The convoy was Outbound Gibraltar 82, escorted by a trimmed-down version of British Escort Group 36, commanded by the "U-boat killer" Johnny Walker in the sloop Stork Stork. The Admiralty DFed Lerchen's contact report and alerted Walker, who in turn notified the four corvettes of his group. Vetch Vetch, equipped with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar, picked up U-252 U-252 on the surface at 7,500 yards and chased for thirty minutes, firing her main battery and snowflake. In defense, Lerchen shot two torpedoes, which only barely missed on the surface at 7,500 yards and chased for thirty minutes, firing her main battery and snowflake. In defense, Lerchen shot two torpedoes, which only barely missed Vetch Vetch, then dived. Stork Stork joined joined Vetch Vetch, and the two vessels dropped forty-five depth charges, which destroyed U-252 U-252 with the loss of all hands. Walker lowered a whaleboat to look for survivors, but the boatmen found only "a revolting mixture of oil, wood, blood, and guts." They fished up some small wooden pieces from the boat, a sheepskin coat, and a pair of leather trousers, which contained a penciled chit headed " with the loss of all hands. Walker lowered a whaleboat to look for survivors, but the boatmen found only "a revolting mixture of oil, wood, blood, and guts." They fished up some small wooden pieces from the boat, a sheepskin coat, and a pair of leather trousers, which contained a penciled chit headed "U-252," and "a human heart and lungs, complete but penetrated by splinters." Stork Stork's physician pickled the heart and lungs in a bottle "for the future pleasure of the Medical Branch."

When no word came from U-252 U-252, and her loss was presumed, Donitz remarked on the similarity of her disappearance to that of Rollmann's U-82 U-82 in early February. Both boats had reported "lightly escorted" convoys in nearly the same area on the western edge of the Bay of Biscay and were never heard from again. He concluded, wrongly, that the British had organized a "dummy convoy" of "special antisubmarine vessels," designed to trap U-boats going to and from France. Thus he forbade the U-boats to attack convoys in this area "for the present." Walker's success over in early February. Both boats had reported "lightly escorted" convoys in nearly the same area on the western edge of the Bay of Biscay and were never heard from again. He concluded, wrongly, that the British had organized a "dummy convoy" of "special antisubmarine vessels," designed to trap U-boats going to and from France. Thus he forbade the U-boats to attack convoys in this area "for the present." Walker's success over U-252 U-252 was, therefore, much more important than the Admiralty realized. Inbound and outbound Gibraltar convoys as well as Outbound South and inbound Sierra Leone convoys were to enjoy uncontested passage while off the coast of France and the British Isles. was, therefore, much more important than the Admiralty realized. Inbound and outbound Gibraltar convoys as well as Outbound South and inbound Sierra Leone convoys were to enjoy uncontested passage while off the coast of France and the British Isles.

In all, during the period from January to March inclusive, Donitz mounted thirty-three patrols to the Western Approaches or other areas in the eastern Atlantic.* Except for that of von Varendorff in the VIID (minelayer) Except for that of von Varendorff in the VIID (minelayer) U-213 U-213, all the patrols were of short duration. Some were merely transfers from Germany to France. These patrols accounted for ten Allied ships for 17,600 tons, including four warships: the American Coast Guard cutter Alexander Hamilton Alexander Hamilton; the British corvette Arbutus Arbutus; the Canadian corvette Spikenard Spikenard; and the British ASW trawler Rosemonde Rosemonde. In return, two boats were lost: U-252 U-252 and and U-581 U-581.

Mediterranean.

Counting the new arrivals and deducting losses, on February 1, 1942, twenty-one U-boats remained in the Mediterranean. Operating from Italian-managed bases at La Spezia, Pola, and Salamis, the force had a new commander: the able destroyer expert Leo Karl Kreisch, replacing Viktor Oehrn. The main missions of the force remained two: support of Rommel's North African offensive by attacking the coasters supporting the opposing British Eighth Army, and thwarting the British reinforcement of the island of Malta. Operating from Italian-managed bases at La Spezia, Pola, and Salamis, the force had a new commander: the able destroyer expert Leo Karl Kreisch, replacing Viktor Oehrn. The main missions of the force remained two: support of Rommel's North African offensive by attacking the coasters supporting the opposing British Eighth Army, and thwarting the British reinforcement of the island of Malta.

As in 1941, the U-boat patrols in the Mediterranean in 1942 were short-seldom more than three weeks-but harrowing in the extreme. The skies were filled with British, German, and Italian aircraft whose air crews could not distinguish between enemy and friendly submarines. Both Allied and Axis air and surface forces planted scores of offensive and defensive minefields. Allied shipping was closely guarded by veteran radar-equipped air and surface escorts, making attacks difficult. Allied submarines posed another hazard.

As a consequence, the Mediterranean U-boats, like the Arctic U-boats, produced thin results. In January, five U-boats recorded attacks, four against Allied destroyers. Near Alexandria, Hermann Hesse in U-133 U-133 hit and sank the British destroyer hit and sank the British destroyer Gurkha II. Gurkha II. Off Tobruk, Heinrich Schonder in Off Tobruk, Heinrich Schonder in U-77 U-77 hit but only damaged the British destroyer hit but only damaged the British destroyer Kimberley Kimberley. In the same area, Wilhelm Dommes in U-431 U-431 sank a 300-ton patrol yacht. All other attacks failed. sank a 300-ton patrol yacht. All other attacks failed.

