for 9,900 tons.

* Joachim Schepke in the new VIIB U-100 U-100 sank a 5,000-ton British freighter. sank a 5,000-ton British freighter.

* Fritz Frauenheim in U-100 U-100 sank a 4,500-ton British freighter. sank a 4,500-ton British freighter.

These were better returns, but until August 23, the results of the nine boats sailing from Germany were considered disappointing: merely eight ships sunk and two damaged.*

At this time B-dienst B-dienst went "blind" or "deaf." After one full year of war, the British realized that Royal Navy codes were compromised and on August 20 they changed all the naval encoding systems. The OKM diarist commented: "This is the most serious blow to our radio intelligence since the outbreak of the war.... It is remarkable that it had not been done before now...." went "blind" or "deaf." After one full year of war, the British realized that Royal Navy codes were compromised and on August 20 they changed all the naval encoding systems. The OKM diarist commented: "This is the most serious blow to our radio intelligence since the outbreak of the war.... It is remarkable that it had not been done before now...." B-dienst B-dienst was hopeful that the new British codes could be broken "in six weeks or so," the diarist noted. But that hope was not to be realized. was hopeful that the new British codes could be broken "in six weeks or so," the diarist noted. But that hope was not to be realized.

The loss of British naval codes may not have been the most serious blow for the U-boat force. During the first year of operations Donitz had laid numerous submarine traps for British naval formations, important troop convoys, and merchant-ship convoys, but owing to inclement weather, errors in navigation by the U-boats or the British, wrong or late information from B-dienst B-dienst, and other factors, almost none of the traps had paid off and a great deal of U-boat patrol time had been wasted. The sailing cycles on most convoy routes had been well established; lax exhaust-smoke control and communications security in convoys was expected to continue. The only really serious setback was the loss of intelligence on positions and operations of British submarines conducting ASW.

In spite of the lost intelligence, the U-boats performed extremely well in the last week of August.

Having repaired his battle damage in Lorient, Viktor Oehrn in U-37 U-37 returned to the hunting grounds to sink a record seven confirmed ships for 24,400 tons in merely four days, including the 1,000-ton British sloop returned to the hunting grounds to sink a record seven confirmed ships for 24,400 tons in merely four days, including the 1,000-ton British sloop Penzance Penzance, misidentified and credited as a "destroyer." Hit by air and surface escorts, Oehrn was compelled to abort to Lorient for the second time.

* Joachim Schepke in U-100 U-100 sank five more ships for 21,000 tons, and damaged a sixth. sank five more ships for 21,000 tons, and damaged a sixth.

* Endrass in U-46 U-46 sank four ships for 29,800 tons, including the 15,000-ton auxiliary cruiser sank four ships for 29,800 tons, including the 15,000-ton auxiliary cruiser Dunvegan Castle Dunvegan Castle.

* Rosing in U-48 U-48 sank three more ships for 19,200 tons, including two British tankers, the 6,800-ton sank three more ships for 19,200 tons, including two British tankers, the 6,800-ton Athelcrest Athelcrest and 6,700-ton and 6,700-ton La Brea La Brea.

* Hans Jenisch in the Type VII U-32 U-32, who sailed from Germany August 15, sank three ships for 13,000 tons and damaged the British light cruiser Fiji Fiji.

* Fritz Frauenheim in U-101 U-101 sank or fatally damaged two more ships (a Greek and a Finn) for 7,700 tons. sank or fatally damaged two more ships (a Greek and a Finn) for 7,700 tons.

* Gunter Kuhnke, in the Type VII U-28 U-28, sank two ships for 5,500 tons.

Perhaps influenced by Goring's generous award of the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz to to Luftwaffe Luftwaffe pilots for unverified and exaggerated kills in the Battle of Britain, and/or for internal and external propaganda purposes, Donitz became less stringent in assessing U-boat claims. Berlin continued to trumpet exaggerated U-boat kills: Hans Jenisch in pilots for unverified and exaggerated kills in the Battle of Britain, and/or for internal and external propaganda purposes, Donitz became less stringent in assessing U-boat claims. Berlin continued to trumpet exaggerated U-boat kills: Hans Jenisch in U-32 U-32, who sank 13,000 confirmed tons, was credited 40,000 tons; Joachim Schepke in U-100 U-100, who sank 25,800 tons, was given 43,000 tons. Donitz more freely awarded Ritterkreuzes Ritterkreuzes. Three other favored skippers who had made but two Atlantic patrols benefited from the relaxation: Engelbert Endrass in U-46 U-46 (credit 105,000 tons, actual 65,347 tons); Hans Rosing in (credit 105,000 tons, actual 65,347 tons); Hans Rosing in U-48 U-48 (credit 88,600 tons, actual 60,702 tons) (credit 88,600 tons, actual 60,702 tons)*; and Fritz Frauenheim in U-101 U-101. Frauenheim had sunk but 54,300 confirmed tons on U-101 U-101, but when his earlier sinkings on the duck U-21 U-21, including the minefield that savaged the 11,500-ton heavy cruiser Belfast, were added, his total was 72,300 tons.

Among the last boats to sail from Germany in August was Georg-Wilhelm Schulz's new IXB U-124 U-124. In honor of the German Alpine troops who had saved them when their former boat, U-64 U-64, had been sunk in Narvik, the U-124 U-124 crewmen had adopted the Alpine forces insignia, the mountain flower edelweiss, and had emblazoned an enlarged version of it on the conning tower. crewmen had adopted the Alpine forces insignia, the mountain flower edelweiss, and had emblazoned an enlarged version of it on the conning tower.

