Upon receiving Hardegen's report, Donitz ordered group Schlagetod Schlagetod to find and attack the convoy. That night Siegfried Rollmann in to find and attack the convoy. That night Siegfried Rollmann in U-82 U-82 and Rolf Mutzelburg in and Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 made contact. Rollmann threaded through the escorts and fired, sinking two big British freighters. One, made contact. Rollmann threaded through the escorts and fired, sinking two big British freighters. One, Treverbyn Treverbyn, loaded with 6,700 tons of iron ore, disappeared instantly with no survivors. In the light of star shells, the sloop Wellington Wellington spotted a U-boat and ran in to shoot and ram, but her gun misfired and the boat evaded and dived. spotted a U-boat and ran in to shoot and ram, but her gun misfired and the boat evaded and dived. Wellington Wellington threw off depth charges, but none hit the mark; however, they discouraged further attacks by U-boats. threw off depth charges, but none hit the mark; however, they discouraged further attacks by U-boats.

The next day, October 22, Coastal Command saturated the air over Sierra Leone 89 with Whitleys and Catalinas and one of its precious few long-range B-24 Liberators of Squadron 120. The continuous air coverage held off the Schlagetod boats as well as two Condors Schlagetod boats as well as two Condors. The British aircraft carried out five attacks on U-boats, but the bombs and depth charges failed to release or misfired or fell wide of the target. In what was said to be the "first" attack by a B-24 Liberator on a U-boat, the aircraft dropped four 450-pound depth charges, set for fifty feet. One misfired but three exploded, doubtless shaking the boat, but no U-boats were sunk as a result of this or the other air attacks.

The presence of very heavy air and surface escort-and the onset of a storm-persuaded Donitz to call off the pursuit. Having diverted for several days to chase the big, fast armed merchant ships and Sierra Leone 89 to little effect, group Schlagetod Schlagetod finally resumed its northwestward course toward Greenland. The chases had eaten up much fuel. Only Hardegen in the Type IXB finally resumed its northwestward course toward Greenland. The chases had eaten up much fuel. Only Hardegen in the Type IXB U-123 U-123 had enough left to conduct an effective patrol. had enough left to conduct an effective patrol.

"WE A ARE AT W WAR"

In the last week of October, U-boats in several areas of the North Atlantic intercepted convoys. The first report came from Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat's veteran U-74 U-74, en route to Greenland waters. Shortly after leaving France, on the morning of October 27 Kentrat found and reported the fast Outbound North 28, about 550 miles west of Ireland. Since the convoy appeared to be headed toward the shrinking Reisswolf Reisswolf pack southeast of Greenland, Donitz ordered Kentrat to withhold attack and to shadow, while he moved the five remaining pack southeast of Greenland, Donitz ordered Kentrat to withhold attack and to shadow, while he moved the five remaining Reisswolf Reisswolf boats into position. Donitz, however, was not optimistic. The weather was foul and two of the five boats into position. Donitz, however, was not optimistic. The weather was foul and two of the five Reisswolf Reisswolf boats were very low on fuel. boats were very low on fuel.

The veteran Type IXB U-106 U-106, sailing fresh from France with plenty of fuel, joined in the chase. She had a new skipper, Hermann Rasch, age twenty-seven, replacing Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Jurgen Oesten, who had been promoted to command Combat Flotilla 9 at Brest. A weird and disturbing episode had occurred on holder Jurgen Oesten, who had been promoted to command Combat Flotilla 9 at Brest. A weird and disturbing episode had occurred on U-106 U-106 shortly after sailing. A gale had suddenly struck the boat in a following sea; a giant wave from astern had "pooped" the bridge, washing all four men on topside watch into the sea. The shortly after sailing. A gale had suddenly struck the boat in a following sea; a giant wave from astern had "pooped" the bridge, washing all four men on topside watch into the sea. The U-106 U-106 had cruised blindly for nearly an hour before the mishap was discovered. Rasch had reversed course to mount a search, but had found no trace of the four men. One consequence of this mishap was that Rasch had to stand bridge watches in place of the lost watch officer, imposing a tremendous added strain on himself. had cruised blindly for nearly an hour before the mishap was discovered. Rasch had reversed course to mount a search, but had found no trace of the four men. One consequence of this mishap was that Rasch had to stand bridge watches in place of the lost watch officer, imposing a tremendous added strain on himself.

