The old hand Adolf-Cornelius Piening in U-155 U-155 crossed the Atlantic via the southern route in company with Karl Neitzel, age forty-one, in the new crossed the Atlantic via the southern route in company with Karl Neitzel, age forty-one, in the new U-510 U-510. In late July they refueled from the new tanker, U-463 U-463, commanded by Leo Wolfbauer. After that the boats separated, Piening in U-155 U-155 to patrol east of Trinidad and south to Dutch Guiana (Surinam), and Neitzel in to patrol east of Trinidad and south to Dutch Guiana (Surinam), and Neitzel in U-510 U-510 to patrol through the Windward Passage along the south coast of Cuba to the southern approaches of the Yucatan Channel. to patrol through the Windward Passage along the south coast of Cuba to the southern approaches of the Yucatan Channel.

Piening turned in another notable performance. In a two-week period, July 28 to August 10, he sank by torpedo and gun ten ships for 44,000 tons. These included the 8,100-ton British tanker San Emiliano San Emiliano and two 400-ton Dutch coasters. He captured several officers from two of the ships, the Norwegian and two 400-ton Dutch coasters. He captured several officers from two of the ships, the Norwegian Bill Bill and the British and the British Empire Arnold. Empire Arnold. Counting the sinkings and claims in his two prior patrols to American waters, Piening qualified for a Counting the sinkings and claims in his two prior patrols to American waters, Piening qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, which was awarded while he was still in the operational area.*

After that, the patrol turned sour. While cruising off the coast of French Guiana near the infamous Devil's Island, Brazil-based Allied aircraft harassed U-155. U-155. On August 18, an attack by a patrol plane killed one crewman and nearly sank the boat with depth charges, bombs, and machine-gun fire. Piening escaped, but the explosions severely damaged his batteries and restricted his ability to dive. Upon receiving this report, Kerneval told Piening to stand by where he was until another boat could provide him assistance. On August 18, an attack by a patrol plane killed one crewman and nearly sank the boat with depth charges, bombs, and machine-gun fire. Piening escaped, but the explosions severely damaged his batteries and restricted his ability to dive. Upon receiving this report, Kerneval told Piening to stand by where he was until another boat could provide him assistance.

En route to the Caribbean via the Windward Passage on August 2, Karl Neitzel in the new U-510 U-510 sighted a lighted ship, which appeared to be a neutral. Per standing orders, Neitzel radioed Kerneval for authority to shoot. The staff ruled that if the ship was not Argentine, Swiss, or Portuguese, he should sink it. He did and learned from the captain, whom he captured, that she was the 5,300-ton Uruguayan neutral sighted a lighted ship, which appeared to be a neutral. Per standing orders, Neitzel radioed Kerneval for authority to shoot. The staff ruled that if the ship was not Argentine, Swiss, or Portuguese, he should sink it. He did and learned from the captain, whom he captured, that she was the 5,300-ton Uruguayan neutral Maldonaldo Maldonaldo, en route to New York with corned beef. The sinking infuriated the Uruguayans and edged that little country closer to a declaration of war.

Two days later Neitzel's hydrophones (passive sonar) failed. In view of the intensified ASW measures in the Caribbean and the inexperience of the boat, Kerneval canceled its Caribbean foray and redirected it to the supposedly safer open waters of the Atlantic, east of the Windward Islands. On August 10 Neitzel found and attacked the 8,000-ton British tanker Alexia Alexia, which mounted a spirited gun defense. Neitzel claimed she was a 14,000-tonner and that he had sunk her, but she was only damaged and later reached port.

Cruising south toward the northeast coast of South America, Neitzel suddenly encountered heavy ship traffic east of Trinidad. On August 18 he shot four torpedoes at a big fast freighter, but missed. The next day he sank a 5,000-ton British freighter, which he claimed to be 11,600 tons. That sinking drew a counterattack from Allied aircraft, one of which damaged U-510. U-510. Upon learning that Neitzel's boat had also incurred damage, Kerneval directed him to rendezvous with Piening in the damaged Upon learning that Neitzel's boat had also incurred damage, Kerneval directed him to rendezvous with Piening in the damaged U-155 U-155, who was marking time near Devil's Island. Neitzel gave Piening some bridging cables for his batteries, but this was not sufficient. Kerneval therefore ordered both boats to return to France in company. An outbound boat was to give U-155 U-155 the necessary spare parts to repair the battery. the necessary spare parts to repair the battery.

The Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Klaus Scholtz in the Type IXB holder Klaus Scholtz in the Type IXB U-108 U-108 traveled by the southern route directly to the area east of Trinidad. As related earlier, he was one of five inbound and outbound boats that responded on July 17 to the discovery of convoy Outbound South 34 by Linder in the inbound traveled by the southern route directly to the area east of Trinidad. As related earlier, he was one of five inbound and outbound boats that responded on July 17 to the discovery of convoy Outbound South 34 by Linder in the inbound U-202. U-202. As also related, Scholtz had joined Suhren in As also related, Scholtz had joined Suhren in U-564 U-564 in an attack on the convoy, and had fired a full salvo of six torpedoes (four bow, two stern) into the formation, all of which missed. in an attack on the convoy, and had fired a full salvo of six torpedoes (four bow, two stern) into the formation, all of which missed.

When Scholtz in U-108 U-108 reached the area east of Trinidad, he had to strictly husband fuel and torpedoes. Nonetheless, he turned in another noteworthy performance. On August 3 he sank the 6,200-ton British tanker reached the area east of Trinidad, he had to strictly husband fuel and torpedoes. Nonetheless, he turned in another noteworthy performance. On August 3 he sank the 6,200-ton British tanker Tricula. Tricula. A week later, he chased a "big" ocean liner in vain, but sank the 2,700-ton Norwegian freighter A week later, he chased a "big" ocean liner in vain, but sank the 2,700-ton Norwegian freighter Brines. Brines. Off French Guiana in the three-day period from August 15 to August 17, he found several tankers sailing alone and sank one of them, the 8,600-ton American Off French Guiana in the three-day period from August 15 to August 17, he found several tankers sailing alone and sank one of them, the 8,600-ton American Louisiana. Louisiana. In retaliation, aircraft attacked In retaliation, aircraft attacked U-108 U-108 with bombs and depth charges, but the boat survived. Damaged and low on fuel, Scholtz headed home. His claims and overclaims qualified him for Oak Leaves to his with bombs and depth charges, but the boat survived. Damaged and low on fuel, Scholtz headed home. His claims and overclaims qualified him for Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, awarded on September 10 when the boat arrived in France. Subsequently, Scholtz left the boat to command Combat Flotilla 12 at Bordeaux.*

The relentlessly aggressive forty-two-year-old Jurgen Wattenberg, former navigator of the Graf Spee Graf Spee, departed France for his third patrol in U-162 U-162 on July 7. Mechanical defects had compelled him to abort his first patrol to the Americas. On his second, east of Trinidad, he had sunk nine confirmed ships for 47,000 tons, including three tankers. Determined to duplicate or exceed his second patrol and win a on July 7. Mechanical defects had compelled him to abort his first patrol to the Americas. On his second, east of Trinidad, he had sunk nine confirmed ships for 47,000 tons, including three tankers. Determined to duplicate or exceed his second patrol and win a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, Wattenberg opted for those same waters east of Trinidad. On the way, he, too, had responded to U-202 U-202's alert on convoy Outbound South 34, expending considerable fuel to no purpose, but no torpedoes.

