Inasmuch as the U-tanker was merely four miles from the convoy and visibility was very poor, the pilot, Robert B. Hopgood, thought at first that it might be one of the convoy's destroyers. Accordingly, he flew low and shot off a recognition flare to establish his identity and to prevent friendly fire. Caught flat-footed in the clumsy, painfully slow-diving U-464 U-464, Harms could do nothing but bluff. Hoping to be taken for an Icelandic fishing vessel or Allied warship, he responded to the recognition flare by releasing one himself. It burned yellow-white, and bore not the slightest resemblance to the proper signal. Attempting to carry the deception a step further, Harms directed the men on his bridge to wave at the plane in a friendly fashion.

Hopgood realized by then that the vessel beneath him was a U-boat. With great presence of mind he attacked instantly, dropping five of his six Mark XVII depth charges, set for twenty-five feet. Two missiles straddled the conning tower and the explosions appeared to lift the boat clear out of the water. Per the ASW doctrine then in force, Hopgood notified all authorities concerned by radio. He then climbed, circled, and came in for a strafing run, raking the boat with 30- and 50- caliber machine-gun fire. The U-464 U-464 responded with superior and "accurate" fire from her two 37mm flak guns, mounted on platforms fore and aft of the bridge, and from a 20mm gun on the bridge. This fire held the Catalina at a distance and, as a result, Hopgood lost sight of the responded with superior and "accurate" fire from her two 37mm flak guns, mounted on platforms fore and aft of the bridge, and from a 20mm gun on the bridge. This fire held the Catalina at a distance and, as a result, Hopgood lost sight of the U-464 U-464.

But the blast of the depth charges had badly damaged U-464 U-464. Unable to dive or to escape on the surface, Harms concluded that other Allied aircraft and ships would arrive soon and that he had no choice but to scuttle. Fortunately for the Germans, an Icelandic fishing trawler, Skaftfellingor Skaftfellingor, appeared out of the fog and drizzle. Harms maneuvered U-464 U-464 close to the trawler and demanded rescue. While the German gunners held the trawler in their sights, part of the close to the trawler and demanded rescue. While the German gunners held the trawler in their sights, part of the U-464 U-464 crew jumped into the sea, climbed on the Icelander, and "captured" it. After that, Harms raised a German flag on crew jumped into the sea, climbed on the Icelander, and "captured" it. After that, Harms raised a German flag on U-464 U-464 and scuttled. He and the rest of the Germans got on board the trawler, perhaps hopeful of escaping in the foul weather to Norway. and scuttled. He and the rest of the Germans got on board the trawler, perhaps hopeful of escaping in the foul weather to Norway.

In the meantime, the Catalina pilot Hopgood found the heavily escorted convoy to which he had been assigned. By signal lamp he informed the British escort commander of his attack and requested help. The British were skeptical and reluctant to rob the convoy of protection, but finally released two of the four destroyers, the ex-American four-stacks Castleton Castleton and and Newark. Newark. Hopgood guided the destroyers back to the site of his attack, arriving in time to see the Germans shift to the trawler and scuttle Hopgood guided the destroyers back to the site of his attack, arriving in time to see the Germans shift to the trawler and scuttle U-464. Castleton U-464. Castleton fired one warning round over the trawler, then closed to capture the Germans, who offered no resistance. fired one warning round over the trawler, then closed to capture the Germans, who offered no resistance. Castleton Castleton took aboard fifty-two Germans, including one surgeon who, in accordance with international law, was treated as a noncombatant. Harms reported that in the Catalina's initial attack, two of his men were hurled overboard and not recovered. The U.S. Navy awarded Hopgood a Navy Cross. took aboard fifty-two Germans, including one surgeon who, in accordance with international law, was treated as a noncombatant. Harms reported that in the Catalina's initial attack, two of his men were hurled overboard and not recovered. The U.S. Navy awarded Hopgood a Navy Cross.

Earlier German U-boat prisoners had disclosed to British interrogators that U-tankers were operating in the Atlantic, but the British had dismissed these revelations as fanciful. Prisoners from Kettner's U-379 U-379, who were recovered on August 8, and those from U-464 U-464, recovered August 20, talked freely of U-tanker operations. Even so, the British continued to doubt. "There may be some truth in the story," the British Anti-Submarine Report for August 1942 smugly proclaimed, "but at present, it must be treated with reserve."

By the closing days of August, there were enough U-boats in the North Atlantic to form two groups. These were the old Loss Loss and the new and the new Vorwarts Vorwarts, created from a stillborn group, Stier Stier, and other boats sailing in August. Some boats of Loss Loss refueled from the U-tanker refueled from the U-tanker U-462 U-462, commanded by Bruno Vowe, others from the Type IXC U-176 U-176, whose cruise to the Americas had been canceled.

Independently of these groups, Klaus Rudloff, age twenty-six, in the new U-609 U-609 patrolled during August off Reykjavik. He saw numerous warships (and twice shot at "destroyers") but sank nothing. Late in August, Kerneval shifted the boat southerly into the convoy lanes to join group patrolled during August off Reykjavik. He saw numerous warships (and twice shot at "destroyers") but sank nothing. Late in August, Kerneval shifted the boat southerly into the convoy lanes to join group Vorwarts. Vorwarts. While complying with these orders on August 31, Rudloff came upon the eastbound Slow Convoy 97. In response to his alert, Kerneval directed group While complying with these orders on August 31, Rudloff came upon the eastbound Slow Convoy 97. In response to his alert, Kerneval directed group Vorwarts Vorwarts, composed of more than a dozen boats-all green-to attack.

British operations research scientists had concluded from mathematical models that if North Atlantic convoys were nearly doubled in size, from about thirty to sixty ships, it would about halve the number of convoys available for U-boats to attack and thereby lessen ship losses by about 56 percent. Authorities at Western Approaches greeted this recommendation with no little skepticism, but nonetheless agreed to try it out and sailed Slow Convoy 97 with fifty-eight ships. It was escorted by Canadian group C-2, composed of two British four-stack destroyers, Broadway and Burnham Broadway and Burnham, and four Canadian corvettes. The destroyers were fitted with Type 271 radar; a rescue ship carried Huff Duff.

Nine U-boats made contact with Slow Convoy 97. Four boats attacked, Klaus Rudloff in U-609 U-609 twice. In the first, he sank two freighters for 10,300 tons. In the second, he shot his last two torpedoes, singly, claiming one "possible" hit, but it could not be confirmed. Heinz Walkerling, age twenty-seven, in the new twice. In the first, he sank two freighters for 10,300 tons. In the second, he shot his last two torpedoes, singly, claiming one "possible" hit, but it could not be confirmed. Heinz Walkerling, age twenty-seven, in the new U-91 U-91 fired four torpedoes into the formation but all missed. Klaus Harney, age twenty-five, in the new fired four torpedoes into the formation but all missed. Klaus Harney, age twenty-five, in the new U-756 U-756, merely seventeen days out from Kiel, and Horst Holtring, age twenty-nine, in the new U-604 U-604, shot but also missed.

Beginning September 1, long-range American and British aircraft (Catalinas and Sunderlands) gave Slow Convoy 97 close cover. Walkerling in U-91 U-91 reported that the aircraft forced him under "once or twice every hour." Therefore it was impossible to haul around the convoy to get into a favorable shooting position ahead. Hans-Ferdinand Massmann, age twenty-five, in the new reported that the aircraft forced him under "once or twice every hour." Therefore it was impossible to haul around the convoy to get into a favorable shooting position ahead. Hans-Ferdinand Massmann, age twenty-five, in the new U-409 U-409, fourteen days out from Kiel, reported that aircraft bombs had smashed both of his periscopes, forcing him to abort. In these attacks the British airmen claimed sinking at least one U-boat. Later, when it was learned that Klaus Harney's U-756 U-756 was lost at this time, September 3, with all hands, the Admiralty credited "British aircraft" with the kill. Upon further study after the war, Admiralty historians withdrew the credit and gave it to the Canadian corvette was lost at this time, September 3, with all hands, the Admiralty credited "British aircraft" with the kill. Upon further study after the war, Admiralty historians withdrew the credit and gave it to the Canadian corvette Morden. Morden. The The U-756 U-756 was the fifth U-boat to be sunk by Canadian air and surface forces within a period of six weeks, a notable achievement but one that was not realized at the time. was the fifth U-boat to be sunk by Canadian air and surface forces within a period of six weeks, a notable achievement but one that was not realized at the time.

The prediction by Donitz on July 27 that the U-boat war was to turn "hard" was timely and correct. In the six-week period, July 24 to September 3, Allied air and surface escorts and submarines in the North Atlantic area sank nine U-boats (eight Type VIIs and one Type XIV U-tanker) and wrecked another VII, U-256 U-256, almost beyond repair. About 400 German submariners had been lost in the sinkings, ninety-four of them captured. Thirteen boats had been forced to abort with battle damage and casualties.

A close analysis of the renewed anticonvoy operations in the North Atlantic by the forty-eight attack U-boats sailing in July and August is revealing. Altogether thirty-eight of these patrols (80 percent) were carried out by new boats or new skippers. All the boats sank forty-four ships, an average of .91 ships per boat per patrol. Twenty-three boats, or nearly half of all those putting out, sank no ships.