In February, seven U-boats recorded attacks. Dommes in U-431 U-431 claimed hits on a destroyer and a tanker; Helmut Rosenbaum in claimed hits on a destroyer and a tanker; Helmut Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73 claimed sinking a destroyer; Robert Bartels in claimed sinking a destroyer; Robert Bartels in U-561 U-561 claimed a hit on a freighter; Georg-Werner Fraatz in claimed a hit on a freighter; Georg-Werner Fraatz in U-652 U-652 claimed hits on a destroyer, a sloop, and a small tanker; Hans-Werner Kraus in claimed hits on a destroyer, a sloop, and a small tanker; Hans-Werner Kraus in U-83 U-83 claimed sinking a corvette and small freighter and hits on a destroyer and a freighter; Friedrich Guggenberger in claimed sinking a corvette and small freighter and hits on a destroyer and a freighter; Friedrich Guggenberger in U-81 U-81, who had won a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for sinking for sinking Ark Royal Ark Royal, claimed hits on a light cruiser; and Hans-Otto Heidtmann in U-559 U-559 claimed sinking a 4,000-ton freighter. But, according to Jurgen Rohwer and postwar Allied records, not one of these ships sank and only a few of the hits for damage could be confirmed. claimed sinking a 4,000-ton freighter. But, according to Jurgen Rohwer and postwar Allied records, not one of these ships sank and only a few of the hits for damage could be confirmed.

The deep-running defect in the electric torpedoes had been fixed by March and results improved, but only slightly. Johann Jebsen in U-565 U-565 sank the 5,500-ton British light cruiser sank the 5,500-ton British light cruiser Naiad Naiad. Fraatz in U-652 U-652 sank the British destroyer sank the British destroyer Jaguar Jaguar, the British frigate Heythrop Heythrop, and probably a 2,600-ton British tanker. Kraus in U-83 U-83 damaged a small freighter. But yet another U-boat was lost. Leaving Salamis on March 14, the damaged a small freighter. But yet another U-boat was lost. Leaving Salamis on March 14, the U-133 U-133, commanded by a new skipper, Eberhard Mohr, age twenty-six, blundered into a defensive minefield and blew up. There were no survivors.*

Admiral Raeder and the OKM were dismayed by the slim returns of the Mediterranean boats. Berlin pointedly logged in early March that although the Mediterranean war patrols were "brief," there were more U-boats in the shipyards undergoing refit than there were boats on patrol and demanded an explanation from the new U-boat force commander, Leo Kreisch. The latter conceded that the situation was "unfortunate" but explained that many boats returned from patrol with battle damage from aircraft, that there were "difficulties" in the supply lines (from Germany), and that Italian shipyards were "10 percent to 15 percent slower" than German shipyards. He was doing everything possible to speed things up.

In all, during the period from January to April, the twenty-one boats of the Mediterranean force sank only six confirmed ships for about 14,500 tons. Four of the seven victims were British warships: the light cruiser Naiad Naiad, destroyers Gurkha II Gurkha II and and Jaguar Jaguar, and the frigate Heythrop Heythrop. Another British warship, the destroyer Kimberley Kimberley, was damaged. These sinkings did not materially assist Rommel, but the presence of the U-boats in the Mediterranean caused the Allies many difficulties.

West Africa.

Two Type IXs sailed to Freetown on February 11: Karl-Friedrich Merten in U-68 U-68 and Axel-Olaf Loewe in the new Type IXC, and Axel-Olaf Loewe in the new Type IXC, U-505 U-505. To conserve fuel, both ran on one diesel engine. South of the Canary Islands, Loewe in U-505 U-505 encountered a "fast" convoy, but he was forced off by the escorts, he reported, and could not shoot. Merten encountered no ships on the voyage south. encountered a "fast" convoy, but he was forced off by the escorts, he reported, and could not shoot. Merten encountered no ships on the voyage south.

The boats reached Freetown in the early days of March. The tropical weather was a shock to the crew of U-505 U-505, fresh from the frigid Baltic. "The boat was heating up like a furnace in daytime," a crewman wrote. "Off watch, we went up on the bridge to get a little relief from the stifling heat down below. The uniform was tropical-no shirts after the first glaze of tan, tropical khaki shorts and pith helmets."

Four months had passed since a U-boat had invaded Freetown waters. Operating independently, Loewe and Merten found many ships sailing alone. In the first eight days of March they sank two ships each. Loewe got the 7,600-ton Norwegian tanker Sydhav Sydhav and a 5,000-ton British freighter; Merten got two big British freighters for 14,400 tons. Merten also attacked what he believed to be a British submarine, operating with a decoy ship, but both torpedoes missed. These attacks left Merten with ten torpedoes and Loewe with fourteen. and a 5,000-ton British freighter; Merten got two big British freighters for 14,400 tons. Merten also attacked what he believed to be a British submarine, operating with a decoy ship, but both torpedoes missed. These attacks left Merten with ten torpedoes and Loewe with fourteen.

The attacks jolted British naval authorities in the Freetown area. They held single ships in port and reorganized convoys. In the days following, Merten and Loewe reported "no traffic" and requested permission to cross the Atlantic to Brazil. Owing to the delicate political situation vis-a-vis Brazil-and to the distances and unfavorable trade winds-Donitz denied the request, directing Loewe in U-505 U-505 to remain off Freetown and sending Merten in to remain off Freetown and sending Merten in U-68 U-68 southward to Lagos, Nigeria. southward to Lagos, Nigeria.

