The spies reported to Berlin that convoy Homebound Gibraltar 75 was preparing to sail at any hour. Upon learning this, Donitz directed the boats that had unsuccessfully chased the Outbound Gibraltar 75 south to the strait, plus others organized as group Breslau Breslau, to prepare to attack Homebound Gibraltar 75. While waiting, two of the six boats, Walter Kell in U-204 U-204, which had escorted the blockade runner Rio Grande Rio Grande to the Azores, and to the Azores, and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Reinhard Suhren in holder Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564, clandestinely refueled from the German supply ship Thalia Thalia in Cadiz. in Cadiz.

Aware from Enigma decrypts that six boats were lying in wait west of Gibraltar to intercept Homebound Gibraltar 75, the British delayed its sailing for nearly a week. During the wait, Kell in U-204 U-204 sank the 9,200-ton British tanker sank the 9,200-ton British tanker Inverlee; Inverlee; Opitz in Opitz in U-206 U-206 sank a 3,000-ton freighter; Hans-Werner Kraus in sank a 3,000-ton freighter; Hans-Werner Kraus in U-83 U-83 attacked a naval task force consisting of the ancient British carriers attacked a naval task force consisting of the ancient British carriers Eagle and Argus Eagle and Argus (serving as aircraft ferries), the cruiser (serving as aircraft ferries), the cruiser Hermione Hermione, and a screening destroyer. Kraus missed the carriers but he was credited, incorrectly, with sinking a destroyer. The task force escaped the gauntlet of U-boats unharmed.

The British mounted daily ASW sweeps to clear out the U-boats lying in wait west of the Gibraltar Strait. On October 19, after Kell in U-204 U-204 sank the tanker, the sloop sank the tanker, the sloop Rochester Rochester and the corvette and the corvette Mallow Mallow found and counterattacked Kell's found and counterattacked Kell's U-204. U-204. Coming up to assist, the corvettes Coming up to assist, the corvettes Bluebell and Carnation Bluebell and Carnation found an oil slick and the air and fuel flasks of a torpedo, but this was not deemed conclusive evidence of a kill. The Admiralty rated the attack as merely "promising," but, as was discovered later, found an oil slick and the air and fuel flasks of a torpedo, but this was not deemed conclusive evidence of a kill. The Admiralty rated the attack as merely "promising," but, as was discovered later, Rochester and Mallow Rochester and Mallow had sunk Kell's had sunk Kell's U-204 U-204 with the loss of all hands. with the loss of all hands.

Finally on the evening of October 22, Homebound Gibraltar 75 sailed. It consisted of seventeen ships and a massive escort of thirteen warships-four destroyers, one sloop, seven corvettes-and the 6,700-ton fighter-catapult ship Ariguani. Ariguani. Ten of the thirteen escorts were equipped with radar-three of them with the powerful new Type 271 centimetric-wavelength sets. In what Donitz logged as "excellent" work, German spies immediately reported the sailing and the exact number and types of ships in the convoy. Ten of the thirteen escorts were equipped with radar-three of them with the powerful new Type 271 centimetric-wavelength sets. In what Donitz logged as "excellent" work, German spies immediately reported the sailing and the exact number and types of ships in the convoy.

Donitz relayed to group Breslau Breslau (five boats) information on the sailing. Several of the boats made contact on the first night, but the escorts beat off the attacks. The destroyer (five boats) information on the sailing. Several of the boats made contact on the first night, but the escorts beat off the attacks. The destroyer Vidette Vidette got a radar contact on a U-boat at three and a half miles and ran in at flank speed to ram, firing her main battery, but the boat crash-dived. got a radar contact on a U-boat at three and a half miles and ran in at flank speed to ram, firing her main battery, but the boat crash-dived. Vidette Vidette mounted an attack, but her crew botched the depth-charge launching and the boat got away. mounted an attack, but her crew botched the depth-charge launching and the boat got away.

On the second night, October 23-24, three U-boats closed the convoy to attack. The corvette Carnation Carnation forced one boat under and held her down with depth charges, but the other two boats had better luck. Klaus Bargsten in forced one boat under and held her down with depth charges, but the other two boats had better luck. Klaus Bargsten in U-563 U-563 missed a freighter but hit the big missed a freighter but hit the big Tribal Tribal-class destroyer Cossack Cossack, blowing off her bow. In two attacks, Reinhard Suhren in U-564 U-564 fired all eleven internal torpedoes. He claimed hits on six ships for damage, but in reality he hit and sank three British freighters for 7,200 tons. The British tried mightily to save fired all eleven internal torpedoes. He claimed hits on six ships for damage, but in reality he hit and sank three British freighters for 7,200 tons. The British tried mightily to save Cossack Cossack but she sank under tow. but she sank under tow.

During October 24 and 25, the boats shadowed and reported while Donitz sent out several flights of Condors and brought up three Italian boats. A Catalina of British Squadron 202 spotted one of the Italian boats, Ferraris Ferraris, on the surface seventeen miles ahead of the convoy. Piloted by Norman F. Eagleton, the Catalina attacked with two depth charges and machine guns, but the charges failed to explode. Seeing the Catalina circling, the destroyer Lamerton Lamerton raced up, firing her 4" guns. Mistaking the destroyer for a corvette, raced up, firing her 4" guns. Mistaking the destroyer for a corvette, Ferraris Ferraris responded with her 3.9" gun and tried to run. But responded with her 3.9" gun and tried to run. But Lamerton Lamerton easily overtook her, whereupon the Italians scuttled and surrendered. easily overtook her, whereupon the Italians scuttled and surrendered.

By the night of October 25-26, when the convoy had been reduced to fourteen ships and ten escorts, three boats ran in to attack. Walter Flachsenberg in U-71 U-71 shot four torpedoes at a "destroyer" but missed. Other escorts pounced on shot four torpedoes at a "destroyer" but missed. Other escorts pounced on U-71 U-71 and depth-charged her for seven hours, Flachsenberg reported. Kraus in and depth-charged her for seven hours, Flachsenberg reported. Kraus in U-83 U-83 fired his last three torpedoes at three different ships, claiming all sank. In reality he hit only one ship, the fighter-catapult ship fired his last three torpedoes at three different ships, claiming all sank. In reality he hit only one ship, the fighter-catapult ship Ariguani Ariguani, which was saved and towed back to Gibraltar. While preparing to shoot, Bargsten in U-563 U-563 was intercepted, attacked, and driven under by the corvette was intercepted, attacked, and driven under by the corvette Heliotrope Heliotrope, but she, too, botched her depth-charge attack. Bargsten fired two torpedoes at a "destroyer" (perhaps Heliotrope Heliotrope) from extreme range and claimed a sinking, but his torpedoes also missed.

Group Breslau Breslau had shrunk to two boats by the evening of October 26: Bargsten in had shrunk to two boats by the evening of October 26: Bargsten in U-563 U-563 and Suhren in and Suhren in U-564. U-564. That night Bargsten fired five of his remaining six torpedoes at two freighters, but all missed. Having downloaded one torpedo from a deck canister, Suhren fired it at a freighter from extreme range. He claimed sinking a 3,000-ton ship, but he also missed. Using radar and intership radio to good effect, the destroyer That night Bargsten fired five of his remaining six torpedoes at two freighters, but all missed. Having downloaded one torpedo from a deck canister, Suhren fired it at a freighter from extreme range. He claimed sinking a 3,000-ton ship, but he also missed. Using radar and intership radio to good effect, the destroyer Duncan Duncan, the sloop Rochester Rochester, and the corvette Mallow Mallow counterattacked both boats and held them off. counterattacked both boats and held them off.

Although Bargsten and Suhren had only one torpedo between them, during October 27 both boats shadowed the Homebound Gibraltar 75 tenaciously. Their reports and several sightings by Condors enabled Donitz to vector one other boat to the convoy. She was Heinz-Otto Schultze's U-432 U-432, homebound from the attack on Slow Convoy 48. Homing on Bargsten's and Suhren's beacons, in the early hours of October 28 Schultze closed and fired at two freighters. He claimed both sank, but only the 1,600-ton Ulea Ulea, which had bravely attempted to ram U-432 U-432, went down.

Based on flash reports from all the boats, Donitz calculated that group Breslau Breslau had won a sensational victory over Homebound Gibraltar 75: a destroyer and seven freighters for 34,000 tons sunk by Kraus, Bargsten, and Schultze, six ships for 25,000 tons damaged by Suhren. The reality was much less, reflecting the smaller size of ships in these convoys: the destroyer had won a sensational victory over Homebound Gibraltar 75: a destroyer and seven freighters for 34,000 tons sunk by Kraus, Bargsten, and Schultze, six ships for 25,000 tons damaged by Suhren. The reality was much less, reflecting the smaller size of ships in these convoys: the destroyer Cossack Cossack and four freighters for 8,800 tons sunk, the fighter-catapult ship and four freighters for 8,800 tons sunk, the fighter-catapult ship Ariguani Ariguani damaged. Two boats were lost: Kell's damaged. Two boats were lost: Kell's U-204 U-204 and and Ferraris Ferraris As related, on the night of October 31, the U-96 U-96, commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock, who was outbound to a Greenland patrol line, came upon a convoy. This was Outbound South 10, consisting of thirtyfour big ships and six escorts bound for Sierra Leone. Since no other U-boats were close by, Kerneval authorized Lehmann-Willenbrock to attack the convoy alone. holder Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock, who was outbound to a Greenland patrol line, came upon a convoy. This was Outbound South 10, consisting of thirtyfour big ships and six escorts bound for Sierra Leone. Since no other U-boats were close by, Kerneval authorized Lehmann-Willenbrock to attack the convoy alone.

