Tactically, Drumbeat was to be a replication of the opening U-boat campaign of September 1939. The boats were to operate not in groups, or wolf packs, but in dependently over a wide area, striking simultaneously on a signal from Kerneval. As in 1939, the aim was to cause the greatest possible physical and psychological jolts. The Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109 and the inexperienced Ernst Kals in the new and the inexperienced Ernst Kals in the new U-130 U-130 were to patrol in the Newfoundland-Nova Scotia area, backing up the ten Type VIIs. Richard Zapp in were to patrol in the Newfoundland-Nova Scotia area, backing up the ten Type VIIs. Richard Zapp in U-66 U-66, Reinhard Hardegen in U-123 U-123, Ulrich Folkers in U-125 U-125, and Jurgen von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502 were to patrol American waters between New York and Cape Hatteras. As in 1939, the skippers were to give priority to largest possible targets-preferably loaded tankers-which were sailing independently. Escorted convoys were to be avoided. To achieve maximum impact, Donitz suggested that the skippers attempt to sink ships with two-fan shots and authorized the use of deck guns when the conditions for such action were safe. were to patrol American waters between New York and Cape Hatteras. As in 1939, the skippers were to give priority to largest possible targets-preferably loaded tankers-which were sailing independently. Escorted convoys were to be avoided. To achieve maximum impact, Donitz suggested that the skippers attempt to sink ships with two-fan shots and authorized the use of deck guns when the conditions for such action were safe.

Folkers in U-125 U-125 and von Rosenstiel in and von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502 sailed for the United States on December 18. Outbound from the Bay of Biscay, Folkers in sailed for the United States on December 18. Outbound from the Bay of Biscay, Folkers in U-125 U-125 encountered the besieged Gibraltar 76, but when he reported the convoy, Kerneval told him to avoid the battle and continue to America. Von Rosenstiel in encountered the besieged Gibraltar 76, but when he reported the convoy, Kerneval told him to avoid the battle and continue to America. Von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502 developed a heavy oil leak which left a telltale trace on the surface of the water, and he aborted and returned to Lorient on December 22. Hardegen in developed a heavy oil leak which left a telltale trace on the surface of the water, and he aborted and returned to Lorient on December 22. Hardegen in U-123 U-123 sailed December 22. Zapp in sailed December 22. Zapp in U-66 U-66 sailed on Christmas Day. Bleichrodt in sailed on Christmas Day. Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109 and Kals in and Kals in U-130 U-130, who were Canada-bound, sailed on December 27, by which time all ten Type VIIs assigned to patrol to Canada were at sea. Total force of the first wave: fifteen boats, of which three Type IXs, U-66 U-66, U-123 U-123, and U-125 U-125, were to attack shipping in United States waters.

Some historians have asserted that British codebreakers detected the sailings of these boats and that London flashed quite specific warnings to Washington and Ottawa, which were largely ignored. These assertions are only partly true.

Based on daily information supplied by Rodger Winn in the Admiralty's U-boat Tracking Room, the naval staff in Washington issued daily U-boat position reports to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. The reports were not very helpful. Almost all contained caveats and disclaimers:

December24: General situation obscure and good information lacking. General situation obscure and good information lacking.

December 25: Situation vague and no indicated activity in North Atlantic. Situation vague and no indicated activity in North Atlantic.

December 26: Sub situation still obscure. No indications of any great activity in North Atlantic but at least two subs are probably west of 40 degrees west.... Sub situation still obscure. No indications of any great activity in North Atlantic but at least two subs are probably west of 40 degrees west....

December 27: Situation in Western Atlantic is vague and obscure. There are possibly 2 or 3 west of 40 degrees west, present position unknown. Situation in Western Atlantic is vague and obscure. There are possibly 2 or 3 west of 40 degrees west, present position unknown.

In his weekly summary of December 29 for the Admiralty, Rodger Winn wrote that "There are indications of an inconclusive character that several U-boats may be moving to the Western Atlantic, possibly to operate in the Caribbean or off Halifax." There was no suggestion that any U-boat might operate off the United States East Coast.

These vague reports from London came intermingled with word of one horrific disaster after the other in the Pacific and Far East. Besides these setbacks, about ten Japanese submarines, operating close off the coasts of California and Oregon in December, sank the American tankers Emidio Emidio and and Montebello Montebello, damaged five other American tankers, and damaged two American freighters. They also shelled an oil field near Santa Barbara, intensifying rumors that the Japanese were on the point of invading California.*

THE "N "NORWAY P PARANOIA"

While the fifteen group Drumbeat boats were slowly plowing westward, the British mounted another surprise commando raid on Norway. Perhaps conceived principally to capture a four-rotor Enigma or Enigma keys and other material, the raid called for a two-pronged assault on December 26-27: a main thrust in Vest Fjord, leading into Narvik, and a secondary thrust much farther south at the island of Vaagso in Nord Fjord near Alesund. Owing to the breakdown-and abort-of one troopship, the main assault on Vest Fjord was less than satisfactory. However, the secondary assault on Vaagso was successful. In addition to operations ashore, British naval forces (the cruiser Kenya Kenya, four destroyers) sank or captured five German merchant ships, two trawlers, and a tugboat. The Admiralty has revealed that the raids netted "cryptoanalytic materials." The OKM diarist logged that a shorebased naval communications facility at Maaloe (in Nord Fjord) had been destroyed with no survivors, and that "the whereabouts of secret documents is unknown.

Amounting to no more than a pinprick, these raids resulted in profound consequences for the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine and the U-boat arm. In a first, small reaction, the OKM temporarily diverted five new Type VII boats sailing from Germany to Nord Fjord to interdict British naval forces. When informed of this, Donitz was dismayed. He protested to the OKM that all five boats were designated for the second wave to American waters; the diversion to Norway was a useless waste of time and fuel, as well as a high-risk assignment for new crews merely a few days out from Kiel on first patrols. Moreover, he curtly refused a further OKM suggestion that nine boats be permanently assigned to the west coast of Norway to protect against further Allied attacks. and the U-boat arm. In a first, small reaction, the OKM temporarily diverted five new Type VII boats sailing from Germany to Nord Fjord to interdict British naval forces. When informed of this, Donitz was dismayed. He protested to the OKM that all five boats were designated for the second wave to American waters; the diversion to Norway was a useless waste of time and fuel, as well as a high-risk assignment for new crews merely a few days out from Kiel on first patrols. Moreover, he curtly refused a further OKM suggestion that nine boats be permanently assigned to the west coast of Norway to protect against further Allied attacks.

The British raids coincided with a flood of rumors reaching Berlin from various sources, forecasting a full-scale Allied invasion of northern Norway. The supposed invasion was to be coordinated with a Soviet attack westward through Finland, possibly abetted by the Swedes. If the attacks developed as rumored, Germany was to be flanked on the north, cut off from vital Swedish iron ore and nickel, and vulnerable to Scandinavian-based Allied air and naval forces attacking over and across the Baltic.

