Wurdemann and Schacht patrolled off the mouth of the Mississippi River for ten days, May 11 to May 20. In a notable series of torpedo attacks, Wurdemann in U-506 U-506 hit seven different American ships, sinking five: the tankers hit seven different American ships, sinking five: the tankers Gulfpenn Gulfpenn, 8,900 tons (90,000 barrels of fuel oil); David McKelvy David McKelvy, 6,800 tons (80,000 barrels of fuel oil); Gulfoil Gulfoil, 5,200 tons (petroleum products); Halo Halo, 7,000 tons*; and the freighter Heredia Heredia, 4,700 tons (bananas, coffee). Crew losses were heavy: thirteen of thirty-eight on Gulfpenn Gulfpenn, seventeen on McKelvy McKelvy, twenty-one on Gulfoil Gulfoil, all but three on Halo Halo, and thirty-eight of sixty7 one on one on Heredia Heredia. The damaged ships were the tankers William C. McTarnahan William C. McTarnahan and and Sun Sun, sailing in ballast. Bedeviled by nine torpedo misses, failures, or malfunctions, including two circular runners, Schacht in U-507 U-507 sank two ships: the 10,700-ton American tanker sank two ships: the 10,700-ton American tanker Virginia Virginia by two torpedoes, and the 4,150-ton Honduran freighter by two torpedoes, and the 4,150-ton Honduran freighter Amapala Amapala by gunfire, boarding, and scuttling. Twenty-seven of forty-one crew members on by gunfire, boarding, and scuttling. Twenty-seven of forty-one crew members on Virginia Virginia perished. perished.

Having expended all torpedoes, U-506 U-506 and and U-507 U-507 headed home by way of the Straits of Florida. On the way back, Wurdemann in headed home by way of the Straits of Florida. On the way back, Wurdemann in U-506 U-506 sank two British freighters by gun east of Florida, raising his confirmed score to eight ships (four tankers) for about 40,000 tons sunk plus damage to three big tankers. Schacht's total was nine confirmed ships (four tankers) sunk for about 45,000 tons. According to Homer Hickam in his book sank two British freighters by gun east of Florida, raising his confirmed score to eight ships (four tankers) for about 40,000 tons sunk plus damage to three big tankers. Schacht's total was nine confirmed ships (four tankers) sunk for about 45,000 tons. According to Homer Hickam in his book Torpedo Junction Torpedo Junction, over 200 crewmen in these seventeen lost ships (eight tankers) were killed in the sinkings or later died in the water or in lifeboats or rafts.

As noted earlier, the single VII of the April group assigned to the Gulf of Mexico was the U-753 U-753, commanded by thirty-four-year-old Alfred Manhardt von Mannstein. He had made one prior patrol in the defense of Norway, cut short when U-753 U-753 was rammed and severely damaged topside by a British "destroyer." The voyage to America was thus was rammed and severely damaged topside by a British "destroyer." The voyage to America was thus U-753 U-753's first full-scale patrol.

Von Mannstein operated in the Gulf of Mexico for about two weeks, May 19 to June 1, in the wakes of U-506 U-506 and and U-507 U-507. Inbound to the gulf via the Straits of Florida on May 19, he spotted a convoy off the western tip of Cuba. He boldly swung around to close and shoot submerged, but the boat suddenly rose and a merchant ship rammed her, mangling the deck gun, which the crew later dismounted and stowed below. This mishap thwarted the attack on the convoy, but over the next several days he shot five torpedoes to sink the 7,200-ton American freighter George Calvert George Calvert and attacked a 300-ton British sailing schooner with a cargo of lumber, and attacked a 300-ton British sailing schooner with a cargo of lumber, E. P. Theriault E. P. Theriault, by gun. He boarded her and set scuttling charges, but Theriault Theriault survived. survived.

Continuing this relentlessly aggressive patrol, von Mannstein had mixed success. An attack on an Erie Erie-class gunboat failed: one torpedo missed, and another ran hot in the tube and had to be ejected. Proceeding northwest to the mouth of the Mississippi River, von Mannstein attacked two big tankers, May 25 to 27. He damaged the 6,600-ton Norwegian Haakon Hauan Haakon Hauan and sank her sister ship, the 6,600-ton and sank her sister ship, the 6,600-ton Hamlet Hamlet, expending five torpedoes. On June 1, von Mannstein left via the Florida Straits, having sunk in this first Type VII foray into the Gulf of Mexico two confirmed ships (one tanker) for about 13,800 tons.

While U-753 U-753 was homebound in the Bay of Biscay in the late afternoon of June 23, a Whitley of Coastal Command Squadron 58, piloted by W. Jones, found and depth-charged her. The initial attack was skillful: the explosions knocked out was homebound in the Bay of Biscay in the late afternoon of June 23, a Whitley of Coastal Command Squadron 58, piloted by W. Jones, found and depth-charged her. The initial attack was skillful: the explosions knocked out U-753 U-753's diesels and rendered her incapable of diving. The British failed to follow up the attack and, although "badly damaged," U-753 U-753 managed to survive. France-based German aircraft and motor launches found managed to survive. France-based German aircraft and motor launches found U-753 U-753 the next morning and escorted her into La Pallice, where she remained out of action for the next three months. the next morning and escorted her into La Pallice, where she remained out of action for the next three months.

This calamity, atop the British aircraft attacks on other boats in June, persuaded Donitz on June 24 to change procedures for crossing the Bay of Biscay. Until then, the orders were fairly loose, leaving tactics up to the skippers. Most preferred to run on the surface day and night to get across this increasingly dangerous area as quickly as possible, relying in daytime on lookouts to spot enemy aircraft early enough to dive to safety, and feeling more or less immune to attack at night. Since the radar-equipped Leigh Light Wellingtons rendered surface travel risky day or or night, Donitz decreed specifically that all U-boats were to cross the Bay of Biscay submerged, surfacing only briefly at night to recharge their batteries and to refresh the air in the boat. night, Donitz decreed specifically that all U-boats were to cross the Bay of Biscay submerged, surfacing only briefly at night to recharge their batteries and to refresh the air in the boat.

This was not a welcome change inasmuch as the boats could barely log more than a hundred miles a day, and this greatly prolonged the crossing and reduced time in the operating areas, but it was intended to be only temporary, pending the arrival of the Metox radar detectors, or FuMBs, and much-improved antiaircraft weaponry, including twin 37mm and 20mm rapid-fire guns. With Metox and these more powerful weapons, Donitz believed that a U-boat could successfully fight it out with an enemy plane in daytime, hence travel on the surface during the day could be resumed.