Wattenberg arrived in the waters off Trinidad in early August. Harassed by ASW aircraft, he had no success for two weeks. As related, on August 18, he found a Trinidad-Aruba-Key West convoy, gave the alarm, tracked, and brought in Reinhard Suhren in the VII U-564. U-564. In this loosely coordinated convoy attack, Wattenberg sank a 5,700-ton American freighter. He continued tracking the convoy for several days, but was unable to make another attack and returned to waters east of Trinidad. There, in a one-week period, from August 24 to August 30, he sank two more big freighters and the 8,300-ton Norwegian tanker In this loosely coordinated convoy attack, Wattenberg sank a 5,700-ton American freighter. He continued tracking the convoy for several days, but was unable to make another attack and returned to waters east of Trinidad. There, in a one-week period, from August 24 to August 30, he sank two more big freighters and the 8,300-ton Norwegian tanker Thelma Thelma, bringing his score for the patrol to four confirmed ships sunk for 30,500 tons.

Late in the afternoon of September 3, when U-162 U-162 was about forty miles south of Barbados, Wattenberg spotted what he believed to be a single destroyer. He gave the order to attack submerged, but when he closed to shooting range, he saw there were not one but was about forty miles south of Barbados, Wattenberg spotted what he believed to be a single destroyer. He gave the order to attack submerged, but when he closed to shooting range, he saw there were not one but three three destroyers! These were British warships en route to Trinidad to escort a convoy northward. Bravely or foolishly, Wattenberg continued the attack, firing a bow torpedo at the center ship, destroyers! These were British warships en route to Trinidad to escort a convoy northward. Bravely or foolishly, Wattenberg continued the attack, firing a bow torpedo at the center ship, Pathfinder. Pathfinder. However, the torpedo malfunctioned, broached, and headed directly for the left ship, However, the torpedo malfunctioned, broached, and headed directly for the left ship, Quentin Quentin, which maneuvered wildly to evade and did so, but just barely.

The three destroyers ran in and pounded U-162 U-162 with depth charges. with depth charges. Pathfinder Pathfinder dropped ten, dropped ten, Quentin Quentin six, and the other ship, six, and the other ship, Vimy Vimy, fourteen. The charges damaged U-162 U-162 severely but Wattenberg held her in control and lay doggo. Believing that the U-boat would eventually surface and try to escape to the east, the senior British commander told severely but Wattenberg held her in control and lay doggo. Believing that the U-boat would eventually surface and try to escape to the east, the senior British commander told Vimy Vimy, which had Type 271 centimetric radar, to stay put, while Quentin Quentin and and Pathfinder Pathfinder, which had meter-wavelength Type 286 radar, searched easterly. Not long after Quentin Quentin and and Pathfinder Pathfinder departed, departed, U-162 U-162 surfaced. surfaced. Vimy Vimy immediately got her on radar at 2,800 yards. immediately got her on radar at 2,800 yards.

Vimy recalled recalled Quentin Quentin and and Pathfinder Pathfinder and ran in at full speed to ram, firing her main battery. The second round hit and ran in at full speed to ram, firing her main battery. The second round hit U-162 U-162 and burst inside the pressure hull. Hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, Wattenberg ordered his men to scuttle and abandon ship. As his men jumped overboard, he fired two red flares to mark the spot. Blinded by the flares and suspecting a ruse, and burst inside the pressure hull. Hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, Wattenberg ordered his men to scuttle and abandon ship. As his men jumped overboard, he fired two red flares to mark the spot. Blinded by the flares and suspecting a ruse, Vimy Vimy attempted to abort the ramming, but her left screw crunched into attempted to abort the ramming, but her left screw crunched into U-162 U-162's aft section, temporarily disabling the destroyer. As the ships entangled, Vimy Vimy threw over another shallow-set depth charge, which hastened threw over another shallow-set depth charge, which hastened U-162 U-162's demise and injured many Germans in the water. The three destroyers rescued Wattenberg and forty-eight of his men and took them to Trinidad. Two Germans died in the sinking.

The British turned over Wattenberg and his men to American intelligence officers in Trinidad. They found these Germans to be "extremely security-conscious" and as a result, they learned "little of intelligence value." In due course the Americans were to discover that Wattenberg was an unyielding foe and troublemaking prisoner, who eventually conceived an elaborate scheme that enabled him and several other U-boat skippers to escape from an Arizona POW camp.

Three Type IXs of the July group which patrolled inside the Caribbean were new. Prior to her patrol, U-511 U-511, a Type IXC, commanded by Friedrich Steinhoff, age thirty-three, had been diverted to the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht's experimental rocket station at Peenemunde, where German scientists and engineers were developing the V-1 cruise and V-2 ballistic missiles. The German rocket experts had developed a small ballistic missile designed to be fired from a submerged submarine. The U-511 U-511 had served briefly as a test platform, but the submarine-launched missile was not fully developed, nor was it to be by war's end. had served briefly as a test platform, but the submarine-launched missile was not fully developed, nor was it to be by war's end.

The U-511 U-511 and the new and the new U-164 U-164, commanded by Otto Fechner, age thirty-six, sailed for the Caribbean by way of the North Atlantic routes. On July 29, both boats were drawn into the chase of convoy Outbound North 115, but U-164 U-164 had a diesel-engine failure and was forced to fall out, and had a diesel-engine failure and was forced to fall out, and U-511 U-511 became lost in fog. Following this fruitless diversion, the boats refueled from Leo Wolfbauer's tanker became lost in fog. Following this fruitless diversion, the boats refueled from Leo Wolfbauer's tanker U-463 U-463 and proceeded to the Caribbean. and proceeded to the Caribbean.

Fechner in U-164 U-164 entered the Caribbean via the Mona Passage. Proceeding to the area near Aruba and Curacao, he encountered "heavy" air patrols but very few ships. When Otto Ites in the Type VII entered the Caribbean via the Mona Passage. Proceeding to the area near Aruba and Curacao, he encountered "heavy" air patrols but very few ships. When Otto Ites in the Type VII U-94 U-94 reported the convoy Trinidad-Key West 15 south of the Windward Passage on August 25, Fechner in reported the convoy Trinidad-Key West 15 south of the Windward Passage on August 25, Fechner in U-164 U-164 made contact and sank a 3,800-ton Dutch freighter. Remaining inside the Caribbean near Jamaica and the south coast of Cuba, he sank one other small freighter of 1,700 tons, then left the Caribbean in frustration to cruise the Atlantic east of Trinidad. There an ASW aircraft bombed him and ruptured a fuel tank, forcing him to return to France. In an arduous patrol of eighty-two days, he sank two ships for 5,500 tons. made contact and sank a 3,800-ton Dutch freighter. Remaining inside the Caribbean near Jamaica and the south coast of Cuba, he sank one other small freighter of 1,700 tons, then left the Caribbean in frustration to cruise the Atlantic east of Trinidad. There an ASW aircraft bombed him and ruptured a fuel tank, forcing him to return to France. In an arduous patrol of eighty-two days, he sank two ships for 5,500 tons.

