The military setback in North Africa was of great concern to the delegates at the Argonaut conference. To prevent a rout of the British Eighth Army, the loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and a possible linkup of German forces in the Middle East, the Americans offered the following emergency forces: * The American 2nd Armored Division, commanded by George S. Patton, Jr., which was training in a California desert. In response to a summons from Marshall, Patton arrived in Washington on June 22 to draw plans for the movement. After several days of study, Patton recommended that it would be more appropriate to send two American divisions to North Africa. In any case, the scheme died aborning owing to the lack of shipping and other factors.

* Three hundred new American Sherman tanks, right off the assembly line, as well as 100 new 105mm (antitank) howitzers. The tanks, less engines, were loaded into fast cargo ships. The 300 tank engines were loaded into a single ship, the 6,200-ton American Fairport Fairport. This special fast military convoy, AS 4, sailed hurriedly from New York on July 13, escorted by two cruisers and seven destroyers.

As related, while homebound, a Type IX of the April group, U-161 U-161, commanded by Albrecht Achilles, came upon this important special convoy on July 16. Achilles boldly set up on and shot at two of the nine cargo ships. As Churchill recalled in his war memoir, the torpedoes hit the Fairport Fairport, which sank with all the tank engines. Two modern destroyers, Kearny Kearny and and Wilkes Wilkes, jumped on U-161 U-161 and depth-charged and hunted her for nine hours. They claimed a kill, but it was not so. Achilles reported that the and depth-charged and hunted her for nine hours. They claimed a kill, but it was not so. Achilles reported that the U-161 U-161 incurred "considerable damage," but neither he nor Donitz was aware of the vital cargo in the holds of the incurred "considerable damage," but neither he nor Donitz was aware of the vital cargo in the holds of the Fairport Fairport.

Upon learning of the loss of the Fairport Fairport, Churchill wrote in his memoir, Roosevelt directed immediately that 300 more engines for the Shermans be loaded and sent to North Africa. This "fast ship" actually overtook the convoy. The first ships of the convoy, Churchill continued, reached Port Said on September 2 with 193 Shermans and twenty-eight 105mm (antitank) howitzers. The rest of the ships arrived September 5. The actual number of weapons delivered to Port Said was 317 Sherman tanks and ninety-four 105mm antitank guns.

* Six American Army Air Forces groups: three fighter, one medium bomber, and one heavy bomber (B-24s). One fighter group, the 57th, composed of seventy P-40s, was rushed overseas on the aircraft carrier Ranger Ranger. Departing the States on July 1, she was escorted by Task Force 22: the heavy cruiser Augusta Augusta, the brand-new light cruiser Juneau Juneau, and six destroyers. As before, Ranger Ranger launched these planes while at sea off the Gold Coast (on July 19). They flew to Accra, Ghana, thence to Egypt. launched these planes while at sea off the Gold Coast (on July 19). They flew to Accra, Ghana, thence to Egypt.

The rest of these air groups plus 4,000 Army Air Forces ground personnel began moving to North Africa by ship or other means in July. In addition, Roosevelt diverted to North Africa forty A-20 medium bombers, which had been en route to the Soviet Union, plus a special group of twenty-five B-24s en route to China* and transferred the twenty-four heavy bombers of the Tenth Air Force from India to Egypt. and transferred the twenty-four heavy bombers of the Tenth Air Force from India to Egypt.

Churchill boarded a Boeing Flying Clipper at Baltimore on June 25 for the return trip to the British Isles. Fortunately for Britain, Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps ran low on gasoline, ammunition, and other supplies, and could not advance into Egypt beyond El Alamein. In subsequent weeks, Churchill swept a broom through the top echelons of his Middle East forces, appointing Harold Alexander as Commander in Chief, and Bernard Law Montgomery as commanding general of the Eighth Army. These new generals were to benefit spectacularly from the arrival in North Africa of the American Sherman tanks, 105mm (antitank) howitzers, and airpower, and by new breaks into German Army Enigma. ran low on gasoline, ammunition, and other supplies, and could not advance into Egypt beyond El Alamein. In subsequent weeks, Churchill swept a broom through the top echelons of his Middle East forces, appointing Harold Alexander as Commander in Chief, and Bernard Law Montgomery as commanding general of the Eighth Army. These new generals were to benefit spectacularly from the arrival in North Africa of the American Sherman tanks, 105mm (antitank) howitzers, and airpower, and by new breaks into German Army Enigma.

Notwithstanding the Argonaut talks, American and British global war planners were still at sixes and sevens. In view of the German advances in the Soviet Union, Marshall still wanted to carry out Sledgehammer in 1942. Contrarily, the British still opposed Sledgehammer and because of the threat Rommel posed to Egypt and the Middle East, urged Gymnast (renamed Torch), the invasion of Vichy French Algeria and Morocco.

To resolve this impasse, Roosevelt, who favored Torch, sent King and Marshall, who did not, to London to confer with Churchill, Harry Hopkins, and Dwight Eisenhower, who had only just arrived to command all American forces in Europe. King and Marshall departed by air on July 16 and arrived in London the next day. The upshot of these talks was that at British insistence, Sledgehammer was finally abandoned and Torch took its place. It was to be staged when the shipping situation permitted, hopefully in October.

GROUP H HECHT.

The arrival in France of four new Type IXs and exceptionally efficient refit operations at the French bases enabled Donitz to order twenty-one boats to American waters in May: twelve Type VIIs and nine Type IXs. Notwithstanding increasing risks and declining returns, all the Type VIIs and one older, short-range IXB, U-124 U-124, were directed to patrol the United States East Coast waters. The eight other longer-range IXs were to be evenly divided between the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. The May boats were to be supported by the tanker U-459 U-459 and by the big XB minelayer, and by the big XB minelayer, U-116 U-116, which resailed May 16 after twelve days in port for battle-damage repairs.

By this time codebreakers at B-dienst B-dienst had developed what the OKM diarist characterized as "excellent" information on the routes and sailing dates of North Atlantic convoys. Noting that the Type IXB had developed what the OKM diarist characterized as "excellent" information on the routes and sailing dates of North Atlantic convoys. Noting that the Type IXB U-124 U-124 and six Type VIIs were to sail for the Americas at about the same time in early May, and six Type VIIs were to sail for the Americas at about the same time in early May,* Donitz ordered them to form a group and rake the North Atlantic convoy routes as they proceeded westward. If they found and attacked a convoy, several purposes could be served. The battle would toughen green U-boat crews, ferret out new Allied detection gear and weaponry, and-hopefully-discourage further transfer of ASW forces from the North Atlantic run to the Caribbean. Should a battle develop, the big XB minelayer Donitz ordered them to form a group and rake the North Atlantic convoy routes as they proceeded westward. If they found and attacked a convoy, several purposes could be served. The battle would toughen green U-boat crews, ferret out new Allied detection gear and weaponry, and-hopefully-discourage further transfer of ASW forces from the North Atlantic run to the Caribbean. Should a battle develop, the big XB minelayer U-116 U-116 was to sail in exclusive support of the group. After replenishment from was to sail in exclusive support of the group. After replenishment from U-116 U-116, the boats were to proceed to American waters.

Designated group Hecht Hecht, the seven boats sailed from French bases May 3 to May 7. Two were commanded by young Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Otto Ites in the Type VII holders: Otto Ites in the Type VII U-94 U-94, and Johann Mohr in the Type IXB U-124 U-124. Of the other five boats, three were experienced and two were green. Already at sea, vainly seeking her blockade runner, the famous U-96 U-96, commanded by a new skipper, Hans-Jurgen Hellriegel, age twenty-four, onetime first watch officer to Engelbert Endrass, joined group Hecht Hecht west of the Bay of Biscay, making a total of eight U-boats. west of the Bay of Biscay, making a total of eight U-boats.

Some of the Hecht Hecht boats were fitted with a new defensive device designed to confuse enemy sonar. Known as boats were fitted with a new defensive device designed to confuse enemy sonar. Known as Bolde Bolde (probably derived from kobold, German for goblin or deceiving spirit), it was a perforated or degradable canister filled with calcium hydride that was fired from an internal tube called a (probably derived from kobold, German for goblin or deceiving spirit), it was a perforated or degradable canister filled with calcium hydride that was fired from an internal tube called a Pillenwerfer Pillenwerfer (pill thrower) and floated at a depth of about 100 feet. When saltwater mixed with the calcium hydride, it generated a great mass of hydrogen bubbles for about six minutes. The bubbles reflected sonar pulses, giving off an echo that, to an inexperienced sonar operator, sounded like a submarine hull. The hope was that by laying a trail of (pill thrower) and floated at a depth of about 100 feet. When saltwater mixed with the calcium hydride, it generated a great mass of hydrogen bubbles for about six minutes. The bubbles reflected sonar pulses, giving off an echo that, to an inexperienced sonar operator, sounded like a submarine hull. The hope was that by laying a trail of Boldes Boldes between it and a pursuing enemy, a U-boat might elude sonar. between it and a pursuing enemy, a U-boat might elude sonar.*

Acting on the "excellent" intelligence on Allied convoys generated by B-dienst B-dienst, group Hecht Hecht raked westward along specific sea-lanes. In the early hours of May 11, one of the experienced boats, raked westward along specific sea-lanes. In the early hours of May 11, one of the experienced boats, U-569 U-569, commanded by Hans Peter Hinsch, made contact with a convoy, Outbound North (Slow) 92, in mid-Atlantic. It was escorted by the American escort group A-3. The group was composed of the big Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutter Spencer Spencer, the modern (1940) American destroyer Gleaves Gleaves, and four Canadian corvettes, one of which, Bittersweet Bittersweet, was equipped with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar. A rescue ship, Bury Bury, trailing the convoy, was fitted with Huff Duff.