On the night of August 25 Schulz found convoy Halifax 65A close to the north end of the Hebrides in heavily patrolled, shallow waters and attacked on the surface. As he was threading in through the escorts, he impulsively fired his two stern tubes at a "destroyer." Both missed and the unsuspecting "destroyer" cruised on. When Schulz had brought U-124 U-124 to firing position, he chose four freighters and fired one torpedo at each, spacing the torpedoes one minute apart. All four torpedoes were seen to hit and explode. The salvo appeared to be the most astonishing of the war: four ships of 30,000 tons sunk by four torpedoes in five minutes! But the claim was incorrect. Only two of the four ships sank. A third, the 4,000-ton Stakesby, was damaged but survived. The fourth torpedo must have missed. to firing position, he chose four freighters and fired one torpedo at each, spacing the torpedoes one minute apart. All four torpedoes were seen to hit and explode. The salvo appeared to be the most astonishing of the war: four ships of 30,000 tons sunk by four torpedoes in five minutes! But the claim was incorrect. Only two of the four ships sank. A third, the 4,000-ton Stakesby, was damaged but survived. The fourth torpedo must have missed.

There was no time to celebrate the supposed victory. One of the destroyers caught U-124 U-124 in its searchlight and pounced, forcing Schulz to crash dive and go deep. At 295 feet the boat hit an outcrop of rock and jarred to a stop. That terrifying moment was followed by another: a rain of close depth charges. Schulz got the boat off the rock, eased deeper, and bottomed at 328 feet. The destroyer made one more desultory depth-charge run, but then gave up the hunt. in its searchlight and pounced, forcing Schulz to crash dive and go deep. At 295 feet the boat hit an outcrop of rock and jarred to a stop. That terrifying moment was followed by another: a rain of close depth charges. Schulz got the boat off the rock, eased deeper, and bottomed at 328 feet. The destroyer made one more desultory depth-charge run, but then gave up the hunt.

Later, after hauling well out to sea, Schulz sent a diver down to inspect the bow for damage incurred when the boat hit the rock. It proved to be serious: Three of the four bow caps had been damaged; only one was fully functional. Upon learning this, Donitz ordered Schulz to leave the hunting grounds and go west to latitude 20 degrees, where he was to broadcast weather reports, which were urgently needed by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe. While doing so, one of the men carelessly half-flooded the stern torpedo room, causing a temporary emergency that evoked chilling memories of Narvik.

The thirteenth and last boat to sail from Germany in August was Prien's U-47 U-47, which put out from Kiel August 27. By then six of the surviving ten Atlantic boats that preceded him in August were in or headed to Lorient for refit, replenishment, rest, and rewards. The other four remained in the hunting grounds: Kuhnke in U-28 U-28, von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65, who had resailed from Brest, Frauenheim in U-101 U-101, and Schulz in U-124 U-124 (with three damaged bow caps) on weather-reporting station. (with three damaged bow caps) on weather-reporting station.

Prien entered the hunting grounds on September 2, and that afternoon his periscope watch detected an unusual cloud of black smoke on the horizon. It turned out to be the 7,500-ton Belgian freighter Ville de Mons Ville de Mons, inbound from New York with no escort and badly in need of a boiler cleaning. Prien hit her with one torpedo and saw the crew abandon in three lifeboats. When the ship showed no signs of sinking, Prien surfaced to polish her off with his deck gun, but changed his mind and put her under with another torpedo. One crewman died of exposure, but the others were rescued.

The codebreakers at B-dienst B-dienst provided Donitz with further information on North Atlantic convoys, deduced from lapses in Allied radio security and other sources. The information included the important news that to reduce the shipping congestion in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and to sail more merchant ships in the favorable late summer and early fall weather, the British on August 15 had initiated a second convoy system on the North Atlantic run. These new convoys departed from the more northerly Canadian port of Sydney, on Cape Breton Island, a part of Nova Scotia, which, owing to ice, closed in winter. They were designated SC to indicate the geographic location (Sydney-Cape Breton, much as HX indicated Halifax), but because they traveled at only 7 to 9 knots, the SC became corrupted to mean "Slow Convoy," as opposed to the faster HXs. provided Donitz with further information on North Atlantic convoys, deduced from lapses in Allied radio security and other sources. The information included the important news that to reduce the shipping congestion in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and to sail more merchant ships in the favorable late summer and early fall weather, the British on August 15 had initiated a second convoy system on the North Atlantic run. These new convoys departed from the more northerly Canadian port of Sydney, on Cape Breton Island, a part of Nova Scotia, which, owing to ice, closed in winter. They were designated SC to indicate the geographic location (Sydney-Cape Breton, much as HX indicated Halifax), but because they traveled at only 7 to 9 knots, the SC became corrupted to mean "Slow Convoy," as opposed to the faster HXs.*

On September 2, B-dienst B-dienst alerted Donitz to inbound Slow Convoy 2, composed of fifty-three ships. Donitz directed Prien to intercept the convoy at a designated location near 20 degrees west on September 6, before it picked up its escort. Donitz planned that three other boats would join Prien for the attack: alerted Donitz to inbound Slow Convoy 2, composed of fifty-three ships. Donitz directed Prien to intercept the convoy at a designated location near 20 degrees west on September 6, before it picked up its escort. Donitz planned that three other boats would join Prien for the attack: U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen), (von Stockhausen), U-101 U-101 (Frauenheim), which had only six torpedoes left, and possibly (Frauenheim), which had only six torpedoes left, and possibly U-124 U-124 (Schulz), despite her three damaged bow caps. The other boat, the Type VII (Schulz), despite her three damaged bow caps. The other boat, the Type VII U-28 U-28 (Kuhnke), could not operate so far west because of fuel limitations. However, an appeal to Berlin to release (Kuhnke), could not operate so far west because of fuel limitations. However, an appeal to Berlin to release U-124 U-124 from weather reporting was rejected, leaving only three boats ( from weather reporting was rejected, leaving only three boats (U-47, U-65 U-65, U-101 U-101) to attack the convoy.