* Includes two veteran boats with new skippers. Includes two veteran boats with new skippers.

Includes one veteran boat with a new skipper. Includes one veteran boat with a new skipper.

The most striking fact in this analysis is that nearly half of all the U-boats sank no ships at all and as a result, the average of the VII sinkings fell below one ship per boat per patrol. In part this was attributable to the very high percentage of hurriedly trained and inexperienced crews and skippers, but other factors contributed. Most have been identified earlier. All bear repeating: * The Type VII U-boat that made up the preponderance of the Atlantic force was less than suitable for anticonvoy operations in the distant Greenland "air gap" owing to its limited range and torpedo capacity. It required supporting U-tankers to effectively carry on such operations. Although the U-tanker force had increased in strength, there were still not enough U-tankers and, besides that, the need to refuel the VIIs resulted in a weak link in the operational chain. and, besides that, the need to refuel the VIIs resulted in a weak link in the operational chain.

* Two-hundred-mile "patrol lines" of twelve or more boats were useful for detecting some convoys but were disadvantageous in massing for a group attack. The boats most distant from the convoy were often unable to close up in time, especially in heavy seas or where Allied aircraft made surface travel hazardous. Therefore most successful "pack attacks" were still carried out on the first night by the few boats closest to the convoy.

* All anticonvoy operations were dependent on accurate navigation. The boat first making contact had to know where it was in order to notify U-boat Control and to bring up the other boats. They too had to know where they were in order to set a correct course to the gathering point. Lacking any kind of electronic aids, all the boats had to navigate by dead reckoning and by sextant readings on the stars, the sun, and the planets. Owing to weather conditions, sextant readings were often unobtainable for days at a time.

* If the contact keeper or shadower attempted to bring up the other boats of the patrol line by radio-beacon signals, as was usually the case, shore stations and/or convoy escorts usually detected the initial contact report and homing beacon by DF and/or Huff Duff. Thereupon one or more escorts of the convoy could "run down the bearing" and, assisted by radar, find and sink the shadower or drive it under with gunfire and depth charges while the convoy made a radical turn to port or starboard to elude the other U-boats attempting to gather for a mass attack.

* U-boats had no radar of any kind, only the Metox radar detector, which was useful in crossing the Bay of Biscay but too clumsy to use in a convoy battle. Hence at night or in the foggy weather often encountered in the Greenland "air gap" and on the Newfoundland Bank, radar-equipped aircraft and surface ships held a great advantage over U-boats in that they could "see" electronically in the dark or fog and therefore could pounce on a surfaced U-boat suddenly and with complete surprise.

* U-boat Control tightly directed most pack attacks by long-distance radio transmissions. Owing to atmospheric disturbances, especially in the Greenland "air gap" area, often these messages were not received or were received in garbled and undecipherable condition. In such cases, the U-boats involved in the operations had to wait for or ask for retransmissions, incurring considerable delays or the risk of being DFed.

Thus a sustained U-boat "pack attack," so promising in theory, in actuality was still extremely difficult to mount. This was especially true if the U-boats were green and the escorting forces were experienced. Allied surface ships and aircraft, "signals intelligence" (codebreaking, traffic analysis, etc.), and electronic devices (radar, Huff Duff) about which the Germans were largely unaware, had already drastically reduced the U-boat threat to convoys.

Histories of the Battle of the Atlantic which imply that as more and more U-boats joined the Atlantic force in the summer and fall of 1942, the threat to North Atlantic convoys increased to a precarious level, are not correct. As will be seen, the number of U-boats that failed to sink any ships at all per patrol rose steadily and, for the Germans, ominously, from half of those sailing to the North Atlantic in July and August 1942, to well beyond that figure in the spring of 1943. Hundreds of convoys on the North Atlantic run-thousands and thousands of ships-crossed the North Atlantic in 1942 unharmed.

RETURN TO THE TO THE M MIDDLE AND S SOUTH A ATLANTIC.

At the time Donitz launched group Wolf Wolf against the North Atlantic convoys, he deployed a smaller group, against the North Atlantic convoys, he deployed a smaller group, Hai Hai (Shark), to reopen the U-boat war in the middle and South Atlantic. (Shark), to reopen the U-boat war in the middle and South Atlantic.

Group Hai Hai was composed of four veteran boats sailing from France in June, plus the veteran was composed of four veteran boats sailing from France in June, plus the veteran U-752 U-752, sailing in early July. All were Type VIICs, which were better suited for attacking convoys than the Type IXs. They were to patrol to Freetown, supported by the Type XB minelayer U-116 U-116, temporarily serving in the Atlantic force as a supply boat. She could provide fuel oil, lubricating oil, fresh water, and food, but not torpedoes.

The ablest and most experienced skipper in group Hai Hai was the was the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Adalbert Schnee in holder Adalbert Schnee in U-201 U-201. He did not disappoint. Southbound on July 6, he found and sank the impressive 14,500-ton British freighter Avila Star. Avila Star. Four days later he discovered convoy Outbound South 33, west of the Madeira Islands. Schnee shadowed and brought up all of group Four days later he discovered convoy Outbound South 33, west of the Madeira Islands. Schnee shadowed and brought up all of group Hai Hai, save the U-752 U-752, which had sailed last.

A hard convoy battle raged over the next seventy-two hours. Schnee in U-201 U-201 sank four British ships for 26,000 tons: three freighters and the 7,000-ton tanker sank four British ships for 26,000 tons: three freighters and the 7,000-ton tanker British Yeoman. British Yeoman. Werner Schulte in Werner Schulte in U-582 U-582 sank two big British freighters for 16,400 tons. Werner von Schmidt in the provisional tanker sank two big British freighters for 16,400 tons. Werner von Schmidt in the provisional tanker U-116 U-116 (which had two stern torpedo tubes) sank the 4,300-ton British freighter (which had two stern torpedo tubes) sank the 4,300-ton British freighter Shaftesbury Shaftesbury and captured her captain. The irrepressibly aggressive Heinrich Zimmermann in and captured her captain. The irrepressibly aggressive Heinrich Zimmermann in U-136 U-136 (who had sunk two corvettes, (who had sunk two corvettes, Arbutus and Spikenard Arbutus and Spikenard, within a week in February) attacked but was trapped by three escorts: the Free French destroyer Leopard Leopard, the British frigate Spey Spey, and the British sloop Pelican Pelican, all of which adroitly capitalized on radar and Huff Duff. Pounded by gunfire and depth charges, the U-136 U-136 went down with the loss of all hands. The cautious Heinz Hirsacker in went down with the loss of all hands. The cautious Heinz Hirsacker in U-572 U-572 made contact with the convoy but did not attack. made contact with the convoy but did not attack.

Adalbert Schnee's report electrified Kerneval. Including the Avila Star Avila Star, he had sunk by torpedo and gun five ships for 40,500 tons in a mere nineteen days. Counting past claims and overclaims, Schnee's score exceeded 200,000 tons and therefore he qualified for the award of Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz. As with Rolf Mutzelburg in As with Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, the award was radioed to Schnee* and plans were set in motion for Hitler to present the medals to Schnee and Mutzelburg at the same time. and plans were set in motion for Hitler to present the medals to Schnee and Mutzelburg at the same time.

After the attack on Outbound South 33, Schnee was left with one torpedo and a few rounds of deck-gun ammunition. He therefore asked Kerneval if he could be detached from group Hai Hai and remain in his present position. But Kerneval denied the request, emphasizing that and remain in his present position. But Kerneval denied the request, emphasizing that U-201 U-201 could serve well in a reconnaissance role. Schnee complied unhappily. Off Freetown, he found no traffic whatsoever. After he had expended his last torpedo to sink what he claimed to be a corvette-in actuality the 500-ton British ASW trawler could serve well in a reconnaissance role. Schnee complied unhappily. Off Freetown, he found no traffic whatsoever. After he had expended his last torpedo to sink what he claimed to be a corvette-in actuality the 500-ton British ASW trawler Laertes Laertes-he was permitted to return to France, where Hitler awarded him and Mutzelburg the Oak Leaves in a joint ceremony. Promoted to a newly created job, First Staff Officer (Operations) to Donitz, Schnee turned the U-201 U-201 over to a new skipper and did not return to combat. over to a new skipper and did not return to combat.

Patrolling off Freetown or to seaward, the remaining three VIIs of group Hai Hai had mixed success. The aggressive Karl-Ernst Schroeter in had mixed success. The aggressive Karl-Ernst Schroeter in U-752 U-752, who had made prior patrols in Arctic, North Atlantic, and American waters, sank four freighters (one American, one British, one Norwegian, one Dutch) for 21,700 tons. Werner Schulte in U-582 U-582 sank two more ships (both American) for 14,300 tons, bringing his score to four ships for 30,600 tons, and captured the captain and engineer of one of them, sank two more ships (both American) for 14,300 tons, bringing his score to four ships for 30,600 tons, and captured the captain and engineer of one of them, Stella Lykes. Stella Lykes. Heinz Hirsacker in Heinz Hirsacker in U-572 U-572 turned in another disappointing patrol: one Dutch freighter for 5,300 tons sunk. turned in another disappointing patrol: one Dutch freighter for 5,300 tons sunk.

