In the second six months of 1941, Donitz mounted eighteen patrols to West African waters. Four boats of the special Freetown task force had to abort owing to the loss of German surface resupply vessels. Another boat, U-67 U-67, rammed by the British submarine Clyde Clyde, was forced to abort. The other thirteen boats sank nineteen confirmed ships, an average of only 1.5 ships sunk per boat per (extended) patrol. Six boats sank no ships. One boat, U-111 U-111, was lost to British forces. No boats sailed to that area in November and December.

AN E EPIC C CONVOY B BATTLE.

As another measure in the effort to support Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps, in early December, the OKM directed Donitz to maintain a dozen boats on continuous patrol in the Atlantic close to the western mouth of the Strait of Gibraltar. They were to continue the attacks on convoys going from the Mediterranean to the British Isles and vice versa.

Again Donitz demurred. Most British supplies, he iterated correctly, went to the Mediterranean via Freetown and Cape Town, not via Gibraltar. Moreover, British ASW forces in the waters immediately west of Gibraltar had been reinforced greatly, and the inbound and outbound Gibraltar convoys were certain to be more heavily escorted than ever. Owing to the heavy commitment of Type VIIs to the Mediterranean and the setbacks ten other Type VIIs had incurred attempting the passage, Donitz did not have enough Type VIIs to attack Gibraltar convoys. If the OKM insisted on these operations, Donitz would be forced to use some Type LXs, which were not considered to be suitable for attacks on heavily escorted convoys.

The OKM insisted.

As a first step, Donitz redeployed the special six-boat group, Steuben, from Newfoundland waters to the approaches to Gibraltar. It contained two Type IXs: Wolfgang Luth's aged U-43 U-43 and Georg Schewe's and Georg Schewe's U-105 U-105. While passing near the Azores in heavy weather on November 29, Luth came upon elements of the storm-scattered convoy Outbound South 12, originally composed of fifty-two merchant ships, guarded by six escorts.

What Luth found was about half the convoy and half the escorts. He sank two British freighters in the convoy, the 5,600-ton Thornliebank Thornliebank and the 4,900-ton and the 4,900-ton Ashby Ashby. The first was a loaded ammo ship, which blew up with an awesome roar, throwing debris all over the place. Later, in a propaganda broadcast, Luth asserted that a grenade hurled from Thornliebank Thornliebank, a kilometer away, hit and bruised his quartermaster, Theodor Petersen, who was topside. Two ex-Coast Guard cutters, Totland and Sennen Totland and Sennen, and another escort sighted U-43 U-43, drove her under, and depth-charged her for several hours, but Luth evaded and escaped.

A day or so later, on December 2, Luth came upon the 11,900-ton American tanker Astral Astral, sailing alone from the Caribbean loaded with gasoline. Believing her to be a 12,300-ton British tanker of the San Melito San Melito class, or so he wrote in a wartime propaganda book, class, or so he wrote in a wartime propaganda book,* Luth hit and sank her with torpedoes. He described the result: Luth hit and sank her with torpedoes. He described the result: The tanker offered a magnificent show as she burned ... for hours afterwards thick clouds of smoke hovered so far above the location that we could see a couple of small, bright "fair weather" clouds underneath them. Over half the sky was covered with black smoke....

None of the thirty-seven-man crew survived. Donitz attempted to vector the other five boats of group Steuben Steuben to Outbound South 12, but all efforts failed. Since these six boats were low on fuel after this futile chase, group to Outbound South 12, but all efforts failed. Since these six boats were low on fuel after this futile chase, group Steuben Steuben had to be disbanded. The had to be disbanded. The Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders Luith in holders Luith in U-43 U-43 and Schewe in and Schewe in U-105 U-105 (who had sunk no ships on this patrol) set a course for France. Initially the other four Type VII boats were ordered to refuel at Vigo and go directly to the Mediterranean, but later some of these orders were modified. (who had sunk no ships on this patrol) set a course for France. Initially the other four Type VII boats were ordered to refuel at Vigo and go directly to the Mediterranean, but later some of these orders were modified.

Inbound to refuel at Vigo for transit to the Mediterranean, one of the Steuben Steuben boats, boats, U-434 U-434, commanded by Wolfgang Heyda, age twenty-eight, on his first patrol from Germany, ran into convoy Outbound Gibraltar 77. While Heyda shadowed, Donitz brought up Luth in U-43 U-43 and another Type IX, Muller-Stockheim's and another Type IX, Muller-Stockheim's U-67 U-67, reconditioned after her collision with the British submarine Clyde Clyde in the Cape Verde Islands and fresh from Lorient. Luth found and attacked a destroyer with his last torpedoes, but he missed. Owing to a critical shortage of fuel, he had to break off and head for France, unable even to shadow. For the same reason Heyda had to break off and go into Vigo. Left alone, Muller-Stockheim in in the Cape Verde Islands and fresh from Lorient. Luth found and attacked a destroyer with his last torpedoes, but he missed. Owing to a critical shortage of fuel, he had to break off and head for France, unable even to shadow. For the same reason Heyda had to break off and go into Vigo. Left alone, Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 found the convoy and shot a bow salvo at a fast-moving "destroyer." One torpedo circled back and nearly hit found the convoy and shot a bow salvo at a fast-moving "destroyer." One torpedo circled back and nearly hit U-67 U-67; the others missed. The "destroyer," other escorts, and British aircraft from Gibraltar thwarted a second attack.

At this time, German spies near Gibraltar reported that convoy Homebound Gibraltar 76 was on the point of sailing for the British Isles. Although he was reluctant to send Type IXs against Gibraltar convoys, the shortage of Type VIIs forced Donitz to position Muller-Stockheim's U-67 U-67 to watch for the convoy. to watch for the convoy.

Meanwhile, Donitz created a new group, Seerauber Seerauber, to reinforce Muller-Stockheim. It was comprised of two ex-Steuben group Type VII boats that had refueled in Vigo, Wolfgang Heyda's group Type VII boats that had refueled in Vigo, Wolfgang Heyda's U-434 U-434 and Dietrich Gengelbach's and Dietrich Gengelbach's U-574 U-574, both still on first patrols, and four other Type IXs: U-107 U-107 and and U-108 U-108, newly sailed from France, the former commanded by a new skipper, Harald Gelhaus, age twenty-six, the latter by the old hand Klaus Scholtz; and two brand-new boats, Bruno Hansmann in U-127 U-127 and Arend Baumann in and Arend Baumann in U-131 U-131, both merely two weeks out of Germany. It was a less-than-satisfactory group: Five of the seven boats were Type IXs; five of the seven skippers were making first patrols.

In the afternoon and evening of December 14, fifty-eight ships departed Gibraltar for the Atlantic. First to leave was Homebound Gibraltar 76, comprised of thirty-two merchant ships and seventeen escorts. Next came a special convoy comprised of one freighter and three tankers, with five escorts, bound for Freetown and points south. Two old hands in Type VIIs, who were preparing to enter the Mediterranean via the strait, spotted the convoys: Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat in U-74 U-74 reported Homebound Gibraltar 76; Heinrich Schonder in reported Homebound Gibraltar 76; Heinrich Schonder in U-77 U-77 reported the Freetown convoy. reported the Freetown convoy.

Notwithstanding the urgency of getting these two boats into the Mediterranean, Donitz directed both to attack the convoys, even if the chances of success were slim. Unable to gain position for an attack, Kentrat in U-74 U-74 broke off and ran the strait on the night of December 15. Dodging the escorts and aircraft, Schonder in broke off and ran the strait on the night of December 15. Dodging the escorts and aircraft, Schonder in U-77 U-77 shot at a freighter and a tanker, sinking the former, the 5,000-ton shot at a freighter and a tanker, sinking the former, the 5,000-ton Empire Barracuda Empire Barracuda. He then resumed his passage to the Mediterranean, getting through on the night of December 16. A little farther west that night, one of the Seerauber Seerauber boats, Scholtz's IXB boats, Scholtz's IXB U-108 U-108, sank the 4,800-ton freighter Cassequel Cassequel, which was, awkwardly, a neutral Portuguese sailing alone. Scholtz then shadowed the convoy tenaciously.

