After collecting his wits and ascertaining that the U-123 U-123 was not seriously damaged, Hardegen dived and reapproached was not seriously damaged, Hardegen dived and reapproached Atik Atik for a second torpedo attack. Carefully aiming at for a second torpedo attack. Carefully aiming at Atik's Atik's engine room from very close range, Hardegen fired one electric, which hit and detonated satisfactorily. engine room from very close range, Hardegen fired one electric, which hit and detonated satisfactorily. Atik Atik went down slowly but surely. Hearing her final distress calls, her sister ship went down slowly but surely. Hearing her final distress calls, her sister ship Asterion Asterion and other warships and aircraft searched for and other warships and aircraft searched for Atik Atik survivors, but none were found. survivors, but none were found.

By this time-the end of March-ASW forces in the Eastern Sea Frontier had increased substantially over those of January, when Hardegen pioneered Drumbeat. Andrews had almost 100 small surface ships of all kinds and about 100 Navy and Coast Guard planes and four blimps under his direct command, plus about 100 Army Air Forces planes and Atlantic Fleet Catalinas at his beck and call. In addition, King and Ingersoll were to make available twenty-three different destroyers in April,* which were to log a total of 140 ASW patrol days. which were to log a total of 140 ASW patrol days.

Hardegen reached the Cape Hatteras area on March 30 in bright moonlight, having downloaded his two topside torpedoes. Although the area was teeming with air and surface patrols, over the next forty-eight hours he attacked three ships, firing one torpedo at each. All missed or malfunctioned. He mounted a second attack on the third target, the 7,100-ton American tanker Liebre Liebre, with his gun and set her on fire. A further attack was thwarted by a patrol boat, which drove Hardegen under in shallow water (100 feet), but failed to stalk U-123 U-123 with persistence and vigor. Hardegen claimed with persistence and vigor. Hardegen claimed Liebre Liebre sank, but she was sailing in ballast and was only damaged. She returned to service four months later. sank, but she was sailing in ballast and was only damaged. She returned to service four months later.

In view of the heavy ASW measures, Hardegen rightly concluded that the shallow waters of Hatteras were no place for a big, clumsy Type IX. Accordingly, he cruised south to the Georgia coast, off St. Simon's Island. On the night of April 7-8, he found and attacked two big, loaded, northbound American tankers, the 9,300-ton Oklahoma Oklahoma and the 8,000-ton and the 8,000-ton Esso Baton Rouge Esso Baton Rouge, firing four of his remaining seven torpedoes on the surface in water merely 43 feet deep. Both ships exploded in fireballs and Hardegen claimed they sank, but both were later salvaged and returned to service. Since no counter-attack developed, Hardegen lurked off Georgia for another day, and in the early hours of April 9 he sank the 3,400-ton American refrigerator ship Esparta Esparta with a single torpedo. with a single torpedo.

Hardegen then proceeded south to the Florida coast, where he noted the "intense" phosphorescence in the waters, which left a dangerous luminous trail astern of the boat. While cruising close off St. Augustine in forty-six feet of water, late on the evening of April 10, Hardegen found the loaded 8,100-ton American tanker Gulfamerica Gulfamerica, northbound on her maiden voyage with an Armed Guard crew manning a 4/50 caliber gun. Although the ship was more than a mile away and moving fast, Hardegen fired one of his last two torpedoes at her. It hit and Gulfamerica Gulfamerica blew up in a fireball within view of those ashore. She later drifted out to sea and sank, the only tanker to be destroyed beyond repair by the Type IX boats in the Eastern Sea Frontier in April. blew up in a fireball within view of those ashore. She later drifted out to sea and sank, the only tanker to be destroyed beyond repair by the Type IX boats in the Eastern Sea Frontier in April.

Almost immediately, ASW forces converged on U-123. U-123. These included Army and Navy aircraft from nearby bases in Jacksonville, the four-stack destroyer These included Army and Navy aircraft from nearby bases in Jacksonville, the four-stack destroyer Dahlgren Dahlgren, and Atik's Atik's sister "Q" ship sister "Q" ship Asterion Asterion, still on her shakedown cruise. One of the aircraft dropped a brilliant flare directly over U-123. U-123. Hardegen crash-dived-and hit bottom at sixty-six feet-but Hardegen crash-dived-and hit bottom at sixty-six feet-but Dahlgren Dahlgren saw the flare, got saw the flare, got U-123 U-123 on sonar, and dropped six close depth charges. The boat "takes a terrible beating," Hardegen logged. "The crew members fly about, and practically everything breaks down. Machinery hisses or roars everywhere." on sonar, and dropped six close depth charges. The boat "takes a terrible beating," Hardegen logged. "The crew members fly about, and practically everything breaks down. Machinery hisses or roars everywhere."

Trapped in shoal water and severely damaged, Hardegen was certain that U-123 U-123 was done for and ordered the crew to prepare to abandon ship. Since the boat could be salvaged easily in such shallow water, he distributed the Enigma rotors (to be disposed of randomly) among the officers and made certain that Enigma documents (printed on water-soluble paper) were out in the open. Others set the scuttling charges and handed out escape apparatus. But was done for and ordered the crew to prepare to abandon ship. Since the boat could be salvaged easily in such shallow water, he distributed the Enigma rotors (to be disposed of randomly) among the officers and made certain that Enigma documents (printed on water-soluble paper) were out in the open. Others set the scuttling charges and handed out escape apparatus. But Dahlgren Dahlgren did not persist in her attack. Nor did she bring up did not persist in her attack. Nor did she bring up Asterion Asterion or other ASW forces. Her skipper concluded wrongly that he had not actually made a U-boat contact and steamed off. or other ASW forces. Her skipper concluded wrongly that he had not actually made a U-boat contact and steamed off.

Scarcely believing his good luck, Hardegen later surfaced and limped to deep water. He lay on the bottom to rest the crew and make repairs. By late evening of April 12, the boat and crew were again ready for action. They found it off Cape Canaveral: the 2,600-ton American freighter Leslie Leslie, northbound from Havana with a load of sugar, and the 4,600-ton British freighter Korsholm Korsholm, loaded with phosphate. He sank Leslie Leslie with his last torpedo and with his last torpedo and Korsholm Korsholm with his deck gun, and then set a course for France. with his deck gun, and then set a course for France.

Hardegen happily calculated his sinking report for Donitz. By his reckoning, on this patrol he had sunk ten ships (seven tankers) for 75,837 tons, substantially exceeding the tonnage sunk on his first patrol to America and-as he logged exuberantly-making U-123 U-123 the second U-boat (after the retired the second U-boat (after the retired U-48 U-48) "to pass 300,000 tons." However, both these claims were inflated (as of course were those of U-48 U-48). On this patrol to then, Hardegen had sunk nine confirmed ships for about 54,300 tons and damaged the tanker Liebre. Liebre. However, two of his tanker sinkings, However, two of his tanker sinkings, Oklahoma Oklahoma and and Esso Baton Rouge Esso Baton Rouge for 24,300 tons, were salvaged, reducing the net bag to seven ships of about 30,000 tons. Under command of Moehle and Hardegen, for 24,300 tons, were salvaged, reducing the net bag to seven ships of about 30,000 tons. Under command of Moehle and Hardegen, U-123 U-123 had sunk not "300,000" tons but about 172,000 tons. had sunk not "300,000" tons but about 172,000 tons.

Imitating Johann Mohr in U-124 U-124, Hardegen reported his sinkings in verse, rendered thus by historian Michael Gannon: For seven tankers the hour has passed, The Q-ship hull went down by the meter, Two freighters, too, were sunk at last, And all of them by the same Drumbeater!

Hardegen's report electrified the U-boat staff in Paris and the OKM in Berlin. But, as on his first patrol to American waters, he was not yet done. Homebound on April 16, he sank the 4,834-ton American freighter Alcoa Guide Alcoa Guide by gun. Reporting this victory, Hardegen raised his total claims to eleven ships for 79,649 tons, a record-breaking patrol (without torpedo resupply), which drew unstinting praise from Admiral Raeder and Donitz. Since his total claims had reached or exceeded 200,000 tons on April 23, a message from Hitler arrived, adding Oak Leaves to Hardegen's by gun. Reporting this victory, Hardegen raised his total claims to eleven ships for 79,649 tons, a record-breaking patrol (without torpedo resupply), which drew unstinting praise from Admiral Raeder and Donitz. Since his total claims had reached or exceeded 200,000 tons on April 23, a message from Hitler arrived, adding Oak Leaves to Hardegen's Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz.*

When U-123 U-123 reached Lorient, Admiral Raeder and Donitz were standing on the pier to congratulate Hardegen and all hands for "a superbly executed operation." Hardegen later flew to reached Lorient, Admiral Raeder and Donitz were standing on the pier to congratulate Hardegen and all hands for "a superbly executed operation." Hardegen later flew to Wolfsschanze Wolfsschanze to receive his Oak Leaves-and a vegetarian dinner-from Hitler. Still later, he took to receive his Oak Leaves-and a vegetarian dinner-from Hitler. Still later, he took U-123 U-123 to Germany for battle-damage repairs and an extended overhaul, which kept her in Germany until December. Having acquired fame rivaling that of the past U-boat heroes Prien and Kretschmer, Hardegen left to Germany for battle-damage repairs and an extended overhaul, which kept her in Germany until December. Having acquired fame rivaling that of the past U-boat heroes Prien and Kretschmer, Hardegen left U-123 U-123 for a job in the Training Command and did not return to combat. for a job in the Training Command and did not return to combat.