En route to the designated area on the evening of September 3, Prien in U-47 U-47 unexpectedly ran across another convoy, Outbound 207. Husbanding his torpedoes, he picked out two targets and carried out a night surface attack. He sank the big 9,000-ton British freighter unexpectedly ran across another convoy, Outbound 207. Husbanding his torpedoes, he picked out two targets and carried out a night surface attack. He sank the big 9,000-ton British freighter Titan Titan and claimed damage to another of 4,000 tons, but the latter could not be identified in postwar records. and claimed damage to another of 4,000 tons, but the latter could not be identified in postwar records.

By the morning of September 4, the three boats, U-47 U-47, U-65 U-65, and U-101 U-101, had formed a north-south scouting line along longitude 20 degrees west. The weather was miserable: gale-force winds, towering seas. On September 5 Prien lost a man overboard. Early the next day von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65 reported contact with the convoy, but the weather and visibility were so bad he was not able to shoot. He shadowed, attempting to bring in the other boats. However, reported contact with the convoy, but the weather and visibility were so bad he was not able to shoot. He shadowed, attempting to bring in the other boats. However, U-101 U-101 reported serious "engine defects," forcing Frauenheim to abort to Lorient. That left only reported serious "engine defects," forcing Frauenheim to abort to Lorient. That left only U-47 U-47 and and U-65 U-65 to attack the convoy, which had picked up its local escorts: two destroyers, two corvettes, and three trawlers. to attack the convoy, which had picked up its local escorts: two destroyers, two corvettes, and three trawlers.

That same evening, September 6, in heavy seas, Prien made contact with Slow Convoy 2 and tracked. Later that night he attacked on the surface and sank three of the fifty-three ships: two British freighters, Neptunian Neptunian, 5,200 tons, and Jose de Larrinaga Larrinaga, 5,300 tons, and the Norwegian freighter Gro Gro, 4,211 tons. Owing to the weather and other factors, von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65 was unable to get into a favorable shooting position and could not attack. was unable to get into a favorable shooting position and could not attack.

As the convoy steamed eastward toward the North Channel, Prien doggedly tracked and radioed positions. Late on the morning of September 9, south of the Hebrides, he sank a fourth ship, the Greek freighter Poseidon Poseidon, 3,800 tons. Responding to Prien's reports a few hours later, Kuhnke in U-28 U-28 came up and sank one ship, the 2,400-ton British freighter came up and sank one ship, the 2,400-ton British freighter Mardinian Mardinian. The bulk of Slow Convoy 2-forty-eight ships and the seven escorts-reached North Channel without further damage.

Prien, having sunk a total of six ships and, he believed, damaged one, had only one torpedo left. Since he had been on patrol only fourteen days and still had an ample supply of fuel, Donitz directed him to go west to 20 degrees and replace the damaged U-124 U-124 (Schulz) on the weather-reporting station. Doubtless Prien found this assignment unappealing-the boat had yet to experience the delights of Lorient-but he carried it out without complaint. When relieved on station, the (Schulz) on the weather-reporting station. Doubtless Prien found this assignment unappealing-the boat had yet to experience the delights of Lorient-but he carried it out without complaint. When relieved on station, the U-124 U-124 headed for Lorient. On September 10, Berlin gloatingly announced Prien's claims: six ships for 40,000 tons sunk, one damaged. headed for Lorient. On September 10, Berlin gloatingly announced Prien's claims: six ships for 40,000 tons sunk, one damaged.

Gunter Kuhnke in the VII U-28 U-28, low on fuel, found and tracked another convoy, Outbound 210. In the early hours of September 11 he attacked on the surface, firing at what he believed to be two tankers and a freighter. He claimed the damaging of one 10,000-ton tanker and the sinking of two freighters for 13,000 tons. Postwar analysis credited him with damage to a 4,700-ton British freighter and sinking a 2,000-ton Dutch freighter. Critically low on fuel, Kuhnke headed for Lorient, claiming a total of five ships for 30,000 tons sunk on this patrol. With these and past overclaims, Kuhnke qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz under the relaxed criteria and it was awarded when he reached Lorient. His confirmed score at this time-all on under the relaxed criteria and it was awarded when he reached Lorient. His confirmed score at this time-all on U-28 U-28-was thirteen ships for 56,272 tons.

Kuhnke's return left two of the August Atlantic boats in the hunting grounds: U-47 U-47 (Prien) on weather station with one torpedo, and (Prien) on weather station with one torpedo, and U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen). The latter had sailed from Germany on August 8, canceled the special mission to land agents in Ireland and aborted to Brest with mechanical defects, refueled in Brest and resailed, and found convoy SC 2, but had not yet fired a torpedo. (von Stockhausen). The latter had sailed from Germany on August 8, canceled the special mission to land agents in Ireland and aborted to Brest with mechanical defects, refueled in Brest and resailed, and found convoy SC 2, but had not yet fired a torpedo.

To this point-September 15-the thirteen Atlantic boats sailing from Germany in August had sunk a total of forty-four confirmed ships for about 230,000 tons, a decline to an average of 3.4 ships per boat per patrol, but still impressive. Five skippers-Oehrn, Prien, Schepke, Endrass, and Rosing-had accounted for two-thirds of the sinkings (twenty-nine). Two boats sailing in August had been lost: U-25 U-25 (Beduhn) and (Beduhn) and U-51 U-51 (Knorr). The base at Lorient had enabled Oehrn in (Knorr). The base at Lorient had enabled Oehrn in U-37 U-37 to remount his aborted patrol to good effect, but otherwise it had yet to make any substantial impact on the U-boat war. to remount his aborted patrol to good effect, but otherwise it had yet to make any substantial impact on the U-boat war.