Loewe patrolled slowly back and forth off Freetown. It was a trying time. "We spotted nothing-absolutely nothing," a crewman wrote. "It was disgruntling to say the least.... The strain was beginning to show. Looking at the same faces day in and day out, listening to the same stories, grown old after the first few weeks, and now the dismal luck on the hunt had frayed nerves here and there. It showed in little ways-sharpened remarks and glum faces, lined with fatigue that resulted from stifling, sleepless days and nights."

Southbound to Nigeria, Merten in U-68 U-68 ran into a mass of single ships off Cape Palmas, Liberia. In a period of twenty-four hours, March 16-17, he sank by tor-pedo and gun four more British freighters for 19,100 tons. Although he had only three torpedoes left, he proceeded onward to Lagos per orders. On March 25 he came upon a five-ship convoy with three escorts, but an aircraft spotted him and foiled his attack. Running low on fuel, he reversed course and headed home. Rounding Cape Palmas on March 30, he encountered another five-ship convoy. With his last torpedoes, he sank a 5,900-ton British freighter, bringing his kills to seven ships for about 40,000 tons. ran into a mass of single ships off Cape Palmas, Liberia. In a period of twenty-four hours, March 16-17, he sank by tor-pedo and gun four more British freighters for 19,100 tons. Although he had only three torpedoes left, he proceeded onward to Lagos per orders. On March 25 he came upon a five-ship convoy with three escorts, but an aircraft spotted him and foiled his attack. Running low on fuel, he reversed course and headed home. Rounding Cape Palmas on March 30, he encountered another five-ship convoy. With his last torpedoes, he sank a 5,900-ton British freighter, bringing his kills to seven ships for about 40,000 tons.

Upon receiving Merten's report of heavy shipping off Cape Palmas, Kerneval shifted Loewe in U-505 U-505 to that area. He reported traffic off Cape Palmas, but now it was closely escorted. After being bombed by an aircraft and hunted and depth-charged by a surface vessel, he hauled south into open ocean, crossing the Equator with appropriate ceremonies. Finally on April 3-twenty-nine days since his last success-Loewe found ships. In two night surface attacks over a period of twenty-four hours, he sank two freighters, one American and one Dutch, each of 5,800 tons. He then cruised back to the Freetown area, where he spent another two weeks without seeing so much as a fishing boat. He returned to Lorient on May 7, having been out for eighty-six days, during which he sank four ships for 25,000 tons. to that area. He reported traffic off Cape Palmas, but now it was closely escorted. After being bombed by an aircraft and hunted and depth-charged by a surface vessel, he hauled south into open ocean, crossing the Equator with appropriate ceremonies. Finally on April 3-twenty-nine days since his last success-Loewe found ships. In two night surface attacks over a period of twenty-four hours, he sank two freighters, one American and one Dutch, each of 5,800 tons. He then cruised back to the Freetown area, where he spent another two weeks without seeing so much as a fishing boat. He returned to Lorient on May 7, having been out for eighty-six days, during which he sank four ships for 25,000 tons.

Donitz was well pleased. The two boats had bagged eleven ships for about 65,000 tons. Moreover, doubtless they had disrupted Allied shipping in the South Atlantic and possibly held in place ASW forces that might otherwise have been shifted to the Americas. Had he had any Type IXs to spare, he would have sent them to Freetown, but all available IXs were committed to the campaign in American waters. Thus Freetown was again left in peace for the next several months.

SHARING D DEEP S SECRETS.

The British and the Americans in early April finally began to freely discuss technology for breaking naval Enigma. The breakthrough came at an Allied conference in Washington, from April 6 to April 17. The primary purpose of that conference was to unify and integrate the collection and distribution of raw Axis intercepts and the Allied HF/DF networks in the Atlantic and Pacific, but the conferees went far beyond that.

The chief of the British delegation was the old Naval Intelligence Division hand Humphrey R. Sandwith, a captain in the Royal Navy. Since the onset of war, Sandwith had been in charge of upgrading the British intercept (Y Service) and HF/DF networks. The chief American delegates were the recent winners in the bureaucratic battle for control of OP20G, Joseph Redman and Joseph Wenger, reputedly the Navy's foremost experts in radio communications.

The British, Canadians, and Americans hammered out agreements that did in fact integrate and greatly improve the collection and distribution of raw Axis radio traffic and HF/DF signals. Adding to the British Atlantic HF/DF network, by summer the Americans had in operation four HF/DF stations on the East Coast, equipped with Type DAB receivers. In addition, the Americans established at Sewall, Maine, a "pilot" model of the more sophisticated Type DAJ receiver, which was fully automatic and which produced a bearing on a U-boat transmission nearly instantaneously.

The historian Bradley Smith wrote that in addition to these important advances in electronics, the British chose this forum to describe to the Americans in detail "how the British extracted intelligence from intercepted enemy radio traffic and how they put it into a form that could be used in naval operations." This included fairly informative disclosures about techniques employed at Bletchley Park, the Admiralty's OIC, and in the U-boat Tracking Room.

The historian Harry Hinsley wrote, additionally, that the British finally-and unequivocally-promised to give the U.S. Navy Department a "bombe," in order "to save it the trouble of designing its own machine." However, Hinsley added, the British were slow to make good on this promise and that as a result of the delay, by June American and British relations "were strained."

On the heels of this conference, Rodger Winn flew to Washington to urge Admiral King and his senior assistants to create a U-boat Tracking Room similar to and linked with his own. King already had a top secret "War Room" akin to the Admiralty's OIC but no U-boat Tracking Room, as such. The American version of the OIC, commanded by King's flag secretary and confidant, George C. Dyer, who limited access to a very few, was known as the Combined Operations and Intelligence Center (COIC).