The other five Type IXs of the March group turned in mixed performances, due in part to the shutdown of Allied tanker shipping in the last two weeks of April.

Richard Zapp in U-66 U-66, who reached Trinidad in mid-April with twenty-four torpedoes (ten in topside canisters), carried out a notable patrol. He sank six confirmed ships for about 44,000 tons-more confirmed tonnage confirmed tonnage sunk than Hardegen and Mohr-and damaged a 12,500-ton British tanker. Four of the six sinkings were tankers. sunk than Hardegen and Mohr-and damaged a 12,500-ton British tanker. Four of the six sinkings were tankers. While still at sea on this sixty-eight-day patrol, Zapp was awarded a While still at sea on this sixty-eight-day patrol, Zapp was awarded a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz and upon his return to France he left the boat to command Combat Flotilla 3. and upon his return to France he left the boat to command Combat Flotilla 3.

Ernst Kals in U-130 U-130 attacked, per orders, the refinery and tank farms on the island of Curacao in the early hours of April 19. But after firing only twelve rounds, which did no discernible damage, counterfire from the shore batteries on Curacao drove him off. Frustrated by the temporary shutdown of tanker shipping in the Caribbean and by some torpedo failures, Kals sank only two confirmed ships, a 5,400-ton freighter and, while homebound, the 7,700-ton American tanker attacked, per orders, the refinery and tank farms on the island of Curacao in the early hours of April 19. But after firing only twelve rounds, which did no discernible damage, counterfire from the shore batteries on Curacao drove him off. Frustrated by the temporary shutdown of tanker shipping in the Caribbean and by some torpedo failures, Kals sank only two confirmed ships, a 5,400-ton freighter and, while homebound, the 7,700-ton American tanker Esso Boston. Esso Boston. His was a disappointing, exceedingly long and frustrating patrol of seventy-five days. His was a disappointing, exceedingly long and frustrating patrol of seventy-five days.

After refueling from the U-tanker U-459 U-459 on April 20-her first "customer"-the on April 20-her first "customer"-the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Klaus Scholtz in the IXB holder Klaus Scholtz in the IXB U-108 U-108 patrolled Bermuda, the Florida Straits, and the Windward Passage. While inbound and outbound, and in his assigned areas, Scholtz sank five confirmed ships for about 31,000 tons. His victims included two tankers: the 9,900-ton American patrolled Bermuda, the Florida Straits, and the Windward Passage. While inbound and outbound, and in his assigned areas, Scholtz sank five confirmed ships for about 31,000 tons. His victims included two tankers: the 9,900-ton American Mobiloil Mobiloil and the 8,100-ton Norwegian and the 8,100-ton Norwegian Norland. Norland.

Walther Kolle in U-154 U-154, patrolling near Puerto Rico, reported "no traffic" and "strong" aircraft ASW patrols. As a result, Donitz shifted him northward to the promising waters of the Windward Passage, where he sank five ships for 28,700 tons and returned to France after sixty days. His victims included three tankers: two 5,000-ton Americans, Comol Rico Comol Rico and and Catahoula Catahoula, and the 8,000-ton British Empire Amethyst. Empire Amethyst.

Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109, patrolling Cape Hatteras and south to Florida waters, sank two freighters for 11,500 tons and a 555-ton Nicaraguan freighter, a disappointing patrol.

In aggregate, the six IXs that sailed to the Americas during March sank twentynine confirmed nonsalvaged ships (thirteen tankers) for 164,100 tons, with Zapp in U-66 U-66 and Hardegen in and Hardegen in U-123 U-123 accounting for nearly half the total. These successes reversed the disquieting downward trend of the IX sinkings, raising the average returns per boat per patrol slightly above those of the December IXs: 4.8 ships for 27,351 tons. The refueling of the IXB accounting for nearly half the total. These successes reversed the disquieting downward trend of the IX sinkings, raising the average returns per boat per patrol slightly above those of the December IXs: 4.8 ships for 27,351 tons. The refueling of the IXB U-108 U-108 by by U-459 U-459 enabled Scholtz to extend his patrol to seventy-one days. However, by exercising stringent fuel discipline, Bleichrodt in the IXB enabled Scholtz to extend his patrol to seventy-one days. However, by exercising stringent fuel discipline, Bleichrodt in the IXB U-109 U-109 patrolled for a like number of days without replenishing, although certainly not without constant concern about running out of fuel. patrolled for a like number of days without replenishing, although certainly not without constant concern about running out of fuel.

A SPECTACULAR F FORAY.

The twenty Type VIIs that sailed to the Americas in March-the largest deployment of VIIs so far-patrolled the United States East Coast from Maine to Florida. All twenty had made prior combat patrols, twelve of the twenty (60 percent) to the Americas. Only one skipper, Wilhelm Schulze in U-98 U-98, replacing Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Robert Gysae, was new but his crew was skilled and earlier had made a patrol to Canadian waters. As related, three of the VIIs were commanded by holder Robert Gysae, was new but his crew was skilled and earlier had made a patrol to Canadian waters. As related, three of the VIIs were commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders, two of whom had made prior patrols to Canada: Erich Topp in holders, two of whom had made prior patrols to Canada: Erich Topp in U-552 U-552 and Rolf Mutzelburg in and Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203. U-203. Another Another Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder, Adalbert Schnee in holder, Adalbert Schnee in U-201 U-201, sailed from a long overhaul in Germany. The resupply boats U-A and U-459 U-A and U-459 were to refuel eight of the twenty VIIs, six of them outbound to America, two of them homebound to France. were to refuel eight of the twenty VIIs, six of them outbound to America, two of them homebound to France.

Eight of these VIIs sailed in the first two weeks of March for Cape Hatteras. Three refueled in mid-ocean from the U-A U-A: Horst Uphoff in U-84 U-84; Hans-Heinz Linder in U-202 U-202, who had used much fuel in a failed attempt to find and escort the inbound blockade runner Germania; Germania; and and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Rolf Mutzelburg in holder Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, who had also used much fuel in a fruitless chase of a convoy, Outbound North 77, found and reported by Otto Ites, who was homebound from the Americas to France in U-94. U-94. The other five boats sailed at one-engine speed, following the Great Circle route. The other five boats sailed at one-engine speed, following the Great Circle route.

All eight VIIs inbound to Cape Hatteras found and attacked important targets, which were sailing in Canadian or American offshore waters.

Paul-Karl Loeser in U-373 U-373 sank two freighters (one British, one Greek) for 9,900 tons. sank two freighters (one British, one Greek) for 9,900 tons.

Helmut Mohlmann in U-571 U-571 sank the 11,000-ton British refrigerator ship sank the 11,000-ton British refrigerator ship Hertford Hertford, loaded with meat and dairy products.

Hans-Heinz Linder in U-202 U-202 and Horst Uphoff in and Horst Uphoff in U-84 U-84 each sank 5,200-ton freighters. each sank 5,200-ton freighters.

Hans Oestermann in U-754 U-754 sank the 8,600-ton tanker sank the 8,600-ton tanker British Prudence. Ritterkreuz British Prudence. Ritterkreuz holder Erich Topp in holder Erich Topp in U-552 U-552 hit and burned out the 6,300-ton Dutch tanker hit and burned out the 6,300-ton Dutch tanker Ocana Ocana, which was later sunk by Allied forces.

Heinz Hirsacker in U-572 U-572 (still under a cloud for his balk at the Gibraltar Strait in January) conducted a lackluster small-gun attack on the 6,200-ton British tanker (still under a cloud for his balk at the Gibraltar Strait in January) conducted a lackluster small-gun attack on the 6,200-ton British tanker Ensis Ensis, which escaped with slight damage.

Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 encountered an unidentified convoy while passing through Canadian waters on March 25, but his attack was thwarted by "well-aimed" depth charges from escorts. encountered an unidentified convoy while passing through Canadian waters on March 25, but his attack was thwarted by "well-aimed" depth charges from escorts.