During August the ducks of the Emsmann Flotilla mounted six patrols to the Atlantic from Germany, Norway, or Lorient. They sank a total of seven ships for 32,000 tons. One duck, U-57 U-57, commanded by Erich Topp, age twenty-six, sank three of the seven ships (for 24,000 tons), but was herself rammed and sunk by the Norwegian tramp Rona Rona on September 3, while entering a lock in the Kiel Canal. Six men died in this mishap but on September 3, while entering a lock in the Kiel Canal. Six men died in this mishap but U-57 U-57 was salvaged, and Topp and the rest of the crew were assigned to commission a new VIIB. On August 31, the duck was salvaged, and Topp and the rest of the crew were assigned to commission a new VIIB. On August 31, the duck U-60 U-60, commanded by Adalbert Schnee, age twenty-six, torpedoed the 15,300-ton Dutch liner Volendam Volendam, which was transporting 321 British children to Canada, but the damaged ship was towed to port and all the children were saved.

British tanker losses remained worrisome. During the months of July and August, the oceangoing U-boats had sunk six for about 44,000 tons, the duck U-61 U-61 one. The duck one. The duck U-57 U-57 had accounted for another, the 7,500-ton British Pecten. In addition, the Italian submarine had accounted for another, the 7,500-ton British Pecten. In addition, the Italian submarine Malaspina Malaspina sank the 8,400-ton tanker sank the 8,400-ton tanker British Fame British Fame near the Azores, and the near the Azores, and the U-A U-A, on patrol off West Africa, sank yet another, the 5,800-ton Norwegian Sarita Sarita* Total Allied tanker losses in July-August: ten. Total Allied tanker losses in July-August: ten.

STRATEGIES, SECRETS, AND D DEALS.

During the air Battle of Britain, Churchill made a bold and far-reaching decision, one that was to profoundly influence the course of World War II. Great Britain was to fight no less defiantly to deny the Axis control of the Mediterranean Sea, the continent of Africa, and the Middle East. After Britain had gathered sufficient military power, she was to employ the Mediterranean Basin as a staging area to counterattack the Axis, first crushing Italy, then Germany, by attacking Germany's "soft underbelly" through Italy and the Balkans.

It was a complicated and controversial strategy, fraught with immense risk. In Africa, Benito Mussolini's forces controlled Libya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Striking out from Ethiopia in several directions during July and August, Italian troops had punched into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the British colony of Kenya, and had overrun the whole of British Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden. Mussolini was then poised in eastern Libya to attack Egypt and he appeared to be massing troops in Albania for an attack on Greece. With the addition of two new 35,000-ton battleships, Littorio Littorio and and Vittorio Vittorio Veneto Veneto, and the older, smaller but modernized battleship Dulio Dulio, the Italian Navy had dramatically increased in strength: five battleships, plus numerous modern heavy and light cruisers and destroyers.

Almost unnoticed during the toughest days of the Battle of Britain, the British proceeded to implement the Mediterranean strategy. In August the Admiralty powerfully reinforced its two naval squadrons, Force H at Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria, and drew plans to reinforce the island of Malta. The War Office beefed up the slim British ground force in Egypt, grandiosely named "The Army of the Nile." In collaboration with Free French leader Charles de Gaulle, Churchill designed schemes to persuade the French leaders of Vichy colonies in Africa and the Middle East to come over to the Allied side.

The Italian Army in Libya, comprised of 200,000 men, launched its offensive against Egypt on September 13. The Army of the Nile, merely 63,000 men, was unable to hold and it fell back sixty miles to Sidi Barrani, fighting a well-executed rear-guard action. With one added surge the Italians might have pushed on to Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal, but they ran out of steam and sat down.

Since the Italian Navy and Italian land-based air posed a formidable threat in the central Mediterranean, the British were hard-pressed to reinforce and resupply the Army of the Nile. Everything from England had to be sent by convoy the long way around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope), thence north into the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, a tedious and inefficient route. In order to eliminate the Italian threat and open the Mediterranean to British convoys, the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, Andrew Cunningham, repeatedly sought to lure the Italian Navy into battle, but the Italian admirals shrewdly prolonged the naval threat by avoiding a major confrontation.

Meanwhile, Churchill and de Gaulle pressed ahead with their schemes to persuade the Vichy French in Africa to come over to the Allied side. The first of these (Operation Menace) was directed at the Vichy colony of Senegal, on the African west coast. The hope was that if a joint Anglo-Free French expedition made a show of force off Senegal's chief seaport, Dakar, where the gunned but unfinished battleship Richelieu Richelieu had taken refuge, the Vichy French would rally to de Gaulle and deliver not only Senegal, which could provide a staging base for mounting further intrigue in Vichy French West Africa, but also had taken refuge, the Vichy French would rally to de Gaulle and deliver not only Senegal, which could provide a staging base for mounting further intrigue in Vichy French West Africa, but also Richelieu Richelieu.

A substantial British naval force was committed to this scheme: the carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal and the battleship and the battleship Resolution Resolution from Force H, the battleship from Force H, the battleship Barham Barham and several cruisers, including and several cruisers, including Fiji Fiji, torpedoed by Jenisch in U-32 U-32 while leaving England. Contrary to the hope, the British warships met a hot reception at Dakar: heavy gunfire from Vichy shore batteries, the while leaving England. Contrary to the hope, the British warships met a hot reception at Dakar: heavy gunfire from Vichy shore batteries, the Richelieu Richelieu, and some Vichy French cruisers and super-destroyers, which had raced down from Toulon. During the exchange of fire, the Dakar-based Vichy submarine Beveziers Beveziers torpedoed the torpedoed the Resolution Resolution, causing "serious damage." Chastened, the British were compelled to withdraw and cancel that scheme, but it was not a total failure. The show of force emboldened the leader of Vichy Cameroon, Jacques Philippe Leclerc, to come over to the Allied side, creating a domino effect in the Vichy colonies of Chad and French Congo. On October 12, French forces of those three colonies, together with some defecting Senegalese troops, invaded and occupied Vichy Gabon.