Hinsch in U-569 U-569 got off a contact report which brought up the two Ritterkreuz holders, Ites in got off a contact report which brought up the two Ritterkreuz holders, Ites in U-94 U-94, and Mohr in U-124 U-124. The rescue ship Bury Bury DFed Hinsch's transmissions, but the American escort commander, John B. Heffernan (in DFed Hinsch's transmissions, but the American escort commander, John B. Heffernan (in Gleaves Gleaves), failed to appreciate the full extent of the impending danger. That night Mohr easily penetrated the thin, unalert screen. In two separate, close attacks, he fired seven torpedoes at overlapping columns of ships. He claimed sinking five vessels for 19,000 tons and damage to one; postwar records credited him with sinking four freighters (three British, one Greek) for 21,800 tons. Coming in behind Mohr, Otto Ites sank one confirmed freighter for 5,600 tons, from which he captured the captain. The shadower, Hinsch in U-569 U-569, claimed one ship sunk but it could not be confirmed.

During the next day, May 12, six of the eight boats of group Hecht Hecht made contact with the convoy. The three new arrivals were commanded by green skippers on first patrols: Hellriegel in the veteran made contact with the convoy. The three new arrivals were commanded by green skippers on first patrols: Hellriegel in the veteran U-96 U-96, Horst Dieterichs, age thirty, in the new U-406 U-406, and Heinrich Muller-Edzards, age thirty-two, in the new U-590 U-590. Only one of the six boats had any luck. Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Otto Ites sank two more freighters for 8,900 tons. He approached the lifeboats of one sinking ship, the Swedish holder Otto Ites sank two more freighters for 8,900 tons. He approached the lifeboats of one sinking ship, the Swedish Tolken Tolken, to capture her captain, but gunners still on board the ship drove U-94 U-94 off and under. Foul weather and poor visibility thwarted further attacks. Assessing the damage-seven confirmed ships sunk-the staff at Western Approaches severely criticized the performance of the American and Canadian escorts. The Canadian naval historian Marc Milner wrote in his book North Atlantic Run that as a result, the American escort commander, Heffernan, "was quietly moved to another command." off and under. Foul weather and poor visibility thwarted further attacks. Assessing the damage-seven confirmed ships sunk-the staff at Western Approaches severely criticized the performance of the American and Canadian escorts. The Canadian naval historian Marc Milner wrote in his book North Atlantic Run that as a result, the American escort commander, Heffernan, "was quietly moved to another command."

The easy success of Hecht Hecht against this unalert convoy and the miserable hunting off the United States East Coast in May persuaded Donitz to change the plan. The XB minelayer against this unalert convoy and the miserable hunting off the United States East Coast in May persuaded Donitz to change the plan. The XB minelayer U-116 U-116 replenished the eight boats of replenished the eight boats of Hecht Hecht with fuel, food, and torpedoes, but only two of the seven Type VIIs were authorized to proceed to America: Otto von Bulow's with fuel, food, and torpedoes, but only two of the seven Type VIIs were authorized to proceed to America: Otto von Bulow's U-404 U-404 and Ernst-August Rehwinkel's and Ernst-August Rehwinkel's U-578 U-578. The other six boats of Hecht Hecht, commanded by three veteran and three green skippers, were to remain in the North Atlantic to exploit the information on Allied convoys coming from B-dienst B-dienst.

The information from B-dienst B-dienst was plentiful, but bad weather bedeviled was plentiful, but bad weather bedeviled Hecht Hecht. Nearly a month passed before the boats locked firmly onto another convoy. This was Outbound North (Slow) 100, escorted by the well-trained and experienced Canadian group C-1, which, however, had sailed minus one destroyer and one corvette (both in refit), leaving only five ships: the veteran Canadian destroyer Assiniboine Assiniboine and four corvettes, two British and two Free French. All five escorts were equipped with radar (four with Type 271) and the convoy rescue ship, and four corvettes, two British and two Free French. All five escorts were equipped with radar (four with Type 271) and the convoy rescue ship, Gothland Gothland, was fitted with Huff Duff. Additional protection was provided by the fighter-catapult ship, Empire Ocean Empire Ocean, carrying a Hurricane fighter.

Mohr in U-124 U-124 found and reported this convoy on June 8. After Hinsch in found and reported this convoy on June 8. After Hinsch in U-569 U-569 made contact and took over as shadower, Mohr closed to attack, but the feisty, battlewise, radar-equipped corvettes blocked his approach. Undeterred, Mohr coolly shifted his attack to the escorts, firing two stern tubes at one "destroyer" and two bow tubes at another "destroyer." The stern torpedoes missed, but the bow torpedoes hit the British-built, Free French-manned corvette made contact and took over as shadower, Mohr closed to attack, but the feisty, battlewise, radar-equipped corvettes blocked his approach. Undeterred, Mohr coolly shifted his attack to the escorts, firing two stern tubes at one "destroyer" and two bow tubes at another "destroyer." The stern torpedoes missed, but the bow torpedoes hit the British-built, Free French-manned corvette Mimose Mimose, which disintegrated in a ball of flames. The other four escorts counterattacked U-124 U-124 and drove her off, thwarting Mohr's attack on the convoy itself. At first light the next day, and drove her off, thwarting Mohr's attack on the convoy itself. At first light the next day, Assiniboine Assiniboine found four survivors of found four survivors of Mimose Mimose, but no more.

By the afternoon of June 9, all six boats of group Hecht Hecht were in contact with the convoy, but new problems arose. The three new skippers (Hellriegel, Dieterichs, Muller-Edzards) reported defective engines, probably the result of the hard chase in heavy seas. Donitz therefore ordered those three boats to withdraw, leaving only Ites in were in contact with the convoy, but new problems arose. The three new skippers (Hellriegel, Dieterichs, Muller-Edzards) reported defective engines, probably the result of the hard chase in heavy seas. Donitz therefore ordered those three boats to withdraw, leaving only Ites in U-94 U-94, Mohr in U-124 U-124, and Hinsch in U-569 U-569 to mount the second attack. Leading the assault that night, Ites sank two British freighters for 11,600 tons and Mohr sank one 4,100-ton British freighter. Later, Hinsch hit and stopped a straggler, the 4,500-ton British freighter, to mount the second attack. Leading the assault that night, Ites sank two British freighters for 11,600 tons and Mohr sank one 4,100-ton British freighter. Later, Hinsch hit and stopped a straggler, the 4,500-ton British freighter, Pontypridd Pontypridd. Then he and Ites put her under with finishing shots, to share credit. Impenetrable fog saved the convoy from further attacks.

Numerous eastbound convoys eluded group Hecht Hecht in June. These included troopship convoy AT 16 from New York, combined with NA 10 from Halifax. This formation consisted in total of six troopships escorted by Task Force 35: the battleship in June. These included troopship convoy AT 16 from New York, combined with NA 10 from Halifax. This formation consisted in total of six troopships escorted by Task Force 35: the battleship New York New York and nine American destroyers. Three of the destroyers in this formation ( and nine American destroyers. Three of the destroyers in this formation (Eberle, Ericsson, Roe) peeled off in Halifax on June 16 and escorted the four troopships of convoy NA 11 from there.

Following the battle with Outbound North (Slow) 100, the six boats of Hecht Hecht reversed course and combed convoy routes on the return to France, handicapped by Ites in reversed course and combed convoy routes on the return to France, handicapped by Ites in U-94 U-94, who also developed engine problems. Ironically, on June 16, Ites found a big convoy, Outbound North (Slow) 102. Composed of sixty-three merchant ships, it was escorted by the American group A 3, which had a new commander, Paul R. Heineman. In view of the known presence of Hecht Hecht, A-3 had been beefed up to nine veteran, very alert ships: three big Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutters, Campbell Campbell, Duane Duane, and Ingham Ingham, the four-stack destroyer Leary Leary, the Canadian destroyer Restigouche Restigouche, and four Canadian corvettes. Most of the ships had radar; Restigouche Restigouche had Huff Duff. had Huff Duff.

All six U-boats attempted to mount a loosely coordinated attack on convoy Outbound North (Slow) 102, but it failed. Restigouche Restigouche DFed the assembly and subsequent chatter and alerted the escorts. The green skipper, Horst Dieterichs in DFed the assembly and subsequent chatter and alerted the escorts. The green skipper, Horst Dieterichs in U-406 U-406, fired a full salvo of five torpedoes at two "destroyers," but all missed and the "destroyers" ran him off. Other escorts blocked the approaches of Mohr in U-124 U-124. Still others caught and depth-charged Ites in U-94 U-94 and Muller-Edzards in and Muller-Edzards in U-590 U-590 for seven and nine hours, respectively. Lucky to have survived these merciless poundings, both boats limped to France with heavy damage, where they remained for forty-one and forty-seven days, respectively, under repair and training. for seven and nine hours, respectively. Lucky to have survived these merciless poundings, both boats limped to France with heavy damage, where they remained for forty-one and forty-seven days, respectively, under repair and training.

Mohr reported that the convoy had escaped in fog and that further pursuit was "hopeless." However, by chance, at dawn on June 18 he happened upon it again and unhesitatingly and audaciously mounted a lone surface attack in broad daylight, firing four bow torpedoes at three big freighters from long range. He claimed two sinkings and damage to the third ship, but postwar records credited only the sinking of the 5,600-ton American freighter Seattle Spirit Seattle Spirit. Ringing up on full speed, Mohr eluded the escorts and set a course for Lorient.

The six boats of group Hecht Hecht returned to France in the last week of June, during the height of Kerneval's intense investigation into the possibility that the Allies had miniaturized radar for aircraft and surface-ship use. Calling up Mohr on a new radio-telephone which scrambled his end of the conversations, Donitz asked if Mohr had detected any sign that the Allies had shipboard radar. Mohr reported that he had been forced to take evasive action seven times during his patrol but had been directly run down and attacked by the escorts only once. He therefore concluded that the Allies had returned to France in the last week of June, during the height of Kerneval's intense investigation into the possibility that the Allies had miniaturized radar for aircraft and surface-ship use. Calling up Mohr on a new radio-telephone which scrambled his end of the conversations, Donitz asked if Mohr had detected any sign that the Allies had shipboard radar. Mohr reported that he had been forced to take evasive action seven times during his patrol but had been directly run down and attacked by the escorts only once. He therefore concluded that the Allies had not not yet installed radar on the escorts(!). yet installed radar on the escorts(!).

