* American destroyers were named for people, cruisers for cities. The destroyer American destroyers were named for people, cruisers for cities. The destroyer Dallas Dallas was named for a nineteenth-century naval hero. To avoid confusion, no cruiser named for the city of Dallas, Texas, was commissioned during the war. was named for a nineteenth-century naval hero. To avoid confusion, no cruiser named for the city of Dallas, Texas, was commissioned during the war.

* Stark and King ruled that older destroyermen were to be transferred to other duty. The objective was to reduce the average age of squadron commanders to forty-five, division commanders to forty-three, and ship captains to forty-one, or less. Thebaud, age fifty-one, was soon relieved by John B. Heffernan, age forty-seven. Stark and King ruled that older destroyermen were to be transferred to other duty. The objective was to reduce the average age of squadron commanders to forty-five, division commanders to forty-three, and ship captains to forty-one, or less. Thebaud, age fifty-one, was soon relieved by John B. Heffernan, age forty-seven.

* For saving the ship, Danis, Esslinger, and Chief Motor Machinist Mate Aucie McDaniel were awarded the Navy Cross, the highest naval award, second only to the national Medal of Honor. For saving the ship, Danis, Esslinger, and Chief Motor Machinist Mate Aucie McDaniel were awarded the Navy Cross, the highest naval award, second only to the national Medal of Honor.

* In addition to In addition to Broadwater Broadwater, Mengersen had sunk one ship on the duck U-18 U-18 and nine ships on and nine ships on U-101 U-101, for a total of ten confirmed ships for about 54,000 tons.

* An account of Hardegen's rescue of Shaw as an example of German humanity was prepared for Donitz's defense at Nuremberg but not submitted. An account of Hardegen's rescue of Shaw as an example of German humanity was prepared for Donitz's defense at Nuremberg but not submitted.

* Cope; his executive officer, Ashton B. Smith; and two other men were awarded the Navy Cross for saving the ship. Admiral King complained that such high awards for merely saving one's ship-without harm to the enemy-were inappropriate, and they were accordingly curtailed. Cope; his executive officer, Ashton B. Smith; and two other men were awarded the Navy Cross for saving the ship. Admiral King complained that such high awards for merely saving one's ship-without harm to the enemy-were inappropriate, and they were accordingly curtailed.

* Reflecting the lingering isolationist sentiment, the Senate vote on November 7 was 50 to 37; the House vote on November 13 was 259 to 138. President Roosevelt signed the bill on November 17. The amendments permitted United States merchant ships to arm and to call at ports of "belligerents," meaning in this instance ports in the British Isles and the Dominions. U.S. Navy gun crews, to be known as the "Armed Guard," were to man the guns on merchant ships. Reflecting the lingering isolationist sentiment, the Senate vote on November 7 was 50 to 37; the House vote on November 13 was 259 to 138. President Roosevelt signed the bill on November 17. The amendments permitted United States merchant ships to arm and to call at ports of "belligerents," meaning in this instance ports in the British Isles and the Dominions. U.S. Navy gun crews, to be known as the "Armed Guard," were to man the guns on merchant ships.

* In a propaganda broadcast, Berlin credited Mutzelburg with sinking 50,000 tons. His confirmed score was eight ships for 26,086 tons. In a propaganda broadcast, Berlin credited Mutzelburg with sinking 50,000 tons. His confirmed score was eight ships for 26,086 tons.

* Her departure left only one boat of those that in 1939 had launched the war in the Atlantic: Wolfgang Luth's Type IX, Her departure left only one boat of those that in 1939 had launched the war in the Atlantic: Wolfgang Luth's Type IX, U-43 U-43.

The new battleship, The new battleship, King George V King George V, and the new fleet carrier, Victorious. Victorious. The Admiralty had sent the other new battleship, The Admiralty had sent the other new battleship, Prince of Wales Prince of Wales, and the battle cruiser Repulse Repulse to Singapore. The new carrier, to Singapore. The new carrier, Indomitable Indomitable, was to reinforce the Far East Fleet, but during workup in the Caribbean, she ran aground off Jamaica and went into Norfolk for lengthy repairs, joining new British carriers Illustrious Illustrious and and Formidable Formidable, which were also in Norfolk for repairs, and she never got to Singapore. grounds that her possible loss would be an unacceptable blow to German prestige and that she was needed for the defense of Norway.

* Mayrant, McDougal, Moffett, Rhind, Rowan, Trippe, Wainwright, Winslow Mayrant, McDougal, Moffett, Rhind, Rowan, Trippe, Wainwright, Winslow, all of which were to be away until after the New Year. Counting the damaged Kearny Kearny and and Du Pont Du Pont and the lost and the lost Reuben James Reuben James, Admiral Bristol's support force was reduced by eleven American destroyers in November.

* A onetime merchant marine officer, Kleinschmidt had crossed the Equator before and was thus a "shellback." He arranged an appropriately brutal initiation ceremony-presided over by King Neptune in costume-for the "polliwogs" crossing the line for the first time. A onetime merchant marine officer, Kleinschmidt had crossed the Equator before and was thus a "shellback." He arranged an appropriately brutal initiation ceremony-presided over by King Neptune in costume-for the "polliwogs" crossing the line for the first time.

Kleinschmidt wrote that he supplied the survivors of both ships with chocolate, cigarettes, matches, and brandy. Kleinschmidt wrote that he supplied the survivors of both ships with chocolate, cigarettes, matches, and brandy.