Predisposed to believe the rumors, Hitler summoned Admiral Raeder to Wolfsschanze Wolfsschanze on December 29. "If the British go about things properly," Hitler fumed, according to the stenographer, "they will attack northern Norway at several points." This, Hitler declared, "might be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war." Therefore, he continued, the on December 29. "If the British go about things properly," Hitler fumed, according to the stenographer, "they will attack northern Norway at several points." This, Hitler declared, "might be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war." Therefore, he continued, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine must use "all its forces for the defense of Norway." By that, Hitler meant must use "all its forces for the defense of Norway." By that, Hitler meant Bismarck Bismarck's sister ship, the super battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz (then in home waters), the battle cruisers (then in home waters), the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst (in Brest, France), the "pocket" battleship (in Brest, France), the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer (in home waters), and the heavy cruisers (in home waters), and the heavy cruisers Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen (in France) and (in France) and Hipper Hipper (in home waters). (in home waters).

Raeder demurred. He did not believe the British raids presaged a major invasion, nor did he credit the rumors of a Soviet thrust through Finland and Sweden. By keeping Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen in France, the Germans would compel the British to retain a sizeable counterforce in home waters that might be used elsewhere-the Mediterranean, for example. Hence the presence of those big ships in France indirectly helped Rommel. Moreover, the ships had been in French ports so long and had been so denuded of experienced personnel that all three would require weeks of workup before they were ready for the combat they were sure to face in a dash to Norway. in France, the Germans would compel the British to retain a sizeable counterforce in home waters that might be used elsewhere-the Mediterranean, for example. Hence the presence of those big ships in France indirectly helped Rommel. Moreover, the ships had been in French ports so long and had been so denuded of experienced personnel that all three would require weeks of workup before they were ready for the combat they were sure to face in a dash to Norway.

Hitler flew into a rage. Perhaps influenced by the destruction at Pearl Harbor and the nearly simultaneous loss of the Prince of Wales Prince of Wales and and Repulse Repulse in the Far East, he denounced the value of battleships in the air age. in the Far East, he denounced the value of battleships in the air age.* He concluded the meeting by directing Raeder to be ready to carry out his orders on his signal. He concluded the meeting by directing Raeder to be ready to carry out his orders on his signal. Tirpitz Tirpitz was to move to Trondheim (as already scheduled) within three weeks. was to move to Trondheim (as already scheduled) within three weeks. Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen were to be brought home as soon as possible-and at any risk-via the English Channel, and thence sail to Norway together with were to be brought home as soon as possible-and at any risk-via the English Channel, and thence sail to Norway together with Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer and and Hipper Hipper. Appropriate air and surface and U-boat escorts were to be provided for all big-ship movements.

There was no detailed discussion of deploying U-boats for the defense of Norway. At that time four Type VII boats had been assigned to Arctic patrols to attack the Murmansk convoys, but the OKM had concurred in Donitz's refusal to provide large numbers of boats for the defense of Norway. However, Hitler had insisted that the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine use "all its forces" for the defense of Norway. The OKM interpreted this to mean every U-boat except those in the Mediterranean assisting Rommel, but deferred such a drastic U-boat redeployment pending a thorough study of the Norway situation and more specific instructions from Hitler. use "all its forces" for the defense of Norway. The OKM interpreted this to mean every U-boat except those in the Mediterranean assisting Rommel, but deferred such a drastic U-boat redeployment pending a thorough study of the Norway situation and more specific instructions from Hitler.

Thus the opening U-boat campaign in North American waters proceeded on uncertain grounds. Should what became known as Hitler's "Norway paranoia" intensify, there was every possibility that the fifteen boats of the first wave would be recalled to thwart the supposed Allied invasion of Norway and that subsequent waves to the Americas would be canceled for the same reason. A dramatic U-boat strike was therefore absolutely essential to avoid what Donitz viewed as another useless diversion of the U-boat force.

"ALL W WE N NEED I IS S SHIPS"

When the Arcadia Conference convened in Washington on December 23, there was a new face in the senior American group: Admiral Ernest J. King, age sixty-three, former commander of the Atlantic Fleet. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt had appointed King (effective December 30) to the newly recreated post of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, a position comparable to that of the Royal Navy's First Sea Lord. King exercised operational and administrative control of the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by his successor, Royal E. Ingersoll; the Pacific Fleet, commanded by Chester W. Nimitz, replacing Husband E. Kimmel; the Asiatic Fleet, commanded by Thomas C. Hart; and the United States Coast Guard, which President Roosevelt had transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Navy by executive order on November 1, 1941. For the time being, Admiral Harold R. Stark retained the title of Chief of Naval Operations, but his days in Washington were numbered and his responsibilities were limited to administrative matters and "long-term planning."

King was a brilliant, salty fighter, so flinty and tough, the story went, that he "shaved with a blow torch." In his forty-year professional career he had served on surface ships and submarines, had qualified as a naval pilot, and had been a pioneer in naval aviation and carrier operations. No one knew the strengths and weaknesses of the Navy-and its senior officer corps-better. No one was more offensive-minded or more eager to avenge the treachery of Pearl Harbor, which had left the Navy in shock and despair. Although King was approaching retirement age, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had recommended him to Roosevelt as the admiral most qualified to shake the Navy out of its post-Pearl Harbor paralysis.

King had only just arrived in Washington. He was still in the process of setting up an office and recruiting a staff. "Nothing was ready," he said later. "I had to start with nothing." However, he had participated in the meetings at the Atlantic Conference in Argentia the previous August and thus he knew most of the American and British luminaries. He said little and the British delegates, including First Sea Lord Dudley Pound, gained the impression that King's mind was focused more on the war in the Pacific than on the war in Europe and the Mediterranean.

This was only partly right. Having just left command of the Atlantic Fleet, King was as acutely aware of naval problems in the Atlantic theater of war as was any British delegate. In particular King, like the British, was deeply concerned about a possible sortie to the Atlantic by the super battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz, to be joined by the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst, the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, and the heavy cruisers Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen from Brest and from Brest and Hipper Hipper from the Baltic. An Atlantic raid by those six German big ships would present a daunting challenge to the depleted British Home Fleet and the American Atlantic Fleet and would imperil troop and supply convoys. The danger would be increased if the Vichy French warships in Martinique elected to reinforce the Germans or to sail independently against Allied naval forces or the Panama Canal. from the Baltic. An Atlantic raid by those six German big ships would present a daunting challenge to the depleted British Home Fleet and the American Atlantic Fleet and would imperil troop and supply convoys. The danger would be increased if the Vichy French warships in Martinique elected to reinforce the Germans or to sail independently against Allied naval forces or the Panama Canal.

Throughout the Arcadia Conference, a flood of profoundly upsetting bulletins arrived from the Pacific and Far East, announcing one Japanese victory after another. The conferees were thus compelled to spend much time devising emergency measures to help beleaguered Allied forces in that theater. Nonetheless, they hewed to the main purpose, which was to lay out a global strategy for winning the war and to formulate war-production schedules to implement the strategy. All delegates, including most emphatically Admiral King, again affirmed the earlier agreements to crush Germany and Italy first, Japan second, but there was much uncertainty and disagreement over how this was to be done and at what point the Allies were to shift from the defensive to the offensive in the Pacific to minimize the consolidation of Japanese conquests.