Although the loss of the comer Heinrich Zimmermann in U-136 U-136 was keenly felt, and Hirsacker again failed, group was keenly felt, and Hirsacker again failed, group Hai was deemed a success Hai was deemed a success. Altogether the four surviving VIIs and Werner von Schmidt's U-116 U-116 (minelayer) sank sixteen ships for about 103,000 tons. Notwithstanding the terrible heat-Schnee reported temperatures of 120 degrees inside (minelayer) sank sixteen ships for about 103,000 tons. Notwithstanding the terrible heat-Schnee reported temperatures of 120 degrees inside U-201 U-201-the good results of Hai Hai and the availability of U-tankers persuaded Donitz to send additional boats to the Azores and West Africa. and the availability of U-tankers persuaded Donitz to send additional boats to the Azores and West Africa.

Seven boats sailed to West African waters in July: six Type IXs and the Type VIID minelayer U-213. U-213. In due course, these and other boats were to be supported by three of the five tankers, In due course, these and other boats were to be supported by three of the five tankers, U-459 U-459, U-460 U-460, and U-462. U-462. While outbound from Lorient on July 27, a Coastal Command Wellington of the Czech Squadron 311, piloted by J. Stransky, attacked While outbound from Lorient on July 27, a Coastal Command Wellington of the Czech Squadron 311, piloted by J. Stransky, attacked U-106 U-106, commanded by Hermann Rasch. Rasch boldly fought back with his bridge flak guns. In this battle, one officer was killed and Rasch was wounded, forcing him to abort. The boat did not sail again until late September.

A week out from Lorient on July 31, the VIID minelayer U-213 U-213 commanded by Amelung von Varendorff found a convoy near the Azores. Von Varendorff reported the contact to Kerneval and then attacked, but the result was fatal. The British sloops commanded by Amelung von Varendorff found a convoy near the Azores. Von Varendorff reported the contact to Kerneval and then attacked, but the result was fatal. The British sloops Erne Erne, Rochester Rochester, and Sandwich Sandwich, all fitted with Huff Duff, caught and sank U-213 U-213 with the loss of all hands. with the loss of all hands.

Two Type IXs sailed south in loose company: Ernst Kals in the U-130 U-130 and Harro Schacht in and Harro Schacht in U-507 U-507. On July 14 Kals in U-130 U-130 came upon a northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 115. It was escorted by four warships, one of which, came upon a northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 115. It was escorted by four warships, one of which, Lulworth Lulworth, was an ex-Coast Guard cutter. Schacht in U-507 U-507 and Primo Longobardo in the Italian submarine and Primo Longobardo in the Italian submarine Pietro Calvi Pietro Calvi heard Kals's alert and closed on the convoy. heard Kals's alert and closed on the convoy.

The Lulworth Lulworth picked up "strong" Huff Duff signals and ran out the bearing. She came upon Longobardo in picked up "strong" Huff Duff signals and ran out the bearing. She came upon Longobardo in Calvi Calvi and Kals in and Kals in U-130 U-130 having a tte-a-tte. When the submarines saw having a tte-a-tte. When the submarines saw Lulworth Lulworth, they crash-dived. An hour and a half later, Lulworth Lulworth got got Calvi Calvi on sonar and carried out three depth-charge attacks that severely damaged the Italian and forced her to the surface. on sonar and carried out three depth-charge attacks that severely damaged the Italian and forced her to the surface. Calvi Calvi had two 4.7" deck guns versus had two 4.7" deck guns versus Lulworth's Lulworth's two 3" guns, but the depth charges had knocked out both of two 3" guns, but the depth charges had knocked out both of Calvi's Calvi's guns. Longobardo fired his stern tubes, but guns. Longobardo fired his stern tubes, but Lulworth Lulworth evaded, responding with her 3" and smaller weapons. Her accurate fire hit evaded, responding with her 3" and smaller weapons. Her accurate fire hit Calvi's Calvi's bridge, killing Longobardo and his second-in-command, whereupon bridge, killing Longobardo and his second-in-command, whereupon Lulworth Lulworth came about to ram. came about to ram. Calvi Calvi evaded wildly, but on the third try evaded wildly, but on the third try Lulworth Lulworth hit the Italian boat in her stern, smashing her propellers and forcing her to surrender. hit the Italian boat in her stern, smashing her propellers and forcing her to surrender.

Meanwhile, in response to Lulworth's Lulworth's alarm, two sloops, alarm, two sloops, Bideford Bideford and and Londonderry Londonderry, rushed to the scene. By that time Lulworth Lulworth had put a boarding party on had put a boarding party on Calvi Calvi, but the British were hampered by a fire in the conning tower, flooding, and the rush of the Italians to get topside and jump into the sea. Creeping into the scene, Kals in U-130 U-130 attempted to attack attempted to attack Lulworth Lulworth, but the latter heard the U-boat on sonar and let fly more depth charges, driving Kals off. The explosions probably killed some Italians in the water and further damaged Calvi Calvi, which suddenly upended and sank. The Lulworth Lulworth boarding party had reached the interior of the boat but found only a "chart and rough log." Its leader was trapped in the sudden sinking and killed. The British vessels rescued thirty-five of seventy-eight crew members from boarding party had reached the interior of the boat but found only a "chart and rough log." Its leader was trapped in the sudden sinking and killed. The British vessels rescued thirty-five of seventy-eight crew members from Calvi. Calvi.

Kals hauled out to report what he had done to help Calvi Calvi and to request instructions. and to request instructions. Calvi's Calvi's loss and the inability of Kals to get around the escorts led Kerneval to believe the convoy to be far more strongly protected than was the case. Accordingly, Kerneval directed Kals in loss and the inability of Kals to get around the escorts led Kerneval to believe the convoy to be far more strongly protected than was the case. Accordingly, Kerneval directed Kals in U-130 U-130 and Schacht in and Schacht in U-507 U-507 to break off operations and proceed to the Freetown area, where they were to refuel from von Schmidt's Type XB minelayer to break off operations and proceed to the Freetown area, where they were to refuel from von Schmidt's Type XB minelayer U-116 U-116, which had earlier supported group Hai. Hai.

It was a long, slow, hot journey to the south. En route Kals in U-130 U-130 sank two big ships by torpedo and gun: the 10,100-ton Norwegian tanker sank two big ships by torpedo and gun: the 10,100-ton Norwegian tanker Tankexpress Tankexpress and the 7,200-ton British freighter and the 7,200-ton British freighter Elmwood. Elmwood. As planned, Kals and Schacht refueled from As planned, Kals and Schacht refueled from U-116 U-116 on July 28. Two days later, Kals sank the 8,400-ton British freighter on July 28. Two days later, Kals sank the 8,400-ton British freighter Danmark Danmark, bringing his score to 25,700 tons. Schacht in U-507 U-507, who had made a sensational patrol to the Gulf of Mexico in May, found no targets.

Kals in U-130 U-130 remained off Freetown for the entire month of August. In that time he sank by torpedo and gun four more ships for 25,900 tons, including two more Norwegian tankers: remained off Freetown for the entire month of August. In that time he sank by torpedo and gun four more ships for 25,900 tons, including two more Norwegian tankers: Malmanger Malmanger, 7,100 tons, and Mirlo Mirlo, 7,500 tons. These successes brought his confirmed score to seven ships (three tankers) for 51,528 tons. Counting sinkings in three prior patrols, Kals qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz,* awarded by radio while he was homebound. awarded by radio while he was homebound.

Finding no action off Freetown, Schacht in U-507 U-507 requested authority to cross the Atlantic to Brazilian waters. Although von Ribbentrop had killed the earlier scheme to launch open warfare with Brazil by a sudden strike of about ten U-boats, Berlin did not object to a one-boat foray, provided that Schacht scrupulously avoided attacks on Argentine and Chilean ships. requested authority to cross the Atlantic to Brazilian waters. Although von Ribbentrop had killed the earlier scheme to launch open warfare with Brazil by a sudden strike of about ten U-boats, Berlin did not object to a one-boat foray, provided that Schacht scrupulously avoided attacks on Argentine and Chilean ships.

Schacht reached the coast of Brazil on August 16. That day and the next he attacked six Brazilian freighters, ranging in size from 4,900 tons to 1,100 tons. One torpedo prematured, but the others hit solidly to sink five ships for 14,800 tons. He climaxed the foray on August 19 with a gun attack on the 90-ton sailing vessel Jacyra. Jacyra. He then expended five torpedoes on August 22 to sink a 3,200-ton Swedish freighter. Total sunk: seven ships for 18,100 tons. He then expended five torpedoes on August 22 to sink a 3,200-ton Swedish freighter. Total sunk: seven ships for 18,100 tons.

In direct reaction to these sinkings, Brazil declared war on Germany on August 22. Scarcely noticed at the time, the declaration merely formalized what had been for several months a state of war. Donitz planned follow-up U-boat forays to Brazil, but the German Foreign Ministry, still fearful of antagonizing Argentina and Chile, did not view them with enthusiasm.

