* Owing to Hitler's "Norway paranoia," in early January Berlin ordered Donitz to establish a defensive line of U-boats between Iceland and the Faeroes. Although some of these boats assumed positions to the north of the regular convoy routes in the Northwest Approaches, as will be seen, they posed a definite threat to inbound North Atlantic convoys as they entered and departed the British Isles. To leave those convoys unescorted could also invite catastrophe.

* The U.S. Navy was already in the process of shifting its patrol bombers and many of its destroyers from the North Atlantic run to American waters, as noted, leaving the preponderance of the escort job on the North Atlantic run to the Canadians and British. As also noted, most of these American destroyers had to be assigned to escort troopship convoys. To uproot the remaining Canadian and British escorts and also move them to East Coast waters not only would have exposed the North Atlantic convoy run to U-boat attack, but also would have placed those warships far from home bases and supply lines, decreasing their effectiveness and availability.

Meanwhile, Admiral Andrews continued to provide Allied shipping all the protection he could with "the tools at hand." He laid defensive minefields on the approaches to the main Atlantic ports: Portland, Maine; Boston; New York; Charleston; and the entrances to the Delaware and Chesapeake bays off Cape May, New Jersey, and Cape Henry, Virginia. He pulled back shipping from well offshore to newly marked inshore lanes very close to the beach in shallow water, where U-boats were less likely to be and where the few available aircraft might offer a modicum of protection. He encouraged the use of protected shortcuts, such as the Cape Cod Canal. He advised merchant ships to exercise strict smoke discipline, to lay over in port at night if possible, or to run blacked out and to zigzag and to minimize radio transmissions, which U-boats might monitor. Unaccustomed to all this rigamarole-or contemptuous of being told what to do by the Navy-the captains of many American merchant ships simply ignored the rules and did what they pleased, and not a few lost their ships.

As a result of the sinkings in the Eastern Sea Frontier, on January 24 King directed Ingersoll to make available to Andrews and to other Sea Frontier commanders Atlantic Fleet aircraft which were based within their respective areas of responsibility. This gave Andrews operational control of forty-four Catalinas, thirty-eight at Norfolk and six at Newport. Ingersoll notified "all Sea Frontier commanders" that the transfers were not permanent but rather a temporary "emergency measure." He stressed that the use of such planes for ASW patrols by Sea Frontiers "should not unduly interfere with scheduled operations of Atlantic Fleet aircraft, especially those on convoy escort."*

Shocked and bewildered by the Japanese successes in the Pacific and Far East, the American public was at first only dimly aware of the gravity of the U-boat campaign in American waters. The Navy did its utmost to keep Americans in the dark by imposing censorship, by downplaying-or lying about-the extent of shipping losses, and by issuing reassuring claims of U-boat kills. A member of the Washington naval staff, Ladislas Farago, asserted in his book The Tenth Fleet The Tenth Fleet that a Navy publicist even deliberately fabricated the legendary radio message from one Argentia-based Hudson pilot, Donald F. Mason, who erroneously claimed a kill: "Sighted Sub. Sank Same." But, in fact, as Admiral Bristol in Argentia asserted in an after-action report to Ingersoll on January 28 (copies to King and Stark), the cry of triumph from Mason was quite genuine, even though he had not actually sunk a U-boat. that a Navy publicist even deliberately fabricated the legendary radio message from one Argentia-based Hudson pilot, Donald F. Mason, who erroneously claimed a kill: "Sighted Sub. Sank Same." But, in fact, as Admiral Bristol in Argentia asserted in an after-action report to Ingersoll on January 28 (copies to King and Stark), the cry of triumph from Mason was quite genuine, even though he had not actually sunk a U-boat.*

GERMAN D DIVERSIONS AND D DELAYS.

During the first weeks of January 1942, rumors of an Allied invasion of Norway intensified in Berlin. Doubtless the British inspired many of the rumors, partly to deceive Hitler, partly to encourage the embryonic Norwegian underground to rise up and strike, and partly to raise the spirits of all Norwegians. Given the recent Allied disasters at Pearl Harbor, Manila, and elsewhere in the Pacific, as well as the grievous British naval setbacks in the Mediterranean, the rumors were incredible. And yet Hitler seized upon each new report as though it were gospel.

As the Norwegian nightmare festered in Hitler's mind, Raeder and the OKM drew plans to execute the Fuhrer's order of December 29, 1941, specifying that "all ships" of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine were to be deployed to defend Norway. The super-battleship were to be deployed to defend Norway. The super-battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz shifted on January 15 from German waters to Norway. Although Raeder remained adamantly opposed to Hitler's order to redeploy the battle cruisers shifted on January 15 from German waters to Norway. Although Raeder remained adamantly opposed to Hitler's order to redeploy the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and the heavy cruiser and the heavy cruiser Prinz Prinz Eugen from France to Norway via the English Channel and Germany, he directed the OKM to carry it out, making arrangements with the Eugen from France to Norway via the English Channel and Germany, he directed the OKM to carry it out, making arrangements with the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe for massive air support. for massive air support.

Hitler's concern over Norway reached fever pitch on January 22. During a meeting with Raeder's chief of staff, Vice Admiral Kurt Fricke, according to the stenographer, the Fiihrer declared that Norway was the "zone of destiny" in the war. An Allied invasion of Norway appeared to be imminent. Hitler was "deeply concerned about the grave consequences which unfavorable developments in the north Norwegian area could have on the entire course of the war." Therefore, Hitler iterated, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine must employ "every available vessel" in Norway. It must "defend the sea lanes to Norway, and must dislodge with all available forces any enemy troops which have landed, entirely forgoing all other [naval] warfare except for the Mediterranean operations." Furthermore, Hitler demanded "unconditional obedience" to all his orders and wishes concerning defense of this area and the "greatest speed and efficiency" in carrying them out. must employ "every available vessel" in Norway. It must "defend the sea lanes to Norway, and must dislodge with all available forces any enemy troops which have landed, entirely forgoing all other [naval] warfare except for the Mediterranean operations." Furthermore, Hitler demanded "unconditional obedience" to all his orders and wishes concerning defense of this area and the "greatest speed and efficiency" in carrying them out.

Fricke left this meeting with the impression that Hitler had ordered that all U-boats other than those in the Mediterranean supporting Rommel were to be deployed in defense of Norway. This implied a cancellation of the U-boat campaign against America. However, on the following day, Hitler's naval aide, Karl-Jesko von Puttkammer, telephoned Fricke to say that Hitler had noted "with satisfaction" the "mounting sinkings in American waters" and that Hitler "wanted these operations to continue." The OKM diarist logged: "This is in significant contrast to his instructions-given only yesterday-about defending Norway."

In view of Hitler's satisfaction with the U-boat campaign in the Americas, the question of exactly how many U-boats were to be diverted to the "defense" of Norway and when they were to be transferred remained unsettled. Donitz doubted the Allies intended to invade Norway. So any diversion of boats to its defense would be a foolish waste of U-boats. Intent on maximizing the impact of the U-boat campaign in the Americas, he did notpress the OKM for a decision. The upshot was a complicated and extemporized commitment, which, however, was to diminish significantly the force of the U-boat campaign against the Americas.

When these discussions began, there were four boats in extreme northern Norway, basing at Kirkenes, merely 100 air miles from Murmansk. Their mission was to warn of and to repel the supposed Allied invasion and to interdict Allied shipping between Iceland and Murmansk. Operating in difficult seas and near-total Arctic darkness, three of the boats had confirmed successes in January: Rudolf Schendel in U-134 U-134 sank a 5,100-ton freighter from Murmansk-bound Convoy PQ 7; Joachim Deecke in sank a 5,100-ton freighter from Murmansk-bound Convoy PQ 7; Joachim Deecke in U-584 U-584 sank a 250-ton Russian submarine, sank a 250-ton Russian submarine, M-175 M-175; Burkhard Hacklander in U-454 U-454 sank the 1,900-ton British destroyer sank the 1,900-ton British destroyer Matabele Matabele and damaged a 5,400-ton British freighter from PQ 8 and a 600-ton Russian trawler. and damaged a 5,400-ton British freighter from PQ 8 and a 600-ton Russian trawler.