* Her upper hull area was coated with rubber strips (known as " Her upper hull area was coated with rubber strips (known as "Alberich") to deflect sonar. The experiment was a failure.

* Snowflake was a double-edged sword. On the one hand it lit the area "like day," robbing the U-boats of concealment. On the other hand it provided enough light to enable the U-boats to clearly see the targets and to make follow-up submerged night attacks by periscope. Snowflake was a double-edged sword. On the one hand it lit the area "like day," robbing the U-boats of concealment. On the other hand it provided enough light to enable the U-boats to clearly see the targets and to make follow-up submerged night attacks by periscope.

* Apparently the work of the Italian boat Apparently the work of the Italian boat Malaspina Malaspina, commanded by Giuliano Prini, but the boat was lost without trace at this time. The reported sinkings could not be confirmed in British records.

* The official British historian wrote that the Admiralty "sometimes received the decrypt of the German report of an arrival at Gibraltar before it received the British notification signal." The official British historian wrote that the Admiralty "sometimes received the decrypt of the German report of an arrival at Gibraltar before it received the British notification signal."

* Buchheim's depiction of Lehmann-Willenbrock sinking a tanker at this time was fiction, based on an attack that Buchheim's depiction of Lehmann-Willenbrock sinking a tanker at this time was fiction, based on an attack that U-96 U-96 had conducted earlier in the year. had conducted earlier in the year.

* After passing through the Gibraltar Strait, the Mediterranean boats employed a different Enigma net, After passing through the Gibraltar Strait, the Mediterranean boats employed a different Enigma net, Sud Sud (called Porpoise by the British), which Bletchley Park was unable to break. Hence the Admiralty's U-boat Tracking Room "lost" these boats and countermeasures were difficult to mount. (called Porpoise by the British), which Bletchley Park was unable to break. Hence the Admiralty's U-boat Tracking Room "lost" these boats and countermeasures were difficult to mount.

* He had a new first watch officer replacing Herbert Werner, the author of He had a new first watch officer replacing Herbert Werner, the author of Iron Coffins Iron Coffins, who had qualified for his own command.

* See Krug (1996), "Filming See Krug (1996), "Filming Das Boot Das Boot."

* After After U-64 U-64 at Narvik, in April 1940, the second U-boat kill by a navy Swordfish, unassisted by surface ships. at Narvik, in April 1940, the second U-boat kill by a navy Swordfish, unassisted by surface ships.

Launched by the Italian submarine Launched by the Italian submarine Scire Scire on the night of December 18-19, the frogmen entered the harbor, riding three slow-running "human torpedoes," or "pigs," with detachable delayed-action, 485-pound warheads. The delayed explosives shattered the 32,000-ton on the night of December 18-19, the frogmen entered the harbor, riding three slow-running "human torpedoes," or "pigs," with detachable delayed-action, 485-pound warheads. The delayed explosives shattered the 32,000-ton Queen Elizabeth Queen Elizabeth and sister ship and sister ship Valiant Valiant, the 7,500-ton tanker Sagona Sagona, and the destroyer Jervis Jervis. Both battleships sank in the shallow water and were out of action for many months. The six Italian frogmen who carried out this amazing deed survived but were captured. damage to the cruiser Aurora Aurora by Axis mines, and the transfer of German airpower ( by Axis mines, and the transfer of German airpower (Luftflotte 2) from the Russian front to the Mediterranean, temporarily broke the Royal Navy's command of the Mediterranean Sea. It was unable to provide the British Eighth Army flank support, and partly as a result, the British offensive, Crusader, bogged down after the capture of Benghazi in Libya. The Axis forces dug in at El Agheila and another stalemate in the North African desert war ensued.

* After After Robin Moor, Lehigh Robin Moor, Lehigh was the second American ship to be sunk by U-boats before America entered the war. was the second American ship to be sunk by U-boats before America entered the war.

* Atlantis Atlantis, the most successful of the raiders, had been at sea for 622 days, had steamed 102,000 miles, and had sunk or captured twenty-two ships for 145,698 tons.

* Merten in Merten in U-68 U-68 transferred seventy men to transferred seventy men to Tazzoli Tazzoli; Mohr in U-124 U-124 gave gave Calvi Calvi seventy men; Clausen in seventy men; Clausen in U-129 U-129 gave gave Finzi Finzi seventy men; and Eckermann in the bigger seventy men; and Eckermann in the bigger U-A U-A gave gave Torelli Torelli fifty men. fifty men.

* Boot Greift Wieder An: Ritterkreuztrager Erzahlen Boot Greift Wieder An: Ritterkreuztrager Erzahlen (Boat Strikes Again: Tales of the Knight's Cross). This and other war patrols of Luth have been described by an American biographer, Jordan Vause, in his (Boat Strikes Again: Tales of the Knight's Cross). This and other war patrols of Luth have been described by an American biographer, Jordan Vause, in his U-boat U-boat Ace (Annapolis, 1990). For details of the loss of Ace (Annapolis, 1990). For details of the loss of Astral Astral, which remained unexplained for twenty years, Vause relied on two separate articles by Edward F. Oliver and Arthur Gordon in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1961 and October 1965, respectively.

* The other eight The other eight Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders then commanding Atlantic boats were Luth in holders then commanding Atlantic boats were Luth in U-43 U-43, Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96, Schewe in U-105 U-105, Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109, Schnee in U-201 U-201, Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, Topp in U-552 U-552, and Suhren in U-564 U-564. With twenty-one confirmed ships to his credit, Luth ranked second after Endrass.