Two Type IXs working in loose cooperation sailed beyond Freetown to the African Gold Coast, or British Ghana and Nigeria. These were Ulrich Folkers in the IXC U-125 U-125, who refueled from U-462 U-462, and Erich Wurdemann in the Type IXC U-506. U-506. Wurdemann had fair luck to September 5, sinking three ships for 16,400 tons. Folkers in Wurdemann had fair luck to September 5, sinking three ships for 16,400 tons. Folkers in U-125 U-125 could not have had worse luck. To the same date he had sunk but one 815-ton British coaster. could not have had worse luck. To the same date he had sunk but one 815-ton British coaster.

The other IX of the July group was the older Model B, U-109 U-109, commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt. Patrolling off Freetown in August, he sank two tankers for 11,800 tons, the 6,000-ton Norwegian holder Heinrich Bleichrodt. Patrolling off Freetown in August, he sank two tankers for 11,800 tons, the 6,000-ton Norwegian Arthur W. Sewall Arthur W. Sewall and the 5,700-ton British and the 5,700-ton British Vimeira Vimeira, from which Bleichrodt captured the captain. Then followed two barren and frustrating weeks at the end of which, on August 25, Bleichrodt also asked permission to go to Brazil, but Kerneval denied the request. Resupplied by the tanker U-460 U-460, Bleichrodt had better luck in September, sinking three big British freighters for about 24,000 tons, from the last of which, Peterton Peterton, Bleichrodt recovered valuable "secret papers" describing the Allied sailing routes in those waters. These sinkings raised Bleichrodt's total to five ships (two tankers) for about 35,600 tons. While homebound on September 23, Bleichrodt got word that he had been awarded Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz.*

In the first half of August, eight attack boats sailed from French bases to West African waters: another IXB, U-107 U-107, and seven Type VIIs. These boats were also to be supported by the three tankers (U-459, U-460 U-460, and U-462 U-462) as well as by the former Dutch submarine U-D5 U-D5, outfitted as a torpedo-supply boat.

The U-107 U-107, commanded by Harald Gelhaus, sailed on August 15. After crossing the Bay of Biscay, he reported to Kerneval that his Metox radar-detector gear worked well, enabling him to avoid attacks by six separate aircraft(!).

As these U-boats were putting out, on August 19 the British carried out a third hit-and-run "raid" on Occupied France, a very large one. About 5,000 Canadian and about 1,000 other Allied troops, massively supported by the RAF, stormed ashore at the channel port of Dieppe. The Germans decisively repulsed the raiders and inflicted a humiliating defeat. Canadian forces incurred 3,363 casualties; other Allied ground forces, 247. The Germans captured about 2,200 men. The Royal Navy, which incurred 550 casualties, lost the destroyer Berkeley Berkeley and numerous landing craft. Although the raid was less than a model of perfection, the huge Allied casualties that resulted further strengthened the British resolve not to mount the main invasion, Roundup, until such time that the Allies could be certain of a reasonable chance of success. and numerous landing craft. Although the raid was less than a model of perfection, the huge Allied casualties that resulted further strengthened the British resolve not to mount the main invasion, Roundup, until such time that the Allies could be certain of a reasonable chance of success.

Upon learning that an Allied raid was in progress at Dieppe, Kerneval diverted Gelhaus in the outgoing U-107 U-107 (as well as (as well as U-69 U-69 and and U-432 U-432) to attack the enemy naval forces in the English Channel, but the Allies withdrew from the Dieppe area before U-107 U-107 got there. When this became apparent, Kerneval directed Gelhaus to turn about and sail to southern waters, orders to follow. got there. When this became apparent, Kerneval directed Gelhaus to turn about and sail to southern waters, orders to follow.

The seven Type VIIs formed a new group, Blucher Blucher, replacing Hai. Hai. These boats included the These boats included the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Peter Cremer in holder Peter Cremer in U-333 U-333, who had barely survived a patrol to Florida in May, and the resailing Type VIID minelayer U-214 U-214, which had been crippled by a Coastal Command aircraft in June.

Close by the Portuguese Azores on August 16, Gerhard Feiler in the veteran U-653 U-653 of group of group Blucher Blucher found a northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 118. It consisted of thirty-three merchant ships, escorted by the armed merchant cruiser found a northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 118. It consisted of thirty-three merchant ships, escorted by the armed merchant cruiser Cheshire Cheshire and four other British warships, including the ex-Coast Guard cutter and four other British warships, including the ex-Coast Guard cutter Gorleston. Gorleston. She and two other escorts, the sloops She and two other escorts, the sloops Folkestone and Wellington Folkestone and Wellington, had Huff Duff.

As the other six boats of group Blucher Blucher homed in on Feiler's beacons, the escorts got bearings by radar and Huff Duff. Running down a Huff Duff contact, homed in on Feiler's beacons, the escorts got bearings by radar and Huff Duff. Running down a Huff Duff contact, Folkestone Folkestone found Cremer in found Cremer in U-333 U-333, who was making a radio report, forced him under, and attacked with depth charges six separate times. These attacks, Cremer wrote, were "really close" and they shook the boat "to the breaking point." The explosions bent his starboard propeller shaft upward, causing internal sparks and a loud and unnerving "screech" in the starboard clutch. The damage forced Cremer to abort.

The U-566 U-566, commanded by a new skipper, Gerhard Remus, age twenty-six, chose to open the battle with a daylight submerged attack. Remus fired three torpedoes at two ships and claimed he sank both for 11,700 tons. In reality, only the 6,600-ton Norwegian freighter Triton Triton went down. The escorts pounced on Remus with depth charges, but he evaded, surfaced after dark, and continued stalking the main body. went down. The escorts pounced on Remus with depth charges, but he evaded, surfaced after dark, and continued stalking the main body.

By the morning of August 18, the convoy had reached a point about 600 miles south of England. This placed it within range of the B-24 Liberators of Coastal Command Squadron 120. The squadron leader, Terence Bulloch, flew the first mission. Cremer in U-333 U-333, who was aborting, and Remus in U-566 U-566, who was attempting to haul ahead of the convoy, both reported attacks by "land-based" bombers, but the damage to both boats was only "slight."

In the afternoon of August 18, Gunther Reeder in the VIID minelayer U-214 U-214 got in to carry out a submerged daylight attack. He fired a full bow salvo of four torpedoes into the formation, claiming four ships sunk for 20,000 tons. In actuality, he sank two big freighters for 13,800 tons and damaged the 10,100-ton armed merchant cruiser got in to carry out a submerged daylight attack. He fired a full bow salvo of four torpedoes into the formation, claiming four ships sunk for 20,000 tons. In actuality, he sank two big freighters for 13,800 tons and damaged the 10,100-ton armed merchant cruiser Cheshire Cheshire, which was saved and towed to port. Reeder reported that "land-based" aircraft prevented him from hauling ahead for a second attack.

One of the Liberators, piloted by Squadron Leader Bulloch, attacked Feiler in U-653 U-653 with six depth charges and two bombs. The close blasts knocked a crewman overboard and drove the boat under with "severe" damage, the second U-boat (after with six depth charges and two bombs. The close blasts knocked a crewman overboard and drove the boat under with "severe" damage, the second U-boat (after U-89 U-89) Bulloch had seriously damaged in as many days. Upon receiving Feiler's report later in the evening, Kerneval ordered him to give all the fuel he could spare to the Type VIIs U-406 U-406 and and U-566 U-566 and then to abort. He limped into Brest on August 31. The boat was out of action for two months. and then to abort. He limped into Brest on August 31. The boat was out of action for two months.

Muller-Edzards in U-590 U-590 got contact on the convoy, but the escorts drove him under and put his radio out of commission. Another boat relayed his request to Kerneval for authority to abort. Kerneval directed Muller-Edzards to stay put and if at all possible, to attack, but nothing came of these orders. Unable to communicate or repair the radio, Muller-Edzards aborted, arriving in St. Nazaire on August 23. After hurried repairs, he resailed four days later. got contact on the convoy, but the escorts drove him under and put his radio out of commission. Another boat relayed his request to Kerneval for authority to abort. Kerneval directed Muller-Edzards to stay put and if at all possible, to attack, but nothing came of these orders. Unable to communicate or repair the radio, Muller-Edzards aborted, arriving in St. Nazaire on August 23. After hurried repairs, he resailed four days later.

Coastal Command Liberators, Sunderlands, and Catalinas were providing Sierra Leone 118 with nearly continuous air coverage by August 19. Nonetheless, in the late afternoon Horst Dieterichs in U-406 U-406, who had temporarily lost his starboard diesel, got ahead, submerged, and attacked by periscope. He hit and sank the 7,500-ton British freighter City of Manila City of Manila, but in return the escorts hunted and attacked the boat relentlessly, inflicting heavy damage and casualties. Reluctant to abort, Dieterichs broke off the chase and hauled out to the west to make repairs. In the process, he discovered his lubricating oil was contaminated.

