What Roosevelt intended to convey was that "his" Navy insisted that anything less than a fleet destroyer was inadequate to serve as a convoy escort. Of course, this was not true. As related, the Navy's General Board in 1939, on which King served, recommended the construction of a 1,200-ton destroyer escort (or British frigate) for convoy escort, and in early 1941, the Bureau of Ships had produced plans for such a vessel. In spite of repeated recommendations from Stark and Navy secretaries Edison and Knox, Roosevelt had at first disapproved this vessel, then relegated it to tenth priority while granting the inadequate little SCs and PCs highest priority. The General Board's recommendation in 1939 that the Navy acquire 2,200-ton Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutters was merely an emergency measure, which the Navy itself had disapproved.*

Doubtless smarting from Roosevelt's swipe at the Navy and what could be viewed as groveling to the British, Admiral King jumped into this high-level exchange with both feet. Over Roosevelt's signature, he sent Churchill a testy and taunting cable on March 19, which Churchill thought showed "a touch of strain": Your interest in steps to be taken to combat the Atlantic submarine menace ... impels me to request your particular consideration of heavy attacks on submarine bases and building and repair yards thus checking submarine activities at their source and where submarines perforce congregate.

In response, Churchill replied the next day, March 20: The highest importance is attached by us to bombing U-boat construction yards and bases and they will play a leading part in our spring bombing offensive. All is in readiness for this, including a vastly improved method of finding our way to the target.... We have been only held back by weather, which is the worst experienced for bombing purposes in fifteen years.... No chance will be lost. We are also studying the attack by long range aircraft upon U-boats coming from Bordeaux to the Caribbean. It is a question of competing claims.

In a communication to Roosevelt on March 29, Churchill expanded on British bombing plans. The RAF was now "emphasizing" attacks on "U-boat nests" in order to "cope with future U-boat hatchings." Two hundred and fifty RAF bombers had struck Luibeck the previous night, with "best ever" results. Coastal Command was gearing up to mount "a day and night patrol" over the Bay of Biscay to harass and delay and kill U-boats outbound from and inbound to the bases in France, thereby reducing pressure on the American seaboard. For that purpose Churchill favored an Admiralty request that four (and later six) squadrons of twin-engine Wellington and Whitley bombers be transferred from Bomber Command to Coastal Command. In recompense, Churchill pleaded for an increase in the buildup of American bomber forces in the British Isles, "even a hundred American heavy bombers" to augment Bomber Command.

In most accounts of Drumbeat and the continuing U-boat campaign in American waters, the impression is given that King would not-or could not-initiate coastal convoying until about May 15. This is not the case. On March 20, King or-dered that several coastal-convoy routes be initiated "at once" even though "escort for a time will be meager." These were: that several coastal-convoy routes be initiated "at once" even though "escort for a time will be meager." These were: * A three-legged ocean network from Trinidad to a MOMP near Bermuda, thence to Halifax. The ships were to sail every fourteen days. A few American destroyers and Canadian corvettes were to serve as escorts.

* An inshore-coastal network from Boston to Halifax and vice versa.* A few American destroyers and Canadian corvettes were to serve as escorts. When this had been established, ships of Outbound North convoys were no longer to disperse offshore but were to continue in convoy to Halifax, thence in the new coastal convoys to Boston, New York, and southward. A few American destroyers and Canadian corvettes were to serve as escorts. When this had been established, ships of Outbound North convoys were no longer to disperse offshore but were to continue in convoy to Halifax, thence in the new coastal convoys to Boston, New York, and southward.

When he received these orders, Ingersoll must have blinked. The following day, March 21, he tactfully reminded King of the many tasks to which his existing overworked destroyers had already been assigned. These still included: escort of cargo convoys on the North Atlantic run; escort of AT and NA troopship and AS high-priority cargo convoys; escort of monthly convoys from New Orleans to the Caribbean and Charleston to Bermuda. In addition, there were a number of "special tasks" right at hand or just ahead in April: * Escort of the repaired British fleet carrier Furious Furious and new "jeep" carriers and new "jeep" carriers Archer Archer and and Avenger Avenger (in transit) from American ports to EASTOMP. (in transit) from American ports to EASTOMP.

* Escort of combined troop convoys AT 14 and NA 7, April 7 to April 18. This was comprised of seven troopships guarded by Task Force 37: the cruiser Philadelphia Philadelphia and ten American destroyers. and ten American destroyers.

* Escort of Pacific-bound convoy BT 202, from East Coast ports to Panama, April 10 to April 17. This was comprised of seventeen troopships guarded by Task Force 38: the battleship Texas Texas, cruiser Brooklyn Brooklyn, and eleven American destroyers.