German spies near Gibraltar reported the departure of Homebound Gibraltar 76. They listed the precise number of merchant ships (thirty-two) but they understated the escort, reporting "three destroyers," a "submarine," "several corvettes," and the aircraft tender Unicorn Unicorn. Actually, the escort was massive: three destroyers, four sloops, nine corvettes, and the "jeep" carrier Audacity Audacity (which resembled (which resembled Unicorn Unicorn), carrying four Martlet fighters to ward off Condors.

The Homebound Gibraltar 76 guardian was Escort Group 36, commanded by forty-five-year-old Frederic J. ("Johnny") Walker in the sloop Stork Stork. Son of a career naval officer, Walker was a tough, outspoken, onetime middleweight boxer with twenty-seven years of regular service. Between the wars he had specialized in ASW, rising to command the ASW school at Portland in 1937, but he had been "passed over" for promotion to captain. Rescued from a staff job, Walker had been given command of the newly formed EG-36 (two sloops, seven corvettes) in March 1941. The group had come out to Gibraltar on its first mission in late November. While waiting for Homebound Gibraltar 76 to sail, it had patrolled the western approaches to the Gibraltar Strait. One of the corvettes incorporated into the group at Gibraltar, Marigold Marigold, had sunk Ey's U-433 U-433 a month earlier. a month earlier.

Upon receiving Kentrat's contact report, Donitz alerted and deployed group Seerauber Seerauber on a north-south line west of Gibraltar and sent out Condors from Bordeaux. However, the visibility was poor on December 15 and neither the U-boats nor the Condors could find the convoy. The usually reliable German spies caused considerable confusion at Kerneval by incorrectly reporting that owing to the U-boat threat, Homebound Gibraltar 76 had aborted and returned to Gibraltar shortly after sailing. on a north-south line west of Gibraltar and sent out Condors from Bordeaux. However, the visibility was poor on December 15 and neither the U-boats nor the Condors could find the convoy. The usually reliable German spies caused considerable confusion at Kerneval by incorrectly reporting that owing to the U-boat threat, Homebound Gibraltar 76 had aborted and returned to Gibraltar shortly after sailing.

On the night of December 15, well after the departure of Homebound Gibraltar 76, four destroyers conducted an ASW sweep thirty miles south of Cape St. Vincent in the western approaches to the Gibraltar Strait. These were the Australian Nestor Nestor and the British and the British Croome, Foxhound Croome, Foxhound, and Gurkha II Gurkha II. At about 11:00 P.M. P.M., Nestor Nestor sighted a U-boat on the surface about seven miles off. sighted a U-boat on the surface about seven miles off. Nestor Nestor alerted the other destroyers, rang up full speed, and manned her guns. alerted the other destroyers, rang up full speed, and manned her guns. Gurkha II Gurkha II and and Foxhound Foxhound raced up, taking positions on raced up, taking positions on Nestor's Nestor's beams. At a range of about six miles, beams. At a range of about six miles, Nestor Nestor opened fire on the U-boat with her main battery, firing eight rounds but achieving no hits. opened fire on the U-boat with her main battery, firing eight rounds but achieving no hits.

Her quarry was the brand-new Type IXC U-127 U-127. Commanded by Bruno Hansmann, age thirty-three, she had sailed from Kiel seventeen days earlier. Assigned to group Seerauber Seerauber, she was holding down the southern end of the patrol line. Based on the erroneous spy report-that Homebound Gibraltar 76 had put back into Gibraltar-Hansmann was lying in wait in case it resailed that night.

Upon reaching the spot where U-127 U-127 had dived, had dived, Nestor Nestor slowed to 18 knots and got an excellent sonar contact. Holding the contact, she carried out a rapid but careful attack, dropping five shallow-set depth charges. slowed to 18 knots and got an excellent sonar contact. Holding the contact, she carried out a rapid but careful attack, dropping five shallow-set depth charges. Foxhound Foxhound also got contact and prepared to run in, but upon hearing a dull explosion deep beneath her keel, she broke off the attack. also got contact and prepared to run in, but upon hearing a dull explosion deep beneath her keel, she broke off the attack. Nestor, Gurkha II Nestor, Gurkha II, and Croome Croome also heard the explosion. Soon afterwards the destroyers found oil and wreckage-pieces of wood, some clothing, and "human remains." It was surmised from this evidence that also heard the explosion. Soon afterwards the destroyers found oil and wreckage-pieces of wood, some clothing, and "human remains." It was surmised from this evidence that Nestor's Nestor's depth charges had ignited an "internal explosion" on the U-boat. depth charges had ignited an "internal explosion" on the U-boat. Nestor Nestor was correctly credited with an unknown U-boat kill; nothing further was ever heard from was correctly credited with an unknown U-boat kill; nothing further was ever heard from U-127 U-127 Condors from Bordeaux found Homebound Gibraltar 76 on the morning of December 16 and shadowed, unseen by any of the escorts. Donitz relayed the position report to group Seerauber Seerauber. In the late afternoon, Klaus Scholtz in the IXB U-108 U-108 regained contact, reported his position, and shadowed. Donitz passed this information to the other regained contact, reported his position, and shadowed. Donitz passed this information to the other Seerauber Seerauber boats, promising Condor support and urging them to converge at highest speed, to get in front of the convoy, and to attack by dawn on December 17, "without fail." Intercepting this Enigma traffic, the Admiralty alerted the convoy to the impending danger and ordered boats, promising Condor support and urging them to converge at highest speed, to get in front of the convoy, and to attack by dawn on December 17, "without fail." Intercepting this Enigma traffic, the Admiralty alerted the convoy to the impending danger and ordered Audacity Audacity to mount ASW patrols, commencing at dawn. to mount ASW patrols, commencing at dawn.

By the early hours of December 17, four boats were in touch with the convoy: Scholtz in the IXB U-108 U-108, still shadowing doggedly; Gelhaus in the IXB U-107 U-107; Baumann in the IXC U-131 U-131; and Gengelbach in the VII U-574 U-574, fresh from refueling in Vigo. With the coming of light, a Martlet from Audacity Audacity took off and scouted. Shortly thereafter the pilot reported a U-boat twenty-two miles ahead of the convoy. Upon sighting the Martlet, it dived. took off and scouted. Shortly thereafter the pilot reported a U-boat twenty-two miles ahead of the convoy. Upon sighting the Martlet, it dived.

Hearing this report, EG-36 commander Johnny Walker in the sloop Stork Stork left the convoy to carry out a U-boat hunt. On his instructions, the three destroyers left the convoy to carry out a U-boat hunt. On his instructions, the three destroyers Blankney, Exmoor II Blankney, Exmoor II, and the ex-American four-stack Stanley Stanley, and the corvette Penstemon Penstemon, joined the chase.

The destroyers raced ahead to the reported position. Arriving first, Blankney Blankney hurled off depth charges at a doubtful contact. When hurled off depth charges at a doubtful contact. When Exmoor II Exmoor II and and Stork Stork arrived, Walker repositioned the three ships to conduct an organized sweep, but they found nothing. Coming up last, the corvette arrived, Walker repositioned the three ships to conduct an organized sweep, but they found nothing. Coming up last, the corvette Penstemon Penstemon, in company with the destroyer Stanley Stanley, got a firm sonar contact. Shortly after 11:00 A.M. A.M., Penstemon Penstemon carried out a deliberate attack, dropping ten depth charges set from 150 to 400 feet. carried out a deliberate attack, dropping ten depth charges set from 150 to 400 feet.

The boat was the Type IXC U-131 U-131, commanded by thirty-seven-year-old Arend Baumann. This very senior officer (crew of 1922) was three weeks out from Kiel on his first patrol. During its hurried workup, U-131 U-131 had damaged its hydrophones. They had not been repaired, leaving had damaged its hydrophones. They had not been repaired, leaving U-131 U-131 "deaf" when submerged and thus unable to evade properly. Some of the ten charges fell very close, causing extensive internal damage. Baumann eased away slowly and attempted repairs, but after an hour and forty-one minutes, he gave up and surfaced, getting off a frantic message to Kerneval reporting he was "unable to dive" and asking for assistance. Kerneval replied that no assistance could be provided, adding: "If there is no other way, sink your boat." "deaf" when submerged and thus unable to evade properly. Some of the ten charges fell very close, causing extensive internal damage. Baumann eased away slowly and attempted repairs, but after an hour and forty-one minutes, he gave up and surfaced, getting off a frantic message to Kerneval reporting he was "unable to dive" and asking for assistance. Kerneval replied that no assistance could be provided, adding: "If there is no other way, sink your boat."