Hacklander's attack on Convoy PQ 8, an indirect hit on the Soviet Union, was a tonic to Berlin. Apart from the sinking of the destroyer Matabele Matabele, and damage to the freighter, Hacklander overclaimed sinking a 2,000-ton freighter, damage to another 5,000-ton freighter, and heavy damage to another "destroyer." The OKM diarist gloated that Hacklander attack served notice that the Arctic Ocean was no longer "free" to the Allies. Inasmuch as Hacklander had incurred damage requiring yard repair in Trondheim, the OKM sent a new boat, U-456 U-456, direct from Kiel to Kirkenes as a replacement, bringing the commitment of boats to Norway to five, although no master deployment plan had as yet been formulated. The four operational boats at Kirkenes patrolled off Murmansk-but none had any luck.

As the invasion rumors intensified during January, to Donitz's dismay the OKM directed that as many boats as possible be held on patrol in the area between Iceland and the British Isles. This order applied to thirteen new boats sailing from Germany, and three experienced boats returning from overhaul in Germany or Norway, a total of sixteen, most of which had been earmarked for patrols to North America. Some of these boats served as defensive scouts during the shift of Tirpitz Tirpitz to Norway; some searched, in vain, for a military convoy of "ten transports," wrongly reported to be deploying American forces from Iceland to Scotland for the supposed invasion of Norway. The diversion of these sixteen U-boats sharply reduced the impact of the opening phase of the U-boat campaign against North America. to Norway; some searched, in vain, for a military convoy of "ten transports," wrongly reported to be deploying American forces from Iceland to Scotland for the supposed invasion of Norway. The diversion of these sixteen U-boats sharply reduced the impact of the opening phase of the U-boat campaign against North America.

In addition to these sixteen boats, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Wolfgang Luth in the aged Type IX holder Wolfgang Luth in the aged Type IX U-43 U-43 patrolled home to Germany for overhaul through the same area. Although the British were still reading naval Enigma in January and diverting convoys around the U-boats, Luth found excellent hunting. He sank four ships for 21,300 tons, the second two from convoy Outbound North 55, disorganized by the heavy winter storms. Upon reaching Germany, Luth, having sunk a total of twelve confirmed ships for 68,000 tons on patrolled home to Germany for overhaul through the same area. Although the British were still reading naval Enigma in January and diverting convoys around the U-boats, Luth found excellent hunting. He sank four ships for 21,300 tons, the second two from convoy Outbound North 55, disorganized by the heavy winter storms. Upon reaching Germany, Luth, having sunk a total of twelve confirmed ships for 68,000 tons on U-43 U-43, relinquished command to a new skipper. Although he could have selected virtually any desk or training job in the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine, like Prien, Kretschmer, Schepke, Lemp, Endrass, and other Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders, Luth elected to return to combat-in a new boat. holders, Luth elected to return to combat-in a new boat.

One of the thirteen newly sailed boats, U-213 U-213, commanded by Amelung von Varendorff, Prien's second watch officer at Scapa Flow, was a curiosity: an improvised minelayer, designated Type VIID. Six of these boats (U-213 to to U-218 U-218) had been ordered after the start of the war. They were basic VIICs into which a 32-foot mine compartment had been spliced immediately aft of the control room. The compartment contained five silos, each designed to hold three vertically launched SMA anchored or moored mines, with 770-pound warheads. The addition of the mine compartment enabled the designers to incorporate more fuel saddle tanks, giving the VIIDs an extra fifty-six tons of oil, extending the range of these boats by 1,600 miles beyond that of the regular VIIC (8,100 versus 6,500). However, the SMA mine proved to be defective, and pending a redesign the OKM had barred its use, releasing the VIIDs for torpedo operations, for which they were also well equipped.

Four of the newly sailed boats patrolled close to two seaports of Iceland, Reykjavik and Seidisfjord. Off Reykjavik on January 29, Ernst Vogelsang in the U-132 U-132, who had made an Arctic patrol in the fall, attacked a "destroyer" which was towing a disabled freighter into port, firing all four bow torpedoes. Some hit and the "destroyer" was severely damaged. She was taken under tow by a British tug, Frisky Frisky, but capsized and was sunk by gunfire from the new American destroyer Ericsson Ericsson. In reality, the ship was one of the 327-foot, 2,200-ton Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutters, Alexander Hamilton Alexander Hamilton, which had come across as part of the escort of convoy Halifax 170. She was the second-and largest-American warship after Reuben James Reuben James to be sunk by a U-boat. Twenty-six of her crew perished. While an American destroyer rescued her survivors, another new destroyer, to be sunk by a U-boat. Twenty-six of her crew perished. While an American destroyer rescued her survivors, another new destroyer, Stack Stack, jumped on U-132 U-132 and inflicted such heavy depth-charge damage that Vogelsang was forced to abort to France. Although numerous American warships had claimed kills of or damage to U-boats, and inflicted such heavy depth-charge damage that Vogelsang was forced to abort to France. Although numerous American warships had claimed kills of or damage to U-boats, Stack Stack was the first American vessel to do harm to a U-boat. Repairs to the was the first American vessel to do harm to a U-boat. Repairs to the U-132 U-132 kept her out of action for the next four months. kept her out of action for the next four months.

Most of the newly sailed boats patrolled in the Northwest Approaches or close to the Faeroes and Shetlands. This familiar territory was more perilous than ever. Apart from the saturation air coverage mounted by Coastal Command aircraft fitted with ASV radar, the British had twenty-five escort groups, comprised of 205 ships (seventy destroyers, sixty-seven corvettes, sixty-eight sloops, etc.), based in ports in the British Isles. Most of these ships were equipped with Type 286 meter-wavelength radar, and many had the superior Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar.* Some were being fitted with High Frequency Direction Finders (Huff Duff). Some were being fitted with High Frequency Direction Finders (Huff Duff).

None of the U-boats found any signs of the supposed Norway invasion forces, but on January 26, Alfred Manhardt von Mannstein in U-753 U-753, ten days out on his maiden patrol, ran into part of a convoy, Outbound North 59, which had scattered in a winter storm. He alerted Kerneval and attacked a tanker, but missed, and a "destroyer" of the escort group counterattacked U-753 U-753. Von Mannstein reported that the "destroyer" dropped only two depth charges but these had caused serious internal damage. Furthermore, the "destroyer" had "run over" the boat (in an apparent attempt to ram) and caused damage topside. As a result, von Mannstein reported, U-753 U-753 was no longer "seaworthy" and he was forced to abort to France. Donitz directed six other boats to this convoy, but none made contact. Thus the sixteen boats diverted to the "defense of Norway" in January sank only one confirmed ship, the Coast Guard cutter was no longer "seaworthy" and he was forced to abort to France. Donitz directed six other boats to this convoy, but none made contact. Thus the sixteen boats diverted to the "defense of Norway" in January sank only one confirmed ship, the Coast Guard cutter Alexander Hamilton Alexander Hamilton.

One of the six boats directed to the scattered Outbound North 59 was Otto Ites in U-94 U-94. Newly sailed from Germany after an overhaul, the boat developed mechanical troubles, as a result of which Ites was returning to Germany. Homebound on January 30, Ites radioed Kerneval that while ventilating his electric torpedoes, he had discovered that due to an air leakage, "excessive pressure" built up in the torpedo balance chamber containing the depth-setting controls, possibly causing the controls to make the torpedoes run deeper than set. Ites's message arrived in Kerneval at the very time the staff was puzzling over the very large number of torpedo failures reported by the first wave of boats to North America. Although it was known that a great many of these failed torpedoes had not been ventilated, Donitz logged, the leaking balance chamber might account for many. Consequently, as an interim step, he immediately forbade all boats at sea to ventilate torpedoes, and relayed news of the discovery to the Torpedo Directorate, with a demand for new and urgent tests.