Not entirely unexpectedly, an Italian Army, staging from Albania, invaded Greece on October 28. Since Greece was an ally of Britain and an Italian conquest of Greece would flank Egypt on the north, imperiling the Army of the Nile and the British naval base at Alexandria, Churchill and the War Cabinet took immediate steps to assist the Greeks. British ground forces from Egypt occupied the islands of Crete and Lemnos. RAF fighter and bomber squadrons moved up to bases near Athens to support the Greek Army.

With the sudden expansion of British responsibilities and operations in the eastern Mediterranean, it became imperative that British naval forces open a direct convoy route from Gibraltar to Alexandria. Toward that end, on November 11, Cunningham staged a surprise attack on the Italian fleet anchorage at Taranto, located in the "heel" of Italy. Flying off the new carrier Illustrious Illustrious, twenty-one old Swordfish biplanes torpedoed three of the five Italian battleships: the big, new Lit-torio and the smaller, but modernized Dulio Dulio and and Cavour Cavour. Littorio Littorio and and Dulio Dulio were knocked out of action for five and seven months, respectively; were knocked out of action for five and seven months, respectively; Cavour Cavour, severely damaged and beached, did not return to active service. The two undamaged battleships, Vittorio Veneto Vittorio Veneto and and Cesare Cesare, hurriedly withdrew to Naples.

This victory opened a British convoy route in the Mediterranean, but only temporarily. Humiliated, Mussolini requested help from Berlin. In response, Hitler sent about 400 Luftwaffe Luftwaffe planes to the island of Sicily to assist the Italians in attacking the British convoys and the covering naval forces. Although the planes to the island of Sicily to assist the Italians in attacking the British convoys and the covering naval forces. Although the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe wrought absolute havoc on the convoys, it was soon clear to Hitler that he would have to send additional ground and air forces to the Mediterranean Basin to reinforce the lackluster Italian armies, which bogged down in both Egypt and Greece. wrought absolute havoc on the convoys, it was soon clear to Hitler that he would have to send additional ground and air forces to the Mediterranean Basin to reinforce the lackluster Italian armies, which bogged down in both Egypt and Greece.

The decision to fight to the utmost in the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East placed immense demands on British military assets. The Admiralty committed a large portion of the Royal Navy to the Mediterranean: the carriers Illustrious Illustrious, Ark Royal Ark Royal, and Eagle Eagle; the battleships Warspite Warspite, Royal Sovereign, Malaya Malaya, Ramillies, Valiant, Barham, and Renown Renown; numerous cruisers; scores of destroyers and auxiliaries; and nearly two dozen submarines.*

Washington never fully understood or approved of this diversion of resources to the Mediterranean Basin. As Washington viewed it, the British strategy amounted to wasteful and inefficient "pecking at the periphery." Washington believed that the full resources and military power of Britain should have been brought directly to bear on Germany itself.

The British decision to fight vigorously for the Mediterranean Basin, at a time when it appeared that the Germans might invade the British Isles, in effect embroiled the Royal Navy in a "two-front war." Owing to the loss of or severe damage to destroyers in the Norway operations and Dunkirk, and to the decision to deploy a large number of destroyers in ports on the English Channel to counter a possible invasion, and to the transfer of numerous destroyers to the Mediterranean, there were only a few left for convoy escort in the North Atlantic and Northwest Approaches, and most of these were old ships in need of upgrading and requiring much upkeep.

Adding to the Admiralty's problems, the first of the twenty new 280-foot, 1,000-ton Hunt Hunt-class destroyers, designed specifically for open-ocean convoy escort, failed to meet Royal Navy standards for that role. Hurriedly designed, they were top-heavy, dangerously unstable in heavy seas, overgunned for the size (four 4"), lacked fuel capacity for extended voyages, and despite the elimination of torpedo tubes, did not have space topside to carry more than fifty depth charges, not really enough for convoy escorting. As a consequence of that and the loss and shortage of other destroyers, the Admiralty had to send the corvettes, which had been selected for inshore escort, to blue-water escort duties. By and large the Hunts Hunts had to be relegated to missions on short-legged routes in home waters and the Mediterranean Sea, a terrible setback. had to be relegated to missions on short-legged routes in home waters and the Mediterranean Sea, a terrible setback.

In those darkest of days, Churchill intensified his secret pleas to Roosevelt for help in supplying destroyers. The President was willing but the renewed requests came at a politically awkward time. He was engaged in a tough run for an unprecedented third term against the popular Republican candidate, Wendell Willkie. He had pledged to keep the United States out of the war in Europe; he dared not alienate the large bloc of isolationist voters.

Pending the election, Roosevelt walked a tightrope. He publicly pushed through the transfer of fifty "flush-deck," or "four-stack," destroyers to Great Britain in early September, justifying that measure as a good deal for the United States since the rights to British bases obtained in the exchange enhanced the security of the Western Hemisphere.

The fifty destroyers for Great Britain came from a fleet of 273 American vessels that had been built in the latter years of World War I. Originally named after American naval heroes, most were renamed for towns common to Britain and the United States (e.g., Annapolis, Georgetown, Richmond, etc.); hence they were known as Town Town-class vessels. They were 315 feet in length, displaced 1,200 tons, and had a top speed of about 29 knots. The main armament consisted of four 4" guns, one 3" gun, and twelve torpedo tubes. Forty-three of these ships went to the Royal Navy and seven to the Royal Canadian Navy, named for Canadian rivers. The Royal Navy manned three vessels (Bath, Lincoln, Mansfield) with Norwegian crews; one ship, Cameron Cameron, was damaged in an air raid on Portland and never became operational.*

Much nonsense has been written about these vessels, such as dubbing them "fifty ships that saved the world." In fact, these ships required a great deal of work, modification, and upgrading. About four months passed before most of the ships reached England and by the time they were fully operational, the dire emergencies that prompted their acquisition had passed. While the symbolic value of the transfer was great for the British, the Town Town-class historian, Arnold Hague, wrote, "The tactical effect of the ships themselves was, however, small ..." and they "passed quite quickly from the operational scene."

