Even though he had given away his presence, after dark that same day, Hartenstein boldly directed his crew to man the 4.1" deck gun and smaller weapons and shoot up the refinery and tank farm. But disaster ensued. The gunners forgot to remove the tampion (or bung) from the muzzle of the gun, and the first round exploded inside the barrel. The blast killed a gunner, severely wounded the gunnery officer, Dietrich-Alfred von dem Borne, son of a high-ranking Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine officer, and mangled the gun muzzle. Hartenstein's medic attempted to repair von dem Borne's shattered leg-a ghastly ordeal for both doctor and patient-but it was obvious that if he were to survive, he needed sophisticated medical care. Accordingly, Hartenstein resourcefully requested permission from Donitz to put von dem Borne ashore on the Vichy island of Martinique. After clearing the request with Berlin, Donitz authorized the landing, even though the Vichy French on Martinique, fearing American reprisals, were reluctant. officer, and mangled the gun muzzle. Hartenstein's medic attempted to repair von dem Borne's shattered leg-a ghastly ordeal for both doctor and patient-but it was obvious that if he were to survive, he needed sophisticated medical care. Accordingly, Hartenstein resourcefully requested permission from Donitz to put von dem Borne ashore on the Vichy island of Martinique. After clearing the request with Berlin, Donitz authorized the landing, even though the Vichy French on Martinique, fearing American reprisals, were reluctant.

Martinique was still under surveillance by Allied aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines to prevent the possible "escape" of the old Vichy French aircraft carrier Bearn Bearn, the heavy cruisers Emile Bertin Emile Bertin and and Jeanne d'Arc Jeanne d'Arc, and other warships to European waters or to attack-and close-the Panama Canal and/or to destroy the refineries on Aruba and Curacao. Hartenstein therefore approached the harbor at Fort-de-France with extreme caution. Vichy French naval officers overcame their reluctance to this plan and sent out a launch and brought von dem Borne ashore. The French doctors amputated his leg; he eventually recovered from his wounds and returned to Germany. American naval observers on Martinique soon learned of the transfer, which seemed to confirm rumors (all false) that the Vichy French on Martinique were actively assisting German U-boats. In reprisal, President Roosevelt insisted that the French "immobilize" (by removing certain machinery) the Martinique-based warships "within 36 hours" or face an American bombing attack. The French immobilized the warships.

Raeder was miffed that his shelling order had not been more aggressively carried out and he gave Donitz a new, explicit order to hit the refinery on Aruba. In response, Donitz shifted Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 from Curacao to Aruba and brought in Rosenstiel in from Curacao to Aruba and brought in Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502. Aruba by that time was on full alert and blacked out. Its single Dutch motor launch cruised defensively off the harbor entrance; the three big coast-defense guns were manned and trained out. As a result, neither boat was able-or willing-to conduct an effective night gun action, and the refineries and tank farms remained untouched.*

Released from the shelling mission, the three boats concentrated on the shipping in the Aruba-Curacao area. All had success. Returning from Martinique, Hartenstein in U-156 U-156 sank four more ships, the last two with the deck gun, which they had made operable by using a hacksaw to cut off the mangled muzzle. These vessels included two tankers, the American sank four more ships, the last two with the deck gun, which they had made operable by using a hacksaw to cut off the mangled muzzle. These vessels included two tankers, the American Oregon Oregon, 7,000 tons, and the British La Carriere La Carriere, 5,700 tons. Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502 sank by torpedo five confirmed tankers: three small ones on the Maracaibo run, the Panamanian sank by torpedo five confirmed tankers: three small ones on the Maracaibo run, the Panamanian Thalia Thalia, 8,300 tons, and the Norwegian Kongsgaard Kongsgaard, 9,500 tons, and claimed a sixth, plus damage to a 9,000-ton American tanker. Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 had a run of bad luck. He reported six torpedo failures or misses on two separate ships, then, later, a crack in his pressure hull that limited his diving depth to ninety-eight feet. Despite these failures and handicaps, he sank by torpedo two tankers (the American had a run of bad luck. He reported six torpedo failures or misses on two separate ships, then, later, a crack in his pressure hull that limited his diving depth to ninety-eight feet. Despite these failures and handicaps, he sank by torpedo two tankers (the American J. N. Pew J. N. Pew, 9,000 tons; the Panamanian Penelope Penelope, 8,400 tons) and damaged a smaller one.

These attacks paralyzed temporarily the Maracaibo-Aruba-Curacao shallow-draft tanker traffic. The tanker crews-mostly Chinese-mutinied and refused to sail without Allied escorts. No tankers entered Aruba or Curacao; the huge refineries were forced to shut down operations temporarily. Dutch authorities jailed the Chinese mutineers, but the traffic was not restored to normal until Admiral John H. Hoover, commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, sent two destroyers and some Catalinas from Puerto Rico to escort the Lake Maracaibo tanker fleet, and an American admiral to organize, command, and coordinate all Allied forces in this vital strategic area.

Of the two U-boats at Trinidad, the new U-161 U-161, commanded by twenty-eight-year-old Albrecht Achilles making his first patrol as skipper, had the first successes. Cruising bravely into the shallow, confined Gulf of Paria, separating Trinidad from mainland Venezuela, Achilles approached Trinidad's well-lighted principal city, Port of Spain, as though U-161 U-161 were a cruise ship. Lying on the surface off Port of Spain just before midnight on February 18 in thirty-six feet of water, Achilles fired a bow salvo at two ships. Two of the four torpedoes failed or missed, but the other two hit a 7,000-ton British tanker and a 7,500-ton American freighter. Both ships settled to the shallow bottom, but both were later salvaged and returned to service. were a cruise ship. Lying on the surface off Port of Spain just before midnight on February 18 in thirty-six feet of water, Achilles fired a bow salvo at two ships. Two of the four torpedoes failed or missed, but the other two hit a 7,000-ton British tanker and a 7,500-ton American freighter. Both ships settled to the shallow bottom, but both were later salvaged and returned to service.

Fully alive to the strategic importance of Trinidad, both as a source of oil and as a way station for shipping, Admiral Hoover was in the process of creating a powerful ASW base on the island, comparable to that on Iceland. But the work had only just begun and Achilles caught the Allied forces by surprise. Thus he was able to make the long run through the shallow waters to open seas on the surface without countermeasures. Although the results were in no way comparable, his bold penetration of the Gulf of Paria was to be compared to Prien's feat at Scapa Flow.

Thereafter Achilles cruised northward in the Windward Islands. Although the Allies temporarily shut down most shipping in those waters, over the next two weeks Achilles found and sank by gun and torpedo two tankers (British Circe Shell Circe Shell, 8,200 tons; Canadian Uniwaleco Uniwaleco, 9,800 tons) and the 7,000-ton American freighter Lihue Lihue, which was armed and fought back spiritedly. An American submarine, S-17 S-17, patrolling Anegada Passage in the Windward Islands on March 4-5, reported a hairraising but luckless encounter with a U-boat that was doubtless U-161. U-161.

When Achilles examined the British island of St. Lucia submerged on March 9, he saw two big ships at dockside in the principal harbor, Port Castries. They were an 8,000-ton Canadian liner and an 8,200-ton British cargo-passenger ship, both of which had arrived that morning. Achilles surfaced after dark, crept silently into the harbor on electric motors, and torpedoed both ships. They sank to the shallow bottom, but were later salvaged and returned to service. As U-161 U-161 withdrew to open water, shorebased machine gunners fired and hit her, but the bullets caused little damage. withdrew to open water, shorebased machine gunners fired and hit her, but the bullets caused little damage.

Cruising farther north in the Windward Islands, Achilles found and sank two more ships in the following days. The first he claimed as a 5,000-ton tanker, but she was probably a 2,000-ton Canadian freighter. The second was the 1,100-ton United States Coast Guard lighthouse tender Acacia Acacia. Achilles sank the lightly armed Acacia Acacia with his deck gun, bringing his confirmed score to five ships (two tankers) for 28,000 tons, plus four ships for 30,500 tons sitting on the bottom in the harbors at Trinidad and St. Lucia. The American four-stack destroyer with his deck gun, bringing his confirmed score to five ships (two tankers) for 28,000 tons, plus four ships for 30,500 tons sitting on the bottom in the harbors at Trinidad and St. Lucia. The American four-stack destroyer Overton Overton rescued thirty-five crewmen of rescued thirty-five crewmen of Acacia Acacia.