When Winn met with King to make his case in persuasive and lawyerly fashion, he encountered no difficulties. King readily agreed, and his deputies assigned the submarine tracking task to a Navy captain, Kenneth A. Knowles, who had retired with a physical disability but had returned to active duty after the Pearl Harbor attack.

A great many avenues opened up as a result of these exchanges. But some Americans remained exasperated over what appeared to be the continuing British reluctance to provide them with a bombe and to tackle four-rotor Enigma with allout vigor. Therefore the Americans did not slacken in their secret efforts to design their own version of a bombe. This important work was carried forward by Howard Engstrom, the Yale mathematician and naval reservist. Called to active duty in February with the rank of full lieutenant, Engstrom took command of OP20G's "Research Section," and devoted himself full-time to naval Enigma. Within merely four months, he rose another notch in rank to lieutenant-commander, a small tribute to his genius and his progress on a bombe design.

* See See Kruh article in Kruh article in Cryptologia Cryptologia, April 1989.

* Hilary P. Jones, Ludlow, Mayrant, Roe, Rowan, Trippe, Wainwright. Hilary P. Jones, Ludlow, Mayrant, Roe, Rowan, Trippe, Wainwright.

Jacob Jones and Dickerson Jacob Jones and Dickerson (damaged at Iceland in January) at New York; (damaged at Iceland in January) at New York; Dallas Dallas and and Upshur Upshur at Norfolk. at Norfolk. Roe Roe remained until about March 3. remained until about March 3.

* Many writers have made too much of this resistance to blackouts or dimouts. Only rarely were moon, weather, and tactical conditions such that distant shorelights were advantageous to the very few German U-boats operating in Florida waters. Most civil defense authorities and mayors all over the East Coast opposed blackouts and dimouts. They were said to increase the danger of crime and automobile and truck accidents and to decrease nighttime restaurant dining, nightclubbing, etc., causing economic hardships for a large number of people. Many writers have made too much of this resistance to blackouts or dimouts. Only rarely were moon, weather, and tactical conditions such that distant shorelights were advantageous to the very few German U-boats operating in Florida waters. Most civil defense authorities and mayors all over the East Coast opposed blackouts and dimouts. They were said to increase the danger of crime and automobile and truck accidents and to decrease nighttime restaurant dining, nightclubbing, etc., causing economic hardships for a large number of people.

Track of the Gray Wolf Track of the Gray Wolf (1988). (1988).

* Credited with sinking 25 confirmed ships for 183,223 tons-all on Credited with sinking 25 confirmed ships for 183,223 tons-all on U-96 U-96-Lehmann-Willenbrock, who provided the prototypical U-boat skipper for Das Boot Das Boot, ranked sixth in the war.

A Type IXD, the largest attack submarine built by the Germans during the war. Conceived to satisfy the advocates of the canceled U-cruisers, the IXD was 35 feet longer (287 versus 252) than the Type IXC and had double the fuel capacity (442 tons), giving it twice the range (24,000 versus 12,000 miles). Like the Type IXC, the IXD was slow-diving and clumsy and was thus unsuitable for attacking escorted convoys. The older onetime flotilla commanders Hans Ibbeken and Ernst Sobe commissioned the first two Type IXDs, A Type IXD, the largest attack submarine built by the Germans during the war. Conceived to satisfy the advocates of the canceled U-cruisers, the IXD was 35 feet longer (287 versus 252) than the Type IXC and had double the fuel capacity (442 tons), giving it twice the range (24,000 versus 12,000 miles). Like the Type IXC, the IXD was slow-diving and clumsy and was thus unsuitable for attacking escorted convoys. The older onetime flotilla commanders Hans Ibbeken and Ernst Sobe commissioned the first two Type IXDs, U-178 U-178 and and U-179 U-179. Gysae and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Wolfgang Luth commissioned the next two, holder Wolfgang Luth commissioned the next two, U-177 U-177 and and U-181 U-181.

* Outwitting a patrol plane, a light cruiser, and an auxiliary cruiser, Outwitting a patrol plane, a light cruiser, and an auxiliary cruiser, Doggerbank Doggerbank laid seventy-five mines off Cape Town on the night of March 12-13. Returning to Cape Town on the night of April 16-17, she laid another eighty mines. Her 155 mines caused temporary chaos in Cape Town, sank two freighters, and damaged three other ships. laid seventy-five mines off Cape Town on the night of March 12-13. Returning to Cape Town on the night of April 16-17, she laid another eighty mines. Her 155 mines caused temporary chaos in Cape Town, sank two freighters, and damaged three other ships.

See Plate 12. See Plate 12.

The Lagos refinery on Aruba, which produced 7 million barrels of petroleum products per month, was the largest in the world. The Lagos refinery on Aruba, which produced 7 million barrels of petroleum products per month, was the largest in the world.

* Donitz's reluctance to shell the refineries and tank farms on Aruba and Curacao-worth far more to the Axis than the tankers Donitz's reluctance to shell the refineries and tank farms on Aruba and Curacao-worth far more to the Axis than the tankers U-67 U-67 or or U-502 U-502 might sink-must be regarded as a serious strategic lapse. might sink-must be regarded as a serious strategic lapse.

* At the time of the award, Clausen's confirmed score on At the time of the award, Clausen's confirmed score on U-37 U-37 and and U-129 U-129 was nineteen ships for 63,855 tons, including, by error, two Vichy vessels: the submarine was nineteen ships for 63,855 tons, including, by error, two Vichy vessels: the submarine Sfax Sfax and the small tanker and the small tanker Rhone Rhone.