* Escort of Task Force 36, Ranger Ranger on an aircraft-ferry mission to Ghana, for which five American destroyers were required. on an aircraft-ferry mission to Ghana, for which five American destroyers were required.

* Deployment for an indefinite period at Argentia on April 23 of a special "heavy strike force" to counter a possible sortie of Tirpitz Tirpitz, et al., into the Atlantic. This force was to consist of one new battleship (North Carolina, later South Dakota South Dakota), one fleet carrier (Ranger, later Wasp Wasp), two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four or five American destroyers.

* Escort of combined troop convoys AT 15 and NA 8, April 30 to May 12. This was comprised of thirteen troopships guarded by Task Force 38: the battleship New York New York, cruiser Brooklyn Brooklyn, and fourteen American destroyers.

To meet all these and other commitments, Ingersoll urged: * That the layover in Londonderry of American destroyers assigned to AT and the returning TA convoys, then working on a five- to six-week cycle, be shortened.

* That the escorts to be released for other tasks by opening out the North Atlantic convoy cycle to seven days be American ships.

* That the British and Canadians provide their "agreed quota" of vessels for each of the five American MOEF groups.

At about this same time, King and Andrews also initiated an informal system of coastal convoying between Florida and Norfolk and between Norfolk and New York-Boston. Under this makeshift system, known as the "Bucket Brigade," ships zigzagged north and south in lanes very close along the coast only in daylight on prescribed legs. At night they put into ports or man-made anchorages, protected by antisubmarine nets and mines. Wherever necessary-and possible-Andrews provided local escort from his slowly growing forces, which on April 1 consisted of the following:

20.

SCs, PCs, etc. (93' to 173') SCs, PCs, etc. (93' to 173')

60.

Coast Guard cutters (75' to 165') Coast Guard cutters (75' to 165')

14.

British trawlers (170') British trawlers (170')

82.

Navy aircraft (14 Catalinas) Navy aircraft (14 Catalinas)*

4.

blimps blimps 89 to 100 Army aircraft Army aircraft

As the Bucket Brigade evolved, a northbound ship hugging the coast might travel in four daylight legs as follows: Key West to Jacksonville, thence Jacksonville to Charleston, thence Charleston to Cape Fear or Cape Lookout, thence Cape Fear or Cape Lookout to Norfolk.

Andrews deployed the bulk of his ASW forces in the dangerous Cape Hatteras area on the leg between Cape Lookout and Norfolk. Northbound ships usually gathered at Cape Lookout. From there, they sailed in informal convoys in daytime around Cape Hatteras, usually escorted by four small warships as well as aircraft. One (slow) warship led the convoy; three (fast) escorts patrolled to seaward and to the rear of the formation. Navy aircraft, such as scout planes, patrolled over the formation.

At Norfolk-or more precisely, Hampton Roads-northbound ships could choose to proceed via the safe "inland" Chesapeake Bay to Baltimore and other ports. Remaining on this inland route, those ships could go farther north yet via the nineteen-mile Chesapeake and Delaware Canal to Delaware Bay, thence to Wilmington and Philadelphia and Camden. Alternatively, a northbound ship might take the shallow-water "outside" lanes close to shore from Norfolk to Delaware Bay and/or to New Jersey ports and New York. From New York, northbound ships might cruise the "inland" route via Long Island Sound, Block Island Sound, and Rhode Island Sound to Buzzard's Bay, thence through the eight-mile Cape Cod Canal to Cape Cod Bay and Boston, Portland (Maine), and other points north. to Delaware Bay, thence to Wilmington and Philadelphia and Camden. Alternatively, a northbound ship might take the shallow-water "outside" lanes close to shore from Norfolk to Delaware Bay and/or to New Jersey ports and New York. From New York, northbound ships might cruise the "inland" route via Long Island Sound, Block Island Sound, and Rhode Island Sound to Buzzard's Bay, thence through the eight-mile Cape Cod Canal to Cape Cod Bay and Boston, Portland (Maine), and other points north.

While the American Navy was putting into place these measures to protect merchant shipping, Admiral King continued to insist that highest priority be given to the protection of troopship convoys. By April, the sailings of AT convoys from the States and NA convoys from Canada (often merged) had been regularized. However, King was still concerned over what he viewed as the inadequate protection provided AT and NA convoys by the Royal Navy from EASTOMP to the British Isles. In response to King's complaints about inadequacy, on April 4 the Admiralty suggested that the American Navy assume full responsibility for the escort of the AT and NA troopship convoys all the way across the Atlantic. On April 9, King agreed to this suggestion.* As a result, fewer American destroyers became available for coastal-convoy duty on the Eastern Seaboard than originally foreseen, further delaying the initiation of that network. As a result, fewer American destroyers became available for coastal-convoy duty on the Eastern Seaboard than originally foreseen, further delaying the initiation of that network.