Steinhoff in U-511 U-511 entered the Caribbean through the Windward Passage. On August 20 he found a convoy south of the passage, but a radar-equipped Catalina drove the boat under and held it there for hours. As related, when Otto Ites in entered the Caribbean through the Windward Passage. On August 20 he found a convoy south of the passage, but a radar-equipped Catalina drove the boat under and held it there for hours. As related, when Otto Ites in U-94 U-94 found the main body of convoy Trinidad-Key West 15 in the same waters on August 27, Steinhoff responded, and while the convoy escorts and Catalina sank found the main body of convoy Trinidad-Key West 15 in the same waters on August 27, Steinhoff responded, and while the convoy escorts and Catalina sank U-94 U-94, Steinhoff attacked the convoy and sank two tankers for 22,000 tons and damaged another of 7,800 tons, which limped into Guantanamo Bay. He cruised these heavily patrolled waters until September 8 but had no further luck.

The third and last Type IX of the July group to enter the Caribbean was the new U-163 U-163, commanded by Kurt-Eduard Engelmann, age thirty-nine. He was assigned to replace Neitzel in U-510 U-510, who had aborted his patrol to the Yucatan Channel, going via the Windward Passage and the south coast of Cuba. While approaching the Windward Passage on the night of August 12-13, Engelmann reported, he was attacked by Catalinas. When Karl Thurmann in U-553 U-553 found convoy Trinidad-Key West 13 on August 17, Engelmann responded, but he could not get around the escort to shoot, he said. Three days later he reported that his evaporators were out of commission, that he had very little drinking water, and that he was therefore forced to abort the patrol. He returned to France after fifty-eight days at sea, having sunk no ships of any kind. found convoy Trinidad-Key West 13 on August 17, Engelmann responded, but he could not get around the escort to shoot, he said. Three days later he reported that his evaporators were out of commission, that he had very little drinking water, and that he was therefore forced to abort the patrol. He returned to France after fifty-eight days at sea, having sunk no ships of any kind.

Altogether the seven Type IXs that sailed to the Americas in July sank twenty-three ships (four tankers) for about 130,000 tons. This was a disappointing average of about 3.3 ships of about 18,500 tons sunk per boat per patrol, similar to the diminished returns of the Type IXs that sailed to the Americas in June. One Type IX, Wattenberg's U-162 U-162, was lost.

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE C CARIBBEAN.

Eight Type IXs sailed to the Americas in August. In view of the intense Allied ASW air patrols and the extension of the convoy network to all sectors of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, none was directed to those waters. Three IXs carried out a special mission in Canadian waters; the other five patrolled the target-rich area east of Trinidad in the Atlantic.

German codebreakers in B-dienst B-dienst provided Donitz with a great flow of information on North Atlantic convoys. Nonetheless, the U-boats in that sector had difficulty in locating the eastbound Halifax and Slow Convoys. Believing that these convoys might be departing Canada via Belle Isle Strait and going far to the north, Donitz assigned three Type IXs of the August group to reconnoiter the strait and the seas to the north of its mouth. provided Donitz with a great flow of information on North Atlantic convoys. Nonetheless, the U-boats in that sector had difficulty in locating the eastbound Halifax and Slow Convoys. Believing that these convoys might be departing Canada via Belle Isle Strait and going far to the north, Donitz assigned three Type IXs of the August group to reconnoiter the strait and the seas to the north of its mouth.*

The three boats sailed from Kiel on August 7 and 8 and arrived off the mouth of Belle Isle Strait about three weeks later. On August 27-28, two of the boats, U-517 U-517 and and U-165 U-165, found a small military convoy en route from Sydney, Nova Scotia, to Greenland via Belle Isle Strait. It consisted of a half dozen ships sailing in two sections. The first section was made up of the 5,600-ton American passenger-cargo vessel Chatham Chatham, with 562 troops and crew on board, escorted by the 240-foot Coast Guard cutter Mojave. Mojave. The second section, comprising several other ships, was escorted by two 165-foot Coast Guard cutters, The second section, comprising several other ships, was escorted by two 165-foot Coast Guard cutters, Algonquin Algonquin and and Mohawk. Mohawk.

Both U-boats closed and attacked. Paul Hartwig in U-517 U-517 sank the sank the Chatham Chatham, which fortunately went down slowly. Her escort, Mojave Mojave, rescued 293 men. Later, the American four-stack destroyer Bernadou Bernadou and the Canadian corvette and the Canadian corvette Trail Trail rescued another 256 men. rescued another 256 men.* Eberhard Hoffmann in the Eberhard Hoffmann in the U-165 U-165 hit and damaged two ships in the second section, the old (1921) 7,300-ton U.S. Navy tanker hit and damaged two ships in the second section, the old (1921) 7,300-ton U.S. Navy tanker Laramie Laramie and the 3,300-ton freighter and the 3,300-ton freighter Arlyn. Arlyn. The The Laramie Laramie was loaded with 361,000 gallons of aviation gas, 55,000 gallons of oil, and general cargo, which included depth charges. The torpedo hit killed four men and blew a huge hole in her port bow, but her captain, Peter M. Moncy, skillfully and bravely saved the ship and returned it to Sydney, escorted by the was loaded with 361,000 gallons of aviation gas, 55,000 gallons of oil, and general cargo, which included depth charges. The torpedo hit killed four men and blew a huge hole in her port bow, but her captain, Peter M. Moncy, skillfully and bravely saved the ship and returned it to Sydney, escorted by the Mohawk. Mohawk. Hartwig in Hartwig in U-517 U-517 put a finishing shot into put a finishing shot into Arlyn. Arlyn.

After clearing with Kerneval, Hoffmann and Hartwig boldly took their big IXs south down the shallow, fifteen-mile-wide Belle Isle Strait. Hartwig in U-517 U-517 poked his nose into a supposed convoy-assembly area, Forteau Bay, but it was empty. While still in the strait in darkness on September 3, he met two small convoys passing on opposite courses and sank the 1,800-ton Canadian laker poked his nose into a supposed convoy-assembly area, Forteau Bay, but it was empty. While still in the strait in darkness on September 3, he met two small convoys passing on opposite courses and sank the 1,800-ton Canadian laker Donald Stewart. Donald Stewart. Three Canadian corvettes and a minesweeper pounced on Three Canadian corvettes and a minesweeper pounced on U-517 U-517, but the attacks failed or were not persistent and Hartwig, who had greater speed, easily escaped on the surface into the wide, fogbound waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Hoffmann in U-165 U-165 entered the Gulf of St. Lawrence first. He cruised south to the east coast of Cape Breton Island, where he botched an attack on a 1,900-ton Canadian coaster. He then sailed northwest to the tip of the Gaspe Peninsula, rounded it, and proceeded west up the St. Lawrence River to a point opposite Matane. There he met convoy Quebec-Sydney 33, comprised of eight big ships, escorted by a corvette, a minesweeper, two motor torpedo boats, and the armed yacht entered the Gulf of St. Lawrence first. He cruised south to the east coast of Cape Breton Island, where he botched an attack on a 1,900-ton Canadian coaster. He then sailed northwest to the tip of the Gaspe Peninsula, rounded it, and proceeded west up the St. Lawrence River to a point opposite Matane. There he met convoy Quebec-Sydney 33, comprised of eight big ships, escorted by a corvette, a minesweeper, two motor torpedo boats, and the armed yacht Raccoon. Raccoon. In a dogged series of attacks over the next twenty-four hours, Hoffmann claimed hits on three ships for 19,000 tons. Postwar records confirmed two sinkings: the 4,700-ton Greek freighter In a dogged series of attacks over the next twenty-four hours, Hoffmann claimed hits on three ships for 19,000 tons. Postwar records confirmed two sinkings: the 4,700-ton Greek freighter Aeas Aeas and the 358-ton and the 358-ton Raccoon. Raccoon.