When U-131 U-131 surfaced, the destroyer surfaced, the destroyer Stanley Stanley sighted her and gave the alarm. All five ships plus a Martlet from sighted her and gave the alarm. All five ships plus a Martlet from Audacity Audacity converged on the position. The closest destroyer, converged on the position. The closest destroyer, Exmoor II Exmoor II, opened fire with her main battery at about six miles, but achieved no hits. The Martlet pilot, George Fletcher, bravely-but unwisely-roared in and strafed U-131 U-131, drawing return fire from Baumann's gunners. The German gunners hit the Martlet in the cockpit, killing or fatally wounding Fletcher, and the Martlet crashed into the sea.

When four of the five escorts brought U-131 U-131 under heavy fire, Baumann ordered the crew to scuttle and abandon ship. At 1:21 under heavy fire, Baumann ordered the crew to scuttle and abandon ship. At 1:21 P.M. P.M., Exmoor II Exmoor II reported, the reported, the U-131 U-131 upended and sank stern first. upended and sank stern first. Exmoor II Exmoor II rescued forty-four Germans, including Baumann. rescued forty-four Germans, including Baumann. Stanley Stanley picked up the other four. picked up the other four. Stork Stork recovered the dead Martlet pilot, Fletcher, and buried him at sea. The Admiralty generously credited recovered the dead Martlet pilot, Fletcher, and buried him at sea. The Admiralty generously credited Stork, Blankney, Exmoor II, Stanley, Penstemon, and Audacity Stork, Blankney, Exmoor II, Stanley, Penstemon, and Audacity for the kill, but the Germans said it was Penstemon's skilled depth-charge attack that directly led to the destruction of for the kill, but the Germans said it was Penstemon's skilled depth-charge attack that directly led to the destruction of U-131 U-131.

Several U-boats clung to the convoy during the night of December 17-18. Klaus Scholtz in U-108 U-108 reported that he torpedoed one ship, but he was mistaken. No ships were hit that night. reported that he torpedoed one ship, but he was mistaken. No ships were hit that night.

The next morning shortly after 9:00, December 18, the destroyer Stanley Stanley spotted a U-boat on the surface about six miles off. The other two destroyers, spotted a U-boat on the surface about six miles off. The other two destroyers, Blankney Blankney and and Exmoor II Exmoor II, and the sloop Deptford Deptford, joined Stanley Stanley for the hunt. When for the hunt. When Stanley Stanley had closed to three miles, the U-boat dived, leaving had closed to three miles, the U-boat dived, leaving Stanley Stanley at a disadvantage since her sonar was temporarily out of commission. Nonetheless, she dropped nineteen single depth charges in a squarish pattern around the presumed position of the boat. Running in to help, at a disadvantage since her sonar was temporarily out of commission. Nonetheless, she dropped nineteen single depth charges in a squarish pattern around the presumed position of the boat. Running in to help, Blankney Blankney got a firm sonar contact at close range and dropped six charges. She then relayed her contact to the four-stack got a firm sonar contact at close range and dropped six charges. She then relayed her contact to the four-stack Stanley Stanley, who fired off fourteen more depth charges with deep settings. For good measure, Blankney Blankney fired another six depth charges with medium settings. fired another six depth charges with medium settings.

The victim of these forty-five depth charges was the U-434 U-434, a Type VII commanded by Wolfgang Heyda, still on his first patrol from Germany. He had refueled in Vigo, under orders to proceed to the Mediterranean, but had been diverted to group Seerauber Seerauber for the attack on Homebound Gibraltar 76. Built in Danzig at a new U-boat shipyard, for the attack on Homebound Gibraltar 76. Built in Danzig at a new U-boat shipyard, U-434 U-434 had numerous serious structural defects, including unreliable gears in the ballast-tank flood and vent valves. Some of the depth charges fell close, inflicting such heavy damage and flooding that Heyda was forced to surface. had numerous serious structural defects, including unreliable gears in the ballast-tank flood and vent valves. Some of the depth charges fell close, inflicting such heavy damage and flooding that Heyda was forced to surface.

When U-434 U-434 popped up, popped up, Blankney Blankney was merely 2,000 yards off. She put on flank speed to ram, firing her main battery. As was merely 2,000 yards off. She put on flank speed to ram, firing her main battery. As Blankney Blankney closed, all the Germans except one officer manning a machine gun jumped overboard. At the last second closed, all the Germans except one officer manning a machine gun jumped overboard. At the last second Blankney's Blankney's captain decided to board rather than ram, but the decision came too late. captain decided to board rather than ram, but the decision came too late. Blankney Blankney struck the U-boat a glancing blow, which did no harm to the boat but rather damaged struck the U-boat a glancing blow, which did no harm to the boat but rather damaged Blankney Blankney. She lowered a whaler with a boarding party, but Heyda had set demolition charges and U-434 U-434 blew up and sank before the whaler reached her. blew up and sank before the whaler reached her. Blankney Blankney rescued Heyda and forty-one others. Four Germans, including the defiant officer who had manned the machine gun, could not be found. rescued Heyda and forty-one others. Four Germans, including the defiant officer who had manned the machine gun, could not be found. Blankney and Stanley Blankney and Stanley shared credit for the kill. shared credit for the kill.

By design or by accident, the surface escort for Homebound Gibraltar 76 gradually diminished. The corvette Carnation Carnation was first to leave. Then the sloops was first to leave. Then the sloops Black Swan and Fowey Black Swan and Fowey. Then the corvette La Malouine La Malouine. After damaging herself in the collision with U-434 U-434, the destroyer Blankney Blankney, joined by another destroyer, Exmoor II Exmoor II, which was low on fuel, returned to Gibraltar. By the evening of December 18, the surface escort had decreased by nearly a third-to eleven ships.

The sole remaining destroyer, the ex-American four-stack Stanley Stanley, took up position at the stern of the convoy. In the early hours of December 19, Stanley Stanley saw a U-boat and gave the alarm. Johnny Walker in saw a U-boat and gave the alarm. Johnny Walker in Stork Stork ordered ordered Stanley Stanley to fire a flare to indicate her position. Upon seeing the flare, Walker established visual communications with to fire a flare to indicate her position. Upon seeing the flare, Walker established visual communications with Stanley Stanley, but it was immediately interrupted by a frantic message from Stanley Stanley: "Torpedoes passed from astern." Moments later, a torpedo hit Stanley Stanley, and she "blew up in a sheet of flame several hundred feet high."

The shooter was Dietrich Gengelbach in the Type VII U-574 U-574, who had refueled in Vigo and was still on his first patrol. He did not have long to savor the victory. Walker in Stork Stork led several corvettes to the scene and within nine minutes led several corvettes to the scene and within nine minutes Stork Stork had a good sonar contact and attacked, dropping fifteen shallow-set depth charges in two runs. Some of these fell close to had a good sonar contact and attacked, dropping fifteen shallow-set depth charges in two runs. Some of these fell close to U-574 U-574, causing such damage that Gengelbach was forced to surface, merely fifteen minutes after the first depth-charge explosion.

The boat came up 200 yards in front of Stork Stork. Catching sight of her, Walker bent on flank speed to ram, firing snowflakes and his main battery. Gengelbach, too, bent on flank speed, circling to port. Stork Stork pulled so close to pulled so close to U-574 U-574 that the British gunners could not depress the main gun to shoot and, as Walker reported, they were reduced to "fist-shaking and roaring curses." Eleven minutes into the chase, that the British gunners could not depress the main gun to shoot and, as Walker reported, they were reduced to "fist-shaking and roaring curses." Eleven minutes into the chase, Stork Stork rammed rammed U-574 U-574 forward of the conning tower and rolled her over. For good measure, Walker dropped ten more depth charges set to explode at fifty feet. forward of the conning tower and rolled her over. For good measure, Walker dropped ten more depth charges set to explode at fifty feet.