Throughout the convoy controversy in February and March, Admiral King vigorously sought to rectify the absurd policy whereby the Army Air Forces retained primary responsibility for providing land-based air patrols against U-boats. On March 26, King won a partial victory. In a dense, legalistic document, signed by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the latter agreed to transfer temporarily operational control of the 1st Bomber Command, now commanded by Westside T. Larson, to Admiral Andrews of the Eastern Sea Frontier. By April 1, Andrews directly controlled and coordinated 170 fixed-wing aircraft (eighty-two Navy, eighty-eight Army), based at eighteen East Coast fields, plus four blimps and a small but growing-and dedicated-volunteer Civil Air Patrol, flying unarmed spotter aircraft out of two airfields in New Jersey and Delaware. By April 1, Andrews directly controlled and coordinated 170 fixed-wing aircraft (eighty-two Navy, eighty-eight Army), based at eighteen East Coast fields, plus four blimps and a small but growing-and dedicated-volunteer Civil Air Patrol, flying unarmed spotter aircraft out of two airfields in New Jersey and Delaware.

The agreement did not, however, foreclose the Army's role in ASW. To the contrary, the Army Air Forces specifically and explicitly retained long-term overall responsibility for carrying out land-based air attacks on U-boats. Despite the British experience-the poor kill-rates of Coastal Command aircraft in hunterkiller roles-the airmen were convinced that the best way to succeed in that mission was by offensive offensive air patrols. Accordingly, at Langley Field, Virginia, the airmen activated a Sea Search Attack Group, reinforced by an R&D outfit, the Search Attack Development Unit. Commanded by William C. Dolan and equipped with Douglas B-18 Bolo bombers fitted with hand-built centimetric-wavelength radar sets and other ASW devices (floating flares, sonobuoys, etc.), the Sea Search Attack Group commenced experimental offensive ASW patrols on the East Coast, independent of and overlapping the patrols of the 1st Bomber Command. air patrols. Accordingly, at Langley Field, Virginia, the airmen activated a Sea Search Attack Group, reinforced by an R&D outfit, the Search Attack Development Unit. Commanded by William C. Dolan and equipped with Douglas B-18 Bolo bombers fitted with hand-built centimetric-wavelength radar sets and other ASW devices (floating flares, sonobuoys, etc.), the Sea Search Attack Group commenced experimental offensive ASW patrols on the East Coast, independent of and overlapping the patrols of the 1st Bomber Command.

GLOBAL N NAVAL C CHALLENGES.

Most accounts of the German U-boat campaign in American waters in the spring of 1942 describe that operation in isolation. This depiction leads invariably to an absurdly incomplete and even distorted picture of American counteractions.

When the U-boat campaign off the United States East Coast reached its peak in April 1942, the following major naval operations were in progress or afoot worldwide.

The Japanese in the Indian Ocean.

In the first week of April, powerful Japanese naval and amphibious forces sailed from Malaysia into the Bay of Bengal. A covering force of five carriers, four battleships, and supporting vessels challenged the newly arrived but weak British Eastern Fleet (three carriers, five old battleships) based at Ceylon. The Japanese sank the old, small carrier Hermes Hermes, the cruisers Cornwall Cornwall and and Dorsetshire Dorsetshire, the destroyers Tenedos Tenedos and and Vampire Vampire, the corvette Hollyhock Hollyhock, and two fleet tankers, and forced the British Eastern Fleet to retreat 3,000 miles west to Kilindini, Kenya (near Mombasa) on the east coast of Africa. During this foray, various Japanese warships and aircraft sank in addition twenty-three British-controlled merchant ships for about 112,000 tons and damaged others. Japanese submarines sank another half dozen merchant ships. Japanese amphibious forces landed at Rangoon, Burma, and on the Andaman Islands, posing a threat to India.

Churchill sent a series of urgent appeals to Roosevelt for assistance in this theater. Among other proposals he suggested that the carrier Ranger Ranger and battleship and battleship North Carolina North Carolina of the Atlantic Fleet might join the British Eastern Fleet or, alternately, that of the Atlantic Fleet might join the British Eastern Fleet or, alternately, that North Carolina North Carolina join the battleship join the battleship Washington Washington on anti- on anti-Tirpitz duty in Scapa Flow, thereby releasing the battleship duty in Scapa Flow, thereby releasing the battleship Duke of York Duke of York to join the Eastern Fleet. Admiral King rejected these proposals, suggesting instead that American heavy bombers be rushed to the Indian Ocean area. to join the Eastern Fleet. Admiral King rejected these proposals, suggesting instead that American heavy bombers be rushed to the Indian Ocean area.