Including the U-96 U-96, which had sailed earlier, the six Hecht Hecht boats patrolled for an average of fifty-seven days. They attacked three Outbound North (Slow) convoys, 92, 100, and 102, sinking thirteen ships (including the corvette boats patrolled for an average of fifty-seven days. They attacked three Outbound North (Slow) convoys, 92, 100, and 102, sinking thirteen ships (including the corvette Mimose Mimose) for about 62,500 tons. The Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders, Otto Ites in holders, Otto Ites in U-94 U-94 and Johann Mohr in and Johann Mohr in U-124 U-124, accounted for 92 percent of the sinkings. Mohr got seven ships for 32,500 tons; Ites got five ships for 25,500 tons. In addition, Ites and Hinsch in U-569 U-569 shared credit for one 4,500-ton freighter. The three new skippers, Hellriegel, Dieterichs, and Muller-Edzards, sank no ships. shared credit for one 4,500-ton freighter. The three new skippers, Hellriegel, Dieterichs, and Muller-Edzards, sank no ships.

Although the young Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders Ites and Mohr had done well as usual, group holders Ites and Mohr had done well as usual, group Hecht Hecht as a whole had to be deemed a keen disappointment. The return on investment, including twenty-five days of exclusive support from as a whole had to be deemed a keen disappointment. The return on investment, including twenty-five days of exclusive support from U-116 U-116, was poor. Moreover, the numerous convoy chases were hard on the boats; refits and battle damage repairs averaged forty-three days.* On analysis, it was seen that sinkings by the On analysis, it was seen that sinkings by the Hecht Hecht boats diminished dramatically when they confronted large, skilled escort groups, as they did in the last convoy, Outbound North (Slow) 102. As in earlier times, foul weather and the fog on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland had spoiled much of the hunting. boats diminished dramatically when they confronted large, skilled escort groups, as they did in the last convoy, Outbound North (Slow) 102. As in earlier times, foul weather and the fog on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland had spoiled much of the hunting.

MINES, AGENTS, AND M MISHAPS.

The diversion of five Type VIIs to group Hecht Hecht reduced the number of VIIs of the May group to reach United States waters to eight. Five of the eight had first to carry out special missions: three were to lay minefields at New York and the Chesapeake and Delaware bays, and two were to land reduced the number of VIIs of the May group to reach United States waters to eight. Five of the eight had first to carry out special missions: three were to lay minefields at New York and the Chesapeake and Delaware bays, and two were to land Abwehr Abwehr agents in New York and Florida. agents in New York and Florida.

The three boats assigned to lay mines sailed from France on May 19. While en route to America, Joachim Berger in U-87 U-87 was directed to mine Boston rather than New York because the ships repatriating German and Italian diplomats ( was directed to mine Boston rather than New York because the ships repatriating German and Italian diplomats (Gripsholm, for one) had not yet sailed from New York.

Horst Degen in U-701 U-701 arrived off the mouth of Chesapeake Bay after dark on June 12. It was the time of the new moon and pitch black. To facilitate the heavy traffic in and out of Chesapeake Bay, the Cape Henry and Cape Charles lights were burning. The lights enabled Degen to fix his position and to navigate directly to the main channel. Working quietly on electric motors close to an unalert patrol boat, at about 1:30 arrived off the mouth of Chesapeake Bay after dark on June 12. It was the time of the new moon and pitch black. To facilitate the heavy traffic in and out of Chesapeake Bay, the Cape Henry and Cape Charles lights were burning. The lights enabled Degen to fix his position and to navigate directly to the main channel. Working quietly on electric motors close to an unalert patrol boat, at about 1:30 A.M. A.M., June 13, Degen laid the fifteen delayed-action TMB mines in thirty-six feet of water in about thirty minutes. He then ran out to deep water, submerged, and loaded his five empty tubes with torpedoes and later downloaded two air torpedoes from topside canisters.

In the late afternoon of June 15, a coastal convoy from Key West, KN 109, composed of twelve ships and six escorts, arrived off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. At about that same time Degen's mines, delayed for sixty hours, activated. As the convoy stood into Norfolk, it passed directly over Degen's field. The mines severely damaged two big, loaded American tankers, R. C. Tuttle R. C. Tuttle and and Esso Augusta Esso Augusta, and destroyed the 500-ton British ASW trawler Kingston Ceylonite Kingston Ceylonite, which was escorting the freighter Delisle Delisle, damaged earlier in Florida waters by Suhren in U-564 U-564. Seventeen of the thirty-two-man British crew on the trawler perished. Believing at first these ships had been torpedoed, the convoy escort, including the four-stack destroyer Bainbridge Bainbridge and the 165-foot Coast Guard cutters and the 165-foot Coast Guard cutters Dione Dione and and Calypso Calypso, ran about madly throwing off depth charges. One of Bainbridge Bainbridge's missiles detonated another German mine, which damaged her, but only slightly. Two days later, June 17, another of the mines blew up the outbound 7,100-ton American freighter Santore Santore, which could not be salvaged. Upon hearing (incorrectly) from B-dienst B-dienst that these mines had sunk four merchant ships and a destroyer, Donitz radioed Degen a "well done," and ordered him to patrol the dangerous waters off Cape Hatteras. that these mines had sunk four merchant ships and a destroyer, Donitz radioed Degen a "well done," and ordered him to patrol the dangerous waters off Cape Hatteras.

Paul-Karl Loeser in U-373 U-373 laid his minefield off Cape May, New Jersey, in the mouth of Delaware Bay, on the night of June 11. Apparently the field was mislaid or the mines malfunctioned. One mine sank the 400-ton American tugboat, laid his minefield off Cape May, New Jersey, in the mouth of Delaware Bay, on the night of June 11. Apparently the field was mislaid or the mines malfunctioned. One mine sank the 400-ton American tugboat, John R. Williams John R. Williams, on June 24, but no others caused any damage. After planting the field, Loeser proceeded to the Cape Hatteras area to reinforce Degen in U-701 U-701. He reported a double miss on a 4,000-ton freighter on June 14, and a single hit for damage on a 5,000-ton British freighter on June 15. Since he did not have enough torpedoes left to justify a refueling, he sailed at slow speed for France, arriving after fifty-one days at sea.

Joachim Berger in U-87 U-87 laid his mines off Boston, but the field produced no results whatsoever. After reloading his tubes with torpedoes, he patrolled north from Boston toward Halifax. Late on June 15, in foul weather, he intercepted convoy Halifax-Boston 25, comprised of six ships and five escorts. Berger sank two big ships from the convoy: the 8,400-ton British freighter laid his mines off Boston, but the field produced no results whatsoever. After reloading his tubes with torpedoes, he patrolled north from Boston toward Halifax. Late on June 15, in foul weather, he intercepted convoy Halifax-Boston 25, comprised of six ships and five escorts. Berger sank two big ships from the convoy: the 8,400-ton British freighter Port Nicholson Port Nicholson, and the 5,900-ton American passenger-cargo vessel Cherokee Cherokee, which had taken on military passengers at Iceland for a voyage to the States. Eighty-six of the 169 men on board perished in the Cherokee Cherokee sinking, one of the very few times in World War II that a U-boat sank a ship carrying Allied troops. sinking, one of the very few times in World War II that a U-boat sank a ship carrying Allied troops.

Berger cruised farther north to Halifax. On June 22 a Hudson of Canadian Air Force Squadron 11 found and attacked the boat, but missed. The next day the squadron leader, W. C. Van Camp, saturated the area with five aircraft. At dawn, one of the Hudsons came out of the sun and fog and caught U-87 U-87 on the surface and dropped three close depth charges near her stern. The explosions knocked the port diesel engine off its mounts, wrecked the stern tube (and its torpedo), and damaged part of the aft main-storage battery. For the second time in as many patrols to Canadian waters, Berger was forced to abort with battle damage and limped home, lucky to have survived. on the surface and dropped three close depth charges near her stern. The explosions knocked the port diesel engine off its mounts, wrecked the stern tube (and its torpedo), and damaged part of the aft main-storage battery. For the second time in as many patrols to Canadian waters, Berger was forced to abort with battle damage and limped home, lucky to have survived.

The U-87 U-87, U-373 U-373, and U-701 U-701 planted forty-five TMB mines. Only those of Degen's planted forty-five TMB mines. Only those of Degen's U-701 U-701 off Norfolk did any significant damage: a 7,100-ton freighter and a British ASW trawler sunk, two big tankers totaling 22,900 tons damaged (but salvaged). Nonetheless Donitz directed the staff to prepare for other mining missions in the Americas. off Norfolk did any significant damage: a 7,100-ton freighter and a British ASW trawler sunk, two big tankers totaling 22,900 tons damaged (but salvaged). Nonetheless Donitz directed the staff to prepare for other mining missions in the Americas.

The two VIIs designated to land the Abwehr Abwehr agents in the United States were the agents in the United States were the U-202 U-202, commanded by thirty-eight-year-old Hans-Heinz Linder, and the U-584 U-584, commanded by Joachim Deecke, age twenty-nine, classmates from the crew of 1933. Linder had made several patrols in the North Atlantic, including one to the United States in March. Deecke had made several patrols, all in Arctic waters. After a complete overhaul in Germany, he arrived in France on May 16 for Atlantic duty. Each boat was to carry four agents. Linder in U-202 U-202 was to land his four on Long Island; Deecke in was to land his four on Long Island; Deecke in U-584 U-584 was to land his four in north Florida. was to land his four in north Florida.

The eight agents had been schooled in sabotage. Each team brought along four crates of explosives that were to be used to blow up aircraft and tank factories and shipyards. To facilitate concealment and travel, the agents had been given about $154,000 in American money. Several of the agents had lived in the United States. Some had fathers, mothers, wives, and other relatives and close friends living there. The two team leaders were to meet in Cincinnati on July 4 to plan and coordinate the sabotage.