His departure left eight His departure left eight Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders engaged in the U-boat war against the Americas: Bigalk, Bleichrodt, Hardegen, Mutzelburg, Schnee, Scholtz, Suhren, and Topp. holders engaged in the U-boat war against the Americas: Bigalk, Bleichrodt, Hardegen, Mutzelburg, Schnee, Scholtz, Suhren, and Topp.

* In the wake of the Italian group, Emilio Olivieri in In the wake of the Italian group, Emilio Olivieri in Calvi Calvi, patrolling alone in the same area and southward to British and Dutch Guiana, sank five ships for 27,571 tons, including three tankers (the Americans T. C. McCobb T. C. McCobb, 7,500 tons, and E.V.R. Thayer E.V.R. Thayer, 7,100 tons, plus the Panamanian Ben Brush Ben Brush, 7,700 tons), bringing the results of the first Italian patrols to the West Indies to twenty ships (nine tankers) sunk for 120,417 tons. However, the Italians sank no more ships in the Atlantic in 1942.

Some of the January boats sank ships in January, February, and March; some of the February boats sank ships in February. Total sinkings by all U-boats in the month of February only: fifty-nine confirmed ships sunk (twenty-three tankers) for 331,219 tons and nine ships damaged (eight tankers). Some of the January boats sank ships in January, February, and March; some of the February boats sank ships in February. Total sinkings by all U-boats in the month of February only: fifty-nine confirmed ships sunk (twenty-three tankers) for 331,219 tons and nine ships damaged (eight tankers).

* Three British, Three British, Inverarder Inverarder, 5,600 tons; Anadara Anadara, 8,000 tons, which was credited in postwar years with sinking U-651 U-651; Finnanger Finnanger, 9,500 tons; and the Norwegian Eidanger Eidanger, 9,400 tons.

* The Allies equipped 768 merchant ships with net defense. A total of twenty-one ships fitted with nets were attacked by torpedoes during the war. The nets deflected ten attacks, but five ships were damaged and six were sunk. The Allies equipped 768 merchant ships with net defense. A total of twenty-one ships fitted with nets were attacked by torpedoes during the war. The nets deflected ten attacks, but five ships were damaged and six were sunk.

* Some of the troops were bound for an amphibious assault (Ironclad) on the Vichy French island of Madagascar, to prevent a possible Japanese lodgement, which would pose a grave threat to British shipping in the Indian Ocean. Some of the troops were bound for an amphibious assault (Ironclad) on the Vichy French island of Madagascar, to prevent a possible Japanese lodgement, which would pose a grave threat to British shipping in the Indian Ocean.

At the time of the award, Bauer's confirmed score was fifteen ships sunk for 62,221 tons. At the time of the award, Bauer's confirmed score was fifteen ships sunk for 62,221 tons.

* Cole, Dahlgren, Dallas, Dickerson, Du Pont, Ellis, Emmons, Greer, Hamilton, Herbert, Macomb, Roper, Tarbell, Upshur Cole, Dahlgren, Dallas, Dickerson, Du Pont, Ellis, Emmons, Greer, Hamilton, Herbert, Macomb, Roper, Tarbell, Upshur.

The destroyers assigned to convoys AT 12 and TA 12 were at sea on these tasks about thirty-five days, February 19 to March 25. Adding a week for refit and R&R, every destroyer assigned to escort a troop convoy to Europe was tied up about six weeks. The destroyers assigned to convoys AT 12 and TA 12 were at sea on these tasks about thirty-five days, February 19 to March 25. Adding a week for refit and R&R, every destroyer assigned to escort a troop convoy to Europe was tied up about six weeks.

* In keeping with the Navy's policy of naming some ships after those lost in combat, the new destroyer escort program included a In keeping with the Navy's policy of naming some ships after those lost in combat, the new destroyer escort program included a Reuben James Reuben James and a and a Jacob Jones Jacob Jones.

* At the time of the award, Berlin propagandists declared Ites had sunk 11 ships for over 100,000 tons. His confirmed score on the duck At the time of the award, Berlin propagandists declared Ites had sunk 11 ships for over 100,000 tons. His confirmed score on the duck U-146 U-146 and and U-94 U-94 was nine ships for 47,257 tons, plus damage to the 8,000-ton tanker. was nine ships for 47,257 tons, plus damage to the 8,000-ton tanker.

* Two American "seaplanes," probably acting on a DF fix, found and attacked Heyse off Bermuda on March 7, dropping a total of six depth charges. Two were duds; the other four fell wide of the mark. Two American "seaplanes," probably acting on a DF fix, found and attacked Heyse off Bermuda on March 7, dropping a total of six depth charges. Two were duds; the other four fell wide of the mark.

* At the time of the award, Mohr's confirmed score was fifteen ships for 64,832 tons, including the light cruiser At the time of the award, Mohr's confirmed score was fifteen ships for 64,832 tons, including the light cruiser Dunedin Dunedin, sunk during the Atlantis-Python Atlantis-Python rescue. rescue.

* No British corvettes arrived in March; only fourteen British trawlers were ready for duty on April 1. No British corvettes arrived in March; only fourteen British trawlers were ready for duty on April 1.