Underlying all discussion was a unanimous desire to launch offensive action against Germany and Italy at the earliest possible time. Churchill proposed a plan (Gymnast) for an Allied invasion of French Northwest Africa, designed to trap Rommel and satisfy Soviet demands for a "second front." Still skeptical of Churchill's "Mediterranean strategy," and believing the Allies should strike directly for the German heartland, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall counter-proposed an Allied invasion of Occupied France (Sledgehammer) in late summer of 1942. Admiral King enthusiastically approved Marshall's early invasion plan, in part because he believed it might result in the evacuation of German U-boat bases in France, forcing the Atlantic U-boats back to more vulnerable and inconvenient bases in Norway and Germany.

Not wishing to delay the commitment of American forces against the Germans a day longer than necessary, Roosevelt overrode Marshall and approved Gymnast, but he also authorized a buildup in the British Isles (Bolero) for Sledgehammer, or its larger alternative, Roundup, to take place in 1943. Others proposed that the Allies seize and fortify islands in the Atlantic off Africa (the Azores, the Canaries, Cape Verdes), but when King pointed out bluntly that "[w]e cannot do all all these things," the last proposals were tabled. these things," the last proposals were tabled.

In the end, the conferees settled on the following major courses of action * Support to the fullest extent possible the Soviet Union, which, with the assistance of the bitterly cold winter weather, had repulsed the Germans at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. The aid for the Soviets was to go the long way via the Cape of Good Hope to the Persian Gulf and also by the shorter route to Murmansk on convoys, sailing from Iceland and fully supported by Allied naval forces, including, when and if necessary, capital ships.

* Carry out Gymnast, the Allied invasion of French Northwest Africa, by May 25.

* Commence immediately an American troop buildup (Bolero) in the British Isles for Sledgehammer in 1942, or if that operation proved to be unfeasible, for Roundup in 1943. Five or six American infantry and tank divisions which had completed most of their training were to embark for Northern Ireland and England as soon as possible. These forces would also serve as a deterrent to a German invasion of the British Isles, still believed to be a possibility.

* Stop the Japanese short of Australasia. For that purpose, the Americans were to hold open a "line of communications" running from Hawaii to the South-west Pacific islands of Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia and commence a military buildup in those places and in Australia for counterattacks.

* Substitute the American Army's 5th Infantry Division for the American Marines and for the British forces in Iceland, enabling the Allies to redeploy those forces to active battlefronts.

The Arcadia decisions generated a huge demand for shipping: troopships, freighters, tankers, and large and small landing craft. Merely to meet their first and most urgent assignments, the Americans were to deploy over 100,000 men and a million tons of supplies to overseas bases in January and February alone. The later, larger-scale operations (Gymnast, Sledgehammer) were to require staggering numbers of troops, weaponry, landing craft, and tens of millions of tons of supplies. However, it soon became evident that there was nowhere near enough shipping to expeditiously carry out all these operations. The new chief of Army plans, Dwight D. Eisenhower, expressed the situation simply but forcefully in his diary: "Ships! Ships! All we need is ships! What a headache!" Churchill later put it more eloquently: "Shipping was at once the stranglehold and sole foundation of our war strategy."

As an emergency step, it was agreed to pool British- and American-controlled merchant shipping. Although the British merchant marine had suffered heavily in the twenty-eight months of war, as related, the losses had been offset to a considerable extent by new construction and acquisition of foreign shipping. Hence it was still very much a formidable force, amounting to some 20 million gross tons, but it was stretched thin to meet British commitments, and many of the ships were worn out or laid up awaiting battle-damage repairs. Sorely neglected in the prewar years, the American merchant marine numbered only about 1,500 ships of about 8 million gross tons. About a third of the ships were old and decrepit and another third were tankers unsuitable for troop and cargo movements. However, when pooled, the two merchant fleets (including tankers) amounted to almost 30 million gross tons.

Pooling assets helped, but it did not solve the acute shortage of shipping. As a result, the planners had to cancel or defer many of the courses of action agreed upon at the Arcadia Conference. One of the first casualties was Gymnast, the early invasion of French Northwest Africa. It was postponed indefinitely. The deployment of American Army troops to Iceland (Indigo) and to Northern Ireland (Magnet) had to be trimmed back and stretched out. Although the Americans continued to urge the buildup (Bolero) for a 1942 invasion of Occupied France (Sledgehammer), it, too, had to be canceled, replaced by the alternate plan, Roundup.

For the long term it was agreed at the Arcadia Conference to build merchant ships on an unprecedented scale. The U.S. Maritime Commission was ready.* At the time of Pearl Harbor, the six British "jeep" carriers under construction were At the time of Pearl Harbor, the six British "jeep" carriers under construction were Areher, Avenger, Biter, Dasher, Tracker Areher, Avenger, Biter, Dasher, Tracker, and Charger. Charger. The last was retained by the U.S. Navy for training air crews, replacing its only "jeep" carrier, The last was retained by the U.S. Navy for training air crews, replacing its only "jeep" carrier, Long Island Long Island, which was sent to the Pacific. Ten of the twenty-five newly ordered "jeep" carriers were to go to the Royal Navy, raising the number of Royal Navy "jeep" carriers under construction in American yards to fifteen. Later, American shipyards produced another twenty-three "jeep" carriers for Great Britain, making a total of thirty-eight, two of which went to the Canadian Navy. British yards produced four. To January 1, 1942, the Maritime Commission had produced 185 ships (54 tankers), of which 103 (27 tankers) were built in 1941. Before the Arcadia Conference, Roosevelt had directed the commission to build 12 million tons of new shipping: 5 million in 1942 and 7 million in 1943. During the Arcadia Conference on January 3, Roosevelt raised the goal to 18 million tons: 8 million in 1942 and 10 million in 1943. After the conference, on February 19, Roosevelt raised the goal yet again to 24 million tons: 9 million in 1942 (750 ships) and 15 million in 1943 (1,500 ships). When-and if-achieved, the last program was to increase the combined Anglo-American merchant fleet to nearly 50 million tons, not counting projected losses.

The early, urgent troop movements arising from the Arcadia Conference imposed a great strain on the U.S. Navy. Coming on the heels of the disasters in the Pacific and Far East, the loss of a troopship at sea would be not only another tragic setback but also an intolerable shock to the American public. King therefore continued in force the policy that all troopships were to sail in convoys and were to be very heavily escorted whenever possible by battleships and cruisers, as well as numerous destroyers, which were to maintain a continuous sonar watch and form virtually impenetrable walls of steel around the troopships. The naval historian Thomas B. Buell wrote that the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Chester Nimitz, "used almost the entire Pacific Fleet" to escort the first contingent of Marines to Samoa in mid-January. The naval historian Thomas B. Buell wrote that the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Chester Nimitz, "used almost the entire Pacific Fleet" to escort the first contingent of Marines to Samoa in mid-January.

