* In support of his argument that the North Atlantic run was "quiet" at this time and therefore a shift of ASW forces was prudent and justified, Gannon cites figures to show how few convoys were attacked and ships were lost in that area. But these figures are not convincing, as ship losses to U-boats in that area were seldom high. As related, 98 percent of the ships in North Atlantic convoys-literally thousands upon thousands of vessels-reached destinations. In support of his argument that the North Atlantic run was "quiet" at this time and therefore a shift of ASW forces was prudent and justified, Gannon cites figures to show how few convoys were attacked and ships were lost in that area. But these figures are not convincing, as ship losses to U-boats in that area were seldom high. As related, 98 percent of the ships in North Atlantic convoys-literally thousands upon thousands of vessels-reached destinations.

*Catalinas helped escort Troop Convoys AT 10 and BT 200. Others provided escort for the new British "jeep" carrier Archer Archer, which, as related, collided with another vessel during workup in the Caribbean and was being towed to Charleston by the Navy tug Cherokee Cherokee.

*Owing to the difficulties of operating Catalina seaplanes in the freezing waters of Newfoundland, the Army had grudgingly agreed to equip the Navy's Patrol Squadron 82, based in Argentia, with "land-based" Hudsons that had been earmarked for the RAF. Bristol's message, on January 28 at 2317 hours, concluded: "Pilot D F Mason Amm 1st Class NAP whose first report was Sighted Sub Sank Same."

* By January 1, 1942, seventy-three ships (fifty-nine corvettes, fourteen destroyers) of the Royal Navy in all waters had been fitted with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar. By January 1, 1942, seventy-three ships (fifty-nine corvettes, fourteen destroyers) of the Royal Navy in all waters had been fitted with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar.

* Examples: Commissioned on November 22, 1941, Examples: Commissioned on November 22, 1941, U-438 U-438 sailed from the Baltic on August 1, 1942. Commissioned on December 11, 1941, sailed from the Baltic on August 1, 1942. Commissioned on December 11, 1941, U-600 U-600 sailed on July 14, 1942. Commissioned February 26, 1942, sailed on July 14, 1942. Commissioned February 26, 1942, U-611 U-611 sailed on October 1, 1942. sailed on October 1, 1942.

* The British submarine The British submarine Unbeaten Unbeaten sank sank U-374 U-374 off Sicily on January 12, 1942, and recovered one survivor, a bridge lookout. British aircraft sank off Sicily on January 12, 1942, and recovered one survivor, a bridge lookout. British aircraft sank U-577 U-577 off Tobruk on January 9, 1942, with the loss of all hands. The off Tobruk on January 9, 1942, with the loss of all hands. The U-331 U-331 ran hard aground off Tobruk on January 27, 1942, but in an amazing display of resourcefulness and seamanship, von Tiesenhausen saved her and returned to base. ran hard aground off Tobruk on January 27, 1942, but in an amazing display of resourcefulness and seamanship, von Tiesenhausen saved her and returned to base.

An Italian agent, employed in the American Embassy in Cairo, had broken into a safe and photographed the American "Black" code materials, which the military attaches used to inform Washington of British plans and operations and military strength in North Africa.

*Corvettes and the fifty British frigates under delayed construction in the United States and their American counterparts, the destroyer escorts, were to be fitted with Hedgehogs. The Americans had in the works a small version of Hedgehog, called Mousetrap, for installation on SCs SCs and and PCs PCs. The Mousetrap was designed to forward fire eight contact bombs by means of rockets, which had no recoil.

* Pfeifer filed formal, written charges against the British, asserting that while in distress, his ship was unlawfully sunk in neutral Portuguese waters. Bockett-Pugh, awarded the DSO for the sinking, rightly dismissed the charges as nonsense. The Admiralty concurred. Pfeifer filed formal, written charges against the British, asserting that while in distress, his ship was unlawfully sunk in neutral Portuguese waters. Bockett-Pugh, awarded the DSO for the sinking, rightly dismissed the charges as nonsense. The Admiralty concurred.

EIGHT.

THE L LOSS OF N NAVAL E ENIGMA.

Thanks to the captures of naval Enigma materials in the spring of 1941, the British had been able to read three-rotor Enigma on the Heimisch Heimisch network (Dolphin to the British) with little delay until the end of that year. The principal source of cribs for breaking this traffic was the short-signal book captured from network (Dolphin to the British) with little delay until the end of that year. The principal source of cribs for breaking this traffic was the short-signal book captured from U-110 U-110, which the U-boats used for making weather reports. The short-signal weather reports were carelessly rebroadcast by German meteorological stations in a less secure code that the British could read. Working back from the readable text of the meteorological stations, the British were usually able to puzzle out the daily key settings for U-boat Enigma with little delay and minimum usage of bombes.

By January 1942, the Germans had issued to the Atlantic and Mediterranean U-boats new four-rotor Enigma machines and a new short-signal book for use on the new U-boat Enigma net, Triton Triton (Shark to the British). Had the British had a copy of the new short-signal book, very likely they could have broken back into Naval Enigma by means of the rebroadcast meteorological traffic. But absent the new short-signal books, they were stymied. They could not read four-rotor Enigma, an incalculable setback. (Shark to the British). Had the British had a copy of the new short-signal book, very likely they could have broken back into Naval Enigma by means of the rebroadcast meteorological traffic. But absent the new short-signal books, they were stymied. They could not read four-rotor Enigma, an incalculable setback.

There were several possibilities for breaking into four-rotor Enigma in use on the Triton Triton (Shark) net. The fastest way was to capture a copy of the new short-signal book. Doubtless that had been one purpose behind the British commando raid in Norway in late December, but no short-signal books had been found. Another way was to feed such cribs as could be obtained from other sources into the three-rotor bombes. But it took three-rotor bombes twenty-six times longer to find the daily settings of a four-rotor Enigma. Yet another way was to build fast, high-technology, four-rotor bombes. The British pursued the first and third possibilities, even though there was much doubt that a four-rotor bombe could be designed and produced in time to influence the outcome of the war. (Shark) net. The fastest way was to capture a copy of the new short-signal book. Doubtless that had been one purpose behind the British commando raid in Norway in late December, but no short-signal books had been found. Another way was to feed such cribs as could be obtained from other sources into the three-rotor bombes. But it took three-rotor bombes twenty-six times longer to find the daily settings of a four-rotor Enigma. Yet another way was to build fast, high-technology, four-rotor bombes. The British pursued the first and third possibilities, even though there was much doubt that a four-rotor bombe could be designed and produced in time to influence the outcome of the war.