The other boat at Trinidad, the veteran U-129 U-129, commanded by Nikolaus Clausen, patrolled southeast of the island in the open Atlantic to intercept the bauxite traffic. In four days, February 20 to 23, Clausen torpedoed and sank four freighters for 11,700 tons. He then cruised south along the coast to British and Dutch Guiana (Surinam) to interdict the bauxite traffic at the source, but he was defeated by the shallow waters of the wide (100 miles) continental shelf at those places and an emergency hold, or diversion, of shipping. Returning to his former hunting ground near Trinidad, in seven days, February 28 to March 6, Clausen sank three more freighters for 13,900 tons, bringing his confirmed score to seven ships-all freighters-for 25,600 tons.

Having delivered a jarring physical and psychological wallop in the Caribbean, the five boats of group Neuland Neuland commenced the prolonged journey home. The group had failed to knock out the refineries on Aruba and Curacao, but it had sunk twenty-four ships (twelve tankers) for 119,000 tons, and probably damaged eight ships (five tankers) for about 50,000 tons. Had they not been hit in shallow harbors, six of the damaged ships (two by Hartenstein, four by Achilles) almost certainly would have been lost forever. Had Muller-Stockheim in commenced the prolonged journey home. The group had failed to knock out the refineries on Aruba and Curacao, but it had sunk twenty-four ships (twelve tankers) for 119,000 tons, and probably damaged eight ships (five tankers) for about 50,000 tons. Had they not been hit in shallow harbors, six of the damaged ships (two by Hartenstein, four by Achilles) almost certainly would have been lost forever. Had Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 not had torpedo problems and a pressure-hull leak, the group's score doubtless would have been even greater. not had torpedo problems and a pressure-hull leak, the group's score doubtless would have been even greater.

While Clausen in U-129 U-129 was homebound in the Bay of Biscay, a Coastal Command Whitley of Squadron 502, piloted by Victor D. Pope, bombed the boat in darkness. However, she survived and reached Lorient. Inasmuch as his claims exceeded 100,000 tons, Clausen was awarded a was homebound in the Bay of Biscay, a Coastal Command Whitley of Squadron 502, piloted by Victor D. Pope, bombed the boat in darkness. However, she survived and reached Lorient. Inasmuch as his claims exceeded 100,000 tons, Clausen was awarded a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.* Berlin propagandists crowed over his successes and also, deservedly so, those of Achilles. Detached from Berlin propagandists crowed over his successes and also, deservedly so, those of Achilles. Detached from U-129 U-129, Clausen, like Gysae and Luth, went back to Germany to commission one of the new IXD U-cruisers.

In terms of the desired impact on the oil traffic in the Caribbean, group Neuland Neuland was a remarkable success: twelve tankers sunk, five damaged, and a temporary shipping paralysis at Aruba-Curacao. But it was also expensive. Like the earlier patrols to Freetown, those of group was a remarkable success: twelve tankers sunk, five damaged, and a temporary shipping paralysis at Aruba-Curacao. But it was also expensive. Like the earlier patrols to Freetown, those of group Neuland Neuland were long: an average of sixty-five days. Although the new boats of the group ( were long: an average of sixty-five days. Although the new boats of the group (U-156, U-161, U-502) resailed after about one month of rest and refit in France, the older boats (U-67, U-129) would require about two months of refit. Hence, in terms of time expended per boat per patrol, including refits, the average return on investment was not all that impressive-to say nothing of the wear and tear on the crew in tropical waters. Moreover, group Neuland Neuland had had the advantage of surprise in virgin territory. Succeeding patrols to the Caribbean, some staffers at Kerneval believed, were to confront intensified ASW measures-however green and inept-with the likelihood of decreasing returns on investment at much greater risk. Thus, those staffers regarded patrols to the Caribbean, like the patrols to Freetown, as uneconomical until a means of resupplying the boats with fuel and torpedoes in that area could be devised. had had the advantage of surprise in virgin territory. Succeeding patrols to the Caribbean, some staffers at Kerneval believed, were to confront intensified ASW measures-however green and inept-with the likelihood of decreasing returns on investment at much greater risk. Thus, those staffers regarded patrols to the Caribbean, like the patrols to Freetown, as uneconomical until a means of resupplying the boats with fuel and torpedoes in that area could be devised.

Based on past performance, Kerneval did not expect much help from the five Italian boats which patrolled just east of the Windward Islands during group Neuland Neuland's foray. At best, it was believed, they might provide a diversion. But these Italian submariners-some trained by the Germans in the Baltic or on war patrols in the North Atlantic-delivered the greatest single coordinated blow of any group of Italian boats in the war.

* Carlo Fecia di Cossato in Tazzoli Tazzoli sank six ships for 29,200 tons, including the British tanker sank six ships for 29,200 tons, including the British tanker Athelqueen Athelqueen, 8,800 tons.

* Athos Fraternale in Morosini Morosini sank three ships for 22,000 tons, including the Dutch tanker sank three ships for 22,000 tons, including the Dutch tanker Oscilla Oscilla, 6,300 tons, and the British tanker Peder Bogen Peder Bogen, 9,700 tons.

* Ugo Giudice in Finzi Finzi sank three ships for 21,500 tons, including the British tanker sank three ships for 21,500 tons, including the British tanker Melpomene Melpomene, 7,000 tons, and the Norwegian tanker Charles Racine Charles Racine, 10,000 tons.

* Antonio de Giacomo in Torelli Torelli sank two ships for 16,500 tons, including the Panamanian tanker sank two ships for 16,500 tons, including the Panamanian tanker Esso Copenhagen Esso Copenhagen, 9,200 tons.

* Luigi Longanesi-Cattani in Da Vinci Da Vinci sank one ship for 3,644 tons. sank one ship for 3,644 tons.

The total came to fifteen ships for about 93,000 tons, including six tankers. Although Torelli Torelli was caught on the surface and bombed by Allied aircraft, which killed two men, she and the other four boats returned safely to Bordeaux. When the results of group was caught on the surface and bombed by Allied aircraft, which killed two men, she and the other four boats returned safely to Bordeaux. When the results of group Neuland Neuland and those of the Italian group were combined, the total of these first nine Axis submarine attacks in the West Indies and the Caribbean were impressive indeed: thirty-nine ships (eighteen tankers) positively sunk for about 212,000 tons, plus probable severe damage to eight ships (five tankers) for about 50,000 tons. and those of the Italian group were combined, the total of these first nine Axis submarine attacks in the West Indies and the Caribbean were impressive indeed: thirty-nine ships (eighteen tankers) positively sunk for about 212,000 tons, plus probable severe damage to eight ships (five tankers) for about 50,000 tons.*

The twenty-five German boats of the January group that reached American waters delivered a severe blow to Allied shipping. The eleven Type IXs, including group Neuland Neuland, sank forty-seven confirmed ships for 276,000 tons (and damaged many others). The fourteen Type VIIs sank twenty-four confirmed ships for 125,000 tons (and damaged others). It was the most successful U-boat foray of the war: seventy-one confirmed ships sunk (twenty-three tankers) for about 401,000 tons. In return, Allied forces sank but one U-boat, In return, Allied forces sank but one U-boat, U-82 U-82.

Doubtless this victory influenced Hitler's decision to continue the campaign in the Americas and to jump-promote Donitz to four-star admiral effective March 14. When he got news of the promotion, Donitz notified all U-boat shore stations and the boats at sea, expressing his "thanks and gratitude to you, my U-boat men."

Notwithstanding this astonishing success, Admiral Raeder and the OKM were annoyed to learn that Donitz had not launched a second group of Type IXs to replace group Neuland Neuland in the Caribbean with no intervening gap. Declaring that the interdiction of Allied oil and bauxite traffic in the Caribbean was of greater importance than any other task, Admiral Raeder insisted that Donitz patrol the Caribbean "to the fullest extent possible" and to make another attempt to shell the refineries and tank farms on Aruba and Curacao. in the Caribbean with no intervening gap. Declaring that the interdiction of Allied oil and bauxite traffic in the Caribbean was of greater importance than any other task, Admiral Raeder insisted that Donitz patrol the Caribbean "to the fullest extent possible" and to make another attempt to shell the refineries and tank farms on Aruba and Curacao.

UNFORESEEN AND U UNPLANNED C CONVOY A ATTACKS.