In view of the heavy air coverage, Donitz canceled operations against Sierra Leone 118 on August 20. For the Germans the results of the action were only so-so. Three of the seven boats of group Blucher Blucher had attacked and sunk four ships for 28,000 tons and damaged the armed merchant cruiser had attacked and sunk four ships for 28,000 tons and damaged the armed merchant cruiser Cheshire. Cheshire. In return, the air and surface escorts had forced three boats to abort: Cremer's In return, the air and surface escorts had forced three boats to abort: Cremer's U-333 U-333, Feiler's U-653 U-653, and Muller-Edzards's U-590. U-590. A fourth boat, A fourth boat, U-594 U-594, commanded by a new skipper, Friedrich Mumm, age twenty-seven, who had lost both air compressors during a depth-charge attack, was directed to obtain spare parts from a U-tanker.

Allied ASW forces had gutted group Blucher. Blucher. Kerneval therefore directed Gelhaus in the IXB Kerneval therefore directed Gelhaus in the IXB U-107 U-107 to join the three surviving Type VII boats, to join the three surviving Type VII boats, U-214 U-214, U-406 U-406, and U-566. U-566. As these orders were being carried out on August 25, Gunther Reeder in the VIID minelayer As these orders were being carried out on August 25, Gunther Reeder in the VIID minelayer U-214 U-214 reported contact with another northbound convoy midway between the Canaries and the Azores. reported contact with another northbound convoy midway between the Canaries and the Azores.

The new convoy was Sierra Leone 119. Reeder shadowed, bringing up other boats, but the escorts, acting on Huff Duff contacts, drove U-214 U-214 off and under. Gerhard Remus in off and under. Gerhard Remus in U-566 U-566 and Gelhaus in and Gelhaus in U-107 U-107 got contact next. Remus carried out a submerged daylight attack, sinking two big freighters for 14,000 tons. In response, escorts counterattacked and one of them rammed got contact next. Remus carried out a submerged daylight attack, sinking two big freighters for 14,000 tons. In response, escorts counterattacked and one of them rammed U-566 U-566, demolishing her bridge and raking back her periscopes. After burning away the worst of the ragged steel with welding torches, Remus limped to France. Repairs to the boat delayed her return to combat until late October.

Air and surface escorts thwarted attacks on the convoy Sierra Leone 119 by the other boats of group Blucher. Blucher. Reeder in Reeder in U-214 U-214 reported that "radar-equipped aircraft" had held him down for "a whole night" and as a result, he fell farther and farther behind and could never gain a firing position. Gelhaus in reported that "radar-equipped aircraft" had held him down for "a whole night" and as a result, he fell farther and farther behind and could never gain a firing position. Gelhaus in U-107 U-107 reported that the surface escorts drove him under and depth-charged him for a full eight hours. He cleared the area with "a loud knocking noise," which, however, his crew was able to fix. Driven off by aircraft, Horst Dieterichs in reported that the surface escorts drove him under and depth-charged him for a full eight hours. He cleared the area with "a loud knocking noise," which, however, his crew was able to fix. Driven off by aircraft, Horst Dieterichs in U-406 U-406 attempted a day light submerged attack, but it failed. attempted a day light submerged attack, but it failed.

The surviving Blucher Blucher boats, boats, U-107 U-107, U-214 U-214, and U-406 U-406, doggedly shadowed the convoy northward but to no purpose. In view of the heavy air cover, Donitz canceled operations against Sierra Leone 119. For the second time, Kerneval reorganized group Blucher Blucher for operations off Freetown. The new group was to consist of for operations off Freetown. The new group was to consist of Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Peter Cremer in the resailing holder Peter Cremer in the resailing U-333 U-333, Muller-Edzards in the rejoining U-590 U-590, Joachim Berger in the veteran VIIB U-87 U-87, plus U-107 U-107, U-214 U-214, and U-406 U-406. Pending the sailing or resailing of the three boats from France, Kerneval parked U-107 U-107 and and U-214 U-214 in a waiting area off Lisbon. While there on September 3, Gelhaus in in a waiting area off Lisbon. While there on September 3, Gelhaus in U-107 U-107 sank two British freighters for 8,600 tons. sank two British freighters for 8,600 tons.

The return of U-boats to South Atlantic waters in the summer of 1942 was not only timely but also profitable. The five boats of group Hai Hai sank sixteen ships for 103,000 tons. The seven Type VIIs and IXs sailing independently in July sank thirty ships for 158,700 tons. The seven Type VIIs and IXs assigned to group sank sixteen ships for 103,000 tons. The seven Type VIIs and IXs sailing independently in July sank thirty ships for 158,700 tons. The seven Type VIIs and IXs assigned to group Blucher Blucher sank eight ships for about 48,000 tons to September 3. Total: fifty-four ships for about 309,600 tons. Two Type VIIs, the sank eight ships for about 48,000 tons to September 3. Total: fifty-four ships for about 309,600 tons. Two Type VIIs, the U-136 U-136 and the Type VIID minelayer and the Type VIID minelayer U-213 U-213, had been lost with all hands. The exchange rate was thus twenty-seven ships sunk for each U-boat, much higher than the rate in the North Atlantic. In view of the good returns, Donitz ordered an increase in patrols to South Atlantic and West African waters for the fall of 1942.

FURTHER P PATROLS TO THE A AMERICAS.

The renewal of the U-boat campaign on the North, middle, and South Atlantic convoy routes in July and August absorbed the majority of the U-boats. Even so, Donitz was reluctant to abruptly discontinue the campaign in the Americas. Apart from the sinkings to be had, a continued U-boat presence in American waters would insure expansions of the convoy network with all its inherent delays, tie down ASW forces, and forestall a shift of them to other areas. Hence twenty-eight more boats sailed to the Americas: ten Type VIIs and seven Type IXs in July, and three Type VIIs and eight Type IXs in August.

Of the ten Type VIIs sailing in July, six were veteran boats from France, the other four new boats from Germany. Two of the six from France were captained by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Reinhard Suhren in holders: Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564 and Gerhard Bigalk in and Gerhard Bigalk in U-751 U-751. Eight of the ten were to patrol the Caribbean area. The other two, Bigalk's U-751 U-751 and the and the U-98 U-98, commanded by Wilhelm Schulze, were to lay TMB (magnetic) minefields at Charleston, South Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida, respectively.

Bigalk in U-751 U-751, who had won his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for sinking the "jeep" carrier for sinking the "jeep" carrier Audacity Audacity during the December 1941 battle with convoy Homebound Gibraltar 76, sailed from St. Nazaire. Three days later, on July 17, a Whitley of Coastal Command Squadron 502, piloted by A.R.A. Hunt, spotted the boat on the surface. Attacking from an altitude of fifty feet, the Whitley dropped six 250-pound Mark VII depth charges with Torpex warheads set for 25 feet. The close straddle literally lifted during the December 1941 battle with convoy Homebound Gibraltar 76, sailed from St. Nazaire. Three days later, on July 17, a Whitley of Coastal Command Squadron 502, piloted by A.R.A. Hunt, spotted the boat on the surface. Attacking from an altitude of fifty feet, the Whitley dropped six 250-pound Mark VII depth charges with Torpex warheads set for 25 feet. The close straddle literally lifted U-751 U-751 out of the water, the airmen reported. Nonetheless, the Whitley mounted a second attack with ASW bombs and machine guns. out of the water, the airmen reported. Nonetheless, the Whitley mounted a second attack with ASW bombs and machine guns.

The U-751 U-751 survived these attacks and contrary to doctrine, Bigalk dived. A couple of hours later when he returned to the surface, a big British four-engine Lancaster of Bomber Command Squadron 61, on loan to Coastal Command and piloted by Peter R. Casement, was orbiting overhead. As the Lancaster ran in to attack, the survived these attacks and contrary to doctrine, Bigalk dived. A couple of hours later when he returned to the surface, a big British four-engine Lancaster of Bomber Command Squadron 61, on loan to Coastal Command and piloted by Peter R. Casement, was orbiting overhead. As the Lancaster ran in to attack, the U-751 U-751 "fired back with all her guns." The Lancaster dropped ten close Mark VIII depth charges, then a string of ASW bombs. The bow of the U-boat rose vertically and she slid stern first beneath the sea. The crew spilled into the water, some of them shaking fists in defiance, the British aircrew reported. The British made no attempt to rescue the Germans. None survived. "fired back with all her guns." The Lancaster dropped ten close Mark VIII depth charges, then a string of ASW bombs. The bow of the U-boat rose vertically and she slid stern first beneath the sea. The crew spilled into the water, some of them shaking fists in defiance, the British aircrew reported. The British made no attempt to rescue the Germans. None survived.*

Wilhelm Schulze in U-98 U-98 laid his dozen mines off Jacksonville on August 9. Something must have gone wrong because the field produced no sinkings. Remaining well offshore, Schulze cruised north to the Cape Hatteras area to patrol in deep water. On the night of August 22, in bright moonlight, he found a convoy off Cape Lookout, but the air and surface escorts thwarted his attack. Upon the return of laid his dozen mines off Jacksonville on August 9. Something must have gone wrong because the field produced no sinkings. Remaining well offshore, Schulze cruised north to the Cape Hatteras area to patrol in deep water. On the night of August 22, in bright moonlight, he found a convoy off Cape Lookout, but the air and surface escorts thwarted his attack. Upon the return of U-98 U-98 to France, it was noted that Schulze had made two long and arduous patrols to American waters without a single sinking, and he left the boat for other duties. to France, it was noted that Schulze had made two long and arduous patrols to American waters without a single sinking, and he left the boat for other duties.