* At the time of the award, Bigalk had sunk two confirmed ships for 15,370 tons, including At the time of the award, Bigalk had sunk two confirmed ships for 15,370 tons, including Audacity Audacity. Klaus Scholtz in U-108 U-108, who had skillfully shadowed the convoy for seven full days and sunk one ship from it, received a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz at the same time. His confirmed score was thirteen ships for 61,760 tons. at the same time. His confirmed score was thirteen ships for 61,760 tons.

Endrass had sunk a total of 25 confirmed ships for 137,990 tons while commanding U-46 and U-567. He ranked eighteenth in tonnage sunk in the war. Endrass had sunk a total of 25 confirmed ships for 137,990 tons while commanding U-46 and U-567. He ranked eighteenth in tonnage sunk in the war.

* Kerneval privately discounted Bigalk's claim to have sunk a Kerneval privately discounted Bigalk's claim to have sunk a Formidable Formidable class carrier, but let the claim stand publicly. Unaware as yet that the British even had a "jeep" carrier, and based in part on erroneous information from German spies at Gibraltar, in part on a report from Muller-Stockheim in class carrier, but let the claim stand publicly. Unaware as yet that the British even had a "jeep" carrier, and based in part on erroneous information from German spies at Gibraltar, in part on a report from Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67, who had seen and shot at Audacity Audacity during the chase but described her as an aircraft "mother ship," Kerneval continued to believe Bigalk had sunk the aircraft tender during the chase but described her as an aircraft "mother ship," Kerneval continued to believe Bigalk had sunk the aircraft tender Unicorn Unicorn.

* See appendices 1, 5, and 6. See appendices 1, 5, and 6.

See See Appendix 18 Appendix 18.

This total included 180 ships from Norway, 156 from Greece, 147 from the Netherlands, and 137 "prizes" or "requisitioned" vessels. This total included 180 ships from Norway, 156 from Greece, 147 from the Netherlands, and 137 "prizes" or "requisitioned" vessels.

See Plate 6. See Plate 6.

* See See Appendix 17 Appendix 17.

* When the British belatedly shifted from riveted to welded construction for some vessels, the riveters went out on strike. Regardless of the hardships inflicted on the civilian population, including themselves, dockyard workers also struck from time to time for increased wages and benefits. When the British belatedly shifted from riveted to welded construction for some vessels, the riveters went out on strike. Regardless of the hardships inflicted on the civilian population, including themselves, dockyard workers also struck from time to time for increased wages and benefits.

During workup in the Baltic, three new VIICs, During workup in the Baltic, three new VIICs, U-560, U-580, and U-583 U-560, U-580, and U-583, were lost in accidental collisions. The U-560 U-560 was raised and salvaged but relegated to a school boat. was raised and salvaged but relegated to a school boat.

In addition, eleven Type II ducks, manned by 275 men, were lost in all waters. Two were accidentally rammed and sunk by German-controlled surface ships; four were sunk by mines, four by British warships, one by a Russian submarine. The British captured seventy-eight men from three of these ducks: In addition, eleven Type II ducks, manned by 275 men, were lost in all waters. Two were accidentally rammed and sunk by German-controlled surface ships; four were sunk by mines, four by British warships, one by a Russian submarine. The British captured seventy-eight men from three of these ducks: U-13, U-63, and U-138 U-13, U-63, and U-138.

* See See Appendix 9 Appendix 9.

* See See Appendix 8 Appendix 8.

* See Plate 11. prised of a total of 12,057 ships. The U-boats sank only 291 of these vessels. See Plate 11. prised of a total of 12,057 ships. The U-boats sank only 291 of these vessels.

* See Plate 10. See Plate 10.

BOOK TWO.

THE U-BOAT WAR AGAINST THE AMERICAS.

DECEMBER 1941-A 1941-AUGUST 1942 1942

SEVEN.

JAPAN S STRIKES.

At the urging of the new and bellicose Prime Minister, Hideki Tojo, on November 5, 1941, the Japanese government resolved to launch war against United States, British, and Dutch forces in the Pacific and Far East. During the ensuing days the Japanese warily and vaguely revealed the decision to Hitler, seeking a written pledge of mutual support-that is, a declaration of war against the United States. Hitler welcomed Japan's decision to launch war, but he haggled over the treaty in an attempt to persuade Japan to launch war against the Soviet Union as well. The Japanese were unwilling to include this in a formal treaty but they left Hitler with the impression that after they had consolidated their Pacific conquests, Germany could count on their support. Meanwhile, Japan would shut off the flow of American (but not Soviet) ships bringing Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union via Vladivostok.

It had always been Hitler's intention to avoid overt war with the United States. In view of his growing military difficulties in the Soviet Union, there was good reason to adhere to that policy. But, as Admiral Raeder-and indirectly, Donitz-insisted, from a naval point of view the United States was already waging war against Germany by the occupation of Iceland, by escorting North Atlantic convoys, by arming its merchant ships and allowing them to proceed into the war zone, and by supplying Great Britain and the Soviet Union with an immense flow of Lend-Lease war materiel at no cost. The entry of Japan into the war was bound to draw substantial Allied naval and air forces from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the Pacific and Asian waters, greatly enhancing the possibilities of decisive Axis maritime victories in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Hence it was in Germany's best interest to welcome Japan into the war and also to join her arm-in-arm, perhaps even coordinating naval warfare in some areas, such as the Indian Ocean. Moreover, a full partnership would give Germany access to a supply of critical raw materials from the Japanese-occupied territories in Southeast Asia.