Donitz had planned to equal or exceed the January U-boat offensive in the Americas in February with twenty-six or more boats. But owing to Hitler's "Norway paranoia" and to the delays in the buildup of the Atlantic force caused by the Baltic ice, eight Type VIIs had to be diverted, temporarily, for the Iceland-Scotland patrol line. Moreover, believing that the Freetown area, unpatrolled since the Atlantis-Python Atlantis-Python disaster in November 1941, might be undermanned and/or unalert, Donitz decided to send two Type IXs to the South Atlantic. The upshot was that only eighteen boats (nine IXs, nine VIIs) put out for American waters in February. Two-thirds (six of nine) of the Type IXs and nearly half (four of nine) of the Type VIIs were new, and because of the Baltic ice most had not completed a full training cycle. disaster in November 1941, might be undermanned and/or unalert, Donitz decided to send two Type IXs to the South Atlantic. The upshot was that only eighteen boats (nine IXs, nine VIIs) put out for American waters in February. Two-thirds (six of nine) of the Type IXs and nearly half (four of nine) of the Type VIIs were new, and because of the Baltic ice most had not completed a full training cycle.

Based on the experiences of Suhren in U-564 U-564 and Feiler in and Feiler in U-653 U-653, Donitz had concluded that by following a Great Circle route and exercising stringent fuel discipline and limited mobility, the Type VIIs could operate in American waters for perhaps as long as ten days, or nearly as long as the VIIs in Canadian waters. He therefore directed that the difficult and less-productive patrols to Canadian waters be temporarily suspended and that all eighteen boats of the February group patrol United States and Caribbean waters.

The February boats were the first to benefit from the British inability to read four-rotor Enigma and thereby avoid known U-boat positions. While en route to the Americas on the same day, February 21, two new Type IXs, U-154 U-154 and and U-155 U-155, attacked big convoys in the mid-Atlantic that were sailing in opposite directions.

Acting on the report of another boat, Walther Kolle, age thirty-four, in U-154 U-154 found the fast, strongly escorted, eastbound convoy Halifax 175. He got off the mandatory contact report, shadowed, then attacked doggedly, firing all fourteen internal torpedoes at a variety of ships, to absolutely no effect. After receiving his shooting report (ten unexplained misses, four "duds" on a tanker) Kerneval ordered Kolle to abort at high speed to Lorient. Upon his arrival it was discovered that the torpedo-data computer was out of calibration. Kolle had been bound for the Caribbean. Repairs and further training delayed his departure to March and, to Berlin's consternation, diminished the U-boat campaign in the Caribbean. found the fast, strongly escorted, eastbound convoy Halifax 175. He got off the mandatory contact report, shadowed, then attacked doggedly, firing all fourteen internal torpedoes at a variety of ships, to absolutely no effect. After receiving his shooting report (ten unexplained misses, four "duds" on a tanker) Kerneval ordered Kolle to abort at high speed to Lorient. Upon his arrival it was discovered that the torpedo-data computer was out of calibration. Kolle had been bound for the Caribbean. Repairs and further training delayed his departure to March and, to Berlin's consternation, diminished the U-boat campaign in the Caribbean.

Adolf-Cornelius Piening in U-155 U-155 found convoy Outbound North 67, which was westbound along a newly adopted, more southerly Great Circle route. Composed of thirty-five merchant ships, including many tankers in ballast, it was escorted by two old and two new American destroyers ( found convoy Outbound North 67, which was westbound along a newly adopted, more southerly Great Circle route. Composed of thirty-five merchant ships, including many tankers in ballast, it was escorted by two old and two new American destroyers (Nicholson and and Lea Lea equipped with meter-wavelength radar) and a Canadian corvette. It was trailed by a 1,600-ton "rescue ship," the equipped with meter-wavelength radar) and a Canadian corvette. It was trailed by a 1,600-ton "rescue ship," the Toward Toward, which had accommodations for several hundred survivors and a medical staff, as well as one of the new shipborne Huff Duff sets, to take local bearings on U-boat shadowers for the benefit of the escorts.

Among the ships in the convoy was the 8,000-ton British tanker Empire Celt Empire Celt, equipped with a new and experimental antitorpedo device known as the Admiralty Net Defense. The device consisted of huge rolls of strong steel "nets," which could be "streamed" from fifty-foot poles over the starboard and port sides in times of danger, or when sailing alone. During controlled tests, the nets had stopped British submarine torpedoes, but this voyage was the first "combat" trial of the device. Although the nets could not be streamed at speeds greater than 9 knots and they were difficult to handle and had to be replaced after each voyage, their advocates believed them capable of providing about 50 to 60 percent protection for freighters and tankers. The Admiralty Net Defense project manager, C.N.E. Currey, and a senior American submariner, George C. Crawford, were embarked on Empire Celt Empire Celt to oversee and observe the combat trial. to oversee and observe the combat trial.

The rescue ship Toward Toward DFed the contact reports of Piening in DFed the contact reports of Piening in U-155 U-155 and gave the alarm. The destroyer and gave the alarm. The destroyer Lea Lea made a desultory search down the bearing for one hour, then returned to her position in the screen. Piening in made a desultory search down the bearing for one hour, then returned to her position in the screen. Piening in U-155 U-155 evaded evaded Lea Lea, the three other destroyers, and the corvette, and in the early morning hours of February 22 attacked three ships with a bow salvo. His torpedoes sank the 8,000-ton British tanker Adellen Adellen and a 1,800-ton freighter. While the convoy continued on course, and a 1,800-ton freighter. While the convoy continued on course, Toward Toward and and Nicholson Nicholson picked up the survivors. picked up the survivors.

Inasmuch as the convoy was westbound, Donitz directed all boats outbound to America that were near the convoy to converge. Two other new Type IXs, Erich Rostin in U-158 U-158 and Jurgen Wattenberg in and Jurgen Wattenberg in U-162 U-162, and four VIIs homed on Piening's beacons, and by late evening on February 23, seven America-bound U-boats were stalking convoy Outbound North 67 and maneuvering around the escorts. By sheer chance and improvisation, it became the first group attack on a North Atlantic convoy since the previous November 2, when the Germans drove Slow Convoy 52 back into Newfoundland.

The old hand Gunther Krech in the Type VII U-558 U-558 was the next boat to attack. His strike on February 24 proved to be one of the most notable of the war. In five hours he sank five confirmed ships: four big tankers in ballast for 32,600 tons was the next boat to attack. His strike on February 24 proved to be one of the most notable of the war. In five hours he sank five confirmed ships: four big tankers in ballast for 32,600 tons* plus a 4,400-ton freighter. Having shot all of his torpedoes save one, Krech returned to France, where he received unstinting praise from Donitz and the usual buildup from Berlin propagandists. plus a 4,400-ton freighter. Having shot all of his torpedoes save one, Krech returned to France, where he received unstinting praise from Donitz and the usual buildup from Berlin propagandists.

Next, two Type IXs closed to attack: Rostin in U-158 U-158 and Wattenberg in and Wattenberg in U-162 U-162. Rostin hit and damaged a tanker. Then he and Wattenberg probably fired simultaneously at the tanker Empire Celt Empire Celt, which was in the process of streaming her Admiralty Net Defense. A torpedo broke through the net and hit amidships, making a gaping hole. She fell out of the convoy and broke in half. The bow sank. A tug from Newfoundland rescued forty-five men from the stern, including Currey and Crawford, and attempted to tow it to St. John's, but the effort came to naught thirty-five miles short of the goal. The failure of the combat trial was a "grave blow" to the Admiralty Net Defense program, a British authority wrote. Nonetheless, the Admiralty fitted numerous ships of 8,000 tons or more with the device.*

The next skipper to attack was Ulrich Borcherdt in the new Type VII U-587 U-587. While outbound from France on February 13, Kerneval had diverted Borcherdt in U-587 U-587 and Viktor Vogel in the new sister ship and Viktor Vogel in the new sister ship U-588 U-588, and Otto Ites in the veteran U-94 U-94, to search for survivors of a Focke-Wulf Condor that had ditched. On February 15, Borcherdt had found five survivors in a dinghy and picked them up. He had then to rendezvous with a homebound boat to hand over the survivors. The first rendezvous, with Gerhard Bigalk in U-751 U-751, had gone awry; the second, on February 18, with Ernst Kals in U-130 U-130, had succeeded. It was a fortunate outcome for the Focke-Wulf crew, but in the search and the handover, Borcherdt had burned up a great deal of precious fuel.