Responding to Hoffmann's signals and beacons, Hartwig in U-517 U-517 sailed across the gulf to intercept the same convoy as it rounded the Gaspe Peninsula southbound. Late on the afternoon of September 7, Hartwig attacked and sank three ships: Greek freighters of 5,700 and 3,300 tons, and a 1,700-ton Canadian coaster. The four surviving escorts, reinforced by another minesweeper, were apparently too dumbstruck (or ill-trained) to mount an effective counterattack. A Hudson of the Canadian 113 Squadron caught Hartwig on the surface and claimed a "probable" kill, but the pilot botched the attack and sailed across the gulf to intercept the same convoy as it rounded the Gaspe Peninsula southbound. Late on the afternoon of September 7, Hartwig attacked and sank three ships: Greek freighters of 5,700 and 3,300 tons, and a 1,700-ton Canadian coaster. The four surviving escorts, reinforced by another minesweeper, were apparently too dumbstruck (or ill-trained) to mount an effective counterattack. A Hudson of the Canadian 113 Squadron caught Hartwig on the surface and claimed a "probable" kill, but the pilot botched the attack and U-517 U-517 sailed on untouched. sailed on untouched.

These eight sinkings plus severe damage to the tanker Laramie Laramie within a period of twelve days caused yet another uproar in the Canadian government. Rolf Ruggeberg in the third boat, within a period of twelve days caused yet another uproar in the Canadian government. Rolf Ruggeberg in the third boat, U-513 U-513, who remained "outside" in the Atlantic, added greatly to the uproar with a daring feat. Taking advantage of foul weather during the night of September 4, he edged U-513 U-513 into Conception Bay (on the north tip of the Avalon Peninsula) on the surface, submerged in a convoy-assembly area, Wabana Roads, and the next day sank two big loaded freighters at anchor: the 5,400-ton British into Conception Bay (on the north tip of the Avalon Peninsula) on the surface, submerged in a convoy-assembly area, Wabana Roads, and the next day sank two big loaded freighters at anchor: the 5,400-ton British Saganaug Saganaug and the 7,300-ton Canadian and the 7,300-ton Canadian Lord Strathcona. Lord Strathcona. In the ensuing chaos a fleeing freighter unknowingly rammed In the ensuing chaos a fleeing freighter unknowingly rammed U-513 U-513, severely damaging her conning tower and putting a damper on Ruggeberg's dare-deviltry.

Notwithstanding the mounting uproar and the ASW response, the three IXs continued the hunt. Hartwig in U-517 U-517 sank the Canadian corvette sank the Canadian corvette Charlottetown Charlottetown and two more freighters for 4,900 tons, raising his score to nine confirmed ships for 27,283 tons sunk. Hoffmann in and two more freighters for 4,900 tons, raising his score to nine confirmed ships for 27,283 tons sunk. Hoffmann in U-165 U-165 sank another 3,700-ton freighter and damaged two more, raising his score to three ships sunk for 8,754 tons and four damaged for 21,751 tons. Ruggeberg in sank another 3,700-ton freighter and damaged two more, raising his score to three ships sunk for 8,754 tons and four damaged for 21,751 tons. Ruggeberg in U-513 U-513, who remained in the Atlantic off Conception Bay and St. John's, made only one other attack, during which he hit and damaged the 7,200-ton American-built British Liberty ship Ocean Vagabond. Ocean Vagabond.

Berlin and Kerneval were jubilant at the outcome of this foray in Canadian waters and praised Hartwig and Hoffmann highly. To Hartwig's claim of 44,000 tons sunk, Donitz arbitrarily added 8,000 tons for a ship Hartwig shot at on September 15 but did not claim. This gave Hartwig a propaganda total of ten ships for 52,000 tons, with which Berlin happily bludgeoned the Canadians. But there was a third act. Approaching Lorient on September 29, Hoffmann in U-165 U-165 struck a British mine and the boat blew up and sank with the loss of all hands. struck a British mine and the boat blew up and sank with the loss of all hands.

The easy success of Hartwig and Hoffmann inside the Gulf of St. Lawrence-and the highly favorable propaganda they generated-persuaded Donitz to continue what came to be known in Canadian history as "the Battle of the St. Lawrence." Several of the IXs sailing from Germany or France in September were assigned to proceed independently to the gulf.

In the meantime, the two Type VIIs that had been ordered to plant TMB (magnetic) minefields in United States waters were pressed into the battle in Canada. After planting his field off the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay on September 10, Ulrich Graf in U-69 U-69 headed for the Cabot Strait. After planting his field off Charleston, South Carolina, Hans-Heinrich Giessler in headed for the Cabot Strait. After planting his field off Charleston, South Carolina, Hans-Heinrich Giessler in U-455 U-455 went north to patrol off St. John's, Newfoundland, replacing Ruggeberg in went north to patrol off St. John's, Newfoundland, replacing Ruggeberg in U-513 U-513.*

Upon entering the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Graf in U-69 U-69 proceeded directly to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. He then cruised upriver to Matane and beyond, penetrating deeper than any other U-boat skipper, including the pioneer Vogelsang. On October 10, Graf met a convoy of seven ships and three escorts headed up-stream to Quebec City, 173 miles distant. Coolly Graf set up on and sank the 2,400-ton Canadian freighter proceeded directly to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. He then cruised upriver to Matane and beyond, penetrating deeper than any other U-boat skipper, including the pioneer Vogelsang. On October 10, Graf met a convoy of seven ships and three escorts headed up-stream to Quebec City, 173 miles distant. Coolly Graf set up on and sank the 2,400-ton Canadian freighter Carolus Carolus, then ran downstream before Allied ASW forces could collect their wits.

Returning to safer waters at the Cabot Strait, on October 14 Graf found and sank a 2,200-ton Canadian railway ferry, Caribou Caribou, escorted by the minesweeper Grandmere. Grandmere. There were 237 persons on board There were 237 persons on board Caribou Caribou, including 118 military personnel. Spotting U-69 U-69, Grandmere Grandmere attempted to ram, but missed. She then dropped eighteen depth charges. Reinforced by other air and surface escorts at dawn, which held Graf on the bottom for sixteen hours, attempted to ram, but missed. She then dropped eighteen depth charges. Reinforced by other air and surface escorts at dawn, which held Graf on the bottom for sixteen hours, Grandmere Grandmere rescued 103 of the 237 persons on rescued 103 of the 237 persons on Caribou. Caribou. The other 136, including many women and children, died in the blast or in the water. The other 136, including many women and children, died in the blast or in the water.

Having gone upriver farther and killed more civilians than any other U-boat skipper, Graf, too, caused an enormous uproar in Ottawa. Homebound on October 20, he attacked a convoy near Argentia and hit the 7,800-ton British freighter Rose Castle Rose Castle, but the torpedo malfunctioned, sparing the ship. Upon his return to France, Graf received a "well done."