There were other considerations. The failure of the German armies to capture Moscow and Leningrad quickly, and to destroy the Soviet armies, had led to uneasiness and doubt in some German quarters. A new fighting partner and a dramatic stroke-such as a ringing declaration of war against the United States-was almost certain to raise spirits and renew energies. The possibility possibility of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union in the Far East might forestall the transfer of Soviet troops from that region to face the Germans outside Moscow and elsewhere, increasing the chance of a German victory in the Soviet Union when the warm weather returned in the spring. of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union in the Far East might forestall the transfer of Soviet troops from that region to face the Germans outside Moscow and elsewhere, increasing the chance of a German victory in the Soviet Union when the warm weather returned in the spring.

So it was decided: When Japan launched war against the United States, Germany-and Italy-were to declare war in partnership. Perhaps to justify this fateful decision, which many in his inner circle opposed, Hitler commenced in private an unprecedented outpouring of bile and venom about President Roosevelt and a sinister circle of American Jews who held him captive.

Although the Japanese professed friendship and complete trust, they artfully concealed from Hitler their plan for launching the war. It was ambitious. In the opening phase, Japanese forces were to strike nearly simultaneously the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the United States Asiatic Fleet and Army Air Forces at Manila, and the British fleet at Singapore (mainly the battleship Prince of Wales Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser and the battle cruiser Repulse Repulse), and capture the American islands of Wake and Guam, the British islands of Tarawa and Maiken, and the British colony at Hong Kong. In the second phase, to follow immediately, Japanese forces were to invade and capture the Philippines, Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra, Java, Burma, and other British and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia.

The Japanese attempted to conceal their preparations for war from Washington by pretending to carry on diplomatic negotiations through the ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. But Washington was not deceived. It was reading the chief Japanese diplomatic code, Purple, currently and fluently, and was fully alive to the deception and anticipated a Japanese attack at almost any hour. The problem was that the Japanese Imperial Navy had recently made a change in its main operational code (JN-25), which American codebreakers had not yet cracked. As a result, they had lost track of the Japanese battle fleet and therefore did not know in which direction the Japanese intended to strike. The prevailing guess was that the Japanese were to go south-perhaps to Malaya. The least likely target on nearly everyone's list was Pearl Harbor.

The Commander in Chief of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, did not favor war. He had traveled abroad often and had the greatest respect for the industrial potential of the United States. He actively lobbied against war behind the scenes, stating that "[i]f I am told to fight regardless of the consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year." His arguments carried little weight with Tojo and other hawks, who believed that in view of its naval commitments to the Atlantic, the United States might be reluctant to fight in the far Pacific or, if it did, it would probably soon tire of the fight and enter into negotiations. If it turned out so, one year of naval wild-running was all Tojo needed.

Confronting the growing possibility of war with the United States, Yamamoto had discarded the old Japanese plan of meeting the American fleet in a climactic battle in Far Eastern waters. In its place, he designed a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, to be carried out by a force of aircraft carriers and supporting vessels. Throughout most of 1941 the naval elements concerned had relentlessly rehearsed various aspects of the plan in utmost secrecy. Meanwhile, Japanese engineers produced special aerial torpedoes (with wooden fins) that would work in the shallow waters (forty feet) of the Pearl Harbor anchorage, and huge aerial bombs, fashioned from 16" armor-piercing battleship gun shells.

After assembling in secrecy at a remote island, Etorofu, in the Kuriles, the Japanese strike force (Kido Butai) sailed on November 26. Commanded by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, it was composed of six fleet carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, three escorting submarines, and a long train of supply ships.* To avoid being seen by commercial shipping, the force traveled far to the north and hugged unfavorable weather fronts. All ships maintained absolute radio silence. The force was preceded by twenty-five large Japanese fleet submarines, which took preassigned patrol stations in Hawaiian waters. Five of the fleet submarines carried 78-foot two-man "midget" submarines, which were to sneak into the Pearl Harbor anchorage when the boom was open and attack capital ships. To avoid being seen by commercial shipping, the force traveled far to the north and hugged unfavorable weather fronts. All ships maintained absolute radio silence. The force was preceded by twenty-five large Japanese fleet submarines, which took preassigned patrol stations in Hawaiian waters. Five of the fleet submarines carried 78-foot two-man "midget" submarines, which were to sneak into the Pearl Harbor anchorage when the boom was open and attack capital ships.

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the Kido Butai Kido Butai launched about 350 aircraft at Pearl Harbor. Striking with complete surprise, the Japanese airmen sank four battleships ( launched about 350 aircraft at Pearl Harbor. Striking with complete surprise, the Japanese airmen sank four battleships (Arizona, California, Oklahoma, West Virginia), an old target ship (Utah), and a minelayer (Oglala). They damaged four other battleships (Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee), three light cruisers (Raleigh, Honolulu, Helena), a seaplane tender (Curtiss), three destroyers (Cassin, Shaw, Downes), and a repair ship (Vestal). Two hundred and nineteen American aircraft were destroyed. Fortunately for the Americans, two carriers of the Pacific Fleet, Two hundred and nineteen American aircraft were destroyed. Fortunately for the Americans, two carriers of the Pacific Fleet, Lexington Lexington and and Enterprise Enterprise, were at sea with their supporting ships and escaped damage, and a third carrier, Saratoga Saratoga, was in California. Inexplicably, Nagumo failed to attack the shore-based fleet oil-storage tanks and the repair shops, thereby making it possible for the surviving elements of the fleet, including the three carriers, to continue basing in Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet submarines had no luck; all five midget submarines foundered or were sunk. Only one of the ten crewmen survived.