The expenditure of fuel prompted Donitz to make an extraordinary entry in his daily diary. However "satisfactory" and "natural" the rescue of the aircrew may "appear," he wrote, "it is nevertheless always difficult to decide whether submarines on their outward voyage should be used to search for crews of planes that have been forced down. Under present conditions every drop of fuel is vital to the boats ... It may well happen that a request for help will have to be refused for the sake of operational duties." Upon reading this entry, the OKM commented that such was the value of experienced aircrews engaged in naval warfare that "a very very serious reason would have to be given if such a request were refused." serious reason would have to be given if such a request were refused."

Coming up astern of the convoy to mount his attack, Borcherdt in U-587 U-587 saw the trailing rescue-ship saw the trailing rescue-ship Toward Toward. She was burning "dim" side lights and was equipped with what Borcherdt believed to be "cable-laying gear." Concluding from these observations that she might be a "decoy" or a "Q" ship, Borcherdt fired one torpedo at her. It missed or malfunctioned, leading Borcherdt and Kerneval to conclude later-and incorrectly-that the torpedo had been deflected by antitorpedo nets. Borcherdt then attacked the convoy, possibly hitting one tanker already fatally damaged by Krech. Escorts thwarted a second attack.

The U.S. Navy decorated the commanding officer of the American escort group, Albert C. Murdaugh in the destroyer Edison Edison, for "particularly outstanding" work in defending the convoy. But in reality, it was a major disaster and embarrassment: eight British-owned or controlled ships (six tankers) sunk, for about 55,000 tons, and one British tanker damaged. The results, Donitz logged, were "particularly satisfactory," especially in view of the number of green skippers involved. The engagement powerfully reinforced his conviction that when sufficient boats were available to find, shadow, and attack, organized group operations against convoys could be resumed with every possibility of good success.

The reports from Krech and other skippers of antitorpedo nets on Empire Celt Empire Celt caused deep concern at Kerneval. It seemed "astounding" to Donitz that a ship could make 9 or 10 knots with streamed nets. He immediately informed the torpedo technicians of this discovery, stressing the urgent need to develop a "countermeasure." The only feasible countermeasure was a reliable magnetic pistol, which would run under the nets and explode the torpedo beneath the ship. The technicians had produced a new and improved magnetic pistol, but it was still undergoing tests. In view of the harsh punishment handed down to their predecessors for the failure of the original magnetic pistol, doubtless the technicians were reluctant to release the new pistol until it was faultless. caused deep concern at Kerneval. It seemed "astounding" to Donitz that a ship could make 9 or 10 knots with streamed nets. He immediately informed the torpedo technicians of this discovery, stressing the urgent need to develop a "countermeasure." The only feasible countermeasure was a reliable magnetic pistol, which would run under the nets and explode the torpedo beneath the ship. The technicians had produced a new and improved magnetic pistol, but it was still undergoing tests. In view of the harsh punishment handed down to their predecessors for the failure of the original magnetic pistol, doubtless the technicians were reluctant to release the new pistol until it was faultless.

Altogether the U-boats had interrupted six cargo convoys on the North Atlantic run in February. These were the loaded eastbound convoys Halifax 173 and 175 and Slow Convoy 67. Three were the empty westbound convoys Outbound North (Slow) 61 and 63 and Outbound North 67. The Germans sank twelve ships from these convoys (six tankers) and three corvette escorts (Alysee, Arbutus, Spikenard). In addition, they damaged two tankers. This was hardly a "quiet" time, certainly no time for a wholesale transfer of escorts from the North Atlantic run to the East Coast, as suggested by Michael Gannon.

During the attack on Outbound North 67, or shortly thereafter, Wattenberg in the new Type IXC U-162 U-162 reported a serious casualty. The caps of two bow tubes had broken loose, blocking the other two bow tubes. He later managed to clear the two blocked tubes and patch the broken ones and requested permission to proceed, but Kerneval decided not to send a new skipper in a partly disabled boat onward to America. She was diverted to escort the incoming blockade-runner reported a serious casualty. The caps of two bow tubes had broken loose, blocking the other two bow tubes. He later managed to clear the two blocked tubes and patch the broken ones and requested permission to proceed, but Kerneval decided not to send a new skipper in a partly disabled boat onward to America. She was diverted to escort the incoming blockade-runner Osorno Osorno into France, but the rendezvous failed. into France, but the rendezvous failed.

The unforeseen, unplanned attacks on convoys Halifax 175 and Outbound North 67, which resulted in the return of a boat (U-558) and two aborts (U-154, U-162), diminished the strength of the February group outbound to the Americas from eighteen to fifteen boats. Moreover, owing to the high expenditure of fuel in the rescue of the Condor air crew and the attack on Outbound North 67, Borcherdt in U-587 U-587 had to be limited to Canadian waters, reducing the group en route to United States waters to fourteen boats. had to be limited to Canadian waters, reducing the group en route to United States waters to fourteen boats.

Unknown to Donitz, the group was further reduced as the boats passed southbound through Canadian waters. On March 1 an American Navy Hudson, piloted by Ensign William Tepuni of the Argentia-based Patrol Squadron 82, spotted and attacked Ernst Kroning's new Type VII U-656 U-656, about sixty miles southeast of Cape Race. The boat went down with all hands. She was the first confirmed U-boat to be sunk by U.S. forces and the first to be sunk in North American waters. Two weeks later, on March 15, a Hudson of the same squadron, piloted by airman Donald F. Mason, who had earlier won a DFC and great fame ("Sighted Sub. Sank Same.") for a nonsinking, spotted and attacked Otto Gericke's new Type IXC U-503 U-503, near the same area. She, too, went down with the loss of all hands. Both Tepuni and Mason were awarded DFCs; airman Mason was promoted to ensign.

ANOTHER H HEAVY B BLOW.

Only thirteen of the eighteen U-boats which sailed to American waters in February actually got there. These included Ulrich Borcherdt in U-587 U-587, restricted by his low fuel situation to Canadian waters, and Ernst Bauer in the IXC U-126 U-126, assigned to the northeast coast of Cuba to attack ships entering and leaving the Caribbean via the Windward Passage, separating eastern Cuba and Haiti. The other eleven boats-five IXs and six VIIs-patrolled the United States East Coast.

Borcherdt in U-587 U-587 had a miserable time in Canadian waters. The weather was still frigid and Allied ASW forces, which sank had a miserable time in Canadian waters. The weather was still frigid and Allied ASW forces, which sank U-656 U-656 and and U-503 U-503 that month, were improving. Between those two U-boat sinkings, on March 8, Borcherdt complained to Kerneval that in a period of nine days he had encountered destroyers or patrol craft ten different times. He shot at some of these and at other vessels, but he managed to sink only one 900-ton coastal freighter. Homebound, he claimed to have sunk a severely damaged and abandoned (but unidentified) tanker. that month, were improving. Between those two U-boat sinkings, on March 8, Borcherdt complained to Kerneval that in a period of nine days he had encountered destroyers or patrol craft ten different times. He shot at some of these and at other vessels, but he managed to sink only one 900-ton coastal freighter. Homebound, he claimed to have sunk a severely damaged and abandoned (but unidentified) tanker.

Nearing the western edge of the Bay of Biscay on March 27, Borcherdt encountered and reported a "fast" southbound convoy. This was one of the prize targets of the war: the heavily escorted Winston Special 17, composed of thirty troop transports with 60,000 British soldiers embarked.* The luckless Borcherdt had only one air torpedo left and could not attack. He shadowed for the benefit of other boats, but one of the many escorts, the destroyer The luckless Borcherdt had only one air torpedo left and could not attack. He shadowed for the benefit of other boats, but one of the many escorts, the destroyer Keppel Keppel, accurately DFed him with its new Huff Duff, and four other escorts-Leamington, Grove, Aldenham, Volunteer-pounced on U-587 U-587 and sank her by depth charges with the loss of all hands. No other boats were able to respond to and sank her by depth charges with the loss of all hands. No other boats were able to respond to U-587 U-587's contact report, so the tracking and loss were to no avail. She was the third of the February boats to be lost in combat and the second boat (after Rollmann's U-82 U-82) to be sunk homebound from the Americas.