Privately and secretly Roosevelt did much more to assist the British. Among his most important steps was to send a military mission, headed by Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, to London in August, ostensibly to assess British chances for survival, but in reality to begin long-term, Anglo-American joint planning for the defeat of the Axis.

In reaction to the U-boat slaughter of British-controlled shipping, at about this same time (August 1940), Roosevelt approved a proposal from Admiral Jerry Land of the U.S. Maritime Commission to greatly increase construction of merchant ships. Since the half-dozen major shipyards in the United States were already burdened with contracts for the huge expansion of the Navy, Land established seven new shipyards (three on the Gulf Coast, four on the West Coast) to build the new merchant ships. The modified Maritime Commission program envisioned letting contracts for two hundred new ships by July 1941, but that was merely a small, first step in what was to grow into the greatest merchant-ship building program in the history of the world.

Seeking new sources for merchant ships, Churchill sent a secret mission to Washington and Ottawa. The mission members brought along blueprints for what was wanted: a simple, welded, 440-foot coal-burning cargo vessel of 10,000 gross tons, capable of cruising at 11 knots on a single shaft. Although the Maritime Commission was already overburdened, Washington agreed to build sixty such ships for the British. Ottawa, in turn, agreed to build twenty-six more, relying mostly on riveted construction rather than welding. The British designated those sixty ships Ocean Ocean-class; the twenty-six Canadian versions, Fort Fort-class.

Provided some refinements were incorporated, the Maritime Commission decreed that the British Ocean Ocean-class cargo vessel should be adopted for the 200 cargo vessels already on order. The chief change was in propulsion: oil-fired boilers rather than the coal-fired "Scotch boilers" in the British ships. The Americans designated this type of vessel the EC EC-2 Emergency Cargo Ship, but they became popularly known as the "Liberty" ships, or facetiously, "The Ugly Duckling."*

As the web of friendship between Great Britain and the United States knitted ever tighter, Churchill and the War Cabinet decided to share Britain's most closely held scientific and technical achievements with the United States. Led by the scientist Henry Tizard, another secret mission, which included the radar expert Taffy Bowen, left for Washington in late August on the liner Duchess of Richmond Duchess of Richmond. The mission carried along a 450-pound Mark VII aerial depth charge and plans and specifications for the Mark VIII 250-pound aerial depth charge; the formula for RDX, an explosive 50 percent more powerful than TNT, to be produced in America as Torpex; a Rolls-Royce Merlin aircraft engine; a Swedish-built Bofors automatic antiaircraft cannon; a proximity fuse for large-caliber antiaircraft guns; a power-driven gun turret for heavy bombers; the latest model of British sonar; plans and specifications for an ahead-throwing antisubmarine mortar called the Hedgehog; plans and specifications for a miniaturized shipborne high frequency direction finder (HF/DF or Huff Duff); plans and specifications for an "escort," or "jeep," aircraft carrier; plans and specifications of the Chain Home British antiaircraft radar net, together with data on the latest models of airborne radar, the antibomber A-I and antiship ASV; and three models of the latest version of the Randall and Boot cavity magnetron, much improved since the first test in February.

All of these items were of intense interest to the American military and the scientists and engineers, and some of them were of great value. But none excited the scientists and engineers more than the Randall and Boot cavity magnetron. It was, an American scientist later wrote, "the most valuable treasure ever brought to these shores." Somewhat chagrined to discover it had been inspired by a forgotten American invention (Hull's magnetron), Washington assigned the task of its full development to the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which in turn farmed out various technical chores to laboratories at General Electric, Westinghouse, the Radio Corporation of America, and Bell Telephone.

At this time, Great Britain and the United States also entered into an agreement to exchange codebreaking information. Both nations had a great deal to share: Sensational new breakthroughs had occurred. In Washington, Army and Navy code-breaking teams, working independently, cracked through difficult Japanese codes in September 1940. The Army team, led by William F. Friedman, broke the Japanese diplomatic machine code, Purple, which had been introduced eighteen months earlier, in February 1939. Within the same week, the Navy team, led by Laurence F. Safford and Agnes Driscoll, broke the Japanese naval code, JN-25, which had been introduced in June 1939.

Friedman's Purple machine, which utilized stepping switches rather than rotors, enabled American codebreakers to "read," on a continuous basis, all high-level diplomatic traffic between Tokyo and Japanese embassies in Washington, London, Berlin, and elsewhere around the globe. Laurence Safford later characterized Friedman's break into Purple as "the masterpiece of cryptanalysis in the war era." The Navy team's break into JN-25 gave it complete and current access to the Japanese Imperial Navy's operational traffic, but it required compilation, by hand, of huge "code books," together with thousands of English translations, a tedious task that took the Navy team another year to complete.

At about this same time, September 1940, the British Tabulating Machine Company delivered the first two prototypes of the Turing-Welchman bombes to Bletchley Park. These wondrous machines, in effect, automated the hunt for five-rotor Enigma keys. The bombes were not a panacea. They had to be prompted with cribs; without cribs they were useless. But after a full year of intense work on various German Enigma nets, Bletchley Park had plenty of cribs on file and its personnel had developed an uncanny sense for spotting new cribs.

Fed a daily dose of cribs, the bombes enabled Welchman and his codebreaking group to break Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Red-but no other Enigma nets-consistently, currently, and accurately. A distinguished British scholar-historian at Bletchley Park, Peter Calvocoressi, remembered: "We were never again to lose Red. It became the constant staple ... it was broken daily, usually on the day in question and early in the day." Red-but no other Enigma nets-consistently, currently, and accurately. A distinguished British scholar-historian at Bletchley Park, Peter Calvocoressi, remembered: "We were never again to lose Red. It became the constant staple ... it was broken daily, usually on the day in question and early in the day."