There was a full moon; the sky was cloudless. In such light a surface attack was perilous, but there was not enough light for a submerged attack. Making the best of an unfavorable situation, Lehmann-Willenbrock remained on the surface and fired four torpedoes at two big ships from "considerable" range. He claimed two hits "amidships" on each ship, but postwar records confirmed only one sinking, a 6,000-ton Dutch freighter. As Lehmann-Willenbrock hauled out to get off shadow reports, one of the escorts, the ex-Coast Guard cutter Lulworth Lulworth, spotted U-96 U-96 at two miles and counterattacked at high speed. Her gunfire drove at two miles and counterattacked at high speed. Her gunfire drove U-96 U-96 under and prevented another attack. under and prevented another attack. Lulworth Lulworth threw off twenty-seven depth charges but none fell close. Lehmann-Willenbrock evaded and later surfaced and got off another shadow report. threw off twenty-seven depth charges but none fell close. Lehmann-Willenbrock evaded and later surfaced and got off another shadow report.

An interested observer on U-96 U-96 was Lothar-Gunther Buchheim, a twenty-three-year-old "war artist" or propagandist. To then, artist Buchheim had depicted the U-boat war with oil paintings and charcoal sketches of returning boats and skippers from a shore billet. Equipped with Leica cameras and notebooks, he was making his first war patrol. Shot with a professional artist's eye, his photographs were remarkable-the best of the war. Many years after the war, Buchheim drew on his notes of this voyage to write a long novel, was Lothar-Gunther Buchheim, a twenty-three-year-old "war artist" or propagandist. To then, artist Buchheim had depicted the U-boat war with oil paintings and charcoal sketches of returning boats and skippers from a shore billet. Equipped with Leica cameras and notebooks, he was making his first war patrol. Shot with a professional artist's eye, his photographs were remarkable-the best of the war. Many years after the war, Buchheim drew on his notes of this voyage to write a long novel, Das Boot Das Boot (1973), which became a worldwide best-seller, the basis for a six-hour German television miniseries, and a taut and realistic 145-minute feature film of the same name, released with English dubbing as (1973), which became a worldwide best-seller, the basis for a six-hour German television miniseries, and a taut and realistic 145-minute feature film of the same name, released with English dubbing as The Boat. The Boat. Still later (1976) Buchheim published a "nonfiction" picture book, an impressionistic history of the U-boat war, using his own pictures and combining fact and fiction. Still later (1976) Buchheim published a "nonfiction" picture book, an impressionistic history of the U-boat war, using his own pictures and combining fact and fiction.

German submariners were delighted with Buchheim's wartime art, photographs, and heroic stories, but they were appalled by his postwar writings and the film. They denounced him for opening the film Das Boot Das Boot with scenes of a wildly drunken orgy at an officers' club in Lorient; for the negative, defeatist, anti-military tone of the book and film; and for the implied criticism of Donitz. Two U-boat skippers, Karl-Friedrich Merten and Kurt Baberg, were so enraged by Buchheim's "nonfiction" U-boat history that in 1985 they published an entire book ( with scenes of a wildly drunken orgy at an officers' club in Lorient; for the negative, defeatist, anti-military tone of the book and film; and for the implied criticism of Donitz. Two U-boat skippers, Karl-Friedrich Merten and Kurt Baberg, were so enraged by Buchheim's "nonfiction" U-boat history that in 1985 they published an entire book (Nein! So War Das Nicht) pointing out Buchheim's errors and/or misleading statements.

When Donitz received Lehmann-Willenbrock's shadow report, he deployed Condors and directed ten other inbound and outbound boats to home on U-96 U-96's beacons. The boats were organized into a new group, Stoertebecker. Stoertebecker. While they were converging, Lehmann-Willenbrock attempted a second attack on Outbound South 10 during the night of November 1-2, but the escorts, ex-American four-stack destroyer While they were converging, Lehmann-Willenbrock attempted a second attack on Outbound South 10 during the night of November 1-2, but the escorts, ex-American four-stack destroyer Stanley Stanley and ex-Coast Guard cutter and ex-Coast Guard cutter Gorleston Gorleston, and the British corvette Verbena drove U-96 U-96 off with gunfire and depth charges. off with gunfire and depth charges.*

Donitz had great hopes for the eleven boats of group Stoertebecker. Stoertebecker. But the group ran into a massive storm-vividly captured on film by Buchheim-which killed any chance for a coordinated attack. After two days of frustration, Donitz canceled the chase and directed the group to intercept a reported Homebound Gibraltar convoy. When this hunt failed, Donitz redirected the group to intercept the northbound convoy Sierra Leone 91, but that pursuit failed as well. Outwitted by British evasions and diversions and bedeviled by foul weather, fuel shortages, and mechanical problems, group But the group ran into a massive storm-vividly captured on film by Buchheim-which killed any chance for a coordinated attack. After two days of frustration, Donitz canceled the chase and directed the group to intercept a reported Homebound Gibraltar convoy. When this hunt failed, Donitz redirected the group to intercept the northbound convoy Sierra Leone 91, but that pursuit failed as well. Outwitted by British evasions and diversions and bedeviled by foul weather, fuel shortages, and mechanical problems, group Stoertebecker Stoertebecker was finally dissolved. It sank no ships. was finally dissolved. It sank no ships.

These several U-boat groups patrolling the eastern Atlantic waters in September and October of 1941 to shut down the flow of British supplies to the Mediterranean via the Gibraltar Strait also turned in quite disappointing results. They had mounted attacks against four Gibraltar convoys (Outbound 74 and 75; Homebound 73 and 75) and had sunk nineteen small ships for about 43,400 tons, plus the destroyer Cossack Cossack and corvette and corvette Fleur de Lys. Fleur de Lys. However, most of the damage in this arduous and risky campaign had been inflicted on the less vital Home bound convoys. To the end of November 1941, all these boats sank only five small Gibraltar-bound merchant ships totaling 8,700 tons and one ship for 6,000 tons from Outbound South 10. This was not much help to Rommel's However, most of the damage in this arduous and risky campaign had been inflicted on the less vital Home bound convoys. To the end of November 1941, all these boats sank only five small Gibraltar-bound merchant ships totaling 8,700 tons and one ship for 6,000 tons from Outbound South 10. This was not much help to Rommel's Afrika Korps. Afrika Korps.

THE C CRISIS IN THE M MEDITERRANEAN.

Of the initial wave of six U-boats that sailed from France to join Axis forces in the Mediterranean, the first, Heinrich Driver's U-371 U-371, entered the Gibraltar Strait on the night of September 21. It was a dangerous passage. British radar-equipped aircraft and surface ships based at Gibraltar patrolled the strait, which at its narrowest point is merely eight miles wide. To hasten the passage and to take advantage of the east-flowing current (Atlantic to the Mediterranean) Driver remained on the surface. His short signal signifying he had arrived safely in the Mediterranean evoked relief at Kerneval.

During the next two weeks the other five Mediterranean-bound boats also passed through the strait successfully. All patrolled with extreme caution, remaining fully submerged during daylight hours. None had any immediate successes, but Driver in U-371 U-371 earned the appreciation of the Italian Navy by rescuing forty-two survivors of an Italian patrol boat, earned the appreciation of the Italian Navy by rescuing forty-two survivors of an Italian patrol boat, Albatros. Albatros. Meanwhile, in the eastern Mediterranean, Italian administrative and technical personnel established a German submarine base at Salamis, Greece, an island near Athens. Meanwhile, in the eastern Mediterranean, Italian administrative and technical personnel established a German submarine base at Salamis, Greece, an island near Athens.

The first task of the Mediterranean U-boats was to shut off the flow of supplies to Tobruk, the Commonwealth enclave on the coast of Libya that Rommel had bypassed during his drive on Egypt. This was a difficult undertaking for the U-boats, working in unfamiliar waters. The British sent supplies at night in small coastal vessels and motorized barges that were hard to find, and because of their shallow draft, almost impossible to hit with torpedoes. Moreover, to avoid the heavy concentration of aircraft (both friends and foes) in those confined waters, the boats had to run submerged for unusually long periods each day, as in the Norway operations. The prolonged submergence built up air pressure inside the hull, which entered the torpedo depth-control mechanism via the as-yet-undetected leak, fooling the mechanism and causing the torpedoes to run deeper than set.