As it turned out, the twenty-three-year-old Otto Ites had discovered the last major defect in the standard electric torpedo. Three weeks later the torpedo technicians confirmed the leakage and, pending a redesign of the balance chamber, recommended temporary corrective measures which would permit ventilation of torpedoes for those boats already on patrol or preparing to sail. Donitz was simultaneously elated and furious. He and his skippers had insisted all along that the torpedoes were still running too deep, but to no avail. Now, thirty months into the war, they were vindicated, thanks to one young skipper with minimum education, a damning commentary on the state of science and engineering in Hitler's Germany.

The correction of this torpedo defect almost at the outset of the U-boat campaign against the Americas was fortuitous, to say the least. It contributed significantly to the success of U-boats everywhere, but especially to those in the second and subsequent waves patrolling North American waters.

Hitler himself drew the formal plan for the use of U-boats to defend Norway on February 6. Altogether, he decreed, twenty U-boats were to be deployed for that purpose at all times: eight on a patrol line between Iceland and the British Isles (to interdict the supposed oncoming American invasion forces from Iceland); six in Kirkenes (to block an invasion force and to attack PQ and QP convoys in Arctic waters); and two each at Narvik, Trondheim, and Bergen, to provide a last-ditch defense against the attacking forces. In addition, the U-A U-A and three large Dutch submarines-captured early in the war and used since at the Submarine School-as well as four "small" submarines, were to be placed on standby to ferry gasoline and other supplies to Narvik and Tromso for the and three large Dutch submarines-captured early in the war and used since at the Submarine School-as well as four "small" submarines, were to be placed on standby to ferry gasoline and other supplies to Narvik and Tromso for the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe.

Hitler's order coincided with a sudden onset of brutal cold in the Baltic region. The OKM diarist logged: "Never in all its history has the German ice observation service witnessed ice conditions as bad as these." Moreover, the ice would be even worse in March, "when surface water reaches lowest temperatures." Summing up, the ice observers predicted Baltic ice to a thickness "not yet experienced in this century," a forecast that proved to be accurate.

The sudden buildup of thick Baltic ice was another severe setback for the U-boat arm. Over the winter nearly 100 boats coming off the ways or in various stages of workup were to be immobilized-frozen at dockside or otherwise delayed for three to four months. The majority of the seventy-eight boats commissioned in the months of November 1941 to February 1942, inclusive, did not leave the Baltic for seven or eight months.* The thirty-seven boats commissioned in March and April 1942 were Baltic bound, on average, six months. As a result, the flow of new boats to all war fronts in 1942 fell off sharply: thirteen in February, thirteen in March, eight in April, six in May. The thirty-seven boats commissioned in March and April 1942 were Baltic bound, on average, six months. As a result, the flow of new boats to all war fronts in 1942 fell off sharply: thirteen in February, thirteen in March, eight in April, six in May.

Because of the prolonged delays imposed by the Baltic ice, it was all the more difficult to assign Type VIIs to the "defense of Norway." Five (including U-454 in overhaul) were already in Norway, leaving a deficit of fifteen. The deficit was to be met by diverting three more of the new VIIs sailing from Germany in January, all seven of the new VIIs sailing from Germany in February, and seven of the ten new VIIs sailing from Germany in March, bringing the total to twenty-two boats. The overage compensated for the boats, such as U-454, that were in overhaul or repairing battle damage.

Inasmuch as Hitler demanded that the twenty boats for the "defense of Norway" be in place no later than February 15, and because of the Baltic ice, the order could not be met promptly with newly sailing boats, Donitz assumed temporary responsibility for providing the eight boats for the anti-invasion patrol line between Iceland and the British Isles. He fulfilled this obligation by prolonging the patrols of some of the newly arrived January boats and by holding some of the newly sailing February boats in the area, as well as some boats outbound to and inbound from the Americas (as fuel permitted), and by sending several boats to the area from France. These holds in and diversions to the Northwest Approaches were to further reduce the number of boats in the hunting grounds of Canada and the United States.

The last major step in the naval reinforcement of Norway was the shift of Gneisenau, Scharnhorst Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen from France to Norway, via the English Channel and Germany. Amid the greatest secrecy, the ships sailed from Brest the night of February 11-12, heavily supported by minesweepers, torpedo boats, destroyers, from France to Norway, via the English Channel and Germany. Amid the greatest secrecy, the ships sailed from Brest the night of February 11-12, heavily supported by minesweepers, torpedo boats, destroyers, Luftwaffe Luftwaffe fighters, and-distantly-the U-boats on the patrol line in the Northwest Approaches. From Enigma and other intelligence sources, the British were aware of the plan and had prepared a counterplan (Fuller) to sink all three ships. However, the British early-warning network (submarines, aircraft, land-based radar, etc.) broke down and Operation Fuller failed. No less than 250 British aircraft, five destroyers, and a half-dozen torpedo boats belatedly attacked the German formation in the English Channel with torpedoes and bombs, but these forces were too little and too late, a humiliating failure. fighters, and-distantly-the U-boats on the patrol line in the Northwest Approaches. From Enigma and other intelligence sources, the British were aware of the plan and had prepared a counterplan (Fuller) to sink all three ships. However, the British early-warning network (submarines, aircraft, land-based radar, etc.) broke down and Operation Fuller failed. No less than 250 British aircraft, five destroyers, and a half-dozen torpedo boats belatedly attacked the German formation in the English Channel with torpedoes and bombs, but these forces were too little and too late, a humiliating failure.

Nonetheless, the German ships did not reach Germany unscathed. In anticipation of the channel dash, the British had sown new minefields along the predicted track of the ships. Both Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst hit British mines. The damage to hit British mines. The damage to Gneisenau Gneisenau was slight, but after reaching the Jade, she struck a sunken wreck that damaged her bottom and put her in drydock for what the OKM predicted to be "three weeks." On the night of February 26-27, an RAF bomber hit her with a bomb that blew up a forward magazine and wrecked the ship beyond repair. The two mines was slight, but after reaching the Jade, she struck a sunken wreck that damaged her bottom and put her in drydock for what the OKM predicted to be "three weeks." On the night of February 26-27, an RAF bomber hit her with a bomb that blew up a forward magazine and wrecked the ship beyond repair. The two mines Scharnhorst Scharnhorst struck damaged a turret and her turbo-electric motors, delaying her transfer to Norway for what the OKM predicted to be "several months," but which stretched to a full year. struck damaged a turret and her turbo-electric motors, delaying her transfer to Norway for what the OKM predicted to be "several months," but which stretched to a full year.

Notwithstanding the unavailability of the two battle cruisers, the OKM proceeded with plans to shift the "pocket" battleship, Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, and the undamaged heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen to Norway. Escorted by three destroyers, they sailed from the Jade on February 21. to Norway. Escorted by three destroyers, they sailed from the Jade on February 21. Tirpitz left Norway to join them for an attack on the Murmansk convoys Tirpitz left Norway to join them for an attack on the Murmansk convoys, but one of four British submarines lying off Trond-heim, Trident Trident, commanded by G. M. Sladen, fired a salvo of three torpedoes at Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen and blew off her rudder and thirty feet of her stern. Sladen's success forced the Germans to cancel the Arctic sortie and return to Norway, yet another embarrassment for the and blew off her rudder and thirty feet of her stern. Sladen's success forced the Germans to cancel the Arctic sortie and return to Norway, yet another embarrassment for the Kriegsmarine. Prinz Eugen Kriegsmarine. Prinz Eugen limped back to Germany for eight months of repairs, after which she was converted to a training ship and did not again leave the Baltic. limped back to Germany for eight months of repairs, after which she was converted to a training ship and did not again leave the Baltic.

These events reduced the big ships for the defense of Norway-and for attacking Murmansk convoys-to three: the super battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz, the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, and the heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper.

MORE F FAILURES IN G GIBRALTAR-AZORES W WATERS.