Giessler in U-455 U-455 arrived off St. John's, Newfoundland, on about October 1 and patrolled foggy waters close to shore for nearly two weeks. He saw only two ships, both beyond reach. On October 14 he reported his gyro compass had failed and that he was aborting. When he arrived in France after sixty-eight days at sea-and no sinkings-it was noted that in four patrols Giessler had sunk only two ships (both tankers) for 13,900 tons, and he left the boat for other duty. arrived off St. John's, Newfoundland, on about October 1 and patrolled foggy waters close to shore for nearly two weeks. He saw only two ships, both beyond reach. On October 14 he reported his gyro compass had failed and that he was aborting. When he arrived in France after sixty-eight days at sea-and no sinkings-it was noted that in four patrols Giessler had sunk only two ships (both tankers) for 13,900 tons, and he left the boat for other duty.

The five Type IXs of the August group that were assigned to patrol the area east of Trinidad sailed from Kiel on August 12 to August 15. Three of the boats, U-175 U-175, U-512 U-512, and U-514 U-514, commissioned in November and December 1941, had been icebound in the Baltic for three or four months. Another, U-515 U-515, commissioned in February 1942, had also been delayed by ice. The last, U-516 U-516, commissioned on March 10,1942, was not seriously delayed by the ice but her workups and final fitting out took five full months.

The U-512 U-512 was commanded by Wolfgang Schultze, age thirty-one, one of two sons of a was commanded by Wolfgang Schultze, age thirty-one, one of two sons of a Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine admiral. According to his peers, he was a vain, temperamental, spoiled brat who drank heavily, even on board ship. During the boat's belated Baltic workup, Schultze rammed and capsized a small freighter ( admiral. According to his peers, he was a vain, temperamental, spoiled brat who drank heavily, even on board ship. During the boat's belated Baltic workup, Schultze rammed and capsized a small freighter (Morgenrot) and was himself rammed by another U-boat. These and other mishaps further delayed U-512 U-512 and gave the impression that Schultze was not only reckless but incompetent. and gave the impression that Schultze was not only reckless but incompetent.

En route to Trinidad Schultze met Bruno Vowe's tanker, U-462 U-462, and replenished. Thereafter, on about September 8, he encountered a big, lone, fast freighter which he estimated at 12,000 tons. In two separate surface attacks he fired four bow torpedoes. None hit or exploded, leading Schultze to conclude, probably wrongly, that the freighter had streamed antitorpedo nets. Four days later he came upon the fully loaded 10,900-ton American tanker Patrick J. Hurley. Patrick J. Hurley. He fired two torpedoes at her but both missed. He then attacked with his 4.1" deck gun, his new 37mm flak gun, and other weapons. The He fired two torpedoes at her but both missed. He then attacked with his 4.1" deck gun, his new 37mm flak gun, and other weapons. The Hurley Hurley crew returned a few rounds from her stern gun but quickly conceded the contest and abandoned ship, allowing crew returned a few rounds from her stern gun but quickly conceded the contest and abandoned ship, allowing Hurley Hurley to sink in a ball of fire. to sink in a ball of fire.

A few days later, on September 19, Schultze spotted a lone freighter about fifty miles east of Martinique. She was the 3,700-ton Spanish neutral Monte Gorbea Monte Gorbea, sailing under her own colors. Brashly assuming she was a British ship in disguise-or so he told Donitz-Schultze torpedoed and sank her. When B-dienst B-dienst picked up her distress calls and informed the OKM, Berlin was furious. Admiral Raeder issued orders through Donitz that when Schultze returned to France he was to be court-martialed. Donitz informed "all boats" of the error and impending court-martial and passed along a stern reminder from Raeder that all skippers were to "comply exactly" with orders concerning the safe treatment of neutrals. picked up her distress calls and informed the OKM, Berlin was furious. Admiral Raeder issued orders through Donitz that when Schultze returned to France he was to be court-martialed. Donitz informed "all boats" of the error and impending court-martial and passed along a stern reminder from Raeder that all skippers were to "comply exactly" with orders concerning the safe treatment of neutrals.

In the meantime, two other IXs of this group arrived east of Trinidad: U-514 U-514, commanded by Hans-Jurgen Auffermann, and U-515 U-515, commanded by Werner Henke. A onetime naval pilot, the twenty-seven-year-old Auffermann had served as first watch officer on U-69 U-69 on her pioneering patrol to Freetown for which Jost Metzler had won a on her pioneering patrol to Freetown for which Jost Metzler had won a Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz. A longtime prewar merchant marine sailor, the thirty-four-year-old Henke had served as second and first watch officer on the A longtime prewar merchant marine sailor, the thirty-four-year-old Henke had served as second and first watch officer on the U-124 U-124 when Georg-Wilhelm Schulz won his when Georg-Wilhelm Schulz won his Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz.

Patrolling the Windward Islands on September 11, Auffermann in U-514 U-514 scouted the most easterly of the islands, Barbados. Its capital, Bridgetown, was situated in a spacious harbor, Carlisle Bay, which had recently been sealed by an antisubmarine net, supported by a floating boom. Spotting two freighters moored at the Bridgetown waterfront, Auffermann fired a series of torpedoes, which broke through the net and hit one of the ships, the 5,500-ton Canadian scouted the most easterly of the islands, Barbados. Its capital, Bridgetown, was situated in a spacious harbor, Carlisle Bay, which had recently been sealed by an antisubmarine net, supported by a floating boom. Spotting two freighters moored at the Bridgetown waterfront, Auffermann fired a series of torpedoes, which broke through the net and hit one of the ships, the 5,500-ton Canadian Cornwallis Cornwallis. He claimed sinking Cornwallis Cornwallis and another ship of 4,500 tons, but the second could not be confirmed. The torpedo blasts stupefied the citizens of peaceful Bridgetown, who rushed to the waterfront to see and another ship of 4,500 tons, but the second could not be confirmed. The torpedo blasts stupefied the citizens of peaceful Bridgetown, who rushed to the waterfront to see Cornwallis Cornwallis settle heavily in the mud. Later the ship was patched up and returned to service, only to be sunk later in the war by another U-boat. settle heavily in the mud. Later the ship was patched up and returned to service, only to be sunk later in the war by another U-boat.

Patrolling the area directly east of Trinidad in a ten-day period from September 12 to September 23, Henke in U-515 U-515 turned in a spectacular first patrol. He sank by gun or torpedo eight confirmed ships for 42,000 tons and damaged two others for 10,700 tons. Among his victims was the British freighter turned in a spectacular first patrol. He sank by gun or torpedo eight confirmed ships for 42,000 tons and damaged two others for 10,700 tons. Among his victims was the British freighter Ocean Vanguard Ocean Vanguard, which, in the fall of 1941, had been the first of the sixty American-built Liberty-type cargo vessels to enter British service, and two tankers: the 10,000-ton Panamanian Stanvac Melbourne Stanvac Melbourne and the 4,700-ton Dutch and the 4,700-ton Dutch Woensdrecht. Woensdrecht. This nearly perfect performance was marred by a single setback. On September 15, while attacking the 5,600-ton American freighter This nearly perfect performance was marred by a single setback. On September 15, while attacking the 5,600-ton American freighter Mae Mae, Henke's deck gun misfired and killed one of his men. Overcredited with sinking ten ships for 54,000 tons, Henke returned speedily to France, where he and his men were showered with praise and medals.

