The U-boat command structure, from Donitz on down, was dismayed. Donitz and his staff, and the seven combat flotilla commanders and staffs, were deeply entrenched at Brest, St. Nazaire, Lorient, La Pallice, and Bordeaux. Apart from the massive U-boat pens, the Germans had built elaborate communications facilities and rest camps for crews. To move all this away from the coast was to require a massive effort at the time all energies were directed at the U-boat campaign in the Americas.

As Donitz viewed Hitler's "strict orders," he and his Kerneval staff had little choice but to return to Paris. "This is a regretted step back where administration is concerned," he logged, "since the direct contact with the front-that is, the personal touch between commanding officer and his operational boats and crews-will not be possible to anything like the same extent from Paris." Accordingly, he directed the staff to explore alternatives-the city of Angers, for one-that would leave him "as far forward as possible."

London and Washington worried constantly that the Tirpitz Tirpitz, like the Bismarck Bismarck, might sortie from Norway into the North Atlantic to raid merchant ships and troopship convoys. It was believed the Tirpitz Tirpitz was likely to conclude such a sortie at St. Nazaire, where a huge dry dock had been constructed on the Loire River for the giant, 83,423-ton French luxury passenger liner was likely to conclude such a sortie at St. Nazaire, where a huge dry dock had been constructed on the Loire River for the giant, 83,423-ton French luxury passenger liner Normandie Normandie.* The British therefore put in motion a scheme to mount a commando raid on St. Nazaire, primarily to destroy the dry dock and discourage a The British therefore put in motion a scheme to mount a commando raid on St. Nazaire, primarily to destroy the dry dock and discourage a Tirpitz Tirpitz sortie, but also to do whatever other mischief it could. sortie, but also to do whatever other mischief it could.

The armada transporting the commando force sailed from Falmouth on the afternoon of March 26, the same day Raeder relayed Hitler's order to relocate U-boat coastal installations. Deceptively flying Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine flags, the armada consisted of the ex-American four-stack destroyer flags, the armada consisted of the ex-American four-stack destroyer Buchanan Buchanan, renamed Campbeltown Campbeltown, a gunboat, a torpedo boat, and sixteen motor launches, escorted part of the way by two other British destroyers. A total of 353 Royal Navy personnel manned Campbeltown Campbeltown and the eighteen small craft, which carried 268 commandos who had trained tirelessly for the mission. The fleet of small craft was to descend upon St. Nazaire in the middle of the night and land the commandos. Stripped of unnecessary gear-and weight-and loaded with three tons of TNT, and the eighteen small craft, which carried 268 commandos who had trained tirelessly for the mission. The fleet of small craft was to descend upon St. Nazaire in the middle of the night and land the commandos. Stripped of unnecessary gear-and weight-and loaded with three tons of TNT, Campbeltown Campbeltown was to wedge herself into the lock of the was to wedge herself into the lock of the Normandie Normandie dry dock. A delayed-action fuse was to explode the TNT after the commandos had withdrawn in the small craft. dry dock. A delayed-action fuse was to explode the TNT after the commandos had withdrawn in the small craft.

As the armada approached the coast of France early on the morning of March 27, Gerd Kelbling in U-593 U-593 discovered it. Released from the reshuffled discovered it. Released from the reshuffled Westwall Westwall group, Kelbling was returning to France. As he reported the force to Kerneval at 7:20 group, Kelbling was returning to France. As he reported the force to Kerneval at 7:20 A.M. A.M. ("three destroyers, ten torpedo boats"), the two escorting destroyers, ("three destroyers, ten torpedo boats"), the two escorting destroyers, Atherstone Atherstone and and Tynedale Tynedale, spotted and attacked him, holding him down for many hours and preventing follow-up reports. Kerneval made the mistake of dismissing the formation as one probably "returning from a mine-laying expedition off the French-Biscay coast."

A British submarine positioned off St. Nazaire on the evening of March 27 transmitted beacons to guide the commando flotilla to the mouth of the Loire. As part of the plan, the RAF bombed St. Nazaire at 11:00 P.M. P.M., but that was probably a mistake inasmuch as it woke up the town and alerted the military defenses. As the armada proceeded up the Loire at 1:30 A.M. A.M., March 28, the Germans detected it and illuminated it with searchlights. An enormous, confused firefight ensued. Campbeltown Campbeltown stearned ahead full speed and at 1:34, rammed the lock per plan, and wedged herself firmly in the dry dock, but the time fuse on the TNT failed. stearned ahead full speed and at 1:34, rammed the lock per plan, and wedged herself firmly in the dry dock, but the time fuse on the TNT failed.

Soon after the first shots were exchanged, Donitz was notified. The initial, panicky report gave the impression that an Allied force of "twenty cruisers and destroyers" was assaulting St. Nazaire and that even heavier warships might be standing off the mouth of the Loire. The stream of follow-up but exaggerated reports indicated that the Allies were mounting a major invasion. Accordingly, forty-one minutes after the first alarm, Donitz sent a message to all U-boats at sea that were east of 29 degrees west longitude: "Make for St. Nazaire at highest speed. English landings in progress." Five boats that were outbound to the Americas reversed course; the four boats of group York York, already inbound to France, rang up full speed.

There were two U-boat combat flotillas based at St. Nazaire: the 7th, commanded by Herbert Sohler, and the 10th, commanded by Gunter Kuhnke. When the senior officer, Sohler, established contact with Donitz, he reported that all headquarters offices and the U-boats had been stripped of "secret documents" and that all crews at the rest camp in La Baule had been evacuated inland to the town of La Roche Bernard. In accordance with orders issued by Donitz on March 14, demolition charges had been set to prevent any U-boat from falling into enemy hands.

Confused and furious fighting raged in St. Nazaire for several hours, during which German forces gradually got the upper hand. They sank or severely damaged fourteen of the eighteen British small craft; only four motor launches finally made it back to England. The Germans killed or captured almost half (171 of 353) of the Royal Navy personnel and all but five of the 268 commandos. (Of these, eighty-five naval personnel and fifty-nine commandos survived the war.) But the raiders achieved their goal: the faulty fuse on the TNT in Campbeltown Campbeltown finally detonated at noon-about eight hours late-destroying the lock and killing a number of Germans who were on board the vessel attempting to defuse the TNT. Some military and civilian sightseers were also killed. Total German casualties as a result of the raid were sixty-seven killed, sixty-two severely wounded, and seventy-four slightly wounded. finally detonated at noon-about eight hours late-destroying the lock and killing a number of Germans who were on board the vessel attempting to defuse the TNT. Some military and civilian sightseers were also killed. Total German casualties as a result of the raid were sixty-seven killed, sixty-two severely wounded, and seventy-four slightly wounded.

The repercussions of this raid were far-reaching. On the afternoon of March 28, Hitler directed Donitz to move U-boat headquarters and the submarine crews to "a safe place." At 10:00 A.M. A.M. on March 30, Donitz reactivated his headquarters in a building on Avenue Marechal Manoury in Paris, linked by teletype to the radio facilities at Kerneval. In response to Hitler's usual demand for an investigation, the Berlin-based Army generals, Alfred Jodl and Wilhelm Keitel, denigrated the performance of the on March 30, Donitz reactivated his headquarters in a building on Avenue Marechal Manoury in Paris, linked by teletype to the radio facilities at Kerneval. In response to Hitler's usual demand for an investigation, the Berlin-based Army generals, Alfred Jodl and Wilhelm Keitel, denigrated the performance of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine. Viewing the criticism as a personal insult, Admiral Raeder not only vigorously defended the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine's performance to Hitler, but also demanded an official apology from Hitler's lackey, Keitel, thus sharply widening the growing gap between himself and Hitler's inner circle.

HITLER'S D DOUBTS AND P PROMISES The U-boat campaign in American waters was savaging Allied shipping at a record rate and disrupting all plans, and had given German morale a timely lift. Yet in April 1942, some high-ranking Berlin strategists who had Hitler's ear began to view the U-boat war with deep misgivings. The enlarged, high-priority U-boat construction program was absorbing high-grade steel and scarce copper, which was desperately needed by the "Wehrmacht and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe for the war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Americans had announced the new-and massive-merchant-ship building goals for 1942-1943. Despite the mounting rate of sinkings by U-boats, the dissenting strategists viewed the naval situation as "hopeless" for the long term. That is, Germany could by no means build enough U-boats to make a decisive dent in the announced Allied shipping program. for the war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Americans had announced the new-and massive-merchant-ship building goals for 1942-1943. Despite the mounting rate of sinkings by U-boats, the dissenting strategists viewed the naval situation as "hopeless" for the long term. That is, Germany could by no means build enough U-boats to make a decisive dent in the announced Allied shipping program.