The loss of Atlantic U-boat Enigma imposed a tremendous burden on Rodger Winn and his assistants in the Admiralty's U-boat Tracking Room. Although Winn could draw upon a large store of knowledge accumulated during the six months of 1941 when Bletchley Park was reading the Heimisch Heimisch (Dolphin) network, a steadily improving land-based British HF/DF network and (Dolphin) network, a steadily improving land-based British HF/DF network and Werft Werft traffic, POW interrogations, photo reconnaissance in the Baltic, and German propaganda in various media glorifying U-boat skippers, he could no longer provide exact and timely tactical information on Atlantic U-boat movements. After the Germans switched to four-rotor Enigma, Winn's weekly U-boat summary of February 9 was gloomy: "Since the end of January, no Special Information has been available about any U-boats other than those controlled by Admiral Norway. Inevitably the Atlantic picture is 'out of focus.' Little can be said with any confidence in estimating the present and future movements of U-boats." traffic, POW interrogations, photo reconnaissance in the Baltic, and German propaganda in various media glorifying U-boat skippers, he could no longer provide exact and timely tactical information on Atlantic U-boat movements. After the Germans switched to four-rotor Enigma, Winn's weekly U-boat summary of February 9 was gloomy: "Since the end of January, no Special Information has been available about any U-boats other than those controlled by Admiral Norway. Inevitably the Atlantic picture is 'out of focus.' Little can be said with any confidence in estimating the present and future movements of U-boats."

The British contempt for Admiral King and America's alleged inability to cope with or its indifference to the U-boat threat has drawn stinging rebukes and silly statements from British and American historians, but none sillier than that of Francis H. Hinsley, the official historian of British intelligence in World War II. In his otherwise superlative history, he writes, in effect, that so inept were the Americans at ASW that the Allied loss of Atlantic U-boat Enigma at the very time Donitz launched the all-out U-boat attack on the Americas did not really adversely affect the Allies. "Not even the best intelligence about their [U-boat] activities off the American coast," Hinsley wrote, "would have facilitated either an effective counterattack on them or the effective evasive routing of shipping so long as the U-boats were at liberty, in the absence of air cover, to operate close inshore and, in the absence of a convoy system, to do so against unprotected shipping."

To the contrary, had the Allies not lost naval Enigma, the story of the U-boat assault on America might have been quite different. Along with other vital bits of information, naval Enigma doubtless would have revealed that: * The U-boat attack on the Americas was not a token gesture or feint but rather an all-out effort employing every U-boat Donitz could lay his hands on and increasing in scale week by week.

* The U-boat campaign in United States waters was to include not only the twenty Type IXs existing on January 1, 1942, the status and movements of which were fairly well known to Allied intelligence, but also a mass of Type VIIs, which, owing to their limited range, had not been foreseen as a threat to American waters.

* Some U-tankers were to be employed to support the campaign in the Americas. They were to provide fuel, food, medical backup, and spare parts for both the Type VII and Type IX attack boats, thus increasing the range, endurance, and productivity of both. Had the Allies learned of this important new dimension in the U-boat war much earlier than was the case, they could have planned countermeasures, such as a carrier strike at a refueling rendezvous, when many U-boats were present and relatively vulnerable. As will be seen, for all too many months the British intelligence agencies refused to credit the rumors of "U-tankers."

* Owing to the close access to deep (hence safer) water, the U-boats were to concentrate attacks off the Cape Hatteras area and off the southern coast of Florida, where the continental shelf was narrowest and most favorable for submarine operations. Had this been known, the Americans could have marshalled their weak ASW forces at those places sooner than they did, especially at Cape Hatteras.

* U-boats were to operate in United States waters not in groups, or wolf packs, as was then standard practice, but singly, maintaining radio silence. Had these important tactical facts been deduced from decrypted Enigma, American naval officers from King down might have been much more willing to risk convoying in those waters despite the dearth of escorts. A single U-boat could usually sink only one or two ships in a convoy before being pinned down or evaded and, while the radio-silence rule was in force, could not summon other boats.

* The big German surface ships (Tirpitz, etc.) were unable for various reasons to make sorties into the Atlantic in early 1942 to attack Allied convoys. Had this been positively known from Enigma, the Americans could have earlier released their heavy naval counterforces at Iceland, Bermuda, and Argentia, and perhaps even reduced the number of destroyers in troopship convoys. If so, destroyers for use in a convoy network along the Eastern Seaboard could have been made available much sooner.

* German codebreakers at B-dienst B-dienst had made a substantial penetration into Naval Cypher Number 3, employed by the Allies for most convoy operations. According to intelligence historian Hinsley, for about ten months in 1942 (about February 15 to December 15) had made a substantial penetration into Naval Cypher Number 3, employed by the Allies for most convoy operations. According to intelligence historian Hinsley, for about ten months in 1942 (about February 15 to December 15) B-dienst B-dienst could read "a large proportion of the signals-sometimes as much as 80 percent." Decrypts of naval Enigma might well have revealed this grave lapse in Allied naval communications security, which in 1942 gave the Germans a decided advantage in the seesaw battle of codebreaking. could read "a large proportion of the signals-sometimes as much as 80 percent." Decrypts of naval Enigma might well have revealed this grave lapse in Allied naval communications security, which in 1942 gave the Germans a decided advantage in the seesaw battle of codebreaking.

To this time there was still no free exchange of cryptographic technology between the British and the Americans. The British had provided Admiral King with Rodger Winn's estimates on probable U-boat operations in the Atlantic, derived in part from Enigma and Werft Werft, but they had not fully revealed their secret techniques for breaking Enigma. With the formal entry of America into the war and the nearly simultaneous loss of naval Enigma, and the increasing ship losses in American waters, the British finally began to share their hard-earned cryptographic technology with the Americans.