Linder in U-202 U-202 arrived off the eastern end of Long Island near Amagansett on the evening of June 12 in heavy mist and fog. Inching perilously close to the beach in shallow water, the crew launched an inflatable rubber boat, manned by two seamen and tethered by a line to arrived off the eastern end of Long Island near Amagansett on the evening of June 12 in heavy mist and fog. Inching perilously close to the beach in shallow water, the crew launched an inflatable rubber boat, manned by two seamen and tethered by a line to U-202 U-202. The four agents* loaded the four crates of explosives and a seabag into the boat, then climbed aboard. As Linder's deck crew played out the tether, the boat drifted through crashing surf to the beach. The four agents unloaded the four boxes and the seabag. Upon feeling tugs on the rope, Linder's deck crew pulled the boat and the two seamen back to loaded the four crates of explosives and a seabag into the boat, then climbed aboard. As Linder's deck crew played out the tether, the boat drifted through crashing surf to the beach. The four agents unloaded the four boxes and the seabag. Upon feeling tugs on the rope, Linder's deck crew pulled the boat and the two seamen back to U-202 U-202.

During the wait, U-202 U-202 had grounded on a sand bar. Linder had gone ahead and astern with full power on the diesels and sallied ship, but had grounded on a sand bar. Linder had gone ahead and astern with full power on the diesels and sallied ship, but U-202 U-202 would not budge. As dawn approached, the men topside could hear cocks crowing and automobile horns. Believing the boat was doomed, Linder prepared to destroy secret papers and scuttle, but fortunately for the Germans, the heavy mist lingered. When the tide flooded, Linder lightened ship by dumping several fuel tanks and was able to work would not budge. As dawn approached, the men topside could hear cocks crowing and automobile horns. Believing the boat was doomed, Linder prepared to destroy secret papers and scuttle, but fortunately for the Germans, the heavy mist lingered. When the tide flooded, Linder lightened ship by dumping several fuel tanks and was able to work U-202 U-202 free and run to deep water. Upon reporting his special mission carried out, he was ordered to patrol the Cape Hatteras area. free and run to deep water. Upon reporting his special mission carried out, he was ordered to patrol the Cape Hatteras area.

On the beach, the four would-be saboteurs changed into civilian clothes and buried the four boxes of explosives and the seabag. As they were so engaged, a twenty-one-year-old Coast Guard beach patrolman, John C. Cullen, hearing German voices, emerged from the mist to confront them. The leader of the team, Georg Dasch, asserted that they were shipwrecked fishermen and offered Cullen $300 to "forget" that he had found them on the beach. Outnumbered and unarmed, Cullen pretended to go along with the bribe. He accepted the money (actually only $240), but he returned immediately to his headquarters to spread the alarm. Meanwhile, the four agents split up and walked to Amagansett to catch trains into New York City, where they were to rendezvous later that day at a restaurant.

Dasch wrote subsequently that he despised Hitler and the Nazis and for that reason he decided to defect and to betray the scheme at the first opportunity. He confided his decision to his teammate Ernest Burger, who agreed to join in the betrayal. On about June 17 or 18, Dasch took a train to Washington, D.C., to reveal the full scheme to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. Burger remained in a New York hotel to keep a close eye on the other two agents of the team.

Meanwhile, late on June 16, Joachim Deecke in U-584 U-584 closed the north Florida coast with the other four agents. closed the north Florida coast with the other four agents. In the early hours of the following morning Deecke put them and their four crates of explosives ashore by inflatable rubber boat at Ponte Vedra Beach, seven miles south of Jacksonville. Deecke withdrew In the early hours of the following morning Deecke put them and their four crates of explosives ashore by inflatable rubber boat at Ponte Vedra Beach, seven miles south of Jacksonville. Deecke withdrew U-584 U-584 with no difficulties and upon reporting his mission accomplished, he, too, was ordered to patrol the Cape Hatteras area. The four agents buried the explosives, changed into civilian clothes, and took a bus to Jacksonville, where they split up into two groups and went on to various locations in the Midwest. with no difficulties and upon reporting his mission accomplished, he, too, was ordered to patrol the Cape Hatteras area. The four agents buried the explosives, changed into civilian clothes, and took a bus to Jacksonville, where they split up into two groups and went on to various locations in the Midwest.

In Washington, on June 18, Dasch made contact with the FBI. The Bureau sent a senior agent, D. L. Traynor, to the Mayflower Hotel to see Dasch, who revealed all about his own group and the other group that landed in Florida. Within twenty-four hours, the FBI had rounded up the other three agents of Dasch's team, Burger, Heinck, and Quirin, and, based on information from Dasch, were soon hot on the trail of the team that landed in Florida. On June 23, FBI agents arrested the other team leader, Kerling, and his teammate, Thiel. By June 27, the last two agents, Haupt and Neubauer, were in custody.

Concealing Dasch's defection, FBI director Hoover immediately announced the capture of the eight agents and the arrest of fourteen relatives or friends. The agents and ten relatives or friends were tried in Washington, New York, and Chicago, July to October, 1942. Six of the eight agents who came by U-boat were found guilty of wartime espionage and electrocuted in a jail in Washington, D.C., on August 8. Dasch and his codefector Burger were sentenced to life and thirty years imprisonment, respectively. In 1948, President Harry S Truman commuted their sentences to the five years, eight months already served and returned them to Germany, where in 1959 Dasch published a book about the mission and his reasons for betraying his cohorts. The ten relatives or friends were also found guilty. In the postwar years Truman commuted their sentences as well.

Upon detachment from group Hecht Hecht early in its operations, von Bulow in early in its operations, von Bulow in U-404 U-404 and Rehwinkel in and Rehwinkel in U-578 U-578 proceeded independently to the East Coast of the United States. Both boats had made prior and successful patrols to the Americas. proceeded independently to the East Coast of the United States. Both boats had made prior and successful patrols to the Americas.

Inbound to his area, von Bulow in U-404 U-404 sank three ships for 12,300 tons. The first two were 5,500-ton American freighters. He got the first with torpedoes and stopped the second, sank three ships for 12,300 tons. The first two were 5,500-ton American freighters. He got the first with torpedoes and stopped the second, West Notus West Notus, with one round from his deck gun. After the crew took to the lifeboats, von Bulow sent a party to scuttle the ship. While his party was so engaged, he rounded up some stray survivors, put them in a sound lifeboat, and gave some of the men medical assistance and others bottles of Perrier water. His third victim was the 1,300-ton Swedish neutral Anna Anna. When von Bulow missed her with a single torpedo, he surfaced and sank her with his gun. Her loss drew a diplomatic protest from Stockholm, but von Bulow insisted that the ship was sailing blacked out and zigzagging, and so he was not blamed. After that, Kerneval directed von Bulow to patrol the Cape Hatteras area.

While still well offshore, Rehwinkel in U-578 U-578 sank two big freighters for about 13,000 tons. The first was a 6,300-ton Dutchman, sank two big freighters for about 13,000 tons. The first was a 6,300-ton Dutchman, Polyphemus Polyphemus, sailing in company with another big ship, which Rehwinkel chased doggedly but lost. The second was the 6,800-ton Norwegian Berganger Berganger, loaded with coffee, which Rehwinkel stopped with a single torpedo. When he surfaced to put the ship under with his deck gun, the Norwegian shot back accurately, forcing U-578 U-578 to submerge and shoot two more torpedoes to sink the ship. Still well offshore, on June 10, Rehwinkel encountered a big freighter at which he fired his last six torpedoes, but none hit. He remained in the offshore area another week, then headed home. to submerge and shoot two more torpedoes to sink the ship. Still well offshore, on June 10, Rehwinkel encountered a big freighter at which he fired his last six torpedoes, but none hit. He remained in the offshore area another week, then headed home.

After planting his mines at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, Horst Degen in U-701 U-701 patrolled the waters off Cape Hatteras, as directed. On June 16 and 17 he reported scant traffic, heavy ASW aircraft and surface-ship patrols, and a double miss on a freighter, leaving him with six torpedoes. The aircraft had dropped "many well-aimed bombs," one of which had damaged his main periscope. One of three "destroyers" he spotted in formation had peeled off and attacked patrolled the waters off Cape Hatteras, as directed. On June 16 and 17 he reported scant traffic, heavy ASW aircraft and surface-ship patrols, and a double miss on a freighter, leaving him with six torpedoes. The aircraft had dropped "many well-aimed bombs," one of which had damaged his main periscope. One of three "destroyers" he spotted in formation had peeled off and attacked U-701 U-701 with depth charges. Degen did not say so, but his air-cleaning machinery was not working properly and his men were nauseous half the time and suffering from the heat inside the boat. Hence, every afternoon at about 1:00 or 2:00, Degen surfaced for about ten minutes, started the diesels, and sucked fresh air into the boat through the conning-tower hatch. with depth charges. Degen did not say so, but his air-cleaning machinery was not working properly and his men were nauseous half the time and suffering from the heat inside the boat. Hence, every afternoon at about 1:00 or 2:00, Degen surfaced for about ten minutes, started the diesels, and sucked fresh air into the boat through the conning-tower hatch.

In the early dark hours of June 19, U-701 U-701 encountered a small (165-ton) Navy trawler, encountered a small (165-ton) Navy trawler, YP-389 YP-389. She had just come out from Morehead City, North Carolina, to patrol the outer edge of a newly laid Cape Hatteras defensive minefield to warn friendly ships not to get too close. Degen boldly attacked the trawler with his deck gun. The YP-389 YP-389 was armed with a 3" bow gun, but it was out of commission, so she could not shoot back. Degen put was armed with a 3" bow gun, but it was out of commission, so she could not shoot back. Degen put YP-389 YP-389 under and sailed away. Six of the crew died, but eighteen were rescued the next day by Coast Guard cutters. Gary Gentile wrote that a Navy court of inquiry recommended that under and sailed away. Six of the crew died, but eighteen were rescued the next day by Coast Guard cutters. Gary Gentile wrote that a Navy court of inquiry recommended that YP-389 YP-389's captain be court-martialed for "failure to seek encounter with the enemy" and "culpable inefficiency."

In due course, four other VIIs of the small May group proceeded to Cape Hatteras: the U-202 U-202 and and U-584 U-584, which had landed the agent teams in New York and Florida; U-332 U-332, commanded by Johannes Liebe, which had sailed independently from France; and von Bulow in U-404 U-404. Soon after Liebe in U-332 U-332 arrived, an ASW aircraft caught and bombed him and forced him to abort. During his long, slow voyage home, Liebe refueled from one of two new U-tankers arrived, an ASW aircraft caught and bombed him and forced him to abort. During his long, slow voyage home, Liebe refueled from one of two new U-tankers* and sank by torpedo and gun two lone freighters for 10,600 tons. The first was the 6,000-ton American vessel and sank by torpedo and gun two lone freighters for 10,600 tons. The first was the 6,000-ton American vessel Raphael Semmes Raphael Semmes. Liebe reported that he fished ten injured survivors from the water, medicated their wounds, then released them to the lifeboats. The second was the 4,600-ton Portuguese neutral Leonidas M. Leonidas M., sunk against firm but belated orders from Kerneval. Liebe captured her captain and engineer and took them to France.