There was a more pressing point. Notwithstanding the great numbers of sinkings in American waters, enormous amounts of military supplies were still getting through to the British Isles, to the British Eighth Army, and to the Soviet Union via the North and South Atlantic, the Arctic, and Indian Ocean sea routes. The critics argued that if Germany was to gain swift victories in the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean Basin, it was far more important to sink merchant ships in those areas rather than American coastal shipping, which included banana, sugar, and molasses vessels, and others of no military consequence, or vessels transporting raw materials, such as bauxite, which could not be transformed into weaponry soon enough to affect the outcome of the short-term fighting. The critics thus urged that the U-boat force be concentrated against those Allied convoys which were directly supporting the battlefronts of Germany's enemies.

So it was that at the height of the most successful U-boat campaign of the war, admirals Raeder and Donitz were compelled to justify to Hitler not only the continuance of the large-scale U-boat building program but also the decision to suspend attacks against convoys in war zones in favor of coastal shipping in American waters. Admiral Raeder made the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine's case for the U-boat strategy to Hitler in four meetings-April 16, May 13 and 14, and June 15-at Wolfsschanze Wolfsschanze. Donitz attended the May 14 meeting and made the presentation. His chief points: * That he did not believe the race between the enemy shipbuilding program and the U-boat sinkings was in any way "hopeless." The announced Allied goal of building 8.2 million new tons of shipping in 1942 was probably propaganda. The experts at the OKM had calculated that the Allies could build no more than about 5 million tons in 1942. Hence Axis forces (submarines, surface ships, aircraft, etc.) need only sink 400,000 to 500,000 tons of shipping per month to keep pace with new construction and "anything above that number" cut "into the basic tonnage of the enemy." All Axis forces were presently sinking ships at the rate of approximately 700,000 tons a month.*

* That since the United States and Great Britain had pooled all merchant shipping, the merchant fleets had to be regarded as one. It was immaterial where where a ship was sunk. Therefore the best policy was to sink ships wherever the greatest number could be sunk at the lowest cost in U-boats lost. Germany should not concentrate "in one specific area" if that meant sinking fewer ships, except in unusual cases (Arctic, Mediterranean) where U-boats were required to relieve pressure on the a ship was sunk. Therefore the best policy was to sink ships wherever the greatest number could be sunk at the lowest cost in U-boats lost. Germany should not concentrate "in one specific area" if that meant sinking fewer ships, except in unusual cases (Arctic, Mediterranean) where U-boats were required to relieve pressure on the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht. Allied tonnage sunk anywhere degraded the ability of the enemy to mount a "second front."

* That U-boat operations in American waters were therefore entirely justified. In the four-month period from January 10 to May 10, U-boats had sunk 303 ships for 2 million tons, including 112 tankers for 927,000 tons. The Americans had begun building an overland oil pipeline from Texas to the Eastern Seaboard (the so-called "Big Inch") but it would not be ready for at least a year, during which time American industry was to remain dependent on coastal tankers. Every tanker sunk "represents a direct setback" to American industrial production. The U-boat force was "attacking the evil at the root."

* That if and when sinkings in American waters became unprofitable, Donitz would resume attacks on the North Atlantic and other convoy routes. The expected arrival in June and July of large numbers of boats that had been delayed by Baltic ice and the shortage of labor in the shipyards for final fit-outs, and the use of U-tankers, should make it easier to find convoys and to mount sustained attacks on them. The many war patrols to the Americas by numerous new boats had been beneficial from a training standpoint and had produced yet another generation of capable skippers-such as Albrecht Achilles, Otto von Bulow, Peter Cremer, and others-who could lead the attacks on the convoys.

In conclusion, Donitz assured Hitler that "the outlook in regard to submarine warfare is promising." The submariners had faith in their equipment and believed in their fighting ability. The most urgent thing to do was to get the delayed submarines out of the Baltic Sea to the Atlantic quickly and "in general to have as many submarines as possible out at sea engaged in operations."

For some months Hitler had been mulling over a monstrous idea to impair Allied shipping: Shoot the merchant crewmen in the lifeboats. That idea first appears in official German records in the minutes of a conference on January 3, 1942, between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Hiroshi shima. "We are fighting for our existence," Hitler told shima, according to the stenographic notes of the meeting, "and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings." If U-boat crews shot up the Allied lifeboats, Hitler explained, when the word got around, "the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people" to man the merchant ships.

This murderous idea next appears, officially, in the OKM diary of February 4, 1942, digesting the topics discussed during meetings between Hitler and Admiral Raeder. The OKM diarist phrased the exchange delicately: Hitler, he wrote, "brought up the question of intensifying warfare on supply traffic by abandoning any consideration for the crews of enemy steamers." Admiral Raeder strongly objected to the idea "for obvious reasons," the OKM diarist wrote, including "the effect which such a policy would have on our own crews." The U-boat crews would be reluctant to carry out the policy for humane reasons and also out of fear that the Allies would retaliate and murder survivors of sunken U-boats.

In a sworn affidavit filed in defense of Donitz at the Nuremberg trials, Admiral Raeder recalled that Hitler raised this idea during the Donitz presentation in the May 14 meeting. "Hitler asked Donitz," Raeder testified, "whether any action could be taken against the crews of torpedoed merchant ships to prevent them from returning home [to man other ships]. Admiral Donitz declined unequivocally any action against the survivors of the ship's crew." Raeder added that he, too, told Hitler that such action against surviving merchant crews "was out of the question."

Donitz went on to suggest that the goal Hitler had in mind could be realized if only the torpedo technicians could produce a reliable magnetic pistol that would explode the torpedoes beneath the targeted ships. That would not only save torpedoes and reduce risks to the U-boats, but-according to the stenographer's notes-would "also have the great advantage that the crew will not be able to save themselves on account of the quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of men will no doubt cause difficulties in the assignment of crews for the great American construction program."

That statement "satisfied" Hitler, Raeder swore in his affidavit, and thereafter Hitler did not approach him "with such a request." Nor was any such order ever issued, Donitz testified at Nuremberg. "Firing upon these men [shipwreck survivors] is a matter concerned with the ethics of war and should be rejected under any and all circumstances," Donitz said.

Yet another idea for impeding the manning of new merchant ships arose in the aftermath of this meeting. Berlin directed that upon sinking a ship, U-boats were to make every effort to capture the captain and chief engineer and bring them back to Germany as POWs. Donitz relayed these orders to all U-boats on June 5, adding that if, in the judgment of the U-boat skipper, such captures would endanger the boat, or impair its fighting ability, they were not to be attempted.

To judge by the stenographer's notes of this May 14 meeting, Hitler was apparently convinced that the Donitz strategy for waging U-boat warfare was sound. "Victory depends on destroying the greatest amount of Allied tonnage possible," the Fiihrer proclaimed. "Thus all offensive operations of the enemy can be slowed down or even stopped entirely.... The submarine war will in the end decide the outcome of the war." He approved Raeder's proposal that submarine production be stepped up from seventeen boats a month "to the very limit." The copper and labor shortages were to be overcome by buying copper on the black market in France and Belgium* and by exempting shipwrights from conscription into the and by exempting shipwrights from conscription into the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht.

Donitz came away from the meeting believing he had won a sweeping victory, that the U-boat force finally had Hitler's unqualified backing, and that Donitz had a free hand to deploy the boats as he saw fit. But, in fact, Donitz had won only a partial victory. Humiliated that Germany could not deploy Tirpitz Tirpitz, in part because the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine had no aircraft carriers to protect her, Hitler directed that work on the carrier had no aircraft carriers to protect her, Hitler directed that work on the carrier Graf Zeppelin Graf Zeppelin was to continue at high priority and, furthermore, that the battle cruiser was to continue at high priority and, furthermore, that the battle cruiser Gneisenau Gneisenau, the heavy cruiser Seydlitz Seydlitz (under construction), and two large ocean liners, (under construction), and two large ocean liners, Europa Europa and and Potsdam Potsdam, be converted to aircraft carriers. This work was to divert high-grade steel, copper, and shipyard workers from U-boat production lines. Moreover, still believing that the Allies intended to invade Norway at any hour, Hitler insisted that not less than twenty U-boats remain in Norway to thwart the supposed invasion and to attack the Murmansk convoys in cooperation with the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, even though the nightless Arctic summer had arrived, robbing the U-boats of cover for surface chases and attacks and for charging batteries, and reducing their effectiveness to near zero.

STRATEGIC V VICTORIES AT C CORAL S SEA AND M MIDWAY.

During the latter days of April and the month of May, Admiral King and his senior advisers had to deal simultaneously with two urgent naval matters: the huge and vitally important battles with Japanese naval forces in the Pacific and the no less vital war against the U-boat in the Atlantic.

The first and most urgent task in the Pacific was to prevent Japanese amphibious invasion of Port Moresby, New Guinea, thereby diminishing the threat to Australia and the line of communications between that continent and the United States. The second most urgent task was to thwart a Japanese amphibious operation in the central Pacific, believed to be an invasion of either Midway Island or Oahu in the Hawaiian chain or possibly Alaska or California.