The deployment of U-boats to North America and Norway in December and January left very few to patrol southward to the areas near Gibraltar and the Azores. Furthermore, when the OKM learned that two more boats-Unno von Fischel's U-374 U-374 and Herbert Schauenburg's and Herbert Schauenburg's U-577 U-577-had been lost in the Mediterranean in January,* it ordered Donitz to send three from the Gibraltar-Azores area into the Mediterranean. Helmut Rosenbaum in it ordered Donitz to send three from the Gibraltar-Azores area into the Mediterranean. Helmut Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73 and Robert Battels in and Robert Battels in U-561 U-561 passed through the Gibraltar Strait on January 14 and 15, respectively, but Heinz Hir-sacker in passed through the Gibraltar Strait on January 14 and 15, respectively, but Heinz Hir-sacker in U-572 U-572, who had shown great promise as first watch officer on Wilhelm Georg Schulz's U-124 U-124, balked on January 16, reporting "bad weather and heavy defenses." Donitz ordered Hirsacker to "try again," but a second effort, on January 19, also failed. The Mediterranean force was thus left with twenty-one boats.

These new transfers coincided with a bold new offensive by Erwin Rommel. Because of the loss of or damage to capital ships in late 1941, the Royal Navy lost control of the Mediterranean Sea. Axis convoys got through to Rommel with tanks and supplies, giving him a temporary upper hand in the war of logistics. Upon learning from a penetration of Allied codes that the British Eighth Army was in a weakened condition, Rommel struck from El Agheila on January 21. He had recaptured Benghazi within a week and forced the British back toward Tobruk. Hir-sacker's balk at this critical juncture-when Rommel most needed U-boats to interdict the coasters supplying the Eighth Army-was an embarrassment to the U-boat force. The consequences to Hirsacker were to be dire. that the British Eighth Army was in a weakened condition, Rommel struck from El Agheila on January 21. He had recaptured Benghazi within a week and forced the British back toward Tobruk. Hir-sacker's balk at this critical juncture-when Rommel most needed U-boats to interdict the coasters supplying the Eighth Army-was an embarrassment to the U-boat force. The consequences to Hirsacker were to be dire.

The transfers to the Mediterranean left but four Type VIIs in southern waters between the Azores and Gibraltar in January. One, U-373 U-373, commanded by Paul-Karl Loeser, was detached to escort a blockade runner, Elsa Essberger Elsa Essberger, into France, a mission that failed when British aircraft from Gibraltar found and attacked both vessels, forcing the German ship to flee to safety in El Ferrol, Spain. Believing the Elsa Essberger Elsa Essberger could make repairs and resail, Loeser hung around for days off El Ferrol, but the repairs took much longer than expected. Having wasted three weeks to little purpose, Loeser returned to France. could make repairs and resail, Loeser hung around for days off El Ferrol, but the repairs took much longer than expected. Having wasted three weeks to little purpose, Loeser returned to France.

The other three boats in southern waters made contact with inbound convoy Sierra Leone 97. When the British learned of this contact, they ordered a new, experimental unit composed of four destroyers (Croome, Hesperus, Laforey, and Wescott Wescott) to sail from Gibraltar to attack the U-boats. Designated as a "Striking Force," it represented in miniature the favored offensive solution to the U-boat threat. Serving as "bait," the convoy had "lured" in the U-boats. Having no direct responsibility for protection of the ships in the convoy, the Striking Force was free to pursue and attack the U-boats to the limit of its endurance.

Commanded by I. H. Bockett-Pugh in Wescott Wescott, whose EG-7 had earned honors on the North Atlantic run, this first sortie of a Striking Force was not a model of perfection. To fool and evade the U-boats, the British ordered the convoy to make a drastic alteration in course. The Striking Force failed to get this word and could not find the convoy. Then the Admiralty ordered two of the four destroyers to more urgent missions. Croome and Wescott Croome and Wescott peeled off, leaving peeled off, leaving Laforey Laforey and Hesperus, which finally found the convoy on the morning of January 14, trailed by a Condor, which was reporting its position to Kerneval. and Hesperus, which finally found the convoy on the morning of January 14, trailed by a Condor, which was reporting its position to Kerneval. Laforey Laforey drove the aircraft off with gunfire, but the plane had already brought in the three boats, including young Horst Elfe's drove the aircraft off with gunfire, but the plane had already brought in the three boats, including young Horst Elfe's U-93 U-93, on her second patrol under his command.

In the early hours of January 15, Laforey Laforey and and Hesperus Hesperus took station about ten miles on the port beam of the convoy. Soon thereafter, took station about ten miles on the port beam of the convoy. Soon thereafter, Hesperus Hesperus got a contact on her meter-wavelength radar at 3,000 yards. got a contact on her meter-wavelength radar at 3,000 yards. Hesperus Hesperus swung around, bent on flank speed, opened fire with her main guns, and turned on her 10" searchlight. The light revealed a U-boat running away at about 17 knots. This was Elfe's swung around, bent on flank speed, opened fire with her main guns, and turned on her 10" searchlight. The light revealed a U-boat running away at about 17 knots. This was Elfe's U-93. Laforey U-93. Laforey joined in the chase, but joined in the chase, but Hesperus Hesperus, with a clear lead, rammed U-93 U-93 on her starboard side with a glancing blow and launched five depth charges set for 50 feet. on her starboard side with a glancing blow and launched five depth charges set for 50 feet.

The blow from Hesperus Hesperus threw Elfe and several others on the bridge into the water and jammed the conning-tower hatch shut, trapping the rest of the crew below. Saltwater leaked into the battery, forming chlorine gas. As the flooding boat filled with deadly fumes, those trapped below worked frantically to open the hatch, finally succeeding at the last possible second. threw Elfe and several others on the bridge into the water and jammed the conning-tower hatch shut, trapping the rest of the crew below. Saltwater leaked into the battery, forming chlorine gas. As the flooding boat filled with deadly fumes, those trapped below worked frantically to open the hatch, finally succeeding at the last possible second. Hesperus Hesperus launched a boat to board, but launched a boat to board, but U-93 U-93 sank before it could reach her. Hesperus picked up Elfe and thirty-five other survivors; sank before it could reach her. Hesperus picked up Elfe and thirty-five other survivors; Laforey Laforey, four. Six Germans were not found. Damaged by the collision, Hesperus Hesperus returned to Gibraltar, where she was highly commended for this aggressive attack, but also reminded of the urgent need to prevent Germans from abandoning ship and scuttling, so that "secret papers" (i.e., Enigma machines, keys, and documents) could be recovered. To prevent scuttling, boarding parties were again-and specifically-authorized to take "drastic action" with weapons to "keep the [U-boat] crew below." That is, shoot any Germans attempting to leave their sinking ships. returned to Gibraltar, where she was highly commended for this aggressive attack, but also reminded of the urgent need to prevent Germans from abandoning ship and scuttling, so that "secret papers" (i.e., Enigma machines, keys, and documents) could be recovered. To prevent scuttling, boarding parties were again-and specifically-authorized to take "drastic action" with weapons to "keep the [U-boat] crew below." That is, shoot any Germans attempting to leave their sinking ships.

Although the Striking Force had botched the rendezvous with the convoy and the British had reduced it by half, it had to be judged a qualified success. Its remaining two ships accounted for the only confirmed U-boat sunk by the British in the Atlantic in January.

Outbound to North America, on January 16 Siegfried von Forstner, on his second patrol in the Type VII U-402 U-402, ran into a southbound "Winston Special" troop convoy due west of the Bay of Biscay. He reported that it was composed of five steamers, escorted by merely "one destroyer," but a Condor that was nearby protecting the outbound merchant-ship raider Thor Thor, and which responded to the report-and boldly attacked the convoy-reported nineteen ships, escorted by five destroyers. Closing on the formation, von Forstner fired at the 12,000-ton liner Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle, which had 1,000 troops on board. The hit blew off her rudder and killed twenty-six men.