The other four VIIs at or converging on the Cape Hatteras-Cape Lookout area had a busy time during the last ten days of June.

* En route to the area, Linder in U-202 U-202, who had landed the agent team on Long Island, sank the neutral 4,900-ton Argentine freighter Rio Tercero Rio Tercero on June 22. He picked up her captain, who angrily protested the sinking, claiming there were thirteen Argentine flags displayed on the sides and superstructure. Linder attempted to placate the captain with some brandy and a pair of shoes, but the sudden appearance of ASW aircraft forced him to break off discussions, release the captain, and dive. Linder had no luck at Cape Hatteras but well offshore on the last day of the month, he sank the 5,900-ton American vessel, on June 22. He picked up her captain, who angrily protested the sinking, claiming there were thirteen Argentine flags displayed on the sides and superstructure. Linder attempted to placate the captain with some brandy and a pair of shoes, but the sudden appearance of ASW aircraft forced him to break off discussions, release the captain, and dive. Linder had no luck at Cape Hatteras but well offshore on the last day of the month, he sank the 5,900-ton American vessel, City of Birmingham City of Birmingham, crowded with 381 passengers and crew. Although the ship went down in four minutes, only nine persons perished. Ships sailing in company or nearby rescued the 372 survivors. Homebound, Linder refueled from the new tanker U-460 U-460, then intercepted convoy Outbound South 34 near the Azores, and brought up several other boats, which profited.

* Deecke in U-584 U-584 had a frustrating time, attributed by some to the shock of shifting from Arctic waters to near-tropical American waters. On June 22, he found two big tankers. A diesel-engine breakdown thwarted an attack on the first, but he shot six torpedoes at the second. Three torpedoes were duds and three missed, and the ship got away, he reported. Off Hatteras on June 27, he found a convoy and fired two torpedoes at an escorting "destroyer," but both missed. After refueling from had a frustrating time, attributed by some to the shock of shifting from Arctic waters to near-tropical American waters. On June 22, he found two big tankers. A diesel-engine breakdown thwarted an attack on the first, but he shot six torpedoes at the second. Three torpedoes were duds and three missed, and the ship got away, he reported. Off Hatteras on June 27, he found a convoy and fired two torpedoes at an escorting "destroyer," but both missed. After refueling from U-460 U-460 for the trip home, he sighted a huge, 18,000-ton tanker and chased, but she was too fast for for the trip home, he sighted a huge, 18,000-ton tanker and chased, but she was too fast for U-584 U-584. After fifty-nine days at sea, Deecke arrived in France. He had landed the agent team in Florida but he had sunk no ships.

* Coming up to the Hatteras area from Georgia, in the early hours of June 24, von Bulow in U-404 U-404, who had refueled from the XB (minelayer) U-116 U-116, sank a 3,300-ton Yugoslavian freighter with three torpedoes. Later that day, he found an eleven-ship northbound convoy off Hatteras, escorted by the 165-foot Coast Guard cutter Dione Dione, a British ASW trawler, and several smaller vessels. After sunset, von Bulow boldly ran in and sank two medium freighters from the convoy, Nordal Nordal and and Manuela Manuela, but the cutter Dione Dione and ASW aircraft foiled a second attack. Home-bound on June 29, he encountered and sank the 6,800-ton Norwegian freighter Moldanger, sailing alone. Nine of the thirty crewmen who were rescued spent forty-eight harrowing days on a life raft. Von Bulow claimed sinking seven freighters for 42,172 tons, making his the most successful of all the VII patrols to the Americas in tonnage sunk, but postwar analysis reduced the claim to seven freighters for 31,061 tons, which almost exactly tied the record patrol of Hans Oestermann in and ASW aircraft foiled a second attack. Home-bound on June 29, he encountered and sank the 6,800-ton Norwegian freighter Moldanger, sailing alone. Nine of the thirty crewmen who were rescued spent forty-eight harrowing days on a life raft. Von Bulow claimed sinking seven freighters for 42,172 tons, making his the most successful of all the VII patrols to the Americas in tonnage sunk, but postwar analysis reduced the claim to seven freighters for 31,061 tons, which almost exactly tied the record patrol of Hans Oestermann in U-754 U-754 to Hatteras in April. to Hatteras in April.

* Horst Degen in U-701 U-701 doggedly patrolled off Hatteras, surfacing briefly in early afternoon to suck foul air out of the boat. German sources credit Degen with damage to the big Norwegian freighter doggedly patrolled off Hatteras, surfacing briefly in early afternoon to suck foul air out of the boat. German sources credit Degen with damage to the big Norwegian freighter Tamesis Tamesis on June 25, but other sources suggest that ship hit one of the American defensive mines. In any case, on June 25, but other sources suggest that ship hit one of the American defensive mines. In any case, Tamesis Tamesis was salvaged. On June 27, Degen intercepted a thirty-one-ship southbound convoy and shot two torpedoes at a 7,000-ton tanker, was salvaged. On June 27, Degen intercepted a thirty-one-ship southbound convoy and shot two torpedoes at a 7,000-ton tanker, British Freedom British Freedom. One torpedo hit, but the tanker was sailing in ballast and was salvaged. One of the escorts, a converted yacht, St. Augustine St. Augustine, dropped thirteen depth charges and forced Degen off. At noon the next day, Degen came upon the big, fully loaded 14,000-ton American tanker William A. Rockefeller William A. Rockefeller, escorted by a Coast Guard aircraft. He stopped the tanker with a single torpedo. Seeing the shadow of U-701 U-701, the aircraft counterattacked with two depth charges and vectored in an 83-foot Coast Guard cutter, Number 470 Number 470. The cutter threw over seven depth charges, which prevented another daylight attack and then rescued the crewmen. Degen returned to the scene after dark and put another torpedo into the tanker. That one sent her to the bottom, the only tanker sunk by a U-boat in the Eastern Sea Frontier in June.

To then, Degen had conducted an exceptional patrol. His mines had sunk the British ASW trawler Kingston Ceylonite Kingston Ceylonite and the 7,100-ton American freighter and the 7,100-ton American freighter Santore Santore, damaged two American tankers, the 11,600-ton Robert C. Tuttle Robert C. Tuttle and the 11,200-ton and the 11,200-ton Esso Augusta Esso Augusta, and slightly damaged the four-stack destroyer Bain-bridge. By torpedo and gun he had sunk the tanker William A. Rockefeller William A. Rockefeller and the trawler and the trawler YP-389 YP-389, and damaged the 7,000-ton tanker British Freedom British Freedom and possibly the 7,300-ton Norwegian freighter and possibly the 7,300-ton Norwegian freighter Tamesis Tamesis. In all: possibly nine ships for about 60,000 tons sunk or damaged, the best VII patrol of all.

The other two VIIs of the May group that had laid mines, U-87 U-87 and and U-373 U-373, were within sight of Lorient by July 7. Strangely, Degen in U-701 U-701, who had sailed the same day as they and had not yet refueled, was still off Cape Hatteras, seeking one more ship to sink with his remaining two or three torpedoes, even though he had found no traffic for nine straight days and nights. The heat and foul air inside the boat were nearly unbearable and he faced a tedious three-week voyage home.

Shortly after 1:00 P.M. P.M. that day, Degen cautiously surfaced to freshen the air in the boat. He and his first watch officer, Konrad Junker, a junior officer, and the senior quartermaster, Gunther Kunert, went to the bridge to serve as lookouts, each man responsible for covering one quarter (90 degrees) of the horizon. Seeing no aircraft or ships, Degen sucked fresh air into the boat for a while, then gave orders to dive. As Junker was preparing to go below, he suddenly shouted: "Aircraft! Port quarter." Momentarily stunned, Degen turned angrily on Junker: "You saw it too late!" that day, Degen cautiously surfaced to freshen the air in the boat. He and his first watch officer, Konrad Junker, a junior officer, and the senior quartermaster, Gunther Kunert, went to the bridge to serve as lookouts, each man responsible for covering one quarter (90 degrees) of the horizon. Seeing no aircraft or ships, Degen sucked fresh air into the boat for a while, then gave orders to dive. As Junker was preparing to go below, he suddenly shouted: "Aircraft! Port quarter." Momentarily stunned, Degen turned angrily on Junker: "You saw it too late!"

The plane was one of thirteen Hudsons of the Army Air Forces' 396th Medium Bombardment Squadron. Formerly based in California on ASW duty, the outfit had recently moved to the Marine Corps air station at Cherry Point, North Carolina. The squadron flew six five-hour ASW missions during daylight hours, patrolling offshore between Cape Hatteras and Charleston, South Carolina. The plane was piloted by twenty-four-year-old Harry J. Kane, assisted by four aircrew. At 2:12 P.M. P.M. that day, while flying at 1,500 feet in broken clouds, Kane himself spotted that day, while flying at 1,500 feet in broken clouds, Kane himself spotted U-701 U-701 about seven miles off his left wingtip. Reflexively, he turned directly toward the U-boat on a descending flight path and alerted his crew, which made ready three 325-pound Mark XVII depth charges, fitted with newly issued fuses set to detonate at twenty-five feet. about seven miles off his left wingtip. Reflexively, he turned directly toward the U-boat on a descending flight path and alerted his crew, which made ready three 325-pound Mark XVII depth charges, fitted with newly issued fuses set to detonate at twenty-five feet.