The number and availability of American destroyers for convoy escort in the Atlantic in late 1941 and in 1942 soon became controversial issues and led to much acrimony between London and Washington and also between the American Army and Navy. Owing to the propensity of popular writers and even naval historians-especially British historians-to accept uncritically the assertions of one side or the other in these debates, an inexcusably distorted record has evolved. The facts are as follows.

Since the outbreak of war in Europe, the United States had been building warships as fast as possible. Owing to the long lead times required, Washington assigned highest priority to building ten new battleships, thirty-one Essex Essex-class fleet carriers, and numerous heavy and light cruisers and submarines. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, partly at the urging of London, the Navy added twenty-five "jeep" carriers for convoy escort to the urgent list. High priority had also been granted for the repair, modernization, and refitting of British warships, for the construction of six British "jeep" carriers, and about 300 other British vessels suitable for convoy escorts.*

As a result of these construction priorities and the transfer of the fifty four-stackers to Great Britain and Canada, when America declared war the Navy confronted an acute shortage of destroyers. In total it had 177, of which only about 100 were modern (post-1934). The others were four-stackers that had been in continuous service since World War I or had been demothballed and recommissioned recently. The American destroyers were divided three ways in December 1941: ninety-two in the Atlantic, seventy-two in the Pacific, and thirteen with the Asiatic Fleet. The American destroyers were divided three ways in December 1941: ninety-two in the Atlantic, seventy-two in the Pacific, and thirteen with the Asiatic Fleet.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, the ninety-two destroyers in the Atlantic were working very hard on various assignments. The hard work and rough North Atlantic seas resulted in the need for repairs, refits, and overhauls. Thus at any given time, about fourteen destroyers (15 percent) were in shipyards and not immediately available. The others were engaged in various special duties in December 1941, some of which bear repeating: * North Atlantic convoy escort between Canada and Iceland. Although the American destroyers rotated in and out of that assignment frequently, at all times about thirty were carrying out this task. About twenty-five of these made up the five American escort groups; the others were at Argentia or Iceland.

* As related, in December eight American destroyers were assigned to escort a special British troop convoy, WS 12X, from Halifax to Cape Town. These ships were tied up in that operation for most of December 1941, and several required refits thereafter. These ships were tied up in that operation for most of December 1941, and several required refits thereafter.

* As part of Task Force 19, composed of Arkansas Arkansas and and Nashville Nashville, six American destroyers were assigned to escort Troop Convoy 16 (TC 16) from New York to Iceland. Two of three American troopships aborted with mechanical problems; three British troopships joined from Halifax.

* As related, in December four American destroyers were assigned to escort the carrier Yorktown Yorktown and the light cruisers and the light cruisers Richmond Richmond and and Trenton Trenton to the Pacific. to the Pacific.

* In January, five American destroyers were assigned to escort the three older battleships to the Pacific. Two other destroyers went there as well.

* Numerous American destroyers were assigned to escort the remaining battleships, carriers, and heavy cruisers of the Atlantic Fleet, some of which were on standby to intercept a sortie of the super battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz and/or other big German ships or the Vichy French warships in Martinique. and/or other big German ships or the Vichy French warships in Martinique.

There was to be no dramatic increase of the Atlantic destroyer force in the months ahead. Construction of new destroyers was not yet in high gear. The Navy commissioned only two new destroyers in December 1941 and three in January 1942. Two more were to be commissioned in February and three in March. The new destroyers had to undergo weeks of shakedowns and workups before joining the fleet.

Worse yet, the Navy had no ships other than destroyers suitable for blue-water convoy escort. That it did not was a noteworthy and regrettable lapse. President Roosevelt and, later, naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison and others blamed the Navy.* But in his postwar memoir, King blamed Roosevelt. The official documentation of that era supports King overwhelmingly. But in his postwar memoir, King blamed Roosevelt. The official documentation of that era supports King overwhelmingly.

Early in the European war, the Navy's General Board-a group of senior admirals facing retirement, including King-recognized the need to acquire large numbers of vessels suitable for escorting convoys. As King wrote, the board agreed that fleet destroyers were "all right" for this purpose, but the board (like the Admiralty) deemed destroyers to be overpowered, overgunned, and too costly to produce in quantity for that task. Hence the General Board, King went on, sought a design "less elaborate than the destroyer." Believing it was "essential to build something something at once," at King's urging, the board recommended, as an emergency measure, quantity production of the new and proven 327-foot at once," at King's urging, the board recommended, as an emergency measure, quantity production of the new and proven 327-foot Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutter, but this proposal was rejected by the Navy and by President Roosevelt. Although they had excellent sea-keeping characteristics and crew habitability, the Navy considered them too big, too expensive, and a little too slow for convoy escort.

In London, meanwhile, the members of Admiral Ghormley's mission and the naval attaches closely analyzed British efforts to produce an ideal oceangoing convoy escort to serve in place of the Royal Navy's fleet destroyers and the inadequate corvettes. As related, the first effort-the Hunt Hunt-class destroyer-proved to be a flop. The second effort-a 290-foot, 1,100-ton, 21-knot "destroyer escort," or in British naval terminology, "frigate"-which was to be built in Canada and the United States under Lend-Lease, held much greater promise.

In early 1941, one of the senior assistant naval attaches in London, Edward L. Cochrane, a noted naval engineer, returned to Washington to take over the Bureau of Ships. On February 1 that year, Cochrane directed the design staff to rush blueprints for a slightly larger and improved version of the British frigate. With a length of 306 feet, a displacement of 1,400 tons, and a speed of 23.5 knots, this "destroyer escort" perfectly met the General Board's recommendation for a ship "less elaborate than the destroyer."*

When the blueprints were completed, the then Secretary of the Navy, Charles Edison (son of inventor Thomas Alva Edison), and Admiral Stark presented them to Roosevelt for approval. To their dismay, Roosevelt approved a British request to build fifty frigates, but denied authority for the Navy to produce destroyer escorts for itself. As King recalled in his memoir, when he-as Atlantic Fleet commander-asked Stark why "nothing was being done to provide adequate escort vessels," Stark replied that "presidential approval could not be obtained." Furthermore, Roosevelt continued to reject requests from Edison's successor, Frank Knox, and from Stark to build destroyer escorts right up to-and beyond-America's entry into the war.

There were several reasons behind Roosevelt's position: First, as King put it, Roosevelt was "something short of realistic in assessing the submarine menace." Based on his experience in World War I, Roosevelt had a "predilection for small antisubmarine craft," which could be mass-produced cheaply and quickly when the need arose. At his urging the Navy had contracted for prototypes of two such vessels: a 110-foot, 14-knot, wood-hull submarine chaser (SC) and a 173-foot, 22-knot, steel-hull patrol craft (PC). But neither was suitable for hunting modern U-boats in rough North Atlantic waters. At his urging the Navy had contracted for prototypes of two such vessels: a 110-foot, 14-knot, wood-hull submarine chaser (SC) and a 173-foot, 22-knot, steel-hull patrol craft (PC). But neither was suitable for hunting modern U-boats in rough North Atlantic waters. King's successor as Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Royal Ingersoll, put it this way in his oral history: King's successor as Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Royal Ingersoll, put it this way in his oral history: The submarine-chasers of which the Navy [eventually] had a lot were not very good. They were one of Mr. Roosevelt's fads: he was a small-boat seaman himself and loved to cruise on little things like the [165-foot presidential yacht] Potomac Potomac and he liked small ships. But the submarine-chaser was no craft to combat the submarine on the high seas. and he liked small ships. But the submarine-chaser was no craft to combat the submarine on the high seas.