This technology exchange was lent impetus by President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. On February 25, Churchill wrote an extraordinary private note to Roosevelt, which was hand-carried to Washington in a diplomatic pouch. Churchill asked Roosevelt to "burn" the letter after reading, but the President did not, and a copy was published in 1989 by Louis Kruh.* In part: In part: One night when we talked late [during the Arcadia Conference] you spoke of the importance of our cipher people getting into close contact with yours. I shall be very ready to put any expert you care to nominate in touch with my technicians. Ciphers for our two navies have been and are continually a matter for frank discussion between our two Services. But diplomatic and military [Army and Air Forces] are of equal importance and we appear to know nothing officially of your versions of these....

In fact, Churchill went on, "some time ago" British codebreakers had cracked some codes used by the American "diplomatic corps." Churchill had put a stop to that activity "from the moment when we became Allies"(!), as he put it, but he had been advised that the possibility that "our enemies" had also broken these diplomatic codes could not be dismissed.

At this time the American codebreaking agencies were in a swivet, particularly those of the U.S. Navy, which had failed to detect in advance any hint of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In the weeks following that disaster, a bureaucratic battle for control of that anomalous and vulnerable group had erupted in the Navy Department. The principal contestants had been the new Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Theodore S. Wilkinson, and the Director of the Office of Naval Communications (ONC), Leigh Noyes, and his deputy, Joseph R. Redman. Distrustful of ONI's ability to do anything right, Admiral King had sided with Noyes and Redman, and therefore ONC had won control of U.S. Navy codebreakers.

Among the many notable changes Noyes and Redman initiated was the bureaucratic beheading of Laurence Safford, who had commanded the Navy code-breaking unit (OP20G) brilliantly for almost six years. Inasmuch as a free exchange of cryptographic technology with the British was in the works and Safford had made no secret of his distrust of and hostility to the British (for not giving bombe technology in exchange for the Purple machine), Noyes and Redman decided to remove Safford from the mainstream. Denying Safford's appeal to keep his post, on February 14 Noyes transferred him from command of OP20G to OP20Q, an outfit concerned with the security of American (and Allied) codes and research. As one consequence, Safford did not receive a high wartime decoration and was not selected to flag rank, a scandalous injustice in the view of most of the old hands in OP20G.

This demotion naturally angered and depressed Safford. Doubtless it colored a memo he wrote on March 18 to Noyes and Redman. As Safford put it, the reason for the memo was to stress the need to safeguard the secrets of the breaking of Japanese codes by sharply limiting the dissemination of information derived from this source. However, owing to the pessimistic asides in the memo, it has attained near-legendary status among historians of American codebreaking.

Typically Safford opened his memo with a slap at the British. They had done a good job in World War I of DFing U-boats and decrypting U-boat radio traffic, he wrote, then had stupidly and egotistically bragged about it in print after the war. "Apparently it never occurred to the British that the Germans would profit by these revelations," Safford wrote accusingly.

Admiral Ernest Joseph King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet (CominCh) from December 20, 1941, and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from March 26, 1942. He held those posts throughout the war and retired on December 15, 1945.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, onetime Assistant Secretary of the Navy, demanded and got an awesome "two-ocean navy" in World War II but failed to properly prepare the U.S. Navy for the U-boat threat in the Atlantic.

Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Commander in Chief Eastern Sea Frontier, was an able leader, but in 1942 he lacked the "tools" to combat the U-boat assault on the Americas.

Admiral Royal Eason Ingersoll relieved Admiral King as Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet in December 1941.

Admiral Percy W. Nelles, Chief of the Royal Canadian Naval Staff from 1934 to 1943.

Reinhard Hardegen, skipper of the Type IXB U-123 U-123, who led Drumbeat, the U-boat assault on East Coast shipping in January 1942.

Erich Topp, skipper of U-552 U-552, launched Drumbeat in Canadian waters. In the war, he sank thirty-four ships for 185,434 tons, to rank fourth among all skippers.

Peter-Erich Cremer, another Drumbeater, commanded U-333 U-333 on two patrols to the U.S. East Coast. on two patrols to the U.S. East Coast.

The vast majority of all North Atlantic convoys got through unharmed by U-boats. Here a convoy forms up in an East Coast anchorage.

American blimps provided added convoy escort for a limited distance offshore.

The burning American tanker S.S. Robert C. Tuttle Robert C. Tuttle struck a mine off Norfolk, Virginia, planted by the Type VII struck a mine off Norfolk, Virginia, planted by the Type VII U-701. U-701. The The Tuttle Tuttle was salvaged, but American forces sank was salvaged, but American forces sank U-701. U-701.

A convoy arrives safely at its destination.

The Duane Duane, one of six big American Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutters that also served as convoy escorts in the North Atlantic, plows into typically heavy seas.

The U.S.S. Toucey, Toucey, a World War I "four-stack" destroyer, commissioned December 9, 1919. President Roosevelt "lent" the British and Canadian navies fifty such vessels in the fall of 1940 in return for base rights at sites in the Western Hemisphere. These and the other American four-stacks served as troop and cargo convoy escorts. a World War I "four-stack" destroyer, commissioned December 9, 1919. President Roosevelt "lent" the British and Canadian navies fifty such vessels in the fall of 1940 in return for base rights at sites in the Western Hemisphere. These and the other American four-stacks served as troop and cargo convoy escorts.

A corvette, the workhorse cargo convoy escort of the North Atlantic. Shown here, the Royal Canadian Navy's Kitchener. Kitchener. British and Canadian shipyards produced hundreds of corvettes. Cheaply built, miserably wet and brutally uncomfortable, the corvette nonetheless played a decisive role in the Battle of the Atlantic. British and Canadian shipyards produced hundreds of corvettes. Cheaply built, miserably wet and brutally uncomfortable, the corvette nonetheless played a decisive role in the Battle of the Atlantic.

A British-built carrier-based Swordfish torpedo bomber. When fitted with radar and depth charges, these old planes served well in the early years of the war as antisubmarine weapons systems.