Seven of these eight boats reached the Cape Hatteras area in late March and early April, overlapping Hardegen in U-123. U-123. Notwithstanding the intensified American ASW measures and a bright, full moon, three of the boats found good hunting. In a spectacular week's work, April 3 to April 10, Erich Topp in Notwithstanding the intensified American ASW measures and a bright, full moon, three of the boats found good hunting. In a spectacular week's work, April 3 to April 10, Erich Topp in U-552 U-552 sank six more ships (four tankers) sank six more ships (four tankers)* for about 40,000 tons, the best performance by any Type VII skipper in American waters. In the period from March 31 to April 6, Hans Oestermann in for about 40,000 tons, the best performance by any Type VII skipper in American waters. In the period from March 31 to April 6, Hans Oestermann in U-754 U-754 also sank six more ships for 23,000 tons: a freighter, two tankers (American also sank six more ships for 23,000 tons: a freighter, two tankers (American Tiger Tiger, 6,000 tons; Norwegian Kollskegg Kollskegg, 9,900 tons), and a tug and two of her three barges. Although his hydrophones were out of commission, "making shallow water operations difficult," Helmut Mohlmann in U-571 U-571 sank the 10,000-ton Norwegian tanker sank the 10,000-ton Norwegian tanker Koll Koll and two freighters. Mutzelburg in and two freighters. Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 claimed sinking three tankers and a freighter for 36,000 tons, but two of the tankers escaped, only damaged, reducing his confirmed score to one freighter and the 8,100-ton British tanker claimed sinking three tankers and a freighter for 36,000 tons, but two of the tankers escaped, only damaged, reducing his confirmed score to one freighter and the 8,100-ton British tanker San Delfino. San Delfino. Hirsacker in Hirsacker in U-572 U-572 sank two freighters for 9,500 tons and damaged a tanker. Arriving last, Uphoff in sank two freighters for 9,500 tons and damaged a tanker. Arriving last, Uphoff in U-84 U-84 sank one 3,000-ton freighter. Neither Linder in sank one 3,000-ton freighter. Neither Linder in U-202 U-202 nor Loeser in nor Loeser in U-373 U-373 sank a ship off Cape Hatteras. sank a ship off Cape Hatteras.

The total bag for these first eight boats was a slaughter: twenty-six ships (ten tankers) for nearly 150,000 tons, counting Topp's tanker, Ocana. Ocana.

It had been expected that the refueling from supply boats was to increase substantially the patrol days of the VIIs in American waters. In reality, that was not the case. The three boats that refueled from U-A U-A outbound to America were at sea an average of fifty-five days. Two others homebound to France, Mohlmann's outbound to America were at sea an average of fifty-five days. Two others homebound to France, Mohlmann's U-571 U-571 and Hirsacker's and Hirsacker's U-572 U-572, refueled from the tanker U-459 U-459, extending their patrols to an average sixty days. Hence, the average time at sea for the five boats of the group that refueled, inbound or outbound, was fifty-seven days. The average time at sea for the three boats that did not refuel was fifty days, making the average gain for the boats of this group that refueled merely seven days.

Nor did refueling increase the ship sinkings by this group. The five of eight boats that refueled, inbound or outbound, sank ten ships-an average of two victims per boat. The three boats that did not refuel sank sixteen ships-an average of 5.3 victims per boat. Sinkings still depended upon the skill and aggressiveness of the skippers and crews, weather, opportunity, luck, and availability of torpedoes. Some skippers of this group (Topp and Mutzelburg, for example) ran out of torpedoes. Replenishment and resupply could not be fully exploited until a means of providing the boats with torpedo reloads could be arranged.*

Erich Topp's claims for this and prior patrols exceeded 200,000 tons, and he therefore qualified for Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz. Hitler announced the award by radio on April 11, while Topp was homebound. Hitler announced the award by radio on April 11, while Topp was homebound. Later, the Fuhrer presented the medal to Topp at Later, the Fuhrer presented the medal to Topp at Wolfsschanze Wolfsschanze, at the same time he awarded Hardegen his Oak Leaves. Although Topp had his choice of virtually any assignment, he preferred to remain in combat with U-552 U-552. He thus became the leading "ace" at the front.

The other twelve VIIs sailed, day by day, during the second half of March. This group included Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Adalbert Schnee in holder Adalbert Schnee in U-201 U-201, on his first patrol to the Americas, and several promising skippers, among them Peter Cremer in U-333 U-333, exonerated for the accidental sinking of the blockade runner Spreewald; Spreewald; Siegfried von Forstner in Siegfried von Forstner in U-402; U-402; and Heinrich Zimmermann in and Heinrich Zimmermann in U-136. U-136. Cremer had made a prior patrol to Canada. Like Schnee, von Forstner and Zimmermann were on their first patrols to American waters. Cremer had made a prior patrol to Canada. Like Schnee, von Forstner and Zimmermann were on their first patrols to American waters.

Outbound, three of the VIIs of this group of twelve refueled from U-459 U-459: the veteran U-98 U-98, commanded by the new skipper, Wilhelm Schulze, age thirty-two; Peter Cremer in U-333 U-333; and Werner Schulte in U-582 U-582, who had used much fuel attempting without success to meet and escort the blockade runner Rio Grande Rio Grande into France. into France.

While Schulte in U-582 U-582 was en route to his refueling rendezvous with was en route to his refueling rendezvous with U-459 U-459 on April 16, the American submarine on April 16, the American submarine R-1 R-1, on ASW patrol, shot four torpedoes at her. Credited with a U-boat kill, the first by an American submarine, the R-1 R-1's skipper, James D. Grant, was awarded the Navy Cross. But U-582 U-582 had escaped the encounter undamaged and replenished as planned. had escaped the encounter undamaged and replenished as planned.

Refuellings were difficult. None of the VIIs had ever practiced the procedure. The crews had not even been properly briefed, the technical adviser on U-459 U-459 wrote. To carry out a refueling, which took one and a half to five hours, the sea had to be relatively calm and the seamanship excellent. The U-tanker went ahead at 3 to 4 knots on electric motors and floated a towing hawser and oil hose back to the boat to be refueled. Usually everything went wrong, the adviser went on: wrote. To carry out a refueling, which took one and a half to five hours, the sea had to be relatively calm and the seamanship excellent. The U-tanker went ahead at 3 to 4 knots on electric motors and floated a towing hawser and oil hose back to the boat to be refueled. Usually everything went wrong, the adviser went on: In the case of 8 [of 15] boats, mishaps occurred causing greater or lesser delays, through hose leakages caused by poor maneuvering, by repeated passing-over of hoses, by inept handling on deck (chafing and tearing because of the lack of chafing mats ...) or through hooks on the diving planes. While the hoses were being passed over, one boat fouled the hoses with its forward hydroplanes, tore the hawser and both hoses away and, when this was cleared, let go the whole equipment.... [However] the crew [of U-459 U-459] behaved magnificently in these operations, which were often most difficult, pushing themselves to the limit of physical endeavor. For example, the provisioning of 4 boats in a period exceeding 16 hours in one day; on another day working 8 to 10 hours with lifelines attached, with seas and breakers constantly washing over them.

The U-459 U-459 doled out its fuel and food sparingly on a rigid schedule drawn up by U-boat headquarters. Most VIIs received about 30 cubic meters of fuel (about 30 tons) and a week to ten days' supply of food, including fresh bread baked in a special facility on board doled out its fuel and food sparingly on a rigid schedule drawn up by U-boat headquarters. Most VIIs received about 30 cubic meters of fuel (about 30 tons) and a week to ten days' supply of food, including fresh bread baked in a special facility on board U-459 U-459, which could produce eight loaves per hour.

Schulte in U-582 U-582 had spent three weeks on the abortive rendezvous with had spent three weeks on the abortive rendezvous with Rio Grande Rio Grande, and was very low on fuel when he reached U-459 U-459. He was allotted 55 cubic meters (about double the usual quota), but even this was not enough to safely carry out an aggressive patrol in United States waters. Donitz therefore diverted him to the island of Bermuda, about 600 miles southeast of New York. There Schulte encountered heavy weather, scant shipping, and "strong" ASW measures. Hounded by aircraft and patrol boats, he shot a triple bow salvo at a "fast passenger ship" but missed. He returned to France with no sinkings to credit-an exceedingly frustrating voyage-and, of course, a refueling to little purpose.

The other eleven VIIs of this group closed on the United States coast from New York to Florida. Several went to the Cape Hatteras area to replace the VIIs that had sailed earlier in the month, arriving just ahead of or during the onset of the new moon, April 14. Among these new arrivals was Eberhard Greger in U-85 U-85, embarked on his fourth war patrol. Southbound off New Jersey on the night of April 10, he sank the 4,900-ton Swedish freighter Christina Knudsen Christina Knudsen with two torpedoes. In the evening of April 13, concealed by the darkness of the new moon, Greger lay in wait in shallow water off Bodie Island, north of Cape Hatteras. with two torpedoes. In the evening of April 13, concealed by the darkness of the new moon, Greger lay in wait in shallow water off Bodie Island, north of Cape Hatteras.