Churchill also proposed that the American Pacific Fleet consider making a threatening gesture of some kind which might draw these Japanese naval forces back from the Bay of Bengal into the Pacific. Unknown to Churchill, at that time the American carriers Hornet Hornet and and Enterprise Enterprise, plus support forces, were boldly approaching the Japanese home islands to launch the "Doolittle raid," which, by uncanny coincidence, was exactly the kind of naval action Churchill sought to relieve pressures in the Indian Ocean. Although the Japanese naval forces withdrew from the Bay of Bengal a few days before the Doolittle raid was carried out April 18, the raid, too often casually dismissed as a stunt, was to profoundly influence the course of the Pacific war in the two months ahead.

The British in Madagascar.

At about this same time, British naval and amphibious forces massed in Cape Town and Durban, South Africa, to invade Vichy Madagascar, thereby denying the Japanese the possibility of a collaborative occupation, a la Indochina. As related, it was this operation (Ironclad) that drew important forces from the British Force H at Gibraltar, forcing a dilution of the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow to reinforce Force H at Gibraltar and the transfer of American Task Force 39 (99) (carrier Wasp Wasp, battleship Washington Washington, etc.) to Scapa Flow to reinforce the Home Fleet on anti-Tirpitz duty. duty.

The lead ships of the British invasion force sailed from Durban to Madagascar on April 25. Elements of the British Eastern Fleet sailed from Kilindini in support. The British hoped that Vichy French forces on Madagascar would not oppose the landing, which took place on May 5, but the French mounted a spirited defense for several days before they were overwhelmed.

To speed up augmentation of Allied airpower in the Indian Ocean area, Churchill urgently requested that Roosevelt ferry fighter planes to West Africa. When Roosevelt acceded to this request, King assigned the task to the carrier Ranger. Ranger. Loaded with sixty-eight Curtiss P-40 Warhawk aircraft, Loaded with sixty-eight Curtiss P-40 Warhawk aircraft, Ranger Ranger sailed from Rhode Island on April 22, escorted by the cruiser sailed from Rhode Island on April 22, escorted by the cruiser Augusta Augusta and five destroyers. and five destroyers.* The aircraft flew off The aircraft flew off Ranger Ranger on May 10, landing at Accra, Ghana (on the Gold Coast). From there, they flew on to India. on May 10, landing at Accra, Ghana (on the Gold Coast). From there, they flew on to India. Ranger Ranger and escorts returned to the United States. and escorts returned to the United States.

It is customary for historians-especially British historians-to portray Admiral King at this time as fixated on Pacific operations to the neglect of the U-boat war in the Atlantic. However, these same historians invariably fail to note the British fixation on Indian Ocean operations at this time and the consequent drain of Allied naval assets from the Atlantic.

Malta.

The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean Basin supporting Rommel's in the Mediterranean Basin supporting Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps launched a series of brutal bombing raids on the British island of Malta at this time, viewed by many Allied war planners as a prelude to an airborne invasion. Believing Malta to be a strategic and psychological asset of incalculable value, Churchill insisted that heroic measures be made to deny it to the Germans, assuring the Maltese that "the Navy will never abandon Malta." launched a series of brutal bombing raids on the British island of Malta at this time, viewed by many Allied war planners as a prelude to an airborne invasion. Believing Malta to be a strategic and psychological asset of incalculable value, Churchill insisted that heroic measures be made to deny it to the Germans, assuring the Maltese that "the Navy will never abandon Malta."

The defense of Malta thus became another heavy drain on Allied naval assets in the Atlantic. The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe and Italian air and naval forces inflicted severe damage on British convoys attempting to fight through to the island. To reinforce the thin British air forces on Malta, Churchill asked Roosevelt on March 31 if the carrier and Italian air and naval forces inflicted severe damage on British convoys attempting to fight through to the island. To reinforce the thin British air forces on Malta, Churchill asked Roosevelt on March 31 if the carrier Wasp Wasp, en route to Scapa Flow in Task Force 39 (99), could fly off Spitfires for Malta. Although Admiral King was not keen to risk a new fleet carrier in this graveyard of warships, in due course he relented and in due course he relented and Wasp Wasp took on forty-seven Spitfires in the Firth of Clyde and sailed to the Mediterranean on April 14. took on forty-seven Spitfires in the Firth of Clyde and sailed to the Mediterranean on April 14.