The early reports from the Mediterranean boats were not encouraging. While attacking a small vessel with the deck gun, Driver's U-371 U-371 was hit by counterfire and forced to abort to Salamis with wounded and damage. Hans Heidtmann in was hit by counterfire and forced to abort to Salamis with wounded and damage. Hans Heidtmann in U-559 U-559 fired seven torpedoes at small vessels and missed with all. Later he claimed sinking a "destroyer" by torpedo, but it could not be confirmed. Hans-Dietrich von Tiesenhausen in fired seven torpedoes at small vessels and missed with all. Later he claimed sinking a "destroyer" by torpedo, but it could not be confirmed. Hans-Dietrich von Tiesenhausen in U-331 U-331 claimed sinking a barge by gun, but it was only damaged. Wolfgang Kaufmann in claimed sinking a barge by gun, but it was only damaged. Wolfgang Kaufmann in U-79 U-79 fired four torpedoes at a 600-ton British gunboat, fired four torpedoes at a 600-ton British gunboat, Gnat. Gnat. Three passed under the ship; one hit. Kaufmann claimed a sinking, but Three passed under the ship; one hit. Kaufmann claimed a sinking, but Gnat Gnat, too, was only damaged. During the entire month of October, the six Mediterranean boats of the first wave sank only four small ships confirmed in postwar records: two 500-ton barges by Helmuth Ringelmann in U-75 and two coasters for 2,000 tons by Udo Heilmann in U-97 U-97.*

A second wave of six U-boats embarked from France to join the Mediterranean force in early November. The first two of these were Friedrich Guggenberger in U-81 U-81 and Franz-Georg Reschke in and Franz-Georg Reschke in U-205. U-205.

While Guggenberger was passing through the Bay of Biscay on the afternoon of October 30, a Catalina of British Squadron 209, recently withdrawn from Iceland and based in southwest England, caught U-81 U-81 on the surface. The pilot, Denis M. Ryan, circled to attack, but Guggenberger shot back and hit the Catalina. Thereupon a Hudson of British Squadron 53, also based in southwest England, arrived and attacked, dropping three depth charges. When Guggenberger crash-dived, Ryan in the Catalina attacked, also dropping three depth charges. The six charges caused so much damage that on the surface. The pilot, Denis M. Ryan, circled to attack, but Guggenberger shot back and hit the Catalina. Thereupon a Hudson of British Squadron 53, also based in southwest England, arrived and attacked, dropping three depth charges. When Guggenberger crash-dived, Ryan in the Catalina attacked, also dropping three depth charges. The six charges caused so much damage that U-81 U-81 had to abort to Brest. had to abort to Brest.

After hurried repairs, Guggenberger resailed for the Gibraltar Strait. During the period of new moon, November 11-12, U-81 U-81 and Reschke's and Reschke's U-205 U-205 passed through the strait undetected. passed through the strait undetected.

At that time the British Force H, having flown off forty-four aircraft to reinforce Malta, was returning to Gibraltar. That formation consisted of the fleet carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal, the ancient carrier Argus Argus (serving as an aircraft ferry), the old battleship (serving as an aircraft ferry), the old battleship Malaya Malaya, the cruiser Hermione Hermione, and seven destroyers.

Italian aircraft reported the return of Force H to Gibraltar. Donitz, in turn, directed Guggenberger in U-81 U-81 and Reschke in and Reschke in U-205 U-205 to likely positions along a track running east from Gibraltar. At dawn on November 13, Reschke in to likely positions along a track running east from Gibraltar. At dawn on November 13, Reschke in U-205 U-205 intercepted the formation and fired a fan of three bow torpedoes at intercepted the formation and fired a fan of three bow torpedoes at Ark Royal Ark Royal. After a run of three minutes, twenty-nine seconds, Reschke observed a flash of fire at Ark Royal Ark Royal and jubilantly assumed one hit, but he was mistaken. After a run of nearly nine minutes, Reschke and jubilantly assumed one hit, but he was mistaken. After a run of nearly nine minutes, Reschke heard heard two detonations and assumed a hit on a destroyer. That was also wrong. None of his three torpedoes had hit anything. two detonations and assumed a hit on a destroyer. That was also wrong. None of his three torpedoes had hit anything.

Later that afternoon Force H, thirty miles east of Gibraltar, steamed right at U-81 U-81 at 19 knots. Carefully raising his periscope in calm seas, at 4:29 at 19 knots. Carefully raising his periscope in calm seas, at 4:29 P.M. P.M., Guggenberger fired all four bow torpedoes-two at Malaya Malaya and two at and two at Ark Royal Ark Royal-from a very long range. A destroyer forced Guggenberger deep, so he could not observe the torpedo runs. At six minutes, six seconds and at seven minutes, forty-three seconds, he heard detonations. He assumed probable hits on Malaya Malaya and an "uncertain" target. and an "uncertain" target.

Guggenberger missed Malaya Malaya but one torpedo struck but one torpedo struck Ark Royal Ark Royal amidships on the starboard side. The explosion flooded a boiler room, killing one man. When amidships on the starboard side. The explosion flooded a boiler room, killing one man. When Ark Royal Ark Royal took on a heavy list, the crew initiated emergency damage-control measures and flooded tanks on the port side to compensate. For a time it seemed that the crew had matters well in hand; nonetheless, the new destroyer took on a heavy list, the crew initiated emergency damage-control measures and flooded tanks on the port side to compensate. For a time it seemed that the crew had matters well in hand; nonetheless, the new destroyer Legion Legion came alongside and took off all men except the damage-control parties. Two salvage tugs set out from Gibraltar to tow the wounded carrier to port. came alongside and took off all men except the damage-control parties. Two salvage tugs set out from Gibraltar to tow the wounded carrier to port.

The other destroyers of the force hunted-and found-U-81 and mounted a punishing counterattack. Guggenberger logged 130 depth charges, but he took and mounted a punishing counterattack. Guggenberger logged 130 depth charges, but he took U-81 U-81 deep and none fell close enough to cause serious damage. His report that night, together with that of Reschke in deep and none fell close enough to cause serious damage. His report that night, together with that of Reschke in U-205 U-205, led Donitz to believe that Guggenberger had hit Malaya Malaya, and that Reschke had hit Ark Royal Ark Royal, a remarkable and highly satisfactory day's work.

During the night of November 13-14, the two salvage tugs arrived and took Ark Royal Ark Royal in tow. The damage-control parties got up steam in one boiler, but suddenly an uncontrollable fire swept through the engine spaces. At 4:30 in tow. The damage-control parties got up steam in one boiler, but suddenly an uncontrollable fire swept through the engine spaces. At 4:30 A.M. A.M., the damage control parties conceded defeat and abandoned ship. At 6:13 A.M. A.M., November 14, the famous Ark Royal Ark Royal rolled over and sank. Her loss, announced that day by the Admiralty, was a grievous blow. Although only one man had died, the Royal Navy had no fleet carrier available to replace her, leaving the British Mediterranean naval forces without sea-based air cover. rolled over and sank. Her loss, announced that day by the Admiralty, was a grievous blow. Although only one man had died, the Royal Navy had no fleet carrier available to replace her, leaving the British Mediterranean naval forces without sea-based air cover.

Kerneval was confused. It assumed Reschke in U-205 U-205 had sunk had sunk Ark Royal Ark Royal and that Guggenberger in and that Guggenberger in U-81 U-81 had severely damaged had severely damaged Malaya. Malaya. The confusion was not sorted out until both boats put into the Italian submarine base at La Spezia later in the month. After studying the patrol reports, Donitz correctly credited Guggenberger with sinking The confusion was not sorted out until both boats put into the Italian submarine base at La Spezia later in the month. After studying the patrol reports, Donitz correctly credited Guggenberger with sinking Ark Royal Ark Royal-and gave him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for that feat-but incorrectly credited him with a hit on for that feat-but incorrectly credited him with a hit on Malaya. Malaya.

The destruction of the Ark Royal Ark Royal and the supposed hit on and the supposed hit on Malaya Malaya were sensational psychological achievements for the German submarine force. In a single blow, one U-boat operating in strange waters had delivered the Royal Navy a greater setback than had the entire Italian Navy in seventeen months of operations. But, in a larger sense, the victory was to prove disadvantageous to the German submarine force. It spawned the erroneous idea in Berlin that German U-boats could easily and cheaply gain control of the Mediterranean Sea. were sensational psychological achievements for the German submarine force. In a single blow, one U-boat operating in strange waters had delivered the Royal Navy a greater setback than had the entire Italian Navy in seventeen months of operations. But, in a larger sense, the victory was to prove disadvantageous to the German submarine force. It spawned the erroneous idea in Berlin that German U-boats could easily and cheaply gain control of the Mediterranean Sea.

Owing to the shortage of boats and to Berlin's diversions, the earlier decision to send only the most experienced skippers to the Mediterranean had been abandoned. The next two boats to attempt the passage through the Strait of Gibraltar were Hans Ey in U-433 U-433 and Johann Jebsen in and Johann Jebsen in U-565. U-565. Young Ey had made one Atlantic patrol; young Jebsen, two. Neither skipper had sunk a ship, although Ey had damaged one freighter. Young Ey had made one Atlantic patrol; young Jebsen, two. Neither skipper had sunk a ship, although Ey had damaged one freighter.