The last ship Henke torpedoed was the 6,000-ton American freighter Antinous. Antinous. After her crew had abandoned ship in lifeboats, Schultze in After her crew had abandoned ship in lifeboats, Schultze in U-512 U-512 came upon the hulk on September 24 and sank it with a single torpedo. This raised Schultze's total bag to three ships for 20,600 tons, including the Spanish neutral, for which he was to face a court-martial. came upon the hulk on September 24 and sank it with a single torpedo. This raised Schultze's total bag to three ships for 20,600 tons, including the Spanish neutral, for which he was to face a court-martial.

By then a third IXC had arrived on the scene: the U-516 U-516, commanded by Gerhard Wiebe, age thirty-five. Wiebe had had a lively voyage to the Americas. South of Iceland on August 27, he had encountered the fast 9,700-ton British freighter Port Jackson Port Jackson, sailing alone. He had fired a full bow salvo at her, but all four torpedoes had missed. He had then opened fire with his deck gun, scoring two hits, but the ship had escaped in the fog. Acting on a sighting by another U-boat, on August 31 in the mid-Atlantic Wiebe had found the fast, 11,000-ton American tanker Jack Carnes Jack Carnes, sailing in ballast. He had chased the ship for 270 miles (eighteen hours at 15 knots) and had finally sunk her with seven torpedoes. On September 6 he had met the aborting U-163 U-163 and received six torpedoes from her. Approaching the area east of Trinidad on September 19, Wiebe had sunk by torpedo the 6,200-ton American freighter and received six torpedoes from her. Approaching the area east of Trinidad on September 19, Wiebe had sunk by torpedo the 6,200-ton American freighter Wichita. Wichita.

In the latter days of September, Schultze in U-512 U-512 and Wiebe in and Wiebe in U-516 U-516, working in loose cooperation, cruised southward off the coast of French Guiana. On September 28, Wiebe came upon the 1,200-ton Brazilian coaster Antonico. Antonico. Since he was short of torpedoes, he sank her with his deck gun in an action that lasted only twenty minutes, he reported. Since he was short of torpedoes, he sank her with his deck gun in an action that lasted only twenty minutes, he reported.* Two days later he sank by torpedo and gun the 5,300-ton British freighter Two days later he sank by torpedo and gun the 5,300-ton British freighter Alipore. Alipore.

Schultze in U-512 U-512 was close by but he found no targets. Although Allied aircraft had earlier attacked the boat and "slightly" wounded Schultze, he incautiously elected to remain on the surface in daylight. Near Devil's Island on the morning of October 2, a radar-equipped Army Air Forces B-18 of Squadron 99, based at Trinidad, caught was close by but he found no targets. Although Allied aircraft had earlier attacked the boat and "slightly" wounded Schultze, he incautiously elected to remain on the surface in daylight. Near Devil's Island on the morning of October 2, a radar-equipped Army Air Forces B-18 of Squadron 99, based at Trinidad, caught U-512 U-512 so disposed. The pilot ran in at an altitude of fifty feet and straddled the U-boat with two standard Mark XVII and two monster Mark XXIX experimental depth charges. The explosions smashed so disposed. The pilot ran in at an altitude of fifty feet and straddled the U-boat with two standard Mark XVII and two monster Mark XXIX experimental depth charges. The explosions smashed U-512 U-512 and drove her to the bottom in 138 feet of water. Apparently most of the compartments flooded instantly and drowned two-thirds of the crew, including Schultze. and drove her to the bottom in 138 feet of water. Apparently most of the compartments flooded instantly and drowned two-thirds of the crew, including Schultze.

The bow torpedo compartment sustained heavy damage but flooded gradually. Sixteen men were trapped there. Had they all had escape lungs they might have survived, but owing to improper stowage, the lungs had become wet with condensation and all but four had been taken to the engine room to dry out. As water and chlorine gas (saltwater mixing with electric-torpedo batteries) filled the compartment, four men strapped on the escape lungs. Others began to collapse from gas, rising air pressure, shock, and panic.

Two men, one wearing a lung, one not, attempted to organize an escape through the angled torpedo-loading hatch. They removed the hatch brace, undogged the hatch, and let seawater flow into the compartment until the pressure equalized and they could push the hatch fully open. They then swam out of the boat, but only the man with the escape lung reached the surface alive. He waved frantically to the plane circling overhead, and the aircrew dropped him a life belt and an inflatable raft. This lone survivor of U-512 U-512 drifted in the raft for ten days, until on October 12 the American four-stack destroyer drifted in the raft for ten days, until on October 12 the American four-stack destroyer Ellis Ellis fished him from the sea. No sign of the other forty-eight men on fished him from the sea. No sign of the other forty-eight men on U-512 U-512 was ever found. was ever found.

The other two boats in this area, Auffermann's U-514 U-514 and Wiebe's and Wiebe's U-516 U-516, found the hunting less and less rewarding. In pursuit of targets, Auffermann sailed south to the Equator. In the estuary of the Amazon River on September 28, he sank two Brazilian freighters for 8,200 tons. Returning northward via the waters off French Guiana on October 12, he sank a 5,700-ton American freighter not far from the area where U-512 U-512 had met her end. Wiebe in had met her end. Wiebe in U-516 U-516 found no more targets off South America, but on the way home he sank a 5,800-ton British ship on October 23. Including a 167-ton sailing ship sunk by gun, Auffermann's confirmed score in found no more targets off South America, but on the way home he sank a 5,800-ton British ship on October 23. Including a 167-ton sailing ship sunk by gun, Auffermann's confirmed score in U-514 U-514 on this ninety-day patrol was five ships for 17,354 tons, plus heavy damage to the freighter on this ninety-day patrol was five ships for 17,354 tons, plus heavy damage to the freighter Cornwallis Cornwallis in Barbados. Wiebe's confirmed score on this ninety-five-day patrol, including the tanker in Barbados. Wiebe's confirmed score on this ninety-five-day patrol, including the tanker Jack Carnes Jack Carnes, was five ships for 28,400 tons sunk, plus damage to the 9,700-ton British freighter Port Jackson. Port Jackson.

The last of the five IXs of the August group to patrol this area was Heinrich Bruns in U-175. U-175. Cruising the shallow waters off British Guiana, Bruns had very good luck. In a mere eighteen days, from September 18 to October 5, he sank by gun and torpedo nine confirmed freighters for 33,400 tons. He returned Cruising the shallow waters off British Guiana, Bruns had very good luck. In a mere eighteen days, from September 18 to October 5, he sank by gun and torpedo nine confirmed freighters for 33,400 tons. He returned U-175 U-175 to France after seventy-four days at sea. to France after seventy-four days at sea.

Altogether the five new Type IXs that patrolled east of Trinidad and south to French, Dutch, and British Guiana and the northern border of Brazil sank thirty confirmed ships for 143,000 tons. Henke in U-515 U-515 and Bruns in and Bruns in U-175 U-175 accounted for over half the total: seventeen ships for about 75,500 tons. One of the five IXs, accounted for over half the total: seventeen ships for about 75,500 tons. One of the five IXs, U-512 U-512, was lost, taking down forty-eight of her forty-nine-man crew.