In accordance with the plan to deal with the threat to Port Moresby, devised by King and Nimitz during their meeting in San Francisco, April 25 to 27, Nimitz deployed the carriers Lexington Lexington and and Yorktown Yorktown and supporting forces to the Coral Sea. On May 7, the Allied forces engaged a superior Japanese force composed of the carriers and supporting forces to the Coral Sea. On May 7, the Allied forces engaged a superior Japanese force composed of the carriers Shokaku Shokaku and and Zuikaku Zuikaku, the light carrier Shoho, and supporting forces. American carrier aircraft sank Shoho while Japanese carrier aircraft sank the modern destroyer Sims and damaged the fleet tanker Neosho. The next day, May 8, the American aviators severely damaged the carrier Shokaku Shokaku, while the Japanese aviators severely damaged the carrier Lexington Lexington and hit the and hit the Yorktown Yorktown. Shokaku Shokaku limped back to Japan, but limped back to Japan, but Lexington Lexington was so badly damaged that she was sunk (by the destroyer was so badly damaged that she was sunk (by the destroyer Phelps Phelps), as was the damaged tanker Neosho (by the destroyer Henley Henley). Both sides lost numerous pilots and aircraft and incurred other heavy casualties.*

During the run-up to the Battle of the Coral Sea, on May 3, a light Japanese force occupied Tulagi in the Solomon Island chain, which the Allies had recently evacuated. Alerted to this new threat to the line of communications to Australia, on the following day, May 4, aircraft from the Yorktown Yorktown hit the Japanese invaders, sinking a destroyer, a minelayer, and one transport. The Americans proclaimed a great victory, but it was nowhere near that. Moreover, the Americans soon learned from radio decrypts that the Japanese objective in the lower Solomons was to build an air base on the much larger adjacent island, Guadalcanal. Since a Japanese air base there would pose a grave threat to the line of communications, it was an operation that could not be allowed to proceed. Thus Admiral King had yet another developing problem to deal with in the South Pacific. hit the Japanese invaders, sinking a destroyer, a minelayer, and one transport. The Americans proclaimed a great victory, but it was nowhere near that. Moreover, the Americans soon learned from radio decrypts that the Japanese objective in the lower Solomons was to build an air base on the much larger adjacent island, Guadalcanal. Since a Japanese air base there would pose a grave threat to the line of communications, it was an operation that could not be allowed to proceed. Thus Admiral King had yet another developing problem to deal with in the South Pacific.

Before and after the Battle of the Coral Sea itself, American codebreakers worked feverishly to positively identify the objectives of an impending and larger Japanese amphibious operation in the central Pacific. From various radio decrypts, intelligence advisers to Nimitz in Hawaii concluded that the first and main objective was an invasion of Midway Island in preparation for an invasion of Hawaii, together with an invasion of the islands of Kiska and Attu in the Aleutian chain, to thwart American air attacks on the Japanese home islands. However, intelligence advisers to Admiral King in Washington insisted that the Japanese objective was "south," probably an invasion of New Caledonia, which the Americans had recently reinforced. When further codebreaking information on May 17 and 18 pointed unequivocally to Midway and the Aleutians, King yielded to Nimitz's intelligence and approved a decision to shift the damaged carrier Yorktown Yorktown from the South Pacific to the central Pacific. After rushed repairs, she was to join the carriers from the South Pacific to the central Pacific. After rushed repairs, she was to join the carriers Hornet Hornet and and Enterprise Enterprise and supporting forces to repel the Japanese at Midway. and supporting forces to repel the Japanese at Midway.

To replace the carrier Lexington Lexington, lost in the Coral Sea, on May 21 Admiral King directed Atlantic Fleet commander Ingersoll to send the carrier Wasp Wasp and a destroyer division (nominally six destroyers) to the Pacific as rapidly as possible. Then attached to the British Home Fleet, and a destroyer division (nominally six destroyers) to the Pacific as rapidly as possible. Then attached to the British Home Fleet, Wasp Wasp had only just flown off a second load of aircraft to Malta and required a week's refit at Norfolk. Three days later, on May 24, King notified the British that had only just flown off a second load of aircraft to Malta and required a week's refit at Norfolk. Three days later, on May 24, King notified the British that Wasp Wasp, the new battleship North Carolina North Carolina, the "jeep" carrier Long Island Long Island (to be used to ferry aircraft), one heavy and one light cruiser, and a division of destroyers were to be shifted to the Pacific. However, none of these warships arrived in Hawaii in time for the Battle of Midway. (to be used to ferry aircraft), one heavy and one light cruiser, and a division of destroyers were to be shifted to the Pacific. However, none of these warships arrived in Hawaii in time for the Battle of Midway.*

Acting on further information from Navy codebreakers, Nimitz was able to deploy his three carriers in a clever ambush off Midway. In a remarkable victory on June 4, aircraft from these American carriers sank four fleet carriers of the Imperial Navy covering force (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu) and forced the Japanese to withdraw. The American ambush included a dozen submarines, one of which, Tambor Tambor, caused a collision between the cruisers Mikuma Mikuma and and Mogami Mogami. The latter limped home but American aircraft found and sank Mikuma Mikuma. Japanese aircraft severely damaged the carrier Yorktown Yorktown. The next day, June 5, one of sixteen Japanese submarines in the attack force, 1-168, torpedoed and sank Yorktown Yorktown and the destroyer and the destroyer Hammann Hammann, which was assisting the crippled carrier. Secondary Japanese forces occupied the Aleutian islands Kiska and Attu.

Admiral King's preoccupation with the Pacific, as the British sneeringly put it, resulted in two strategic naval victories of immense consequences within six months of Pearl Harbor. The loss of four fleet carriers and one light carrier, the damage to the fleet carrier Shokaku Shokaku, and the loss of the cream of the Japanese naval air arm was a devastating setback to the Imperial Navy. With the return of the carrier Saratoga Saratoga from repairs in the States and the transfer of the carrier from repairs in the States and the transfer of the carrier Wasp Wasp from the Atlantic, Nimitz could deploy four fast carrier task forces, sufficient naval air power to counterbalance and hold at bay the remaining Japanese carrier forces. Hence the Japanese were no longer able to undertake big operations such as an invasion of Midway or Hawaii, which required a strong force of sea-based air. Nor were they able to capitalize on the occupation of Kiska and Attu. from the Atlantic, Nimitz could deploy four fast carrier task forces, sufficient naval air power to counterbalance and hold at bay the remaining Japanese carrier forces. Hence the Japanese were no longer able to undertake big operations such as an invasion of Midway or Hawaii, which required a strong force of sea-based air. Nor were they able to capitalize on the occupation of Kiska and Attu.

The Japanese did not, however, relax pressures in the Pacific. They intensified efforts in New Guinea with an overland attack on Port Moresby, and in the Solomon Island chain, areas where land-based aircraft could provide the Japanese the requisite air umbrella. One month after the Battle of Midway, on July 6, the Japanese landed two construction battalions (2,571 soldiers) on Guadalcanal to commence work on the air base. Owing to a new-and blinding-increase in the complexity in the latest variation of Japanese naval code JN-25, American code-breakers were unable to forewarn of this new Japanese landing. The first solid information on it came from Australian coast watchers hiding out in the Solomons.

The sudden and unexpected appearance of Japanese construction forces on Guadalcanal came as a shock to the Americans. It forced them to enlarge a planned attack on Tulagi and Florida islands (Watchtower) to include the capture of Guadalcanal and to push the timetable forward to the earliest possible date. Commanded by Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (who had been replaced in London by former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark), on August 7, American and Australian naval forces simultaneously landed elements of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Although caught by surprise, the Japanese reacted swiftly and effectively. They counterattacked the Allies with strong air and naval forces and sent a steady stream of infantry to drive the American Marines from Guadalcanal.

Neither Washington nor Tokyo had planned for a decisive battle in the Solomon Island chain. However, the struggle for Guadalcanal was to grow into one, dominating all other Allied and Axis operations in the Pacific for the remainder of 1942. The desperate fighting in the air and on the seas and in the jungles was to result in ghastly casualties on both sides and-ultimately-yet another legendary Pacific victory for the Americans.

PENETRATING G GULFS.

During the spring of 1942, the massive U-boat pens at the French Atlantic bases were completed and brought to peak efficiency. Owing to the diversion of U-boats to the Mediterranean and the Arctic and to delays in the arrival of new boats assigned to the Atlantic, there were ample berthing spaces and repair crews to accommodate promptly all boats in need of refit. Hence the home base turnaround time of many boats was sharply reduced. This development, plus the sailing of six new boats (three IXs, three VIIs) from Germany to the Atlantic force, enabled Donitz in April to order the largest U-boat force yet to American waters: thirty-one boats-fourteen IXs and seventeen VIIs.