The two boats passed through the Gibraltar Strait without being detected on the night of November 15-16. Donitz directed them to operate close to Gibraltar, in the area near Guggenberger's U-81 U-81 and Reschke's and Reschke's U-205 U-205, to thwart the supposed British amphibious landing in Algeria. They were named group Arnauld Arnauld, in honor of the World War I submarine hero von Arnauld de la Periere, who was to take command of the Mediterranean U-boats at that time but was killed en route to Rome in a plane crash.

Fully aware of the mounting U-boat threat in the western Mediterranean, the British set a U-boat trap on November 16. They sailed a "dummy convoy" east from Gibraltar, composed of several empty merchant ships, escorted by two sloops and four corvettes. At least one of the corvettes, Marigold Marigold, was equipped with Type 271 centimetric radar.

That night, November 16, Marigold Marigold fell out of formation with a temporary engine defect. Later, while she was hurrying to catch up with the "convoy," Ey in fell out of formation with a temporary engine defect. Later, while she was hurrying to catch up with the "convoy," Ey in U-433 U-433 saw her sailing alone, very close to the place where saw her sailing alone, very close to the place where Ark Royal Ark Royal had sunk. Mistaking the corvette for a light cruiser, Ey attacked her, firing four torpedoes, all of which missed. Unaware that she was under attack, had sunk. Mistaking the corvette for a light cruiser, Ey attacked her, firing four torpedoes, all of which missed. Unaware that she was under attack, Marigold Marigold made radar contact on made radar contact on U-433 U-433 and ran in at full speed to ram, firing her 4" gun. She closed to 300 yards, but Ey crash-dived. and ran in at full speed to ram, firing her 4" gun. She closed to 300 yards, but Ey crash-dived. Marigold Marigold hastily threw off five depth charges by eye, but these did no harm. hastily threw off five depth charges by eye, but these did no harm. Marigold Marigold then stopped and quietly lay to, attempting to find then stopped and quietly lay to, attempting to find U-433 U-433 with hydrophones. with hydrophones.

Believing the "cruiser" had gone off, Ey came up to periscope depth to look around and surface. Marigold Marigold got a good sonar contact on got a good sonar contact on U-433 U-433 and attacked at once, dropping ten shallow-set depth charges. Some of these exploded directly below the U-boat, causing such terrible damage that Ey gave the order to surface, scuttle, and abandon ship. Seeing the boat come up astern, and attacked at once, dropping ten shallow-set depth charges. Some of these exploded directly below the U-boat, causing such terrible damage that Ey gave the order to surface, scuttle, and abandon ship. Seeing the boat come up astern, Marigold Marigold swung around to attempt a boarding, firing her main gun and smaller weapons. But the abandoned swung around to attempt a boarding, firing her main gun and smaller weapons. But the abandoned U-433 U-433 ran off on one diesel, zigzagging crazily and flooding rapidly. After she sank, ran off on one diesel, zigzagging crazily and flooding rapidly. After she sank, Marigold Marigold picked up Ey and thirty-seven of his men. Two other Germans, Ey reported, attempted to swim to the Spanish coast, thirty miles away. They were never found. Unaware of this loss, Donitz assumed ten U-boats were still operating in the Mediterranean. picked up Ey and thirty-seven of his men. Two other Germans, Ey reported, attempted to swim to the Spanish coast, thirty miles away. They were never found. Unaware of this loss, Donitz assumed ten U-boats were still operating in the Mediterranean.

Marigold's destruction of destruction of U-433 U-433 achieved fame of a sort in British naval circles. It was the first U-boat kill in which Type 271 centimetric radar played a key role. achieved fame of a sort in British naval circles. It was the first U-boat kill in which Type 271 centimetric radar played a key role.

Taking advantage of intercepted Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Enigma traffic, which revealed that Rommel intended to launch an all-out attack on the bypassed Commonwealth garrison at Tobruk, on November 18 the British Eighth Army unleashed its long-planned, all-out offensive, Crusader, from Sidi Barrani, Egypt. Caught by surprise, the Germans and Italians fought stubbornly, but the weight of the British attack pushed them back. The offensive, together with the lingering belief that the British intended to make an amphibious landing behind Rommel in Algeria to trap Axis forces in a pincer, led Hitler to declare an "emergency." The Enigma traffic, which revealed that Rommel intended to launch an all-out attack on the bypassed Commonwealth garrison at Tobruk, on November 18 the British Eighth Army unleashed its long-planned, all-out offensive, Crusader, from Sidi Barrani, Egypt. Caught by surprise, the Germans and Italians fought stubbornly, but the weight of the British attack pushed them back. The offensive, together with the lingering belief that the British intended to make an amphibious landing behind Rommel in Algeria to trap Axis forces in a pincer, led Hitler to declare an "emergency." The Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine was to make every conceivable effort to save Rommel's was to make every conceivable effort to save Rommel's Afrika Korps; Afrika Korps; above all the German Navy was to put an end to the British attacks on Rommel's supply ships, no matter what the cost. above all the German Navy was to put an end to the British attacks on Rommel's supply ships, no matter what the cost.

In response, Raeder and the OKM reached a fateful decision. As related, every available U-boat of the Atlantic operational force was to be committed to the task of saving Rommel and gaining control of the Mediterranean Basin. The five boats then on Arctic duty, based in northern Norway, were transferred to the Atlantic force, replaced by four new boats from Kiel. In all (Raeder reported to Hitler), fifty U-boats were to be assigned to support Rommel: twenty Type VIIs in the eastern Mediterranean and thirty boats in the western Mediterranean and/or just outside the Atlantic gateway to the Strait of Gibraltar.

The Admiralty saw from naval Enigma intercepts what was afoot and took countermeasures. Coastal Command intensified patrols in the Bay of Biscay with radar-equipped aircraft based in southwest England and Gibraltar. Derby House transferred numerous radar-equipped escorts from the North Atlantic run to Gibraltar. A radar-equipped Swordfish squadron formerly based on the carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal shifted to a land base in Gibraltar. The newly arrived, radar-equipped escorts and aircraft patrolled the Gibraltar Strait day and night to block the passage of U-boats. shifted to a land base in Gibraltar. The newly arrived, radar-equipped escorts and aircraft patrolled the Gibraltar Strait day and night to block the passage of U-boats.

Of the nine U-boats already inside the Mediterranean, not all were available for this emergency. The U-boat refit and repair facilities at Salamis and La Spezia were not fully operational and many delays were incurred. The first boat to sail on a second Mediterranean patrol was von Tiesenhausen in U-331 U-331, leaving from Salamis. His first task was to land and recover a German commando party at R'as Gibeisa, Libya, which was to blow up a British military train. Von Tiesenhausen put the commandos ashore, but the British caught them in the act.

While patrolling submerged near the British naval base at Alexandria, Egypt, on the morning of November 25, von Tiesenhausen's hydrophone operator reported heavy screws. Running down the bearing, von Tiesenhausen came to periscope depth and saw a heart-stopping sight: the battleships Queen Elizabeth, Barham Queen Elizabeth, Barham, and Valiant Valiant, escorted by about eight destroyers. He set up on the Queen Elizabeth Queen Elizabeth, but she eluded him and he was forced to turn to the next behemoth in line. This was the 31,100-ton Barham Barham, but the ship so massively filled his periscope lens, he could not identify her. He fired a full salvo of four bow torpedoes and went very, very deep-to 820 feet, a record.

Barham-badly damaged by Lemp in U-30 U-30 in December 1939-was in the process of shifting formation. Three of von Tiesenhausen's four torpedoes hit her broadside, one or more in or near a magazine. in December 1939-was in the process of shifting formation. Three of von Tiesenhausen's four torpedoes hit her broadside, one or more in or near a magazine. Barham Barham blew up with a thunderous explosion and sank within three minutes, taking down her skipper and about half the crew; in all, 862 men died. After Prien's blew up with a thunderous explosion and sank within three minutes, taking down her skipper and about half the crew; in all, 862 men died. After Prien's Royal Oak Royal Oak, she was the second battleship to be sunk by a U-boat, the first while at sea. The Admiralty withheld the news of her loss for many weeks.

Von Tiesenhausen did not see or hear the results of his attack. That night he reported to Donitz that he had "torpedoed a battleship" but the outcome was unknown. Absent evidence of a sinking or an announcement from the Admiralty or inside information from B-dienst B-dienst, Donitz was restrained in his praise, logging only that the attack was "very satisfactory." However, when the British finally announced the loss of Barham Barham, Donitz awarded von Tiesenhausen a Ritterkreuz. Ritterkreuz.

In the last week of November, ten more boats headed for the Mediterranean via the Gibraltar Strait. The first five got through but two of those were lost shortly thereafter.

The first loss was U-95 U-95, commanded by the veteran Gerd Schreiber, who had commissioned the boat in August 1940 and had commanded her ever since. After passing through the strait shortly after midnight on November 28, the bridge watch spotted an "object" in the dark. The object was a Dutch submarine in British service, 0-21 0-21, commanded by Johannes Frans van Dulm, returning to Gibraltar from a luckless patrol off Italy.