Second, a mindless theory had taken deep root in Washington-fostered by Jerry Land at the U.S. Maritime Commission and others-that one way to defeat the U-boat was simply to produce merchant ships at a much faster rate than U-boats could sink them. Hence, in the early days of the war, Roosevelt awarded a higher priority to building merchant ships than to any convoy escorts other than the small SCs and PCs.

Third, in his desire to pit American soldiers against the Germans at the earliest possible time (Gymnast and/or Sledgehammer) and to meet requirements in the Pacific, Roosevelt awarded a very high priority for landing craft. The estimated numbers required were prodigious: 8,000 to 20,000 (large and small) for Sledgehammer and not less than 4,000 for the Pacific. Production of these vessels in American yards also took precedence over the British frigates and American destroyer escorts throughout most of 1942.

When America entered the war, Roosevelt ordered fast, mass production of SCs and PCs. The SC program was known as "Sixty Ships in Sixty Days."* The Navy had no objection to this directive. As anticipated, the little SCs and PCs proved to be necessary school boats for the tens of thousands of reservists coming into the Navy and for convoy escort in inshore waters and in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. But as the official papers of Knox, King, Stark, and Ingersoll reveal, the Navy deeply resented Roosevelt's stubborn and quixotic refusal to authorize mass production of the destroyer escorts required for rougher waters where enemy aircraft might be encountered. In one angry letter to Stark on the subject, Knox aptly characterized Roosevelt's policy as "Blind Folly." The Navy had no objection to this directive. As anticipated, the little SCs and PCs proved to be necessary school boats for the tens of thousands of reservists coming into the Navy and for convoy escort in inshore waters and in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. But as the official papers of Knox, King, Stark, and Ingersoll reveal, the Navy deeply resented Roosevelt's stubborn and quixotic refusal to authorize mass production of the destroyer escorts required for rougher waters where enemy aircraft might be encountered. In one angry letter to Stark on the subject, Knox aptly characterized Roosevelt's policy as "Blind Folly."

It is abundantly clear from these and other contemporary records-and it bears repeating-that the American Navy was fully alive to the urgent need for convoy escorts and repeatedly urged President Roosevelt to authorize them. He, not the Navy, was responsible for the prolonged delay in the production of the British frigates and American destroyer escorts. Roosevelt vastly underestimated the U-boat threat in Atlantic waters and authorized only the wrong kind of ships (PCs, SCs) to deal with the threat, both unfortunate-and ultimately scandalous-miscalculations for which Roosevelt avoided any blame, then or later. Statements to the effect that Admiral King in particular failed to anticipate the need for Atlantic convoy escorts or delayed the construction of same in favor of weaponry to fight in the Pacific are gross distortions.

Although the main task of the Coast Guard in prewar years had been search and rescue, it had served ably in the hunt for seagoing bootleggers in the 1920s. Therefore its 30,000 personnel (25,000 military; 5,000 civilians) and 168 named ships one hundred feet in length or larger were a welcome addition to the Navy. Most of these larger vessels, along with several big yachts, were to be pressed into service as convoy escorts. The sixty-seven larger Coast Guard vessels based in the Atlantic and Pacific were: The most formidable of these vessels was the aforementioned 327-foot Treasury Treasury class, named for persons who had held the post of Secretary of the Treasury. class, named for persons who had held the post of Secretary of the Treasury.* A modification of the Navy's discontinued A modification of the Navy's discontinued Erie Erie-class gunboat, the Treasury Treasury or or Secretary Secretary class had a top speed of 19.5 knots and a range of 7,000 miles at 13 knots cruising speed. Designed originally to accommodate a small seaplane for search and rescue purposes, the vessel was beamy (41 feet) and thus quite roomy. Some vessels were armed with two single 5/51 caliber guns; others with three single 5/51 caliber guns. All had depth-charge tracks; some had Y-type throwers. class had a top speed of 19.5 knots and a range of 7,000 miles at 13 knots cruising speed. Designed originally to accommodate a small seaplane for search and rescue purposes, the vessel was beamy (41 feet) and thus quite roomy. Some vessels were armed with two single 5/51 caliber guns; others with three single 5/51 caliber guns. All had depth-charge tracks; some had Y-type throwers.

A naval officer, Andrew G. Shepard, thought these seven ships made excellent convoy escorts. "They are considerably more roomy, so that they can carry a large number of survivors. They are better sea boats than destroyers, and lend themselves better to boat operations and rescues. In connection with picking up people, their hospital accommodations are superior to those of destroyers."

A NEW C CONVOY P PLAN.

The fifteen U-boats bound for American waters encountered hideous weather: brutal cold and mountainous seas. Horst Degen in the new Type VII U-701 U-701 reported that his first watch officer, who rashly went topside without a safety belt, was washed overboard and lost. Despite the hostile weather, Degen and two other new skippers of VIIs found-and attacked-shipping along the way. Between January 2 and 7, Degen fired eleven internal torpedoes at "a group" of ships and at two ships sailing alone. Nine torpedoes missed or failed, but two hit, sinking the 3,700-ton British freighter reported that his first watch officer, who rashly went topside without a safety belt, was washed overboard and lost. Despite the hostile weather, Degen and two other new skippers of VIIs found-and attacked-shipping along the way. Between January 2 and 7, Degen fired eleven internal torpedoes at "a group" of ships and at two ships sailing alone. Nine torpedoes missed or failed, but two hit, sinking the 3,700-ton British freighter Baron Erskine. Baron Erskine. Joachim Berger in Joachim Berger in U-87 U-87 sank the 8,200-ton British tanker sank the 8,200-ton British tanker Cardita. Cardita. Peter Cremer in Peter Cremer in U-333 U-333 fired four torpedoes at a 10,800-ton American tanker, but missed. None of the boats could down-load torpedoes from deck canisters in such weather. Degen made the entire Atlantic crossing with no internal torpedoes and was therefore compelled to evade two other ships he encountered. fired four torpedoes at a 10,800-ton American tanker, but missed. None of the boats could down-load torpedoes from deck canisters in such weather. Degen made the entire Atlantic crossing with no internal torpedoes and was therefore compelled to evade two other ships he encountered.