Japanese aircraft hit and destroyed only one of the approximately forty American fleet submarines based in Pearl Harbor and Manila. Within mere hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington directed the others, as well as the six old S S boats in Manila, to "wage unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan." Most left on independent patrols within a few days. Having trained for years to operate with the battle fleet, American submarine force commanders and skippers had never even considered, let alone planned for, an unrestricted war against Japanese merchant shipping, and many found it difficult to adjust to this new role. Furthermore, it gradually became apparent that there were drastic defects in the torpedoes. Like the German torpedoes, the American torpedoes ran much too deep and there were flaws in the magnetic and contact pistols. The upshot was that American submariners achieved little in the first few months of the war in the Pacific. boats in Manila, to "wage unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan." Most left on independent patrols within a few days. Having trained for years to operate with the battle fleet, American submarine force commanders and skippers had never even considered, let alone planned for, an unrestricted war against Japanese merchant shipping, and many found it difficult to adjust to this new role. Furthermore, it gradually became apparent that there were drastic defects in the torpedoes. Like the German torpedoes, the American torpedoes ran much too deep and there were flaws in the magnetic and contact pistols. The upshot was that American submariners achieved little in the first few months of the war in the Pacific.*

The sneak attack of the Kido Butai Kido Butai on Pearl Harbor was a classic, well-executed tactical operation, indisputably a great naval victory. As intended, it crippled the Pacific Fleet, giving Japan virtually a free hand to carry out the planned conquests in Southeast Asia. And yet, strategically it may have been a mistake. The treacherous nature of the attack, which cost the lives of 2,403 American military personnel-and wounded 1,178-outraged Americans and generated hatred to-ward the Japanese to a degree that nullified any possibility that the Americans would ever lose interest in the Pacific war and negotiate a settlement. As the historian Ronald H. Spector put it, "Had [Japan] avoided American possessions and concentrated on the British and the Dutch, Roosevelt would have found it awkward trying to win support for a war in defense of distant European colonies in Asia, rather than leading a righteous crusade to avenge Pearl Harbor." on Pearl Harbor was a classic, well-executed tactical operation, indisputably a great naval victory. As intended, it crippled the Pacific Fleet, giving Japan virtually a free hand to carry out the planned conquests in Southeast Asia. And yet, strategically it may have been a mistake. The treacherous nature of the attack, which cost the lives of 2,403 American military personnel-and wounded 1,178-outraged Americans and generated hatred to-ward the Japanese to a degree that nullified any possibility that the Americans would ever lose interest in the Pacific war and negotiate a settlement. As the historian Ronald H. Spector put it, "Had [Japan] avoided American possessions and concentrated on the British and the Dutch, Roosevelt would have found it awkward trying to win support for a war in defense of distant European colonies in Asia, rather than leading a righteous crusade to avenge Pearl Harbor."

The loss of American warships at Pearl Harbor and the extent of the Japanese threat in the Pacific necessitated the rapid transfer of some warships from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. First to shift was Task Force 17, comprised of the aircraft carrier Yorktown Yorktown and two light cruisers ( and two light cruisers (Richmond, Trenton), which left the Panama Canal Zone December 22. Four modern (1939-1940) destroyers, Hughes, Russell, Sims Hughes, Russell, Sims, and Walke Walke, provided escort. Contrary to published statements implying that upwards of twenty-four American destroyers left the Atlantic Fleet for the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, these were the only destroyers to make the shift that month. these were the only destroyers to make the shift that month.

Washington alerted other warships of the Atlantic Fleet to prepare for transfer to the Pacific Fleet in early January 1942. Chief among these were the older battleships Idaho, Mississippi Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico New Mexico, which had been in the Atlantic only about six months. These were to be escorted by five modern (1939-1940) destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet: Anderson, Hammann, Morris, Mustin Anderson, Hammann, Morris, Mustin, and O'Brien O'Brien. All these ships sailed to the Pacific in early January, as did two other modern (1938) destroyers, Sampson Sampson and and Warrington. Warrington. Total destroyers transferred to the Pacific in December and January: eleven, nine from Squadron 2 and two from Squadron 9. Total destroyers transferred to the Pacific in December and January: eleven, nine from Squadron 2 and two from Squadron 9.

These transfers left the Atlantic Fleet with nine capital ships: three old battleships useful only for convoy escort (Arkansas, New York, Texas), two new battleships in extended workup (North Carolina, Washington), and four carriers (Hornet, preparing to leave for the Pacific, Ranger, Wasp Ranger, Wasp, and the "jeep" Long Island Long Island). Fourteen cruisers (five heavy; nine light) in various states of readiness made up the rest of the heavy striking power of the Atlantic Fleet, plus, of course, the destroyers, of which more later.