A Wagnerian drama ensued on the shattered U-574 U-574. Gengelbach gave the order to scuttle and abandon ship, but then he and the engineer officer fell into some kind of dispute. The Germans reported later that during the dispute the engineer apparently committed suicide with his pistol. Gengelbach chose suicide as well. After all his men had jumped overboard, he threw himself into the conning tower and went down with the boat.

Having done away with U-574 U-574, at the cost of damage to her own bow and loss of her sonar dome, Stork Stork proceeded to search for British survivors of proceeded to search for British survivors of Stanley Stanley. Homing on cries in the water, Stork Stork picked up five Germans from picked up five Germans from U-574 U-574 and twenty-five British sailors from and twenty-five British sailors from Stanley Stanley. The corvette Samphire Samphire found eleven more Germans and three more men from found eleven more Germans and three more men from Stanley Stanley. In all, Stork Stork and and Samphire Samphire rescued sixteen Germans and twenty-eight British. rescued sixteen Germans and twenty-eight British.

All this time the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Klaus Scholtz in the IXB holder Klaus Scholtz in the IXB U-108 U-108 had been dogging the convoy with remarkable tenacity. During sixty hours of tracking and reporting, he had made several torpedo attacks, claiming, incorrectly, that he had hit at least one ship. While had been dogging the convoy with remarkable tenacity. During sixty hours of tracking and reporting, he had made several torpedo attacks, claiming, incorrectly, that he had hit at least one ship. While Stork Stork and the other escorts were preoccupied with the rescue of survivors from and the other escorts were preoccupied with the rescue of survivors from U-574 U-574 and and Stanley Stanley, Scholtz attacked the formation of freighters, firing his last torpedoes at the 2,900-ton British Ruckinge Ruckinge. Scholtz reported a sinking, stressing that he was out of torpedoes, but Kerneval ordered him to keep shadowing.

The Ruckinge Ruckinge was wrecked but she did not sink. However, her thirty-nine-man crew hastily took to lifeboats, leaving behind the ship's "confidential papers." was wrecked but she did not sink. However, her thirty-nine-man crew hastily took to lifeboats, leaving behind the ship's "confidential papers." Stork Stork and the freighter and the freighter Finland Finland recovered the survivors. When Walker learned that the captain had left secret papers behind, he ordered the corvette recovered the survivors. When Walker learned that the captain had left secret papers behind, he ordered the corvette Samphire Samphire to board the hulk and recover them. After this was done, to board the hulk and recover them. After this was done, Samphire Samphire sank the sank the Ruckinge Ruckinge by gunfire. by gunfire.

During that day, December 19, Condors patrolled from Bordeaux. En route to Homebound Gibraltar 76, they found and reported a southbound convoy. Although the southbound convoy was obviously a more valuable military target, Donitz was not confident of the Condor position reports and clung to the bird-in-hand. He told the Seerauber Seerauber boats that Homebound Gibraltar 76 was "still the object of operations" but authorized an attack on the southbound convoy if any boat encountered it without deviation. Continuing on to Homebound Gibraltar 76, the Condors received a hot reception from boats that Homebound Gibraltar 76 was "still the object of operations" but authorized an attack on the southbound convoy if any boat encountered it without deviation. Continuing on to Homebound Gibraltar 76, the Condors received a hot reception from Audacity's Audacity's Martlets. The British pilots shot down two Condors that day and damaged a third. Martlets. The British pilots shot down two Condors that day and damaged a third.

Meanwhile, Donitz had dispatched three other Type VIIs from French bases to reinforce group Seerauber Seerauber. All, he logged, were manned by aggressive and "experienced" skippers, who, he was "confident," could deal with this "difficult" convoy. The skippers were Walter Flachsenberg in U-71, Ritterkreuz U-71, Ritterkreuz holder Engelbert Endrass, the reigning U-boat ace still in Atlantic combat, holder Engelbert Endrass, the reigning U-boat ace still in Atlantic combat,* in his new command, in his new command, U-567 U-567, and Gerhard Bigalk in U-751 U-751. Flachsenberg and Bigalk had arrived in the Atlantic in June. Flachsenberg had sunk no confirmed ships; Bigalk had sunk one for 5,400 tons. Since taking over the U-567 U-567 in September, Endrass had made one patrol but had sunk no ships. in September, Endrass had made one patrol but had sunk no ships.

Despite deteriorating weather and exhaustion, the three remaining IXs of group Seerauber, U-67, U-107, and U-108 Seerauber, U-67, U-107, and U-108, hung on to the convoy during December 19 to 21. Only U-67 U-67 and and U-107 U-107 had torpedoes, but neither had any luck. Muller-Stockheim in had torpedoes, but neither had any luck. Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 fired three of his remaining nine torpedoes at a "large destroyer" but missed, he reported, "owing to a misfire in the middle tube." All three boats were harassed by Martlets from fired three of his remaining nine torpedoes at a "large destroyer" but missed, he reported, "owing to a misfire in the middle tube." All three boats were harassed by Martlets from Audacity Audacity. One Martlet pilot claimed to have found two U-boats twenty-five miles astern of the convoy, lying side by side on the surface with a "plank" between them. The pilot said he strafed the boats and despite counterfire from both, "shot three men" off the plank. The British surmised that the boats had collided and were repairing the damage.

Homing on Scholtz's beacons, the three Type VIIs newly sailed from France made contact with the convoy on the afternoon of December 21. Perhaps needlessly, Donitz radioed them: "Given equal firing opportunity, sink the aircraft carrier first. You'll find it easier then." Aware from Admiralty signals that six U-boats were stalking the convoy, Walker in Stork Stork ordered the sloop ordered the sloop Deptford Deptford and some corvettes to haul away some distance and stage a "mock battle" (star shells, gunfire) to mislead and draw off the U-boats. However, the "battle" had the opposite of the intended effect. Seeing it, several freighters in the convoy became alarmed and fired off snowflakes, giving away the game and lighting up the real convoy. and some corvettes to haul away some distance and stage a "mock battle" (star shells, gunfire) to mislead and draw off the U-boats. However, the "battle" had the opposite of the intended effect. Seeing it, several freighters in the convoy became alarmed and fired off snowflakes, giving away the game and lighting up the real convoy.

These snowflakes served as a beacon for Engelbert Endrass in U-567 U-567. He ran in and torpedoed the 3,300-ton British freighter Annavore Annavore. Loaded with iron ore, she sank instantly; only four of her crew could be found. Upon seeing this attack, Walker in Stork Stork ordered the ordered the Deptford Deptford group to break off the mock battle and rejoin the convoy. group to break off the mock battle and rejoin the convoy.

At almost exactly this same moment, 11 P.M. P.M., Bigalk in U-751 U-751 saw saw Audacity Audacity steaming unprotected, silhouetted against the light of snowflakes. He mistook the 10,000-ton "jeep" carrier for a new fleet carrier of the 23,000-ton steaming unprotected, silhouetted against the light of snowflakes. He mistook the 10,000-ton "jeep" carrier for a new fleet carrier of the 23,000-ton Formidable Formidable class. "Good God!" he exclaimed when recounting the attack later in a Berlin radio broadcast. "What a chance!" Quickly but coolly, Bigalk set up and fired three bow torpedoes. All hit class. "Good God!" he exclaimed when recounting the attack later in a Berlin radio broadcast. "What a chance!" Quickly but coolly, Bigalk set up and fired three bow torpedoes. All hit Audacity Audacity. Flooding heavily from three solid hits, Audacity Audacity (an ex-merchant ship with no hull armor) went down in ten minutes. Unaware that she had sunk, Bigalk submerged to reload his bow tubes, intending to finish her off with another salvo. But when he surfaced, there was no sign of " (an ex-merchant ship with no hull armor) went down in ten minutes. Unaware that she had sunk, Bigalk submerged to reload his bow tubes, intending to finish her off with another salvo. But when he surfaced, there was no sign of "Formidable." Upon his report of the attack, Donitz congratulated him and later, when Bigalk returned to France, he received a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.*