On January 8 Degen, Berger, and Cremer-and other boats-ran headlong into a winter hurricane. Cremer remembered: The waves were as high as houses. They struck the deck like an avalanche and swept away the few things they could seize on. Fenders and lines under the outer casing disappeared, supports cracked like matchwood. The boat listed up to 60 degrees-as the pendulum in the control room showed-so that it seemed one could plunge one's bare hands in the water, then righted itself like a self-righting doll, owing to its low center of gravity, only to tip over immediately to the other side.... The U-boat literally climbed the mountainous seas, plunged through the wave crests, hung for a moment with its stem in the empty air and plunged down the other side into the trough of the waves. When it buried its nose, the screws in the stern seemed to be revolving in the air. The stern dropped down, the screws disappeared in the maelstrom and the exhaust broke off with a gurgle. In the hard thumps, U-333 U-333 shuddered in every frame member like a steel spring.... shuddered in every frame member like a steel spring....

Degen wrote that he attempted to maintain a topside watch, but when a gigantic wave tore loose a bridge gun, which swiveled around and severely injured his second watch officer, he gave up the effort. Like Cremer, he dogged the conning-tower hatch shut and sat out the storm. For nearly a full week U-701 U-701 ran submerged, making twenty or thirty miles a day, coming up once or twice daily for brief periods to ventilate the boat and to recharge batteries. Finally the storm abated and Degen was able to repost a bridge watch, down-load torpedoes, and obtain a celestial fix, his first in ten days. ran submerged, making twenty or thirty miles a day, coming up once or twice daily for brief periods to ventilate the boat and to recharge batteries. Finally the storm abated and Degen was able to repost a bridge watch, down-load torpedoes, and obtain a celestial fix, his first in ten days.

These violent storms also caused grief in the Allied camp. They utterly scattered six westbound convoys: Outbound North 51 to 56. In the escort group of Outbound North 55, the American destroyer Mayo Mayo and the British destroyer and the British destroyer Douglas Douglas collided, and both ships had to abort with heavy damage. Iceland reported winds of 100 miles an hour, "the worst storm in fifteen years." The high winds drove the American cruiser collided, and both ships had to abort with heavy damage. Iceland reported winds of 100 miles an hour, "the worst storm in fifteen years." The high winds drove the American cruiser Wichita Wichita and six other vessels aground, destroyed five American Catalinas, and wrecked minefields and antisubmarine booms, DF stations, and military barracks. In addition, Iceland reported that the American "escort for [convoy] ON 56 [was] unable to sail." Storms badly damaged and six other vessels aground, destroyed five American Catalinas, and wrecked minefields and antisubmarine booms, DF stations, and military barracks. In addition, Iceland reported that the American "escort for [convoy] ON 56 [was] unable to sail." Storms badly damaged Broome Broome and and Dickerson Dickerson, two of the five destroyers of that group.

As the U-boats of the first wave drew close to the North American coast, B-dienst B-dienst picked up the distress call of a Greek vessel that had dropped out of a convoy 180 miles east of Newfoundland with a broken rudder. Donitz notified Reinhard Hardegen in picked up the distress call of a Greek vessel that had dropped out of a convoy 180 miles east of Newfoundland with a broken rudder. Donitz notified Reinhard Hardegen in U-123 U-123 and authorized him to investigate if he was no more than 150 miles away. Although Hardegen was over twice that distance from the stricken ship, he ignored the restriction and closed on the position, eager for a kill. But when he found the Greek, she was surrounded by a tug and two "destroyers," an enemy force that cooled Hardegen's ardor. He aborted the attack and resumed his slow, one-engine journey to New York, regretting this brash and useless expenditure of fuel. and authorized him to investigate if he was no more than 150 miles away. Although Hardegen was over twice that distance from the stricken ship, he ignored the restriction and closed on the position, eager for a kill. But when he found the Greek, she was surrounded by a tug and two "destroyers," an enemy force that cooled Hardegen's ardor. He aborted the attack and resumed his slow, one-engine journey to New York, regretting this brash and useless expenditure of fuel.

As a ruse de guerre ruse de guerre to conceal the westward movement of these boats, Donitz had assigned a new Type VII from Germany, to conceal the westward movement of these boats, Donitz had assigned a new Type VII from Germany, U-653 U-653, commanded by Gerhard Feiler, age thirty-two, to broadcast dummy radio signals, simulating a heavy concentration of U-boats in the Northwest Approaches. The British, however, were not fooled. By January 2, Rodger Winn had developed enough data to enable Washington to notify the Atlantic Fleet that "Information indicates that five or six [U-boats] are proceeding west to Newfoundland area" and that "activity [was] expected there shortly." Two days later Washington told the Atlantic Fleet: "Positions are not definite but six [U-boats] are thought to be moving west." In his weekly summary of January 5 for the Admiralty, Winn noted the deception tactics of U-653 U-653 and speculated that her purpose was in part to conceal the "concentration" of "six U-boats off Newfoundland." The next day, January 6, Washington told the Atlantic Fleet: "The westward movement of U-boats which was suspected is now confirmed but the number operating seems to be larger than was at first suspected. There are several [U-boats] probably already in the western Atlantic in the vicinity of Newfoundland" and "seven more" westbound. and speculated that her purpose was in part to conceal the "concentration" of "six U-boats off Newfoundland." The next day, January 6, Washington told the Atlantic Fleet: "The westward movement of U-boats which was suspected is now confirmed but the number operating seems to be larger than was at first suspected. There are several [U-boats] probably already in the western Atlantic in the vicinity of Newfoundland" and "seven more" westbound.

The reports from Winn remained equally vague until about January 12. In his weekly report to the Admiralty of that date, he stated: The general situation is now somewhat clearer and the most striking feature is a heavy concentration off the North American seaboard from New York to Cape Race.Two groups have so far been formed. One, of six boats, is already in position off Cape Race and St. John's and a second, of five boats, is apparently approaching the American coast between New York and Portland. It is known that these five U-boats will reach their attacking areas by 13th January.Five other U-boats are between 30 degrees and 50 degrees west, proceeding towards one or the other of the above areas, and may later be reinforced by another five westbound boats, making a total of twenty-one boats.

This report was nearly accurate. By January 12, the first boats had reached North American waters and were presumably to open hostilities, simultaneously, on January 13. However, not "five" but only three were headed for the "American coast between New York and Portland": Zapp in U-66 U-66, Hardegen in U-123 U-123, and Folkers in U-125 U-125. The other westbound boats that Winn reported (making a total of twenty-one) were the lead boats of the "second wave."

While still in Canadian waters that same day-January 12-Hardegen in U-123 U-123 reached a point about 110 miles southeast of Cape Sable, Nova Scotia. There he came upon the 9,100-ton British freighter reached a point about 110 miles southeast of Cape Sable, Nova Scotia. There he came upon the 9,100-ton British freighter Cyclops Cyclops, sailing alone. Although he was behind his scheduled arrival off New York and was not authorized to sink any ship under 10,000 tons before January 13, Hardegen could not let a tempting target such as Cyclops Cyclops get away. He closed and fired two torpedoes, and both hit. Radioing get away. He closed and fired two torpedoes, and both hit. Radioing SSS SSS (submarine attack), (submarine attack), Cyclops Cyclops went down with the loss of 100 of her 181-man crew. Without pausing to help the survivors, Hardegen resumed his course to New York, having tapped out the first beat on the drum. went down with the loss of 100 of her 181-man crew. Without pausing to help the survivors, Hardegen resumed his course to New York, having tapped out the first beat on the drum.