Of the three older, shorter-range Type IXBs which set off for the United States East Coast in April, two made promising starts. Werner Winter in U-103 U-103, who refueled from the U-tanker U-459 U-459, sank a 6,000-ton British freighter in mid-Atlantic May 5. The same day, Hermann Rasch in U-106 U-106 sank an 8,000-ton Canadian freighter. But after that it was all downhill. Patrolling offshore from Cape Hatteras to Florida, neither boat saw anything for days on end. Similarly, the third IXB, sank an 8,000-ton Canadian freighter. But after that it was all downhill. Patrolling offshore from Cape Hatteras to Florida, neither boat saw anything for days on end. Similarly, the third IXB, U-107 U-107, commanded by Harald Gelhaus, who arrived off Cape Hatteras a week later, saw nothing. All three U-boats felt the effect of the new Key West-Norfolk-Key West convoy system.

The absence of East Coast traffic and the great successes of Folkers, Schacht, and Wiirdemann in the Yucatan Channel and the Gulf of Mexico prompted Donitz to shift these three Type IXBs to those areas. To do so, it was necessary to arrange for Rasch's U-106 U-106 and Gelhaus's and Gelhaus's U-107 U-107 to be refueled homebound by to be refueled homebound by U-459 U-459, which was to make a rapid turnaround in France.

Winter in U-103 U-103 and Rasch in and Rasch in U-106 U-106 led the way. Winter went south through the Windward Passage to replace Folkers in the southern approaches to the Yucatan Channel; Rasch went west through the Straits of Florida to replace Schacht and Wiirdemann in the Gulf of Mexico. As related, at this same time four Type VIIs entered the Caribbean Sea and von Mannstein in the Type VII led the way. Winter went south through the Windward Passage to replace Folkers in the southern approaches to the Yucatan Channel; Rasch went west through the Straits of Florida to replace Schacht and Wiirdemann in the Gulf of Mexico. As related, at this same time four Type VIIs entered the Caribbean Sea and von Mannstein in the Type VII U-753 U-753 also patrolled in the Gulf of Mexico off the mouth of the Mississippi River. also patrolled in the Gulf of Mexico off the mouth of the Mississippi River.

Both U-103 and U-106 found good hunting. Patrolling south of the Yucatan Channel, May 17 to May 28, Winter in and U-106 found good hunting. Patrolling south of the Yucatan Channel, May 17 to May 28, Winter in U-103 U-103 sank eight ships for 36,200 tons, bringing his bag on this patrol to nine ships for 42,200 tons. His victims included two American tankers: sank eight ships for 36,200 tons, bringing his bag on this patrol to nine ships for 42,200 tons. His victims included two American tankers: Sam Q. Brown Sam Q. Brown, 6,600 tons, and New Jersey New Jersey, 6,400 tons. Homer Hickam wrote that after sinking the 5,000-ton American freighter Ogontz Ogontz, Winter apologized to her captain ("Sorry ... but this is war"), personally medicated one survivor, and directed that the lifeboats be stocked with cigarettes and food.

Patrolling north of the Yucatan Channel in the Gulf of Mexico for an equal number of days, May 21 to June 1, Rasch in U-106 U-106 missed a huge whale-factory ship with two torpedoes but sank four ships for 21,200 tons and damaged a 4,600-ton American freighter, bringing his sinkings on this patrol to five ships for 29,000 tons. His victims also included two tankers, the Mexican missed a huge whale-factory ship with two torpedoes but sank four ships for 21,200 tons and damaged a 4,600-ton American freighter, bringing his sinkings on this patrol to five ships for 29,000 tons. His victims also included two tankers, the Mexican Faja de Oro Faja de Oro, 6,100 tons, and the American Carabulle Carabulle, 5,000 tons, sunk by 193 rounds from his 4.1" deck gun and two torpedoes. Twenty-two of forty crew members on Carabulle Carabulle perished. Homebound, both perished. Homebound, both U-103 U-103 and and U-106 U-106 refueled as planned from refueled as planned from U-459 U-459, which sailed on her second resupply mission June 6 after three weeks of voyage repairs. Counting past claims and sinkings, Winter qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, which was awarded while he was still at sea.* Upon his return to France, he left the boat to command Combat Flotilla 1. Upon his return to France, he left the boat to command Combat Flotilla 1.

Lagging behind his sister ships, Gelhaus in U-107 U-107 went south into the Caribbean via the Windward Passage on May 29. That night he sank a 2,600-ton British freighter, then proceeded to the area south of the Yucatan Channel, replacing Winter in went south into the Caribbean via the Windward Passage on May 29. That night he sank a 2,600-ton British freighter, then proceeded to the area south of the Yucatan Channel, replacing Winter in U-103 U-103. In the ensuing ten days, June 1 to June 10, he sank four freighters for 14,200 tons. Homebound, in the mid-Atlantic, he sank the impressive 10,000-ton Dutch freighter Jagersfontein Jagersfontein, bringing his bag to six freighters for 27,000 tons. Then he refueled from U-459 U-459, as planned.

In all, these three Type IXBs, U-103 U-103, U-106 U-106, and U-107 U-107, sank twenty ships for 98,300 tons on patrols of sixty-nine, seventy-six, and eighty-two days, respectively. These successes were directly attributable to the availability of U-459 U-459 for refueling. Without refueling, none of these shorter-range IXBs could have carried out extended patrols in the Gulf of Mexico or the Yucatan Channel. for refueling. Without refueling, none of these shorter-range IXBs could have carried out extended patrols in the Gulf of Mexico or the Yucatan Channel.

Altogether, the six Type IX captains who sailed in April (Folkers, Gelhaus, Rash, Schacht, Winter, Wiirdemann) sank forty-six ships (fourteen tankers) for 230,000 tons. This was an average of 7.7 ships for 38,333 tons per boat per patrol.

In response to this slaughter, Admiral King named the experienced U-boat hunter James L. Kauffman, who had been Commander of Naval Forces, Iceland, to replace Crenshaw. On June 17 Kauffman shifted the headquarters of the Gulf Sea Frontier from Key West to a more elaborate facility in Miami. At the same time, Hap Arnold directed First Air Force commander Follett Bradley to establish an ASW Gulf Task Force to serve under Kauffman's direction, with headquarters in Miami. Composed initially of twenty B-18 bombers and two squadrons of observation planes, the Gulf Task Force was activated about June 1. It was reinforced by eight B-17 bombers and two observation squadrons from Third Air Force training units in Florida and Louisiana, and by the Civil Air Patrol.

In her study of U-boats in the Gulf of Mexico,* Melanie Wiggins writes that in the wake of this May slaughter of shipping, local officials resorted to stern measures. Convinced of the truth of rumors that the U-boat skippers obtained help from "Axis aliens" living along the coast, American and Mexican authorities rounded up suspects and spirited them away (a story that needs further airing). Notwithstanding the Navy's doubts of its value and the dangers to motorists and truckers, on June 1 American officials dimmed out Galveston and other areas along the coastline. Melanie Wiggins writes that in the wake of this May slaughter of shipping, local officials resorted to stern measures. Convinced of the truth of rumors that the U-boat skippers obtained help from "Axis aliens" living along the coast, American and Mexican authorities rounded up suspects and spirited them away (a story that needs further airing). Notwithstanding the Navy's doubts of its value and the dangers to motorists and truckers, on June 1 American officials dimmed out Galveston and other areas along the coastline.