A wild nighttime action ensued. Directed by Walker in Stork Stork, the ten remaining escorts of Homebound Gibraltar 76 ran hither and yon, firing snowflakes, rescuing survivors of Audacity Audacity, and dropping depth charges. The corvettes Samphire, Vetch, and Marigold Samphire, Vetch, and Marigold each carried out an attack on a U-boat, but no kills resulted. Spotting a U-boat on the surface, the sloop each carried out an attack on a U-boat, but no kills resulted. Spotting a U-boat on the surface, the sloop Deptford Deptford turned to ram. When the boat dived, turned to ram. When the boat dived, Deptford Deptford raced up and threw off ten shallow-set depth charges "by eye." After the noise subsided, Deptford got a solid sonar contact and attacked with care, firing another ten depth charges. Holding the contact, raced up and threw off ten shallow-set depth charges "by eye." After the noise subsided, Deptford got a solid sonar contact and attacked with care, firing another ten depth charges. Holding the contact, Deptford Deptford carried out three more full-scale depth-charge attacks. The Admiralty ruled there was not sufficient evidence to credit a U-boat kill, but years later, after a painstaking study of the British and German records, British historians concluded that carried out three more full-scale depth-charge attacks. The Admiralty ruled there was not sufficient evidence to credit a U-boat kill, but years later, after a painstaking study of the British and German records, British historians concluded that Deptford Deptford had sunk Englebert Endrass in had sunk Englebert Endrass in U-567 U-567.

The attack on Endrass utterly drained the crew of Deptford Deptford. Returning to the convoy in pitch darkness, improperly alert, Deptford Deptford smashed into the port side of smashed into the port side of Stork Stork. Her bow, Walker logged, rode right up on Stork Stork, crushing the after cabin, where the five survivors of Gengelbach's U-574 U-574 were being held. Two of the Germans, Walker reported dispassionately, "were pulped, literally, into a bloody mess." Fortunately were being held. Two of the Germans, Walker reported dispassionately, "were pulped, literally, into a bloody mess." Fortunately Deptford Deptford had not hit any of had not hit any of Stork's Stork's vital machinery, and after the two sloops got untangled, both continued onward at considerably reduced speed, neither with working sonar. vital machinery, and after the two sloops got untangled, both continued onward at considerably reduced speed, neither with working sonar.

During December 22, Donitz requested reports from the Seerauber Seerauber boats. Nothing had been heard from Bruno Hansmann in the new Type IXC boats. Nothing had been heard from Bruno Hansmann in the new Type IXC U-127 U-127, for days. It was wrongly assumed that escorts from Homebound Gibraltar 76 had sunk her rather than, as was the case, the destroyer hunter-killer group. It was also assumed, correctly, that the convoy escorts had sunk the new Type IXC U-131 U-131, as well as the two new Type VIICs that had refueled in Vigo, Heyda's U-434 U-434 and Gengelbach's and Gengelbach's U-574 U-574. No one would permit himself to believe that the invincible Engelbert Endrass in the VIIC U-567 U-567 was gone, and yet he did not reply to repeated requests for his position and status. When it was finally conceded that was gone, and yet he did not reply to repeated requests for his position and status. When it was finally conceded that U-567 U-567 was lost, Donitz withheld the news for weeks. was lost, Donitz withheld the news for weeks.

After assessing the battle on December 22, Donitz called off the chase and directed Muller-Stockheim's U-67 U-67, Gelhaus's U-107 U-107, Scholtz's U-108 U-108, and Bigalk's U-751 U-751 to return to France. Upon tabulating the results of this epic chase, Donitz was devastated: one aircraft tender to return to France. Upon tabulating the results of this epic chase, Donitz was devastated: one aircraft tender* and three (actually only two) small freighters sunk at a cost of five (as he thought) U-boats, including Endrass. It was a terrible setback for the U-boat force. and three (actually only two) small freighters sunk at a cost of five (as he thought) U-boats, including Endrass. It was a terrible setback for the U-boat force.

Reinforced by surface and air escorts based in the British Isles, including a B-24 Liberator of British Squadron 120, which came out 800 miles, Homebound Gibraltar 76 reached its destination on December 23. Although the loss of Audacity Audacity and the four-stack and the four-stack Stanley Stanley was a sharp blow, the Admiralty lavished praise and awards on escort commander Johnny Walker and his captains. In relentlessly aggressive actions, they had positively sunk three U-boats ( was a sharp blow, the Admiralty lavished praise and awards on escort commander Johnny Walker and his captains. In relentlessly aggressive actions, they had positively sunk three U-boats (U-131, U-434, U-574) within a period of three days-an unprecedented achievement-and had brought home thirty of the thirty-two merchant ships of the convoy, a timely and smashing victory.

The U-boat effort to assist Axis forces in North Africa in the fall of 1941 was thus costly: thirteen boats and about 600 men lost in combat in merely six weeks-the greatest loss rate of the war to then-and another half-dozen boats knocked out with battle damage. No less disconcerting was the complete curtailment of the U-boat war in the North Atlantic in favor of assisting the Afrika Korps Afrika Korps.

Donitz drafted a tactful plea to the OKM. He conceded the urgent need to assist Axis ground forces in North Africa by sending U-boats to the Mediterranean, but he urged that attacks on Gibraltar convoys on the Atlantic side of the strait be curtailed. It was unfair and a terrible waste of assets to pit inexperienced skippers against the heavily escorted Gibraltar convoys. Four skippers on first patrols had been lost in the chase of Homebound Gibraltar 76. It was also unwise, he insisted, to send the big, clumsy Type IX boats against heavily escorted Gibraltar convoys or to patrol them near the heavily defended Gibraltar Strait. Of the five Type IXs sent against Homebound Gibraltar 76, only Scholtz in U-108 U-108 had managed to sink a ship. The others had had an arduous and perilous time; two IXs ( had managed to sink a ship. The others had had an arduous and perilous time; two IXs (U-127, U-131) had been lost.

The OKM agreed-reluctantly. U-boat attacks against the heavily escorted Gibraltar convoys were to be terminated, and patrols to the Atlantic area immediately west of Gibraltar cut to a bare minimum.

ASSESSMENTS.

The formal entry of the United States into World War II marked the end of the twenty-eight months of U-boat warfare almost solely against the British Empire. It provides a convenient milestone to assess the outcome of the Anglo-German naval campaign. In order to draw some conclusions, it is necessary to examine closely another barrage of numbers.

In these first twenty-eight months of war, the Germans deployed 153 oceangoing attack U-boats to the various war zones.* According to the most reliable source, British author V. E. Tarrant, these boats sank 1,124 British and "neutral" ships of about 5.3 million gross tons. According to the most reliable source, British author V. E. Tarrant, these boats sank 1,124 British and "neutral" ships of about 5.3 million gross tons. The sinkings included twenty-eight warships: aircraft carriers The sinkings included twenty-eight warships: aircraft carriers Courageous Courageous and and Ark Royal Ark Royal; battleships Royal Oak Royal Oak and and Barham Barham; the first "jeep" carrier, Audacity Audacity; light cruisers Dunedin Dunedin and and Galatea Galatea; nine destroyers (among them the American Reuben James Reuben James and the ex-American four-stacks and the ex-American four-stacks Bath, Broadwater, and Stanley Bath, Broadwater, and Stanley); three sloops; six corvettes; and three submarines (British Thistle and Spearfish Thistle and Spearfish; French Doris Doris).

The loss of 5.3 million gross tons of British and "neutral" merchant shipping to Axis submarines was undeniably a tough blow. Not the least of the considerations was the heavy loss of life in the ranks of the British merchant-ship crews. The Admiralty put that figure to December 31, 1941, at 9,267 men. Most died quickly and horribly in the explosions and sinkings, or slowly and agonizingly in lifeboats and on rafts. Although statistically the odds of a ship being hit or sunk were quite low, every voyage was a prolonged and terrifying nightmare for the crewmen.