On the day British aircraft sank Bigalk in U-751 U-751, July 17, a homebound boat, Hans-Heinz Linder in U-202 U-202, found a convoy, Outbound South 34, close to the site of that sinking. Linder shadowed-and reported-until he was forced off by the escorts. His signals brought in two Type VIIs outbound to the Americas, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Reinhard Suhren in holder Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564 and Ludwig Forster in and Ludwig Forster in U-654 U-654, as well as two Type IXs, one outbound and one homebound.

Owing to a shortage of fuel, Linder in U-202 U-202 had to break off and continue to France, but by then Suhren had gained and held contact. After Forster in had to break off and continue to France, but by then Suhren had gained and held contact. After Forster in U-654 U-654 reported that he was also in contact, Suhren attacked, firing four bow torpedoes at four different ships. He claimed four hits on four ships: two ships for 10,000 tons sunk and two for 13,000 tons damaged. A postwar analysis credited the two sinkings for 11,100 tons but not the damage. The outbound Type IXB reported that he was also in contact, Suhren attacked, firing four bow torpedoes at four different ships. He claimed four hits on four ships: two ships for 10,000 tons sunk and two for 13,000 tons damaged. A postwar analysis credited the two sinkings for 11,100 tons but not the damage. The outbound Type IXB U-108 U-108, commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Klaus Scholtz, shot a full salvo of six torpedoes (four bow, two stern) at three ships, but all six missed or malfunctioned. No other boat could get in to attack, and the rest of the convoy escaped. holder Klaus Scholtz, shot a full salvo of six torpedoes (four bow, two stern) at three ships, but all six missed or malfunctioned. No other boat could get in to attack, and the rest of the convoy escaped.

Suhren in U-564 U-564 and Forster in and Forster in U-654 U-654 continued southwest to the Caribbean. On July 22, Suhren came upon a heart-stopping sight one thousand miles due west of Gibraltar: two westbound "British battleships," escorted by three "destroyers." Suhren shadowed and reported but he could not gain a shooting position. His reports brought up Forster in continued southwest to the Caribbean. On July 22, Suhren came upon a heart-stopping sight one thousand miles due west of Gibraltar: two westbound "British battleships," escorted by three "destroyers." Suhren shadowed and reported but he could not gain a shooting position. His reports brought up Forster in U-654 U-654 and Rolf Mutzelburg in and Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, homebound from his notable patrol in the Caribbean, but neither boat could overtake the vessels. Suhren and Mutzelburg met at sea the following day so that outbound Suhren could transfer a sick crewman to homebound U-203 U-203. Doubtless Suhren, who wore Oak Leaves on his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, extended congratulations to Mutzelburg, who had attained the same honor a week before.

Still traveling in company on August 3, Suhren in U-564 U-564 and Forster in and Forster in U-654 U-654 met the new U-tanker met the new U-tanker U-463 U-463, commanded by Leo Wolfbauer. The VIIs topped off fuel tanks, but Suhren needed torpedoes. Upon learning that the luckless Type IX U-154 U-154, which was homebound from the Caribbean, had a full load, Suhren arranged via Kerneval to meet U-154 U-154 and take on some of her torpedoes. and take on some of her torpedoes.* Afterward the two VIIs proceeded to and entered the Caribbean Sea, Suhren to the area west of Trinidad, Forster farther west to Panama. Afterward the two VIIs proceeded to and entered the Caribbean Sea, Suhren to the area west of Trinidad, Forster farther west to Panama.

By that time almost all Allied shipping in the Caribbean Sea had been organized into convoys, running between Key West, Trinidad, Aruba, Curacao, and Guantanamo Bay. Most of the air and surface escorts for these convoys were American, but the British and Canadians had each contributed one surface escort group, and the British a squadron of twenty Hudsons from Coastal Command based on Trinidad.

Aware of the expanded convoy networks in the Caribbean, Donitz encouraged his VII skippers to work together informally, if at all possible. Upon finding a convoy, a skipper was to broadcast a contact report, then attack. If other VIIs were nearby, they were to converge on the contact at high speed, mindful that in the Caribbean there was not much sea room for a prolonged convoy chase, that the number of Allied ASW aircraft was seemingly increasing day-by-day and therefore air attacks were likely, and that radio traffic between U-boats should be kept to a minimum.

When Jurgen Wattenberg in the Type IX U-162 U-162 reported a convoy just west of Trinidad on August 19, Suhren in reported a convoy just west of Trinidad on August 19, Suhren in U-564 U-564 unhesitatingly raced to the scene, made contact, and attacked. Notwithstanding "two pistol failures," he claimed he sank a tanker and a freighter for 15,000 tons and damaged two for 13,000 tons, but only the two sinkings for about 13,000 tons could be confirmed, including the 7,000-ton tanker unhesitatingly raced to the scene, made contact, and attacked. Notwithstanding "two pistol failures," he claimed he sank a tanker and a freighter for 15,000 tons and damaged two for 13,000 tons, but only the two sinkings for about 13,000 tons could be confirmed, including the 7,000-ton tanker British Consul. British Consul. Shifting to the area east of Trinidad, in the Atlantic Ocean, for the next ten days, Suhren saw nothing worth a torpedo. However, on August 30, when he closed on Trinidad, he found and sank by torpedo and gun the 8,200-ton Norwegian tanker Shifting to the area east of Trinidad, in the Atlantic Ocean, for the next ten days, Suhren saw nothing worth a torpedo. However, on August 30, when he closed on Trinidad, he found and sank by torpedo and gun the 8,200-ton Norwegian tanker Vardaas. Vardaas.

Having exhausted all torpedoes, Suhren headed for France. He reported five ships (two tankers) sunk for 35,000 tons-an estimate close to the actuality-and four others for 26,000 damaged. The staff at Kerneval misinterpreted his report, logging that Suhren had sunk sunk a total of nine ships for 60,000 tons. Or perhaps the misinterpretation was deliberate to justify yet another honor: the addition of Swords to Suhren's a total of nine ships for 60,000 tons. Or perhaps the misinterpretation was deliberate to justify yet another honor: the addition of Swords to Suhren's Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz on September 1. on September 1. Upon returning to France, Suhren left the boat. Later he took over a newly created and exalted post in Norway, Commander of U-boats, North. Upon returning to France, Suhren left the boat. Later he took over a newly created and exalted post in Norway, Commander of U-boats, North.

Ludwig Forster in the VII U-654 U-654 patrolled off Panama for ten days, August 12 to 21. During that time he saw only one vessel, a fast-moving motor torpedo boat. Upon receiving his interim report, Kerneval shifted the boat to the area directly south of Guantanamo Bay in the Windward Passage. The next day, August 22, a radar-equipped Army Air Forces B-18 of the 45th Bombardment Squadron caught patrolled off Panama for ten days, August 12 to 21. During that time he saw only one vessel, a fast-moving motor torpedo boat. Upon receiving his interim report, Kerneval shifted the boat to the area directly south of Guantanamo Bay in the Windward Passage. The next day, August 22, a radar-equipped Army Air Forces B-18 of the 45th Bombardment Squadron caught U-654 U-654 running on the surface. Attacking swiftly and skillfully, the pilot, P. A. Koening, dropped four shallow-set Torpex depth charges, which straddled the boat. Moments later oil and debris floated to the surface, the last sign of running on the surface. Attacking swiftly and skillfully, the pilot, P. A. Koening, dropped four shallow-set Torpex depth charges, which straddled the boat. Moments later oil and debris floated to the surface, the last sign of U-654 U-654. There were no survivors.

The other six VIIs that sailed to American waters in July went to the Caribbean via the North Atlantic routes. Kerneval directed several of these temporarily to attack convoys and refuel. As related, one veteran boat, Karl Thurmann's U-553 U-553, sank the 9,400-ton British freighter Loch Katrine Loch Katrine from convoy Outbound North 115. During a refueling on August 5, a crewman on the new boat from convoy Outbound North 115. During a refueling on August 5, a crewman on the new boat U-598 U-598, commanded by Gottfried Holtorf, washed overboard and drowned.

Four of the six boats patrolled close to the Windward Passage, on the lookout for Key West-Guantanamo Bay and Key West-Trinidad convoys, which they hoped to attack in loosely coordinated actions. On August 12, the new VII U-658 U-658, commanded by Hans Senkel, age thirty-two, found one, Key West-Trinidad 13. His alert brought in the other three VIIs, which found, in addition, the northbound Trinidad-Key West 12. In the attacks that ensued, Senkel claimed sinking a tanker and freighter for 21,000 tons and a hit on a 6,000-ton freighter, but only one minor sinking, a 1,311-ton Dutch freighter, was confirmed. Gottfried Holtorf in the new U-598 U-598 sank two British ships, a 2,300-ton freighter and the 7,000-ton tanker sank two British ships, a 2,300-ton freighter and the 7,000-ton tanker Empire Corporal Empire Corporal, and damaged the 6,200-ton British tanker Standella. Standella. Karl Thurmann in Karl Thurmann in U-553 sank two freighters for 10,000 tons and so badly damaged a third, the 7,000-ton British Empire Bede U-553 sank two freighters for 10,000 tons and so badly damaged a third, the 7,000-ton British Empire Bede, that she had to be sunk by the British corvette Pimpernel. Pimpernel. The new The new U-600 U-600, commanded by Bernard Zurmuhlen, which had earlier sunk a 130-ton British sailing ship but missed a "destroyer" with a salvo of three torpedoes, sank two freighters for 9,600 tons. Total for the four boats: eight confirmed freighters for 37,200 tons sunk, one tanker damaged.