This slaughter in the gulf drew vigorous demands for better protection of shipping from oil companies, merchant seamen, and, behind the scenes, the British. Rising in defence of the Navy, Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, declared on June 6 that American ASW forces had "passed growing pains" and were "well established and functioning effectively," and that his committee was fully confident that Axis submarines would be defeated. "Critics should remember," he said, "that the British have had three years [sic] experience in coping with the U-boat problem and that the British Isles [where the problem had been largely overcome] would fit comfortably into the Gulf of Mexico."

Four long-range Type IXs patrolled the southern Caribbean from Trinidad to the Panama Canal. Three of the four were directed to attack shipping off the canal, but when B-dienst B-dienst predicted heavy tanker traffic off Trinidad, that mission was canceled. All four boats patrolled in the eastern Caribbean near Trinidad and the north coast of Venezuela. predicted heavy tanker traffic off Trinidad, that mission was canceled. All four boats patrolled in the eastern Caribbean near Trinidad and the north coast of Venezuela.

The first to sail was Jurgen Wattenberg in the IXC U-162 U-162, who had been forced to abort his first patrol to the Americas with mechanical defects. At forty-two years of age, Wattenburg (crew of 1921) was the oldest active skipper of an attack boat in the Atlantic U-boat force. Earlier in the war he had served on the "pocket" battleship Admiral Graf Spee Admiral Graf Spee, but after she was scuttled, he had made his way back to Germany.

Perhaps eager to avenge the humiliating loss of that ship, Wattenburg conducted a notably aggressive patrol in U-162 U-162. In a nineteen-day period, April 30 to May 18, he sank eight confirmed ships by torpedo and gun for 47,000 tons plus a 119-ton American sailing schooner, Florence M. Douglas Florence M. Douglas. His sinkings included four tankers.* One of his victims, the 6,700-ton Brazilian freighter One of his victims, the 6,700-ton Brazilian freighter Parnahyba Parnahyba, moved the Brazilian government one step closer to a declaration of war against Germany. The sailing schooner yielded three live pigs. The Germans ate two but adopted the third, "Douglas," as a mascot, which they presented to flotilla commander Viktor Schutze when they reached France.

The return trip of U-162 U-162 was also memorable. By the night of June 8, when Wattenburg reached the western fringes of the Bay of Biscay, RAF Coastal Command ASW patrols were intense. One of these aircraft equipped with meter-wavelength ASV radar caught was also memorable. By the night of June 8, when Wattenburg reached the western fringes of the Bay of Biscay, RAF Coastal Command ASW patrols were intense. One of these aircraft equipped with meter-wavelength ASV radar caught U-162 U-162 on the surface. Wattenburg crash-dived. The bombs or depth charges caught the boat at 80 or 90 feet but did no serious damage. Still, it was a new and disconcerting experience for the crew, another of the air attacks that led to Donitz's specific order of June 24 to cross the Bay of Biscay submerged. on the surface. Wattenburg crash-dived. The bombs or depth charges caught the boat at 80 or 90 feet but did no serious damage. Still, it was a new and disconcerting experience for the crew, another of the air attacks that led to Donitz's specific order of June 24 to cross the Bay of Biscay submerged.

The other three IXs arrived in the Trinidad area about the time Wattenburg in U-162 U-162 was concluding his patrol. Two of the three skippers, Werner Hartenstein in was concluding his patrol. Two of the three skippers, Werner Hartenstein in U-156 U-156 and Jurgen von Rosenstiel in and Jurgen von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502, had opened the U-boat war in the Caribbean in February; the other, Adolf-Cornelius Piening in U-155 U-155, had made one patrol to Cape Hatteras.

Piening in the IXC U-155 U-155 hunted west of Trinidad toward the island of Los Testigos, where the shipping was so dense that he and his crew scarcely slept. Notwithstanding a double miss on a tanker, in seventeen days, May 14 to May 30, he sank by torpedo seven confirmed ships for 33,000 tons and probably damaged another. His victims included two tankers: the 8,100-ton British hunted west of Trinidad toward the island of Los Testigos, where the shipping was so dense that he and his crew scarcely slept. Notwithstanding a double miss on a tanker, in seventeen days, May 14 to May 30, he sank by torpedo seven confirmed ships for 33,000 tons and probably damaged another. His victims included two tankers: the 8,100-ton British San Victorio San Victorio (benzine and paraffin) and the 7,800-ton Panamanian (benzine and paraffin) and the 7,800-ton Panamanian Sylvan Arrow Sylvan Arrow. The loss of life on San Victorio San Victorio was brutal: Only one man of fifty-four survived. Intending to close the coast of Venezuela to raid shipping with his deck gun, Piening was thwarted by the failure of his gyrocompass. He returned directly to France without refueling, a round trip of merely fifty-six days. was brutal: Only one man of fifty-four survived. Intending to close the coast of Venezuela to raid shipping with his deck gun, Piening was thwarted by the failure of his gyrocompass. He returned directly to France without refueling, a round trip of merely fifty-six days.

Werner Hartenstein in U-156 U-156 had even better success in Atlantic waters east of Trinidad. In a six-day period from May 13, he sank five freighters for 25,600 tons and damaged the 8,000-ton British tanker had even better success in Atlantic waters east of Trinidad. In a six-day period from May 13, he sank five freighters for 25,600 tons and damaged the 8,000-ton British tanker San Eliseo San Eliseo. However, Hartenstein's rich harvest was interrupted by a message from Donitz assigning him to a special mission.

From press reports and other sources, Hitler had formed the incorrect impression that the United States intended to invade and capture the Vichy island of Martinique and the naval vessels there, including the old aircraft carrier Bearn Bearn. Unable to persuade the Vichy government to scuttle the warships, and unaware that pressure from Washington already had persuaded the Vichy French to immobilize them, Hitler directed Raeder to send U-boats to Martinique to thwart an invasion and/or to destroy any Vichy warships-Bearn in particular-which might attempt to leave the harbor to join the Free French Navy serving with Allied naval forces. in particular-which might attempt to leave the harbor to join the Free French Navy serving with Allied naval forces.

Inasmuch as Hartenstein in U-156 U-156 had earlier sneaked into Fort-de-France (to land an injured officer) and fortuitously had brought along updated charts of Martinique, Donitz assigned him to lead the mission. He was reinforced by one other boat, had earlier sneaked into Fort-de-France (to land an injured officer) and fortuitously had brought along updated charts of Martinique, Donitz assigned him to lead the mission. He was reinforced by one other boat, U-69 U-69, a Type VII commanded by Ulrich Graf, who had earlier refueled from U-459 U-459 and come south to the Caribbean. and come south to the Caribbean.