The Arcadia conference in Washington was still in session when Winn's appreciation of January 12 circulated. First Sea Lord Dudley Pound expressed the deepest concern. Except for the Canada-Iceland leg of the North Atlantic run, shipping in North American waters was not organized into convoys. Ships of convoys westbound from the British Isles normally dispersed well to the east of the North American coast (at about longitude 55 degrees west), sailing onward to destinations unescorted. Ships en route from the Caribbean or the United States East Coast to join eastbound convoys in Sydney and Halifax also sailed alone. Unless immediate measures were taken, this traffic, as well as the heavy local American coastal traffic, lay wide open to U-boat attack.

Obviously all this shipping would benefit from an extension of the convoy network to the East and Gulf coasts of the United States and to the Caribbean Sea. No naval authority in the Allied camp contested that view, but the hows and whens generated enormous heat. In dealing with this issue, most historians-especially British historians-have gone badly astray, depicting the Americans as dumb and inept or even criminally neglectful country cousins. Relying consistently on biased sources, historians have wildly distorted in particular the capabilities and views of Admiral King, distortions that have been allowed to stand for all too long.

The wildest of the distortions is that Admiral King had learned nothing from the British experience in fighting U-boats, or that he was so narrowly focused on the Pacific theater that he failed to appreciate, or deliberately ignored, the extent of the U-boat threat in the Atlantic. For these reasons, it was charged, King "refused" to initiate convoying or even "opposed" convoying.

Nothing could be further from the truth. For a full year, December 1940 to December 1941, first as commander of the Atlantic Fleet and then as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, King had had closer contact with German U-boat operations than any other senior officer in the U.S. Navy. He had established the naval bases in Argentia, Bermuda, and elsewhere to fight U-boats, and directed the occupation of Iceland and the formation of the naval and air bases there. He had deployed the Atlantic destroyer force and naval-air patrol squadrons in Argentia and Iceland to escort North Atlantic convoys. One of his destroyers, Niblack Niblack, had been the first American warship to attack a U-boat with depth charges. Another, Greer Greer, had been the first to exchange close fire with a U-boat. Yet another, Kearny Kearny, had been the first American warship to be hit by a U-boat torpedo and also the first to incur battle casualties. Still another, Reuben James Reuben James, had been the first American warship to be sunk by a U-boat. From this firsthand combat experience, and from his direct contacts with the Royal Navy, and from the flood of reports from Admiral Ghormley's mission and the American naval attaches in London, King had an unusually firm grasp of the menace to merchant shipping posed by U-boats.

In his capacity as Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, King not only organized and supported convoying on the North Atlantic run, but he also urged shore-based naval authorities to prepare to initiate convoying on the United States East Coast. Three weeks before before Pearl Harbor, King wrote a high-ranking naval authority: Pearl Harbor, King wrote a high-ranking naval authority: It seems to me that the time is near at hand near at hand when we shall have to begin to make up our own convoys at Boston, New York, Hampton Roads [Norfolk].... Each of these posts requires an organization to deal with the make-up of convoys, such as that now in force at Halifax and at Sydney, Nova Scotia, when ice permits. when we shall have to begin to make up our own convoys at Boston, New York, Hampton Roads [Norfolk].... Each of these posts requires an organization to deal with the make-up of convoys, such as that now in force at Halifax and at Sydney, Nova Scotia, when ice permits.I am told that organizations of the necessary scope and size and readiness do not exist. do not exist. May I therefore suggest that steps be taken at once-if not already underway-to get the indicated convoy ports organized, to which end it would be well to have first-hand knowledge of how Halifax is organized-and managed. May I therefore suggest that steps be taken at once-if not already underway-to get the indicated convoy ports organized, to which end it would be well to have first-hand knowledge of how Halifax is organized-and managed.*

At this same time, King proposed to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, several important changes to improve the North Atlantic convoy system. These proposals were designed to eliminate the Allied dependence on Iceland as an interim escort layover base because the weather was so hostile, the R&R accommodations were so inadequate, and handovers of convoys between escort groups were so uncertain, especially in winter weather.

The King plan would also release American destroyers for convoy duty on the United States East Coast. These ships would help overcome the "weakness of our coastal defense force," King wrote, and prepare for the "imminent probability of a [Axis] submarine attack."

It should not be necessary to stress that these documents portray King as a senior officer very much concerned with convoying, one doing his utmost to improve the existing system and urging all to prepare for convoying in United States coastal waters. And yet, in view of the lingering and absurd charges that Admiral King was ignorant of or hostile to convoying, the repetition is justified.

Inasmuch as many historians denigrate or ignore altogether the role of the Canadian Navy in the protection of Allied merchant shipping, it is also appropriate at this point to restate its substantial contribution. Of the escort vessels required to implement the King proposal, nearly 40 percent were to be Canadian. In addition, Ottawa was to manage the North Atlantic convoy escort and routing until the American Navy was in position to assume that duty.

The naval staffs in Washington and London offered several modifications to the King convoy plan, but the basic outline remained intact and was the subject of much discussion at the Arcadia conference. In these sessions, Churchill and Pound argued that there should be a single overall commander of all convoy escorts in the North Atlantic rather than three separate commands, as King proposed, and that the single commander should be the admiral at Western Approaches, Percy Noble. Under the existing plan, King commanded all American and Canadian escorts in the western Atlantic. He did not wish to relinquish "strategic control" and put the American ships under a British commander for logistical and other reasons, among them the possibility that when established, convoys on the United States East Coast might be commanded by Canadian or British officers.

King's adamant stand on this command-and-control issue vastly irritated the British. Although it was by then obvious that the Royal Navy was wearing out and was to be massively overshadowed by the American Navy in all waters, including the Atlantic, the British did not gladly surrender naval first place to the Americans. They continued to press hard for strategic control of all North Atlantic convoy escorts. Some American historians have suggested that the British falsely, deliberately, and continuously criticized King and the American performance in ASW to strengthen the case for British control, and that British historians, wittingly or unwittingly, have passed along these calculated criticisms as fact.

The King convoy plan was the subject of further intense discussions at a "Convoy conference" in Washington on January 22, following the Arcadia conference. The British again pressed for a single North Atlantic escort commander and urged the formation of convoys on the United States East Coast. Toward that end, they confirmed an offer by the Admiralty to lend the United States "upon completion" ten Royal Navy corvettes that were "in refit" or "under construction" to speed up the formation of convoys. King continued to oppose the idea of a single commander of escorts but gladly accepted the offer of ten corvettes inasmuch as he was doing everything possible to amass sufficient escorts for a convoy system in the Eastern Seaboard.*

Within forty-eight hours-by January 24-the conferees at the Convoy conference had hammered out and agreed to and distributed a modified version of the King plan. It preserved the existing multinational command structure, eliminated Iceland as an escort base, and adopted the "straight through" Great Circle route farther southward, thereby forswearing the ability to reroute convoys on evasion courses in the extreme northern latitudes. Under the plan, 200 warships (seventy destroyers, 130 corvettes) were to participate in the escorting of Halifax, Slow, Outbound North, and Outbound North (Slow) convoys. The Americans were to provide about thirty destroyers; the British about twenty-eight destroyers and sixty-one corvettes; and the Canadians thirteen destroyers and seventy corvettes or minesweepers.