These thirty-one boats were to be resupplied, where necessary, by two U-tankers. These were Wilamowitz-Mollendorf's U-459 U-459, which had sailed in March and was still on station in the mid-Atlantic, and the new Type XB minelayer,* U-116 U-116, commanded by thirty-six-year-old Werner von Schmidt, which, owing to the failure of the SMA (moored) mine, had been temporarily released to Donitz. However, while U-116 U-116 was en route to the operational area on April 29, a Coastal Command Hudson depth-charged and damaged her near Rockall Bank and she was forced to abort to Lorient for repairs. This mishap delayed was en route to the operational area on April 29, a Coastal Command Hudson depth-charged and damaged her near Rockall Bank and she was forced to abort to Lorient for repairs. This mishap delayed U-116 U-116's deployment for twenty-two days, disrupting the planned resupply operations for the April boats.

The damage to U-116 U-116 was a direct result of intensified Coastal Command air patrols in the Bay of Biscay. These radar-equipped aircraft caught and damaged two other new boats sailing from Germany in April: the Type IX was a direct result of intensified Coastal Command air patrols in the Bay of Biscay. These radar-equipped aircraft caught and damaged two other new boats sailing from Germany in April: the Type IX U-172 U-172, and the Type VII U-590 U-590. The last was hit by a Whitley of Squadron 502, piloted by Edward Cotton. Both were compelled to return to France for repairs, delaying their departures to May, thus reducing the total number of April boats that reached America waters to twenty-nine.

Of these twenty-nine, sixteen were Type VIIs, of which nine had made prior patrols to the Americas. Three were commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Giinther Krech in holders: Giinther Krech in U-558 U-558; Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564; and Gerhard Bigalk in U-751 U-751. Twelve of the sixteen were to refuel from the tanker U-459 U-459 while she was still on her maiden voyage or while she was on a hurriedly arranged second voyage in early June. while she was still on her maiden voyage or while she was on a hurriedly arranged second voyage in early June.

Donitz assumed correctly that the easy times in American East Coast waters were coming to an end. The April VIIs were certain to confront intensified-perhaps even lethal-ASW measures, especially from airplanes. It was also likely that the Americans had finally initiated coastal convoying. If so, the VIIs were to find the hunting very difficult. It would not be prudent for U-boats to attack inshore convoys in the shallow waters of the continental shelf at any time, day or night. There were not enough VIIs to mount sustained night pack attacks against offshore convoys, assuming they could be found. Should conditions in coastal waters prove to be unfavorable as believed, Donitz had plans for some VIIs to refuel at sea and patrol to the less well defended Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea.

Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564, who wore Oak Leaves on his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, was the first of the April VIIs to arrive. After refueling from U-459 U-459, he briefly overlapped Peter Cremer in U-333 U-333 in Florida waters, arriving in early May. Cruising close to shore in shallow waters from Cape Canaveral to Fort Lauderdale, in merely one week, May 3 to 9, Suhren attacked and claimed five ships sunk (including two big tankers) for 30,000 tons. However, two of these ships, the 9,800-ton British tanker Eclipse and the 3,500-ton American freighter in Florida waters, arriving in early May. Cruising close to shore in shallow waters from Cape Canaveral to Fort Lauderdale, in merely one week, May 3 to 9, Suhren attacked and claimed five ships sunk (including two big tankers) for 30,000 tons. However, two of these ships, the 9,800-ton British tanker Eclipse and the 3,500-ton American freighter Delisle Delisle, survived the torpedo hits and were towed into ports and repaired, reducing Suhren's confirmed bag for the week to three ships sunk for 20,400 tons, including the 7,000-ton Panamanian tanker Lubrafol Lubrafol.

Probing farther south to Miami, on May 14 Suhren sank the neutral 4,000-ton Mexican tanker Potrero del Llano Potrero del Llano, named after Mexico's once-great oil fields near Tampico. Suhren claimed the vessel was sailing blacked out and that there were armed escorts in her vicinity, making her a legitimate target. The Mexicans insisted the vessel had bright spotlights illuminating the Mexican flags painted on her sides. Whatever the truth of the matter, the Mexican government seized upon the incident to declare that as of May 22 a state of war was to exist with Germany. Thereupon, Donitz advised the Atlantic boats that all Mexican ships were fair game and to beware of ASW measures in Mexican waters.

On that same day, May 14, the United States Navy initiated an organized merchant-ship coastal-convoy system to replace the ragged (but effective) Bucket Brigade, between Key West and Norfolk. The plan was to sail a forty-five-ship convoy, escorted by not less than five warships as well as land-based aircraft, nonstop in each direction every three days. The first convoy, KS 500 (Key West, Southbound) sailed from Norfolk on May 14. Its counterpart, KN 100 (Key West, Northbound) sailed on May 15. The schedules were arranged so that all ships passed Cape Hatteras in daylight with maximum available air cover. Although the value of dimouts and blackouts remained in question, some cities along the southern coastline cooperated by imposing them.

Cruising off the Florida Keys on May 17, with all torpedoes expended, Suhren in U-564 U-564 spotted what was probably a section of KS 500. He tracked "fourteen ships escorted by four destroyers" rounding Key West and going west into the Gulf of Mexico. He broke radio silence to convey this important intelligence to Donitz, then he set a course for home, overclaiming an impressive six ships for 34,000 tons sunk. However, his confirmed score-four ships for 24,400 tons, plus damage to two others-was the best patrol of the April VIIs. spotted what was probably a section of KS 500. He tracked "fourteen ships escorted by four destroyers" rounding Key West and going west into the Gulf of Mexico. He broke radio silence to convey this important intelligence to Donitz, then he set a course for home, overclaiming an impressive six ships for 34,000 tons sunk. However, his confirmed score-four ships for 24,400 tons, plus damage to two others-was the best patrol of the April VIIs.

On the final leg of his patrol in the Bay of Biscay, Suhren confronted a new and formidable hazard. After eighteen months of R&D and bureaucratic delays, RAF Coastal Command had finally (on June 1) put in service the aircraft-mounted Leigh Light, designed to illuminate U-boats during the last mile of the approach, when ASV meter-wavelength radar was blind. As part of intensified ASW air patrols in the Bay of Biscay, five twin-engine Wellingtons of Coastal Command Squadron 172 had been fitted with these lights.

While Suhren was approaching the French coast on the night of June 4, Squadron Leader Jeaff H. Greswell picked up an ASV contact and commenced the first combat approach with a Leigh Light. His target was the Italian submarine Luigi Luigi Torelli Torelli, commanded by Augusto Migliorini, outbound from Bordeaux to the West Indies. Greswell homed on Torelli Torelli by radar, then switched on the Leigh Light, but owing to a faulty setting in his altimeter, his approach was too high and he saw no sign of a submarine. However, Migliorini, mistaking the Wellington for a German aircraft, fired recognition flares, precisely pinpointing his boat. On a second approach with the Leigh Light, Greswell got by radar, then switched on the Leigh Light, but owing to a faulty setting in his altimeter, his approach was too high and he saw no sign of a submarine. However, Migliorini, mistaking the Wellington for a German aircraft, fired recognition flares, precisely pinpointing his boat. On a second approach with the Leigh Light, Greswell got Torelli Torelli squarely in the brilliant beam and straddled her with four shallow-set 300-pound Torpex depth charges from an altitude of fifty feet. The blasts savaged the boat, forcing Migliorini to abort. squarely in the brilliant beam and straddled her with four shallow-set 300-pound Torpex depth charges from an altitude of fifty feet. The blasts savaged the boat, forcing Migliorini to abort.*

Suhren reached France safely the next day. He found the Kerneval staff in a minor uproar about the attack on Torelli Torelli. Notwithstanding repeated assurances to the contrary by technical authorities in Berlin and elsewhere, it seemed obvious that the British had managed to miniaturize radar to fit in aircraft. Donitz demanded that the technical services immediately produce a "radar detector" or FuMB (an abbreviation of the German phrase for "Radar Observation Equipment"). Thanks to prewar R&D by the French firm Metox-Grandin, to which they had earlier gained access, the Germans were able to quickly produce a prototype receiver and a small, crude, diamond-shaped, dismountable aerial made of wire and wood that could be set up on the bridge of a U-boat while it was on the surface. Astonishingly, this primitive FuMB (known as the "Biscay Cross") was capable of detecting meter-wavelength radar emissions at up to 18.6 miles and to warn of them by emitting a "whistling" or "humming" noise. Donitz issued orders to equip all U-boats in the Atlantic force with a FuMB, but the order could not be carried out fully until early September.