Declaring this military convoy to be a "must" target, Donitz diverted three other America-bound Type VIIs and alerted the remaining two Type VIIs in the Gibraltar-Azores area, putting six boats on the scent. The two boats near the Azores were low on fuel and had to go home; two of the four American-bound boats could not find the convoy and resumed voyages to westward. Von Forstner in U-402 U-402 hung on, bringing up twenty-nine-year-old Werner Pfeifer in the brand-new Canada-bound Type VII hung on, bringing up twenty-nine-year-old Werner Pfeifer in the brand-new Canada-bound Type VII U-581 U-581. Pfeifer could not find the convoy; however, he attacked what he believed to be a corvette, firing three torpedoes. It was not a corvette, but probably the British ASW trawler Rosemonde Rosemonde, which disappeared about this time with the loss of all hands.

Although damaged, the Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle made it to the port of Horta in the Portuguese Azores, where by international law she was entitled to make battle repairs. When it became clear to Kerneval that the main body of the convoy had eluded the boats, Donitz ordered von Forstner in made it to the port of Horta in the Portuguese Azores, where by international law she was entitled to make battle repairs. When it became clear to Kerneval that the main body of the convoy had eluded the boats, Donitz ordered von Forstner in U-402 U-402 and Pfeifer in and Pfeifer in U-581 U-581 to close on Horta, wait for the to close on Horta, wait for the Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle to resail, and then sink her in a coordinated attack. to resail, and then sink her in a coordinated attack.

Pfeifer in U-581 U-581 arrived off Horta on the night of January 31. She was not a happy boat; the thirty-one-year-old engineering officer, Helmut Krummel, was a strict disciplinarian to whom Pfeifer had granted unusual authority. "Every petty officer had been punished at his hands," a British intelligence officer wrote later, and "on one occasion a chief petty officer had threatened Krummel with personal violence in the presence of other officers." As the crew saw it, according to the British report, the skipper, Werner Pfeifer, who had known Krummel before the war, had "come under the evil influence of this man." arrived off Horta on the night of January 31. She was not a happy boat; the thirty-one-year-old engineering officer, Helmut Krummel, was a strict disciplinarian to whom Pfeifer had granted unusual authority. "Every petty officer had been punished at his hands," a British intelligence officer wrote later, and "on one occasion a chief petty officer had threatened Krummel with personal violence in the presence of other officers." As the crew saw it, according to the British report, the skipper, Werner Pfeifer, who had known Krummel before the war, had "come under the evil influence of this man."

Pfeifer was determined to carry out the mission. In an astonishing display of boldness-and a blatant violation of the neutrality laws-he submerged and cruised right into the harbor at Horta. Coming quietly to the surface merely 100 yards from shore, Pfeifer found Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle moored on the other side of a stone pier, beyond reach. Had the pier been made of wood rather than stone, Pfeifer recalled, he would have fired torpedoes. Thus thwarted, he aborted the attack, withdrew to sea, and met von Forstner in moored on the other side of a stone pier, beyond reach. Had the pier been made of wood rather than stone, Pfeifer recalled, he would have fired torpedoes. Thus thwarted, he aborted the attack, withdrew to sea, and met von Forstner in U-402 U-402. Thereupon the two skippers worked out a plan to guard the two exits from Horta: Pfeifer in South Channel, von Forstner in North Channel.

Meanwhile, the Admiralty directed Gibraltar to provide assistance to Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle. Bockett-Pugh in the destroyer Wescott Wescott sailed with a reduced Striking Force, that included the sailed with a reduced Striking Force, that included the Hunt Hunt-class destroyers Croome Croome and and Exmoor Exmoor and an oceangoing tug. and an oceangoing tug.

Wescott was the first ship of the Royal Navy to be equipped with a new, secret ASW weapon, the Hedgehog. This was a bow-mounted, multiple-barrel mortar capable of firing a salvo of twenty-four 65-pound bombs (with 30-pound warheads) into a small circular pattern about 250 yards ahead of the ship. The bombs were to be armed with the new and more powerful explosive Torpex, and had contact pistols that required no depth setting. They would not explode unless they hit a target or the ocean floor. was the first ship of the Royal Navy to be equipped with a new, secret ASW weapon, the Hedgehog. This was a bow-mounted, multiple-barrel mortar capable of firing a salvo of twenty-four 65-pound bombs (with 30-pound warheads) into a small circular pattern about 250 yards ahead of the ship. The bombs were to be armed with the new and more powerful explosive Torpex, and had contact pistols that required no depth setting. They would not explode unless they hit a target or the ocean floor.

Hedgehog had several theoretical advantages over the conventional stern or stern-quarter launched or dropped depth charge. It eliminated the need for the attacker to run directly over the U-boat and speed up to sonar-deafening levels to avoid depth-charge damage to its own stern, and also eliminated the useless, sonardeafening explosions of depth charges that usually missed. With Hedgehog, so the theory went, the attacker could maintain sonar contact with its quarry at all times and frustrate the usual U-boat evasions during the run-over and the depth-charge explosions.

Hedgehog also had several disadvantages. It was big and had a terrific recoil, and could therefore be mounted only on the bows of the larger escorts.* It was a "precision instrument" that was complicated to arm and fire, and it still had many "bugs." Moreover, inasmuch as a direct hit was required to detonate the bombs, there was no possibility of inflicting It was a "precision instrument" that was complicated to arm and fire, and it still had many "bugs." Moreover, inasmuch as a direct hit was required to detonate the bombs, there was no possibility of inflicting damage damage on a U-boat or of terrorizing the Germans with near misses. As a consequence, many escort commanders and their crews remained skeptical. on a U-boat or of terrorizing the Germans with near misses. As a consequence, many escort commanders and their crews remained skeptical.

When Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle sailed in the early hours of February 2 by the light of a full moon, the three destroyers of the Striking Force took station to seaward. sailed in the early hours of February 2 by the light of a full moon, the three destroyers of the Striking Force took station to seaward. Wescott Wescott and and Croome Croome were off the South Channel where Pfeifer in were off the South Channel where Pfeifer in U-581 U-581 was waiting. was waiting. Exmoor Exmoor was off the North Channel where von Forstner in was off the North Channel where von Forstner in U-402 U-402 was waiting. Pfeifer saw the destroyers, dived, and boldly fired a torpedo at one of them, but it missed. Moments later, the port diesel-exhaust valve suddenly failed, flooding the engine room and dragging the boat stern first to 524 feet. To stop the descent and regain control of the boat, Pfeifer blew main ballast tanks. was waiting. Pfeifer saw the destroyers, dived, and boldly fired a torpedo at one of them, but it missed. Moments later, the port diesel-exhaust valve suddenly failed, flooding the engine room and dragging the boat stern first to 524 feet. To stop the descent and regain control of the boat, Pfeifer blew main ballast tanks. Wescott Wescott and and Croome Croome heard all this racket on sonar and closed to attack, just as the heard all this racket on sonar and closed to attack, just as the U-581 U-581 popped to the surface, running hell-bent for asylum in neutral Portuguese waters. popped to the surface, running hell-bent for asylum in neutral Portuguese waters.

Sighting the boat, Wescott Wescott put on full speed to ram, but she miscalculated the angle and missed. As the two ships passed, side by side, thirty feet apart, put on full speed to ram, but she miscalculated the angle and missed. As the two ships passed, side by side, thirty feet apart, Wescott Wescott dropped ten shallow-set depth charges, which exploded all over dropped ten shallow-set depth charges, which exploded all over U-581 U-581. Unable to fire her main batteries because Croome Croome was in the way, was in the way, Wescott Wescott hauled out and turned 180 degrees and closed hauled out and turned 180 degrees and closed U-581 U-581 bow-to-bow for another ramming attempt. By then, Pfeifer had ordered his men to abandon ship and scuttle and most of his crew was topside, wearing lifesaving gear. As the vessels closed bow-on at nearly 50 miles per hour, the Germans leaped overboard. bow-to-bow for another ramming attempt. By then, Pfeifer had ordered his men to abandon ship and scuttle and most of his crew was topside, wearing lifesaving gear. As the vessels closed bow-on at nearly 50 miles per hour, the Germans leaped overboard.