It is seldom mentioned in accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic of the period under review but, remarkably, the British were able to make up this loss of 5.3 million gross tons of merchant shipping to Axis submarines in several ways. These included the construction of about 2 million gross tons of new (and superior) merchant shipping in British yards and the one-time confiscation, purchase, or lease of about 4 million more gross tons from Axis and Allied "neutral" sources. In fact, the total British-controlled merchant marine fleet actually In fact, the total British-controlled merchant marine fleet actually increased during increased during this period from about 3,000 ships of 17.8 million gross tons to about 3,600 ships of 20.7 million gross tons. this period from about 3,000 ships of 17.8 million gross tons to about 3,600 ships of 20.7 million gross tons.

Some writers have described an "oil crisis" in the British Isles caused by the heavy loss of Allied tankers to U-boats in this period. Actually, Allied tanker losses to Axis submarines were not crippling: 117 vessels of about 936,777 gross tons, of which seventy-six of 628,110 gross tons were British-owned.* under review, British shipyards made up about half of the loss of British-owned tanker tonnage by completing thirty-seven new and larger tankers of about 365,000 gross tons. Besides that, in this period the British government acquired control of about 200 tankers from Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other nations. Over and above that, in 1941 the United States diverted fifty tankers to the British "oil shuttle" in American waters and authorized U.S. (and Panamanian) companies to charter tankers to the British in war zones. As a result of these gains, the size of the British-controlled tanker fleet actually under review, British shipyards made up about half of the loss of British-owned tanker tonnage by completing thirty-seven new and larger tankers of about 365,000 gross tons. Besides that, in this period the British government acquired control of about 200 tankers from Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other nations. Over and above that, in 1941 the United States diverted fifty tankers to the British "oil shuttle" in American waters and authorized U.S. (and Panamanian) companies to charter tankers to the British in war zones. As a result of these gains, the size of the British-controlled tanker fleet actually increased increased substantially by the end of 1941. Owing to that and to petrol rationing and other fuel-conservation measures, the official British historian wrote, no real oil crisis occurred in the British Isles in this period. substantially by the end of 1941. Owing to that and to petrol rationing and other fuel-conservation measures, the official British historian wrote, no real oil crisis occurred in the British Isles in this period.

However, total imports to the British Isles continued to fall sharply, from about 60 million tons in 1939 to about 45 million tons in 1940 to an uncomfortable and worrisome rock-bottom 31 million tons in 1941. By the end of that year, almost all consumer goods and food in the British Isles were rationed and "Victory Gardens," begun as patriotic gestures, had become virtual necessities.

In addition to U-boat sinkings of and damage to merchant ships, there were numerous other causes for the drastic loss of imports. Chief among these were the diversion of shipping for strictly military purposes and delays incurred by convoying. Other reasons: Luftwaffe Luftwaffe bomb and mine damage to shipping and seaports; the loss of convoy routes in the Mediterranean Sea; inefficiencies in the British unloading and distribution systems; overcrowding in ship refit, overhaul, and damage repair facilities; labor problems; bomb and mine damage to shipping and seaports; the loss of convoy routes in the Mediterranean Sea; inefficiencies in the British unloading and distribution systems; overcrowding in ship refit, overhaul, and damage repair facilities; labor problems;* and increased shipping accidents and collisions due to convoying and to the shutting down of navigational aids, and to other wartime restrictions. and increased shipping accidents and collisions due to convoying and to the shutting down of navigational aids, and to other wartime restrictions.

In return for the destruction of and damage to this Allied shipping, the Atlantic U-boat force did not escape unharmed. To December 31, 1941, forty-nine oceangoing U-boats manned by about 2,150 men were lost in Atlantic combat operations to all causes. The British rescued and imprisoned 39 percent (828) of these men; the others died terrible deaths at sea. Five other oceangoing U-boats manned by about 220 men newly arrived in the Mediterranean were lost in those waters during November and December 1941. The British rescued and imprisoned 54 percent (119) of these men. The total of fifty-four oceangoing U-boats lost in action to the end of 1941 amounted to about 35 percent of the 153 oceangoing attack boats deployed in all war zones outside the Baltic. The total of 2,400 men lost (947 captured) was the cream of the prewar submarine force. The British rescued and imprisoned 39 percent (828) of these men; the others died terrible deaths at sea. Five other oceangoing U-boats manned by about 220 men newly arrived in the Mediterranean were lost in those waters during November and December 1941. The British rescued and imprisoned 54 percent (119) of these men. The total of fifty-four oceangoing U-boats lost in action to the end of 1941 amounted to about 35 percent of the 153 oceangoing attack boats deployed in all war zones outside the Baltic. The total of 2,400 men lost (947 captured) was the cream of the prewar submarine force.

To this point it would be difficult to declare a "victor" in the so-called Battle of the Atlantic. Inasmuch as the British had persuaded the Americans to provide significant help (sixty warships; North Atlantic convoy escort; occupation of Iceland; amendments liberalizing the Neutrality Act; the "oil shuttle"; and most significantly, Lend-Lease), they had assured themselves of victory over the U-boat in the long term. However, in the short term, many more difficult months lay ahead. The British had not defeated the U-boat force; rather, they had taken the necessary steps to prevent it from defeating them.

In truth, neither Germany nor Great Britain had been properly prepared for a submarine war in the Atlantic, and it showed. When that war came, neither side responded with war-decisive measures. Both sides made errors of commission and omission. A review of these helps to set the stage for the second phase of the U-boat war.

First, the British side.

* The appeasing antiwar attitude held during the prewar years by a majority of British citizens and the various governments opened the way for Hitler to abrogate the Versailles Treaty and enter into a bilateral naval agreement with the British, which allowed him to create a second U-boat force. In light of the naval experience of World War I, this has to be ranked as an egregious and unfortunate mistake, but given the dark economic situation of the 1930s and the mood of the British-democracy, perhaps unavoidable and inevitable.

* Although it then became possible that the British would have to fight a U-boat force again, the London government did not take sufficiently vigorous steps in the late 1930s to prepare for that contingency. Made smug by the success of convoying in World War I and overconfident of modern sonar to detect submerged U-boats unfailingly, the Admiralty neglected men and weaponry for possible antisubmarine warfare in the wider reaches of the Atlantic.

One result was that when war came the British did not have nearly enough surface and air escorts to support convoying, or adequate ASW weaponry. When the 1,000-ton Hunt Hunt-class destroyers intended for Atlantic ocean escort failed to meet satisfactory standards, the British had to rely heavily on the slow corvettes, which had been earmarked for inshore escort and were not adequately armed or suited for the rough waters of the open ocean. Historically, the scandalously neglected stepchild of the RAF, Coastal Command, remained outside Admiralty control for too long and did not get the men, aircraft, electronics, and weaponry required for proper escorting of convoys and killing U-boats.

Beyond that neglect, the Admiralty squandered some of its most valuable ASW assets in ill-conceived ventures, such as hunter-killer operations in 1939 and the attempted occupations of Norway in the spring of 1940 and of Greece in 1941. Hunter-killer operations cost the Royal Navy the carrier Courageous Courageous. The attempted occupations of Norway and Greece cost it numerous destroyers sunk or damaged, besides those lost at Dunkirk.* Elsewhere all too many destroyers were worn down in futile hunter-killer patrolling. Elsewhere all too many destroyers were worn down in futile hunter-killer patrolling.

* The British had no way of foreseeing the sudden, craven collapse of France. However, when it became unequivocally clear in the summer of 1940 that the Germans were shifting the entire oceangoing U-boat operational force to bases on the Atlantic coast of occupied France, the British failed to take steps to interfere. Had the War Cabinet directed RAF Bomber Command to focus its airpower on those bases rather than on German cities, doubtless the British would have prevented the construction of the massive, bombproof U-boat pens. The failure to do so or to mount vigorous ASW air patrols over the Bay of Biscay, a "choke point" that all inbound and outbound U-boats in France had to transit, were British errors of omission in 1941 of regrettable proportions.

* The secret British break into naval Enigma in 1941 was a triumph of intelligence, literally and figuratively. However, it was a two-edged sword. While it enabled the British to evade U-boats and save ships, at the same time it had the effect of reducing the U-boat kill rate.