The long-range Catalina patrol bomber. American and Canadian factories produced 3,290 Catalinas during the war. The Canadians called this plane the Canso, one of which is shown here. Originally designed to be a flying boat, some later versions were fitted with wheels to become amphibians.

The British-designed and built Sunderland flying boat, employed by RAF Coastal Command in antisubmarine operations. The British produced about seven hundred Sunderlands during the war, some of which were supplied to Commonwealth squadrons.

The American-designed Lockheed Hudson, built in America and Britain. Shown here is the newer, slightly larger U.S. Navy version, the Ventura.

The American-designed and -built B-24 Liberator patrol bomber, a highly effective antisubmarine weapon as well as a strategic heavy bomber.

American aircraft attack and sink the Type XB (minelayer-tanker) U-118. U-118.

The big Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutter Spencer Spencer attacks the Type IXC attacks the Type IXC U-175 U-175 with a salvo of depth charges. with a salvo of depth charges.

After blowing U-175 U-175 to the surface, a to the surface, a Spencer Spencer boarding party attempts but fails to enter the boat to seize intelligence materials. boarding party attempts but fails to enter the boat to seize intelligence materials.

Final gasp of U-175. U-175. The The Spencer Spencer closes to rescue German survivors. closes to rescue German survivors.

A famous photograph symbolizing the defeat of the German U-boat force shows a survivor of U-175 U-175 pleading for rescue. pleading for rescue.

Shocked survivors of U-175 U-175 huddle on the deck of the huddle on the deck of the Spencer. Spencer.

As one consequence of the British disclosures, he went on, in World War II "German ciphers and communications procedure are such that the information obtainable by radio is substantially zero." With the exception of "weather codes" and certain other "minor systems," Safford continued, the only German naval messages that had been read had been "the result of captures."

Therefore, he concluded glumly, "our prospects of ever breaking the German 'Enigma' cipher machine are rather poor."

On their part, the British remained contemptuous of the American intelligence setup in general and codebreaking in particular. There was still no centralized intelligence agency in Washington, no place where all the bits and pieces of information on the enemy came together for analysis and dissemination. Codebreakers in the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and FBI still toiled in nearly complete isolation, more or less competing with one another, rather than working as a unified team, a la Bletchley Park. The pressures of war-the challenge of breaking naval and other Enigmas for one-demanded closer cooperation between British and American intelligence services. It was coming, but the traditional barriers and safeguards gave way all too slowly. Not until April did the British and Americans take positive steps toward meaningful intelligence exchanges.

FIRST T TYPE VII P VII PATROLS T TO T THE U UNITED S STATES.

Notwithstanding the diversion of nearly fifty Type VII U-boats to duty in the Mediterranean and in the defense of Norway, as well as the delays caused by the worst ice of the century in the Baltic, Donitz was able to send twenty-six boats to American waters in January of 1942: twelve Type IXs and fourteen Type VIIs.

The boats sailing to the Americas in January were to cover an enormous area reaching from Canada to the Caribbean. The twelve Type IXs were to patrol the more distant United States East Coast and the Caribbean. Notwithstanding the "heavy" ASW measures, "tremendous cold," and poor returns of the December VIIs, the bulk of the January VIIs were to patrol Canadian waters, although three VIIs were to venture experimentally into United States waters.

Seven of the twelve Type IXs that put out in January were to attack shipping directly in United States coastal waters. Five of these were older, shorter-range model IXBs that had carried out the attack on Freetown the previous year. Outbound from France, one, Heinrich Schuch in U-105 U-105, ran into convoy Sierra Leone 98 and with two torpedoes sank one of the escorts, the former Coast Guard cutter Mendota Mendota, redesignated as the sloop Culver Culver, which was fitted not only with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar but also one of the most advanced British shipboard HF/DF (Huff Duff) sets. Immediately thereafter Schuch was directed to search for Spreewald Spreewald survivors and, as related, upon finding some, aborted to France. The other four IXBs patrolled from New York to Cape Hatteras. The other two boats of this group, both new longer-range Type IXCs, patrolled farther south in Florida waters. survivors and, as related, upon finding some, aborted to France. The other four IXBs patrolled from New York to Cape Hatteras. The other two boats of this group, both new longer-range Type IXCs, patrolled farther south in Florida waters.

When the first of these six Type IXs reached United States waters in late January and early February, they found that ASW measures had not improved very much. Apart from various defensive steps in the Eastern Sea Frontier, the most important new measure was the temporary employment of Catalinas on loan from the Atlantic Fleet for ASW patrols.

The new "straight through" King convoy plan for the North Atlantic run, effective February 4, yielded, as promised, ten destroyers to cadre a convoy network on the Eastern Seaboard. Seven of these,* all modern, were "made available" to Admiral Andrews of the Eastern Sea Frontier in the period February 6 to February 8. However, the proffered British component of this network (ten corvettes, twenty-four ASW trawlers) was nowhere to be seen. In fact, none of these British vessels was to arrive for weeks. Andrews mustered a total of twenty-eight other vessels in his frontier that were capable-but only just barely-of coastwise convoying but, as he told King, he needed a minimum of twice that number of ships merely to initiate convoying. all modern, were "made available" to Admiral Andrews of the Eastern Sea Frontier in the period February 6 to February 8. However, the proffered British component of this network (ten corvettes, twenty-four ASW trawlers) was nowhere to be seen. In fact, none of these British vessels was to arrive for weeks. Andrews mustered a total of twenty-eight other vessels in his frontier that were capable-but only just barely-of coastwise convoying but, as he told King, he needed a minimum of twice that number of ships merely to initiate convoying.

A further complication arose. Another big troopship convoy, AT 12, was scheduled to leave New York February 10. The fact that the Admiralty had provided only two four-stack destroyers at EASTOMP to escort the first such convoy, AT 10, had infuriated King. He therefore pointedly telexed the Admiralty to ask if it could provide AT 12 proper escort from EASTOMP. The Admiralty replied that owing to the need to escort its own troopship convoy, Winston Special 16, it could not provide substantial escort for AT 12 until the end of February. It therefore became necessary to postpone the departure of AT 12 by nine days, to February 19, at which time six of the seven destroyers (less Roe Roe) on temporary duty with the Eastern Sea Frontier were assigned to reinforce the escort of AT 12. To replace them, Ingersoll released four four-stacks, which, of course, were less satisfactory both in number and quality. In all, Ingersoll was able to loan Andrews eleven different destroyers for ASW purposes in February. which, of course, were less satisfactory both in number and quality. In all, Ingersoll was able to loan Andrews eleven different destroyers for ASW purposes in February.