ASSESSMENTS.

The withdrawal of Type VIIs from independent patrols to American waters in August of 1942 was another major turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic. That and a sharp decline in Type IX patrols signaled the beginning of the end of the all-out U-boat war against the Americas and provides a convenient milestone to sum up and assess that campaign.

Any such assessment must begin by restating the distortions in existing accounts. Admiral King and the American naval staff emerge in most of these as fools or knaves or worse, the U.S. Army leaders and the British as brilliant and infallible warlords. To see the U-boat campaign in American waters in a proper light, these important reminders and correctives are required.

First, it must be remembered that the historically majestic British Royal Navy was in a state of serious decline, and the American Navy was in vigorous ascendancy. As historian James R. Leutze has shown,* British navalists did not gladly admit of this role reversal and were quite unwilling to surrender naval supremacy to their untutored, uncouth country cousins. This jealousy, very much prevalent in 1942, colored the views of British navalists regarding the effectiveness of the American and Canadian navies and leaders, and, subsequently, British naval historians, who have uncritically accepted contemporary, biased British reports on the North American cousins as gospel. British navalists did not gladly admit of this role reversal and were quite unwilling to surrender naval supremacy to their untutored, uncouth country cousins. This jealousy, very much prevalent in 1942, colored the views of British navalists regarding the effectiveness of the American and Canadian navies and leaders, and, subsequently, British naval historians, who have uncritically accepted contemporary, biased British reports on the North American cousins as gospel.

Besides that, it must be remembered that notwithstanding the public displays of amity, the American and British war planners were in serious disagreement over strategy for most of 1942. The Americans were eager to mount Sledgehammer, the invasion of Occupied France, and to come to grips directly with German power on the ground. Contrarily, the British opposed Sledgehammer in favor of a number of low-intensity operations on the "periphery" and what was predicted to be a morale-crushing, war-winning strategic bombing campaign against German industry and cities.

American and British navalists held divergent views over the strategic role of Allied sea power in the Atlantic theater. As was done by Americans in World War I, Admiral King assigned highest priority to the safe delivery of soldiers and other military personnel to overseas destinations, particularly those American forces embarked originally for the British Isles to carry out Sledgehammer. The British laid nearly equal stress on the importance of protecting "trade" or merchant shipping engaged in transporting food, oil, and tools of war to the British Isles, which were deemed vital for her survival and her ability to wage the kind of war the British War Cabinet preferred.

British historians and popular writers seldom acknowledge there was ever a divergence of strategic views over the use of maritime assets in 1942 or that the protection of troop transports was seen by the Americans as the most vital task of all. They mainly write that the Americans were incredibly stupid in the protection of merchant shipping, "refusing" as they did to initiate convoying in American waters until May, and, as a consequence, suffered a devastating naval defeat. The recent suggestions by American naval historians Dean C. Allard and Robert W. Love, Jr., that the transporting of American troops from the United States across the Atlantic to the British Isles in the first eight months of 1942 with no losses was a significant naval victory by and of itself, has largely gone unremarked by British historians. was a significant naval victory by and of itself, has largely gone unremarked by British historians.

Another aspect of the Allied naval disputations in this period that the critics of Admiral King seldom acknowledge is that the American Navy had to cope with a "two-ocean war." In order to protect the line of communications to Australia and prevent an invasion of that continent, as set forth in Anglo-American strategic agreements, the Americans had to send tens of thousands of soldiers and airmen to Hawaii, New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands, and Australia.* These troopship convoys, most crossing vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean, had to be protected as stoutly as the Atlantic troopship convoys. It was therefore not possible (as urged by the British Admiralty) to withdraw American destroyers from the Pacific to serve as escorts for cargo convoys in the Atlantic. These troopship convoys, most crossing vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean, had to be protected as stoutly as the Atlantic troopship convoys. It was therefore not possible (as urged by the British Admiralty) to withdraw American destroyers from the Pacific to serve as escorts for cargo convoys in the Atlantic.

When the shortage of destroyers and other suitable vessels forced King to choose between escorting American and British troopships and escorting cargo vessels and tankers, he chose to protect the troops.

A third important factor to remember in order to see the U-boat campaign in American waters in a proper light is that the American Army and Navy were in serious disagreement over ways of coping with the U-boat threat throughout 1942. The Army believed that special units of radar-equipped, four-engine, land-based aircraft, such as the B-24 Liberators, should be employed to hunt down U-boats "offensively," a so-called hunter-killer strategy. Contrarily, the Navy deemed hunter-killer operations to be futile and urged that such aircraft be employed "defensively" for the protection of convoys, to which U-boats were certain to be drawn like bees to honey, and "offensively" only against submarine-building yards, forward bases, and known "choke points" such as the Bay of Biscay.

Because of this divergence of views and because the Army Air Forces were opposed for political, doctrinal, and other reasons to rescinding a prewar agreement that gave it exclusive control of land-based aircraft, in 1942 the Navy was barred from organizing its own land-based aircraft units for convoy escort. Instead, the Navy had to beg and borrow Army Air Forces units, whose personnel were not trained in convoy escort or ASW and, in any case, detested this "defensive" assignment as opposed to the glamorous "offensive" strategic bombing of the German heartland. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the eight months of the U-boat campaign in American waters the Army Air Forces units failed abysmally, sinking only one U-boat (U-701) unassisted by surface ships or other forces.

In the existing accounts of the U-boat campaign in the Americas, this absurd and wasteful interservice battle over control of airpower is almost never depicted adequately. That President Roosevelt allowed it to persist throughout 1942 and half of 1943 is one of the great military misfortunes of World War II. Be that as it may, the situation demands the fullest exposition in discussing this phase of the U-boat war.

A fourth factor to recall is that the Allies "lost" naval Enigma on the U-boat Triton (Shark) net in early 1942. The official British intelligence historian has dismissed this setback as of small consequence in the U-boat campaign in the Americas, but in fact, it was of vital importance. Had U-boat naval Enigma not been lost, the Americans would have discovered at once that this new campaign was an allout German assault, employing all available Atlantic submarines, including medium-range Type VIIs and new U-tankers. Informed of these facts and other tactical data, such as the fact that the U-boats were not to operate in coordinated groups or "wolf packs," the American military high command doubtless would have reacted differently, perhaps even to the extent of authorizing unescorted oil and cargo convoys.

A fifth factor to remember is that in early 1942 just as the campaign in the Americas was being launched, the Germans discovered the last major defect in their submarine torpedoes. This was the leak in the balance chamber that caused them to run much deeper than set. The steps taken to correct this defect greatly improved torpedo performance and the percentage of hits in American waters.

A sixth factor to keep in mind is that in 1940-1941, the Americans loaned to the British and Canadians fifty four-stack destroyers and ten Lake Lake-class Coast Guard cutters. Had these sixty big warships remained in U.S. Navy control, they would have been sufficient to establish convoy networks immediately on the East Coast and in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, preventing the loss of scores of ships and hundreds of merchant seamen.