That same day, the four-stack Roper Roper sailed from Norfolk to Cape Hatteras on ASW patrol. Commanded by Hamilton W. Howe, sailed from Norfolk to Cape Hatteras on ASW patrol. Commanded by Hamilton W. Howe, Roper Roper was armed with five 3/50 caliber guns, six torpedo tubes, and seventy-five 300-pound depth charges, which could be rolled from her stern tracks or shot from Y and K guns. She had recently been equipped with a British-built Type 286 meter-wavelength radar. was armed with five 3/50 caliber guns, six torpedo tubes, and seventy-five 300-pound depth charges, which could be rolled from her stern tracks or shot from Y and K guns. She had recently been equipped with a British-built Type 286 meter-wavelength radar.

Just after midnight, April 14, while southbound off Bodie Island, Roper Roper got a radar contact at 2,700 yards. Inasmuch as these waters were teeming with smaller Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats, fishing trawlers, tugboats, and salvage craft, initially the contact caused no great excitement. got a radar contact at 2,700 yards. Inasmuch as these waters were teeming with smaller Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats, fishing trawlers, tugboats, and salvage craft, initially the contact caused no great excitement. Roper Roper routinely turned to run down the bearing. While doing so, sonar picked up the noise of fast screws. That report caused excitement. The contact was moving too fast to be the usual patrol or fishing boat. routinely turned to run down the bearing. While doing so, sonar picked up the noise of fast screws. That report caused excitement. The contact was moving too fast to be the usual patrol or fishing boat.

The radar contact was U-85 U-85. Trapped by a destroyer in water only 100 feet deep, Greger had two choices: to dive and possibly be pounded to pieces by depth charges, or to run at full speed on the surface to deep water. Perhaps hoping he could shake the destroyer in the darkness, Greger chose to run. But he did not know the destroyer had radar. Despite numerous indications to the contrary, Donitz and his submariners still believed that radar was too big, bulky, and sensitive for installation on small ships.

Chasing at 20 knots, Roper Roper gradually overhauled gradually overhauled U-85 U-85. In a last but futile effort to rid himself of the pursuer, Greger fired his stern tube at 700 yards. The torpedo missed, running close down Roper's Roper's port side. When port side. When Roper Roper closed to 300 yards, and appeared to be coming in to ram, Greger gave the order to scuttle and abandon ship. To facilitate this final, desperate act and get out of closed to 300 yards, and appeared to be coming in to ram, Greger gave the order to scuttle and abandon ship. To facilitate this final, desperate act and get out of Roper's Roper's way, Greger abruptly turned hard to starboard. way, Greger abruptly turned hard to starboard.

When U-85 U-85 turned, turned, Roper Roper switched on her 24" searchlight and opened fire at point-blank range. Seeing the Germans running on deck to abandon ship, the excited Americans, they said later, concluded they had come up to man switched on her 24" searchlight and opened fire at point-blank range. Seeing the Germans running on deck to abandon ship, the excited Americans, they said later, concluded they had come up to man U-85 U-85's deck gun to shoot it out.* In reaction, the Americans raked the U-boat's deck with machine-gun fire, cutting down the Germans who were trying to jump over the side. In reaction, the Americans raked the U-boat's deck with machine-gun fire, cutting down the Germans who were trying to jump over the side.

With her sea cocks open, U-85 U-85 quickly flooded and went down by the stern in ninety-eight feet of water. As she did so, the Americans, as they said later, saw "about forty" Germans in the water or on the deck of quickly flooded and went down by the stern in ninety-eight feet of water. As she did so, the Americans, as they said later, saw "about forty" Germans in the water or on the deck of U-85 U-85, many crying out in German, "please save us." Roper Roper thus had the opportunity to capture U-boat prisoners for intelligence and propaganda purposes, and there was a good possibility that in such shallow water Navy divers could enter thus had the opportunity to capture U-boat prisoners for intelligence and propaganda purposes, and there was a good possibility that in such shallow water Navy divers could enter U-85 U-85 and recover a four-rotor Enigma, the new short-signal book, and other secret materials. But the excited Americans apparently did not give these matters any consideration. and recover a four-rotor Enigma, the new short-signal book, and other secret materials. But the excited Americans apparently did not give these matters any consideration. Roper Roper swung around, charged through the German survivors in the water, and dropped eleven depth charges set for fifty feet, directly on top of swung around, charged through the German survivors in the water, and dropped eleven depth charges set for fifty feet, directly on top of U-85 U-85. Those Germans who were not cut to pieces by Roper Roper's propellers were killed by the depth charges. Not one man of the crew survived. The force of the explosions shattered U-85 U-85 externally and internally and rolled her nearly flat in the sand on her starboard side. externally and internally and rolled her nearly flat in the sand on her starboard side.

Fearing other U-boats might be near-the fate of sister ship Jacob Jones Jacob Jones perhaps fresh in mind- perhaps fresh in mind-Roper radioed an account of her attack and hauled away. After daylight, a Catalina, a blimp, and five other aircraft appeared. The Catalina spotted the German bodies and bits of wreckage and dropped a depth charge for good measure. Other aircraft drew radioed an account of her attack and hauled away. After daylight, a Catalina, a blimp, and five other aircraft appeared. The Catalina spotted the German bodies and bits of wreckage and dropped a depth charge for good measure. Other aircraft drew Roper Roper back to the scene with smoke flares. back to the scene with smoke flares. Roper Roper, too, dropped another depth charge, then lowered away two boats to collect the bodies and debris. In the midst of this gruesome operation, Roper Roper's sonar reported a U-boat contact-perhaps the hulk of U-85 U-85-and she broke off to fire four more depth charges to no purpose.

Roper's boats found thirty-one German bodies. Two of them were badly mangled. After searching the clothing of these two, Roper Roper's men callously left them in the sea. The other twenty-nine bodies were brought on board, stacked on deck, and covered with a tarpaulin. Roper Roper dropped two more depth charges on dropped two more depth charges on U-85 U-85, then headed triumphantly for Norfolk. Outside the harbor, a Navy tug, Scioto Scioto, took off the twenty-nine bodies. After they had been searched again (two useful diaries were found), photographed, and fingerprinted, they were buried in marked graves with full military honors in the National Cemetery, Hampton, Virginia, in coffins provided by the Veteran's Administration.

The Navy immediately initiated efforts to salvage U-85 U-85 and/or to recover her intelligence materials. Numerous small craft, including two of the twenty-two and/or to recover her intelligence materials. Numerous small craft, including two of the twenty-two* newly arrived British ASW trawlers, newly arrived British ASW trawlers, Bedfordshire Bedfordshire and and Saint Loman Saint Loman, swarmed over U-85 U-85. Early in these operations, hard-hat divers found an armed but unexploded depth charge lying on the bottom alongside U-85 U-85. A Navy demolition team exploded the charge, no doubt further damaging the boat. Between April 15 and May 4, Navy divers made about one hundred descents to the wreck. Inasmuch as she was lying nearly flat on her starboard side, none of the divers could get inside the boat to look for her Enigma or other intelligence material. Because of the depthcharge damage to her air lines and tankage, she could not be raised-or even righted-by salvage air.

When it was finally decided that U-85 U-85 could be raised only by "extensive" use of pontoons, the salvage effort was abandoned. The divers stripped could be raised only by "extensive" use of pontoons, the salvage effort was abandoned. The divers stripped U-85 U-85 of much topside gear-the 20mm bridge gun, the IZO torpedo aimer, and the gyro-compass repeater-and "dismantled" the 88mm deck gun, which still had the tampion in the muzzle. But they could not pry open the storage canister and remove the topside torpedo. They reported no evidence of gun hits by of much topside gear-the 20mm bridge gun, the IZO torpedo aimer, and the gyro-compass repeater-and "dismantled" the 88mm deck gun, which still had the tampion in the muzzle. But they could not pry open the storage canister and remove the topside torpedo. They reported no evidence of gun hits by Roper Roper and concluded that and concluded that U-85 U-85 was "probably scuttled." was "probably scuttled."

Several other VIIs were near Cape Hatteras when Roper Roper sank sank U-85 U-85. The Bucket Brigade convoy scheme between Key West and New York was in operation by that time, and aircraft patrolled Hatteras from dawn to dusk. There was no authorized ship traffic at night. Daytime U-boat operations close to shore where the Bucket Brigade convoys sailed were hazardous.

Two of the VIIs mounted attacks. Near sunset on April 17, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Adalbert Schnee in holder Adalbert Schnee in U-201 U-201 found and damaged a 7,500-ton tanker, but-awkwardly-it turned out to be the Argentine neutral found and damaged a 7,500-ton tanker, but-awkwardly-it turned out to be the Argentine neutral Victoria Victoria. American naval vessels rescued the crew and eventually confiscated the ship from the pro-German Argentines, setting in train a diplomatic uproar that ultimately drew an apology to the Argentines from Berlin. In the late afternoon of April 18, Heinrich Zimmermann in U-136 U-136 boldly attacked an eight-ship Bucket Brigade convoy, which was escorted by the hard-working 165-foot Coast Guard cutter boldly attacked an eight-ship Bucket Brigade convoy, which was escorted by the hard-working 165-foot Coast Guard cutter Dione Dione, two British ASW trawlers, a small patrol boat, and several aircraft. Zimmermann fired two torpedoes at the loaded 9,000-ton American tanker Axtell J. Byles. Axtell J. Byles. One torpedo broached, alerting the escort; the other hit, blowing a hole in the tanker, but she survived and reached Norfolk. One torpedo broached, alerting the escort; the other hit, blowing a hole in the tanker, but she survived and reached Norfolk. Dione Dione responded with a salvo of eight depth charges and called in eight aircraft, which dropped more depth charges and bombs. However, Zimmermann escaped undamaged. responded with a salvo of eight depth charges and called in eight aircraft, which dropped more depth charges and bombs. However, Zimmermann escaped undamaged.