Notwithstanding the obvious dearth of escorts, the British continued to pressure King to initiate convoying on the Eastern Seaboard. On February 12, King directed Andrews to submit a convoy plan. Andrews in turn queried the commanders of the naval districts within his frontier. All remained opposed to convoying until such time as sufficient escorts were available. Reminding King that each day sixty-six different northbound ships and a "like number" of southbound ships passed through his frontier (a total of 120 to 130 vessels daily), for which a minimum of sixty-eight escorts were required, Andrews recommended that "no attempt be made to protect coastwise shipping by a convoy system until an adequate number of suitable escort vessels is available."

At about this same time, February 12, the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and and Gneisenau Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen left Brest on the "channel dash" to Germany. The sudden movement of these big German ships increased the threat of an Atlantic sortie by them or left Brest on the "channel dash" to Germany. The sudden movement of these big German ships increased the threat of an Atlantic sortie by them or Tirpitz Tirpitz and and Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer or by all of them, possibly in conjunction with the Vichy naval forces at Martinique, to attack Allied cargo and troop convoys. Because the Allies could not read naval Enigma, this possibility froze Atlantic Fleet heavy units-and attendant destroyers-at Iceland, Bermuda, Argentia, and Casco Bay, Maine. or by all of them, possibly in conjunction with the Vichy naval forces at Martinique, to attack Allied cargo and troop convoys. Because the Allies could not read naval Enigma, this possibility froze Atlantic Fleet heavy units-and attendant destroyers-at Iceland, Bermuda, Argentia, and Casco Bay, Maine.

Accidents to Atlantic Fleet destroyers continued to contribute to the shortage of that type of vessel. On February 18, the valuable 14,000-ton Navy supply ship Pollux Pollux, en route to Argentia, and two escorting destroyers, Truxtun Truxtun and and Wilkes Wilkes, ran aground on the Avalon Peninsula in a wild storm. The Pollux Pollux and the four-stacker and the four-stacker Truxtun Truxtun were completely wrecked, with the loss of 212 out of 386 men in the two crews. Although damaged, were completely wrecked, with the loss of 212 out of 386 men in the two crews. Although damaged, Wilkes Wilkes, a new destroyer, managed to back off and survive. She returned to service after extensive repairs.

The most successful of the six January Type IXs patrolling United States waters was Hermann Rasch in the veteran U-106 U-106, making his second patrol as skipper. Still under a cloud for having lost the entire bridge watch on his first patrol to Newfoundland, Rasch hunted off the coast of New York, Delaware, and Maryland. In two weeks, January 24 to February 6, he sank by torpedo and gun five ships for 42,000 tons, including the 6,800-ton American tanker Rochester Rochester and one of the largest and fastest passenger-cargo vessels in the world, the 15,400-ton Swede, and one of the largest and fastest passenger-cargo vessels in the world, the 15,400-ton Swede, Amerikaland. Amerikaland. His patrol not only removed all doubts about his competence, but also earned a well-done from Donitz and from Berlin propagandists. His patrol not only removed all doubts about his competence, but also earned a well-done from Donitz and from Berlin propagandists.

The other three IXBs attacking from New York to Cape Hatteras had good success despite a large number of torpedo misses or failures.

* Between February 2 and February 5, Werner Winter in U-103 U-103 (four torpedo failures or misses) sank by gun and torpedo four confirmed ships for 26,500 tons, including three American tankers: the 6,200-ton (four torpedo failures or misses) sank by gun and torpedo four confirmed ships for 26,500 tons, including three American tankers: the 6,200-ton W. L. Steed; W. L. Steed; the 8,300-ton the 8,300-ton India Arrow; India Arrow; the 8,400-ton the 8,400-ton China Arrow. China Arrow. Winter also claimed a "destroyer" but it was not so. Winter also claimed a "destroyer" but it was not so.

* In the eleven days from February 8 to February 18, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Klaus Scholtz in holder Klaus Scholtz in U-108 U-108 (four torpedo failures or misses) sank five freighters for 20,000 tons, including (four torpedo failures or misses) sank five freighters for 20,000 tons, including Ocean Venture Ocean Venture, one of the sixty Liberty ships built for Britain, embarked on her maiden voyage.

* In the period from January 31 to February 6, Harald Gelhaus in U-107 U-107 (three torpedo misses or failures) sank two ships for 10,800 tons, including the 7,400-ton British tanker (three torpedo misses or failures) sank two ships for 10,800 tons, including the 7,400-ton British tanker San Arcadio San Arcadio, which was sailing well offshore.

The two new longer-range IXCs which patrolled Florida waters were Ulrich Heyse, age thirty-five, in U-128 U-128, who had been delayed for months repairing damage incurred in a grounding en route to Norway, and Fritz Poske, age thirty-seven, in the new U-504. U-504. Florida, like Cape Hatteras, where the continental shelf was very narrow, proved to be a rich and relatively safe hunting ground. The deep-water sanctuary began merely ten miles offshore at the edge of the north-flowing Gulf Stream, a natural and heavily traveled sea-lane. Florida, like Cape Hatteras, where the continental shelf was very narrow, proved to be a rich and relatively safe hunting ground. The deep-water sanctuary began merely ten miles offshore at the edge of the north-flowing Gulf Stream, a natural and heavily traveled sea-lane.