Although Degen had dived U-701 U-701, it was too late to get "deep." Kane passed over the boat's swirl at an altitude of fifty feet and dropped all three depth charges. The first charge fell twenty-five feet short of the boat but the next two hit close to or on U-701 U-701's stern. The explosions wrecked and flooded all of the boat aft of the conning tower. Within two minutes the control room filled with salt water almost to the overhead. Unable to blow the ballast tanks, Degen immediately led an escape party through the conning-tower hatch. Eighteen men got out that way, rising in the giant air bubbles. Unknown to Degen, when the boat hit bottom, eighteen others escaped through the bow torpedo-room loading hatch. The Germans estimated that about seven of the total crew of forty-three died in the sinking or the escape procedure.

Kane circled overhead, watching the two separate groups of survivors pop to the surface. He dropped four life vests and a rubber lifeboat to the Germans and marked the location with a smoke bomb. He then notified all agencies concerned by radio and attempted to guide an 83-foot Coast Guard cutter, Number 472 Number 472, by radio and signal lamp to the site of the sinking. However, by that time the smoke bomb had exhausted itself and the swift current of the Gulf Stream had swept the two separate groups of survivors well to the north, and the cutter found nothing. By 4:30 P.M. P.M., Kane was low on fuel and had to leave.

American aircraft, patrol boats, and a blimp scoured the seas for the survivors on the following day, July 9, but found nothing. Huddled together in two groups-each unknown to the other-the Germans began to die one by one from shock and exposure or madness from drinking saltwater. Degen's rapidly dwindling group clung to a makeshift "raft," consisting of three escape lungs and three life preservers (two of the preservers from the Hudson) lashed together. The men scavenged a lemon and a coconut that drifted by.

About noon the next day, July 10, a Navy blimp, K-8, piloted by George S. Middleton, found seven survivors of U-701 U-701 in two groups about 110 miles offshore. The blimp crew lowered a life raft, blankets, water, food, and a first-aid kit, then radioed for a seaplane. A Coast Guard pilot, Richard L. Burke, homed on the blimp and landed near the seven survivors, who had been in the water forty-nine hours. Among the living were Degen and his senior quartermaster, Kunert, and three men who had escaped from the bow compartment. Burke flew the survivors to Norfolk, where they were hospitalized and then turned over to ONI and FBI officials. Later in the day, the 83-foot Coast Guard cutter in two groups about 110 miles offshore. The blimp crew lowered a life raft, blankets, water, food, and a first-aid kit, then radioed for a seaplane. A Coast Guard pilot, Richard L. Burke, homed on the blimp and landed near the seven survivors, who had been in the water forty-nine hours. Among the living were Degen and his senior quartermaster, Kunert, and three men who had escaped from the bow compartment. Burke flew the survivors to Norfolk, where they were hospitalized and then turned over to ONI and FBI officials. Later in the day, the 83-foot Coast Guard cutter Number 480 Number 480 recovered five German bodies. No sign of the other thirty-one men of recovered five German bodies. No sign of the other thirty-one men of U-701 U-701 was ever found. was ever found.*

The ONI interrogators wrote that the seven survivors of U-701 U-701 were grateful for their rescue and appeared to be cooperative. They revealed much of interest, including the important news that U-tankers had come into service in the North Atlantic. However, the survivors artfully concealed knowledge of their own and were grateful for their rescue and appeared to be cooperative. They revealed much of interest, including the important news that U-tankers had come into service in the North Atlantic. However, the survivors artfully concealed knowledge of their own and U-87 U-87's and U-373 U-373's mining missions and the landing of Abwehr Abwehr agents by agents by U-202 U-202 and and U-584 U-584. After the ONI had milked the survivors dry-or so it was assumed-Degen and Kunert were incarcerated in an officers' POW camp in Arizona and the five enlisted men at camps elsewhere. The news about the U-tankers was slow to reach the operating forces; the British continued to doubt that it was true.

In all, the eight VIIs of the May group that reached American waters sank twenty ships for about 102,000 tons, including three trawlers for 1,000 tons. This was an average of 2.5 ships for 12,750 tons sunk per boat per patrol. One boat, von Bulow's U-404 U-404, accounted for nearly one-third of all the sinkings and the tonnage. Excluding the lost U-701 U-701, the boats were at sea for an average of sixty days. The minefields planted by U-87 U-87, U-373 U-373, and U-701 U-701 caused the Americans no little consternation, but the forty-five mines, which displaced fifteen torpedoes in the boats, actually sank only two trawlers and one freighter for a total of about 8,000 tons. The fifteen displaced torpedoes might have achieved much more. caused the Americans no little consternation, but the forty-five mines, which displaced fifteen torpedoes in the boats, actually sank only two trawlers and one freighter for a total of about 8,000 tons. The fifteen displaced torpedoes might have achieved much more.

Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans were unaware of a major shipping accident that might have yielded more sinkings yet. On the night of June 28, the 350-foot merchant ship Stephen R. Jones Stephen R. Jones, en route from Norfolk to Boston with 6,300 tons of coal, ran aground in the Cape Cod Canal, then capsized and broke in half. This mishap blocked the canal, forcing all north and southbound ship traffic in that area to go "outside" around Cape Cod. Owing to the destruction of the ship and to strong currents in the canal, it took about four weeks to clear away all the wreckage, repair damage, and reopen the canal. Had the Germans known about this mishap, Donitz could have concentrated the U-boats off Cape Cod, probably with good results and without great risk, inasmuch as a large pool of deep water (650-700 feet) lies fifteen miles off the cape.

This temporary closing of the Cape Cod Canal lent impetus to a proposed plan to transfer the assembling and sailing of Halifax and Slow convoys from Canadian ports to New York.

MORE R RECORD P PATROLS BY THE T TYPE I IXS.

Eight Type IXs, including three new arrivals from Germany, sailed to the Americas in May. Four had made prior patrols to the Americas but one of them, U-129 U-129, had a new skipper, replacing Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Nikolaus Clausen. The other veteran, holder Nikolaus Clausen. The other veteran, U-68 U-68, had made three prior patrols to Freetown and the South Atlantic.

Donitz intended that the first two IXs to sail in May, U-158 U-158 and and U-504 U-504-both experienced boats-were to patrol off the mouth of the Mississippi River. However, there was a mixup in the issuance of the orders. As a result, Erich Rostin in U-158 U-158 patrolled the north end of the Yucatan Channel and Fritz Poske in patrolled the north end of the Yucatan Channel and Fritz Poske in U-504 U-504 patrolled the south end of the Yucatan Channel, and the mouth of the Mississippi River was left unthreatened temporarily. patrolled the south end of the Yucatan Channel, and the mouth of the Mississippi River was left unthreatened temporarily.

South of the Yucatan Channel, the very senior (crew of 1923) thirty-seven-year-old Fritz Poske in U-504 U-504 sank a small British freighter on May 29. Then, it seemed, all traffic ceased and eleven frustrating days passed before it resumed. After that, in the week from June 8 to June 14, Poske sank five more freighters, bringing his total to six for about 20,000 tons. He then returned to France without refueling, completing a voyage of sixty-seven days. sank a small British freighter on May 29. Then, it seemed, all traffic ceased and eleven frustrating days passed before it resumed. After that, in the week from June 8 to June 14, Poske sank five more freighters, bringing his total to six for about 20,000 tons. He then returned to France without refueling, completing a voyage of sixty-seven days.

While en route to his assigned area north of the Yucatan Channel, Erich Rostin in U-158 U-158 sank three ships: two in the mid-Atlantic (one the 8,100-ton British tanker sank three ships: two in the mid-Atlantic (one the 8,100-ton British tanker Darina Darina) and one south of Cuba. After passing north through the Yucatan Channel into the Gulf of Mexico, between June 4 and June 7, Rostin sank three more freighters. When the mixup in orders was discovered, Rostin was directed to patrol the mouth of the Mississippi River, to which, belatedly, U-67 U-67, U-129 U-129, and the new U-157 U-157 were also headed. Arriving first, Rostin in were also headed. Arriving first, Rostin in U-158 U-158 sank two big tankers, the 13,500-ton Panamanian Sheherazade and the aged (1918) 8,200-ton American Cities Service Toledo (83,000 barrels of crude oil) on June 11 and 12. sank two big tankers, the 13,500-ton Panamanian Sheherazade and the aged (1918) 8,200-ton American Cities Service Toledo (83,000 barrels of crude oil) on June 11 and 12.

On his course to the Mississippi River via the Old Bahama Channel and the Straits of Florida, Wolf Henne, age thirty-six, in the new U-157 U-157 found and sank a 6,400-ton American tanker, found and sank a 6,400-ton American tanker, Hagan Hagan, which was loaded with molasses. Upon learning of this loss, the commander of the Gulf Sea Frontier, James Kauffman, directed all available forces to "hunt this submarine to exhaustion and destroy it."

An Army Air Forces B-18 picked up U-157 U-157 on ASV radar at first light on June 11. Closing to two miles, the aircrew saw on ASV radar at first light on June 11. Closing to two miles, the aircrew saw U-157 U-157 on the surface and attacked, passing over the boat at 900 feet, but the attack failed when the bomb-bay doors malfunctioned. Making a diving turn, the B-18 came in a second time at 300 feet, but by then on the surface and attacked, passing over the boat at 900 feet, but the attack failed when the bomb-bay doors malfunctioned. Making a diving turn, the B-18 came in a second time at 300 feet, but by then U-157 U-157 was nearly under. The plane dropped four Mark XVII depth charges set for twenty-five feet. All charges detonated, but the outcome was unknown. An hour and a half later a Pan American Airways commercial airliner saw the U-boat on the surface. But still later that morning, three other Army aircraft could not find her. was nearly under. The plane dropped four Mark XVII depth charges set for twenty-five feet. All charges detonated, but the outcome was unknown. An hour and a half later a Pan American Airways commercial airliner saw the U-boat on the surface. But still later that morning, three other Army aircraft could not find her.

An armada of ASW vessels sailed from the schools in Key West and Miami. The Key West group, composed of nine ships, included the four-stack destroyers Dahlgren Dahlgren and and Noa Noa, and the 165-foot Coast Guard cutters Thetis Thetis and and Triton Triton. The Miami group was composed of five PCs, reinforced by the four-stack destroyer Greer Greer, which joined it on June 12. All fifteen vessels converged in the Florida Straits between Key West and Havana.