The military historian Bradley F. Smith has documented the background of the Anglo-American cryptographic agreement.* He wrote that the initial proposal came from a U.S. Army representative in London, Brigadier General George Strong, and that thereafter senior American officials pressed for an exchange, apparently with President Roosevelt's blessing. On the other hand, British and American codebreakers, traditionally suspicious and secretive, were actively opposed to the agreement and delayed it as long as possible. Largely at the urging of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the deal was finally struck in mid-December 1940, in a one-page document that has not yet been released to the public. He wrote that the initial proposal came from a U.S. Army representative in London, Brigadier General George Strong, and that thereafter senior American officials pressed for an exchange, apparently with President Roosevelt's blessing. On the other hand, British and American codebreakers, traditionally suspicious and secretive, were actively opposed to the agreement and delayed it as long as possible. Largely at the urging of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the deal was finally struck in mid-December 1940, in a one-page document that has not yet been released to the public.

MORE H HAPPY T TIMES.

Facing the second year of the war and fully aware of the tightening bond between the United States and Great Britain, Donitz was a frustrated warrior. He had not once wavered from his belief that Great Britain could only be defeated by a massive U-boat assault. He viewed the preparations for a possible invasion of the British Isles-and rumors of secret preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union-as ludicrous diversions of resources from the main task.

Hitler had promised U-boats-hundreds of U-boats-but Hitler had not delivered. When push came to shove for steel and other materials, the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe consistently took precedence. Moreover, preparations for the invasion of Britain (conversion of river barges to landing craft, etc.) had diverted labor and materiel from the U-boat construction program. Donitz complained to Raeder and the OKM that twenty-three oceangoing boats had been delayed four to six months because of a shortage of torpedo tubes. As a result of this bottleneck-and others-the modest production schedule of U-boats for 1940 had fallen behind by thirty-seven boats. Besides that, Donitz warned, unless emergency steps were taken, the U-boat arm would run out of torpedoes in October. consistently took precedence. Moreover, preparations for the invasion of Britain (conversion of river barges to landing craft, etc.) had diverted labor and materiel from the U-boat construction program. Donitz complained to Raeder and the OKM that twenty-three oceangoing boats had been delayed four to six months because of a shortage of torpedo tubes. As a result of this bottleneck-and others-the modest production schedule of U-boats for 1940 had fallen behind by thirty-seven boats. Besides that, Donitz warned, unless emergency steps were taken, the U-boat arm would run out of torpedoes in October.

Under intense pressure from Donitz, Admiral Raeder had a showdown meeting with Hitler. Perhaps by that time Hitler realized the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe was losing the Battle of Britain, that an invasion was out of the question, and that the war with Britain could not be won without massive numbers of U-boats. Whatever the case (documentation is lacking), Hitler at last emphatically and explicitly granted highest possible priority ("Special Stage," replacing the overused "First Priority") to U-boat and submarine torpedo construction, and to U-boat maintenance and repair and training. was losing the Battle of Britain, that an invasion was out of the question, and that the war with Britain could not be won without massive numbers of U-boats. Whatever the case (documentation is lacking), Hitler at last emphatically and explicitly granted highest possible priority ("Special Stage," replacing the overused "First Priority") to U-boat and submarine torpedo construction, and to U-boat maintenance and repair and training.

Hitler also raised the possibility of stopgap assistance from an ally. Benito Mussolini had offered to send thirty oceangoing submarines to operate in the Atlantic, provided Hitler would permit them to base in German-occupied Bordeaux. Donitz was skeptical. Word of the Italian submarine fiasco in June-especially the craven surrender of Galileo Galileo to a British trawler-had reached the U-boat arm. Nonetheless the offer could hardly be refused. to a British trawler-had reached the U-boat arm. Nonetheless the offer could hardly be refused.

Donitz had to be encouraged by news of the Hitler-approved U-boat construction program, to be carried out with "Special Stage" priority. It envisioned a production rate of twenty-five U-boats a month by December 1941, merely fifteen months away. If those numbers were realized, it seemed possible that the naval war with Great Britain could be won in 1943. But Donitz had no knowledge of the fabulous cavity magnetron, nor of the Turing-Welchman bombes, nor of the miniaturization of radar and HF/DF (Huff Duff) to fit on small vessels, nor had he any inkling of the ability of the U.S. Maritime Commission to mobilize merchant-ship construction on a truly immense scale.

The turning point in the Battle of Britain occurred on September 15,* when RAF Fighter Command decisively Repulsed a massive when RAF Fighter Command decisively Repulsed a massive Luftwaffe Luftwaffe attack, claiming 183 kills. The confirmed kill was only about one-third that number, but the blow was a crushing setback for the exhausted and riddled attack, claiming 183 kills. The confirmed kill was only about one-third that number, but the blow was a crushing setback for the exhausted and riddled Luftwaffe Luftwaffe. Two days later, Hitler officially postponed the invasion of England (Sea Lion) and intensified secret planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union (Barbarossa) in the spring of 1941.

Through the winter of 1940 the war against Great Britain was waged by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe and and Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine. The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe shifted to night bombing of British cities ("The Blitz"). The shifted to night bombing of British cities ("The Blitz"). The Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine continued the campaign against British shipping by U-boats, a few warship and merchant-ship raiders, torpedo boats, and surface-ship minelayers. The oceangoing U-boat force continued to bear the burden of the naval war. continued the campaign against British shipping by U-boats, a few warship and merchant-ship raiders, torpedo boats, and surface-ship minelayers. The oceangoing U-boat force continued to bear the burden of the naval war.