In contrast, the old hand Ernst Bauer in the Type IX U-126 U-126, patrolling the Old Bahama Channel north and northeast of Cuba, enjoyed beautiful weather, weak or no ASW forces, and dense shipping near the Windward Passage. In a mere twelve days-March 2 to March 13-Bauer sank by torpedo and gun seven confirmed ships for 33,000 tons and damaged three others of 23,000 tons. His victims included the 8,200-ton Panamanian tanker Hanseat Hanseat sunk and two other tankers damaged. In view of his past overclaims and his role in the rescue of survivors of the German merchant raider sunk and two other tankers damaged. In view of his past overclaims and his role in the rescue of survivors of the German merchant raider Atlantis Atlantis, Bauer was awarded the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz and got the usual buildup from Berlin propagandists. and got the usual buildup from Berlin propagandists.

American ASW forces were still not much improved. As related, eleven different destroyers released from the North Atlantic run patrolled the Eastern Sea Frontier intermittently in February, but about half of them had been siphoned off to escort troop convoy AT 12. At the end of February, there were only five destroyers (including Roe Roe) on ASW duty in the Eastern Sea Frontier.

During the month of March, Atlantic Fleet commander Ingersoll made available to Andrews on a temporary basis fourteen different destroyers.* Andrews later calculated that these warships spent a total of sixty-three days on ASW duty in his area during the month, an average of about two destroyers in service per day. The four-stack Andrews later calculated that these warships spent a total of sixty-three days on ASW duty in his area during the month, an average of about two destroyers in service per day. The four-stack Herbert Herbert contributed the most: eighteen full days. contributed the most: eighteen full days.

The demand for destroyers increased in all sectors. Apart from the diminishing number providing escort on the North Atlantic convoy run, among the important tasks performed in March were: * Escort of Pacific-bound troopship convoy BT 201 from New York to Panama, March 4 to March 12, which merged with Task Force 18 (Pacific-bound carrier Hornet Hornet and cruisers and cruisers Nashville Nashville and and Vincennes Vincennes). Nine American destroyers or destroyer transports or destroyer minesweepers escorted the formation: Dickerson, Ellyson, Grayson, Gwin, Manley, Meredith, Monssen, Stansbury Dickerson, Ellyson, Grayson, Gwin, Manley, Meredith, Monssen, Stansbury, and Sturtevant Sturtevant. The Grayson, Gwin, Meredith Grayson, Gwin, Meredith, and Monssen Monssen accompanied accompanied Hornet Hornet into the Pacific for the "Doolittle raid" on Tokyo and remained in that theater, bringing the total number of destroyers transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific to fifteen. into the Pacific for the "Doolittle raid" on Tokyo and remained in that theater, bringing the total number of destroyers transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific to fifteen.

* Escort of two high-priority supply convoys, AS 1 and AS 2, to Ascension Island and Freetown, March 14 and March 19. The escorts consisted of the new British "jeep" carrier Archer Archer (in transit), the British cruiser (in transit), the British cruiser Devonshire Devonshire, the American cruisers Cincinnati Cincinnati and and Memphis Memphis, and eight American destroyers: Cole, Du Pont, Ellis, Greer, Jouett, Somers, Upshur Cole, Du Pont, Ellis, Greer, Jouett, Somers, Upshur, and Winslow Winslow.

* Escort of British troopship convoy NA 5 (two vessels) from Halifax to the British Isles, March 14 to March 22. Two new (1941) American destroyers, Nicholson Nicholson and and Swanson Swanson, carried out this task.

* Escort of troopship convoy TA 12, returning to the States, March 14 to March 25. This escort was Task Force 32, comprised of the battleship New York New York, the cruiser Philadelphia Philadelphia, and the ten destroyers that had escorted the eastbound troopship convoy AT 12.

* Escort of Task Force 39 (renamed 99) consisting of the carrier Wasp Wasp, the new battleship Washington Washington, and the heavy cruisers Tuscaloosa Tuscaloosa and and Wichita Wichita from Casco Bay, Maine, to Scapa Flow, March 25 to April 4. Six modern destroyers were assigned to the task: from Casco Bay, Maine, to Scapa Flow, March 25 to April 4. Six modern destroyers were assigned to the task: Lang, Madison, Plunkett, Sterett, Wainwright Lang, Madison, Plunkett, Sterett, Wainwright, and Wilson. Wilson. Placed under British control, this American force reinforced the British Home Fleet, which had been diluted to supply ships for Force H at Gibraltar, engaged in the British conquest of Madagascar. Placed under British control, this American force reinforced the British Home Fleet, which had been diluted to supply ships for Force H at Gibraltar, engaged in the British conquest of Madagascar.

Accidents to destroyers continued. During workup just prior to the trip to Scapa Flow, the carrier Wasp Wasp and the destroyer and the destroyer Stack Stack collided in fog on March 17 off the Delaware Capes. Badly damaged, flooded and heeled over, collided in fog on March 17 off the Delaware Capes. Badly damaged, flooded and heeled over, Stack Stack barely survived this mishap and was in repair for months. One of her crew, Frank LeR. Knight, who alertly and bravely clawed his way aft to set all of barely survived this mishap and was in repair for months. One of her crew, Frank LeR. Knight, who alertly and bravely clawed his way aft to set all of Stack Stack's depth charges on "safe" after the collision, won the Medal of Honor.

The first of the eleven February boats to reach the United States coast was the Type VII U-578 U-578, commanded by Ernst-August Rehwinkel, who had earlier made a patrol in the Arctic. Shortly after midnight on February 27, while cruising thirty miles off the New Jersey coast in shallow water, Rehwinkel spotted a zigzagging blacked-out, northbound tanker. She was the 7,500-ton American R. P. Resor R. P. Resor, loaded with 78,720 barrels of fuel oil and newly armed with a gun manned by a nine-man Navy Armed Guard crew. Rehwinkel fired a two-fan shot from close range. Caught unawares, Resor Resor blew up in a thunderous fireball. Only three of the fifty men on board survived. She burned for two days in clear view of those ashore. blew up in a thunderous fireball. Only three of the fifty men on board survived. She burned for two days in clear view of those ashore.

That afternoon, two of the four-stacks on ASW duty in the Eastern Sea Frontier, Dickerson Dickerson and and Jacob Jones Jacob Jones, sailed from New York. Recently released from North Atlantic convoy duty, Jones Jones was the namesake of another World War I four-stacker which had been sunk by a U-boat in European waters on December 6, 1917. Her orders were to patrol close inshore at night and out to the 100 fathom (600 foot) curve in daylight. Near dark, she and was the namesake of another World War I four-stacker which had been sunk by a U-boat in European waters on December 6, 1917. Her orders were to patrol close inshore at night and out to the 100 fathom (600 foot) curve in daylight. Near dark, she and Dickerson Dickerson paused briefly at the smoking hulk of tanker paused briefly at the smoking hulk of tanker Resor Resor, which Rehwinkel in U-578 U-578 had destroyed, to look for survivors. Finding none, the destroyers moved on to set up patrols. had destroyed, to look for survivors. Finding none, the destroyers moved on to set up patrols.

At about five o'clock the following morning, February 28, while lying on the surface, Rehwinkel in U-578 U-578 saw the saw the Jacob Jones Jacob Jones coming directly toward him, apparently oblivious to the U-boat's presence. Rehwinkel waited calmly for the range to close, then fired two bow torpedoes. Both hit and coming directly toward him, apparently oblivious to the U-boat's presence. Rehwinkel waited calmly for the range to close, then fired two bow torpedoes. Both hit and Jacob Jones Jacob Jones blew apart and sank. As she went down, her armed depth charges exploded and the concussions killed many men in the water. Later in the morning, an Army aircraft spotted the wreckage and a small patrol boat rescued eleven out of her crew of about 200. No more were ever found. The loss of blew apart and sank. As she went down, her armed depth charges exploded and the concussions killed many men in the water. Later in the morning, an Army aircraft spotted the wreckage and a small patrol boat rescued eleven out of her crew of about 200. No more were ever found. The loss of Jacob Jones Jacob Jones-the second American destroyer after Reuben James Reuben James to be sunk by a U-boat-underscored not only the futility but also the dangers of hunter-killer ASW destroyer patrols. to be sunk by a U-boat-underscored not only the futility but also the dangers of hunter-killer ASW destroyer patrols.*

Rehwinkel had fuel for about one week of patrolling in American waters. Heavy storms raked the East Coast during the first week of March, making it difficult for him and all other U-boat skippers to find and sink ships. On March 7, he reported, an aircraft bombed him off Cape Hatteras-the first German report of an attack on a U-boat in United States waters-but the bombs were "small" and the attack was ineffectual. Having found no other targets, he headed home. On the way back he sank a 3,100-ton freighter that was sailing alone.