The American air and sea forces hunted U-157 U-157 relentlessly for forty-eight hours, June 11 to June 13. On the night of June 12-13, radar-equipped Army Air Forces B-18s reestablished contact with the U-boat. At dawn on June 13, Kauffman directed the Key West group to the site and recalled the Miami group. At about 4:00 relentlessly for forty-eight hours, June 11 to June 13. On the night of June 12-13, radar-equipped Army Air Forces B-18s reestablished contact with the U-boat. At dawn on June 13, Kauffman directed the Key West group to the site and recalled the Miami group. At about 4:00 P.M. P.M., the 165-foot Coast Guard cutter Thetis Thetis got a "strong" sonar contact. Her captain, Nelson C. McCormick, who had earlier commanded a sister ship, got a "strong" sonar contact. Her captain, Nelson C. McCormick, who had earlier commanded a sister ship, Dione Dione, off Cape Hatteras, carried out an immediate and skillful attack, dropping ten depth charges in two runs, which brought up huge air bubbles and oil. The destroyer Noa Noa, the 165-foot Coast Guard cutter Triton Triton, and three other vessels converged on Thetis Thetis and dropped twenty-two more depth charges at the oil slick. and dropped twenty-two more depth charges at the oil slick.

These attacks without doubt destroyed U-157 U-157, with the loss of all hands. Thetis Thetis and the other vessels found not only great quantities of oil but also two pairs of trousers, a small tube of oil made in Germany, and pieces of deck grating and other wood. The Army Air Forces rightfully claimed part credit for the kill, as did and the other vessels found not only great quantities of oil but also two pairs of trousers, a small tube of oil made in Germany, and pieces of deck grating and other wood. The Army Air Forces rightfully claimed part credit for the kill, as did Noa Noa and and Triton Triton and several other vessels, but Kauffman gave sole credit to McCormick in and several other vessels, but Kauffman gave sole credit to McCormick in Thetis Thetis. Donitz was unaware of the loss for a number of days.

The other two IXs en route to the mouth of the Mississippi River, U-67 U-67 and and U-129 U-129, were several days behind U-157 U-157 and had no hint of her loss either. Passing through the Florida Straits on June 16, Gunther Muller-Stockheim in and had no hint of her loss either. Passing through the Florida Straits on June 16, Gunther Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 sank a 2,200-ton Nicaraguan freighter very close to the site of the sank a 2,200-ton Nicaraguan freighter very close to the site of the U-157 U-157 loss. Two nights later, on June 18, the new skipper of loss. Two nights later, on June 18, the new skipper of U-129 U-129, Hans-Ludwig Witt, age thirty-two, who had put down two big freighters in the mid-Atlantic, sank a 3,500-ton American freighter in the west end of the Old Bahama Channel. The following day Witt encountered-and reported-two convoys in the Straits of Florida. However, as there were no other U-boats nearby to help Witt, who was a green skipper, Donitz forbade him to attack or even shadow these convoys.

Still unaware that U-157 U-157 was lost, Kerneval suddenly realized that its revised orders had directed four boats to the mouth of the Mississippi River. To relieve this dangerous congestion, Kerneval directed Witt's was lost, Kerneval suddenly realized that its revised orders had directed four boats to the mouth of the Mississippi River. To relieve this dangerous congestion, Kerneval directed Witt's U-129 U-129 and Rostin's and Rostin's U-158 U-158 to patrol the coast of Mexico-Germany's newest enemy-from the Yucatan Channel to Tampico, Mexico's principal oil port. Only Muller-Stockheim's to patrol the coast of Mexico-Germany's newest enemy-from the Yucatan Channel to Tampico, Mexico's principal oil port. Only Muller-Stockheim's U-67 U-67 and Henne's (lost) and Henne's (lost) U-157 U-157 were to patrol the mouth of the Mississippi River. were to patrol the mouth of the Mississippi River.

Both Rostin and Witt found good hunting in Mexican waters. In the week June 17 to June 23, Rostin in U-158 U-158 sank four more ships, including the Norwegian tanker sank four more ships, including the Norwegian tanker Moira Moira, 1,600 tons, bringing his total for this patrol to an astonishing twelve confirmed ships (four tankers) for 61,200 tons. This was the best patrol by any boat to the Americas and it earned Rostin a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, awarded by radio on June 28.* The new skipper, Witt, in The new skipper, Witt, in U-129 U-129 sank five more ships, including two Mexican tankers: the 7,000-ton sank five more ships, including two Mexican tankers: the 7,000-ton Tuxpan Tuxpan and the 2,000-ton and the 2,000-ton Las Choapas Las Choapas.

Homebound, all torpedoes expended, Rostin in U-158 U-158 encountered the 4,000-ton Latvian freighter encountered the 4,000-ton Latvian freighter Everalda Everalda in the open ocean midway between North Carolina and the island of Bermuda. He stopped the ship with his deck gun, took the captain and "one Spaniard" prisoner, and sent a party on board to capture her secret papers and scuttle her. This sinking, which Rostin reported by radio, raised his confirmed score for this patrol to a record thirteen ships for 65,108 tons. in the open ocean midway between North Carolina and the island of Bermuda. He stopped the ship with his deck gun, took the captain and "one Spaniard" prisoner, and sent a party on board to capture her secret papers and scuttle her. This sinking, which Rostin reported by radio, raised his confirmed score for this patrol to a record thirteen ships for 65,108 tons.

Rostin's report of this latest sinking and the capture of two prisoners and secret documents went to Kerneval at about noon, June 30. Several British DF installations, including one on the island of Bermuda merely 130 miles to the southeast, picked up Rostin's transmissions and plotted a fix. Bermuda then relayed the U-boat's position to an aircraft of the American Navy's Bermuda-based Patrol Squadron 74, equipped with Mariner flying boats. A Mariner pilot, Richard E. Schreder, turned immediately toward the estimated position of the U-boat. After a run of merely fifty miles, he found U-158 U-158 cruising on the surface. He could see "about fifteen men" lounging on deck, sunning themselves, an inexplicably careless lapse so close to Bermuda. Schreder attacked, dropping two demolition bombs that missed, and two Mark XVII depth charges with shallow settings. One of the latter hit the boat's bridge and wedged in the superstructure, the aircrew reported. When Rostin dived to escape, it apparently detonated, fatally damaging cruising on the surface. He could see "about fifteen men" lounging on deck, sunning themselves, an inexplicably careless lapse so close to Bermuda. Schreder attacked, dropping two demolition bombs that missed, and two Mark XVII depth charges with shallow settings. One of the latter hit the boat's bridge and wedged in the superstructure, the aircrew reported. When Rostin dived to escape, it apparently detonated, fatally damaging U-158 U-158, which sank with no survivors.

Unaware of the loss, when U-158 U-158 did not appear for resupply from a U-tanker northeast of Bermuda, Donitz assumed Rostin had had an engine and/or a radio failure. Hoping for the best, he directed the U-tanker to stand by at the rendezvous during certain hours for a full week. All other boats were to keep an eye out for did not appear for resupply from a U-tanker northeast of Bermuda, Donitz assumed Rostin had had an engine and/or a radio failure. Hoping for the best, he directed the U-tanker to stand by at the rendezvous during certain hours for a full week. All other boats were to keep an eye out for U-158 U-158. When the facts were learned after the war, it was to be remarked that Rostin had enjoyed his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for only two days. for only two days.

Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 arrived off the mouth of the Mississippi River on June 19. Inasmuch as Henne in arrived off the mouth of the Mississippi River on June 19. Inasmuch as Henne in U-157 U-157 had been sunk off Key West and had been sunk off Key West and U-129 U-129 and and U-158 U-158 had been sent to patrol the Mexican coastline, Muller-Stockheim had this rich territory all to himself for a time. Ranging the Gulf Coast from Florida to Texas, in the three weeks from June 20 to July 13, Muller-Stockheim attacked six tankers. He sank four and damaged two had been sent to patrol the Mexican coastline, Muller-Stockheim had this rich territory all to himself for a time. Ranging the Gulf Coast from Florida to Texas, in the three weeks from June 20 to July 13, Muller-Stockheim attacked six tankers. He sank four and damaged two* and also sank a 2,200-ton freighter, making his confirmed sinkings for the patrol six ships for 30,000 tons. After a protracted voyage home on one engine, and a refueling, he reached France on August 8, having been at sea eighty-one days. and also sank a 2,200-ton freighter, making his confirmed sinkings for the patrol six ships for 30,000 tons. After a protracted voyage home on one engine, and a refueling, he reached France on August 8, having been at sea eighty-one days.

Returning from the Mexican coast, the new skipper Witt in U-129 U-129 patrolled the Yucatan Channel, going south to Honduras then back north to the Gulf of Mexico. He sank three more ships, including the 6,300-ton Russian tanker patrolled the Yucatan Channel, going south to Honduras then back north to the Gulf of Mexico. He sank three more ships, including the 6,300-ton Russian tanker Tuapse Tuapse. On July 21 he finally commenced the long slow journey home on one engine. His claimed and confirmed sinkings for his first patrol as skipper were impressive indeed: eleven ships (three tankers) for about 41,500 tons. He was out for ninety-four days.

Three IXs of the May group patrolled to the Panama Canal area: Karl-Friedrich Merten in U-68 U-68, Helmut Witte in the new U-159 U-159, and Carl Emmermann in the new U-172 U-172. Upon sailing, Merten in U-68 U-68 received orders to help escort the blockade runner received orders to help escort the blockade runner Munsterland Munsterland into Bordeaux. He made contact with the vessel and another escort, into Bordeaux. He made contact with the vessel and another escort, U-437 U-437, in the southwestern reaches of the Bay of Biscay on May 15, but Allied aircraft spoiled the rendezvous. Merten was forced to sneak into El Ferrol, Spain, to repair an exhaust valve; Munsterland Munsterland went on to Bordeaux alone, went on to Bordeaux alone, U-437 U-437 to St. Nazaire. Moored alongside the "interned" German vessel to St. Nazaire. Moored alongside the "interned" German vessel Max Albrecht Max Albrecht, Merten completed repairs, topped off his fuel tanks, and resailed U-68 U-68 after a few hours. after a few hours.