The other fifteen VIIs of the April group sailed for the Americas day by day. Inasmuch as the weather in Canadian waters had dramatically improved and Donitz wished to hold Allied ASW forces there to the greatest extent possible and to disrupt North Atlantic convoy sailings to and from Halifax, Sydney, and St. John's, he directed four of the boats to patrol off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. The other eleven were to continue south to the United States East Coast and to the Bahama Islands, east of Florida. If the planned refuelings with U-459 U-459 were successful, five of the Type VIIs were to go further yet and explore the distant Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. were successful, five of the Type VIIs were to go further yet and explore the distant Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

Three of the four boats assigned to patrol Canadian waters had made prior patrols to the Americas: Heinz-Otto Schultze in U-432 U-432, Karl Thurmann in U-553 U-553, and Viktor Vogel in U-588 U-588. The fourth was the Type VIID minelayer U-213 U-213, commanded by Amelung von Varendorff, who had made one prior patrol in the defense of Norway. Before attacking any shipping, von Varendorff had first to carry out an unwelcomed special mission: to land an Abwehr Abwehr agent on the coast of New Brunswick. agent on the coast of New Brunswick.*

Two of the four Canada-bound Type VIIs, Thurmann's U-553 U-553 and Vogel's U-588, were diverted for several days in the futile hunt for the big troopship convoy AT 15-NA 8. Released from that duty, both approached Canadian coastal waters behind schedule. On May 6 Thurmann shot at a freighter escorted by a "corvette," but the torpedo failed or missed and the escort drove him off with depth charges. On the following day, an aircraft dropped three close "aerial bombs," which caused considerable damage to the boat. Seeking a "quiet" area to make repairs, Thurmann limped through Cabot Strait into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, a large, shallow, landlocked body of water at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, and Vogel's U-588, were diverted for several days in the futile hunt for the big troopship convoy AT 15-NA 8. Released from that duty, both approached Canadian coastal waters behind schedule. On May 6 Thurmann shot at a freighter escorted by a "corvette," but the torpedo failed or missed and the escort drove him off with depth charges. On the following day, an aircraft dropped three close "aerial bombs," which caused considerable damage to the boat. Seeking a "quiet" area to make repairs, Thurmann limped through Cabot Strait into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, a large, shallow, landlocked body of water at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, which to then had not been penetrated by U-boats. which to then had not been penetrated by U-boats.

The other VII, Viktor Vogel in U-588, took up station directly off Halifax, Nova Scotia. On May 9 he attacked and damaged the 7,500-ton American freighter Greylock Greylock. Harassed by ASW air and surface patrols, Vogel slowly inched south to Cape Sable. Near there on May 10, he sank the 4,000-ton British freighter Kitty Kitty's Brook Brook. His attacks temporarily froze the Boston-Halifax-Boston convoys and other fast ships sailing alone.

After completing repairs to U-553 U-553, Thurmann, on his own initiative, decided to explore the Gulf of St. Lawrence. He crawled slowly northwest toward Anticosti Island, which lies off the Gaspe Peninsula in the broad estuary of the St. Lawrence River. While U-553 U-553 was incautiously cruising the surface on the afternoon of May 10, an American B-17, based at Gander, saw and attacked her, dropping five bombs or depth charges from an altitude of about 2,300 feet. Although these explosions caused severe damage to the boat, Thurmann pressed on toward Anticosti. The American airmen were dilatory in reporting their attack to other Allied ASW forces in the area, so no follow-up air-sea hunt was mounted and the danger U-553 presented to the river traffic was not immediately appreciated. was incautiously cruising the surface on the afternoon of May 10, an American B-17, based at Gander, saw and attacked her, dropping five bombs or depth charges from an altitude of about 2,300 feet. Although these explosions caused severe damage to the boat, Thurmann pressed on toward Anticosti. The American airmen were dilatory in reporting their attack to other Allied ASW forces in the area, so no follow-up air-sea hunt was mounted and the danger U-553 presented to the river traffic was not immediately appreciated.

In a remarkable and bold thrust, which was to be likened to Prien's penetration of Scapa Flow, Thurmann reached the mouth of the St. Lawrence River by the early hours of May 12. Within the first four hours of daylight, he spotted five big, outbound, oceangoing freighters and shot torpedoes at four. He claimed sinking three ships and a hit for damage on the fourth. Postwar records credited two freighters sunk: the 5,400-ton British Nicoya Nicoya and the 4,700-ton Dutch and the 4,700-ton Dutch Leto Leto.

The presence of U-553 U-553 in the Gulf of St. Lawrence caused an uproar. Donitz, the U-boat staff, the Canadian government, and Allied ASW forces were equally thunderstruck. The Allies temporarily froze all gulf and river shipping, extinguished navigation lights, and saturated the gulf with ASW air patrols. With nine torpedoes remaining, Thurmann lay low for a week, making repairs, eluding enemy aircraft and warships, and patiently waiting for the resumption of ship traffic. Finally, on May 21, he gave up and exited the gulf via Cabot Strait. Upon receipt of Thurmann's report, Donitz replied with congratulations. Praising Thurmann by name, Berlin propagandists crowed over his feat, implying that U-boats were operating with impunity in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. in the Gulf of St. Lawrence caused an uproar. Donitz, the U-boat staff, the Canadian government, and Allied ASW forces were equally thunderstruck. The Allies temporarily froze all gulf and river shipping, extinguished navigation lights, and saturated the gulf with ASW air patrols. With nine torpedoes remaining, Thurmann lay low for a week, making repairs, eluding enemy aircraft and warships, and patiently waiting for the resumption of ship traffic. Finally, on May 21, he gave up and exited the gulf via Cabot Strait. Upon receipt of Thurmann's report, Donitz replied with congratulations. Praising Thurmann by name, Berlin propagandists crowed over his feat, implying that U-boats were operating with impunity in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Meanwhile, the third VII of the group assigned to Canadian waters, von Varendorff in the Type VIID minelayer U-213 U-213, arrived to land the Abwehr Abwehr agent. Logged aboard agent. Logged aboard U-213 U-213 as as Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine lieutenant "M. A. Langbein," the agent carried forged papers in the name of "Alfred Haskins" of Toronto. His probable mission was to report the sailings of Halifax convoys and other military information. He had a portable radio transmitter-receiver, civilian clothes, and $7,000 in U.S. currency. Entering the Bay of Fundy, von Varendorff landed the agent via rubber dinghy on Melvin's Beach, near the town of St. Martins, New Brunswick, in the early hours of May 14. lieutenant "M. A. Langbein," the agent carried forged papers in the name of "Alfred Haskins" of Toronto. His probable mission was to report the sailings of Halifax convoys and other military information. He had a portable radio transmitter-receiver, civilian clothes, and $7,000 in U.S. currency. Entering the Bay of Fundy, von Varendorff landed the agent via rubber dinghy on Melvin's Beach, near the town of St. Martins, New Brunswick, in the early hours of May 14.* Von Varendorff then explored the Bay of Fundy for enemy merchant ships, but found none. Von Varendorff then explored the Bay of Fundy for enemy merchant ships, but found none.

The fourth and last of the Canada-bound boats, Schultze in U-432 U-432, reached the Nova Scotia area in mid-May. He cruised south to Cape Sable, where on May 17 Vogel in U-588 U-588 sank the 2,100-ton Norwegian freighter sank the 2,100-ton Norwegian freighter Skottland Skottland but missed the British freighter Fort Binger, which was manned by a Free French crew who aggressively counterattacked Vogel by gun and drove him off. East of Cape Sable that same day, Schultze in but missed the British freighter Fort Binger, which was manned by a Free French crew who aggressively counterattacked Vogel by gun and drove him off. East of Cape Sable that same day, Schultze in U-432 U-432 attacked and sank by gun the 325-ton Boston-based fishing trawler attacked and sank by gun the 325-ton Boston-based fishing trawler Foam Foam. At about this same time, von Varendorff in the VIID minelayer U-213 U-213, having found no shipping, exited the Bay of Fundy at Cape Sable.

The U-boat staff was puzzled that none of the four boats assigned to Canadian waters had found a major convoy. Believing the Allies may have shifted the routes farther offshore, Kerneval ordered Vogel, von Varendorff, and Schultze to recon-noiter an area about 200 miles southeast of Cape Sable. Leaving the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Thurmann in U-553 U-553 replaced the three boats in the Cape Sable area and explored the Bay of Fundy. replaced the three boats in the Cape Sable area and explored the Bay of Fundy.

Taking up the assigned stations well to the southeast of Cape Sable, Vogel, Schultze, and von Varendorff found no convoys but encountered numerous ships sailing alone. On May 21 and 23, Vogel in U-588 U-588 sank two by gun and torpedo: the 3,300-ton American freighter Plow City and the 4,500-ton British freighter sank two by gun and torpedo: the 3,300-ton American freighter Plow City and the 4,500-ton British freighter Margot Margot.* Having expended all his torpedoes to sink four confirmed ships for 14,000 tons, Vogel set a course for France. Nearby, Schultze in Having expended all his torpedoes to sink four confirmed ships for 14,000 tons, Vogel set a course for France. Nearby, Schultze in U-432 U-432 sank the lone 4,500-ton British freighter sank the lone 4,500-ton British freighter Zurichmoor Zurichmoor, then returned to the Cape Sable area, switching places with Thurmann in U-553 U-553, who was running low on fuel and food. While 240 miles due south of Cape Sable on June 2, Thurmann in U-553 U-553 sank the 7,000-ton British freighter sank the 7,000-ton British freighter Mattawin Mattawin. Although he was nearly out of food and had but three torpedoes and little fuel remaining, Thurmann was reluctant to head home. However, on June 11, a Catalina found and attacked U-553 U-553, dropping two close depth charges which disabled the port diesel and forced Thurmann to abort. On May 26, von Varendorff in the VIID minelayer U-213 U-213 chased a freighter for eight hours to achieve a favorable firing position, but all three torpedoes missed. chased a freighter for eight hours to achieve a favorable firing position, but all three torpedoes missed.