Wescott struck struck U-581 U-581 abaft the conning tower, riding up and over the after deck, incurring minor damage to herself. The U-boat upended and sank immediately, stern first. Ironically, abaft the conning tower, riding up and over the after deck, incurring minor damage to herself. The U-boat upended and sank immediately, stern first. Ironically, Wescott Wescott had had no opportunity to use her Hedgehog. had had no opportunity to use her Hedgehog. Wescott Wescott and and Croome Croome (merely a spectator) rescued Pfeifer and forty men, including the unpopular engineer, Krummel. Six Germans were unaccounted for. One, the second watch officer, Werner Sitek, swam to shore and was later repatriated to Germany. (merely a spectator) rescued Pfeifer and forty men, including the unpopular engineer, Krummel. Six Germans were unaccounted for. One, the second watch officer, Werner Sitek, swam to shore and was later repatriated to Germany.* British intelligence officers, who exploited the bitterness of this unhappy crew, reported that apart from the officers, "only three men" of British intelligence officers, who exploited the bitterness of this unhappy crew, reported that apart from the officers, "only three men" of U-581 U-581 had had "any previous U-boat experience." had had "any previous U-boat experience."

When the rudderless Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle sailed out of Horta, she took the North Channel, where von Forstner in sailed out of Horta, she took the North Channel, where von Forstner in U-402 U-402 was waiting. The destroyer was waiting. The destroyer Exmoor Exmoor, joined by the destroyer Croome Croome, assumed escort duties. Von Forstner fired a total of five torpedoes at one or the other of the destroyers, but all missed. Upon sighting U-402 U-402, the destroyers attacked with guns and depth charges, driving her off. Although he was low on fuel, von Forstner hung on to the formation until Heinz Hirsacker in U-572 U-572, returning from his second balk at the Gibraltar Strait, homed in on his beacons. But Hirsacker was no help; he made no attacks. To Kerneval's chagrin, the Llangibby Castle Llangibby Castle, closely escorted by the three-destroyer Striking Force and later by aircraft, finally reached Gibraltar with her 1,000 troops.

Thus the half-dozen U-boats patrolling in southern waters during January sank just one confirmed ship: the ASW trawler Rosemonde Rosemonde. In return, Bockett-Pugh's experimental Striking Force in two separate forays had sunk two U-boats: Elfe's U-93 U-93 and Pfeifer's and Pfeifer's U-581 U-581. In view of these losses and the lack of success, and the shortage of boats for the defense of Norway and the campaign in the Americas, Donitz convinced the OKM that patrols to the Gibraltar-Azores area should be temporarily terminated.

* The fleet carriers: The fleet carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku. Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku. The battleships: The battleships: Hiei, Kirishima. Hiei, Kirishima. The heavy cruisers: The heavy cruisers: Tone, Chikuma. Tone, Chikuma.

Three of the four battleships that sank were salvaged; Three of the four battleships that sank were salvaged; Arizona Arizona was not. was not. Oklahoma Oklahoma did not return to service, but did not return to service, but California California and and West Virginia West Virginia eventually did. The four damaged battleships were put back in service within several months. eventually did. The four damaged battleships were put back in service within several months.

* For complete details, see my For complete details, see my Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (1975). (1975).

See Gannon, See Gannon, Operation Drumbeat Operation Drumbeat, p. 177. He wrote that "two squadrons of the newest, long-legged destroyers had been removed to the Pacific Theater in late December." This incorrect assertion is apparently derived from an error in the U.S. Navy's Administrative History of World War II, No. 138 (Atlantic Fleet), p. 261: "Two squadrons of the best and newest destroyers were transferred to the Pacific in late December, 1941...." Normally, a destroyer squadron was composed of twelve vessels. Only Squadron 2, composed of two understrength divisions divisions (3 and 4), transferred to the Pacific at this time. (For more detail, see (3 and 4), transferred to the Pacific at this time. (For more detail, see Appendix 12 Appendix 12.) * S-1, S-21, S-22, S-24, S-25 S-1, S-21, S-22, S-24, S-25, and S-29 S-29. The S-25 S-25, renamed Jastrazab Jastrazab, and manned by a Polish crew, was accidentally sunk off Norway by Allied forces on May 5, 1942.

Including the work of the Italian frogmen in Alexandria harbor, on December 19 and the Mediterranean-based U-boats, in a period of thirty-seven days the Royal Navy incurred its own "Pearl Harbor": the carrier Including the work of the Italian frogmen in Alexandria harbor, on December 19 and the Mediterranean-based U-boats, in a period of thirty-seven days the Royal Navy incurred its own "Pearl Harbor": the carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal, the battleships Prince of Wales Prince of Wales and and Barham Barham, the battle cruiser Repulse Repulse, the "jeep" carrier Audacity Audacity, and the light cruisers Dunedin, Neptune Dunedin, Neptune, and Galatea Galatea sunk; the battleships sunk; the battleships Valiant Valiant and and Queen Elizabeth Queen Elizabeth severely damaged. severely damaged.

* Of the 64 boats of the Atlantic force, fourteen (22 percent) were not combat-ready or available. The VIICs Of the 64 boats of the Atlantic force, fourteen (22 percent) were not combat-ready or available. The VIICs U-73, U-561 U-73, U-561, and U-572 were ordered to the Mediterranean in January to replace losses. The ex-Turk U-A U-A was undergoing conversion to a provisional U-tanker. The IX was undergoing conversion to a provisional U-tanker. The IX U-43 U-43, the VIIs U-94, U-201, U-563 U-94, U-201, U-563, and U-101 U-101 were homebound to or in Germany for overhaul, battle-damage repairs, or retirement. The Arctic transfer were homebound to or in Germany for overhaul, battle-damage repairs, or retirement. The Arctic transfer U-752 U-752 was in Kiel for overhaul before going to the Atlantic. Four other VIIs were undergoing battle-damage repairs in French bases: was in Kiel for overhaul before going to the Atlantic. Four other VIIs were undergoing battle-damage repairs in French bases: U-71, U-202, U-558 U-71, U-202, U-558, and U-569 U-569.

* See See Appendix 4 Appendix 4.

Perhaps to counteract the U-boat failures and lift morale, at this time five skippers received high honors: Otto Kretschmer, in a British POW camp, was awarded the coveted Crossed Swords to his Perhaps to counteract the U-boat failures and lift morale, at this time five skippers received high honors: Otto Kretschmer, in a British POW camp, was awarded the coveted Crossed Swords to his Ritterkreuz; Ritterkreuz; Reinhard Suhren in Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564, who had won a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz as first watch officer on the famous as first watch officer on the famous U-48 U-48, was awarded Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, as was Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96. Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat in U-74 U-74 and Robert Gysae in and Robert Gysae in U-98 U-98 received the received the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. As skipper of U-564 U-564, Suhren had sunk eight confirmed ships for 27,136 tons and shared credit for two other sinkings. Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96, the leading ace in tonnage sunk still in active combat, had sunk a total of 18 confirmed ships for 143,604 tons. Kentrat in U-74 U-74 (then in the Mediterranean) had sunk five confirmed ships for 27,561 tons. Gysae in (then in the Mediterranean) had sunk five confirmed ships for 27,561 tons. Gysae in U-98 U-98 had sunk nine confirmed ships for 46,727 tons. had sunk nine confirmed ships for 46,727 tons.

* According to the information available up to 1996, there was no coordination between the Japanese submarine assault off the West Coast and the German U-boat assault off the East Coast. Both assaults apparently evolved independently. By pure coincidence, the assaults were mutually supporting. For example, the Japanese submarine attacks held ASW aircraft on the West Coast for weeks and compelled Pacific forces to initiate convoying, heavily escorted by Pacific Fleet destroyers. According to the information available up to 1996, there was no coordination between the Japanese submarine assault off the West Coast and the German U-boat assault off the East Coast. Both assaults apparently evolved independently. By pure coincidence, the assaults were mutually supporting. For example, the Japanese submarine attacks held ASW aircraft on the West Coast for weeks and compelled Pacific forces to initiate convoying, heavily escorted by Pacific Fleet destroyers.