In addition to the North Atlantic convoy escort, the King plan was designed to provide about twenty-four destroyers for other important escort duty. Fourteen destroyers (ten Royal Navy, four American) were to be reserved for escorting troop convoys. The other ten destroyers (all American) were to cadre the new convoy network on the United States East Coast.

When he received a copy of the foregoing convoy escort agreement, Dudley Pound was not pleased. Five days later, January 29, he cabled Washington to say he had "personally" examined the plan and had strong reservations in several areas. His grumpy comments, paraphrased: * He was "seriously disturbed" at the length of time the plan had been under discussion and the "resulting delay in putting our combined available escort forces to the most economical use.

* There should be a convoy system on the United States Eastern Seaboard and it was "important to lose no time in finding a scheme which will release the necessary forces for this purpose."

* The present system of "divided control" of escorts was "wasteful of our resources" and he urged "most strongly" that Western Approaches should exercise "strategic direction" at "the earliest possible moment." He stressed that such "strategic direction" in no way implied "unified control of Atlantic by British."

To this time the Admiralty was under the impression-or professed to be-that the United States had committed fifty-one destroyers to escort duty on the North Atlantic run. Thus, under the new King plan, it appeared that in proposing a total contribution of about thirty American destroyers, Washington was freeing up twenty-one destroyers that the Admiralty believed could be used to cadre a convoy network on the Eastern Seaboard, not merely the ten destroyers King had promised for that purpose. Thus Pound proposed in his message to Washington a different arithmetic distribution of vessels that would make available "twenty-one destroyers" for "U.S. East Coast convoys" of which "roughly twelve U.S. destroyers" should possibly become "immediately available for work on the American seaboard.

It should be stressed that in these exchanges at no time did King agree to the British assumption (or proffered assumption) that "twenty-one" American destroyers would be released to cadre East Coast convoys. To the contrary, King repeatedly stated that only ten American destroyers were to be allocated for that purpose. Nonetheless, ensuing official Admiralty accounts of the convoy agreement stated that, in fact, only ten American destroyers became available for the East Coast and the "discrepancy" (i.e., nonappearance of eleven American destroyers) "can only be explained on the assumption that the balance were employed elsewhere."*

The upshot of these prolonged and testy discussions was a modified King plan, which included these chief features: * That for North American waters, the Canadians were to provide six escort groups for the purpose of escorting North Atlantic convoys to and from Halifax and latitude 45 degrees west (West Ocean Meeting Point, or WESTOMP), which was about 1,100 miles one-way. To be designated the Western Local Escort Force (WLEF), this force (to supersede the Newfoundland Escort Force) was to consist of forty-seven ships: five Canadian destroyers, twelve Royal Navy destroyers "on loan," and thirty corvettes, mostly Canadian.

* That for waters of the British Isles, the Royal Navy was to provide a similar but smaller group to escort North Atlantic convoys to and from Northern Ireland and Scotland and 22 degrees west (East Ocean Meeting Point, or EASTOMP), eliminating the British layovers in Iceland. To be designated the Eastern Local Escort Force (ELEF), this group was to be composed of eighteen British destroyers.

* That for the long (1,800-mile) intervening space between WESTOMP and EASTOMP, the Allies were to create a multinational force, composed of fourteen close-escort groups, five American, five British, and four Canadian. To be designated Mid-Ocean Escort Force (MOEF), it was to be comprised of 143 ships: fifteen American destroyers; fifteen British destroyers; twelve Canadian destroyers, and 101 corvettes, fifty-two British, forty-nine Canadian. In addition, the Americans were to provide one Iceland-based group (five destroyers) to "shuttle" east-bound and westbound Iceland traffic (much of it bound to or from Murmansk) to and from the passing Slow Convoys and Outbound North (Slow) convoys.

The MOEF groups were to travel "straight across" the Atlantic from WESTOMP to Londonderry, Northern Ireland, and oppositely from EASTOMP to St. John's, Newfoundland. If granted the authority to go at best cruising speed (12-14 knots) from meeting points to bases and vice versa, by strictly following a Great Circle route, the MOEF forces could save sufficient fuel to make it "straight across" the ocean. American destroyers of the MOEF were to make one round-trip west-east to Londonderry and east-west to Canada, then return to Boston or Portland for maintenance and repairs and crew R&R.

After further discussions between Washington and London, and some minor modifications, King and Pound approved the King convoy plan on February 3 and 4, respectively. In his declaration of acceptance, King iterated that a single commander with "strategic control" of transatlantic convoys was "not acceptable" inasmuch as the existing setup of American control (over American and Canadian forces) in the western Atlantic was "working satisfactorily." In his declaration of acceptance, Pound expressed "considerable reluctance" on that point because "it perpetuates a system of dual control with all its proved disadvantages and delays." The British "will do all we can to make scheme work," Pound went on, "but I must be free to reopen question should I consider our [merchant-ship] trade is suffering."

As one measure to expedite the transfer of American destroyers from the North Atlantic run, at this time Admiral King directed that the six Atlantic-based 327-foot Treasury Treasury-class Coast Guard cutters be assigned formally and permanently to convoy-escort duty in that sector. In due course, five of these six big, roomy vessels (Bibb, Campbell, Duane, Ingham, Spencer) were to become workhorses on that convoy route, incomparably superior to the American, British, and Canadian four-stackers and in many ways more suitable for this task than modern American fleet destroyers.

Owing to the necessary transfer of eleven modern destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet in December and January and to a sudden and unforeseen heavy demand for destroyers to escort individual troopships and troopship convoys in the Atlantic, Admiral King was unable to provide the promised fifteen American destroyers for the MOEF plus five in Iceland. In fact, little by little, almost all American destroyers on the North Atlantic run had to be withdrawn to escort troopship convoys in the Atlantic, and for other urgent tasks, including assistance to the British Home Fleet.

British and Canadian historians, displaying no knowledge or understanding of the American policy of providing massive destroyer escort for troopships, have criticized King for leaving the escort of cargo or nontroopship convoys on the North Atlantic run to the Canadians and British. Typically, Canadian historian W.D.G. Lund wrote that "[w]hen the United States entered the war, all of the American destroyers were withdrawn immediately for service in other theaters, and by February 1942 there were only two United States Coast Guard cutters available for duty as convoy escorts."*

This assertion utterly ignores the fact that the strength of the Atlantic Fleet destroyer force actually remained fairly constant in 1942 and was ever-present in that theater, engaged mostly in escort of troopships convoys and capital ships, many working in behalf of the British. The issue boils down to this: In view of the scant resources, when faced with the challenge of escorting cargo or troopships, King chose to escort the latter, reflecting the American view that military lives were more precious than military cargo. One result, the American naval historian Robert W. Love, Jr., wrote, was that "[t]he Navy's defense of American troop shipping was one of the unalloyed victories of World War II."