To March 1, 1942, all the U-boats assigned to the campaign in the Americas had sunk forty-five tankers and damaged thirteen. Eighteen of the forty-five were sunk in the waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier, eleven in the Caribbean, and sixteen elsewhere. (See To March 1, 1942, all the U-boats assigned to the campaign in the Americas had sunk forty-five tankers and damaged thirteen. Eighteen of the forty-five were sunk in the waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier, eleven in the Caribbean, and sixteen elsewhere. (See Appendix 17 Appendix 17.) Moreover, on February 26, Andrews reported to King that the trawlers were "not satisfactory escorts." Moreover, on February 26, Andrews reported to King that the trawlers were "not satisfactory escorts."

* Naval authorities were considering seven days, not eight. Naval authorities were considering seven days, not eight.

* Earlier, Roosevelt wrote Churchill that "I have always held destroyers should not be used [for] coast patrol as they are all-purpose ships." Few in the Navy quarreled with that view, but King and most senior officers argued that coastal convoys required, at minimum, destroyer escorts (or frigates), which had the necessary seaworthiness, range, endurance, and firepower. Earlier, Roosevelt wrote Churchill that "I have always held destroyers should not be used [for] coast patrol as they are all-purpose ships." Few in the Navy quarreled with that view, but King and most senior officers argued that coastal convoys required, at minimum, destroyer escorts (or frigates), which had the necessary seaworthiness, range, endurance, and firepower.

King to Ingersoll, information to NSHQ, Ottawa, March 20 at 1305 and 1310 hours. King to Ingersoll, information to NSHQ, Ottawa, March 20 at 1305 and 1310 hours.

* Halifax-Boston convoys were designated XB; Boston-Halifax convoys, BX. Halifax-Boston convoys were designated XB; Boston-Halifax convoys, BX.

Including Task Force 39 (99), comprised of the new battleship Including Task Force 39 (99), comprised of the new battleship Washington Washington, carrier Wasp Wasp, cruisers Wichita Wichita and and Tuscaloosa Tuscaloosa, and six destroyers temporarily at Scapa Flow, the U.S. Navy earmarked altogether about twenty warships specifically to counter a sortie of Tirpitz Tirpitz et al.: two carriers, two new battleships, four heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and about ten destroyers. et al.: two carriers, two new battleships, four heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and about ten destroyers.

* Plus other Atlantic Fleet Catalinas, based at Norfolk, temporarily on loan. The 82 Navy aircraft included 15 of 70 Vought OS2U Kingfisher scout seaplanes that were diverted from delivery to the British and were manned by Coast Guard aircrews. Plus other Atlantic Fleet Catalinas, based at Norfolk, temporarily on loan. The 82 Navy aircraft included 15 of 70 Vought OS2U Kingfisher scout seaplanes that were diverted from delivery to the British and were manned by Coast Guard aircrews.

The canal could accommodate ships drawing up to 25 feet and up to 500 feet in length. Most loaded northbound tankers drew too much water to use the canal, but all southbound tankers (in ballast and drawing less water) of 500 feet in length or less were required to go that way. The canal could accommodate ships drawing up to 25 feet and up to 500 feet in length. Most loaded northbound tankers drew too much water to use the canal, but all southbound tankers (in ballast and drawing less water) of 500 feet in length or less were required to go that way.

* Public Records Office (PRO), Kew, "Control of Shipping in West Atlantic During U-boat Campaign. January-June 1942." Document ADM 205/21, pp. 1-10. Public Records Office (PRO), Kew, "Control of Shipping in West Atlantic During U-boat Campaign. January-June 1942." Document ADM 205/21, pp. 1-10.

The same agreement gave Admiral Hoover of the Caribbean Sea Frontier operational control of the Army Air Forces's fifty-plane Antilles Air Task Force. The same agreement gave Admiral Hoover of the Caribbean Sea Frontier operational control of the Army Air Forces's fifty-plane Antilles Air Task Force.

* Ellyson, Emmons, Hambleton, Macomb, Rodman. Ellyson, Emmons, Hambleton, Macomb, Rodman.

Over Roosevelt's signature, King pointedly asked Churchill why the Admiralty could not use the British carrier Over Roosevelt's signature, King pointedly asked Churchill why the Admiralty could not use the British carrier Furious Furious, departing the United States on April 3, for this purpose.

* En route to the British Isles with convoy QP 11, En route to the British Isles with convoy QP 11, Edinburgh Edinburgh went down with close to six tons of gold in 465 ingots of twenty-six pounds each. Most of the gold (payment to the Americans for war supplies) was recovered by British divers in 1981 and split with the Soviets. went down with close to six tons of gold in 465 ingots of twenty-six pounds each. Most of the gold (payment to the Americans for war supplies) was recovered by British divers in 1981 and split with the Soviets.

The commander of Task Force 99, Robert C. Giffen, wrote King that British destroyers "used bad technique" in heavy fog at 18 knots and that his battleship, The commander of Task Force 99, Robert C. Giffen, wrote King that British destroyers "used bad technique" in heavy fog at 18 knots and that his battleship, Washington Washington, had a "close call" in this mishap, nearly colliding with the British destroyer Martin. Martin. Incidents of this kind reinforced King's conviction that American and British naval forces should not be "mixed." Incidents of this kind reinforced King's conviction that American and British naval forces should not be "mixed."

* The other carrier in the Pacific, The other carrier in the Pacific, Saratoga Saratoga, torpedoed by a Japanese submarine on January 11, 1942, and repaired on the West Coast, was still in workup.

Forces on Bataan surrendered April 9 and those on Corregidor, May 6. Forces on Bataan surrendered April 9 and those on Corregidor, May 6.