Schreiber in U-95 U-95 went to battle stations. Believing the other submarine might be a friendly U-boat or an Italian boat, he was hesitant to shoot. He made three undetected approaches, aborting each. On the fourth, he flashed the current German recognition signal. This strange signal galvanized went to battle stations. Believing the other submarine might be a friendly U-boat or an Italian boat, he was hesitant to shoot. He made three undetected approaches, aborting each. On the fourth, he flashed the current German recognition signal. This strange signal galvanized 0-21 0-21. Van Dulm went to battle stations, set up on U-95 U-95, and fired a stern tube. It missed, but a second stern torpedo hit U-95 U-95 and blew her to pieces. Cautiously approaching the wreckage, van Dulm found Schreiber, three other officers, and eight men in the water. He fished them out and took them to Gibraltar. and blew her to pieces. Cautiously approaching the wreckage, van Dulm found Schreiber, three other officers, and eight men in the water. He fished them out and took them to Gibraltar.

At Gibraltar, Schreiber was incarcerated with Hans Ey, skipper of U-433 U-433, which had been sunk two weeks earlier. Schreiber and Ey discovered a weak link in the British security chain and escaped, intending to find sanctuary on Spanish soil. But the British recaptured both skippers and sent them on to London.

The second loss inside the Mediterranean was Ottokar Paulshen's U-557. U-557.* After passing through the strait on the night of November 26, Paulshen was directed to patrol in the eastern Mediterranean, off Alexandria, in company with the Italian submarine After passing through the strait on the night of November 26, Paulshen was directed to patrol in the eastern Mediterranean, off Alexandria, in company with the Italian submarine Dagabur. Dagabur. On the night of December 14, On the night of December 14, Dagabur Dagabur, commanded by Alberto Torri, found the 5,200-ton British light cruiser Galatea Galatea, inbound to Alexandria. Torri fired two torpedoes at the cruiser and "heard" two detonations. Whether or not he hit her was never resolved. Paulshen in U-557 U-557 joined the attack and shot. Shortly thereafter, joined the attack and shot. Shortly thereafter, Galatea Galatea went down. went down.

Following this victory, Paulshen set a course for the new U-boat base at Salamis. Late in the evening of December 16, while he was passing about fifteen miles west of Crete, the Italian PT boat Orione Orione sighted him. Mistaking sighted him. Mistaking U-557 U-557 for an Allied submarine, for an Allied submarine, Orione Orione came at Paulshen full speed with machine guns blazing and rammed. Badly holed, the came at Paulshen full speed with machine guns blazing and rammed. Badly holed, the U-557 U-557 went down; went down; Orione Orione, also badly damaged, barely survived the encounter. When the Germans learned of the attack the next day, they correctly surmised that Orione Orione had attacked had attacked U-557 U-557 and sent air patrols from Crete to search for survivors. None was found. and sent air patrols from Crete to search for survivors. None was found.

The next five boats sailing to the Mediterranean in late November, during the period of a full moon, encountered the intensified British ASW measures. None of the five made it through the strait. In brief: * After refueling in Vigo, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Lehmann-Willenbrock in holder Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 was caught in the strait by one of the radar-equipped Swordfish, formerly of was caught in the strait by one of the radar-equipped Swordfish, formerly of Ark Royal Ark Royal. The plane dropped two 450-pound depth charges from low altitude. Hit and severely damaged, and hounded by six surface craft, Lehmann-Willenbrock bottomed at 180 to 240 feet for about five hours to make repairs, then aborted to France. Still on board U-96 U-96, the propagandist Lothar-Gunther Buchheim drew upon the retreat of U-96 for the climax of his novel, Das Boot Das Boot, greatly exaggerating the incident, as well as the British air threat to the U-boat pens in France. The film and miniseries did likewise.*

* Siling from St. Nazaire on November 29, Herbert Opitz in U-206 struck a mine on the same day and sank with the loss of all hands. The British mistakenly credited the loss of U-206 U-206 to a Whitley of British Squadron 502 on November 30, but in a postwar assessment the credit was withdrawn. When she failed to respond to queries, Donitz correctly assumed she had struck a mine off St. Nazaire and demanded that the OKM intensify minesweeping on the French coast. to a Whitley of British Squadron 502 on November 30, but in a postwar assessment the credit was withdrawn. When she failed to respond to queries, Donitz correctly assumed she had struck a mine off St. Nazaire and demanded that the OKM intensify minesweeping on the French coast.

* Sailing from Brest, Klaus Bargsten in U-563 U-563 (who had sunk the destroyer (who had sunk the destroyer Cossack Cossack) was caught by a Whitley of Squadron 502 in the Bay of Biscay. Attacking out of the sun, the pilot, W. W. Cave, dropped six depth charges which so damaged the boat that she could not dive. After its depth-charge attack, the plane strafed U-563 U-563 five times, wounding Bargsten (two bullets in his shoulder) and two of his men. five times, wounding Bargsten (two bullets in his shoulder) and two of his men.

Bargsten radioed for help. In response, Donitz ordered Opitz's sunk U-206 U-206 and another Mediterranean-bound boat, Walter Flachsenberg in and another Mediterranean-bound boat, Walter Flachsenberg in U-71 U-71, to assist U-563 U-563. However, Flachsenberg incurred an engine breakdown and was himself forced to abort to France. The wounded Bargsten got U-563 U-563 into Lorient, but the boat was so smashed up that she had to return to Germany for rebuilding. Taking advantage of inclement weather, Bargsten made the voyage roundabout the British Isles on the surface without being detected. Upon reaching Germany, he and his crew were given a long Christmas leave and a new boat. Pilot Cave and his copilot, A. E. Coates, a New Zealander, were both killed later in the war. into Lorient, but the boat was so smashed up that she had to return to Germany for rebuilding. Taking advantage of inclement weather, Bargsten made the voyage roundabout the British Isles on the surface without being detected. Upon reaching Germany, he and his crew were given a long Christmas leave and a new boat. Pilot Cave and his copilot, A. E. Coates, a New Zealander, were both killed later in the war.

* Sailing from Brest, Gunther Krech in U-558 U-558 attempted a passage through the strait on the night of December 1-2, in the light of a nearly full moon. Radar-equipped British aircraft detected Krech west of the strait and two of them attacked. When the aircraft called in surface vessels, the sloop attempted a passage through the strait on the night of December 1-2, in the light of a nearly full moon. Radar-equipped British aircraft detected Krech west of the strait and two of them attacked. When the aircraft called in surface vessels, the sloop Stork Stork and the corvette and the corvette Samphire Samphire responded, hurling off depth charges. The British assessed the combined air-surface ship attack as inconclusive, but in fact, responded, hurling off depth charges. The British assessed the combined air-surface ship attack as inconclusive, but in fact, U-558 U-558 was badly damaged and Krech was forced to abort to France. was badly damaged and Krech was forced to abort to France.

After a temporary reverse, the British Eighth Army regrouped and drove Axis forces farther west in Libya and liberated Tobruk. Fifteen more U-boats, some of them commanded by skippers on first Atlantic patrols, and some of which refueled in Vigo, headed for the Strait of Gibraltar.

* Still on his first patrol out of Germany, Jurgen Konnenkamp in U-375 U-375 sailed directly to the strait. Trapped and depth-charged by the British ASW forces on the night of December 6, Konnenkamp was forced to retreat into the Atlantic, where he told Donitz he would try again "on a more favorable night." Two nights later, December 9, he made it. sailed directly to the strait. Trapped and depth-charged by the British ASW forces on the night of December 6, Konnenkamp was forced to retreat into the Atlantic, where he told Donitz he would try again "on a more favorable night." Two nights later, December 9, he made it.

* Sailing from Brest December 3, on his second patrol, Alfred Schlieper in U-208 U-208 cleared the Bay of Biscay, but was never heard from again. It was later determined that on December 7 cleared the Bay of Biscay, but was never heard from again. It was later determined that on December 7 U-208 U-208 was detected, depth-charged, and sunk by the British destroyers was detected, depth-charged, and sunk by the British destroyers Hesperus Hesperus and and Harvester Harvester, seventy miles west of the strait. There were no survivors.

* Sailing from St. Nazaire December 7, on his second patrol, Heinrich Heinsohn in U-573 U-573 was forced to abort with a leaking torpedo tube. Resailing on December 11, was forced to abort with a leaking torpedo tube. Resailing on December 11, U-573 U-573 passed through the strait on December 18. passed through the strait on December 18.

* Still on his first patrol out of Germany, Johannes Liebe in U-332 U-332 received orders to refuel in Vigo, then go into the Mediterranean. While approaching the coast on December 6, received orders to refuel in Vigo, then go into the Mediterranean. While approaching the coast on December 6, U-332 U-332 was detected and bombed by a Catalina of British Squadron 202, piloted by Hugh Garnell, who called in ASW surface ships. Liebe escaped these pursuers, but two days later, December 9, another British aircraft found and bombed or depth-charged was detected and bombed by a Catalina of British Squadron 202, piloted by Hugh Garnell, who called in ASW surface ships. Liebe escaped these pursuers, but two days later, December 9, another British aircraft found and bombed or depth-charged U-332 U-332, inflicting such heavy damage that Liebe was forced to abort to France. Later in the war, airman Garnell was killed in the South Pacific.