Hartenstein and Graf took up stations off Martinique on May 20. The next day Hartenstein sank a 1,700-ton Dominican freighter and Graf sank a 1,900-ton Canadian freighter. Upon receiving the sinking reports, Donitz reminded the skippers tartly that their "main task" was to attack American warships or Vichy warships leaving Fort-de-France. Four days later, May 25, Hartenstein hit the four-stack American destroyer Blakeley Blakeley. The blast blew off sixty feet of her bow, killing six and wounding twenty-one crewmen. Astonishingly, Blakeley Blakeley managed to limp into Fort-de-France. Donitz denied a request from Hartenstein to penetrate the harbor to finish off the destroyer. managed to limp into Fort-de-France. Donitz denied a request from Hartenstein to penetrate the harbor to finish off the destroyer.*

The hit on Blakeley Blakeley caused uproars in Washington and Vichy. Perhaps as a result, the Vichy French government disclosed to Berlin that its warships at Martinique had been immobilized and posed no threat to either the Allies or the Axis. Even so, Hartenstein and Graf remained off the island for another week. During that time Hartenstein sank two more ships, including the 6,000-ton Brazilian caused uproars in Washington and Vichy. Perhaps as a result, the Vichy French government disclosed to Berlin that its warships at Martinique had been immobilized and posed no threat to either the Allies or the Axis. Even so, Hartenstein and Graf remained off the island for another week. During that time Hartenstein sank two more ships, including the 6,000-ton Brazilian Alagrete Alagrete, but he paid a heavy price. An American Catalina, apparently equipped with meter-wavelength ASV radar, found and bombed U-156 U-156. The blast cracked two main ballast tanks and a fuel ballast tank and knocked out all the hydrophone gear. Reporting this mishap, Hartenstein aborted the patrol and complained of the nearly unendurable tropical heat, made all the worse because the constant pressure of American ASW forces had forced him to remain submerged 121 hours out of 168 hours during the previous seven days.

In the meantime, the fourth Type IX in the southern Caribbean, U-502 U-502, commanded by Jurgen von Rosenstiel, had been patrolling farther westward, near the islands of Curacao and Aruba, where she had done well on her first Caribbean patrol. This time the hunting was poor. In two weeks von Rosenstiel sank but one ship, the 5,000-ton Brazilian Goncalves Dias Goncalves Dias. In early June, however, when Donitz shifted U-502 U-502 easterly to the Trinidad area, her successes improved dramatically. In the two-week period, June 2 to June 15, von Rosenstiel sank six confirmed ships for 31,300 tons, bringing his score for the patrol to an impressive eight ships for 41,200 tons. His victims included two American tankers: easterly to the Trinidad area, her successes improved dramatically. In the two-week period, June 2 to June 15, von Rosenstiel sank six confirmed ships for 31,300 tons, bringing his score for the patrol to an impressive eight ships for 41,200 tons. His victims included two American tankers: M. F. Elliott M. F. Elliott, 6,900 tons, and F. K. Lane F. K. Lane, 6,600 tons.

Upon departing Martinique, Hartenstein in U-156 U-156 teamed up with von Rosenstiel in teamed up with von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502 for the return voyage to France. On June 22 Hartenstein, who had conducted a largely stationary patrol, transferred fuel oil to von Rosenstiel, who had roamed considerably. The following day, von Rosenstiel in for the return voyage to France. On June 22 Hartenstein, who had conducted a largely stationary patrol, transferred fuel oil to von Rosenstiel, who had roamed considerably. The following day, von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502 sighted the 4,600-ton British freighter sighted the 4,600-ton British freighter Willimantic Willimantic, sailing alone, but he had neither torpedoes nor deck gun ammunition. Responding to the sighting report, Hartenstein in U-156 U-156 found and sank found and sank Willimantic Willimantic by gun and took her captain prisoner. This sinking raised Hartenstein's bag for the patrol to an even more impressive nine freighters and a sailing vessel sunk for 40,000 tons, plus damage to the 8,000-ton British tanker by gun and took her captain prisoner. This sinking raised Hartenstein's bag for the patrol to an even more impressive nine freighters and a sailing vessel sunk for 40,000 tons, plus damage to the 8,000-ton British tanker San Eliseo San Eliseo and the American destroyer and the American destroyer Blakeley Blakeley.

Hartenstein and Rosenstiel reached the western fringes of the Bay of Biscay in early July. The Wellingtons of Coastal Command Squadron 172, fitted with ASV radar and Leigh Lights, had been, patrolling the bay for about one month. In the early hours of July 5, a Wellington, commanded by Pilot Officer Wiley B. Howell, an American serving in the RAF, picked up Rosenstiel's U-502 U-502 and straddled her with four shallow-set 250-pound depth charges. Nothing more was ever heard from and straddled her with four shallow-set 250-pound depth charges. Nothing more was ever heard from U-502 U-502. There were no survivors of this first successful sinking by a Leigh Light Wellington; In all, the four IXs patrolling the southwest Atlantic and the Caribbean also achieved very good results. They sank thirty-four confirmed ships (eight tankers) for about 164,000 tons, an average of 8.5 ships for 41,000 tons per boat per patrol.

The last three of the thirteen IXs to sail in April drew a special mission. Operating loosely as a group, they were to attack Allied shipping in the area of the Brazilian island of Fernando de Noronha, 250 miles northeast of Natal, at the "bulge" in Brazil. These skippers were Ritterkreuz holder Ritterkreuz holder Ernst Bauer in Ernst Bauer in U-126 U-126, Ulrich Heyse in U-128 U-128, and Albrecht Achilles in U-161 U-161. All had made prior patrols to the Americas. Each boat carried twenty-three torpedoes: fifteen electrics internally and eight airs in topside canisters.

While en route to this distant area, on May 11, Heyse in the IXC U-128 U-128 came upon a large northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 109, composed of thirty-one ships guarded by only four escorts. The escorts picked up Heyse's contact report by Huff Duff, chased down the bearing, and drove him off and down. Three delivered depth-charge attacks. Two of the escorts, the sloops came upon a large northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 109, composed of thirty-one ships guarded by only four escorts. The escorts picked up Heyse's contact report by Huff Duff, chased down the bearing, and drove him off and down. Three delivered depth-charge attacks. Two of the escorts, the sloops Landguard Landguard (ex-American Coast Guard cutter (ex-American Coast Guard cutter Shoshone Shoshone) and Hastings Hastings, incurred "major engine defects" from their own depth-charge explosions. As a consequence, Landguard Landguard had to be taken in tow by a merchant ship, leaving only three escorts to protect the convoy. had to be taken in tow by a merchant ship, leaving only three escorts to protect the convoy.

The next day, May 12, Heyse brought up Bauer in U-126 U-126 and Achilles in and Achilles in U-161 U-161. After dark, Heyse in U-128 U-128 attacked, firing four bow torpedoes at two ships. He reported several hits, but only one vessel, the 3,500-ton British freighter attacked, firing four bow torpedoes at two ships. He reported several hits, but only one vessel, the 3,500-ton British freighter Denmark Denmark (loaded with iron ore) went down. Exceptionally aggressive action by the escorts, including (loaded with iron ore) went down. Exceptionally aggressive action by the escorts, including Landguard Landguard, who slipped her tow, held all three U-boats at bay. Under orders to conserve fuel and torpedoes for the special mission, the three boats did not press the attack on the convoy.