Broome, Decatur, Dickerson, Du Pont, Herbert, MacLeish, McCormick, Roper Broome, Decatur, Dickerson, Du Pont, Herbert, MacLeish, McCormick, Roper, and the miscellaneous auxiliary Semmes. Semmes.

Fury, Impulse, Ready, Restless, and Temptress. Temptress.

* The Type XIV U-tankers, affectionately known as The Type XIV U-tankers, affectionately known as Milchkuhs Milchkuhs (Milk Cows), were indeed bovine: 220 feet in length, 31 feet shorter than a Type IX, with bulbous external saddle fuel tanks, which gave the boat a surface displacement of nearly 1,700 tons. The Milk Cow had a fuel-oil capacity of about 650 tons-about 200 tons for its own use and 450 tons for its "customers." Its crew of 53 included a doctor. It was lightly armed for defense: no torpedo tubes; antiaircraft guns on the bridge. Apart from its slow surface speed and clumsiness while submerged, the chief drawback of the Type XIV was that it had no room below to carry torpedoes for its "customers"; four were carried in deck canisters. (Milk Cows), were indeed bovine: 220 feet in length, 31 feet shorter than a Type IX, with bulbous external saddle fuel tanks, which gave the boat a surface displacement of nearly 1,700 tons. The Milk Cow had a fuel-oil capacity of about 650 tons-about 200 tons for its own use and 450 tons for its "customers." Its crew of 53 included a doctor. It was lightly armed for defense: no torpedo tubes; antiaircraft guns on the bridge. Apart from its slow surface speed and clumsiness while submerged, the chief drawback of the Type XIV was that it had no room below to carry torpedoes for its "customers"; four were carried in deck canisters.

* Bristol, Broome, Buchanan, Cole, Dallas, Dickerson, Du Pont, Edison, Ellis, Emmons, Greer, Hambleton, Hamilton, Herbert, Lea, MacLeish, Macomb, Nicholson, Noa, Roper, Semmes, Swanson, Woolsey. Bristol, Broome, Buchanan, Cole, Dallas, Dickerson, Du Pont, Edison, Ellis, Emmons, Greer, Hambleton, Hamilton, Herbert, Lea, MacLeish, Macomb, Nicholson, Noa, Roper, Semmes, Swanson, Woolsey.

* Hardegen's confirmed score on the duck Hardegen's confirmed score on the duck U-147 U-147 and and U-123 U-123 was twenty-three ships for 132,081 tons, not counting the two unidentified ships usually credited on his first patrol to America but counting the two sunk but salvaged tankers, was twenty-three ships for 132,081 tons, not counting the two unidentified ships usually credited on his first patrol to America but counting the two sunk but salvaged tankers, Oklahoma Oklahoma and and Esso Baton Rouge. Esso Baton Rouge.

Panamanians Panamanians Heinrich von Riedemann Heinrich von Riedemann, 11,000 tons, and H. G. Seidel H. G. Seidel, 10,400 tons; Norwegian Sandar Sandar, 7,600 tons; and the Dutch Amsterdam Amsterdam, 7,300 tons.

At the time of the award, April 23, Zapp's confirmed score was thirteen ships for 80,014 tons. By the end of the patrol, it stood at fifteen ships for 103,495 tons. At the time of the award, April 23, Zapp's confirmed score was thirteen ships for 80,014 tons. By the end of the patrol, it stood at fifteen ships for 103,495 tons.

* Three Americans: Three Americans: B. T. Benson B. T. Benson, 8,000 tons; Atlas Atlas, 7,100 tons; Tamaulipas Tamaulipas, 7,000 tons; and the British Splendor British Splendor, 7,100 tons.

* To fulfill this need, in the fall of 1941 Donitz and the OKM had ordered the conversion of four Type VIICs ( To fulfill this need, in the fall of 1941 Donitz and the OKM had ordered the conversion of four Type VIICs (U-1059 to to U-1062 U-1062) to torpedo-supply boats, designated Type VIIF. Similar in length (254 feet) and shape to the Type VIID minelayer, the VIIF had a torpedo-storage compartment inserted between the control room and engine room that had space for twenty-four torpedoes, in addition to the boat's own internal load. Pending the arrival of the VIIFs (in 1943), two captured Dutch boats (commissioned U-D3 U-D3 and and U-D5 U-D5) were converted to torpedo-supply boats. However, the conversions were begun too late for the campaign in the Americas.

Berlin propagandists credited Topp with sinking 31 ships for 208,000 tons, including a destroyer and an "escort." At the time of the award, his confirmed score on the duck Berlin propagandists credited Topp with sinking 31 ships for 208,000 tons, including a destroyer and an "escort." At the time of the award, his confirmed score on the duck U-57 U-57 and and U-552 U-552 was 28 ships for about 163,000 tons, including the American destroyer was 28 ships for about 163,000 tons, including the American destroyer Reuben James Reuben James and the 227-ton British ASW trawler and the 227-ton British ASW trawler Commander Horton. Commander Horton.

* A doubtful conclusion, probably influenced by Allied propaganda depicting German submariners as fanatical, mad-dog Nazi killers. No rational U-boat skipper would engage in a surface gun battle with a destroyer, which had the advantage in firepower, gun armor, and speed to ram, as well as the ability to call in aircraft and other ASW forces. A doubtful conclusion, probably influenced by Allied propaganda depicting German submariners as fanatical, mad-dog Nazi killers. No rational U-boat skipper would engage in a surface gun battle with a destroyer, which had the advantage in firepower, gun armor, and speed to ram, as well as the ability to call in aircraft and other ASW forces.