In preparation for the invasion, Donitz had moved U-boat headquarters to a spartan building in Paris, linked to a superb radio net. When the invasion was canceled, he directed the staff to prepare to move onward to Lorient. But the move was delayed until adequate communications facilities could be established in Lorient. In the interim, Donitz-promoted to vice admiral-directed the boats from his Paris headquarters and conferred at length, either in Paris or Lorient, with every skipper within hours of his return from war patrol.

Donitz commenced the second year of submarine warfare with twenty-four commissioned oceangoing boats, three fewer than the day the war began, and only about half of that number fully combat-ready. The other half included four brand-new boats in workup and unavailable for combat; two trained but green boats which had not yet made war patrols; the U-A U-A, returned from her long-but very successful-voyage to West Africa in need of drastic modifications; the Type VII U-31 U-31, salvaged and recommissioned but an unknown quantity; three marginal Type VIIs; three aging Type IXs; and the VIIB U-52 U-52 in the shipyard for overhaul. in the shipyard for overhaul.

It was not much of a force to wage a submarine war. But Donitz had some factors working in his favor. The bases at Lorient and St. Nazaire were fully staffed and capable of providing fast refits. The torpedoes (with British-type impact pistols) were more dependable; the shortage of torpedoes was being overcome by emergency measures. Most of the constricting rules of warfare had been rescinded. The first group of big Italian oceangoing submarines had arrived in Bordeaux.* The codebreakers at The codebreakers at B-dienst B-dienst had established the general pattern of the inbound and outbound North Atlantic convoys. The convoys were thinly escorted and other ASW measures had been reduced to a minimum. had established the general pattern of the inbound and outbound North Atlantic convoys. The convoys were thinly escorted and other ASW measures had been reduced to a minimum.

Although the inbound and outbound North Atlantic convoys sailed on predictable schedules through a relatively restricted area in the Northwest Approaches, the experience of August had shown that those convoys were not all that easy to find. The British varied the sailing routes, going north or south of Rockall Bank, and diverted around locations where convoys were under attack or where a U-boat had been seen or DFed. With so few boats to patrol, Donitz could cover only a few of the possible routes and still keep the boats close enough to one another to mount pack attacks. Since the boats could not "see" or "hear" for more than a few miles, and less in unfavorable weather, many convoys had slipped by undetected.

To assist in convoy spotting, Donitz had appealed to the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe for aerial reconnaissance near Rockall Bank. Two "naval" air for aerial reconnaissance near Rockall Bank. Two "naval" air gruppes gruppes, basing in France, were designated for that purpose. However, the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, fully committed to the Blitz, to air-dropping newly produced "acoustic" mines in British seaports, and to other missions, had not yet provided assistance. "Despite all my endeavors," Donitz complained in his diary, the in British seaports, and to other missions, had not yet provided assistance. "Despite all my endeavors," Donitz complained in his diary, the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe "reported no forces available for this task." "reported no forces available for this task."

Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, Commander in Chief U-boats from September 28, 1935, to January 30, 1943, and of the German Navy from January 30, 1943, to May I, 1945, when he succeeded Adolf Hitler as chief of state.

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Commander in Chief of the German Navy from October 1, 1928 to January 30, 1943.

Admiral Percy L. H. Noble. Commander in Chief Western Approaches from February 17, 1941, to November 19, 1942.

Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty from September 3, 1939, to May 10, 1940, thereafter Prime Minister, and Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers Pound, First Sea Lord from June 12, 1939, to his death in office on October 15, 1943.

Surprise unveiling of the reborn U-boat arm in 1935. These small U-boats are new Type II "Ducks," used mostly as school boats.

A nest of U-boats showing clearly the difference in size of the Type VII and the larger Type IX, one of which is moored outboard in the front row. For additional information, see the contrasting cutaways.

Preparing for a war patrol, a German submariner finds a cramped writing nook in the bow torpedo room, which is festooned with sausages, cheese, bread, and other food.

Loading a torpedo into the bow room. Standard German torpedoes were 23 feet long, 21 inches in diameter, and weighed 3.383 pounds. Including four missiles in the torpedo tubes, the usual war load forward in the Type VII and Type IX was ten.

The Commander in Chief U-boats and the boats at sea kept in touch by means of radio transmissions, encoded and decoded on a naval Enigma machine. This is a "four-rotor" naval Enigma, on display at the Smithsonian Institution.

Ready and eager for action in the Atlantic, the Type VII U-564 U-564 sails for a war cruise. sails for a war cruise.

The British Home Fleet at Scapa Flow, where Gunther Prien in U-47 U-47 sank the battleship sank the battleship Royal Oak Royal Oak.

Gunther Prien, Germany's most celebrated U-boat skipper. He sank 189,156 tons of Allied shipping to rank third in tonnage among all skippers. Killed in action March 1941.

Otto Schuhart in U-29 U-29 hit the British aircraft carrier hit the British aircraft carrier Courageous Courageous, shown here mere moments before she sank.

A Type Vll in the rough waters of the North Atlantic, seeking victims.

Herbert Schultze. skipper of U-48 U-48 who sank 183,432 tons, to rank fifth. who sank 183,432 tons, to rank fifth.

Joachim Schepke, skipper of U-100 U-100, who sank 155,882 tons to rank thirteenth. Killed in action March 1941.

Otto Kretschmer, the "Tonnage King," who sank forty-five ships for 269,872 tons to rank number one among all German skippers. Captured by the British from his sinking boat, U-99 U-99, in March 1941, he spent the rest of the war in a POW camp.

Hit by a U-boat torpedo, an unidentified Allied tanker sinks beneath the waves.

Heinrieh Lehmann-Willenbroek, skipper of U-96 U-96, who sank 183,223 tons to rank sixth. He was depicted, fictionally, in Lothar-Gunther Buchheim's novel, TV miniseries, and feature film Das Boot Das Boot.

Adalbert Schnee, skipper of U-201 U-201, won fame and high decorations for bold attacks on Allied convoys. He sank twenty ships and damaged several others.