Lastly, Washington canceled the transfer to Argentia, Newfoundland, of a reinforced squadron of about eighteen S S-class submarines and the new tender Griffin. Griffin. Intended originally to augment Admiral Bristol's Support Force (a dubious assignment), two divisions comprising twelve boats and Intended originally to augment Admiral Bristol's Support Force (a dubious assignment), two divisions comprising twelve boats and Griffin Griffin went to the Pacific instead. The six boats of the other division were loaned to the Royal Navy. went to the Pacific instead. The six boats of the other division were loaned to the Royal Navy.*

The Japanese war plan unfolded with astonishing efficiency and speed. Basing on the island of Formosa, Japanese aircraft quickly destroyed American air power in the Philippines and drove out the Asiatic Fleet, setting the stage for an invasion of Luzon. On December 10, Japanese aircraft from Indochina bombed and sank the Prince of Wales Prince of Wales and and Repulse Repulse at sea, with the loss of 840 sailors out of 3,761. ("In all the war," Churchill wrote, "I never received a more direct shock." at sea, with the loss of 840 sailors out of 3,761. ("In all the war," Churchill wrote, "I never received a more direct shock.") The Pacific islands of Wake, Guam, Tarawa, and Maiken and the British colony of Hong Kong fell. Japanese forces invaded Malaya and other forces gathered to strike at Borneo, Sumatra, and Java.

During the final days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, while they were still frantically seeking Hitler's signature on the treaty of partnership, the Japanese had continued to conceal their war plans, telling Hitler only that "war may come quicker than anyone dreams." Thus the attack on Pearl Harbor came as a complete shock to Hitler. Viewing himself as the senior partner in the Axis, he was embarrassed and angry that the Japanese had not taken him into their confidence-had, in fact, deceived him to a certain extent-and had not sought his advice or approval, or even assistance, as did the Italians. It was not only a personal slap in the face, but also a signal that Tokyo intended to fight its war as it saw fit and in its own best interest, without consultation with Berlin and Rome.

Nonetheless, Hitler swallowed his pride and fulfilled his pledge to the Japanese. He summoned his puppet legislators to the Reichstag Reichstag on December 11 and declared war on the United States, publicly spewing bile at Roosevelt. Later that same day, Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo jointly vowed not to lay down arms until the United States and Great Britain were crushed-and not to make a separate peace. In response, Roosevelt asked the Congress to declare war on Germany. But there were no pronouncements from Moscow; Japan and the Soviet Union remained wary nonbelligerents. on December 11 and declared war on the United States, publicly spewing bile at Roosevelt. Later that same day, Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo jointly vowed not to lay down arms until the United States and Great Britain were crushed-and not to make a separate peace. In response, Roosevelt asked the Congress to declare war on Germany. But there were no pronouncements from Moscow; Japan and the Soviet Union remained wary nonbelligerents.

For Churchill, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war on the United States was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, America's full-scale entry into the war assured eventual victory ("So we had won after all," he wrote). On the other hand, American fury at the Japanese raised the disturbing possibility that the Americans might reverse the agreed-upon Anglo-American strategic war plan and go after Japan first, Germany and Italy second. If so, it would prolong British losses in men and resources on far-flung battlefields and oceans, and bring deprivation, discomfort, and danger at home.

To make sure that the Americans stuck to the plan, Churchill hurried to Washington for a second round of face-to-face talks with Roosevelt. He and a large party of senior military advisers left the Firth of Clyde on December 12 on the new battleship Duke of York. Duke of York. Encountering fierce North Atlantic storms, the battleship (on its shakedown cruise) and its escorts turned south and ran through the Bay of Biscay, boldly passing within one hundred miles of Brest and crossing what Churchill described as the "stream" of U-boats entering and leaving French bases. Aware of U-boat positions from decrypted naval Enigma, the Admiralty guided the Encountering fierce North Atlantic storms, the battleship (on its shakedown cruise) and its escorts turned south and ran through the Bay of Biscay, boldly passing within one hundred miles of Brest and crossing what Churchill described as the "stream" of U-boats entering and leaving French bases. Aware of U-boat positions from decrypted naval Enigma, the Admiralty guided the Duke of York Duke of York through the Bay of Biscay on evasive courses. Crossing the middle Atlantic, she arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, without incident on December 22. The next day Roosevelt and Churchill and their respective military chiefs commenced a series of meetings on global strategy known as the Arcadia Conference. through the Bay of Biscay on evasive courses. Crossing the middle Atlantic, she arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, without incident on December 22. The next day Roosevelt and Churchill and their respective military chiefs commenced a series of meetings on global strategy known as the Arcadia Conference.

A NEW W WAR.

When Hitler declared war against the United States, the bulk of the German submarine force was committed, directly or indirectly, to the support of Axis forces in North Africa, a task for which it was not suited and which Donitz believed to be a wasteful diversion from the "decisive" task of shutting off the flow of imports to Great Britain in the North Atlantic.

Kerneval rejoiced over the formal declaration of war with the United States. It provided Donitz with the strongest possible arguments for a curtailment of the dangerous and unremunerative Mediterranean/Gibraltar operations and a resumption of full-scale U-boat war in the North Atlantic without restrictions. It offered the possibility of launching a devastating attack on Allied shipping in American waters before the Americans could organize convoys or effective ASW forces, perhaps decisively disrupting the flow of war materials from the Arsenal of Democracy on its very doorstep.

The German problem-the all too familiar problem-was the acute shortage of U-boats. Owing to battle losses and retirements, diversions to the Arctic and the Mediterranean, and the mounting delays in new production and workups, on January 1, 1942, the Atlantic U-boat force numbered only sixty-four oceangoing U-boats: nineteen Type IXs; forty-four Type VIIs; and U-A U-A.*

The Atlantic U-boat force was not only short of boats but also relatively green. Forty-four of the sixty-four boats (69 percent) had been in the Atlantic six months or less. Fourteen of the forty-four recent arrivals (32 percent) had only just joined the force in December 1941. Six of the Type VIIs were transfers from the Arctic force and had yet to make a full war patrol in the Atlantic.