Both boats operated in an overlapping coastal area between Daytona Beach and Palm Beach in good warm weather and moonlight conditions, with no interference from ASW forces, despite the heavy phosphorescence of the water. In the period from February 19 to March 5, Heyse in U-128 U-128 sank by torpedo two American tankers ( sank by torpedo two American tankers (Pan Massachusetts, 8,200 tons, and Cities Service Empire Cities Service Empire, 8,100 tons) and the 11,000-ton Norwegian tanker O. A. Knudsen O. A. Knudsen by torpedo and gun east of the Bahamas. From February 22 to February 26, Poske in by torpedo and gun east of the Bahamas. From February 22 to February 26, Poske in U-504 U-504 sank by torpedo two American tankers ( sank by torpedo two American tankers (Republic, 5,300 tons, and W. D. Anderson W. D. Anderson, 10,200 tons) and the 8,200-ton Dutch tanker Mamura Mamura, Only one crewman survived from the W. D. Anderson. W. D. Anderson. Poske incurred "serious damage" to his superstructure from "heavy seas," which forced him to abort. Homebound, he sank a 2,800-ton British freighter by torpedo. Both skippers took advantage of bright lights ashore to silhouette targets. In spite of the human carnage and the oil-soaked beaches, a few Florida resort owners resisted a blackout on the grounds that it would discourage winter tourism. Poske incurred "serious damage" to his superstructure from "heavy seas," which forced him to abort. Homebound, he sank a 2,800-ton British freighter by torpedo. Both skippers took advantage of bright lights ashore to silhouette targets. In spite of the human carnage and the oil-soaked beaches, a few Florida resort owners resisted a blackout on the grounds that it would discourage winter tourism.*

These six Type IXs of the "second wave," which sailed to the United States East Coast in January, thus sank twenty-three ships for about 157,000 gross tons, including eleven tankers, ten in the Eastern Sea Frontier and one, by U-128 U-128, just east of the Bahamas. This almost exactly replicated the bag of the five Type IXs of the "first wave," which sailed to the Americas in December. The two "waves" comprising eleven Type IXs sank an aggregate of forty-six ships for about 307,000 tons. The claimed tonnage sunk was substantially greater.

Many merchant marine crewmen were killed or died in lifeboats, and many of the survivors suffered ghastly ordeals. In an account of the U-boat assault against the United States, author Gary Gentile reported that of 1,631 passengers and crewmen on board twenty-nine ships sunk in January and February 1942, 999 persons died and 632 survived. The heavy fatalities included the 250 passengers and crewmen who perished in the sinking of the Canadian liner reported that of 1,631 passengers and crewmen on board twenty-nine ships sunk in January and February 1942, 999 persons died and 632 survived. The heavy fatalities included the 250 passengers and crewmen who perished in the sinking of the Canadian liner Lady Hawkins. Lady Hawkins. Discounting that ship, the death rate of merchant marine crewmen on the other ships sunk was, by his figures, about 50 percent. Discounting that ship, the death rate of merchant marine crewmen on the other ships sunk was, by his figures, about 50 percent.

The delayed big troopship convoy AT 12 sailed from New York on February 19. It consisted of fifteen transports carrying 14,688 soldiers for Iceland (Indigo) and Northern Ireland (Magnet). It was escorted by Task Force 32, comprised of the battleship New York New York, the light cruiser Philadelphia Philadelphia, and ten American destroyers. As related, six other American destroyers on temporary ASW duty on the Eastern Seaboard reinforced the convoy. Task Force 32 put into Iceland to serve as an anti-Tirpitz force and later to load troops for the return to the States. At EASTOMP, six British destroyers relieved Task Force 32 to shepherd the Northern Ireland section onward. Admiral King deemed the British escort to be inadequate. The inadequacy was responsible, in part, for a forthcoming proposal for American warships to escort eastbound troopship convoys all the way across the Atlantic. force and later to load troops for the return to the States. At EASTOMP, six British destroyers relieved Task Force 32 to shepherd the Northern Ireland section onward. Admiral King deemed the British escort to be inadequate. The inadequacy was responsible, in part, for a forthcoming proposal for American warships to escort eastbound troopship convoys all the way across the Atlantic.

Thirteen VIIs of the second wave-four captained by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders-operated in foul, frigid Canadian waters, harassed by ASW forces. Despite five torpedo failures or misses, the ranking U-boat ace, Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock in holders-operated in foul, frigid Canadian waters, harassed by ASW forces. Despite five torpedo failures or misses, the ranking U-boat ace, Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96, who wore newly minted Oak Leaves on his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, bagged an impressive five ships for 25,500 tons off Halifax, Nova Scotia, including the 9,000-ton British tanker Kars Kars. Upon his return to France, Lehmann-Willenbrock was promoted to command the 9th Combat Flotilla at Brest,* replacing Jurgen Oesten, who was sent to provide technical help for the U-boats basing in Norway. The second most successful skipper was Siegfried Rollmann in replacing Jurgen Oesten, who was sent to provide technical help for the U-boats basing in Norway. The second most successful skipper was Siegfried Rollmann in U-82 U-82, who sank two tankers (British Athelcrown, 12,000 tons; Norwegian Leiesten Leiesten, 6,100 tons) and the 1,200-ton British destroyer Belmont Belmont, another of the fifty American four-stackers transferred to Britain, which was escorting return troopship convoy NA 2. There were no survivors of Belmont Belmont. Although he reported six torpedo failures or misses, Ritterkreuz holder Ritterkreuz holder Gerhard Bigalk in Gerhard Bigalk in U-751 U-751 sank two ships for 11,500 tons and, in a running gun battle off Halifax, damaged an 8,100-ton Dutch tanker. sank two ships for 11,500 tons and, in a running gun battle off Halifax, damaged an 8,100-ton Dutch tanker.

Six other VIIs of this group sank one ship each. Ludwig Forster, age twenty-six, in the new U-654 U-654, reported nine torpedo failures or misses (seven on a stopped target), but he hit and damaged the Free French corvette Alysee Alysee, which was escorting convoy Outbound North 60. The Canadian corvette Hepatica Hepatica took took Alysee Alysee in tow, but the latter foundered before reaching port. in tow, but the latter foundered before reaching port. Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Robert Gysae in holder Robert Gysae in U-98 U-98 sank a 5,300-ton British freighter. Upon his return to France, he left the boat to commission a new and much larger boat. sank a 5,300-ton British freighter. Upon his return to France, he left the boat to commission a new and much larger boat. Two boats sank no ships: Gunther Heydemann in Two boats sank no ships: Gunther Heydemann in U-575 U-575, much delayed on his outbound leg by the search for Spreewald Spreewald survivors, and Wilhelm Zahn in survivors, and Wilhelm Zahn in U-69 U-69. Having made three barren patrols in U-69 U-69, upon his return to France Zahn went to other duty.