Escorted by the battle cruiser Renown Renown, cruisers Charybdis Charybdis and and Cairo Cairo, and a flock of destroyers, including the American Lang Lang and and Madison, Wasp Madison, Wasp slipped through the Gibraltar Strait unseen and launched the Spitfires on April 20. In the first week of May, slipped through the Gibraltar Strait unseen and launched the Spitfires on April 20. In the first week of May, Wasp Wasp, with American destroyers Lang Lang and and Sterett Sterett, made a second trip from the Clyde to the Mediterranean in company with the British carrier Eagle Eagle and escorts. On May 9, and escorts. On May 9, Wasp Wasp flew off another forty-seven Spitfires to Malta. flew off another forty-seven Spitfires to Malta.

The Murmansk Run.

In response to a direct order from Hitler, Tirpitz Tirpitz, the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, the heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper, supporting destroyers, and the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe threatened Allied PQ and QP convoys en route from Iceland to Murmansk and return. threatened Allied PQ and QP convoys en route from Iceland to Murmansk and return. Tirpitz Tirpitz made one sortie in March-her first combat mission-but it was a complete failure. However, owing to her presence and that of made one sortie in March-her first combat mission-but it was a complete failure. However, owing to her presence and that of Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer and and Hipper Hipper, the British were compelled to sail heavy ships of the Home Fleet to provide cover for the Murmansk convoys.

As the periods of daylight in the Arctic became longer in April, the risk of German attacks on Murmansk convoys increased. This seasonal factor led Admiral Pound to suggest to the War Cabinet that the Murmansk convoys might not be worth the risk. But in view of the impending German spring offensive against the Red Army, Roosevelt insisted it was not only impolitic but also dangerous to suspend the Murmansk convoys. He not only refused to consider a suspension but also demanded that the Admiralty increase the size and frequency of Murmansk convoys to clear out 107 merchant ships loading or loaded for Murmansk, which were backing up in Iceland and elsewhere.

Reflecting the views of the Admiralty, Churchill parried. The Murmansk run had cost the Royal Navy the cruisers Trinidad Trinidad, damaged, and Edinburgh Edinburgh, sunk.* Besides that, the battleship Besides that, the battleship King George V King George V of the Home Fleet had been damaged in a horrendous collision with the destroyer of the Home Fleet had been damaged in a horrendous collision with the destroyer Punjabi Punjabi, which broke in half and sank. The battleship had to have extensive repairs before she could again provide cover for a Murmansk convoy, The best Churchill could promise was the sailing of three PQ convoys of twenty-five to thirty-five ships every two months. Based on this lukewarm projection, Roosevelt and King rightly concluded that to keep promises made to Stalin, ships of the American task force temporarily at Scapa Flow would have to be assigned to escort Murmansk convoys. Not without reason, King began to suspect that the goal of the Admiralty was to pull American naval assets ever deeper into the multifarious British naval schemes, however ill-advised those schemes (such as Madagascar and Malta) seemed to the Americans. The best Churchill could promise was the sailing of three PQ convoys of twenty-five to thirty-five ships every two months. Based on this lukewarm projection, Roosevelt and King rightly concluded that to keep promises made to Stalin, ships of the American task force temporarily at Scapa Flow would have to be assigned to escort Murmansk convoys. Not without reason, King began to suspect that the goal of the Admiralty was to pull American naval assets ever deeper into the multifarious British naval schemes, however ill-advised those schemes (such as Madagascar and Malta) seemed to the Americans.

Sledgehammer.

Uppermost on the American list of naval operations-or possible operations-in early April was Sledgehammer, the emergency invasion of Occupied France, should the Red Army collapse under the weight of the German spring offensive. On April 8, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Harry Hopkins arrived by air in London to obtain British approval for Sledgehammer in 1942 and to discuss the larger alternative, Roundup, in 1943.

Owing to the impending Doolittle air raid on Japan and to cryptographic intelligence that indicated another big-perhaps even decisive-naval battle brewing in the Pacific, King remained in Washington. However, it bears repeating that King fully approved of Sledgehammer (and Roundup) in part as a means of evicting German U-boats from French bases and in part to curb what he viewed as the British peripheral operations in the Mediterranean Basin and Indian Ocean, and to keep the Admiralty focused to the greatest extent possible on operations the Americans believed to be most likely to lead to an early defeat of Germany.

The British opposed both Sledgehammer and Roundup but deliberately and deceptively gave Marshall and Hopkins the impression that they approved Roundup so that the Americans would not abandon the campaign against Germany and go all-out after Japan. In fact, what the British sought was a revival of the canceled Gymnast, the invasion of Vichy French Northwest Africa, to trap Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps between Gymnast forces and the British Eighth Army. between Gymnast forces and the British Eighth Army.