It was not yet apparent to Donitz, but the fact was that, however thin and green, by mid-April American ASW air and surface forces, augmented by the British ASW trawlers, had rendered the Cape Hatteras area and most of the continental shelf unproductive for U-boat operations. Several VIIs of the March group dutifully remained near Cape Hatteras, but after April 20, as Donitz noted later, none had any success and most reported "strong" ASW patrols.

Granted freedom of action, most of the VIIs hauled away from Hatteras. These and others patrolled several hundred miles offshore, beyond range of most air patrols, loosely covering the sea lanes from Massachusetts to Georgia. An exception was Siegfried von Forstner in U-402 U-402, who had sunk one freighter inbound but none in a frustrating week off Hatteras. At the end of his patrol, he hugged the shallow North Carolina coast south to Cape Lookout and Cape Fear. There he sank the 5,300-ton Russian tanker Ashkabad Ashkabad and a big (215-foot, 1,000-ton) but ancient (1906) yacht, and a big (215-foot, 1,000-ton) but ancient (1906) yacht, Cythera Cythera, which the Navy, for the second time in two world wars, had acquired and converted to an escort/rescue vessel.

The Russian Ashkabad Ashkabad sank in shallow water and her skipper believed she could be salvaged. But according to the writer Gary Gentile, the destroyer sank in shallow water and her skipper believed she could be salvaged. But according to the writer Gary Gentile, the destroyer Semmes Semmes, uninformed of this prospect, came along and destroyed her with gunfire to clear the ship channel. Hit by two torpedoes, the ancient yacht Cythera Cythera blew to pieces. As she sank, her armed depth charges exploded, killing all but two enlisted men of the seventy-one-man crew. Von Forstner fished both from the water and took them back to Germany-the first American naval POWs to be captured by the Germans. Both were to survive the war. blew to pieces. As she sank, her armed depth charges exploded, killing all but two enlisted men of the seventy-one-man crew. Von Forstner fished both from the water and took them back to Germany-the first American naval POWs to be captured by the Germans. Both were to survive the war.

The hunting offshore was spotty: * Ludwig Forster in U-654 U-654, who had sunk a 7,000-ton British freighter inbound, sank two other freighters 300 miles east of Hatteras for a total of 17,755 tons, making him the high scorer of this group.

* Second place went to Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Adalbert Schnee in holder Adalbert Schnee in U-201 U-201, who sank three freighters for 15,300 tons by torpedo and gun, 400 miles east of Georgia. Schnee also had a fleeting glimpse of the liner Aquitania Aquitania, inbound from Australia to New York to take American troops to Northern Ireland, but she was going very fast and there was no way he could overtake her.

* Karl-Ernst Schroeter in U-752 U-752 got wartime and postwar credit for sinking three ships for 15,500 tons by torpedo and gun, but research by Gary Gentile has disallowed one, the 4,800-ton Norwegian freighter got wartime and postwar credit for sinking three ships for 15,500 tons by torpedo and gun, but research by Gary Gentile has disallowed one, the 4,800-ton Norwegian freighter Reinholt Reinholt, which was only damaged by gunfire.

* After his abortive attack on the Bucket Brigade convoy, Zimmermann in U-136 U-136 went north to New Jersey and New York waters, where he sank two freighters for 12,400 tons, the second, the Dutch went north to New Jersey and New York waters, where he sank two freighters for 12,400 tons, the second, the Dutch Arundo Arundo, merely fifteen miles east of the Ambrose lightship marking the channel into New York harbor. On his way home he attacked the 300-ton Canadian sailing ship Mildred Pauline Mildred Pauline by gun. He reported that he had "missed," but in fact, she went down. by gun. He reported that he had "missed," but in fact, she went down.

* Gunther Heydemann in U-575 U-575 turned in a second disappointing patrol to the Americas, sinking only one ship for 6,900 tons while inbound. turned in a second disappointing patrol to the Americas, sinking only one ship for 6,900 tons while inbound.

Worse yet, two VIIs sank no ships at all: Walter Schug in U-86 U-86 and Wilhelm Schulze, the new skipper of the veteran and Wilhelm Schulze, the new skipper of the veteran U-98 U-98, who had refueled from U-459 U-459 inbound to America. Both skippers shot at freighters, but missed. Caught by a "destroyer" in fifty-nine feet of water off Florida, Schulze in inbound to America. Both skippers shot at freighters, but missed. Caught by a "destroyer" in fifty-nine feet of water off Florida, Schulze in U-98 U-98 fired four torpedoes at his assailant, but missed. In retaliation, the (as yet unidentified) "destroyer" carried out a "heavy" depth-charge attack, Schulze reported, but it was not "persistent" and thus he was able to escape. fired four torpedoes at his assailant, but missed. In retaliation, the (as yet unidentified) "destroyer" carried out a "heavy" depth-charge attack, Schulze reported, but it was not "persistent" and thus he was able to escape.

Having suffered a two-day engine breakdown and refueled from U-459 U-459, Peter Cremer in U-333 U-333 also headed for Florida waters. On the afternoon of April 30, while 300 miles east of Jacksonville, he spotted the masts of the modern 11,000-ton, double-hull tanker also headed for Florida waters. On the afternoon of April 30, while 300 miles east of Jacksonville, he spotted the masts of the modern 11,000-ton, double-hull tanker British Prestige British Prestige, zigzagging at 10 knots, loaded with highoctane aviation gasoline. Cremer tracked her until dark, then fired two bow torpedoes. When both missed, he submerged, reloaded the tubes, then surfaced to pursue, hampered by a very bright moon. Hauling around, he submerged for a periscope attack, closing to point-blank range, silhouetting the big ship against the moon. As he was on the point of firing, the zigzagging British Prestige British Prestige unwittingly rammed unwittingly rammed U-333 U-333. The tanker lurched to starboard, the startled skipper reported, and the crew heard a loud "rumbling crushing noise." It was obvious the ship had hit a submerged object-U-boat? whale?-but she did not pause to investigate. Unknown to the captain or crew, her outer hull was ripped open from stem to stern.

The collision severely damaged U-333 U-333. Her stem was "twisted to port," jamming shut the two port bow torpedo tubes. The bridge structure was mangled; the attack periscope was bent to port at a crazy angle and could not be retracted. Had Cremer aborted the patrol, no one would have reproached him, but it was his second mistake in as many patrols-sinking Spreewald Spreewald had been the first-and there was the possibility that he might lose his command. He therefore set his crew to work with welding torches and mallets to cut and hammer had been the first-and there was the possibility that he might lose his command. He therefore set his crew to work with welding torches and mallets to cut and hammer U-333 U-333 back into operable condition. Remarkably, the men succeeded, and Cremer closed the Florida coast near Fort Pierce with his "half-wrecked" boat. back into operable condition. Remarkably, the men succeeded, and Cremer closed the Florida coast near Fort Pierce with his "half-wrecked" boat.

Cremer lay silently on the surface in bright moonlight on May 5, fifteen miles offshore in twenty-six feet of water. At about midnight, the 8,300-ton American tanker Java Arrow Java Arrow, a straggler from a Bucket Brigade convoy, came along southbound, in ballast. Cremer fired two torpedoes by eye. Both hit and the ship "burned furiously" and sank, or so Cremer believed. Actually, she was salvaged and returned to service. Four hours later, when the 1,300-ton Dutch freighter Amazone Amazone appeared, Cremer fired two more torpedoes. Both hit and appeared, Cremer fired two more torpedoes. Both hit and Amazone Amazone went down. Two hours later-near dawn on May 6-yet another ship loomed up, the 7,100-ton American tanker went down. Two hours later-near dawn on May 6-yet another ship loomed up, the 7,100-ton American tanker Halsey Halsey, northbound with a load of naphtha and fuel oil. Cremer fired two bow and one stern torpedo at her by eye. The two bow shots hit and Halsey Halsey exploded in a fireball and sank. exploded in a fireball and sank.