Three of the four April boats that were assigned to Canadian waters did not refuel. Von Varendorff in the VIID minelayer U-213 U-213, which had 50 percent greater fuel capacity than a VIIC (169 tons vs. 113 tons), had no need to replenish. Upon completing his patrol of sixty days, during which he successfully landed the Abwehr Abwehr agent but sank no ships whatsoever and came home rather soon, von Varendorff drew a stern rebuke. Thurmann in U-553 and Vogel in agent but sank no ships whatsoever and came home rather soon, von Varendorff drew a stern rebuke. Thurmann in U-553 and Vogel in U-588 U-588 carried out patrols of sixty-seven and fifty days, respectively. carried out patrols of sixty-seven and fifty days, respectively.

Returning to the Cape Sable area, Heinz-Otto Schultze in U-432 had a busy time. On May 31 he sank a 1,200-ton Canadian coaster. On June 2 he sank by gun two small American fishing trawlers: the 41-ton Aeolus Aeolus and the 102-ton and the 102-ton Ben and Josephine Ben and Josephine. Citing these sinkings and that of the trawler Foam Foam, some historians were to condemn Schultze for ruthlessness. But apparently Donitz and/or the U-boat staff encouraged such attacks in the belief that fishing trawlers and other small craft reported U-boat sightings by radio.*

While about seventy miles southwest of Cape Sable on June 9, Schultze in U-432 U-432 found a convoy. He reported twelve freighters escorted by "two destroyers, two corvettes, and a blimp." Since no other boats were nearby, Kerneval authorized Schultze to attack alone. Firing a full bow salvo at two big freighters, he claimed sinking one 8,000-tonner and damaging another, but the records confirmed only damage to the 7,000-ton Norwegian vessel found a convoy. He reported twelve freighters escorted by "two destroyers, two corvettes, and a blimp." Since no other boats were nearby, Kerneval authorized Schultze to attack alone. Firing a full bow salvo at two big freighters, he claimed sinking one 8,000-tonner and damaging another, but the records confirmed only damage to the 7,000-ton Norwegian vessel Kronprinsen Kronprinsen. Low on fuel and torpedoes, Schultze set a course for France, refueling from U-459 U-459 on the way. Since his claims and credits for this and prior patrols exceeded 100,000 tons, he was awarded a on the way. Since his claims and credits for this and prior patrols exceeded 100,000 tons, he was awarded a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.

DIFFICULT H HUNTING ON THE E EAST C COAST.

The eleven other VIIs of the April group headed for the United States East Coast and the Bahama Islands. Inbound, two of the skippers, Hans-Heinrich Giessler in U-455 U-455 and Gerd Kelbling in the new and Gerd Kelbling in the new U-593 U-593, were held in Canadian waters to hunt for the big troopship convoy AT 15-NA 8. Their hunts for this military target were futile, but the diversion took Giessler's U-455 U-455 into the path of the lone 7,000-ton tanker into the path of the lone 7,000-ton tanker British Workman British Workman, which he sank by torpedo on May 3 about 200 miles south of Cape Race.

Both boats had expended considerable fuel during the hunt for AT 15-NA 8 and they were unable to reach Cape Hatteras. Both remained in the waters between Nova Scotia and northern New Jersey and New York. Giessler in U-455 U-455 had no further luck in American waters, but homebound in the mid-Atlantic he sank a second British tanker, the 6,900-ton had no further luck in American waters, but homebound in the mid-Atlantic he sank a second British tanker, the 6,900-ton George H. Jones George H. Jones. Kelbling in U-593 U-593 hit the Greek freighter hit the Greek freighter Stavros Stavros for damage and sank the 8,400-ton Panamanian tanker for damage and sank the 8,400-ton Panamanian tanker Persephone Persephone close off the coast of northern New Jersey. She was the only tanker sunk in the Eastern Sea Frontier in the month of May. Neither Giessler nor Kelbling refueled this time. The former was out sixty-two days, the latter fifty-nine days. close off the coast of northern New Jersey. She was the only tanker sunk in the Eastern Sea Frontier in the month of May. Neither Giessler nor Kelbling refueled this time. The former was out sixty-two days, the latter fifty-nine days.

Nine VIIs patrolled the waters from New Jersey southward. As expected, these boats confronted greatly intensified ASW measures, including "heavy" air patrols all along the East Coast, mounted by 172 Navy and Coast Guard aircraft, plus the Army Air Forces planes. By the time these boats arrived, the Bucket Brigade convoys were in full operation and, as related, on May 14, the first Key West-Norfolk-Key West convoys sailed. Sixteen destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet spent an aggregate 238 days under control of the Eastern Sea Frontier: 184 days at sea on ASW missions, 54 days in replenishment or refit. spent an aggregate 238 days under control of the Eastern Sea Frontier: 184 days at sea on ASW missions, 54 days in replenishment or refit.

The historian of the Eastern Sea Frontier wrote of the month of May, in part: There was an extraordinary change this month in the fortunes of the war beneath the sea. April, when ships had gone down at the rate of almost one per day, was the worst month within the Frontier since the submarine first invaded this coast. As it drew to a close there was no indication and no hope that these severe losses could be appreciably reduced in the foreseeable future. In fact when two vessels went down on the 30th [of April], it was possible to predict that sinkings might well increase. Then, in the first 17 days of May not one ship was lost in the Eastern Sea Frontier.* In the fourteen days that remained [of May] only four vessels were sunk in our waters.... In the fourteen days that remained [of May] only four vessels were sunk in our waters....

While inbound to the Cape Hatteras area, three VIIs sank ships near the outer boundary line of the Eastern Sea Frontier: * Ulrich Graf, the new and aggressive skipper of the U-69, got the 600-ton four-masted American sailing vessel James E. Newsom by gun.

* Friedrich-Hermann Praetorius in U-135 U-135 got the 7,100-ton British freighter got the 7,100-ton British freighter Qu'Appelle Qu'Appelle. Responding to her SOS, a Canadian aircraft sighted her lifeboats and, two days later, a Canadian minesweeper rescued thirty-four survivors from the boats. They reported thirteen crew had been killed in the sinking.

* Gerhard Feiler in U-653 U-653 got the 6,200-ton British freighter Peisander, en route from Australia. A week after the sinking, her five lifeboats reached Nantucket Island. got the 6,200-ton British freighter Peisander, en route from Australia. A week after the sinking, her five lifeboats reached Nantucket Island.

One VII that reached the Cape Hatteras-Cape Lookout area was lost: the U-352, commanded by thirty-one-year-old Hellmut Rathke. He had made one prior patrol in the defense of Norway during which he fired at a "destroyer" but he had not yet hit anything. After he replenished inbound from U-459 U-459, Rathke boldly closed on Onslow Bay, North Carolina, on May 8. There he found a freighter escorted by a Coast Guard cutter. He fired three torpedoes at the two ships, but all missed or malfunctioned.

Late in the afternoon on the following day, Rathke sighted another Coast Guard cutter sailing alone, thirty miles south of Cape Lookout. She was the 165-footer Icarus Icarus, southbound from New York to Key West to join the new coastal-convoy organization. Commanded by fifty-two-year-old Maurice D. Jester, who rose from the enlisted ranks, Icarus Icarus was a taut ship with five months of ASW duty. Believing the Cape Hatteras-Cape Lookout area to be infested with U-boats, was a taut ship with five months of ASW duty. Believing the Cape Hatteras-Cape Lookout area to be infested with U-boats, Icarus Icarus was on full alert. As Rathke closed to point-blank range to fire a single torpedo, was on full alert. As Rathke closed to point-blank range to fire a single torpedo, Icarus Icarus got a solid sonar contact at 2,000 yards. Rathke shot before got a solid sonar contact at 2,000 yards. Rathke shot before Icarus Icarus take action, but the torpedo prematured, or malfunctioned, or hit the ocean bottom, erupting in an explosion that shook take action, but the torpedo prematured, or malfunctioned, or hit the ocean bottom, erupting in an explosion that shook Icarus Icarus from stem to stern. from stem to stern.