Many authors have described a "great growth" of the U-boat peril in 1942, often put at an increase of "twenty boats per month." If this figure is meant to describe newly commissioned attack boats, it is only a slight exaggeration. In the first five months of 1942, the Germans commissioned seventy-eight new attack boats, a monthly average of 15.6. In the remaining seven months of 1942, when new commissionings actually reached and slightly exceeded twenty boats per month, the total figure was 148, or a monthly average of 21.1. For the entire year the figure was 226, a monthly average of 18.8 boats.

That, however, is merely one part of the story. Some of these new attack boats were assigned to the Submarine School or to R&D projects and never reached a war front. A few were lost to mines or in accidents in the Baltic. Owing to delays in workup or to commissioning dates late in 1942, about half of the 226 new boats commissioned in 1942 did not reach war fronts until 1943. About fifty of these were lost on first patrols from Germany or Norway, most of them having achieved nothing noteworthy, and, of course, they were only a brief "paper" addition to the war-front flotillas.

The only meaningful figure in this welter of numbers is the actual "growth" of the Atlantic U-boat force. This was nowhere near the oft-implied "twenty boats per month." Owing to the delays in the Baltic, diversions to the Arctic and the Mediterranean, and combat losses, in the first six months of 1942 the Atlantic U-boat force grew by only thirty-four attack boats, or an average of 5.6 per month. Doubtless by coincidence, the growth was divided exactly between Type VIIs and Type IXs: Owing to the vast distances from France to North America-3,000 miles from Lorient to New York-only the twenty Type IXs were suitable craft for the impending campaign in those waters. One of the twenty was the older U-43 U-43 and eight were Type IXBs with a range of only 8,700 miles at 12 knots. The other eleven were Type IXCs with a range of 11,000 miles at 12 knots. and eight were Type IXBs with a range of only 8,700 miles at 12 knots. The other eleven were Type IXCs with a range of 11,000 miles at 12 knots.

At the time Berlin authorized the U-boat attack on North America, eight of the twenty Type IXs were not available for that purpose. The weary IX U-43 U-43 was under orders to return to Germany for a prolonged overhaul. Four IXs ( was under orders to return to Germany for a prolonged overhaul. Four IXs (U-68, U-124, U-126, U-129) were returning from patrols to the South Atlantic and required long overhauls. Three IXs (U-67, U-107, U-108) were committed to the arduous battle with convoy Homebound Gibraltar 76 and had to return first to France to replenish fuel and torpedoes and give the crews some rest.

Only six Type IXs could be made ready for launching the U-boat war in American waters. Contrary to some published accounts, Donitz did not handpick U-boat "aces" for the initial attack. He made do with six Type IX boats and skippers at hand in France. These were: * Richard Zapp in the IXC U-66 U-66. Zapp had arrived in the Atlantic in May 1941 and had made three patrols: one in the North Atlantic, cut short by a mechanical breakdown, and two long patrols to the South Atlantic, during which he had sunk five ships.

* Heinrich Bleichrodt in the IXB U-109 U-109. Bleichrodt had won a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz in two patrols on the famous in two patrols on the famous U-48 U-48 in the fall of 1940, sinking fourteen and a half ships. Subsequently he had commissioned the Type IX in the fall of 1940, sinking fourteen and a half ships. Subsequently he had commissioned the Type IX U-67 U-67, which was temporarily diverted to sonar R&D. Assigned to command U-109 U-109 in June 1941, Bleichrodt had made two Atlantic patrols, both bedeviled by mechanical problems, and had concluded the second on escort duty. He had sunk no ships on in June 1941, Bleichrodt had made two Atlantic patrols, both bedeviled by mechanical problems, and had concluded the second on escort duty. He had sunk no ships on U-67 U-67 or or U-109 U-109.

* Reinhard Hardegen in the IXB U-123 U-123. The boat had come to the Atlantic in September 1940 commanded by Karl-Heinz Moehle, who won a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Since taking command in May 1941, Hardegen had made two patrols, one to Freetown, one to Newfoundland. He had sunk one confirmed ship on the duck U-147 U-147 and five confirmed ships on and five confirmed ships on U-123 U-123-none on his second patrol in U-123. U-123.

* Ulrich Folkers in the IXC U-125 U-125. The boat had reached the Atlantic in July 1941, under command of Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Gunter Kuhnke, who took her on one luckless patrol to the South Atlantic. Promoted to command holder Gunter Kuhnke, who took her on one luckless patrol to the South Atlantic. Promoted to command U-125 U-125 on December 15, 1941, Folkers had not yet made a patrol or sunk a ship as skipper. on December 15, 1941, Folkers had not yet made a patrol or sunk a ship as skipper.

* Ernst Kals in the IXC U-130 U-130. Sailing from Kiel on his first patrol, Kals had run into the eastbound Slow Convoy 57 on December 10. Attacking alone, he had fired six torpedoes and sunk three freighters for 15,000 tons. Recalled from patrol to prep for the attack on America, he reached Lorient on December 16, after merely seventeen days at sea.

* Jurgen von Rosenstiel in the IXC U-502 U-502. The boat had made one Atlantic patrol, September 29 to November 9, during which von Rosenstiel sank no ships but severely damaged the whale-factory ship Svend Foyn Svend Foyn.