While Marshall and Hopkins were in London, Churchill and First Sea Lord Pound repeatedly drew attention to the heavy Allied shipping losses to U-boats on the United States Eastern Seaboard, and continued to insist that the Americans initiate convoying in that area. Doubtless Marshall agreed with that line-it was the American Army line as well-and perhaps he influenced Hopkins, who on April 14 cabled President Roosevelt to urge that coastal convoying be initiated. In part, Hopkins said: Shipping losses in western North Atlantic during period January 12th to April 12th of United Nations tonnage are 1,200,000 gross tons. During the past week we have lost in the same area 150,000 tons of which 106,000 tons were tankers. It seems to me that the ships we are losing are in the main far more important than the cargoes. We are going to need all of these ships desperately in the next few months.British are agreeable to reducing stocks [i.e., imports] to make sure that ships are not sunk and it seems to me that we should be able to do the same thing. In other words, unless the cargoes are absolutely essential the ships should not be permitted to sail until our new [convoy] scheme comes into operation next month. I doubt very much that anything short of convoy is going to do this job and risking further ships without reasonably sure protection is the wrong policy. I should feel somewhat differently about this if every cargo was absolutely essential to the war effort during the next few weeks, but if the British can give up cargoes temporarily, I am sure we can....I cannot impress upon you too strongly the concern which all here [in London] have in regard to this matter. This is only natural because this island is so dependent on imports and they realize full well the significance of these sinkings to the future of the war. I need not dwell on the importance of every possible ship to us during the coming months. I had planned to postpone a discussion of this until I could see you, but the matter seems to me to be of such urgency that I decided to take it [up] by cable.

Doubtless this provocative cable dismayed King, who was at that very time doing everything in his power, to meet the other multifarious British naval requests and to initiate convoying in the Eastern Sea Frontier. Moreover, as he cabled Hopkins (for delivery to Churchill) on April 16, King had already decided to suspend tanker sailings: Conference of representatives of agencies concerned have reached decision to lay up tankers operating on Atlantic coast for a period, depending upon availability of more protection. Opportunity will be taken to arm ships as rapidly as possible. Action on dry cargo ships under consideration....

From that day, April 16, to April 29, a period of two weeks, all tankers under American control in the Western Hemisphere remained in ports. On April 18, the British likewise suspended tanker sailings in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean, but after a change in routing plans resumed sailings six days later, April 23. Under the new routing plans, British-controlled tankers were to sail to Trinidad, thence due east across the Atlantic to Freetown, and from that place to the British Isles in Sierra Leone convoys.

In a separate message to Roosevelt, Churchill expressed delight and satisfaction over his meetings with Marshall, Hopkins, and others, and regret that Admiral King had not come over as well. "We have established the most intimate contacts with the United States Army and Air Force [sic] but as Harry will tell you, we are not nearly so closely linked up on the Naval side. Yet all depends on this being successfully handled in unison. I am therefore sending the First Sea Lord [Pound] back with General Marshall and Harry in order that he may discuss with you and Admiral King the whole position and make long-term plans...."

The American party and First Sea Lord Pound departed the British Isles by air on April 18. Pound remained in Washington for a week, April 20 to April 26, conferring with Roosevelt, King, and others on the many naval matters on the agenda.

Pound and others in the British naval party found Admiral King and his senior aides preoccupied with the Pacific. British historians and writers depict this preoccupation as some sort of chicanery or disloyalty or, in view of the U-boat threat in the Atlantic, scandalous stupidity.

In fact, King had every justification for being preoccupied with the Pacific that week. Allied codebreakers, who had partially broken back into the latest variation of the Japanese naval code, JN 25, had picked up clues which indicated that the Japanese might be planning an amphibious attack in "late April" on Port Moresby, New Guinea, and/or the islands of New Caledonia and Fiji. The capture of Port Moresby would provide the Japanese an ideal staging base for an invasion of Australia, which had been designated as the main Allied stronghold in the southwest Pacific. The capture of New Caledonia and/or Fiji would put the Japanese in position to cut the Allied line of communication to Australia, which, under terms of the Arcadia conference, the Americans were pledged to keep open. Beyond that, on April 18, American naval codebreakers had found hints in the partially decrypted radio traffic that the Japanese might be planning another big assault on Hawaii or perhaps even California(!).