The other ten February boats (five IXs, five VIIs) arrived almost literally in Rehwinkel's wake. Piening and Rostin in the Type IXCs U-155 U-155 and and U-158 U-158, who had expended torpedoes and fuel on Outbound North 67, bracketed Cape Hatteras. Operating in heavy weather, Piening in U-155 U-155 had a run of bad luck. His first watch officer was washed overboard and lost, the first German submariner to die in United States waters. Piening sank one 7,900-ton freighter, had a run of bad luck. His first watch officer was washed overboard and lost, the first German submariner to die in United States waters. Piening sank one 7,900-ton freighter, Arabutan Arabutan, but, awkwardly, she was another "neutral" Brazilian. Rostin in U-158 U-158 had better luck. With small difficulty, he sank by torpedo and gun two American tankers in ballast, the 7,000-ton had better luck. With small difficulty, he sank by torpedo and gun two American tankers in ballast, the 7,000-ton Ario Ario and the 11,600-ton and the 11,600-ton John D. Gill John D. Gill, plus an American freighter, and he damaged the 11,600-ton American tanker Olean Olean, also sailing in ballast. Piening in U-155 U-155 returned to France after forty-nine days at sea and Rostin in returned to France after forty-nine days at sea and Rostin in U-158 U-158 after fifty-eight days. Both skippers were commended for aggressive first patrols. after fifty-eight days. Both skippers were commended for aggressive first patrols.

En route to America, young Otto Ites in the Type VIIC U-94 U-94-praised by Kerneval for his discovery of the leak in the torpedo balance chamber-sank a 7,000-ton British freighter and one of the twenty-four America-bound British ASW trawlers, Northern Princess Northern Princess. While patrolling off New York in heavy weather on March 7, he sank a 5,200-ton passenger-cargo ship that was blacked out and zigzagging. She turned out to be yet another Brazilian "neutral," Caryu Caryu, the fourth Brazilian ship sunk by U-boats within three weeks. In angry reprisal, the Brazilian president, Vargas, froze German and Japanese assets in Brazilian banks, seized other German and Japanese properties, and whipped the public into an angry mood, setting the stage for a declaration of war.

Ites sank one other ship-for a total of four for 28,300 tons-before the shortage of fuel compelled him to head for France. En route he ran into a convoy, Outbound North 77, which he reported, then attacked, firing four torpedoes at an 8,000-ton British tanker, Imperial Transport Imperial Transport, in ballast. He damaged that ship and attempted to shadow the convoy, but owing to a shortage of fuel he had to break off before any other boats came up. Upon his arrival in France, Donitz awarded Ites a Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz.*

Viktor Vogel in the new Type VII U-588 U-588 ran almost parallel with Ites in American waters, from New York southward. Inbound, he sank a 4,900-ton British freighter. Off New York on March 2, he hit a 4,800-ton British tanker in ballast with one torpedo, then doggedly attacked her with his deck gun, firing an astonishing 200 rounds over a period of four hours. Vogel claimed a sinking, but although heavily damaged, the ship survived and limped into New York. Off the New Jersey coast on March 10, after the storms had abated, Vogel torpedoed the 6,700-ton American tanker ran almost parallel with Ites in American waters, from New York southward. Inbound, he sank a 4,900-ton British freighter. Off New York on March 2, he hit a 4,800-ton British tanker in ballast with one torpedo, then doggedly attacked her with his deck gun, firing an astonishing 200 rounds over a period of four hours. Vogel claimed a sinking, but although heavily damaged, the ship survived and limped into New York. Off the New Jersey coast on March 10, after the storms had abated, Vogel torpedoed the 6,700-ton American tanker Gulftrade Gulftrade, which broke into halves before sinking. After ten days in American waters, Vogel commenced the long voyage to France. He arrived on March 27, having spent forty-four days at sea-thirty-four days going to and from North America.

The son of a senior Imperial Navy officer, Otto von Bulow in the new VII U-404 U-404 arrived next. Passing southbound near Halifax, he found a 5,100-ton American freighter stopped outside the port, apparently waiting for a pilot. Mistakenly believing she was a much larger ship underway at 10 knots, von Bulow fired "a lot" of torpedoes at her before he got a hit and sank her. He then proceeded to the New York area, where he sank two more ships in two days, a 7,600-ton American freighter and-awkwardly-the aged 1,900-ton Chilean neutral, arrived next. Passing southbound near Halifax, he found a 5,100-ton American freighter stopped outside the port, apparently waiting for a pilot. Mistakenly believing she was a much larger ship underway at 10 knots, von Bulow fired "a lot" of torpedoes at her before he got a hit and sank her. He then proceeded to the New York area, where he sank two more ships in two days, a 7,600-ton American freighter and-awkwardly-the aged 1,900-ton Chilean neutral, Tolten Tolten. Berlin had assured the pro-German Chilean government that its ships (bringing copper to the United States) were to enjoy safe passage, provided they were not in convoy or blacked out. In compliance with American rules, Tolten Tolten was blacked out, so von Bulow was not held responsible. One crewman survived the sinking. was blacked out, so von Bulow was not held responsible. One crewman survived the sinking.

Cruising southward off the New Jersey coast, low on torpedoes and fuel, on the evening of March 16 von Bulow found the 8,100-ton British tanker San Demetrio San Demetrio. Earlier in the war the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer had severely damaged this ship with gunfire during had severely damaged this ship with gunfire during Schee Schee's attack on convoy Halifax 84. By heroic efforts, the crew had saved her, an action which had been romanticized in a wartime propaganda film. Von Bulow hit her with a torpedo, just forward of the bridge. "Nothing happened," he remembered. "No boat was lowered. Nothing at all. Then all at once flames engulfed the entire length of the ship. The heat from the fire was so great I had to draw back to 800 meters or more." Nineteen of the fifty-three-man crew died in the inferno.

Having exhausted fuel and torpedoes to sink four confirmed ships for 22,700 tons on his maiden patrol-a noteworthy first outing-von Bulow commenced a slow, eighteen-day return to France. On the way, on March 22, he ran into an Allied force of "two cruisers, six destroyers, and five big ships" and shot his last two torpedoes. He heard two "thuds," but no explosions, leading him to conclude both torpedo pistols had failed. No other U-boat was able to respond to this rich find.

Two veteran boats of the February group converged on Cape Hatteras.

Johannes Liebe in the Type VII U-332 U-332 got there first, very low on fuel. Kerneval hoped to give him some fuel from Heyse's got there first, very low on fuel. Kerneval hoped to give him some fuel from Heyse's U-128 U-128, homebound from Florida waters, but Heyse, who was under orders to scout Bermuda, reported that owing to an acute shortage of food, he was unable to detour.* Restricted to merely six days, Liebe continued the slaughter off Cape Hatteras with the sinking of three ships: a four-masted 700-ton American sailing schooner, a 5,000-ton Yugoslavian freighter, and the 11,600-ton American tanker Restricted to merely six days, Liebe continued the slaughter off Cape Hatteras with the sinking of three ships: a four-masted 700-ton American sailing schooner, a 5,000-ton Yugoslavian freighter, and the 11,600-ton American tanker Australia Australia.

Johann Mohr in the Type IXB U-124 U-124 arrived next. Inbound near Bermuda, he sank the 7,200-ton tanker arrived next. Inbound near Bermuda, he sank the 7,200-ton tanker British Resource British Resource, which blew up, spewing flames 600 feet into the sky. Approaching Cape Hatteras waters on the evening of March 16 in the darkness of the new moon, Mohr sank a 1,700-ton Honduran freighter.