To the end of 1941, most U-boats were sunk or disabled while tracking or attacking convoys. The successful "evasion" strategy therefore sharply reduced contacts between U-boats and convoys with a commensurate reduction in opportunities to kill U-boats. In all of 1941, British-controlled ASW forces sank only thirty oceangoing U-boats, an average of 2.5 per month. British intelligence put new U-boat construction at an average of twenty boats per month. It was not that high in 1941, but even so, it was at least six times or more than the kill rate. Thus it was clear-at least to the Americans-that the British could not rely so completely on convoy "evasion" much longer. In addition to strengthening defensive convoy escort, they needed to hurl offensive air and submarine forces at U-boat construction yards, training areas, bases and pens, the Bay of Biscay, and elsewhere to kill U-boats at a much higher rate.

Some historians have argued that the British failure to honor the December 1940 Anglo-American Enigma deal in spirit and give the Americans complete access to Enigma-breaking secrets in 1941 was another regrettable British mistake. The British were hard-pressed to find technicians and facilities to build three-rotor bombes, let alone the anticipated new generation of four-rotor bombes. The Americans had technicians and facilities to do both. Had the British revealed Enigmabreaking machine technology to the Americans more willingly and sooner, it is likely that specialized American production know-how could have minimized the possibilities of "losing" naval Enigma for an extended time, as was soon to be the case. That same advanced codebreaking technology could also have better detected the German breaks into Anglo-American naval codes, which also occurred.

* Although it soon became clear that the land-based aircraft of Coastal Command served well in an ASW role, even if only to hold U-boats down while the convoys fled the area or surface vessels arrived, the British War Cabinet in 1941 continued to rank the ASW role of Coastal Command far below the role of Bomber Command in razing German cities. Coastal Command therefore lacked adequate numbers of suitable ASW aircraft, centimetric-wavelength ASV radar, and electronic navigation and position-finding systems. The development of stable aerial bombs and depth charges with more powerful Torpex warheads and fuses capable of actuating at shallow (25-foot) depths likewise lagged, as did the powerful Leigh Light, which was imperative for nighttime ASW operations.

* British management of the naval assets of Canada, a chief ally in the U-boat war, left much to be desired. Where this clumsy growing child with huge new responsibilities required sensitive nourishment, it got too much abuse and contempt. Had the Royal Navy provided the Canadian Navy more vigorous and sympathetic training in convoying and ASW and with improved ships, electronics, and weaponry, sooner rather than later the Canadians in time doubtless could have done as well in the escort role as the British, or perhaps even better. Although it was not so great a factor in this period, American management of Canadian naval assets was no better.

Second, the German side.

* Hitler erred in his assumption that he could occupy Poland with small or no military intervention by Great Britain and France. He likewise underestimated the willingness of the British to fight for home and hearth, epitomized in the person of Winston Churchill. The Fuhrer's decision to postpone the defeat of Great Britain in favor of the conquest of the Soviet Union was another fatal miscalculation. That huge enterprise diverted men and materials from the construction of U-boats, the one weapons system that had any chance of isolating and defeating Great Britain. The failure to rush production of U-boats to the maximum after Hitler abrogated the Anglo-German naval treaty early in 1939 ceded to Great Britain valuable time in which to ward off a truly decisive U-boat blow and to coax help from the American "Arsenal of Democracy."

* Hitler erred not only in failing to provide a vigorous increase in U-boat production but also in his insistence on diverting large numbers of U-boats to Norway, the Arctic, and the Mediterranean. At the close of 1941, about one-third (thirty) of the entire combat-ready oceangoing U-boat force was posted in those areas, leaving only sixty-four boats of that type in the Atlantic force, not nearly enough U-boats to wage anything like decisive naval warfare. To no avail, Donitz rightly argued that the U-boat arm should be maximally deployed against the vital North Atlantic convoy run between Canada and the British Isles, not split up and sent to less important areas or assigned to support land operations or to escort surface ships or to report weather.

* Hitler and Mussolini erred in the strategic and tactical deployment of the thirty-one oceangoing Italian submarines that had been based at Bordeaux by mid-1941.* As Donitz suspected, neither the boats nor the crews were qualified for combat in the rough and dangerous waters of the North Atlantic. Doubtless far better successes would have been achieved had the Italian boats been assigned earlier rather than much later to patrol southward to the Azores, Canaries, and Cape Verde islands, and to West African waters. Had they been so deployed, these submarines also would have forced the British to provide substantial ASW forces in the southern area much sooner, further reducing these scarce resources in the North Atlantic area. As Donitz suspected, neither the boats nor the crews were qualified for combat in the rough and dangerous waters of the North Atlantic. Doubtless far better successes would have been achieved had the Italian boats been assigned earlier rather than much later to patrol southward to the Azores, Canaries, and Cape Verde islands, and to West African waters. Had they been so deployed, these submarines also would have forced the British to provide substantial ASW forces in the southern area much sooner, further reducing these scarce resources in the North Atlantic area.

* To avoid another Lusitania Lusitania incident or a similar outrage while he sought to negotiate Great Britain and France out of the war, Hitler initiated U-boat warfare with a set of rules and restrictions so complicated that U-boat skippers had to be issued a special handheld "wheel" device to sort out what could or could not be sunk. These rules substantially reduced the effectiveness of the U-boats, increased the risks that had to be run, and led in part to the high U-boat losses in the first year of the war. incident or a similar outrage while he sought to negotiate Great Britain and France out of the war, Hitler initiated U-boat warfare with a set of rules and restrictions so complicated that U-boat skippers had to be issued a special handheld "wheel" device to sort out what could or could not be sunk. These rules substantially reduced the effectiveness of the U-boats, increased the risks that had to be run, and led in part to the high U-boat losses in the first year of the war.

The accidental sinking of Athenia Athenia by Lemp in by Lemp in U-30 U-30 on the first day of hostilities, rightfully denounced in London as an outrage, made a mockery of Berlin's claims to be fighting a carefully "restricted" U-boat campaign. In the face of the universal perception that Germany had launched barbarous "unrestricted" U-boat warfare, the continuation of these complicated rules and restrictions was, to say the least, an ill-advised course for Hitler to follow, and it gained him absolutely nothing, politically or otherwise. on the first day of hostilities, rightfully denounced in London as an outrage, made a mockery of Berlin's claims to be fighting a carefully "restricted" U-boat campaign. In the face of the universal perception that Germany had launched barbarous "unrestricted" U-boat warfare, the continuation of these complicated rules and restrictions was, to say the least, an ill-advised course for Hitler to follow, and it gained him absolutely nothing, politically or otherwise.

* Donitz erred in his insistence that the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine stake almost all on the overtouted medium Type VIIC U-boat. Conceived to attack convoys in the Northwest, Western, and Southwestern Approaches in groups or "wolf packs" on relatively brief missions, the VIIC was not suitable for longer-range operations and for hard, fuel-guzzling convoy chases in the central and western North Atlantic without means at hand to provide spare parts and to refuel and replenish torpedo, food, and water supplies. Besides that, the VIIs were much too crowded and cramped for sustained operations and lacked air conditioning for summer months and proper heating for winter months. stake almost all on the overtouted medium Type VIIC U-boat. Conceived to attack convoys in the Northwest, Western, and Southwestern Approaches in groups or "wolf packs" on relatively brief missions, the VIIC was not suitable for longer-range operations and for hard, fuel-guzzling convoy chases in the central and western North Atlantic without means at hand to provide spare parts and to refuel and replenish torpedo, food, and water supplies. Besides that, the VIIs were much too crowded and cramped for sustained operations and lacked air conditioning for summer months and proper heating for winter months.

In view of the propensity of the high-performance diesel engines to break down under continuous strain, the VIIs would have benefited greatly by the inclusion of a third diesel engine. So fitted, when one engine broke down a Type VIIC could still keep two engines on line and maintain chase speed. The addition of a third diesel engine would have necessitated an increase in the length of the VIIC, and that in turn would have made possible an increase in its external fuel capacity and its top speed by perhaps one or two knots. The added living space inside the pressure hull certainly would have improved habitability.