Homebound with only one "defective" torpedo in his stern room, Siegfried Rollmann in U-82 U-82 found another convoy 600 miles west of Lorient. Donitz urged caution. If it proved to be a Gibraltar convoy, he told the staff, in view of the probable heavy escort, it should be avoided.' However, when Rollmann reported the escort to consist of "only corvettes," Kerneval assumed it to be an Outbound South convoy and attempted to vector in three VIIs that were en route to America. Unable to attack and low on fuel, Rollmann nonetheless shadowed dutifully, but the intercept failed. The convoy was indeed an Outbound South-Number 18-and the radar-equipped British escorts were alert and adept. On February 6, the sloop found another convoy 600 miles west of Lorient. Donitz urged caution. If it proved to be a Gibraltar convoy, he told the staff, in view of the probable heavy escort, it should be avoided.' However, when Rollmann reported the escort to consist of "only corvettes," Kerneval assumed it to be an Outbound South convoy and attempted to vector in three VIIs that were en route to America. Unable to attack and low on fuel, Rollmann nonetheless shadowed dutifully, but the intercept failed. The convoy was indeed an Outbound South-Number 18-and the radar-equipped British escorts were alert and adept. On February 6, the sloop Rochester Rochester and the corvette and the corvette Tamarisk Tamarisk trapped trapped U-82 U-82 and sank her with depth charges, with the loss of all hands. The and sank her with depth charges, with the loss of all hands. The U-82 U-82 was the first of the boats sailing to American waters to be lost. was the first of the boats sailing to American waters to be lost.

Two of the thirteen VIIs assigned to Canadian waters probed experimentally southward into United States waters, well to seaward, opposite New York. These were Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564, also wearing new Oak Leaves on his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, and Gerhard Feiler in the new boat U-653 U-653. Suhren sank the 11,400-ton Canadian tanker Victolite Victolite by torpedo and gun and attacked a British tanker by gun, but she escaped, only slightly damaged. Near the same area (350 miles east of New York) Feiler in by torpedo and gun and attacked a British tanker by gun, but she escaped, only slightly damaged. Near the same area (350 miles east of New York) Feiler in U-653 U-653 sank one ship, a 1,600-ton Norwegian freighter. sank one ship, a 1,600-ton Norwegian freighter.

Suhren still had a good supply of torpedoes, but he was critically low on fuel. In response to his request for help, Kerneval directed Werner Winter; homebound in the IXB U-103 U-103, to refuel U-564 U-564. However, owing to bad weather and imprecise navigation, the rendezvous failed and Kerneval had to call upon Harald Gelhaus, homebound in the IXB U-107 U-107. During the rendezvous, on February 13, Gelhaus rammed Suhren, holing his starboard fuel tank and crushing all four of the bow tubes. The accident forced Suhren to abort and left Gelhaus so low on fuel he returned in company with Suhren, from whom, ironically, he might obtain fuel if necessary. Had the Allies been able to read naval Enigma, they might well have attacked this rendezvous and destroyed the two disabled U-boats.

While creeping east at one-engine speed, Suhren and Gelhaus ran into a group of six big westbound tankers dispersing from an Outbound North convoy. Owing to his smashed bow tubes, Suhren could not attack. Gelhaus hit the Norwegian tanker Egda Egda with his last torpedo, but since she was in ballast the damage was slight. No other boats were close enough to reach this rich group of targets. with his last torpedo, but since she was in ballast the damage was slight. No other boats were close enough to reach this rich group of targets.

The brief probes of the Type VIIs U-564 U-564 and and U-653 U-653 into United States waters produced small returns, but they convinced Donitz that by following the Great Circle route and observing stringent fuel discipline, the VIIs could patrol for a week to ten days in United States waters. A February foray into these waters by another VII, the battle-tested into United States waters produced small returns, but they convinced Donitz that by following the Great Circle route and observing stringent fuel discipline, the VIIs could patrol for a week to ten days in United States waters. A February foray into these waters by another VII, the battle-tested U-432 U-432, commanded by Heinz-Otto Schultze, which arrived under unusual circumstances, demonstrated that if refueled at sea the VIIs could operate in those waters for even longer periods.

The voyage of U-432 U-432 to United States waters had its roots in yet another infuriating demand by the OKM for escort duty. This time it was for the outbound minelayer-raider to United States waters had its roots in yet another infuriating demand by the OKM for escort duty. This time it was for the outbound minelayer-raider Doggerbank Doggerbank, which had orders to plant fields in the approaches to Cape Town, South Africa. The OKM directed Kerneval to provide one or more Type IXs as the escort. However, upon objections from Donitz, who did not want to divert any scarce IXs from the attack on the Americas for this prolonged task, the OKM agreed that a Type VII would suffice. Furthermore, it was also agreed that the VII was to refuel from Doggerbank Doggerbank and leave her when she reached a point closest to the United States. and leave her when she reached a point closest to the United States.

The escort task fell to Schultze in U-432 U-432, who sailed on January 21. Schultze accompanied Doggerbank Doggerbank in heavy weather until January 31, when he refueled at sea-the first refueling of a Type VII in the Americas operations-and departed for the Cape Hatteras area. Although British intelligence had detected the sailing of in heavy weather until January 31, when he refueled at sea-the first refueling of a Type VII in the Americas operations-and departed for the Cape Hatteras area. Although British intelligence had detected the sailing of Doggerbank Doggerbank and suspected her destination, she went on to achieve modest success. and suspected her destination, she went on to achieve modest success.*

Well stocked with fuel, Heinz-Otto Schultze in U-432 U-432 reached the Cape Hatteras area February 14. Patrolling from Hatteras north to the Maryland coast and back, over the next twelve days he sank six confirmed ships for 27,900 tons, outperforming the reigning "ace," Lehmann-Willenbrock in reached the Cape Hatteras area February 14. Patrolling from Hatteras north to the Maryland coast and back, over the next twelve days he sank six confirmed ships for 27,900 tons, outperforming the reigning "ace," Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96, to register the best Type VII patrol in American waters to then. Awkwardly, his first two victims were Brazilian "neutrals": the 5,200-ton Buarque Buarque and the 4,100-ton and the 4,100-ton Olinda Olinda. The pro-American Brazilian dictator-president Getulio Vargas registered an immediate and vehement diplomatic-and public-protest. Berlin braced for "reprisal measures" against Axis assets in Brazil.