Jester and the crew of Icarus Icarus reacted smartly and professionally, firing five shallow-set depth charges from the tracks and Y gun at a likely spot. All five closely straddled reacted smartly and professionally, firing five shallow-set depth charges from the tracks and Y gun at a likely spot. All five closely straddled U-352 U-352 and exploded with immense force, wrecking the boat and killing the first watch officer, Josef Ernst. Rathke bottomed at 114 feet to play dead, but when and exploded with immense force, wrecking the boat and killing the first watch officer, Josef Ernst. Rathke bottomed at 114 feet to play dead, but when Icarus Icarus dropped five more close, shattering depth charges, he surfaced to abandon ship and scuttle. dropped five more close, shattering depth charges, he surfaced to abandon ship and scuttle.

When U-352 U-352 broached stern up, broached stern up, Icarus Icarus raked her with her 3" bow gun and machine guns from close range. This hail of fire killed or wounded many Germans who were leaping into or already in the sea. Homer Hickam wrote that an raked her with her 3" bow gun and machine guns from close range. This hail of fire killed or wounded many Germans who were leaping into or already in the sea. Homer Hickam wrote that an Icarus Icarus crewman yelled at his fellow Americans: "For God's sake! Don't shoot them in the water!" Struggling in the sea, shouting to the Americans to stop shooting and to save his wounded men, Rathke used his belt as a tourniquet on a wounded machinist, Gerhard Reussel, whose left leg had been shot off. crewman yelled at his fellow Americans: "For God's sake! Don't shoot them in the water!" Struggling in the sea, shouting to the Americans to stop shooting and to save his wounded men, Rathke used his belt as a tourniquet on a wounded machinist, Gerhard Reussel, whose left leg had been shot off.

Fearing that another U-boat might be nearby, Jester hauled Icarus Icarus away, requesting instructions from various naval shore commands by radio. Should he rescue the German survivors or leave them in the water? Directed to rescue the survivors, Jester returned to the scene within the hour and fished out thirty-three Germans, including machinist Reussel, who died of his wounds on board away, requesting instructions from various naval shore commands by radio. Should he rescue the German survivors or leave them in the water? Directed to rescue the survivors, Jester returned to the scene within the hour and fished out thirty-three Germans, including machinist Reussel, who died of his wounds on board Icarus Icarus, and took them into Charleston, South Carolina. The bodies of thirteen other Germans who were killed inside the boat or in the water were left behind. The thirty-two survivors-the first German submariners to be captured by the Americans-were taken to an internment camp at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Reussel was buried with military honors in the National Cemetery at Beaufort, South Carolina.

The Navy ordered salvage divers to comb U-352 U-352 to obtain Enigma and other intelligence information, but since to obtain Enigma and other intelligence information, but since Icarus Icarus had failed to buoy the wreck, the task was difficult. Divers from the Navy salvage tug had failed to buoy the wreck, the task was difficult. Divers from the Navy salvage tug Umpqua Umpqua, protected from U-boat attack by the British ASW trawlers Northern Duke, Northern Dawn Northern Duke, Northern Dawn, and Stella Polaris Stella Polaris, finally found U-352 U-352 in 114 feet of water on May 23. They buoyed the wreck, reported on the damage, and took photographs, but for various reasons, salvage operations were not pursued. No divers entered the boat. She yielded no intelligence information. in 114 feet of water on May 23. They buoyed the wreck, reported on the damage, and took photographs, but for various reasons, salvage operations were not pursued. No divers entered the boat. She yielded no intelligence information.*

Three of this group of VIIs attacked ships on the homeward voyage. On June 1, Dietrich Borchert in U-566 U-566 sank the 9,000-ton British freighter sank the 9,000-ton British freighter Westmoreland Westmoreland, only his second success in two patrols to American waters. Upon reaching France, he left the boat for other duty. When Bermuda learned of Westmoreland's loss, the old (1918) 1,000-ton American minesweeper Gannet Gannet, serving as a tender for the Navy's Catalina Squadron 74 on Bermuda, and a British ASW yacht, Sumar Sumar, put out to look for survivors. Gerhard Feiler in U-653 U-653 came upon came upon Gannet Gannet and and Sumar Sumar on June 7. He torpedoed on June 7. He torpedoed Gannet Gannet, which sank in four minutes.* Praetorius in Praetorius in U-135 U-135 sank the 4,500-ton Norwegian freighter sank the 4,500-ton Norwegian freighter Pleasantville Pleasantville well east of South Carolina. well east of South Carolina.

In view of the poor hunting and the strong ASW measures in the Eastern Sea Frontier, Donitz directed five VIIs of the April group, which had replenished from U-459 U-459, to patrol far to southward: four to the Caribbean Sea, one to the Gulf of Mexico.

The first of the four VIIs to reach the Caribbean Sea was Dietrich Hoffmann in the new U-594 U-594. His patrol was a disastrous flop: eight misses on a tanker and a freighter, and a gunner washed overboard and lost during a gun attack on the tanker. Upon receiving Hoffmann's reports, Donitz canceled a proposed second refueling and ordered him to return directly to France at once. He arrived on June 25, completing a seventy-six-day patrol during which he sank nothing. After a careful review of the patrol, Donitz sent Hoffmann to other duty and gave command of U-594 U-594 to another officer. to another officer.

The other three VIIs followed. Patrolling near Trinidad, Ulrich Graf, the new skipper of U-69 U-69, sank two ships for 9,400 tons, including the 6,800-ton Norwegian tanker Lise Lise, but he was then ordered to carry out a special mission off the Vichy island of Martinique (see below). Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Gunther Krech added luster to his and U-558's reputation by positively sinking five more ships, bringing his total for the patrol to six confirmed ships for 16,400 tons, plus damage to the 7,100-ton American tanker holder Gunther Krech added luster to his and U-558's reputation by positively sinking five more ships, bringing his total for the patrol to six confirmed ships for 16,400 tons, plus damage to the 7,100-ton American tanker William Boyce Thompson William Boyce Thompson. Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Gerhard Bigalk in 7-757 sank two medium American freighters ( holder Gerhard Bigalk in 7-757 sank two medium American freighters (Nicaro, Isabella) for 4,555 tons. Homebound, he fired three torpedoes at a big freighter, but two failed and the third missed.

The aggregate returns of the sixteen VIIs that sailed to the Americas in April declined: thirty-three confirmed ships (seven tankers) sunk plus five sailing vessels and fishing trawlers for about 158,200 tons.

As related, the most successful patrol was that of Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Reinhard Suhren in holder Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564, completed just before the Allies initiated full-scale convoying on the United States East Coast. Including the "neutral" tanker which brought Mexico into the war, Suhren sank four confirmed ships (two tankers) for 24,400 tons and damaged two other ships for 13,200 tons. The second best patrol was that of Karl Thurmann in U-553, who, as related, penetrated the Gulf of St. Lawrence on his own initiative and sank there and elsewhere three confirmed ships for 17,000 tons. Three other boats (U-455, U-588 U-588, and U-753 U-753) sank about 14,000 tons each, including three tankers. Two ( Two (U-69, U-735 U-735) sank about 12,000 tons each, including one tanker. Six boats sank under 10,000 tons each, including one tanker, and three boats (U-213, U-352 U-352, and U-594 U-594) sank no ships at all. One boat, U-352 U-352, was lost.

Eleven of these sixteen VIIs refueled. Discounting the lost U-352 U-352, the other ten were able to extend their patrols to an average sixty-nine days and sank an average 2.7 ships per boat per patrol. The five VIIs that did not refuel, including the luckless U-213 U-213 (minelayer), patrolled for an average sixty days and sank an average 2.0 ships per boat per patrol. Discounting the badly handled U-213, the four VIIs that did not refuel sank an average 2.5 ships per boat per patrol. Thus it was that the refueling of this group extended the patrols by about nine days, but did not appreciably increase the sinkings. Much still depended on the area of the patrols, aggressiveness of the skippers, skill of the crews, weather, luck, and other factors. (minelayer), patrolled for an average sixty days and sank an average 2.0 ships per boat per patrol. Discounting the badly handled U-213, the four VIIs that did not refuel sank an average 2.5 ships per boat per patrol. Thus it was that the refueling of this group extended the patrols by about nine days, but did not appreciably increase the sinkings. Much still depended on the area of the patrols, aggressiveness of the skippers, skill of the crews, weather, luck, and other factors.

Contrary to the myths that arose in later years, the returns of the five VIIs sent to the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico were disappointing. At sea an average of seventy days, these boats sank eleven ships for about 38,600 tons in the Caribbean and gulf, an average of 2.2 ships for 7,700 tons sunk per boat per patrol. This return was no better than the VII returns from other waters and it was small compensation for the extreme hardships the crews endured from the terrible tropical heat and humidity and the chronic shortages of food and fresh water.

In the first five months of the campaign in the Americas, Donitz mounted seventy patrols by Type VIIs. These sank 155 confirmed ships for 778,307 tons, including all trawlers and sailing vessels and ships encountered in the ocean coming and going. Partly reflecting the result of the attacks on convoy Outbound North 67, the nine VIIs that sailed in February achieved the best results.