The major American naval forces in the Pacific at that time were ill-disposed to thwart Japanese moves in the southwest Pacific. The carriers Hornet Hornet and and Enterprise Enterprise and supporting vessels were only just beginning the return voyage from the April 18 Doolittle air raid on Japan. There was no way they could replenish in time to reinforce Allied naval forces in the southwest Pacific by "late April." If the Japanese were to be thwarted in that area, the carriers and supporting vessels were only just beginning the return voyage from the April 18 Doolittle air raid on Japan. There was no way they could replenish in time to reinforce Allied naval forces in the southwest Pacific by "late April." If the Japanese were to be thwarted in that area, the carriers Lexington Lexington and and Yorktown Yorktown and supporting forces, including land-based aircraft, would have to do the job. and supporting forces, including land-based aircraft, would have to do the job.*

There was little debate in Washington over whether or not an attempt should be made to thwart the Japanese in the southwest Pacific. Another major setback in the Pacific, such as the loss of Port Moresby or New Caledonia or Fiji or even Australia, combined with the fall of Bataan and Corregidor would be devastating. It might topple the Churchill government and even lead to an impeachment of President Roosevelt. At the least, such a setback would again besmirch the Navy's reputation. would be devastating. It might topple the Churchill government and even lead to an impeachment of President Roosevelt. At the least, such a setback would again besmirch the Navy's reputation.

The situation was so fraught with danger that King insisted on a face-to-face meeting with Pacific Fleet commander Chester Nimitz at a mutually convenient site. Thus, on April 24, when First Sea Lord Pound and his party were settling in for sweeping and prolonged strategy talks, King and his senior advisers abruptly left Washington to meet with Nimitz and his senior advisers, April 25 to April 27, in San Francisco. There the principals and their staffs hammered out a plan for a precious few American capital ships to battle Japanese capital ships on the high seas for the first time in the war.

Left high and dry in Washington, it is little wonder that First Sea Lord Pound and his delegates felt snubbed by Admiral King and wrongly came away convinced that King was much too narrowly preoccupied with the Pacific. Nonetheless, Pound's conferences with Roosevelt and King's subordinates usefully cleared the air on a number of important naval issues, including the impending start-up of convoys in all waters of North America which were accessible to U-boats.

The convoy routes in American waters, to be initiated in the first two weeks of May, if possible, were: * Key West-Norfolk-Key West Key West-Norfolk-Key West.

This route was to be protected by forty-three warships organized into five escort groups and aircraft. The ships were to include nine American four-stack destroyers, to be permanently assigned to the Eastern Sea Frontier in April; five of the ten British corvettes that finally arrived in April twelve of the fourteen British ASW trawlers that completed voyage repairs and came into service in April; two big gunboats (ex-yachts twelve of the fourteen British ASW trawlers that completed voyage repairs and came into service in April; two big gunboats (ex-yachts Plymouth Plymouth and and St. Augustine St. Augustine); nine new 173-foot PCs; four 165-foot Coast Guard cutters (Argo, Calypso, Dione, Icarus) and two World War I Eagle subchasers. Eight other vessels (four 165-foot Coast Guard cutters; two British trawlers; two Eagles) were to serve as a reserve force. Fifty-seven small craft along the route were to provide ASW patrols and rescue.

* Halifax-Boston-Halifax. Halifax-Boston-Halifax.

This route was to be protected by the Canadian WLEF, composed of four-stack destroyers and corvettes.

* A direct Halifax-Caribbean-Halifax route. A direct Halifax-Caribbean-Halifax route.

To be utilized exclusively for Canadian oil imports and protected by one Canadian group (four corvettes) withdrawn from the MOEF, this route was to commence operations May 17. Initially the convoys were to be comprised of six tankers sailing every fourteen days, but by June 8 the sailings had increased to one every ten days, directly from Aruba, bypassing Trinidad.

* Trinidad-Aruba-Trinidad. Trinidad-Aruba-Trinidad.

This British tanker "shuttle" route, which commenced operations on May 18, was to be protected by one British escort group withdrawn from the MOEF. After reaching Trinidad, loaded British tankers were to sail independently from Trinidad east to Freetown, thence to the British Isles in Sierra Leone convoys, thereby bypassing the hazardous American Eastern Seaboard. Tankers returning to Trinidad to join the reverse convoys to Aruba were to sail in Outbound South convoys.

* Others. Others.

Several other routes in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean were to be established as escorts became available.