The next day, March 17, Mohr closed submerged on Cape Hatteras in shallow water. Beginning late that afternoon, in the space of eight hours he found and attacked three ships. His torpedoes sank two-a 5,100-ton Greek freighter and the 9,600-ton American tanker E. M. Clark E. M. Clark-and severely damaged the 6,900-ton American tanker Acme Acme. During these attacks, the four-stack destroyer Dickerson Dickerson and the 165-foot Coast Guard cutter and the 165-foot Coast Guard cutter Dione Dione (armed with a 3" bow gun, depth-charge racks, and Y guns) were on ASW patrol near Cape Hatteras. Engrossed in rescuing survivors of the Greek and the (armed with a 3" bow gun, depth-charge racks, and Y guns) were on ASW patrol near Cape Hatteras. Engrossed in rescuing survivors of the Greek and the E. M. Clark E. M. Clark, neither warship conducted an attack on U-124 U-124, but a Navy seaplane dropped two close depth charges, which rattled the boat and convinced Mohr to head for deeper water for a day's rest.

The following night, March 18-19, Mohr returned to shallow water in pitch darkness, navigating by the Cape Hatteras lighthouse and other helpful aids. The U-124 U-124 lay silently on the surface, waiting. Soon the bridge watch spotted two blacked-out American tankers: the southbound 6,000-ton lay silently on the surface, waiting. Soon the bridge watch spotted two blacked-out American tankers: the southbound 6,000-ton Papoose Papoose in ballast, and the northbound 7,000-ton in ballast, and the northbound 7,000-ton W. E. Hutton W. E. Hutton, loaded with 65,000 barrels of heating oil. Mohr coolly torpedoed both ships. Hutton Hutton exploded in a giant fireball. Fifteen of the total fifty-five crewmen on both ships perished. The survivors rowed to shore or were rescued. exploded in a giant fireball. Fifteen of the total fifty-five crewmen on both ships perished. The survivors rowed to shore or were rescued.

The four-stack destroyer Dickerson Dickerson raced south to the scene. En route, she came upon the northbound 7,700-ton American freighter raced south to the scene. En route, she came upon the northbound 7,700-ton American freighter Liberator Liberator, which had a 4" gun manned by a green Armed Guard crew. Mistaking Dickerson Dickerson for a U-boat, the gun crew on for a U-boat, the gun crew on Liberator Liberator opened fire. Remarkably, one or two rounds struck opened fire. Remarkably, one or two rounds struck Dickerson Dickerson's bridge. The blast killed two sailors, fatally wounded the skipper, John K. Reybold, and wrecked the bridge. Dickerson Dickerson returned to Norfolk for funerals and repairs, her fate, like that of returned to Norfolk for funerals and repairs, her fate, like that of Jacob Jones Jacob Jones, underscoring the futility and dangers of ASW hunter-killer patrols.

Perhaps attracted by the muzzle blasts of the gun on Liberator Liberator, Liebe in U-332 U-332, who was nearby but very low on fuel, bore in to attack her. His torpedoes struck solidly and Liberator Liberator went down. Five crewmen died in the sinking, but a Navy tugboat rescued thirty-five survivors, including the Armed Guard, who came ashore bragging that before being themselves sunk, they had hit-and sunk-a "U-boat," actually the destroyer went down. Five crewmen died in the sinking, but a Navy tugboat rescued thirty-five survivors, including the Armed Guard, who came ashore bragging that before being themselves sunk, they had hit-and sunk-a "U-boat," actually the destroyer Dickerson Dickerson. After expending his last three torpedoes on a tanker-all misses-Liebe commenced a protracted voyage home. He claimed four ships sunk for 22,000 tons; the postwar accounting confirmed four ships sunk but raised his tonnage to 25,000.

Mohr in U-124 U-124 hauled out to deep water again to rest his crew and to download torpedoes from the topside canisters. He returned submerged to Cape Hatteras in the late afternoon of March 20. By then, another veteran Type VII, Walter Flachsenberg in hauled out to deep water again to rest his crew and to download torpedoes from the topside canisters. He returned submerged to Cape Hatteras in the late afternoon of March 20. By then, another veteran Type VII, Walter Flachsenberg in U-71 U-71, who had sunk the 6,400-ton Norwegian tanker Ranja Ranja offshore, had entered the Cape Hatteras area. That night Flachsenberg sank a 5,800-ton American freighter, and Mohr in offshore, had entered the Cape Hatteras area. That night Flachsenberg sank a 5,800-ton American freighter, and Mohr in U-124 U-124 damaged by torpedo and gun two more blacked-out American tankers: the 8,000-ton damaged by torpedo and gun two more blacked-out American tankers: the 8,000-ton Esso Nashville Esso Nashville and the 11,400-ton and the 11,400-ton Atlantic Sun Atlantic Sun. Mohr claimed both ships sank, but they survived. Esso Nashville Esso Nashville broke in half; broke in half; Atlantic Sun Atlantic Sun escaped with slight damage. The destroyer-transport escaped with slight damage. The destroyer-transport McKean McKean, which was passing by, and two Coast Guard cutters salvaged the stern section of Esso Nashville Esso Nashville, which later returned to service with a new bow.

In his eight-day patrol off Cape Hatteras, Mohr had expended eighteen of his twenty torpedoes. On the last night, March 23, he shot the other two at the loaded northbound, 5,400-ton American tanker Naeco Naeco. She blew up in a fireball; twenty-four of her thirty-eight-man crew perished in the flames or water. The four-stack destroyer Roper Roper, the Coast Guard cutter Dione Dione, the minesweeper Osprey Osprey, and another naval vessel raced to the scene, but by that time Mohr was homebound in deep water. The ships could only collect Naeco Naeco's living and dead.

When Mohr compiled his final score, he was ecstatic: ten ships (eight tankers) sunk for 64,000 tons. He submitted his sinking report to Donitz in the form of a ditty, which the propagandist Wolfgang Frank later rendered into English, downgrading his tonnage: The new-moon night is black as ink Off Hatteras the tankers sink While sadly Roosevelt counts the score- Some 50,000 tons-by Mohr.

Both Mohr and Frank got the figures wrong. In actuality Mohr had sunk seven ships (five tankers) for 42,048 tons and damaged three tankers for 26,167 tons. Even so, when the severe damage to Acme Acme and and Esso Nashville Esso Nashville was figured in, Mohr's was the most productive patrol in American waters to then. Counting his overclaims and those on two prior patrols, Mohr exceeded 100,000 tons and qualified for a was figured in, Mohr's was the most productive patrol in American waters to then. Counting his overclaims and those on two prior patrols, Mohr exceeded 100,000 tons and qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. It was awarded promptly, and Mohr got the usual buildup from Berlin propagandists.*

Flachsenberg in U-71 U-71 remained in shallow Cape Hatteras waters. He reported that American air patrols had intensified and that the pilots "were now getting pretty slick with their bombs." Nonetheless, in the days following, Flachsenberg sank a loaded tanker and a freighter. In the wake of his attack on the tanker, the 8,000-ton remained in shallow Cape Hatteras waters. He reported that American air patrols had intensified and that the pilots "were now getting pretty slick with their bombs." Nonetheless, in the days following, Flachsenberg sank a loaded tanker and a freighter. In the wake of his attack on the tanker, the 8,000-ton Dixie Arrow Dixie Arrow, which blew up in a fireball, a Navy seaplane and the four-stack destroyer Tarbell Tarbell raced to the scene. The plane dropped two close bombs; raced to the scene. The plane dropped two close bombs; Tarbell Tarbell carried out an aggressive depth-charge attack, but she broke it off when it was realized her charges were injuring Allied survivors in the water. carried out an aggressive depth-charge attack, but she broke it off when it was realized her charges were injuring Allied survivors in the water. Tarbell Tarbell then rescued twenty-two of then rescued twenty-two of Dixie Arrow Dixie Arrow's thirty-three-man crew.

Homebound on March 31, Flachsenberg encountered several ships north of Bermuda. He sank the 12,900-ton British tanker San Gerardo San Gerardo. The next day he sank a 5,800-ton British freighter with his last torpedoes. Flachsenberg's total of five ships (three tankers) for 39,000 tons was one of the two most productive patrols by the Type VIIs in American waters. He returned to France April 20 after fifty-six days at sea-another VII record in this campaign-logging that he had traveled 7,906 miles.

The last of the February boats to arrive in United States waters were two Type IXs: the new skipper Heinrich Schuch in the veteran IXB U-105 U-105 and Georg Lassen in the new IXC and Georg Lassen in the new IXC U-160 U-160. Having apparently failed to follow a Great Circle route, Schuch ran critically low on fuel. Inbound, he sank two tankers, the 10,400-ton British Narragansett Narragansett and the 7,600-ton Norwegian and the 7,600-ton Norwegian Svenor Svenor, north of Bermuda, then proceeded to Cape Hatteras. His fuel shortage drastically restricted his action and he sank no other ships.