American ASW forces responded vigorously to this last sinking. First on the scene was PC-451 PC-451, a prewar Navy prototype, manned by the Coast Guard. The force of her depth charges slammed U-333 U-333 into the sand at sixty-six feet, froze her hydroplanes, and caused other external and internal damage. Then came sister ship into the sand at sixty-six feet, froze her hydroplanes, and caused other external and internal damage. Then came sister ship PC-450 PC-450 and the 125-foot Coast Guard cutter and the 125-foot Coast Guard cutter Vigilant Vigilant, and two other smaller Coast Guard patrol boats. But Cremer managed to outwit these attackers, clawing along the sandy bottom toward deep water-197 feet-his thrashing propeller noises drowned out by the errant depth-charge explosions.

After fifteen hours of brutal punishment and nerve-stretching tension, Cremer got away, or so he thought. An aircraft had followed U-333 U-333's leaking oil trail and had brought up the four-stack Dallas Dallas, en route from the Navy's sonar school in Key West to Charleston. But Dallas Dallas was not equal to the challenge. After dropping twenty-five 300-pound depth charges, she resumed her voyage, and by what the Germans deemed "a miracle," was not equal to the challenge. After dropping twenty-five 300-pound depth charges, she resumed her voyage, and by what the Germans deemed "a miracle," U-333 U-333 escaped, battered but undaunted. escaped, battered but undaunted.

Cremer was not finished. Limping home in the dark and rainy early morning hours of May 10, 500 miles east of Florida, he ran across the 5,200-ton British freighter Clan Skene Clan Skene sailing alone. He fired his last two bow torpedoes. Both hit and the ship went down. Upon hearing the full and amazing story of Cremer's patrol, Donitz awarded him a sailing alone. He fired his last two bow torpedoes. Both hit and the ship went down. Upon hearing the full and amazing story of Cremer's patrol, Donitz awarded him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Cremer's first patrol to America had ended with a court-martial, his second in a blaze of glory and publicity.*

Hans-Dieter Heinicke in U-576 U-576, making his second patrol to American waters, hit and sank a 5,100-ton bauxite freighter 400 miles east of Hatteras, then headed toward Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Passing northbound off New York, he shot at the Norwegian freighter Tropic Star. Tropic Star. One torpedo hit but failed to explode, and the lucky One torpedo hit but failed to explode, and the lucky Tropic Star Tropic Star sailed on. Off Cape Cod in the early hours of April 30, Heinicke found a formation of freighters, possibly a Boston-Halifax convoy. He fired his last torpedoes at four overlapping ships, hitting the 1,300-ton Norwegian sailed on. Off Cape Cod in the early hours of April 30, Heinicke found a formation of freighters, possibly a Boston-Halifax convoy. He fired his last torpedoes at four overlapping ships, hitting the 1,300-ton Norwegian Taborfjell Taborfjell, loaded with Cuban sugar. She sank. Three of her crew survived and were rescued by the British submarine P-552 P-552, one of the nine American submarines recently loaned to the Royal Navy.*

Later that day, April 30, Heinicke spotted the most impressive group of targets yet found in American waters. It was the American troop convoy AT 15, composed of seven transports, including Aquitania Aquitania, bound from New York to Argentia, Iceland, and Northern Ireland. Traveling at 12 knots, it was escorted by the battleship New York New York, the light cruiser Brooklyn Brooklyn, the new British "jeep" carrier Avenger Avenger (in transit), and fourteen destroyers, as well as air patrols. It was to join another troop convoy, NA 8, composed of four troopships sailing from Halifax on May 3, which increased the total number of troopships to eleven, with 19,000 troops embarked. (in transit), and fourteen destroyers, as well as air patrols. It was to join another troop convoy, NA 8, composed of four troopships sailing from Halifax on May 3, which increased the total number of troopships to eleven, with 19,000 troops embarked.

Having no torpedoes, Heinicke could only grind his teeth in frustration. After the formation had passed within firing range, he surfaced to shadow and report, but one of his diesels broke down. Consulting his plotting board, Donitz saw that there were four VIIs inbound to America within 600 to 1,000 miles of the convoy. Although he did not believe there was much hope of an interception, he felt obliged to try, in view of the valuable targets entailed. He directed the four boats to proceed at full speed and to form a patrol line, running due south from Cape Race, Newfoundland, and urged Heinicke in U-576 U-576 to make every possible effort to regain contact. to make every possible effort to regain contact.

After getting his diesel back on line, Heinicke did, in fact, regain contact, at about the time convoys AT 15 and NA 8 merged, on May 3. However, he reported "strong" air escort forced him off and down and thereafter he "lost" the convoy again. Acting on Heinicke's latest report, Donitz shifted the four-boat patrol line thirty miles north-closer to Cape Race-directly into the shallow fog-shrouded waters of the Grand Banks. However, none of the five boats found the convoy, and Donitz canceled the operation.

In all, the twenty VIIs that sailed to the Americas in March sank forty-six confirmed ships (twelve tankers) for about 242,000 tons, nearly a third of the total (thirteen ships for 71,000 tons) accounted for by two skippers, Erich Topp in U-552 U-552 (five tankers) and Hans Oestermann in (five tankers) and Hans Oestermann in U-754 U-754 (three tankers). It was a spectacular foray-the high point for the VIIs in American waters-but a close analysis by the U-boat staff revealed a disappointing trend. The average sinkings per patrol of the March group declined sharply from those of the VIIs of the February group: down from 3.2 ships for 18,651 tons to 2.3 ships for 12,097 tons. Moreover, contrary to many accounts-and the myths arising later-the first big refueling operation of VIIs had (three tankers). It was a spectacular foray-the high point for the VIIs in American waters-but a close analysis by the U-boat staff revealed a disappointing trend. The average sinkings per patrol of the March group declined sharply from those of the VIIs of the February group: down from 3.2 ships for 18,651 tons to 2.3 ships for 12,097 tons. Moreover, contrary to many accounts-and the myths arising later-the first big refueling operation of VIIs had not not resulted in increased sinkings. The eight VIIs of the March group that replenished sank an average of only 1.6 ships for 9,396 tons per patrol. Three refueled VIIs sank no ships: Schug in resulted in increased sinkings. The eight VIIs of the March group that replenished sank an average of only 1.6 ships for 9,396 tons per patrol. Three refueled VIIs sank no ships: Schug in U-86 U-86, Schulze in U-98 U-98, and Schulte in U-582 U-582.

Owing to the increase in average sinkings by the Type IXs, in aggregate the twenty-six boats of the March group almost exactly duplicated the aggregate sinkings of the twenty-six boats of the January group: seventy-five confirmed ships (twenty-five tankers) sunk for 406,046 tons. This was another severe blow to Allied shipping. However, when it is taken into account in this comparison that one January boat aborted, that eight others were manned by green skippers and crews, that all the January VIIs patrolled in the more heavily defended Canadian waters, that the weather was far less favorable, and that eight of the March boats refueled, it was less of a blow than might have been expected.

The failure of the more experienced boats of the March group to significantly exceed the aggregate returns of a like number of January boats was a certain indication that the provisional convoying measures and ASW in the Eastern Sea Frontier were beginning to take effect. The loss of Greger's U-85 U-85, the near losses of Hardegen's U-123 U-123 and of Cremer's and of Cremer's U-333 U-333, and the vigorous counterattack incurred by Zimmermann in U-136 U-136 during his assault on a Bucket Brigade convoy, were other indications. Since a steady improvement in ASW measures in the Eastern Sea Frontier was expected, Donitz and his staff drew plans to shift the weight of the U-boat campaign to the less well-guarded shipping lanes in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. during his assault on a Bucket Brigade convoy, were other indications. Since a steady improvement in ASW measures in the Eastern Sea Frontier was expected, Donitz and his staff drew plans to shift the weight of the U-boat campaign to the less well-guarded shipping lanes in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

PATROLS TO O OTHER W WATERS.

Had Hitler not unwisely insisted that about fifty U-boats be assigned to defend against a supposed invasion of Norway and to support Rommel's operations in North Africa, the U-boat campaign of 1942 in American waters doubtless would have been much more devastating than it was. As Donitz predicted, the U-boats diverted to those peripheral tasks achieved little. Several were lost. These operations, in brief: Arctic.

In compliance with Hitler's direct order to send more U-boats to the Arctic, between January and the end of March eighteen new Type VIIs went directly there from Germany, raising that force to about twenty-five boats.* Those operating in the Arctic waters were commanded by a rear admiral, Hubert Schmundt, who was advised by Jurgen Oesten. These boats based in Kirkenes and Narvik and returned often to Trondheim for refits and battle-damage repairs. Schmundt, Oesten, and other staff officers established headquarters aboard ships, first on the E-boat tender Those operating in the Arctic waters were commanded by a rear admiral, Hubert Schmundt, who was advised by Jurgen Oesten. These boats based in Kirkenes and Narvik and returned often to Trondheim for refits and battle-damage repairs. Schmundt, Oesten, and other staff officers established headquarters aboard ships, first on the E-boat tender Tanga Tanga in Kirkenes, then on the luxury yacht in Kirkenes, then on the luxury yacht Grille Grille (built for Hitler) in Narvik. (built for Hitler) in Narvik.