* And foolishly agreed with Raeder's proposal that construction of Germany's single aircraft carrier, And foolishly agreed with Raeder's proposal that construction of Germany's single aircraft carrier, Graf Zeppelin Graf Zeppelin, for which no aircraft had yet been developed, be vigorously pursued, even though there was an acute shortage of high-grade steel and shipyard workers for the U-boat production lines.

Rudolf Schendel in Rudolf Schendel in U-134 U-134, Burkhard Hacklaander in U-454 U-454, Joachim Deecke in U-584 U-584, and Bernhard Lohse in U-585 U-585, based in Kirkenes on the Barents Sea in extreme northern Norway. En route to Kirkenes, Schendel in U-134 U-134 by mistake attacked and sank the 2,200-ton German freighter by mistake attacked and sank the 2,200-ton German freighter Steinbek Steinbek off Tana Fjord, killing twelve men. Uninformed of German ship traffic, and defended by Donitz, Schendel was held blameless. off Tana Fjord, killing twelve men. Uninformed of German ship traffic, and defended by Donitz, Schendel was held blameless.

* Morison wrote that the Navy was "woefully unprepared materially and mentally" for U-boat warfare, in part because it had not requested ASW vessels and escorts. Morison wrote that the Navy was "woefully unprepared materially and mentally" for U-boat warfare, in part because it had not requested ASW vessels and escorts.

Maritime Commission goals were expressed in the larger, more impressive deadweight tonnage figures. American shipyards were to produce about 85 percent of the projected tonnage. To do so was to require about 90 shipyards and 700,000 workers, a very large percentage of them women, personified-and glorified-by nicknames "Rosie the Riveter" and "Wilma the Welder." Maritime Commission goals were expressed in the larger, more impressive deadweight tonnage figures. American shipyards were to produce about 85 percent of the projected tonnage. To do so was to require about 90 shipyards and 700,000 workers, a very large percentage of them women, personified-and glorified-by nicknames "Rosie the Riveter" and "Wilma the Welder."

Excepting giant British ocean liners, such as Excepting giant British ocean liners, such as Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, and Aquitania Aquitania, which were placed at the disposal of the Americans for transporting troops to distant Australia. These ships cruised at 26 knots and were therefore too fast for sustained escorts and, in any case, deemed unlikely to be hit by a U-boat, or if hit, unlikely to sink owing to dense compartmentalization.

The Navy demothballed and recommissioned seventy-two four-stackers in Philadelphia and San Diego in the period from March 1 to June 30, 1940. Less the fifty for the British and Canadian navies, the American Navy got twenty-two. The American Navy commissioned eighteen new destroyers in 1940 ( The Navy demothballed and recommissioned seventy-two four-stackers in Philadelphia and San Diego in the period from March 1 to June 30, 1940. Less the fifty for the British and Canadian navies, the American Navy got twenty-two. The American Navy commissioned eighteen new destroyers in 1940 (DD 415 to DD 432) and seventeen in 1941 ( and seventeen in 1941 (DD 433 to DD 444, DD 453 to DD 457, and DD 463 DD 463).

See See Appendix 16 Appendix 16.

* The British frigate and its American counterpart, the destroyer escort, were similarly armed: three 3/50 caliber guns, two depth-charge tracks on the stern, and eight depth-charge throwers on the port and starboard quarters. The slightly larger American version incorporated three torpedo tubes. In later models, the main battery of the American version was upgraded to two 5/38 caliber guns. Both the British and American types had extensive antiaircraft weaponry. The British frigate and its American counterpart, the destroyer escort, were similarly armed: three 3/50 caliber guns, two depth-charge tracks on the stern, and eight depth-charge throwers on the port and starboard quarters. The slightly larger American version incorporated three torpedo tubes. In later models, the main battery of the American version was upgraded to two 5/38 caliber guns. Both the British and American types had extensive antiaircraft weaponry.

During World War I, in his role as Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1913-1920), Roosevelt played an important part in the production of 440 110-foot, wood-hulled subchasers by 30 American shipyards. These little gasoline-powered, short-legged craft were suitable for relatively calm waters but not the rugged North Atlantic and, of course, they were not equipped with antiaircraft armament and ammo storage. Stark's biographer, B. Mitchell Simpson III, wrote: "... The real need was for a larger ship that could be used in all kinds of weather. When he was Chief of Naval Operations, Stark struggled unsuccessfully to convince Roosevelt of this need, because Roosevelt favored smaller patrol craft." During World War I, in his role as Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1913-1920), Roosevelt played an important part in the production of 440 110-foot, wood-hulled subchasers by 30 American shipyards. These little gasoline-powered, short-legged craft were suitable for relatively calm waters but not the rugged North Atlantic and, of course, they were not equipped with antiaircraft armament and ammo storage. Stark's biographer, B. Mitchell Simpson III, wrote: "... The real need was for a larger ship that could be used in all kinds of weather. When he was Chief of Naval Operations, Stark struggled unsuccessfully to convince Roosevelt of this need, because Roosevelt favored smaller patrol craft."

The SC mounted one 3/50 caliber gun and a few depth charges. The PC mounted two 3/50 caliber guns and depth charges. The guns were no larger than the gun on the Type VII U-boat and smaller than the guns on the Type IX. Owing to the lack of space for antiaircraft weapons, neither craft could operate safely where Axis aircraft might be encountered. The SC mounted one 3/50 caliber gun and a few depth charges. The PC mounted two 3/50 caliber guns and depth charges. The guns were no larger than the gun on the Type VII U-boat and smaller than the guns on the Type IX. Owing to the lack of space for antiaircraft weapons, neither craft could operate safely where Axis aircraft might be encountered.

* See See Appendix 14 Appendix 14.

The keels of the first two of the fifty British vessels were laid on February 28, 1942. Altogether, only ninety-two destroyer escorts were laid down in American yards in 1942, fifty for the British, forty-two for the Americans. Owing to the low priority (for a time, tenth place) none was commissioned until 1943. By prior agreement, the Americans ultimately retained forty-five of the fifty British vessels, delaying delivery of the rest until well into 1943. The keels of the first two of the fifty British vessels were laid on February 28, 1942. Altogether, only ninety-two destroyer escorts were laid down in American yards in 1942, fifty for the British, forty-two for the Americans. Owing to the low priority (for a time, tenth place) none was commissioned until 1943. By prior agreement, the Americans ultimately retained forty-five of the fifty British vessels, delaying delivery of the rest until well into 1943.

* Bibb, Campbell, Duane, Alexander Hamilton, Ingham, Spencer, Taney. Bibb, Campbell, Duane, Alexander Hamilton, Ingham, Spencer, Taney. The The Alexander Hamilton Alexander Hamilton retained her full name to distinguish her from the four-stack Navy destroyer retained her full name to distinguish her from the four-stack Navy destroyer Hamilton. Hamilton.

* King to Rear Admiral Adolphus Andrews, November 17, 1941, King Papers, Library of Congress. His italics. Andrews responded, with considerable asperity, that such port organizations were already in place and reminded King that two prototype convoys had sailed from New York, one in July, one in September 1941, admittedly, however, attended by a great deal of confusion. King to Rear Admiral Adolphus Andrews, November 17, 1941, King Papers, Library of Congress. His italics. Andrews responded, with considerable asperity, that such port organizations were already in place and reminded King that two prototype convoys had sailed from New York, one in July, one in September 1941, admittedly, however, attended by a great deal of confusion.

King to CNO Stark, November 17, 1941, cited in Marc Milner, King to CNO Stark, November 17, 1941, cited in Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run North Atlantic Run, pp. 90-93.

* Contrary to the impression in some accounts, these ten corvettes did not arrive in American ports for months. In a sense they were quid pro quo for the ten Contrary to the impression in some accounts, these ten corvettes did not arrive in American ports for months. In a sense they were quid pro quo for the ten Lake Lake-class Coast Guard cutters transferred to the Royal Navy a year earlier.