* Donitz also erred by greatly overestimating the ability of single U-boats or groups of U-boats to find, shadow, and attack convoys. As the U-boats on the North Atlantic run were forced ever westward to avoid British air and surface escorts and U-boat hunters, the ocean areas to be searched for convoys by eye and passive sonar increased almost exponentially. To overcome this handicap, Donitz requested-then demanded-large numbers of long-range Luftwaffe Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft specifically to locate convoys. Hitler and Goring assured Donitz that his requests and demands were to be met, but in fact they were unable to provide anywhere near adequate and competent air reconnaissance at sea. The Condors, which were based in France and Norway in 1941, were too little and too late. Crews were insufficiently trained in navigation and communications. reconnaissance aircraft specifically to locate convoys. Hitler and Goring assured Donitz that his requests and demands were to be met, but in fact they were unable to provide anywhere near adequate and competent air reconnaissance at sea. The Condors, which were based in France and Norway in 1941, were too little and too late. Crews were insufficiently trained in navigation and communications.

In the absence of good intelligence on convoy locations, Donitz was compelled to resort to convoy-hunting "patrol lines," the spacing of the U-boats of a group (or "wolf pack") on a straight line at precise positions about fifteen miles apart. The organization and deployment of the U-boats in these search lines and shifting of the lines resulted in heavy radio traffic back and forth, thereby providing the British with a continuous flow of standardized and predictable messages-the necessary grist for the codebreakers' mills. Moreover, the patrol lines were of such great length (165 miles per twelve boats) that it was difficult for the boats most distant from the convoy contact to close in time to attack, especially in daytime when enemy air was present. Hence, in most instances, "convoy battles" consisted of first-night strikes carried out by a few of the boats in the patrol line. The usual depiction of a voracious "pack of wolves" circling and hungrily gnawing at a convoy over a number of days was the product of darkly imaginative propagandists on both sides.

PLATE 10 10.

PLATE 11 11.

This propaganda has left the impression that the U-boats savaged one merchant-ship convoy after another. This is not true. In the first twenty-eight months of the war, the British sailed about 900 Atlantic convoys. U-boats achieved major victories (six or more confirmed ships sunk) over only nineteen of these convoys.* Ninety-eight percent of all the ships in these convoys reached the British Isles. Ninety-eight percent of all the ships in these convoys reached the British Isles.

* The German technical branches failed scandalously to provide U-boats with efficient, safe, and reliable electronics and torpedoes, essential for the success of World War II submarine warfare. Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine scientists and engineers egregiously neglected radar technology, especially in failing to vigorously pursue miniaturized centimetric-wavelength radar for U-boats. The early development of this important detection device by the Germans would have greatly enhanced the ability of U-boats to find and attack convoys at night and in times of poor or no visibility, to defend themselves from sudden surprise attacks by radar-fitted enemy surface and air forces, and to navigate precisely near coastlines. The pursuit of this electronic technology doubtless would have resulted also in a greater appreciation at much earlier dates for and knowledge about radar detectors of various wavelengths to counter search radar employed by the Allies. The failure of scientists and engineers egregiously neglected radar technology, especially in failing to vigorously pursue miniaturized centimetric-wavelength radar for U-boats. The early development of this important detection device by the Germans would have greatly enhanced the ability of U-boats to find and attack convoys at night and in times of poor or no visibility, to defend themselves from sudden surprise attacks by radar-fitted enemy surface and air forces, and to navigate precisely near coastlines. The pursuit of this electronic technology doubtless would have resulted also in a greater appreciation at much earlier dates for and knowledge about radar detectors of various wavelengths to counter search radar employed by the Allies. The failure of Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine engineers to test the air and electric torpedoes and pistols more thoroughly in prewar years needs no further comment, except to say that at the end of 1941 the torpedoes still had serious defects. engineers to test the air and electric torpedoes and pistols more thoroughly in prewar years needs no further comment, except to say that at the end of 1941 the torpedoes still had serious defects.

* The Germans not only underestimated the ability of the British to develop powerful miniaturized radar, but also their ability to DF U-boat radio transmissions with a high degree of accuracy. At the end of 1941, the greatly improved British land-based HF/DF (Huff Duff) networks provided fairly reliable information on U-boat positions, and a miniaturized HF/DF for surface ships was ready. The Germans had scant to no HF/DF technology and scoffed at the possibility that the British systems were effective.

* The Germans consistently underestimated not only the willingness of President Roosevelt and the American government to support the British in various ways, but also America's ability to produce mind-boggling quantities of ships of all kinds. Donitz arrogantly dismissed the colossal American shipbuilding projections as so much "propaganda" and, at the same time, almost uncritically accepted U-boat-sinking claims, which in some cases were inflated, intentionally or otherwise, by as much as 100 percent. These judgments greatly distorted the actual progress of the naval race, exaggerating the successes of U-boats and minimizing the ability of Great Britain and America to produce shipping. Thus the Germans always thought they were doing infinitely better than was truly the case.

What emerges from this analysis is that, contrary to the general perception at the close of 1941, German U-boats were nowhere close to isolating and strangling Great Britain. Although occasionally successful, group or "wolf pack" tactics were on the whole a failure, and the Type VII as well as the Type IX U-boats were unsuitable for this kind of warfare in the Atlantic. For all the reasons laid out above, the rate of U-boat nonperformance (no sinkings per patrol) had reached ominously high levels in all areas, so much so that it is clear that U-boats had lost any prospect of crushing Great Britain, let alone defeating the formidable new enemy, the United States.

Nonetheless, the myth of U-boat prowess and invincibility had taken firm root in the public mind for the second time in this century. Rightly, Churchill had proclaimed a Battle of the Atlantic to sharply focus the attention of British ASW authorities on the U-boat problem. This battle cry achieved its purpose more rapidly than is generally credited. Therefore, one is still left to puzzle over Churchill's lugubrious postwar assertion that the only thing that really worried him during the war was the U-boat peril.

* Five surviving prewar vessels plus Five surviving prewar vessels plus Assiniboine Assiniboine and seven ex-American four-stacks. One of the prewar vessels, and seven ex-American four-stacks. One of the prewar vessels, Saguenay Saguenay, had only just returned from prolonged battle-damage repairs in a British shipyard.

* The vessels met on September 3. The The vessels met on September 3. The U-106 U-106 escorted to September 8, when Focke-Wulf Condors took over off Cape Finisterre. The blockade runner reached Bordeaux safely. escorted to September 8, when Focke-Wulf Condors took over off Cape Finisterre. The blockade runner reached Bordeaux safely.

Donitz approved of the rescue. An account of it was prepared for his defense at Nuremberg, but it was not submitted. Donitz approved of the rescue. An account of it was prepared for his defense at Nuremberg, but it was not submitted.

* The fourth rotor, known as the Beta Wheel, was mounted on the rotor axle and was a fixed addition inside the machine, somewhat like the reflector, although the Beta Wheel could be set in a "neutral," or nonoperating, position. The other three rotors remained interchangeable, with a total of eight rotors to choose from. The fourth rotor, known as the Beta Wheel, was mounted on the rotor axle and was a fixed addition inside the machine, somewhat like the reflector, although the Beta Wheel could be set in a "neutral," or nonoperating, position. The other three rotors remained interchangeable, with a total of eight rotors to choose from.

The safer area was referred to as the "Air Gap" or "Greenland Air Gap" or "Black Hole," or by other slangy nomenclature. The safer area was referred to as the "Air Gap" or "Greenland Air Gap" or "Black Hole," or by other slangy nomenclature.

* As the designation makes clear, a "Support Group" was different from an "Escort Group." Usually it was a reinforcing element for a threatened convoy. "Hunter-Killer Groups" often served in the role of "Support Groups." As the designation makes clear, a "Support Group" was different from an "Escort Group." Usually it was a reinforcing element for a threatened convoy. "Hunter-Killer Groups" often served in the role of "Support Groups."

* The Admiralty routed the eastbound Slow Convoy 43, Halifax 148, the American Task Force 15 en route to Iceland with Army troops, and other convoys to the south of The Admiralty routed the eastbound Slow Convoy 43, Halifax 148, the American Task Force 15 en route to Iceland with Army troops, and other convoys to the south of Markgraf Markgraf.