Arriving in the area of Fernando de Noronha, the task force could find no shipping. Therefore in early June Donitz ordered the pack to rake northwesterly along the coast of South America to Trinidad. Cruising that area over the next thirty days, Bauer in U-126 U-126 exceeded his earlier, spectacular patrol to the Windward Passage by sinking five confirmed ships for 41,500 tons and two sailing ships, plus damage to the 7,100-ton American tanker exceeded his earlier, spectacular patrol to the Windward Passage by sinking five confirmed ships for 41,500 tons and two sailing ships, plus damage to the 7,100-ton American tanker Gulfbelle Gulfbelle, which fought back spiritedly with her guns. His sinkings included two Norwegian tankers: Hoegh Giant Hoegh Giant, 11,000 tons, and Leiv Eiriksson Leiv Eiriksson, 10,000 tons. In an adjacent area, east of Trinidad, in the period from June 8 to 28, Heyse in U-128 U-128 sank four more ships for 32,000 tons, and damaged the 5,700-ton American freighter sank four more ships for 32,000 tons, and damaged the 5,700-ton American freighter Steel Engineer Steel Engineer. His victims also included two Norwegian tankers: South Africa South Africa, 9,200 tons, and Andrea Brovig Andrea Brovig, 10,200 tons.* Achilles in Achilles in U-161 U-161 found the weather and the hunting poor. Near Trinidad, where he achieved fame on his first patrol, he found a convoy on June 14 but managed to sink only one 8,000-ton freighter, found the weather and the hunting poor. Near Trinidad, where he achieved fame on his first patrol, he found a convoy on June 14 but managed to sink only one 8,000-ton freighter, Scottsburg Scottsburg, and in return was rammed.

After makeshift repairs, Achilles went west to the Panama Canal area, where he sank a 35-ton American sailing vessel, Cheerio Cheerio, by gun and torpedoed a 3,300-ton freighter at dockside in Puerto Limon, Costa Rica. However, the freighter was later salvaged. Homebound, he attacked a military convoy and sank a ship loaded with important cargo. Also homebound, Bauer in U-126 U-126 found a "heavily smoking" northbound convoy west of the Bay of Biscay, but Donitz suspected it was a U-boat "trap" and refused Bauer permission to attack. found a "heavily smoking" northbound convoy west of the Bay of Biscay, but Donitz suspected it was a U-boat "trap" and refused Bauer permission to attack.

All three boats of this special task force refueled in July on the way back to France. Bauer in U-126 U-126 arrived on July 22, having sunk seven confirmed ships (two tankers) for about 42,000 tons. Heyse in arrived on July 22, having sunk seven confirmed ships (two tankers) for about 42,000 tons. Heyse in U-128 U-128 arrived on July 25, having sunk five confirmed ships (two tankers) for about 36,000 tons. Achilles arrived on August 7, completing a record patrol of 102 days, during which he sank two confirmed freighters for 14,200 tons, and damaged another of 3,300 tons at dockside in Costa Rica. arrived on July 25, having sunk five confirmed ships (two tankers) for about 36,000 tons. Achilles arrived on August 7, completing a record patrol of 102 days, during which he sank two confirmed freighters for 14,200 tons, and damaged another of 3,300 tons at dockside in Costa Rica.

The returns of the thirteen Type IXs sailing in April to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean shattered all existing records. Including the sailing vessels, they sank ninety-five confirmed ships (twenty-six tankers) for 482,843 tons, an average of 7.3 ships of about 37,141 tons sunk per boat per patrol, which on average was seventy-six days. One Type IX-Rosenstiel's U-502 U-502-was lost in the Bay of Biscay. The "exchange rate" of these boats was thus ninety-five to one, a kill ratio never again achieved in the war.

Six of the thirteen Type IXs that sailed to the Americas refueled, including the lost U-502 U-502. These six patrolled for an average eighty-three days. The seven IXs that did not refuel patrolled for an average of seventy days. Thus refueling added an average of about thirteen days of patrolling for the six boats of this group. These six sank an average of 6.3 ships per boat per patrol. The seven boats that did not refuel sank an average of 8.1 ships per boat patrol.

ALLIED O OIL P PROBLEMS M MOUNT.

The slaughter inflicted by the twenty-nine U-boats that sailed to the Americas in April was undeniably a spectacular German naval victory: 133 confirmed ships sunk (thirty-three tankers) for 641,100 gross tons and fourteen ships damaged (six tankers) for 81,000 gross tons. The number of the victims sunk or damaged was thus 147 ships (thirty-nine tankers) for 722,000 gross tons.

The great majority of these ships were sunk and damaged in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea or in the approaches to those areas in the western Atlantic. The German victory was made possible by a swift and adroit shift of U-boats from the United States East Coast to those two areas, which were not yet prepared for U-boat warfare. Had the Allies been able to read four-rotor naval Enigma on the U-boat net Triton Triton (Shark), almost certainly they would have detected this shift as well as the refueling operations early enough to have taken special precautions and more effective ASW measures. For example, the destruction of the tanker (Shark), almost certainly they would have detected this shift as well as the refueling operations early enough to have taken special precautions and more effective ASW measures. For example, the destruction of the tanker U-459 U-459 doubtless would have disrupted U-boat operations and spared many Allied ships in May and June. doubtless would have disrupted U-boat operations and spared many Allied ships in May and June.

In the five months, January 1 to June 1, 1942, the Germans and Italians sank 129 tankers in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico. Of these, forty-nine were of American registry, thirty-seven were British, nineteen were Norwegian, and twelve were Panamanian. The other twelve were Canadian, Dutch, Venezuelan, Mexican, and Russian.

With the introduction of the Halifax-Boston-Halifax and Norfolk-Key West-Norfolk convoy systems, admirals King and Andrews had reduced tanker losses in the Eastern Sea Frontier to near zero (one loss in May; one in June). The difficult problem areas remained the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. King was not yet able to provide sufficient air and surface escorts to establish convoys between Trinidad and Key West and between the Texas and Louisiana oil ports and Key West.

Per plan, the British and Canadians established two convoy systems in the Caribbean Sea during May: * A British route running between Aruba-Curacao and Trinidad. One British group (B-5) of the Mid-Ocean Escort Force (MOEF) shifted from the North Atlantic run to the Caribbean to provide surface escort, reducing the MOEF from twelve to eleven groups: six British, four Canadian, and one American.* American aircraft provided additional cover; the British ordered Coastal Command Squadron 53 (twenty Hudsons) to Trinidad. As related, from Trinidad British tankers sailed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, unescorted, thence in convoy to the British Isles. American aircraft provided additional cover; the British ordered Coastal Command Squadron 53 (twenty Hudsons) to Trinidad. As related, from Trinidad British tankers sailed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, unescorted, thence in convoy to the British Isles.