For those staffers who opposed sending VIIs to the Americas, the decline in returns of the April boats was persuasive. The fifteen surviving VIIs that sailed in April had spent 991 days at sea to sink 158,210 tons of confirmed shipping, merely 25 percent of what was thought to be a reasonable return. The critics made the case for operating the VIIs in packs closer to home, especially in summertime, when the climate in southern American waters was so hot and debilitating, and so much more favorable for operations in the North Atlantic.

Donitz conceded that the return on investment for the VIIs in American waters was marginal and that the patrols were very hard on the crews. And yet he did not want to stop altogether the VII patrols to American waters. Even a few VIIs operating on the Eastern Seaboard would insure that the Allies continued convoying there with the usual shipping delays and would tie down substantial numbers of ships and aircraft on ASW missions. However, he directed that most of the VIIs sent to United States waters in the month of May should first carry out special missions, such as minelaying or landing Abwehr Abwehr agents. agents.

SLAUGHTER IN THE G GULF OF M MEXICO AND C CARIBBEAN S SEA.

Thirteen of the twenty-nine boats of the April group that reached the Americas were Type IXs, ten of which had made a prior patrol to that area.

The first IX to sail was U-125 U-125, a Type C commanded by Ulrich Folkers, who had made a disappointing maiden patrol off Cape Hatteras in January. Donitz assigned him to virgin territory: an area in the Caribbean off southwest Cuba, at the southern approaches to the Yucatan Channel, which separates Cuba and the Yucatan area of Mexico. Outbound from France, Folkers sank by torpedo and gun a lone 5,100-ton American freighter in mid-ocean. Upon reaching his area in early May, he found heavy, unescorted shipping plying between the Panama Canal Zone and the Gulf of Mexico. In the ensuing sixteen days, May 3 to May 18, Folkers sank by torpedo and/or gun eight more ships, including two tankers, the 8,900-ton American Mercury Sun Mercury Sun, and the 12,000-ton Canadian Calgarolite Calgarolite, bringing his total bag to nine confirmed ships for 47,000 tons. Discounting the two "unknowns" Hardegen claimed on his first Drumbeat patrol, it was the most fruitful voyage by any U-boat in American waters to date. Proudly reporting this bonanza and suggesting that other boats should patrol the area, Folkers returned directly to France without refueling, completing the round trip in seventy-one days.

The next two boats to sail were the new extended-range Type LXC sister ships, U-506 U-506 and and U-507 U-507. These and von Mannstein's Type VII U-753 U-753 were to launch the U-boat campaign in the Gulf of Mexico, where it was believed, correctly, ASW measures were weak. Both IXs were to enter the gulf via the Old Bahama Channel (north of Cuba) and the Straits of Florida. Upon reaching the Old Bahama Channel on April 30, Harro Schacht, age thirty-four, in were to launch the U-boat campaign in the Gulf of Mexico, where it was believed, correctly, ASW measures were weak. Both IXs were to enter the gulf via the Old Bahama Channel (north of Cuba) and the Straits of Florida. Upon reaching the Old Bahama Channel on April 30, Harro Schacht, age thirty-four, in U-507 U-507, found and sank the lone 2,900-ton American tanker Federal Federal by gun. Trailing by several days, on May 3, Erich Wtirdemann, age twenty-eight, in by gun. Trailing by several days, on May 3, Erich Wtirdemann, age twenty-eight, in U-506 U-506, shot a torpedo to sink the 600-ton Nicaraguan freighter Sama Sama in the Florida Straits. in the Florida Straits.

Donitz had directed both LXs to proceed northwest across the gulf to the mouth of the Mississippi River. It was assumed, correctly, that the area would be swarming with ships. Several surprise sinkings might close the Mississippi to traffic, a worthwhile objective, but not without real danger for these big boats: the water at the delta was muddy and quite shallow and the currents were extremely tricky.

Protection of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico and Yucatan Channel was the responsibility of the newly established Gulf Sea Frontier, commanded by Russell S. Crenshaw, who had set up headquarters in Key West, terminus of the East Coast Bucket Brigade and other convoys.* Like Adolphus Andrews, his counterpart on the East Coast, Crenshaw had only slim resources: two four-stack destroyers ( Like Adolphus Andrews, his counterpart on the East Coast, Crenshaw had only slim resources: two four-stack destroyers (Noa, Dahlgren), nine 165-foot and 125-foot Coast Guard cutters, five large converted yachts, and about thirty-five Army, Navy, and Coast Guard aircraft. Astonishingly, two of these aircraft on hurriedly mounted ASW patrols scored near misses on both U-506 U-506 and and U-507 U-507. Wurdemann in U-506 U-506 reported heavy damage to one of his two stern tubes. Schacht in reported heavy damage to one of his two stern tubes. Schacht in U-507 U-507 reported damage to his starboard bow plane and the loss of two tons of fuel oil, apparently from a ruptured tank. reported damage to his starboard bow plane and the loss of two tons of fuel oil, apparently from a ruptured tank.

Schacht in U-507 U-507 sank the first ship inside the gulf, the 2,700-ton American freighter sank the first ship inside the gulf, the 2,700-ton American freighter Norlindo Norlindo. Hit by a single torpedo, she sank stern first in three minutes. Schacht gave the survivors forty packs of cigarettes, a cake adorned with French writing, crackers, matches, water, and ten gallons of time pulp made from fresh times. "Sorry we can't help you [further]," Schacht said in perfect English, according to the survivors, "Hope you get ashore okay."

The next night, May 5, Schacht sank two American tankers by torpedoes. The first was the 5,100-ton Munger T. Ball Munger T. Ball, fully loaded with gasoline, which burst into flames. Thirty-seven of forty-one crewmen perished. The second was the 7,000-ton Joseph M. Cudahy Joseph M. Cudahy, which radioed a report of the Ball Ball sinking, adding unwisely and unnecessarily, "Nine miles away." Upon hearing that, Schacht immediately searched for, found, and chased sinking, adding unwisely and unnecessarily, "Nine miles away." Upon hearing that, Schacht immediately searched for, found, and chased Cudahy Cudahy. His first torpedo missed, but the second hit and she sank. Twenty-seven of thirty-seven crewmen died.

Later that night, the U-507 U-507 crew downloaded torpedoes from the topside canisters. While doing so, the restraining gear broke and a torpedo slid uncontrolled into the bow compartment. On its downward path, it struck and gashed open the arm of a radioman, a severe and excruciatingly painful injury. Schacht reported the injury to Kerneval and the fact that he had no painkillers. Kerneval arranged a rendezvous with Wurdemann in crew downloaded torpedoes from the topside canisters. While doing so, the restraining gear broke and a torpedo slid uncontrolled into the bow compartment. On its downward path, it struck and gashed open the arm of a radioman, a severe and excruciatingly painful injury. Schacht reported the injury to Kerneval and the fact that he had no painkillers. Kerneval arranged a rendezvous with Wurdemann in U-506 U-506, who had morphine; however, the boats failed to meet. Kerneval arranged a second rendezvous, which also failed, then a third, likewise fruitless. The sinkings and the numerous radio transmissions to set up the rendezvous attracted swarms of Army, Navy, and Coast Guard aircraft and led to stringent shipping controls in the Gulf Sea Frontier, similar to those in effect in the Eastern Sea Frontier.

Schacht gave up trying to find Wurdemann and resumed his course to the Mississippi River. He put the injured crewman in an officer's bunk, dressed his festering wound, and gave him sleeping pills. On May 6, he came upon the 6,800-ton American freighter Alcoa Puritan Alcoa Puritan, loaded with bauxite. Schacht missed with one torpedo, attacked with his 4.1" deck gun, then finished off the ship with a torpedo.* On the day after that, he sank the 3,100-ton Honduran freighter On the day after that, he sank the 3,100-ton Honduran freighter Ontario Ontario by gun. A day later still, May 8, he sank the 2,400-ton Norwegian freighter by gun. A day later still, May 8, he sank the 2,400-ton Norwegian freighter Torny Torny with a single torpedo. Two crew members died; a Navy seaplane rescued the twenty-four survivors. with a single torpedo. Two crew members died; a Navy seaplane rescued the twenty-four survivors.

Both U-506 U-506 and and U-507 U-507, on about May 10, finally closed on the mouth of the Mississippi River. Wurdemann in U-506 U-506 mounted the first attack. He shot four torpedoes at the old (1920) 7,000-ton American tanker mounted the first attack. He shot four torpedoes at the old (1920) 7,000-ton American tanker Aurora Aurora, sailing in ballast. After the crew abandoned ship, Wurdemann surfaced and raked the ship with his 4.1" deck gun. He claimed that Aurora sank in flames, but in fact, a Coast Guard vessel towed her into Burrwood, Louisiana, and she ultimately returned to service.