* At sea on his second Atlantic patrol, Gunther Heydemann in U-575 U-575 also received orders to refuel in Vigo and proceed to the Mediterranean. While approaching the coast on December 9, he, too, was detected and depth-charged. He refueled in Vigo, per orders, on the night of December 11, but while doing so Heydemann discovered the depth-charge damage was so severe that he had to abort to France for repairs. also received orders to refuel in Vigo and proceed to the Mediterranean. While approaching the coast on December 9, he, too, was detected and depth-charged. He refueled in Vigo, per orders, on the night of December 11, but while doing so Heydemann discovered the depth-charge damage was so severe that he had to abort to France for repairs.

* Sailing from St. Nazaire on his third patrol, Hans Peter Hinsch in U-569 U-569 attempted to transit the strait on the night of December 16, during bright moonlight. British aircraft detected Hinsch in the strait and drove him under with depth charges. The boat was so badly damaged that Hinsch was also forced to return to France for repairs. attempted to transit the strait on the night of December 16, during bright moonlight. British aircraft detected Hinsch in the strait and drove him under with depth charges. The boat was so badly damaged that Hinsch was also forced to return to France for repairs.

* Sailing from Brest, Hans-Heinz Linder in U-202 U-202 had orders to go through the strait after the full moon. He reached the western approaches to the strait during the night of December 21, but he was forced to return to France. He did not sail again until March. had orders to go through the strait after the full moon. He reached the western approaches to the strait during the night of December 21, but he was forced to return to France. He did not sail again until March.

* Sailing from Kiel after a refit, the ex-Arctic boat U-451 U-451, commanded by Eberhard Hoffmann, making his first Atlantic patrol, was ordered into Lorient for a quick refueling before going through the strait. After three days in Lorient, Hoffmann put out to sea, arriving off the strait in the early hours of December 21. As Hoffmann was preparing to enter, one of the radar-equipped Swordfish, formerly of Squadron 812 on Ark Royal Ark Royal, detected U-451 U-451 at three and a half miles. Descending to sixty feet, the Swordfish dropped three 250-pound depth charges, all set to detonate at a depth of fifty feet. at three and a half miles. Descending to sixty feet, the Swordfish dropped three 250-pound depth charges, all set to detonate at a depth of fifty feet.

Hoffmann crash-dived, unwittingly leaving his first watch officer, Walter Kohler, crew of 1934, topside. Alerted by flares from the Swordfish, the British corvette Myosotis Myosotis rushed to the area of the attack. She found a thick oil slick but could get no radar or sonar contact. Hearing shouts from Kohler, the British found him and hauled him aboard rushed to the area of the attack. She found a thick oil slick but could get no radar or sonar contact. Hearing shouts from Kohler, the British found him and hauled him aboard Myosotis Myosotis. Kohler did not know if U-451 U-451 had been sunk or had escaped. Thus his rescue and capture could not be regarded as proof of a kill. But kill it had been; nothing was ever heard from had been sunk or had escaped. Thus his rescue and capture could not be regarded as proof of a kill. But kill it had been; nothing was ever heard from U-451 U-451 again. She was the first German U-boat to be sunk at night by an aircraft. again. She was the first German U-boat to be sunk at night by an aircraft.*

* Sailing from France on his second patrol, Unno von Fischel in U-374 U-374 passed through the strait on the night of December 10-11. Kerneval logged a desperate message from von Fischel stating that he had been detected, that he was being chased by "four destroyers," and that he required "immediate aircraft aid." The last was perhaps a garble; von Fischel well knew that German "aircraft aid" in the strait was next to impossible. Thereafter he apparently decided to attack his attackers. On December 11 he sank a 500-ton patrol vessel, passed through the strait on the night of December 10-11. Kerneval logged a desperate message from von Fischel stating that he had been detected, that he was being chased by "four destroyers," and that he required "immediate aircraft aid." The last was perhaps a garble; von Fischel well knew that German "aircraft aid" in the strait was next to impossible. Thereafter he apparently decided to attack his attackers. On December 11 he sank a 500-ton patrol vessel, Rosabelle Rosabelle, and the gallant 500-ton trawler Lady Shirley Lady Shirley, which two months earlier had sunk Wilhelm Kleinschmidt's U-111 U-111 in an open-ocean gun action. These victories enabled von Fischel to shake the other pursuers and enter the Mediterranean. in an open-ocean gun action. These victories enabled von Fischel to shake the other pursuers and enter the Mediterranean.

By the third week of December thirty-seven U-boats had set off for the Mediterranean via the Gibraltar Strait. Three boats had been lost approaching or attempting the passage (U-206, U-208, U-451); eight had turned back, six with severe battle damage and two with mechanical or other problems. Thus only twenty-six of the thirty-seven boats got inside the Mediterranean Sea and three of these, U-95, U-433 U-95, U-433, and U-557 U-557, had been lost almost immediately, leaving twenty-three.

While attempting to attack separate convoys in the eastern Mediterranean, two more U-boats were lost to British escort forces in December. On December 23 the destroyers Hasty Hasty and and Hotspur Hotspur depth-charged and forced Wolfgang Kaufmann in depth-charged and forced Wolfgang Kaufmann in U-79 U-79 to scuttle. Kaufmann and all forty-three other crewmen were rescued. On December 28 the destroyer to scuttle. Kaufmann and all forty-three other crewmen were rescued. On December 28 the destroyer Kipling Kipling depth-charged Helmut Ringelmann in depth-charged Helmut Ringelmann in U-75 U-75 and forced him to scuttle. Ringelmann and about eighteen others were killed in the action; and forced him to scuttle. Ringelmann and about eighteen others were killed in the action; Kipling Kipling fished out twenty-five Germans. These two losses reduced the number of U-boats patrolling inside the Mediterranean to twenty-one. fished out twenty-five Germans. These two losses reduced the number of U-boats patrolling inside the Mediterranean to twenty-one.

In addition to sinking the carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal, the battleship Barham Barham, and the light cruiser Galatea Galatea, the U-boats operating in the Mediterranean in November and December, 1941, sank two other warships (the Australian sloop Parramatta Parramatta and the British corvette and the British corvette Salvia Salvia) and eight freighters or tankers for about 30,500 tons. These losses, together with a successful attack by Italian frogmen on the battleships Queen Elizabeth Queen Elizabeth and and Valiant Valiant in Alexandria harbor, in Alexandria harbor, the loss of the cruiser the loss of the cruiser Neptune Neptune and damage to the cruiser and damage to the cruiser Aurora Aurora by Axis mines, and the transfer of German airpower ( by Axis mines, and the transfer of German airpower (Luftflotte 2) from the Russian front to the Mediterranean, temporarily broke the Royal Navy's command of the Mediterranean Sea. It was unable to provide the British Eighth Army flank support, and partly as a result, the British offensive, Crusader, bogged down after the capture of Benghazi in Libya. The Axis forces dug in at El Agheila and another stalemate in the North African desert war ensued. 2) from the Russian front to the Mediterranean, temporarily broke the Royal Navy's command of the Mediterranean Sea. It was unable to provide the British Eighth Army flank support, and partly as a result, the British offensive, Crusader, bogged down after the capture of Benghazi in Libya. The Axis forces dug in at El Agheila and another stalemate in the North African desert war ensued.

In the early stages of Mediterranean U-boat operations, Donitz controlled the boats from Kerneval. He assumed that the boats were to return to the Atlantic when the military situation in North Africa turned in favor of the Axis. However, on December 7, the OKM transferred control of the boats to the German high command in Rome, headed by airman Albert Kesselring. His senior naval adviser (and "liaison" to the Italian Navy) was Eberhard Weichold. Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Viktor Oehrn (ex- holder Viktor Oehrn (ex-U-37) temporarily held the title Fuhrer U-boats, South. A fifty-three-year-old Italian-speaking officer, Franz Becker (crew of 1906), administratively commanded the twenty-one surviving U-boats, all assigned to the 29th Flotilla based at Salamis, La Spezia, and Pola, Yugoslavia.

Contrary to Donitz's assumption, no U-boat sent to the Mediterranean in 1941 (or later) ever returned to the Atlantic. The Mediterranean Sea was to become a seemingly endless drain of U-boats. It was a diversion of strength from the "decisive" area of the North Atlantic run and a move that achieved little at high cost.

THE L LOSS OF K KOTA P PINANG, ATLANTIS, AND P PYTHON.

Notwithstanding the sharp decline in U-boat successes in West African waters, Donitz continued patrols to that area in late fall of 1941. As before, the presence of even a few U-boats accomplishing little compelled the British to convoy, drew ASW forces from the decisive North Atlantic area, and indirectly helped Rommel.

Two further "waves" set off for that distant area.