HARDEGEN'S S SECOND P PATROL As in January, Donitz sent twenty-six U-boats to the Americas in March: six Type IXs and twenty Type VIIs. It was a relatively experienced group. Two-thirds of the boats had made patrols to the Americas earlier in the year. Six boats (three IXs; three VIIs) were commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Klaus Scholtz in holders: Klaus Scholtz in U-108 U-108; Heinrich Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109; Reinhard Hardegen in U-123; Adalbert Schnee in U-201 U-201, returning from a long overhaul in Germany to make his first patrol to the Americas; Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203; and Erich Topp in U-552. U-552.

The March boats were to be supported by two U-tankers. One, the U-A U-A, commanded by Hans Cohausz and temporarily released from standby supply duty for the "defense of Norway," was to refuel three Type VIIs, then return to Germany. The other, U-459 U-459, the first U-tanker designed as such,* was to sail directly from Germany to the western Atlantic, refuel fifteen boats, then return to France. The was to sail directly from Germany to the western Atlantic, refuel fifteen boats, then return to France. The U-A U-A was a temporary and less than satisfactory expedient, but was a temporary and less than satisfactory expedient, but U-459 U-459, commanded by "an old gentleman," Georg von Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, age forty-eight, a veteran of the Imperial Navy, was a timely physical and psychological backup for the U-boat campaign in American waters.

All twenty-six March boats were assigned to patrol United States and Caribbean waters, none to Canadian waters. Three short-range Type IXBs and all twenty Type VIIs were to operate from New York to points southward. Three longrange Type IXCs were to carry out a second strike in the Caribbean. At the insistence of Admiral Raeder and the OKM, one of the Caribbean boats, Ernst Kals in U-130 U-130, was to shell the refineries and tank farms on Curacao.

Wearing his newly won Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, Reinhard Hardegen in U-123 U-123 was the first of the six Type IXs to sail in March. He departed with sixteen torpedoes (fourteen internal, two in topside canisters) and another propagandist, Rudolf Meisinger. After weathering a four-day gale, in the three days following, March 22 to March 24, Hardegen came upon two big, loaded tankers in mid-Atlantic, sailing alone. He sank the first, the 7,000-ton American was the first of the six Type IXs to sail in March. He departed with sixteen torpedoes (fourteen internal, two in topside canisters) and another propagandist, Rudolf Meisinger. After weathering a four-day gale, in the three days following, March 22 to March 24, Hardegen came upon two big, loaded tankers in mid-Atlantic, sailing alone. He sank the first, the 7,000-ton American Muskogee Muskogee, with a single air torpedo. The second, the 8,100-ton British Empire Steel Empire Steel, was more difficult. One torpedo misfired in the tube, a second was fired in error. The next two torpedoes hit solidly, and the ship, loaded with gasoline, exploded in flames. Hardegen manned his deck gun to polish off the flaming hulk, but the heat was so intense that he broke off the action after eight rounds. There were no survivors from either ship.

Approaching Hatteras on the afternoon of March 26, the bridge reported smoke puffs on the horizon. Upon closing this target, Hardegen was disappointed to find what appeared to be an ancient 3,000-ton tramp steamer sailing alone. Nonetheless, he tracked her and after dark fired one torpedo from close range. It hit with a solid thwack, but the detonation appeared to be weak. Hardegen again manned his deck gun to polish off his victim.

Unsuspected by Hardegen, his quarry was the Atik Atik (ex- (ex-Carolyn), one of two old (1912) American "Q" ships engaged in a highly classified ASW patrol 250 miles off the East Coast. She was four days out from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on her shakedown cruise. Her sister ship Asterion Asterion (ex- (ex-Evelyn), also on her shakedown cruise, was close by, but not in direct communication. As part of her ruse, when the torpedo struck, Atik Atik lowered away two lifeboats, as if the crew were abandoning ship. lowered away two lifeboats, as if the crew were abandoning ship.

When Hardegen closed to fire his deck gun, Atik Atik suddenly came alive in a most startling and formidable fashion. Her bulwarks fell away, revealing a gun aimed directly at suddenly came alive in a most startling and formidable fashion. Her bulwarks fell away, revealing a gun aimed directly at U-123. U-123. The gun blazed, but fortunately for Hardegen and his men, the shells fell wide. Then came a hail of machine-gun fire and a barrage of depth charges. Astonished and chagrined-feeling like a schoolboy, he said later-Hardegen ran off at flank speed, frantically evading the fire. Some shells and bullets hit the bridge, fatally wounding a midshipman, Rudolf Holzer. The gun blazed, but fortunately for Hardegen and his men, the shells fell wide. Then came a hail of machine-gun fire and a barrage of depth charges. Astonished and chagrined-feeling like a schoolboy, he said later-Hardegen ran off at flank speed, frantically evading the fire. Some shells and bullets hit the bridge, fatally wounding a midshipman, Rudolf Holzer.