The overlapping battles with these two opposite-sailing convoys were fierce. The boats reported "strong" air and surface escorts. Zurmuhlen in U-600 U-600 stated that the Allied aircraft were able to locate his boat with great precision at night, indicating they were equipped with ASV radar. Moreover, he said, the surface escorts had "very good sonar" and their depth charges were uncomfortably "accurate." As a result, the stated that the Allied aircraft were able to locate his boat with great precision at night, indicating they were equipped with ASV radar. Moreover, he said, the surface escorts had "very good sonar" and their depth charges were uncomfortably "accurate." As a result, the U-600 U-600 had incurred "considerable" damage that the crew could not repair, and Zurmuhlen was forced to abort. Holtorf in had incurred "considerable" damage that the crew could not repair, and Zurmuhlen was forced to abort. Holtorf in U-598 U-598 likewise reported heavy depth-charge damage that forced him to abort. Homebound, Hans Senkel in the fuel-short likewise reported heavy depth-charge damage that forced him to abort. Homebound, Hans Senkel in the fuel-short U-658 U-658 found another convoy (Panama-Guantanamo 6) from which he sank two freighters for 10,835 tons and damaged another one for 6,466 tons. found another convoy (Panama-Guantanamo 6) from which he sank two freighters for 10,835 tons and damaged another one for 6,466 tons.

Thus three of the four boats at the Windward Passage left for France. Shortly after clearing the Caribbean, Zurmuhlen in U-600 U-600 ran across a big, fast freighter but in spite of "faultless data," he missed with two torpedoes. En route home, he and Senkel in ran across a big, fast freighter but in spite of "faultless data," he missed with two torpedoes. En route home, he and Senkel in U-658 U-658 and Holtorf in and Holtorf in U-598 U-598 refueled from Leo Wolfbauer's tanker refueled from Leo Wolfbauer's tanker U-463 U-463. While entering the channel leading into La Pallice, U-600 U-600 triggered a British mine. The boat survived, but two months were required to repair both this battle damage and that incurred in the Caribbean. Holtorf's triggered a British mine. The boat survived, but two months were required to repair both this battle damage and that incurred in the Caribbean. Holtorf's U-598 U-598 remained in port for 105 days, undergoing battle-damage repairs. remained in port for 105 days, undergoing battle-damage repairs.

Karl Thurmann in U-553 U-553 patrolled the Caribbean for another ten days but found no more targets. Having refueled on the way to American waters and exercised strict fuel discipline, he did not require a refill to get home. His claims, in cluding the big freighter sunk in the North Atlantic, totaled five ships for 32,000 tons, plus a 6,000-ton tanker damaged. Counting overclaims, Thurmann qualified for a patrolled the Caribbean for another ten days but found no more targets. Having refueled on the way to American waters and exercised strict fuel discipline, he did not require a refill to get home. His claims, in cluding the big freighter sunk in the North Atlantic, totaled five ships for 32,000 tons, plus a 6,000-ton tanker damaged. Counting overclaims, Thurmann qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, which was awarded on August 24, while he was still in the Caribbean. Berlin propagandists cheered the award, crediting Thurmann with sinking eighteen ships for 106,000 tons plus damage to twenty others.* When Thurmann reached France, When Thurmann reached France, U-553 U-553 underwent a four-month overhaul and did not resail until January 1943. underwent a four-month overhaul and did not resail until January 1943.

After refueling from a U-tanker, the new U-217 U-217, a Type VIID (minelayer), patrolled off Aruba and Curacao. On the night of August 18, her commander, Kurt Reichenbach-Klinke, age twenty-five, poked his bow into the harbor at Willemstad, Curacao, and shot three torpedoes at the tanker Esso Concord Esso Concord, moored to a pier. He claimed a sinking but it could not be confirmed. The next day he attacked and sank with his gun the 75-ton British sailing vessel Seagull Seagull D, which he claimed was transporting "fifty soldiers." While D, which he claimed was transporting "fifty soldiers." While U-217 U-217 was engaged in this action, an Army Air Forces B-18 found and attacked the boat with depth charges and bombs, inflicting so much damage that Reichenbach-Klinke was compelled to withdraw to a distant area to make repairs. Reporting that "several" of his crew had been felled by heat strokes, Reichenbach-Klinke returned to France on October 16, completing a miserable patrol of ninety-five days, during which he sank no ships other than the sailboat. was engaged in this action, an Army Air Forces B-18 found and attacked the boat with depth charges and bombs, inflicting so much damage that Reichenbach-Klinke was compelled to withdraw to a distant area to make repairs. Reporting that "several" of his crew had been felled by heat strokes, Reichenbach-Klinke returned to France on October 16, completing a miserable patrol of ninety-five days, during which he sank no ships other than the sailboat.

The last of the July boats to enter the Caribbean was Gunther Krech in the VII U-558. U-558. Mere hours behind him came Mere hours behind him came Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Otto Ites in the VII holder Otto Ites in the VII U-94 U-94, who sailed from France on August 2. Both boats refueled from Bruno Vowe's tanker, U-462 U-462, on August 20, each filling their tanks to the brim. The boats then proceeded to the Windward Passage to hunt for convoys. On August 24, Krech in U-558 U-558 slipped through the passage and sank a 2,000-ton British freighter on the south side, a romper from convoy Trinidad-Key West 15. He broke radio silence to report that while in the passage he was bombed and depth-charged by an enemy ASW group composed of aircraft and destroyers working in cooperation. Kerneval directed Krech to leave the area and patrol westward along the south coast of Cuba to the Yucatan Channel. slipped through the passage and sank a 2,000-ton British freighter on the south side, a romper from convoy Trinidad-Key West 15. He broke radio silence to report that while in the passage he was bombed and depth-charged by an enemy ASW group composed of aircraft and destroyers working in cooperation. Kerneval directed Krech to leave the area and patrol westward along the south coast of Cuba to the Yucatan Channel.

Ites in U-94 U-94 combed the southern approaches to the Windward Passage, hunting convoys. On August 27 he found one and flashed an alarm. It was the main body of the heavily escorted northbound convoy Trinidad-Key West 15, consisting combed the southern approaches to the Windward Passage, hunting convoys. On August 27 he found one and flashed an alarm. It was the main body of the heavily escorted northbound convoy Trinidad-Key West 15, consisting of twenty-one merchant ships and nine escorts of mixed nationality. There were no other Type VIIs near enough to attack, but a Type IXC of the July group, U-511 U-511, commanded by Friedrich Steinhoff, responded.

That evening a radar-equipped Catalina of Patrol Squadron 92, based at the American naval installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-facing the Windward Passage-joined the convoy to provide air escort. It was a beautiful tropical night, illuminated by a bright, full moon. At about 3:00 A.M. A.M., August 28, the airmen picked up U-94 U-94 on radar and then saw her on the surface astern of the convoy. The pilot, Gordon R. Fiss, attacked from an altitude of about seventy-five feet, dropping four new, experimental, 625-pound Mark XXIX depth charges, on radar and then saw her on the surface astern of the convoy. The pilot, Gordon R. Fiss, attacked from an altitude of about seventy-five feet, dropping four new, experimental, 625-pound Mark XXIX depth charges,* set to detonate at fifty feet. Ites saw the plane coming and dived, but it was too late to get deep. The heavy, close explosions blew set to detonate at fifty feet. Ites saw the plane coming and dived, but it was too late to get deep. The heavy, close explosions blew U-94 U-94 back to the surface and damaged her propulsion system, cutting her maximum speed to about 11 knots, not enough to evade even the slowest escorts, so Ites dived again. back to the surface and damaged her propulsion system, cutting her maximum speed to about 11 knots, not enough to evade even the slowest escorts, so Ites dived again.

Airman Fiss flew to one of the escorts, the Canadian corvette Oakville Oakville, commanded by Clarence A. King, and flashed an alert by signal lamp. King rang up full speed and upon reaching the site where Fiss had dropped flares, threw over five depth charges set for 100 feet. After the water calmed, King's men got U-94 U-94 on sonar and then by moonlight saw the boat dead ahead on the surface. King unhesitatingly turned on sonar and then by moonlight saw the boat dead ahead on the surface. King unhesitatingly turned Oakville Oakville to ram, machine guns and cannons blazing. to ram, machine guns and cannons blazing. Oakville Oakville struck struck U-94 U-94 a glancing blow, skewing the U-boat around wildly. Hauling off so that he could bring his 4" gun to bear, King got off four rounds, one of which blew away a glancing blow, skewing the U-boat around wildly. Hauling off so that he could bring his 4" gun to bear, King got off four rounds, one of which blew away U-94's U-94's deck gun. Then King rammed deck gun. Then King rammed U-94 U-94 a second time, simultaneously throwing over one depth charge set to explode directly beneath the U-boat. a second time, simultaneously throwing over one depth charge set to explode directly beneath the U-boat.