* A Canadian route running between Trinidad and Halifax via Bermuda.

Four (later six) Canadian corvettes shifted from the MOEF to provide surface escort. American aircraft on Trinidad and Bermuda furnished additional cover. Canadian warships of the Western Local Escort Force (WLEF) escorted the tankers on the trip from Halifax to Portland, Maine, the Atlantic terminus of a pipeline to refineries in Montreal, which had come into operation in November 1941.

One reason that King was unable to establish American convoy routes in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico in May was the failure of President Roosevelt's much-touted 110-foot SC building program ("Sixty Ships in Sixty Days") to live up to its billing. By May 1, this program had encountered many difficulties and was embarrassingly behind schedule. So was the 175-foot PC building program; from January 1 to May 1, only a dozen PCs were completed and half of these were still in workup.* As one consequence, on May 21, Admiral King asked Admiral Pound for the loan of "fifteen or twenty corvettes" from the British "Home Station" so that he could initiate American convoys in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. Pound replied that the British had no corvettes on the "Home Station"; however, he was willing to reduce MOEF groups from eleven to ten to meet this request, provided the Admiralty could be assured that American and Canadian escort groups "worked as hard" as British groups. Believing that a further reduction in MOEF groups would almost certainly invite a renewal of intense U-boat attacks on the North Atlantic run, King let the matter rest, but not happily. As one consequence, on May 21, Admiral King asked Admiral Pound for the loan of "fifteen or twenty corvettes" from the British "Home Station" so that he could initiate American convoys in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. Pound replied that the British had no corvettes on the "Home Station"; however, he was willing to reduce MOEF groups from eleven to ten to meet this request, provided the Admiralty could be assured that American and Canadian escort groups "worked as hard" as British groups. Believing that a further reduction in MOEF groups would almost certainly invite a renewal of intense U-boat attacks on the North Atlantic run, King let the matter rest, but not happily.

In the first week of June, as the great Battle of Midway loomed, King convened yet another Convoy Conference in Washington to deal with the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico shipping crisis. The conferees decided that a proposed convoy system, Guantanamo Bay-New York-Guantanamo Bay, be postponed in favor of a temporary Key West-Trinidad-Key West system to be initiated on July 1. In addition, a temporary Key West-Panama-Key West system and a Gulf of Mexico system were to follow as soon as possible. The British agreed to retain the British MOEF group B-5 in the Caribbean to facilitate the start-up of these convoys. be postponed in favor of a temporary Key West-Trinidad-Key West system to be initiated on July 1. In addition, a temporary Key West-Panama-Key West system and a Gulf of Mexico system were to follow as soon as possible. The British agreed to retain the British MOEF group B-5 in the Caribbean to facilitate the start-up of these convoys.

At this time King renewed the Navy's long-standing request for destroyer escorts (DEs). On June 15, he wrote Roosevelt that "We need modified DEs [i.e., the American, not the British version] at the earliest possible moment. If we cannot get them soon," King continued, "it will be necessary to put some important [shipping] routes 'out of bounds' in order to prevent prohibitive losses." However, at that time Roosevelt believed that the emergency invasion of France (Sledgehammer) in late summer of 1942 was still a strong possibility and the construction of landing craft of various types remained priority number one for several more months.

In addition to this frustrating situation, King also had to wage continuous bureaucratic warfare with the Army and Army Air Forces over methods of employing land-based aircraft for ASW purposes.

In compliance with the agreement of March 26 between the Army and Navy, the Army Air Forces had parceled out units of the 1st Bomber Command to the Eastern and Gulf Sea Frontiers and had placed its Antilles Air Task Force under control of the Caribbean Sea Frontier. The several sea frontier commanders, Andrews, Kauffman, and Hoover, had assigned these land-based Army aircraft to two principal tasks: air escort for convoys and/or important ships sailing alone, and search patrols in likely U-boat operating areas.

Stimson and Marshall of the Army and Hap Arnold of the Army Air Forces were not in agreement with the Navy's disposition and utilization of its land-based aircraft. As Arnold's airmen saw it, the units of the 1st Bomber Command had been "chopped up" and meted out to the various sea frontiers for permanent duty. Aircraft assigned to one sea frontier were not allowed to cross boundaries into another sea frontier. The rotation of aircraft and crews from ASW patrols to training in navigation and high-level bombing, and vice versa, had not worked well. The aircrews hated area and convoy patrols. It was dull, defensive defensive, and very difficult work, even with meter-wavelength ASV radar, and the rewards were few.

In five months of ASW operations, Hap Arnold and the air staff had settled on a firm doctrine to counter U-boats. Rather than decentralizing and delegating control of air units to the various sea frontiers as King insisted, Arnold and the airmen urged creation of a centralized single command in control of highly mobile air units which, in theory, could be shifted rapidly from frontier to frontier as the situation required. In place of defensive defensive patrolling and escorting, the centralized command was to devote its resources principally to patrolling and escorting, the centralized command was to devote its resources principally to offensive offensive ASW operations, pouncing upon a reported U-boat or group of U-boats with well-trained and equipped "hunter-killer" air units, capable of mounting persistent and prolonged chases. ASW operations, pouncing upon a reported U-boat or group of U-boats with well-trained and equipped "hunter-killer" air units, capable of mounting persistent and prolonged chases.

In furtherance of this doctrine, on May 20 the War Department directed Hap Arnold to reorganize the 1st Bomber Command. "The reorganization should be of a character," the directive specified, "that will fulfill the special requirements of antisubmarine and Allied air operations, in consonance with the Army responsibility in operating in support of, or in lieu of naval forces for protection of shipping." Arnold was to provide 1st Bomber Command with every available twin-engine B-18 (medium) bomber in the United States and to equip these with centimetric-wavelength ASV radar as fast as the sets became available and with proper depth-charge and bomb racks for ASW. As the planes were so equipped, they were to be organized into "Submarine Destroyer Squadrons," to operate from a network of new bases on the East and Gulf Coasts, employing tactics recommended by the ASW R&D group at Langley Field, and linked by first-class communication.

When Secretary of War Stimson informed Secretary of the Navy Knox and Admiral King of the Army Air Forces doctrine and reorganization plans for the 1st Bomber Command, the navalists were lukewarm and cautious. In a formal response that left Stimson almost incredulous, King welcomed the assignment of 1st Bomber Command exclusively to an ASW role but disapproved the idea of a centralized ASW command, even if the commander was to be an admiral. He recommended against any hurried and radical command-and-control changes that might interfere with ongoing operations.

The loss of the 129 Allied tankers deeply dismayed and disturbed the British. It appeared that British petroleum stockpiles-or oil reserves-might fall to an unacceptable level. The situation had been worsened by the need to transfer about fifty British tankers to the Indian Ocean to support British operations there and in the Mediterranean Basin, and by the decision to route British-bound tankers the longer way from Trinidad east to Freetown, thence north in the slow Sierra Leone convoys.