The fourteen VIIs of the second wave that sailed to the Americas in January thus sank twenty-four ships (three tankers) for about 125,000 tons. This was an average of 1.7 ships sunk per boat per patrol, the same as the averages of the ten December boats, which sank eighteen ships for about 85,000 tons, or, again, 1.7 ships per boat per patrol. Two skippers of Type VIIs of the February group, Lehmann-Willenbrock in Two skippers of Type VIIs of the February group, Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 and Schultze in and Schultze in U-432 U-432, accounted for almost half the total bag of the second wave: eleven ships (one tanker) for about 53,300 tons.

FIRST F FORAYS TO THE WEST I INDIES AND CARIBBEAN.

Of the twenty-six German U-boats that sailed to the Americas in January, none generated more interest than the five Type IXCs directed to areas in the Caribbean Sea. Designated group Neuland Neuland (New Land), their specific mission was to interdict the flow of oil and bauxite from South America to North America. (New Land), their specific mission was to interdict the flow of oil and bauxite from South America to North America. Neuland Neuland was backstopped by a group of five big Italian boats, which patrolled from Bordeaux to western Atlantic waters just east of the Windward Islands chain. was backstopped by a group of five big Italian boats, which patrolled from Bordeaux to western Atlantic waters just east of the Windward Islands chain.

Most South American oil originated in two places: the rich fields under the shallow Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, and the British West Indies island of Trinidad. The Maracaibo crude was shipped in small, shallow-draft tankers through the Gulf of Venezuela to huge refineries on the Dutch islands of Aruba and Curacao, which lay a few miles off the north coast of Venezuela and which, upon the fall of the Netherlands, had been occupied by British troops, who were in the process of being replaced by American troops. Large seagoing tankers carried the gasoline and petroleum derivatives onward. Most of the Trinidad oil was refined on that island. Strategically located close off the northeast coast of Venezuela, Trinidad was also a port of call for ships southbound to Latin American and African ports and for a fleet of shallow-draft ships that carried bauxite (the base mineral for aluminum) north from British Guiana and Dutch Guiana (Surinam) to Trinidad, where the bauxite was transferred to larger ships. and Curacao, which lay a few miles off the north coast of Venezuela and which, upon the fall of the Netherlands, had been occupied by British troops, who were in the process of being replaced by American troops. Large seagoing tankers carried the gasoline and petroleum derivatives onward. Most of the Trinidad oil was refined on that island. Strategically located close off the northeast coast of Venezuela, Trinidad was also a port of call for ships southbound to Latin American and African ports and for a fleet of shallow-draft ships that carried bauxite (the base mineral for aluminum) north from British Guiana and Dutch Guiana (Surinam) to Trinidad, where the bauxite was transferred to larger ships.

Group Neuland Neuland was composed of three veteran boats and two new boats that had made brief transit patrols from Germany to Lorient in December, but had seen no noteworthy action. Three boats sailed on January 20 to the Aruba-Curacao area, 4,000 miles distant: Gunther Muller-Stockheim in was composed of three veteran boats and two new boats that had made brief transit patrols from Germany to Lorient in December, but had seen no noteworthy action. Three boats sailed on January 20 to the Aruba-Curacao area, 4,000 miles distant: Gunther Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67, Jurgen von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502, and Werner Hartenstein in the new U-156. U-156. The other two sailed on January 25 for the Trinidad area, 3,600 miles distant: Nikolaus Clausen in The other two sailed on January 25 for the Trinidad area, 3,600 miles distant: Nikolaus Clausen in U-129 U-129 and Al-brecht Achilles in the new and Al-brecht Achilles in the new U-161 U-161. All traveled southwest across the Atlantic at one-engine speed, an agonizingly slow voyage of three weeks or more. As in Drumbeat, the five boats were to launch attacks on the same day-February 16, when the moon was new.

While the boats were creeping toward the Caribbean, Donitz and Berlin fell into sharp dispute over how to launch a key part of this operation. Berlin-Admiral Raeder himself-ordered that the three Aruba-Curacao boats were to open the campaign with a surprise shelling of the huge refineries and tank farms on those islands, which were easily accessible from the sea. Although it was known that the islands were occupied by British and American forces and that Aruba had three big (7.5") coast-defense guns, Raeder thought a sudden night attack would catch the Allied forces by surprise, set the refineries and tank farms afire, and put them out of action for months. Believing that a surprise attack on the unarmed tankers would be more profitable-and certainly less risky and more satisfying to his submariners-Donitz vigorously opposed the order on the grounds that the shelling might fail and would alert enemy shipping to the presence of U-boats and perhaps lead to a temporary halt in tanker traffic, resulting in failure for group Neuland Neuland. Admiral Raeder refused to rescind his order; nonetheless, Donitz defied Raeder and directed the boats to open the campaign by attacking tankers, after which, if conditions permitted, they were to shell the refineries and tank farms.

In the early hours of February 16, thirty-two-year-old Werner Hartenstein in U-156 U-156, the newest but most senior skipper (crew of 1928) of the Neuland Neuland group, opened the German Caribbean campaign. He eased into the mouth of San Nicholas, the harbor of Aruba, and shot a salvo of torpedoes at three moored tankers. All hit, sinking one (the 2,400-ton British group, opened the German Caribbean campaign. He eased into the mouth of San Nicholas, the harbor of Aruba, and shot a salvo of torpedoes at three moored tankers. All hit, sinking one (the 2,400-ton British Oranjestad Oranjestad) and severely damaging the other two, including one American vessel. In due course, the two damaged tankers were repaired and returned to service.