The Arctic boats had no luck whatsoever in the month of February. While they patrolled in the nearly twenty-four-hour darkness of the Arctic winter, convoys PQ 9, PQ 10, and PQ 11 (in all, about fifty merchant ships) arrived in Murmansk without any harm from U-boats. The opposite-sailing QP convoys likewise escaped attack by German forces.

When Tirpitz Tirpitz sailed March 6 on her futile first mission against convoys PQ 12 (sixteen ships) and QP 8 (fifteen ships), four U-boats based at Kirkenes deployed off Murmansk to intercept PQ ships that might escape sailed March 6 on her futile first mission against convoys PQ 12 (sixteen ships) and QP 8 (fifteen ships), four U-boats based at Kirkenes deployed off Murmansk to intercept PQ ships that might escape Tirpitz Tirpitz. Two other U-boats sailed from Narvik to directly support Tirpitz Tirpitz. One, Otto Kohler's new U-377 U-377, was mistakenly attacked by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, which claimed an "enemy submarine" sinking. When it was realized that the "enemy" was probably Kohler in U-377 U-377, the OKM, fearing the boat lost, upbraided the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, but U-377 U-377 was not seriously damaged. was not seriously damaged.

Patrolling close off Murmansk, Burkhard Hacklander in U-454 U-454, who had intercepted PQ 8 in January, also intercepted PQ 12. He sent beacons to call in the other three boats near Murmansk, but only Max-Martin Teichert in the new U-456 U-456 found him. Neither boat had success, and PQ 12 arrived without loss. In a biting critique to the OKM, Donitz pointed out that the boats had been placed too close to Murmansk; they needed much more sea room to operate against a PQ convoy. found him. Neither boat had success, and PQ 12 arrived without loss. In a biting critique to the OKM, Donitz pointed out that the boats had been placed too close to Murmansk; they needed much more sea room to operate against a PQ convoy.

The next Murmansk convoy, PQ 13, and its westbound counterpart, QP 9, sailed on March 20 and 21, respectively. A massive Arctic storm scattered the twenty ships of PQ 13 over thousands of square miles of ocean. As the various ships straggled into the Murmansk area, the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe sank two and three of the four U-boats sank one each: Friedrich-Karl Marks in sank two and three of the four U-boats sank one each: Friedrich-Karl Marks in U-376 U-376, Siegfried Strelow in U-435 U-435, and Max-Martin Teichert in U-456. U-456.

At this time, three Norway-based U-boats commanded by older but green skippers were lost. The British minesweeper Sharpshooter Sharpshooter, which was escorting the westbound convoy QP 9, came out of a snowstorm on March 24 and rammed and sank the U-655 U-655, commanded by Adolph Dumrese, age thirty-two, who was on his first war patrol. Sharpshooter Sharpshooter, which recovered "two lifebuoys and a canvas dinghy," reported: "Submarine turned upside down and sank stern first." There were no survivors. An escort of PQ 13, the British destroyer Fury Fury, was credited with sinking U-585 U-585, commanded by Bernhard Lohse, age twenty-nine, on March 29, but it was discovered after the war that U-585 U-585 did not attack PQ 13. Assigned to lay TBM mines (the Bantos field) off the Rybachi Peninsula, she may have been destroyed by one of her own mines. There were no survivors. En route to Norway, a new boat, did not attack PQ 13. Assigned to lay TBM mines (the Bantos field) off the Rybachi Peninsula, she may have been destroyed by one of her own mines. There were no survivors. En route to Norway, a new boat, U-702 U-702, commanded by Wolf-Rudigen von Rabenau, age thirty-four, struck a mine in the North Sea and sank with all hands.

The next Arctic convoys, PQ 14 and QP 10, sailed on April 8 and 10, respectively. Enlarged to twenty-four freighters, PQ 14 unexpectedly ran into drift ice which caused damage to numerous ships and forced sixteen of the twenty-four freighters and two minesweeper escorts back to Iceland. Eight freighters, including the convoy commander's flagship, the 7,000-ton British Empire Howard Empire Howard, pressed on to Murmansk. As the stragglers were approaching the Kola Inlet, Heinz-Ehlert Clausen, age thirty-two, in the new boat U-403 U-403, hit and sank Empire Howard Empire Howard with two torpedoes. Friedrich-Karl Marks, age twenty-seven, in another new boat, with two torpedoes. Friedrich-Karl Marks, age twenty-seven, in another new boat, U-376 U-376, fired three torpedoes at "a 10,000-ton cruiser," doubtless Edinburgh Edinburgh, and claimed hits for damage. But Edinburgh Edinburgh reached Murmansk unhurt, as did the other seven freighters. reached Murmansk unhurt, as did the other seven freighters. Luftwaffe Luftwaffe planes and U-boats hit the opposite-sailing QP 10, composed of sixteen empty freighters. The planes and U-boats hit the opposite-sailing QP 10, composed of sixteen empty freighters. The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe sanl two ships and severely damaged a third, the 5,800-ton Russian sanl two ships and severely damaged a third, the 5,800-ton Russian Kiev. Kiev. Siegfried Stelow in Siegfried Stelow in U-435 U-435 sank the sank the Kiev Kiev and a 6,000-ton Panamanian freighter, bringing total losses to QP 10 to four ships, and Strelow's total sinkings (from two convoys) to three ships for 18,252 tons, making him far and away the tonnage leader among the German skippers based in Norway. and a 6,000-ton Panamanian freighter, bringing total losses to QP 10 to four ships, and Strelow's total sinkings (from two convoys) to three ships for 18,252 tons, making him far and away the tonnage leader among the German skippers based in Norway.

In all, during February, March, and April 1942, the Arctic U-boat force sank merely five merchant ships for about 30,600 tons, plus the 250-ton British ASW trawler Sulla Sulla. In return, three U-boats were lost with all hands in the same period. Of course, no Allied invasion of Norway occurred.

Northwest Approaches.

Until the Norway-based U-boat force reached a permanent strength of about twenty-five boats, Donitz continued to maintain eight or more U-boats from the Atlantic force on patrol in the Northwest Approaches. In early February these boats, designated group Westwall Westwall, comprised four boats earmarked for permanent duty in Norway and four new boats en route to France to join the Atlantic force. As noted earlier, these boats attacked several convoys on the North Atlantic run.

The U-586 U-586, commanded by Dietrich von der Esch, age twenty-seven, who was merely three weeks into his first patrol, discovered convoy Outbound North (Slow) 63 on February 6. In response to his report, three other Westwall Westwall boats-all new-converged on his beacons: Heinrich Zimmermann in boats-all new-converged on his beacons: Heinrich Zimmermann in U-136 U-136, Amelung von Varendorff in the Type VIID (minelayer) U-213 U-213, and Hans-Jurgen Zetzsche, age twenty-six, in U-591 U-591. But Zetzsche was too low on fuel to chase, and before he could get in an attack he was forced to break off and head for Norway. Von der Esch reported that he fired a full bow salvo at a "cruiser," but the four torpedoes were "duds." He reloaded his bow tubes and then fired four more torpedoes at three escorts but, he reported, all missed.

The British escort of this convoy DFed these U-boat contact reports by Huff Duff. The ex-American four-stack destroyer Chelsea Chelsea and the corvette and the corvette Arbutus Arbutus, equipped with Type 271 centimetric radar, peeled off to run down a bearing. Arbutus Arbutus got a radar contact at 3,000 yards on one of the boats, Zimmermann's got a radar contact at 3,000 yards on one of the boats, Zimmermann's U-136. Arbutus U-136. Arbutus drove drove U-136 U-136 under and attacked with depth charges, but Zimmermann counterattacked with torpedoes and blew under and attacked with depth charges, but Zimmermann counterattacked with torpedoes and blew Arbutus Arbutus to pieces. Temporarily disabled by jammed steering gear, to pieces. Temporarily disabled by jammed steering gear, Chelsea Chelsea finally came up to assist. She saw a U-boat, probably finally came up to assist. She saw a U-boat, probably U-136 U-136, and opened fire with her guns, but the boat swung around and passed close down Chelsea Chelsea's port side, then dived. Chelsea Chelsea got a sonar contact and carried out four deliberate depth-charge attacks, but Zimmermann evaded and continued to shadow the convoy. got a sonar contact and carried out four deliberate depth-charge attacks, but Zimmermann evaded and continued to shadow the convoy.

Concerned that these green skippers might come to grief, Donitz called off the attack. En route to Norway for permanent duty, von der Esch in U-586 U-586 encountered the 9,100-ton Norwegian tanker encountered the 9,100-ton Norwegian tanker Anna Knudsen Anna Knudsen sailing alone. He fired his last three torpedoes at her, claiming a hit for damage, which was later confirmed. He then proceeded to Bergen, then onward to Narvik to operate against PQ convoys. sailing alone. He fired his last three torpedoes at her, claiming a hit for damage, which was later confirmed. He then proceeded to Bergen, then onward to Narvik to operate against PQ convoys.