The first of two boats, Ernst Bauer in U-126 U-126 and Nikolaus Clausen in and Nikolaus Clausen in U-129 U-129, sailed in late September. They-and the other boats in the South Atlantic-were to be supported by a supply ship, Kota Pinang Kota Pinang, which sailed from Bordeaux at the end of September. Alerted to this scheme by Enigma decrypts, the Admiralty ordered two Gibraltar-based cruisers, Kenya Kenya and and Sheffield Sheffield, to intercept Kota Pinang. Kenya Kota Pinang. Kenya found her about 750 miles west of Spain in the early hours of October 4 and sank her by gunfire, leaving the survivors to fend for themselves. found her about 750 miles west of Spain in the early hours of October 4 and sank her by gunfire, leaving the survivors to fend for themselves.

Clausen in U-129 U-129 had been assigned to rendezvous with had been assigned to rendezvous with Kota Pinang Kota Pinang and provide escort. He arrived that morning in the midst of the shelling. After and provide escort. He arrived that morning in the midst of the shelling. After Kenya Kenya hauled out, Clausen closed the lifeboats and took aboard the 119 German survivors. He reversed course for Lorient, but upon learning of this setback, Donitz directed Clausen to take the survivors into El Ferrol, Spain. Two days later, Clausen stood off that port, transferred the survivors to a Spanish tugboat, then returned to Lorient to replenish his greatly depleted food and fresh-water supplies. In due course the German survivors were repatriated to German-occupied France. hauled out, Clausen closed the lifeboats and took aboard the 119 German survivors. He reversed course for Lorient, but upon learning of this setback, Donitz directed Clausen to take the survivors into El Ferrol, Spain. Two days later, Clausen stood off that port, transferred the survivors to a Spanish tugboat, then returned to Lorient to replenish his greatly depleted food and fresh-water supplies. In due course the German survivors were repatriated to German-occupied France.

The loss of Kota Pinang Kota Pinang was a severe blow to the South Atlantic U-boat campaign. As a result, it was necessary to start four of the five boats in South Atlantic waters on homeward voyages, leaving only Merten's was a severe blow to the South Atlantic U-boat campaign. As a result, it was necessary to start four of the five boats in South Atlantic waters on homeward voyages, leaving only Merten's U-68 U-68, which had resupplied from both the U-111 U-111 and the damaged and the damaged U-67 U-67. Homebound, Zapp in U-66 U-66, Winter in U-103 U-103, and Hessler in U-107 U-107 were temporarily attached to the luckless group were temporarily attached to the luckless group Stoertebecker Stoertebecker off Gibraltar, but none had sufficient fuel or provisions to operate effectively, and they soon went on to France. Upon arrival, Hessler was promoted to the job of first staff officer to his father-in-law, replacing Viktor Oehrn, who went to the Mediterranean. off Gibraltar, but none had sufficient fuel or provisions to operate effectively, and they soon went on to France. Upon arrival, Hessler was promoted to the job of first staff officer to his father-in-law, replacing Viktor Oehrn, who went to the Mediterranean.

As it happened, at this time the famous German raider Atlantis Atlantis was homebound from a long voyage in the Pacific. Donitz made arrangements to resupply Merten's was homebound from a long voyage in the Pacific. Donitz made arrangements to resupply Merten's U-68 U-68, Bauer's U-126 U-126, and Clausen's U-129 U-129 from from Atlantis Atlantis, but shortly after sailing, Clausen in U-129 U-129 suffered an engine failure that forced him to return to France for the second time. suffered an engine failure that forced him to return to France for the second time.

That left only two boats in the South Atlantic in late October: Merten in U-68 U-68 and Bauer in and Bauer in U-126 U-126. Exploring very far into the South Atlantic to find the convoy routes, Merten reconnoitered the islands of Ascension and St. Helena. He found nothing at Ascension, but at St. Helena he boldly slipped into the harbor at Jamestown and sank the 8,100-ton British tanker Darkdale Darkdale with a salvo of four torpedoes. He then took with a salvo of four torpedoes. He then took U-68 U-68 east to explore the African coast at Walvis Bay, British Southwest Africa. On the way, he sank two big British freighters for 10,300 tons, which were sailing alone. Off Freetown, Bauer in east to explore the African coast at Walvis Bay, British Southwest Africa. On the way, he sank two big British freighters for 10,300 tons, which were sailing alone. Off Freetown, Bauer in U-126 U-126 sank three lone ships for 16,900 tons, including the 7,000-ton tanker sank three lone ships for 16,900 tons, including the 7,000-ton tanker British Mariner British Mariner, and on October 19, the 5,000-ton American freighter Lehigh Lehigh* which was zigzagging, leading Bauer to mistake it for a British vessel, or so he claimed. Both boats then hauled out to the mid-Atlantic to rendezvous with the homebound raider which was zigzagging, leading Bauer to mistake it for a British vessel, or so he claimed. Both boats then hauled out to the mid-Atlantic to rendezvous with the homebound raider Atlantis Atlantis.

The second wave of U-boats to the South Atlantic was more ambitious. Four boats, including Bauer's U-126 U-126, supported first by the raider Atlantis Atlantis, then by a supply ship, Python Python, freshly sailed from France, were to attack shipping directly off Cape Town, South Africa. The other three boats were Joachim Mohr in U-124 U-124, Nikolaus Clausen in the delayed U-129 U-129, and the U-A U-A, returned to the Atlantic after months in a shipyard, still commanded by Hans Eckermann. From Enigma traffic, the Admiralty divined what was afoot and set in motion countermeasures to spoil the German operation.

As arranged, Merten in U-68 U-68 met met Atlantis Atlantis on November 13, but the seas were too rough to carry out a resupply. The vessels remained in touch, awaiting a break in the weather. Meanwhile, the British authorized yet another "tactical use" of naval Enigma. Heavy cruisers on November 13, but the seas were too rough to carry out a resupply. The vessels remained in touch, awaiting a break in the weather. Meanwhile, the British authorized yet another "tactical use" of naval Enigma. Heavy cruisers Devonshire Devonshire and and Dorsetshire Dorsetshire and the light cruiser and the light cruiser Dunedin Dunedin sailed independently to track down and sink sailed independently to track down and sink Atlantis Atlantis, the supply ship Python Python, and the five U-boats that were to rendezvous with them. On November 14, the weather abated and U-68 U-68 came alongside came alongside Atlantis Atlantis. Merten took on oil, food, water, soap, towels, underwear, and cigarettes, then left to patrol home by way of Freetown.

As also arranged, Bauer in U-126 U-126 met met Atlantis Atlantis on November 22, a fine morning. Bauer had developed engine trouble that he was unable to repair and had received permission from Kerneval to abort the Cape Town mission and return to France. Hence Bauer's supply requirements were not urgent. on November 22, a fine morning. Bauer had developed engine trouble that he was unable to repair and had received permission from Kerneval to abort the Cape Town mission and return to France. Hence Bauer's supply requirements were not urgent.

The skipper of Atlantis Atlantis, Bernhard Rogge, invited Bauer and "a few" of his crew to breakfast. Believing the area to be safe from enemy attack, Bauer accepted. While Bauer was taking a bath, an Atlantis Atlantis lookout reported masts on the horizon. This was the heavy cruiser lookout reported masts on the horizon. This was the heavy cruiser Devonshire Devonshire, armed with eight 8" guns. Based on Enigma decrypts, the Admiralty had directed her to the rendezvous area, ostensibly on routine patrol. Her scout plane had found Atlantis Atlantis and and U-126 U-126.

Devonshire opened fire at a range of about seven miles. opened fire at a range of about seven miles. Atlantis Atlantis and and U-126 U-126 separated immediately, leaving Bauer and his men stranded on board separated immediately, leaving Bauer and his men stranded on board Atlantis Atlantis. Commanded by a junior watch officer, U-126 U-126 submerged to avoid the gunfire and to attack submerged to avoid the gunfire and to attack Devonshire Devonshire if the opportunity presented itself. Aware that if the opportunity presented itself. Aware that U-126 U-126 was nearby, was nearby, Devonshire Devonshire remained at extreme range and maneuvered at high speed, pumping shells at remained at extreme range and maneuvered at high speed, pumping shells at Atlantis Atlantis. When these had wrecked Atlantis Atlantis beyond any hope, Rogge scuttled and abandoned ship. beyond any hope, Rogge scuttled and abandoned ship.* Seeing that Seeing that Atlantis Atlantis had sunk, had sunk, Devonshire Devonshire cleared the area to avoid an attack by cleared the area to avoid an attack by U-126 U-126.

The U-126 U-126 surfaced and picked up Bauer and the other submariners. Bauer got off a report of the disaster to Kerneval, then organized a rescue of the 305-man crew of surfaced and picked up Bauer and the other submariners. Bauer got off a report of the disaster to Kerneval, then organized a rescue of the 305-man crew of Atlantis Atlantis. He took 107 men on board U-126 U-126: fifty-five, including all wounded, belowdecks and fifty-two on the upper deck. The other 198 men were distributed among six lifeboats. Bauer took the lifeboats in tow and set a course for the South American coast, reporting his action to Donitz, adding that on the return voyage, U-126 U-126 would require refueling. would require refueling.