To prevent a dangerous depletion of oil reserves, on May 2 the British petitioned the Americans for the "loan" (i.e., gift) of the equivalent of seventy tankers of 10,000 deadweight tons, a total of 700,000 deadweight tons. President Roosevelt "dramatically and almost unexpectedly" (as London put it) honored this request, despite America's own tanker losses and the shortage of such vessels in the Pacific. The oil czar, Harold Ickes, notified the British on May 14 that the request (known as "Red Gap") was to be met in the "next four weeks." It was not only met, but exceeded substantially: a total of 854,000 deadweight tons, 170,000 for Canada and 684,000 for the United Kingdom.

This second generous gift of oil tankers to Britain was made possible by the following factors: * The dramatic rise in deliveries of oil from Texas to the northeast United States by railroad tank cars. In January 1942, the oil industry delivered about 100,000 barrels a day to that area by rail. By June 1942, rail deliveries had risen to about 726,000 barrels a day.

* The start-up of the Plantation Pipeline. Running from Baton Rouge via Bremen, Georgia, to Greensboro, North Carolina, this line delivered about 50,000 barrels a day. From Greensboro, the oil moved further northeast by rail and barge. By June 1942, this pipeline, and those in the upper Midwest, delivered about 125,000 barrels of oil per day to the Northeast.*

* The initiation of gasoline rationing in the northeast United States on May 15, 1942.

* Far more efficient use of all means of conveying oil to the Northeast in 1942.

* Production of new tankers by Jerry Land's Maritime Commission.

* The astonishingly rapid reconversion of many oil-burning industrial plants to coal-burning or to natural gas.

Nor was that all. To prevent a dangerous fall in oil reserves, on August 1, London again petitioned Washington for tanker assistance. This time (the "Blue Gap") the British requested the equivalent of fifty-four tankers of 10,000 deadweight tons, a total of 540,000 more deadweight tons. President Roosevelt promptly met this request as well. Within thirty days-by September 1-oil czar Ickes had allocated to the British the equivalent of forty more tankers, or a total of 400,000 dead-weight tons. The rest of the British request was fulfilled in the months of October and November.

The total tanker assistance by the Americans to the British in 1942 (Red and Blue Gaps) was thus more than 124 "notional tankers" of 10,000 deadweight tons, or 1.24 million deadweight tons. In response to the first assist (Red Gap) Churchill cabled Roosevelt on May 27: I must express my gratitude for your allocation of 70 tankers to build up United Kingdom stocks of oil. Without this help our stocks would have fallen to a dangerous level by the end of the year. This action is the more generous considering recent heavy American tanker losses and the sacrifices involved in releasing so many ships.

THE A ARGONAUT C CONFERENCE.

The Allied shipping situation, which governed all plans, together with the need to clarify and coordinate global strategy, war production programs, and other matters, persuaded Churchill to suggest a second meeting with Roosevelt in Washington. Roosevelt approved the conference, designated Argonaut, and not a minute too soon.

By that time-June 1942-Hitler's vast mechanized armies were surging out of the Ukraine toward the Caucasus Mountains and the rich oil fields at Baku on the Caspian Sea and southeast toward Stalingrad on the Volga River. Anticipating a renewed German attack on Moscow, Stalin had concentrated his forces in the center. As a consequence Red armies on the south and southeastern fronts were hard-pressed to resist the German advance. Personally directing this massive offensive offensive, Hitler moved his command post to a site in the Ukraine.

German successes in the Mediterranean Basin provided additional impetus for this third round of Roosevelt-Churchill talks. Near Tobruk, on June 12-13, Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps delivered the British Eighth Army what appeared to be a decisive blow, setting the stage for the capture of Tobruk and possibly the whole of Egypt. At about the same time, June 13-16, the delivered the British Eighth Army what appeared to be a decisive blow, setting the stage for the capture of Tobruk and possibly the whole of Egypt. At about the same time, June 13-16, the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe-and some Italian naval units-decisively repulsed an all-out British attempt to reinforce Malta by simultaneously sailing heavily escorted convoys east from Gibraltar and west from Alexandria. Only two out of the seventeen supply ships in the two convoys got through; the rest were sunk or turned back. In the aftermath of these British setbacks on land and sea, the Royal Navy abandoned its major base at Alexandria, withdrawing eastward to Haifa, Palestine, and Beirut, Lebanon.

Worse yet was a disturbing forecast from Rodger Winn in the Admiralty's U-boat Tracking Room. On June 1, Winn estimated that the Germans had built 355 U-boats to then, of which only seventy-five were positively known to have been sunk. That left a net force of about 280 to 285 commissioned U-boats on June 1.* Furthermore, Winn estimated, the Germans were building new U-boats at the rate of "15-25 per month." If the forecast proved accurate, it meant the net force was to grow to at least 400 U-boats by January 1, 1943. Furthermore, Winn estimated, the Germans were building new U-boats at the rate of "15-25 per month." If the forecast proved accurate, it meant the net force was to grow to at least 400 U-boats by January 1, 1943.

Many responsible American officials believed that disturbing forecast to be greatly understated, among them Adolphus Andrews, commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier. Analyzing the Winn paper, his diarist wrote in June that the number of surviving U-boats might be not 280 or 285 but as many as 325, of which not 125 but as many as 140 were assigned to the Atlantic force. Doubtless reflecting the views of Andrews, the diarist went on to predict: At the present rate of building the Germans will have over 500 submarines by January 1, 1943. It is probable that most of the new construction will ultimately be used against us in the Atlantic. When it is remembered that in the first six months of the war [i.e., war with the United States] an average of 100 submarines available to operate in the Atlantic have caused very large losses, doubling or tripling of this number presents a problem of great seriousness, particularly when it is also remembered that sinkings of U-boats [by the Allies] have been so small as to be almost negligible during the same period. U-boat crews which were green in March are now hardened veterans [and] will form the working nucleus of the larger fleet to be at sea six months from now.The solution of this problem lies primarily in developing the means to destroy submarines and not so much in their location and detection (where most of our research endeavor has been placed to date). Though attack, capture and holding of the Bay of Biscay coast would be a dangerous and costly operation, it may be more costly to permit the enemy to use and expand activities from these bases.

Amid great secrecy, Churchill left the British Isles June 17 in a Boeing Flying Clipper. Twenty-six and a half hours later, the huge flying boat landed on the Potomac River in Washington. There Churchill transferred to a smaller aircraft and flew to the President's home in Hyde Park, New York, where Roosevelt, Churchill, and Harry Hopkins commenced strategy talks. Churchill stressed these points: * The "heavy sinkings" of merchant ships by U-boats in American waters constituted the "greatest and most immediate danger" to the Allies. He urged Roosevelt to do everything possible to hasten the extension of the convoy network into the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

* If mounted in early September 1942, as planned, Sledgehammer was "certain to lead to disaster." No responsible British military authority favored it.