Lassen in U-160 U-160, who had been first watch officer on Schuhart's U-28 U-28 when the latter sank the carrier when the latter sank the carrier Courageous Courageous, had had a devastating setback during Baltic workup: an internal fire had killed seven of his crew and seriously wounded one other. Notwithstanding this reverse, and an undertrained crew, Lassen sank five ships and damaged a tanker. One of the ships was the 8,300-ton American cargo-passenger vessel City of New York City of New York, with 124 persons on board. The four-stacker Roper Roper rescued sixty-nine survivors, including a woman who had given birth to a baby in a lifeboat. Another victim was the 14,647-ton British cargo-passenger vessel rescued sixty-nine survivors, including a woman who had given birth to a baby in a lifeboat. Another victim was the 14,647-ton British cargo-passenger vessel Ulysses Ulysses, the second largest vessel after the Amerikaland Amerikaland to be sunk in American waters. En route from Australia to Halifax-thence to Britain- to be sunk in American waters. En route from Australia to Halifax-thence to Britain-Ulysses had a crew of 195 men and carried ninety-five passengers, including sixty-one women and children, and a cargo of 11,000 tons of pig iron, rubber, wool, and other goods. All 290 crew and passengers got away safely in ten lifeboats and were soon rescued by the destroyer-transport had a crew of 195 men and carried ninety-five passengers, including sixty-one women and children, and a cargo of 11,000 tons of pig iron, rubber, wool, and other goods. All 290 crew and passengers got away safely in ten lifeboats and were soon rescued by the destroyer-transport Manley Manley.

Although the Allies might have found it difficult to credit, the foray of the February group was not altogether satisfactory in German eyes, owing mainly to the disappointing returns from the Type IXs. Nine Type IXs had sailed, but two had aborted, one had been lost, and one (U-105) had arrived with insufficient fuel for a fully effective patrol. As a consequence, the nine Type IXs that embarked for the Americas had sunk, in total, only twenty-eight ships (thirteen tankers) for 176,630 tons, half accounted for by two skippers, Mohr in U-124 U-124 and Bauer in and Bauer in U-126 U-126. This was a disappointing decline to an average of 3.1 confirmed ships sunk per Type IX per patrol.

In contrast, the returns from the VIIs were very good. Nine VIIs had sailed. As related, Krech in U-558 U-558 had returned to France after his successful attack on Outbound North 67, Borcherdt in had returned to France after his successful attack on Outbound North 67, Borcherdt in U-587 U-587 had been held in Canadian waters, and Kroning in had been held in Canadian waters, and Kroning in U-656 U-656 had been sunk inbound to the Americas. Thus only six of the nine VIIs intended for United States waters actually got there, but the six sank twenty-two ships, including the destroyer had been sunk inbound to the Americas. Thus only six of the nine VIIs intended for United States waters actually got there, but the six sank twenty-two ships, including the destroyer Jacob Jones Jacob Jones. When added to the sinkings of Krech and Borcherdt, sinkings by the VIIs per boat were slightly greater than those of the IXs: twenty-nine ships (ten tankers) for 167,864 tons, an average of 3.2 confirmed ships sunk per boat per patrol.

Despite the disappointing returns of the IXs, in aggregate the eighteen boats of the February group struck another heavy blow at Allied shipping: fifty-seven confirmed ships (twenty-three tankers) sunk for 344,494 tons. In return, the Allies had sunk three U-boats with the loss of all hands: U-503, U-587 U-503, U-587, and U-656 U-656.

HEATED E EXCHANGES.

The slaughter off Cape Hatteras by Mohr in U-124 U-124 and the other February boats infuriated London. Where were the American destroyers which had been released from the North Atlantic run to form coastal convoys? Could not coastal convoys be initiated with the British ASW trawlers that had just arrived? Why not transfer some American destroyers from the Pacific to the Atlantic? and the other February boats infuriated London. Where were the American destroyers which had been released from the North Atlantic run to form coastal convoys? Could not coastal convoys be initiated with the British ASW trawlers that had just arrived? Why not transfer some American destroyers from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

Most British officials apparently refused to understand the American problem: the density of the ship traffic, the immensely long coastline, the shortage of proper escorts owing to other urgent tasks. The British obtuseness and ignorance are perfectly reflected in a private diary entry of Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, of March 16, in which he quite wrongly assumes that the ten British corvettes and twenty-four British ASW trawlers had already arrived in the United States: "Not much news, except of fearful sinkings-nearly all on American coast. Americans do do certainly seem to be terrifyingly inefficient. And we have lent them about forty naval vessels!" certainly seem to be terrifyingly inefficient. And we have lent them about forty naval vessels!"*

Needlessly drawing attention to the "immense" tanker losses, on March 12 Churchill cabled President Roosevelt's troubleshooter, Harry Hopkins, demanding "drastic action" to expand the convoy network. Unless it were done-and done quickly-Churchill insisted, the British would be compelled to halt tanker sailings and to take other drastic steps which would reduce vital British imports, already well below absolute minimum requirements. on March 12 Churchill cabled President Roosevelt's troubleshooter, Harry Hopkins, demanding "drastic action" to expand the convoy network. Unless it were done-and done quickly-Churchill insisted, the British would be compelled to halt tanker sailings and to take other drastic steps which would reduce vital British imports, already well below absolute minimum requirements.

Roosevelt replied on March 16 that under the new King escort plan for the North Atlantic run, "we had hoped that ten United States destroyers would ... be made available for work on the Atlantic seaboard," but that "this has not worked out completely," in part because: * The British had not yet provided a full quota of MOEF escorts and owing to that, "it has been necessary to reinforce eastbound British midocean escorts" with American vessels.

* The Canadians likewise had not yet provided a full quota of escorts for WLEF and owing to "the weakness of the Canadian western local escorts" American vessels had to stay with westbound convoys about 300 extra miles "westward of the agreed limit," WESTOMP.

* The unforeseen decision to deploy Task Force 39 (renamed 99) to Scapa Flow to reinforce the British Home Fleet was to cause a further drain of American destroyers.

* The British ASW trawlers "have only recently arrived or are approaching" and those that had arrived were undergoing "essential voyage repairs.

Roosevelt expressed the hope that Churchill could have a talk with First Sea Lord Dudley Pound "to see if we can't get the complete revision of the transatlantic escort working so that the ten destroyers can get on to the patrol along our Atlantic seaboard...." He went on to say that "I feel sure we are going to get on top of this but it requires some help from you during the next few weeks."

In the meantime, for the "next few weeks" Roosevelt had two suggestions for Churchill which would "more effectively deal with the submarine": * Open out the cycle of transatlantic convoys to sailings every "eight days"* until July 1, at which time "our mounting production of small escort vessels [SCs, PCs] and planes will come into full play." until July 1, at which time "our mounting production of small escort vessels [SCs, PCs] and planes will come into full play."

* Direct Western Approaches personally to order British merchant vessels operating in the western Atlantic "to conform to routes prescribed by the [U.S.] Navy" and to douse running lights at night.

The opening out of the cargo-convoy cycle on the North Atlantic run would, of course, further reduce vital British imports. However, Roosevelt thought that preferable to the "unwise" Admiralty alternative proposal to reduce the number of escorts per North Atlantic cargo convoy. In any case, Roosevelt hastened to add, with the American merchant-shipbuilding program going so well, he was "sure" that any decline in vital British imports caused by opening out the convoy cycle could be made up "in the second half of the year."

Perhaps regretting the asperity of his March 16 communication, on March 18 Roosevelt again wrote Churchill to say, in part, that he expected by May 1 to get "a pretty good coastal patrol working from Newfoundland to Florida and through the West Indies." To do so, Roosevelt went on, he had "begged, borrowed and stolen every vessel of every description over eighty feet long...." Roosevelt then took a gratuitous and wholly unjustified swipe at admirals King and Stark and others, which has been exploited by King's critics: My Navy has been definitely slack in preparing for this submarine war off our coast. As I need not tell you, most Naval officers have declined in the past to think in terms of any vessel of less than two thousand tons. You learned that lesson two years ago. We still have to learn it.