Upon learning of the disaster, the OKM and Kerneval arranged for the newly arrived supply ship Python Python to rescue the to rescue the Atlantis Atlantis survivors and return to France. But the Cape Town U-boat assault was to proceed anyway, Merten's survivors and return to France. But the Cape Town U-boat assault was to proceed anyway, Merten's U-68 U-68 substituting for Bauer's substituting for Bauer's U-126 U-126, whose engines were still unreliable. The four boats of the reconstituted Cape Town group were to replenish from Python Python before she returned to France. before she returned to France.

Homing on the beacon signals of Bauer's U-126 U-126, Python Python came up on November 24. She took aboard the 305 came up on November 24. She took aboard the 305 Atlantis Atlantis survivors and then replenished Bauer in survivors and then replenished Bauer in U-126 U-126. Thereupon Bauer departed for France. Python Python steamed to a new rendezvous 1,700 miles south of the steamed to a new rendezvous 1,700 miles south of the Atlantis Atlantis sinking, in order to replenish the four Cape Town boats. Learning of these new arrangements via Enigma decrypts, the Admiralty set in motion a second trap. sinking, in order to replenish the four Cape Town boats. Learning of these new arrangements via Enigma decrypts, the Admiralty set in motion a second trap.

En route to the rendezvous with Python Python, on the afternoon of November 24, Mohr in U-124 U-124 sighted the top-hamper of a British warship. She was the old light cruiser sighted the top-hamper of a British warship. She was the old light cruiser Dunedin Dunedin, zigzagging at high speed. Mohr hauled around to take position along the cruiser's path, then submerged for a periscope attack. Bedeviled by temporarily inoperable bow planes and a broken depth gauge, Mohr's attack was less than picture-perfect. Moreover, when he was finally ready to shoot, Dunedin Dunedin suddenly altered course away. In desperation Mohr fired three torpedoes from the extreme range of 6,000 yards. Astonishingly, after a run of five minutes and twenty-three seconds, two of the three torpedoes hit suddenly altered course away. In desperation Mohr fired three torpedoes from the extreme range of 6,000 yards. Astonishingly, after a run of five minutes and twenty-three seconds, two of the three torpedoes hit Dunedin Dunedin. She blew up and sank instantly, with heavy loss of life.

According to plan, two U-boats met Python Python on November 30: Merten in on November 30: Merten in U-68 U-68 and Eckermann in and Eckermann in U-A U-A. Resupplying for the fourth time on his prolonged patrol, Merten in U-68 U-68 took on a full load of fuel. The next day, December 1, while Merten was transferring torpedoes from took on a full load of fuel. The next day, December 1, while Merten was transferring torpedoes from Python Python to to U-68 U-68, Eckermann in U-A U-A nuzzled up to take on fuel. Coached to the rendezvous by the Admiralty, the heavy cruiser nuzzled up to take on fuel. Coached to the rendezvous by the Admiralty, the heavy cruiser Dorsetshire Dorsetshire, armed with eight 8" guns, arrived in the late afternoon and launched a scout plane, which spotted the German vessels. Concerned that Python Python might have British POWs on board, might have British POWs on board, Dorsetshire Dorsetshire fired two "warning shots" from twelve miles, intending to force fired two "warning shots" from twelve miles, intending to force Python Python to surrender. to surrender.

Caught unawares, the German vessels dispersed immediately. The defenseless Python Python ran away at flank speed, leaving the two U-boats between her and ran away at flank speed, leaving the two U-boats between her and Dorsetshire Dorsetshire. Merten and Eckermann dived to attack, but everything possible went wrong. Merten's torpedoes were not yet properly stowed nor had the boat been trimmed. When he dived, U-68 U-68 went out of control, plunging steeply by the bow. The emergency action required to save the boat spoiled any chance of mounting an attack. Eckermann in went out of control, plunging steeply by the bow. The emergency action required to save the boat spoiled any chance of mounting an attack. Eckermann in U-A U-A botched his attack, firing five torpedoes from excessive range with a setup which underestimated botched his attack, firing five torpedoes from excessive range with a setup which underestimated Dorsetshire Dorsetshire's, speed. To avoid further U-boat attack, Dorsetshire Dorsetshire hauled off and left the area, and hauled off and left the area, and Python Python scuttled. scuttled.

After Dorsetshire Dorsetshire disappeared, the two U-boats surfaced amid disappeared, the two U-boats surfaced amid Python's Python's survivors. Including the crew of survivors. Including the crew of Atlantis Atlantis, there were 414 Germans variously distributed in eleven lifeboats and numerous rafts. The Atlantis Atlantis captain, Bernhard Rogge-the senior officer present-assumed command of the rescue. He put about 100 survivors on board captain, Bernhard Rogge-the senior officer present-assumed command of the rescue. He put about 100 survivors on board U-68 U-68 and another 100 on and another 100 on U-A U-A and redistributed the remaining 200 men in the ten lifeboats. Each of the U-boats then took five lifeboats in tow. Eckermann in and redistributed the remaining 200 men in the ten lifeboats. Each of the U-boats then took five lifeboats in tow. Eckermann in U-A U-A reported this second disaster to Kerneval, adding that both U-boats and their trains of lifeboats had sufficient fuel to reach France, about 5,000 miles distant. reported this second disaster to Kerneval, adding that both U-boats and their trains of lifeboats had sufficient fuel to reach France, about 5,000 miles distant.

The news of this second sinking came as a terrible shock. Donitz canceled the Cape Town foray and directed the other two boats, Mohr in U-124 U-124 and Clausen in and Clausen in U-129 U-129, to find U-68 U-68 and and U-A U-A and render all possible assistance. Racing north on the night of December 3, Mohr in and render all possible assistance. Racing north on the night of December 3, Mohr in U-124 U-124 encountered a blacked-out, zigzagging freighter, which he stopped and searched. She was the 6,300-ton American vessel encountered a blacked-out, zigzagging freighter, which he stopped and searched. She was the 6,300-ton American vessel Sagadahoc Sagadahoc, bound for Durban, South Africa. Concluding that her cargo was contraband, Mohr ordered the crew into lifeboats and then sank her, the third American merchant ship to fall victim to U-boats before the United States entered the war.

By December 5, Mohr in U-124 U-124 and Clausen in and Clausen in U-129 U-129 had arrived at the scene of the had arrived at the scene of the Python Python disaster. Rogge transferred the 200 survivors in the lifeboats to disaster. Rogge transferred the 200 survivors in the lifeboats to U-124 U-124 and and U-129 U-129 and cast the lifeboats adrift. The four U-boats, each carrying about 104 survivors, then proceeded north at much higher speed. Half the survivors on each boat were belowdecks, the other half on the upper deck, sitting in rubber dinghies or rafts, which would float free in case the boat had to crash-dive. For the survivors topside it was a long, cold, miserable ride. and cast the lifeboats adrift. The four U-boats, each carrying about 104 survivors, then proceeded north at much higher speed. Half the survivors on each boat were belowdecks, the other half on the upper deck, sitting in rubber dinghies or rafts, which would float free in case the boat had to crash-dive. For the survivors topside it was a long, cold, miserable ride.

Meanwhile, Donitz turned to the Italians for assistance. They sent four big Bordeaux-based boats racing south at maximum speed. These met the four German U-boats at separate locations near the Cape Verde Islands, December 16 to 18, gave them fuel, lube oil, and food, and took aboard 260 German survivors.* While While Torelli Torelli was en route to France, a British destroyer or corvette caught and severely depth-charged her, but she survived. The other seven boats arrived in France without mishap. was en route to France, a British destroyer or corvette caught and severely depth-charged her, but she survived. The other seven boats arrived in France without mishap.

The Atlantis-Python Atlantis-Python rescue operation soon became a legendary tale. Not a single German of the 414 on rescue operation soon became a legendary tale. Not a single German of the 414 on Atlantis Atlantis and and Python Python was lost. But the sinking within the space of sixty days of first was lost. But the sinking within the space of sixty days of first Kota Pinang Kota Pinang, then Atlantis Atlantis, and then Python Python convinced Donitz that resupply of submarines from surface ships was no longer feasible. Patrols to Freetown-or to Cape Town-had to be abandoned until U-boat tankers under construction became available. convinced Donitz that resupply of submarines from surface ships was no longer feasible. Patrols to Freetown-or to Cape Town-had to be abandoned until U-boat tankers under construction became available.

The loss of Atlantis Atlantis and and Python Python raised anew the suspicion that the British had broken naval Enigma. The OKM agreed the losses were not "coincidental," but after yet another cursory investigation of communications security, it reaffirmed its faith in Enigma, citing the fact that in recent weeks three prize ships had arrived in France and two blockade runners had departed France and despite heavy radio traffic, none had been attacked. This conclusion was based in large part on the false assumption that the British would act tactically on all Enigma information. raised anew the suspicion that the British had broken naval Enigma. The OKM agreed the losses were not "coincidental," but after yet another cursory investigation of communications security, it reaffirmed its faith in Enigma, citing the fact that in recent weeks three prize ships had arrived in France and two blockade runners had departed France and despite heavy radio traffic, none had been attacked. This conclusion was based in large part on the false assumption that the British would act tactically on all Enigma information.