These six Type IXs comprised the first wave. A second wave of Type IXs sailed to United States waters about two weeks after the first. A third wave of Type IXs put out shortly after the second, to patrol the West Indies and the Caribbean Sea. Other IXs followed.

Although the first boats to American waters enjoyed the advantages of surprise and weak ASW forces, patrols to that area were not without great dangers and difficulties. Apart from the vast distances to and from the areas, the chief drawback was the extremely shallow water along much of the United States East Coast, the "continental shelf," which in the New York area extends seaward nearly 100 miles. To avoid any possibility of being trapped in these very shallow waters by ASW forces, the big clumsy IXs were advised to attack only at night, leaving time to run out to the 200-meter curve (656 feet of water) before daylight, a fuel-wasting but prudent procedure. Since it was likely that the Americans would divert all coastal shipping to these shallow waters and patrol them with aircraft, and possibly order shipping to put into the many convenient ports along the East Coast at night, the succeeding waves of U-boats, lacking the element of surprise, might face even greater difficulties.

There was one very promising spot in this otherwise hostile subsurface geography: the Outer Banks of North Carolina, whose chief feature was Cape Hatteras. At that protrusion, the continental shelf is less than thirty miles wide, merely a two-hour run to deep water at full speed on the surface. Hence, if shipping hugged the coast, as might be expected, to take advantage of air cover, Cape Hatteras offered the possibility of dense traffic with easy access to a deep-water sanctuary and probably lightships and lighthouses to provide precise navigation.

Farther to the south, off the coast of Florida, the subsurface geography was likewise favorable. From Palm Beach south to Miami the continental shelf extends seaward only about ten miles. However, the Florida coastline is a long way from Lorient and the waters are highly phosphorescent. A Type IX patrolling those waters could stay only a short time and ran the danger of its glittering wake being spotted by aircraft at nighttime.

To add physical and psychological punch to the assault on North America, Donitz suggested that a group of Type VIIs should patrol Canadian waters near Halifax, Nova Scotia, and St. John's, Newfoundland. Apart from ships these boats might sink, their mere appearance would hold in place Allied escorts and ASW forces on the North Atlantic run and in Canadian waters, which otherwise might be transferred to United States waters. It was even possible that this group of U-boats might force the Allies to abort eastbound convoys, just as they had aborted the besieged Slow Convoy 52 in early November. If so, some ships taking supplies to the Soviet Union via Murmansk might be delayed or might not arrive at all, a setback for the Red Army at a crucial time.

Not everyone at Kerneval or the OKM approved of the commitment of the Type VIIs to Canadian waters. The weather in the North Atlantic-and the Newfoundland area-was certain to be hideous and radio-communications poor. The Type VIIs could barely reach Newfoundland in good weather at one-engine speed with enough fuel left to make a productive patrol. Under the best of circumstances, at one-engine speed, it would take each boat about two and a half weeks to reach the area and two and a half weeks to return, leaving only fuel and food enough for about ten days of patrolling in Canadian waters, and even less if a protracted convoy chase became necessary. If they encountered stormy seas en route to Canada, further delays could be expected, drastically curtailing the time available for covering patrol zones. Moreover, the continental shelf seaward of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia was no less shallow and wide than that in United States waters. The Grand Banks, with an average depth of about 250 feet, extends about 200 miles to the east of Newfoundland.

Besides that, the critics argued, was it not wiser to use the VIIs to continue the U-boat war against North Atlantic convoys closer to home? Owing to the diversion of boats to the Mediterranean (and to British evasion tactics, based on Enigma), the North Atlantic convoys had scarcely been hit in the fall of 1941. Thousands of ships loaded with weaponry, oil, and food had reached Iceland and the British Isles unmolested, some proceeding onward to Murmansk. Operating much closer to home bases, the VIIs could almost certainly be employed more efficiently and with less physical and psychological strain on the crews against these convoys.

Donitz prevailed. The Type VIIs were to augment the Type IXs in American waters, regardless of risks and inefficiencies. By ingenious use of some of the ballast and fresh-water tankage, the VIIs could extend their range by about 1,000 miles, gaining a little more mobility in Canadian waters. The VIIs attempting to patrol the more distant hunting grounds off Cape Hatteras would have no mobility. To conserve fuel, they would have to lie doggo on the bottom most of the daylight hours and hope shipping came their way.

The upshot was that ten Type VIIs comprising a first wave were to sail to Canadian waters in December. Two were commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Rolf Mutzelburg in holders: Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 and Erich Topp in and Erich Topp in U-552 U-552. However, five of the ten were new boats sailing from Germany on first patrols.* Other waves of VIIs were to follow. Other waves of VIIs were to follow.

On December 17, Donitz summoned to Kerneval the six skippers of the Type IXs of the first wave, which bore the code name Paukenschlag Paukenschlag (Drumbeat). It was a new war, a new opportunity to strike an unwary and untested opponent a heavy blow. In view of the depressing failures of the (Drumbeat). It was a new war, a new opportunity to strike an unwary and untested opponent a heavy blow. In view of the depressing failures of the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union and North Africa, a dramatic U-boat victory in American waters would help lift morale in Germany and rekindle Hitler's and the OKM's support for the U-boat arm, which had achieved so little in the Atlantic in the second half of 1941. in the Soviet Union and North Africa, a dramatic U-boat victory in American waters would help lift morale in Germany and rekindle Hitler's and the OKM's support for the U-boat arm, which had achieved so little in the Atlantic in the second half of 1941.