Incapable of diving or firing back or outrunning Oakville Oakville, Ites gave orders to abandon and scuttle. He and his men swarmed topside into the hurricane of machine-gun and cannon fire from Oakville Oakville, which killed or fatally wounded about a dozen Germans. Hit twice in the leg, Ites leaped into the water as King swung Oakville Oakville around to ram around to ram U-94 U-94 for the third time. for the third time. Oakville Oakville hit the U-boat hard and square abaft the conning tower, tearing gaping holes in her own bottom. At the moment of collision, a "boarding party" consisting solely of one of hit the U-boat hard and square abaft the conning tower, tearing gaping holes in her own bottom. At the moment of collision, a "boarding party" consisting solely of one of Oakville's Oakville's officers, H.E.T. Lawrence, and a petty officer, A. J. Powell, courageously jumped onto the bow of officers, H.E.T. Lawrence, and a petty officer, A. J. Powell, courageously jumped onto the bow of U-94 U-94 with pistols drawn to thwart the scuttling and to capture Enigma documents and/or perhaps even the entire U-boat. At nearly that same moment, the wounded Ites and another severely wounded German swam up to with pistols drawn to thwart the scuttling and to capture Enigma documents and/or perhaps even the entire U-boat. At nearly that same moment, the wounded Ites and another severely wounded German swam up to Oakville Oakville and were hauled aboard. and were hauled aboard.

Complying with standard procedure, the boarders, Lawrence and Powell, rushed the conning tower with pistols to hold the Germans below and thereby thwart the scuttling. The Canadians shot two Germans in the conning tower who ignored their orders. The "extremely frightened" Germans who were still below "set up a terrific clamor," Lawrence reported, so much so that he allowed them to come topside. While Powell held these Germans in loose captivity with his pistol, Lawrence rushed below to the pitch-dark control room, which was rapidly flooding and smelled of "gas." In a hurried search by his own dimming flashlight, Lawrence could find no "secret papers" of any kind. As U-94 U-94 upended and sank, stern first, he grabbed four pairs of binoculars and rushed topside. Boats from upended and sank, stern first, he grabbed four pairs of binoculars and rushed topside. Boats from Oakville Oakville and from another escort, the American four-stack destroyer and from another escort, the American four-stack destroyer Lea Lea, fished the two Canadians and twenty-four Germans from the water.

While Oakville Oakville and and Lea Lea-and the Catalina-were so distracted, Friedrich Steinhoff in the Type IXC U-511 U-511 moved in and attacked the convoy. He fired a full salvo at three different tankers. Astonishingly, in these first shots as skipper, Steinhoff hit all three. He sank the 13,000-ton British moved in and attacked the convoy. He fired a full salvo at three different tankers. Astonishingly, in these first shots as skipper, Steinhoff hit all three. He sank the 13,000-ton British San Fabian San Fabian and the 9,000-ton Dutch and the 9,000-ton Dutch Rotterdam Rotterdam, and damaged the 8,800-ton American Esso Aruba Esso Aruba, which limped into Guantanamo Bay under her own steam. One of three American SCs in the escort rescued the fifty-nine survivors of the two sunken tankers.

The Americans took custody of the twenty-six German survivors of U-94 U-94 at Guananamo Bay. They were smugly satisfied to discover that in Ites they had captured a at Guananamo Bay. They were smugly satisfied to discover that in Ites they had captured a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder, or "star." Over the next several weeks American intelligence officers grilled Ites and his men, who appeared to cooperate and talk freely but who actually revealed very little of value. When the Americans queried Ites about the Enigma machine on holder, or "star." Over the next several weeks American intelligence officers grilled Ites and his men, who appeared to cooperate and talk freely but who actually revealed very little of value. When the Americans queried Ites about the Enigma machine on U-94 U-94, he was disarmingly casual. The machines were not secret, he said. Before the war they had been sold on the open market but they were "useless if the settings were not known." Had he known the Allies wanted an Enigma, Ites went on cavalierly, he would have "brought mine along for you."

There was an unpleasant aftermath to the U-94 U-94 sinking. The commandant of the Guantanamo naval base, George L. Weyler, attempted to enlarge the American contribution and diminish that of the Canadians by insisting that the destroyer sinking. The commandant of the Guantanamo naval base, George L. Weyler, attempted to enlarge the American contribution and diminish that of the Canadians by insisting that the destroyer Lea Lea had "opened fire" on had "opened fire" on U-94 U-94 and therefore had earned part credit for her destruction. Furthermore, Weyler's official report of the action to higher American authorities contained veiled criticisms of the Canadians. Based on the reports of the American crews of the Catalina and and therefore had earned part credit for her destruction. Furthermore, Weyler's official report of the action to higher American authorities contained veiled criticisms of the Canadians. Based on the reports of the American crews of the Catalina and Lea Lea, Oakville's Oakville's skipper, Clarence King, was able to demolish Weyler's case and refute his tactless report. Official credit for the kill was divided equally between Catalina pilot Fiss and his aircrew, and skipper King and the skipper, Clarence King, was able to demolish Weyler's case and refute his tactless report. Official credit for the kill was divided equally between Catalina pilot Fiss and his aircrew, and skipper King and the Oakville Oakville crew. The crew. The U-94 U-94 was the sixth U-boat to be killed all or in part by Canadian forces within six weeks, a remarkable achievement, but one that was not realized at the time. was the sixth U-boat to be killed all or in part by Canadian forces within six weeks, a remarkable achievement, but one that was not realized at the time.

Donitz deduced promptly that Ludwig Forster in U-654 U-654 and Otto Ites in and Otto Ites in U-94 U-94 had been sunk, most likely, he believed, by enemy air. The loss of the much-admired twenty-four-year-old had been sunk, most likely, he believed, by enemy air. The loss of the much-admired twenty-four-year-old Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Ites-who had discovered the cause of the deep-running torpedoes in January-was keenly felt throughout the U-boat arm. His loss may have influenced Donitz's decision to send no more Type VIIs to the Caribbean to attack convoys. The area was too confined, the convoys too heavily guarded by Allied ASW forces. Thus holder Ites-who had discovered the cause of the deep-running torpedoes in January-was keenly felt throughout the U-boat arm. His loss may have influenced Donitz's decision to send no more Type VIIs to the Caribbean to attack convoys. The area was too confined, the convoys too heavily guarded by Allied ASW forces. Thus U-94 U-94 became the last of the Type VIIs to draw an assignment inside the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico. became the last of the Type VIIs to draw an assignment inside the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico.

Unaware of these actions, Gunther Krech in U-558 U-558, the only Type VII to make two patrols inside the Caribbean, cruised westward along the south coast of Cuba to the southern approaches to the Yucatan Channel. He remained in that once-rich area for ten days without seeing anything worth a torpedo. Then he cruised south to Panama and eastward to Aruba, Curacao, and Trinidad. Finally, on September 13, he ran into a convoy sailing from Trinidad via Aruba to Guantanamo. In two successive attacks, Krech claimed numerous hits that sank a tanker and freighter for 15,000 tons and damaged a tanker and freighter for 12,000 tons. Postwar analysis credited three big ships sunk: two freighters for 15,200 tons and the 6,700-ton Norwegian tanker Vilja Vilja. Three days later in the waters west of Trinidad, he sank a 2,600-ton American freighter, bringing his confirmed sinkings for this patrol to five ships for 26,400 tons. These sinkings qualified Krech for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, which was awarded on September 17* as he pointed as he pointed U-558 U-558's prow eastward. Upon reaching France, the boat underwent a three-month overhaul and did not resail until January 1943.

Besides Ites in U-94 U-94, only two other Type VIIs sailed to American waters in August. Both were veteran boats: Ulrich Gra in U-69 U-69 and Hans-Heinrich Giessler in and Hans-Heinrich Giessler in U-455 U-455. Both were assigned to lay TMB (magnetic) mines: Graf in U-69 U-69 to reseed the entrance to Chesapeake Bay where Degen in to reseed the entrance to Chesapeake Bay where Degen in U-701 U-701 had planted a field; Giessler to foul Charleston, South Carolina, in place of Bigalk in had planted a field; Giessler to foul Charleston, South Carolina, in place of Bigalk in U-751 U-751, who was lost before he got out of the Bay of Biscay. Both boats carried torpedoes as well.

MORE P POOR R RETURNS FROM THE T TYPE IX IXS.

Eighteen Type IXs sailed to the Americas in late summer, ten in July and eight in August. As related, three of the July group that went by northern routes ran into convoys or joined organized packs and remained in the North Atlantic. Of the fifteen Type IXs that reached American waters, twelve were on maiden patrols. ran into convoys or joined organized packs and remained in the North Atlantic. Of the fifteen Type IXs that reached American waters, twelve were on maiden patrols.

In the July group of seven, four patrolled east and southeast of Trinidad, where traffic to and from Freetown, Cape Town, and North and South America converged. The other three boats patrolled inside the Caribbean Sea. All seven encountered "heavy" air patrols.