* Rather than Sledgehammer, the Allies should reconsider Gymnast, the postponed Allied invasion of French Northwest Africa, and Jupiter, an Allied occupation of extreme northern Norway to provide land-based flank protection for Murmansk convoys.

* British scientists had made substantial (paper) progress on an atomic bomb, disguised in the British Isles for security reasons as R&D on "Tube Alloys." The British and Americans should "at once pool all our information, work together on equal terms, and share the results."

In Washington at this time, June 19, the normally cool and reserved Army Chief of Staff, George Marshall, blasted King with a memo that has served King's critics well. The intent and timing of this memo, the content of which King knew as well as or better than Marshall, is not at all clear. Listing the heavy Allied shipping losses in four categories, Marshall wrote: The losses by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean now threaten our entire war effort.... We are all aware of the limited number of escort craft available, but has every conceivable improvised means been brought to bear on this situation? I am fearful that another month or two of this [loss rate] will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the enemy in critical theaters to exercise a determining influence in the war.

Marshall's memo drew from King on June 21 a remarkably calm and lengthy review of the steps already taken to combat the U-boat, together with King's views on what was required for the future. "Though we are still suffering heavy losses outside the east convoy zone," King wrote, "the situation is not hopeless." He stressed these points: * The U-boat threat could only be eliminated completely by "wiping out the German building yards and bases" with heavy bomber attacks. This was a matter which King had been "pressing with the British, so far with only moderate success."

* Meanwhile, if all shipping could be brought under defensive defensive escort and air cover, "our losses will be reduced to an acceptable figure." King went on to emphasize his unwavering view that "escort is not just escort and air cover, "our losses will be reduced to an acceptable figure." King went on to emphasize his unwavering view that "escort is not just one one way of handling the submarine menace; it is the way of handling the submarine menace; it is the only only way that gives any promise of success." way that gives any promise of success."* Hence, "we must get every ship that sails the seas under constant close protection." Hence, "we must get every ship that sails the seas under constant close protection."

* Alluding to the Army Air Forces' doctrine of offensive offensive "hunter-killer" air patrols to the exclusion of "hunter-killer" air patrols to the exclusion of defensive defensive convoy escort, King again threw cold water on that approach. "The so-called patrol and hunting operations have time and again proved futile," he wrote. The only efficient way to kill U-boats at sea was to attack "continuously and relentlessly" those U-boats that had been drawn to the convoys. However, this was a doctrine that required enormous numbers of radar-equipped, well-trained surface escorts and land- and carrier-based aircraft, not yet in sight, let alone in hand. convoy escort, King again threw cold water on that approach. "The so-called patrol and hunting operations have time and again proved futile," he wrote. The only efficient way to kill U-boats at sea was to attack "continuously and relentlessly" those U-boats that had been drawn to the convoys. However, this was a doctrine that required enormous numbers of radar-equipped, well-trained surface escorts and land- and carrier-based aircraft, not yet in sight, let alone in hand.

King concluded his memo by asking Marshall for assistance in five categories: * Build up, "as soon as practicable," a force of about 1,000 radar-equipped Army aircraft to patrol the projected 7,000 miles of convoy lanes in the Eastern, Gulf, Caribbean, and Panama Sea Frontiers. This airpower was not to be "a temporary measure pending augmentation" of naval surface forces but rather "a permanent arrangement" to "protect our shipping properly."

* Reduce requests for "special convoys" to rush Army troops to "the Caribbean and other local danger zones" until such time as surface escorts were plentiful. The protection provided for "special convoys" diminished the protection available for "shipping in general."

* Reduce unescorted cargo-ship movements, and insist that such ships travel in established convoys.

* Reduce the growing requirements for the protection of important coastal structures, such as oil refineries, from U-boat gun bombardments, which were "not formidable," only "occasional," and easily thwarted.

* Examine every "new project with respect to its effect on our antisubmarine effort." Any such military proposal or operation that "retards the output of antisubmarine vessels or involves the diversion of vessels engaged in protection of merchant shipping will unduly aggravate the present bad situation."

President Roosevelt, Churchill, and Hopkins left Hyde Park for Washington via presidential train on the evening of June 20. Upon arrival at the White House the next day, they confronted shocking news: Some 33,000 seasoned British and Commonwealth troops had surrendered Tobruk to an Axis force of about half that number. Churchill wrote later: "This was one of the heaviest blows I can recall during the war."

The American and British delegations that assembled for the Argonaut conference in Washington met off and on from June 21 to June 27. The shipping crisis and the military setback in North Africa dominated all else.

Under relentless pressure from Churchill and his advisers, as well as from Stimson, Marshall, and others in Washington, President Roosevelt again chastised Admiral King for the delays in initiating convoys. Reviewing the heavy losses of unescorted shipping in North American waters for the period May 17 to June 27, Roosevelt wrote King privately: One hundred and eighteen ships sailing independently were lost as against twenty under escort. I realize the problem of making up escorts for convoys but about three months have elapsed since we undertook it. I also realize that strict observance of convoy rules will slow up voyages of many ships but, frankly, I think it has taken an unconscionable time to get things going, and further, I do not think that we are utilizing a large number of escort vessels which could be used, especially in the Summer time. We must speed things up and we must use the available tools even though they are not just what we would like to have.

Apart from ignoring the delays in his emergency SC program ("Sixty Ships in Sixty Days") and the PC program, and the low priority granted to destroyer escort construction, this memo reflected Roosevelt's wrongheaded notion that small, cheap, mass-produced vessels such as SCs, private fishing trawlers, and yachts could do the convoy escort job in American waters. It drew from King a prompt and remarkably restrained reply, which stressed tactfully the impracticably of Roosevelt's obsession with small-boat escorts.

"I am in entire accord with your view as to the advantages of escorted convoys," King wrote Roosevelt. "I have established convoy systems, beginning with the most dangerous areas, as acquisition of escort vessels permitted. I have used vessels of every type and size that can keep up with the ships they guard. I have accepted the smallest escorts that give promise of a reasonable degree of protection."

After listing the various convoy systems in place. King wrote that "these convoys are a step in the right direction" but that the Allies "are still at a disadvantage": * Escorts are unduly weak, consisting of too large a proportion of small craft with little fighting power.

* Only medium-speed (nominally 10-knot) convoys are at present possible. Fifteen-knot and faster ships normally proceed independently. Very slow ships are, where possible, moved from port to port in daylight with a token escort of small craft.

* There are no regular convoys at present to Gulf of Mexico ports, but it is expected that 83-foot Coast Guard cutters will become available in the near future for this service.

* Small craft now used in the Caribbean frequently cannot keep up with convoys against the trade winds.

* A dangerous concentration of unprotected shipping exists in the open sea beyond Trinidad.

* The smaller craft now extensively used in escort service will not stand winter weather in the North Atlantic.

King concluded: My goal-and I believe yours also-is to get every ship under escort. For this purpose we (the United States and Great Britain) need a very large number-roughly 1,000-sea-going escort vessels of DE [destroyer escort] or corvette type. I am doing my best to get them quickly.