Having set forth those important reminders, the assessment of the U-boat campaign in the Americas may now proceed in a fairer prospective. To assist in this assessment, it is necessary to examine another set of numbers. These are derived from U-boat sailings to American waters from December 18, 1941, through August 31, 1942.*

* The Germans mounted 184 war patrols: 80 by Type IXs and 104 by Type VIIs. This was an average of about twenty sailings per month, a much heavier commitment of force than usually depicted.

* These boats sank 609 ships for 3.1 million gross tons, including all trawlers, small auxiliaries, and sailing vessels as well as ships sunk en route to and from the Americas. This was an average of about sixty-eight vessels a month for about 350,000 tons.

The ships sunk in the campaign in the Americas in this period constitute about one-quarter of all Allied shipping sunk by German U-boats in World War II. Thus, the campaign was the single most important of the war in terms of sinkings achieved in a relatively brief time period for effort expended-the high-water mark of the U-boat war. Only about six of the 184 patrols to American waters in this period resulted in no sinkings or damage to Allied shipping. Moreover, German losses were relatively modest: twenty-two U-boats (ten IXs and twelve VIIs). Of the approximately 1,000 submariners manning these boats, only about 200 survived, 114 of these as POWs.

One of the ironies of this most successful campaign was that the Type IX boats, which Donitz had so ardently opposed, achieved by far the greatest successes. Fortuitously for the Germans, thirty-four new Type IXs, long in production, workup, and retrofit, became available to the Atlantic force in the first eight months of 1942. The eighty patrols by the Type IXs accounted for 384 of the vessels sunk (63 percent of the total) for about 2.0 million gross tons (65 percent). The 104 patrols by the Type VIIs accounted for the other 225 vessels (37 percent) for about 1.1 million gross tons (35 percent). Overall, the Type IXs averaged 4.8 vessels sunk for 25,100 gross tons per boat per patrol compared with an average 2.2 vessels sunk for 10,686 gross tons per boat per patrol by the Type VIIs. By this reckoning, had Donitz had his way and there had been far fewer Type IXs, and had the eighty Type IX patrols been carried out by Type VIIs, the total sinkings in the campaign would have been considerably less: perhaps 400 ships for about 2.0 million tons, rather than 609 ships for 3.1 million tons.

PLATE 12 12.

A striking feature of this campaign in the Americas was the very large number of Allied tankers that fell victim to the Germans in the first eight months of 1942.* Losses by area: Losses by area: U.S. Eastern Seaboard 43 43.

Gulf of Mexico 22 22.

Caribbean/Latin America 72 72 Canada 6 6.

Total 143 143.

When these tanker losses are added to the tankers sunk by Axis submarines en route to and from the Americas and patrolling to other areas, such as Freetown, Sierra Leone, and the Azores, during the first eight months of 1942, the total of tanker losses in this period rises to 188.

This was indisputably a blow to the Allies: The losses restricted a number of Allied military operations and were the cause of much friction between the U.S. Army and Navy and between London and Washington. But contrary to some accounts, it was not a crippling blow. The American, British, and Canadian shipyards produced ninety-two bigger and better tankers for about 925,000 tons in 1942, replacing half the number of tankers lost but nearly two-thirds of the tonnage lost. In 1943, American shipyards alone produced another 214 tankers for about 2.1 million gross tons, while tanker losses to U-boats fell dramatically to forty-eight for 373,000 tons.

The Americans compensated for the drop in the oil flow caused by the tanker losses and convoying in 1942 through a drastic reduction in their dependence on oceangoing tankers and by the use of alternative oil-delivery systems. This shift can be seen in the following chart of the oil flow from Texas and Louisiana to the northeast United States, measured in barrels per day: Delivery System Jan. 1942 Jan. 1942 Dec. 1942 Dec. 1942 Railroad tank cars 98,500 98,500.

740,063 740,063.

Pipelines 62,500 62,500.

158,180 158,180.

Barges, lake vessels 42,500 42,500.

64,380 64,380.

Oceangoing tankers 1,268,500 1,268,500.

111,759 111,759.

Totals 1,472,000 1,472,000.

1,074,382 1,074,382.

The deficit in this flow of oil was overcome in 1942 by gasoline rationing on the Eastern Seaboard and the conversion of factories from oil to coal and to natural gas, as well as a depletion of oil stockpiles in that area.

The decreased dependence on oceangoing tankers for oil delivery to the northeastern United States and the output of new tankers in 1942 enabled the Americans to again "loan" the British tankers. In response to requests from London (the so-called Red Gap and Blue Gap), Washington made available in 1942 the equivalent of about 100 tankers. This emergency diversion of ships, together with stricter gasoline rationing in the British Isles and a depletion of British stockpiles, averted the oft-predicted oil crisis there in the first eight months of 1942. However, convoying in the Americas and the rerouting of tankers inbound to the British Isles via Freetown, together with intensified British military operations in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean area, strained British oil resources to the absolute limit.

Over and above the tankers, the U-boats engaged in the campaign in the Americas sank 440 Allied cargo ships, trawlers, auxiliaries, and sailing vessels for about 1.7 million gross tons. This was another tough blow, but contrary to many accounts, it was not a crippling one either. The losses were made good quickly by new ship construction. In 1942, American, British, and Canadian shipyards produced about 7.1 million gross tons, or about a million more gross tons than were lost to U-boats (6.1 million).* In particular, American shipyards performed truly astonishing feats during this period. These can best be shown by yet another set of figures that compare worldwide Allied shipping losses to all Axis submarines with new construction in American yards in the summer of 1942. In particular, American shipyards performed truly astonishing feats during this period. These can best be shown by yet another set of figures that compare worldwide Allied shipping losses to all Axis submarines with new construction in American yards in the summer of 1942.

Admiralty figures, by Axis submarines in all waters. Admiralty figures, by Axis submarines in all waters.

In American yards only. Note that new ships averaged 7,300 tons; older ships in the "sunk" column, 4,900 tons. Hence not as many new ships were required to equal or surpass the gross registered tonnage of ships sunk. In American yards only. Note that new ships averaged 7,300 tons; older ships in the "sunk" column, 4,900 tons. Hence not as many new ships were required to equal or surpass the gross registered tonnage of ships sunk.

In summary, while it is undeniably true that the sinking of 609 ships for 3.1 million gross tons in the North American campaign was a notable German naval achievement, it did not by any means dent decisively the Allied merchant-ship pool of about 30 million gross tons. As related, most of the merchant-ship losses were made good quickly by new construction and, owing to the shifts in oil delivery systems in the United States and to rationing, no crippling oil crises developed in the Americas or British Isles in 1942-only a number of frustrating, temporary spot shortages requiring emergency measures.

PLATE 13 13.

Another striking feature of this campaign was the relatively small effect it had on the vital lifeline transporting cargo from North America to the British Isles (see Plate 13). In the first eight months of 1941, 2,867 loaded ships in Halifax and Slow convoys had arrived in the United Kingdom. By comparison, in the first eight months of 1942, 2,411 loaded ships in Halifax and Slow convoys arrived in the United Kingdom. The difference-456 fewer ships in 1942-was due not so much to U-boat sinkings in American waters as to three other factors: * The diversion of about 200 loaded cargo ships to northern Russia in convoys PQ 7 through PQ 17. Of this total, 42 ships sailed in convoys PQ 7 through PQ 11, about 160 ships in convoys PQ 12 (departing March 1) through PQ 17.