* In British accounts, it is asserted that King deceptively sent these eleven so-called "missing" destroyers to the Pacific. In British accounts, it is asserted that King deceptively sent these eleven so-called "missing" destroyers to the Pacific.

In early 1942, the Canadian Newfoundland Escort Force could call on eighty-three Canadian warships: thirteen destroyers and seventy corvettes. In early 1942, the Canadian Newfoundland Escort Force could call on eighty-three Canadian warships: thirteen destroyers and seventy corvettes.

* See essay in Boutilier (1982) and appendices 12 and 16. According to the U.S. Navy's daily ship position reports, in the period February 10 to February 20, 1942, there were still five American Escort Groups (A-1 to A-5), composed of twenty destroyers, serving on the North Atlantic run, plus two See essay in Boutilier (1982) and appendices 12 and 16. According to the U.S. Navy's daily ship position reports, in the period February 10 to February 20, 1942, there were still five American Escort Groups (A-1 to A-5), composed of twenty destroyers, serving on the North Atlantic run, plus two Treasury Treasury-class cutters. These were escorting cargo convoys HX 175 and 176, ON 67 and 69, and SC 70. By mid-March, the number of American destroyers in that duty was twelve, plus one cutter. By May 1, the number was about ten destroyers plus two cutters in the five American escort groups. Canadian or British escorts increased these American MOEF groups to full strength.

Love, Love, History of the U.S. Navy History of the U.S. Navy (1992), vol. 2, ch. 4. (1992), vol. 2, ch. 4.

* Later Berlin propagandists released fabricated still and motion pictures of "the lights of New York," ostensibly photographed by Tolle. Although the fabrications were amateurish, German audiences accepted them as authentic. The stills and movie footage were still in circulation in 1996. Later Berlin propagandists released fabricated still and motion pictures of "the lights of New York," ostensibly photographed by Tolle. Although the fabrications were amateurish, German audiences accepted them as authentic. The stills and movie footage were still in circulation in 1996.

* At this time Coastal Command had four Catalina squadrons in the British Isles: 209, 210, 240, and the Canadian 413. These had a total of thirty-six aircraft, plus reserves and trainers. The other British Catalinas were based elsewhere. At this time Coastal Command had four Catalina squadrons in the British Isles: 209, 210, 240, and the Canadian 413. These had a total of thirty-six aircraft, plus reserves and trainers. The other British Catalinas were based elsewhere.

* These four were model Ks, the "mass"- production blimp of World War II. They were 252 feet in length, armed with Mark XVII depth charges, and had carrier pigeons (!) for secure communications with Lakehurst. In June 1942 Congress authorized a total blimp strength of 200 K types or variations. Goodyear Aircraft contracted to build 134 Ks during the war plus a number of 149-foot model L trainers, duplicates of its five-ship prewar "advertising fleet," which the Navy bought soon after Pearl Harbor. These four were model Ks, the "mass"- production blimp of World War II. They were 252 feet in length, armed with Mark XVII depth charges, and had carrier pigeons (!) for secure communications with Lakehurst. In June 1942 Congress authorized a total blimp strength of 200 K types or variations. Goodyear Aircraft contracted to build 134 Ks during the war plus a number of 149-foot model L trainers, duplicates of its five-ship prewar "advertising fleet," which the Navy bought soon after Pearl Harbor.

* War-planner Eisenhower fumed in his diary that if someone shot King it might help win the war. War-planner Eisenhower fumed in his diary that if someone shot King it might help win the war.

* In books In books Drumbeat Drumbeat (1990) and (1990) and Slide Rules and Submarines Slide Rules and Submarines (1990), respectively. (1990), respectively.

* Brazos Brazos collided with the British "jeep" carrier collided with the British "jeep" carrier Archer Archer in workup in the Caribbean. in workup in the Caribbean.

* The Big Inch, begun in July 1942, delivered the first crude to the Philadelphia area about a year later, in August 1943. The Little Big Inch, begun in April 1943, delivered the first product to Linden, New Jersey, in March 1944. During the war, these two lines delivered about 380 million barrels of oil and product. The Plantation, built in 1941, came into full operation in 1942. The Big Inch, begun in July 1942, delivered the first crude to the Philadelphia area about a year later, in August 1943. The Little Big Inch, begun in April 1943, delivered the first product to Linden, New Jersey, in March 1944. During the war, these two lines delivered about 380 million barrels of oil and product. The Plantation, built in 1941, came into full operation in 1942.

Excluding Panamanian-registered vessels. Excluding Panamanian-registered vessels.

* Including one ship sunk on the duck Including one ship sunk on the duck U-147 U-147, Hardegen's confirmed sinkings were eleven ships for 60,787 tons. Owing to the vivid and precise description of the sinkings of the two "unidentified" ships for 8,000 tons in Hardegen's log, Gannon was persuaded to credit them. An American researcher, Edward R. Rumpf, suggests that those two ships could have been the 1,300-ton Norwegian Octavian Octavian and the 5,300-ton Panamanian and the 5,300-ton Panamanian Olympic Olympic, whose loss has been attributed to another U-boat.

With these two sinkings, Hardegen's claimed score for the patrol rose to ten ships for 66,135 tons, the best patrol in recent memory. The final, confirmed score was seven ships for 46,744 tons, not counting the two "unknowns." With these two sinkings, Hardegen's claimed score for the patrol rose to ten ships for 66,135 tons, the best patrol in recent memory. The final, confirmed score was seven ships for 46,744 tons, not counting the two "unknowns."

* Bleichrodt was wrongly credited with sinking the 6,100-ton British freighter Bleichrodt was wrongly credited with sinking the 6,100-ton British freighter Empire Kingfisher Empire Kingfisher, which ran aground.

* Intercepted by the Australian cruiser Intercepted by the Australian cruiser Sydney Sydney in Australian waters on November 19, 1941, soon after giving in Australian waters on November 19, 1941, soon after giving Spreewald Spreewald her prisoners, her prisoners, Kormoran Kormoran sank sank Sydney Sydney with the loss of all hands. with the loss of all hands. Kormoran Kormoran herself was so badly wrecked in the engagement she had to scuttle, with the loss of eighty-five of her 400-man crew. herself was so badly wrecked in the engagement she had to scuttle, with the loss of eighty-five of her 400-man crew.

* Cremer himself was first to reveal the full story in his book, Cremer himself was first to reveal the full story in his book, U-boat Commander U-boat Commander (1982). (1982).

Some of the boats of the second wave sailing in January overlapped the December boats and sank ships in January. Some of the December boats sank ships in early February. Totals by both groups in the month of January only: forty-two ships sunk (fifteen tankers) for 230, 685 tons; five ships (four tankers) damaged. Some of the boats of the second wave sailing in January overlapped the December boats and sank ships in January. Some of the December boats sank ships in early February. Totals by both groups in the month of January only: forty-two ships sunk (fifteen tankers) for 230, 685 tons; five ships (four tankers) damaged.

Twenty-two of the twenty-four trawlers were standard 170-foot coal-burners with a top speed of 12 knots. They were equipped with a 4" bow gun, depth charges, and British sonar. One, Twenty-two of the twenty-four trawlers were standard 170-foot coal-burners with a top speed of 12 knots. They were equipped with a 4" bow gun, depth charges, and British sonar. One, Northern Princess Northern Princess, was believed to have foundered in heavy seas en route to Newfoundland and was lost with all hands. Actually, she was torpedoed by Otto Ites in U-94 U-94 en route to America. The first ten trawlers did not reach New York until March 12. The others came later in the month. Many were in need of voyage repairs or refits and did not carry spare parts or metric-gauge tools and required scarce high-grade coal, but the British crews were indomitable and inspiring. en route to America. The first ten trawlers did not reach New York until March 12. The others came later in the month. Many were in need of voyage repairs or refits and did not carry spare parts or metric-gauge tools and required scarce high-grade coal, but the British crews were indomitable and inspiring.

* James Phinney Baxter III, in his book James Phinney Baxter III, in his book Scientist Against Time Scientist Against Time (1950). (1950).