Also en route to Bergen and low on fuel, Zetzsche in U-597 U-597 found a group of targets on February 10. It was Slow Convoy 67, composed of twenty-two ships, thinly escorted by six Canadian corvettes that were pioneering Admiral King's new "straight through" escort scheme-a nonstop voyage from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Londonderry, Northern Ireland ("Newfie to Derry" as the sailors put it). In response to Zetzsche's report-and aware of his low fuel situation-Donitz authorized him to attack. Zetzsche shot all of his internal torpedoes at three ships; one 4,000-ton Norwegian freighter sank. found a group of targets on February 10. It was Slow Convoy 67, composed of twenty-two ships, thinly escorted by six Canadian corvettes that were pioneering Admiral King's new "straight through" escort scheme-a nonstop voyage from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Londonderry, Northern Ireland ("Newfie to Derry" as the sailors put it). In response to Zetzsche's report-and aware of his low fuel situation-Donitz authorized him to attack. Zetzsche shot all of his internal torpedoes at three ships; one 4,000-ton Norwegian freighter sank.

Zimmermann in U-136 U-136 came up on Zetzsche's beacons. Shortly before midnight, he fired a bow salvo at a cargo ship and one of the escorts. He apparently missed the cargo ship, but one or more torpedoes hit the Canadian corvette came up on Zetzsche's beacons. Shortly before midnight, he fired a bow salvo at a cargo ship and one of the escorts. He apparently missed the cargo ship, but one or more torpedoes hit the Canadian corvette Spikenard Spikenard, which blew up and went down slowly-the second corvette (after Arbutus Arbutus) sunk by Zimmermann within five days. No immediate effort was-or could be-mounted to look for Spikenard Spikenard survivors. The next day at 11:00 survivors. The next day at 11:00 A.M. A.M., a British corvette, Gentian Gentian, found eight Spikenard Spikenard crewmen on a raft. No others were ever found. The other twenty-one ships and the five corvettes of Slow Convoy 67 reached port safely. crewmen on a raft. No others were ever found. The other twenty-one ships and the five corvettes of Slow Convoy 67 reached port safely.

Continuing his patrol in the vicinity of Rockall Bank, Zimmermann in U-136 U-136 had further success. On February 16, he sank a straggler from convoy Halifax 174, the 6,900-ton British motorship had further success. On February 16, he sank a straggler from convoy Halifax 174, the 6,900-ton British motorship Empire Comet. Empire Comet. Three days later he found the big, fast, heavily escorted convoy Halifax 175. It was his report that brought up Kolle in the new, Americas-bound Type IXC Three days later he found the big, fast, heavily escorted convoy Halifax 175. It was his report that brought up Kolle in the new, Americas-bound Type IXC U-154 U-154, who, as related, shot all fourteen internal torpedoes to no effect, owing to a defective torpedo-data computer. Zimmermann also had a frustrating experience: his last two torpedoes failed or missed. Two other Westwall Westwall boats, von Varendorff's Type VIID (minelayer) boats, von Varendorff's Type VIID (minelayer) U-273 U-273 and Karl-Ernst Schroeter's and Karl-Ernst Schroeter's U-752 U-752, also responded, but by then the convoy was nearing the British Isles and Coastal Command aircraft frustrated their attacks. Schroeter reported two hits on a big tanker-as well as two misses-but his hits could not be confirmed.

Altogether, group Westwall Westwall and the Americas-bound boats had come upon a half dozen east- or westbound North Atlantic convoys in February. Donitz logged that the increasing frequency of North Atlantic convoy contacts was "surprising." Six months earlier he and others at Kerneval had suspected that the British might be reading naval Enigma and had demanded an investigation. Yet no one at Kerneval detected any relationship between the increasing convoy contacts and the changeover to four-rotor Enigma. and the Americas-bound boats had come upon a half dozen east- or westbound North Atlantic convoys in February. Donitz logged that the increasing frequency of North Atlantic convoy contacts was "surprising." Six months earlier he and others at Kerneval had suspected that the British might be reading naval Enigma and had demanded an investigation. Yet no one at Kerneval detected any relationship between the increasing convoy contacts and the changeover to four-rotor Enigma.

In order to maintain the eight boats of the Westwall Westwall group on station in the Northwest Approaches during March, Donitz was compelled to provide six boats from France that had been scheduled to sail to the Americas in late February. Inasmuch as four of the six-Berger in group on station in the Northwest Approaches during March, Donitz was compelled to provide six boats from France that had been scheduled to sail to the Americas in late February. Inasmuch as four of the six-Berger in U-87 U-87, Praetorius in U-135 U-135, Thurmann in U-553 U-553, and Degen in U-701 U-701-had patrolled to the Americas in the first wave and were familiar with that distant territory, the diversion to Westwall Westwall was frustrating not only to Donitz but also to the skippers and crews. was frustrating not only to Donitz but also to the skippers and crews.

Only four of the eight Westwall Westwall boats had contact with the enemy in the month of March, and the results were slight. On March 1, in foul weather, Praetorius in boats had contact with the enemy in the month of March, and the results were slight. On March 1, in foul weather, Praetorius in U-135 U-135 found an Outbound North convoy 240 miles west of the Hebrides. He shot four torpedoes but all missed. Five other found an Outbound North convoy 240 miles west of the Hebrides. He shot four torpedoes but all missed. Five other Westwall Westwall boats attempted to home on Praetorius's beacons, but the bad weather defeated them. A few days later von Varendorff in the Type VIID (minelayer) boats attempted to home on Praetorius's beacons, but the bad weather defeated them. A few days later von Varendorff in the Type VIID (minelayer) U-213 U-213 came upon a large ship escorted by two destroyers, but owing to the heavy weather he was unable to attack. came upon a large ship escorted by two destroyers, but owing to the heavy weather he was unable to attack.

Conducting an exceptionally bold patrol close to the dangerous south coast of Iceland, during a six-day period, March 6 to March 11, Degen in U-701 U-701 attacked five different ships and patrol craft, firing seven torpedoes. He claimed sinking one cargo ship and three patrol craft for 4,100 tons, but the postwar records credited only one 272-ton fishing trawler and two 500-ton British ASW trawlers, attacked five different ships and patrol craft, firing seven torpedoes. He claimed sinking one cargo ship and three patrol craft for 4,100 tons, but the postwar records credited only one 272-ton fishing trawler and two 500-ton British ASW trawlers, Notts Country Notts Country and and Stella Capella Stella Capella.

Gerd Kelbling, age twenty-six, in the new U-593 U-593, merely ten days out from Germany, found a convoy, but owing to the freeze-up on the Baltic, the boat had had scant tactical training. Donitz therefore ordered Kelbling to attack only in darkness and only if the circumstances were completely favorable. Air and surface escorts thwarted his attack.*

During the abortive sortie of the Tirpitz Tirpitz against the Murmansk convoy PQ 12, March 6 to 11, the OKM placed the eight boats of the against the Murmansk convoy PQ 12, March 6 to 11, the OKM placed the eight boats of the Westwall Westwall group under control of the admiral commanding group North, to support and protect group under control of the admiral commanding group North, to support and protect Tirpitz Tirpitz. Four experienced boats, designated group York York, were to hunt aggressively for Home Fleet units that might sortie to intercept Tirpitz Tirpitz. The other four less experienced boats were to play supporting roles, but upon a request from Donitz, these four were returned to Kerneval's control, and were replaced by four new boats sailing from Germany. Neither group York York nor the four boats released to Kerneval found any targets. At Donitz's suggestion, beginning on March 25, the four new boats from Germany commenced replacing group nor the four boats released to Kerneval found any targets. At Donitz's suggestion, beginning on March 25, the four new boats from Germany commenced replacing group York York, which also returned to Kerneval's control. The eight new boats that replaced Westwall Westwall were to remain permanently based in Norway. were to remain permanently based in Norway.

The OKM directed that the four boats of group York York, inbound to France, detour through the Denmark Strait to scout for Home Fleet or American capital ships. Since the York York boats were low on fuel, Donitz could not comply. Rather, he assigned that task to a new Type VII, boats were low on fuel, Donitz could not comply. Rather, he assigned that task to a new Type VII, U-252 U-252, commanded by Kai Lerchen, age thirty-one, which sailed from Germany March 26 on a special mission (Dana) to land a German agent on Iceland. After landing the agent, Lerchen reconnoitered the Denmark Strait, where he sank a 1,400-ton Norwegian freighter. Inbound to France on April 14, he ran into a convoy and reported. Since Lerchen also had had scant tactical training, Donitz authorized him to attack only at night under favorable conditions. After landing the agent, Lerchen reconnoitered the Denmark Strait, where he sank a 1,400-ton Norwegian freighter. Inbound to France on April 14, he ran into a convoy and reported. Since Lerchen also had had scant tactical training, Donitz authorized him to attack only at night under favorable conditions.