* Several days earlier, April 11, one of the British ASW trawlers, Several days earlier, April 11, one of the British ASW trawlers, St. Cathan St. Cathan, was accidentally rammed and sunk by a merchant ship off North Carolina, leaving twenty-two.

Many sport divers, including Roger A. Warden and Homer H. Hickam, Jr., author of Many sport divers, including Roger A. Warden and Homer H. Hickam, Jr., author of Torpedo Junction Torpedo Junction, routinely dive on U-85 U-85. They dispute the Navy's report in one instance: they found evidence that one of Roper Roper's 3/50 caliber guns registered a hit on the sub, just abaft the conning tower. They also say there is a G7a (air) torpedo in a topside canister. Warden writes that in 1997 a diver found a box containing three Enigma rotors.

* In addition to the six In addition to the six S S-class submarines, the U.S. Navy in early 1942 loaned the British three R R-class boats for use in ASW training. The Canadian minesweeper Georgian Georgian accidentally rammed and sank accidentally rammed and sank R R-19, renamed P-514 P-514, off Cape Race.

* In addition to the six In addition to the six S S-class submarines, the U.S. Navy in early 1942 loaned the British three R R-class boats for use in ASW training. The Canadian minesweeper Georgian Georgian accidentally rammed and sank accidentally rammed and sank R R-19, renamed P-514 P-514, off Cape Race.

* See See Appendix 5 Appendix 5.

* Kelbling reported that an escort fixed his boat with a "bright red light" at a range of 4,000 yards and "accurate" gunfire followed at a range of 2,000 yards. Kerneval speculated that the light might be "infrared rays," until it was informed, to the staff's chagrin, that such rays were invisible. The matter was finally dismissed as "probably a colored searchlight," but in the flap over the light, the "accurate gunfire" at 2,000 yards in total darkness-an almost certain indication that the escorts were equipped with miniaturized, highly sensitive, and accurate radar-was overlooked. Assured by the technical services that escorts were not large enough to carry effective radar, Kerneval continued to accept that brass-bound judgment as reliable. Kelbling reported that an escort fixed his boat with a "bright red light" at a range of 4,000 yards and "accurate" gunfire followed at a range of 2,000 yards. Kerneval speculated that the light might be "infrared rays," until it was informed, to the staff's chagrin, that such rays were invisible. The matter was finally dismissed as "probably a colored searchlight," but in the flap over the light, the "accurate gunfire" at 2,000 yards in total darkness-an almost certain indication that the escorts were equipped with miniaturized, highly sensitive, and accurate radar-was overlooked. Assured by the technical services that escorts were not large enough to carry effective radar, Kerneval continued to accept that brass-bound judgment as reliable.

The agent, who has not been identified in published sources, was put ashore on the north coast of Iceland on or about April 7. Presumably his mission was to report Allied ship sailings. The agent, who has not been identified in published sources, was put ashore on the north coast of Iceland on or about April 7. Presumably his mission was to report Allied ship sailings.

* See See Appendix 2 Appendix 2.

See See Appendix 6 Appendix 6.

* Leaving twenty Type VIIs in the Mediterranean U-boat force on April 1, 1942. Between January 5 and March 18, 1942, British submarines sank five Italian submarines in the Mediterranean. Leaving twenty Type VIIs in the Mediterranean U-boat force on April 1, 1942. Between January 5 and March 18, 1942, British submarines sank five Italian submarines in the Mediterranean. Unbeaten Unbeaten, which earlier sank U-374 U-374, got one; Upholder Upholder got two; got two; Ultimatum Ultimatum and and Thorn Thorn, one each.

NINE.

THE B BRITISH R RAID on S on ST. NAZAIRE British reconnaissance aircraft brought back pictures in February 1942 that suggested the Germans had built a new and effective radar network along the Channel coast of Occupied France. On the recommendation of an RAF scientist concerned with intelligence matters, R. V. Jones, British commando forces, under the direction of Admiral Louis Mountbatten, drew plans to raid one radar site and capture the gear and the German operators. Mountbatten chose as his objective an installation on Cape d'Antifer, a 400-foot chalk headland near the village of Bruneval, about 12 miles north of Le Havre.

In the late afternoon of February 27, a force of 120 British commandos, led by John D. Frost, boarded twelve Whitley aircraft. Later that evening, in a snowfall, the commandos parachuted into fields near the radar site. In a brief but eminently successful operation, which cost only two men killed, Frost and his men got the gear, captured a German operator, and were evacuated by Royal Navy vessels that nosed up to an accessible beach nearby. From the booty acquired, the British were able to deduce a great deal about German radar technology and production. The great success of the "Bruneval Raid" encouraged plans for larger raids on the French coastline.

Hitler was enraged by this raid, which made a mockery of his overhyped beach defenses. He demanded an investigation of the state of all German coastal installations in Occupied France. The review concluded that, owing to the shift of German ground and air forces to the Soviet Union and Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine forces to Norway, the Atlantic U-boat bases in particular were inadequately defended against attack. On March 26, Admiral Raeder relayed Hitler's "strict orders" that pending Army and air reinforcements, all U-boat commands near the coast were to "pull back" to safer ground. forces to Norway, the Atlantic U-boat bases in particular were inadequately defended against attack. On March 26, Admiral Raeder relayed Hitler's "strict orders" that pending Army and air reinforcements, all U-boat commands near the coast were to "pull back" to safer ground.