While en route to the Caribbean, both of these new IXs encountered Allied ships in mid-ocean, sailing alone. Witte in U-159 U-159 claimed sinking five for 26,200 tons, but only three for 14,600 tons were confirmed, including the 2,600-ton British tanker claimed sinking five for 26,200 tons, but only three for 14,600 tons were confirmed, including the 2,600-ton British tanker Montenol Montenol. Emmermann in U-172 U-172 sank three for 17,900 tons, including the 9,000-ton British tanker sank three for 17,900 tons, including the 9,000-ton British tanker Athelknight Athelknight. These two boats-and Merten in U-68 U-68-reached the Trinidad area during the first week in June. On June 5 and 6 Merten sank two big tankers, the 6,700-ton American L. J. Drake L. J. Drake and the 13,000-ton Panamanian and the 13,000-ton Panamanian C. O. Stillman C. O. Stillman.

The three boats proceeded west to Panama. On the way, Witte in U-159 U-159 attacked by gun two sailing ships, the Brazilian Paracury and the 150-ton Honduran Sally. He left both with decks awash and, he thought, doomed, but the crew of the 265-ton Paracury reboarded and saved her. Near Curasao and Aruba, on June 7, Witte sank a 3,400-ton American freighter. Not far away, on June 8, Emmermann in attacked by gun two sailing ships, the Brazilian Paracury and the 150-ton Honduran Sally. He left both with decks awash and, he thought, doomed, but the crew of the 265-ton Paracury reboarded and saved her. Near Curasao and Aruba, on June 7, Witte sank a 3,400-ton American freighter. Not far away, on June 8, Emmermann in U-172 U-172 sank a 1,700-ton American freighter. sank a 1,700-ton American freighter.

The three boats were deployed along the sea-lanes leading to Panama by June 10. That day the most important American warship formation to reach Panama in months must have passed close to all three: the carrier Wasp, the new battleship North Carolina, the cruisers Quincy Quincy and and San Juan San Juan, and seven destroyers. These warships were bound for the Pacific to reinforce Operation Watchtower-the proposed Allied capture of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida islands in the Solomon Island chain.

That night Merten in U-68 U-68 spotted two big heavily laden freighters inbound to Panama. He eased in close and fired five torpedoes. Two missed but two hit the 5,000-ton British freighter spotted two big heavily laden freighters inbound to Panama. He eased in close and fired five torpedoes. Two missed but two hit the 5,000-ton British freighter Ardenvohr Ardenvohr, which sank quickly, and one hit the 8,600-ton British freighter Surrey Surrey, which sank slowly. Noting that the crew of Surrey Surrey had hauled away the lifeboats in great haste, Merten's curiosity was aroused. He fished out and queried a lone survivor who had been left behind. He informed Merten that had hauled away the lifeboats in great haste, Merten's curiosity was aroused. He fished out and queried a lone survivor who had been left behind. He informed Merten that Surrey Surrey, which finally sank beneath the waves, was loaded with 5,000 tons of dynamite!

As if on cue, the dynamite somehow exploded. The force of the blast lifted U-68 U-68 completely out of the water and slammed her down so hard that Merten thought the boat had been torpedoed. The crash temporarily knocked out the two diesels and the gyro compass, and smashed gauges and crockery throughout the boat. completely out of the water and slammed her down so hard that Merten thought the boat had been torpedoed. The crash temporarily knocked out the two diesels and the gyro compass, and smashed gauges and crockery throughout the boat.

While Merten was below surveying the damage, the bridge reported yet another ship. After the engineer got the diesels back on the line, Merten commenced a long stern chase. When he saw that he could not overtake the vessel before daylight, he shot one torpedo from extreme range. It hit, sinking the 5,900-ton British freighter Port Montreal Port Montreal, also bound for the Pacific with war materiel. Upon receiving Merten's sinking report to then-five ships (three tankers) for 40,000 tons-Donitz awarded him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.*

Over the next two days, June 11 to 13, Witte in U-159 U-159 went into action very close to Panama. He attacked and claimed sinking four freighters for 28,700 tons. Three of the four for 18,600 tons (one British, two American) were later confirmed, but there was no record of the other. Counting earlier overclaims in this patrol, Witte reported that he had sunk nine ships for about 53,000 tons. His confirmed score to this point was six ships for 43,300 tons. Having exhausted his torpedo supply, Witte withdrew easterly to the Aruba-Curagao area, as did Merten in went into action very close to Panama. He attacked and claimed sinking four freighters for 28,700 tons. Three of the four for 18,600 tons (one British, two American) were later confirmed, but there was no record of the other. Counting earlier overclaims in this patrol, Witte reported that he had sunk nine ships for about 53,000 tons. His confirmed score to this point was six ships for 43,300 tons. Having exhausted his torpedo supply, Witte withdrew easterly to the Aruba-Curagao area, as did Merten in U-68 U-68.

The assaults by Merten and Witte-six ships sunk in three days-humiliated the Panama Sea Frontier. In response, the naval commander, Clifford van Hook, organized a "killer group," composed of two destroyers (the modern Edison Edison and the four-stack and the four-stack Barry Barry), sundry smaller craft, and Catalinas. The Army Air Forces beefed up land-based ASW units. While these forces were in play, June 14 to June 18, Carl Emmermann in U-172 U-172 sank four ships for 12,800 tons immediately off Panama, including, by gun, the 125-ton British sailing schooner sank four ships for 12,800 tons immediately off Panama, including, by gun, the 125-ton British sailing schooner Dutch Princess Dutch Princess and the 2,000-ton American tanker and the 2,000-ton American tanker Motorex Motorex. Intensified air patrols, improved control of shipping, and a spell of bad weather spoiled Emmermann's hunting, restricting him to a second gun attack on a sailing schooner, the 35-ton Colombian vessel Resolute Resolute.*

While patrolling near Aruba and Curacao, Merten in U-68 U-68 and Witte in and Witte in U-159 U-159 sank two more ships each. Both of Merten's victims were tankers. One was the 2,500-ton Panamanian sank two more ships each. Both of Merten's victims were tankers. One was the 2,500-ton Panamanian Arriaga Arriaga; awkwardly, the other was the 9,200-ton Vichy French Frimaire Frimaire, under Portuguese charter, for which the OKM had specifically requested safe passage. When officers at the OKM learned the Frimaire Frimaire had been sunk, they were furious, but Donitz defended Merten-his most recent had been sunk, they were furious, but Donitz defended Merten-his most recent Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz winner-who insisted the ship had no Vichy or Portuguese markings. The two sinkings raised Merten's confirmed score for the patrol to seven ships (four tankers) for about 51,000 tons. Witte's two victims were small freighters, both sunk by deck gun. winner-who insisted the ship had no Vichy or Portuguese markings. The two sinkings raised Merten's confirmed score for the patrol to seven ships (four tankers) for about 51,000 tons. Witte's two victims were small freighters, both sunk by deck gun.

Homebound, Witte in U-159 U-159 and Emmermann in and Emmermann in U-172 U-172 each sank another ship. Lacking torpedoes, Witte stopped the 9,600-ton American tanker E. J. Sadler with his bridge-mounted antiaircraft guns, then put a party on board to scuttle. The sinking of each sank another ship. Lacking torpedoes, Witte stopped the 9,600-ton American tanker E. J. Sadler with his bridge-mounted antiaircraft guns, then put a party on board to scuttle. The sinking of Sadler Sadler raised Witte's confirmed score to ten ships (two tankers) for about 50,000 tons. Emmermann stopped the 8,400-ton American freighter raised Witte's confirmed score to ten ships (two tankers) for about 50,000 tons. Emmermann stopped the 8,400-ton American freighter Santa Rita Santa Rita with his last torpedo and likewise put a party on board to scuttle. He also took the captain prisoner and directed the demolition party to ransack the ship for anything useful. They returned with extremely valuable charts and documents that revealed Allied shipping routes and the location of the minefields in Cape Town, South Africa, and at some other ports. The sinking of with his last torpedo and likewise put a party on board to scuttle. He also took the captain prisoner and directed the demolition party to ransack the ship for anything useful. They returned with extremely valuable charts and documents that revealed Allied shipping routes and the location of the minefields in Cape Town, South Africa, and at some other ports. The sinking of Santa Rita Santa Rita raised Emmermann's confirmed score to ten ships (two tankers) for 40,800 tons, counting the two sailing schooners. raised Emmermann's confirmed score to ten ships (two tankers) for 40,800 tons, counting the two sailing schooners.

While Witte in U-159 U-159 was inbound in the Bay of Biscay, on the night of July 11-12, a Wellington of Coastal Command's 172 Squadron, fitted with ASV radar and a Leigh Light, found the boat and attacked. Witte ordered his bridge gunners to shoot out the light, but they were blinded by its glare. The aircraft dropped four 250-pound depth charges that shook the boat severely and caused a great deal of minor damage, but nothing fatal. The pilot was the American serving in the RAF, Wiley B. Howell, who seven nights earlier had hit and sunk Jurgen von Rosenstiel's Type IXC was inbound in the Bay of Biscay, on the night of July 11-12, a Wellington of Coastal Command's 172 Squadron, fitted with ASV radar and a Leigh Light, found the boat and attacked. Witte ordered his bridge gunners to shoot out the light, but they were blinded by its glare. The aircraft dropped four 250-pound depth charges that shook the boat severely and caused a great deal of minor damage, but nothing fatal. The pilot was the American serving in the RAF, Wiley B. Howell, who seven nights earlier had hit and sunk Jurgen von Rosenstiel's Type IXC U-502 U-502 with the loss of all hands. with the loss of all hands.

In all, eight Type LXs sailed to the Americas in May. One, Wolf Henne in the new U-157 U-157, who sank one ship, had been lost attempting to enter the Gulf of Mexico. The other seven, including two new boats, Witte in U-159 and Emmermann in U-172 U-172, turned in record-breaking returns. Not counting the three sailing ships sunk by Witte and Emmermann, these eight IXs sank sixty-one ships for 304,000 tons: an average of 7.6 ships for 38,000 tons per boat per patrol. Counting the truncated voyages of the two lost boats, U-157 U-157, sunk in the Florida Straits, and U-158 U-158, sunk near Bermuda, the May IXs spent 517 days at sea.