Kentrat in U-74 U-74 mounted a remarkable 1,000-mile chase of Outbound North 28 across the North Atlantic. Based on his continuing reports and beacons, Donitz moved the mounted a remarkable 1,000-mile chase of Outbound North 28 across the North Atlantic. Based on his continuing reports and beacons, Donitz moved the Reisswolf Reisswolf group to intercept. Four group to intercept. Four Reisswolf Reisswolf boats, including Rasch's newly joined boats, including Rasch's newly joined U-106 U-106, made contact. However, when Donitz finally authorized an attack, the strong escort of American destroyers drove off Kentrat and all other boats except Rasch in U-106 U-106.

Rasch launched his attack in the early, foggy hours of October 30, about 500 miles east of Newfoundland. He chose two big tankers in ballast and fired two bow torpedoes at each. He missed one tanker but hit the other with both torpedoes. The victim was the old (1921) 9,000-ton U.S. Navy fleet oiler Salinas Salinas. Rasch thought-and claimed-that she blew up and disintegrated, but that was not correct. Salinas Salinas was badly damaged, but her captain, Harley F. Cope, and his crew held was badly damaged, but her captain, Harley F. Cope, and his crew held Salinas Salinas together together* and finally got her into Argentia, escorted by the four-stack destroyer and finally got her into Argentia, escorted by the four-stack destroyer Du Pont. Du Pont. Rasch logged that the American destroyers depth-charged Rasch logged that the American destroyers depth-charged U-106 U-106 for nine hours, inflicting considerable damage and flooding aft, and thwarted another attack on the convoy. for nine hours, inflicting considerable damage and flooding aft, and thwarted another attack on the convoy.

The arduous chase of Outbound North 28 brought an end to the operations of the Reisswolf Reisswolf group. Three boats ( group. Three boats (U-73, U-502, and U-568 U-568) that were low on fuel, turned about for France. Two others, U-77 U-77 and and U-751 U-751, held in place southeast of Greenland to cadre a new pack, Stosstrupp. Stosstrupp. Kentrat in Kentrat in U-74 U-74 and Rasch in and Rasch in U-106 U-106 continued the chase of Outbound North 28 westward into Newfoundland waters, attempting to bring in the four boats of the continued the chase of Outbound North 28 westward into Newfoundland waters, attempting to bring in the four boats of the Mordbrenner Mordbrenner group, which had patrolled off the mouth of Belle Isle Strait, but the attempt failed. Total damage to Outbound North 28: the American tanker group, which had patrolled off the mouth of Belle Isle Strait, but the attempt failed. Total damage to Outbound North 28: the American tanker Salinas Salinas torpedoed but saved. torpedoed but saved.

At about this time the nine boats of the Schlagetod Schlagetod group, which had diverted to chase the armed merchant cruisers and Sierra Leone 89, reached Canadian waters and formed a patrol line to the northeast of Newfoundland. Four of the nine were very low on fuel and could remain only a few days. One boat, Hardegen's Type IXB group, which had diverted to chase the armed merchant cruisers and Sierra Leone 89, reached Canadian waters and formed a patrol line to the northeast of Newfoundland. Four of the nine were very low on fuel and could remain only a few days. One boat, Hardegen's Type IXB U-123 U-123, was detached and sent to keep a watch for convoys off Belle Isle Strait, replacing the Mordbrenner Mordbrenner group, which had gone south in a futile effort to find Outbound North 28 in the approaches to Newfoundland. Hardegen's arrival brought the total number of boats in Newfoundland waters to seven, but three of the four boats of the group, which had gone south in a futile effort to find Outbound North 28 in the approaches to Newfoundland. Hardegen's arrival brought the total number of boats in Newfoundland waters to seven, but three of the four boats of the Mordbrenner Mordbrenner group were very low on fuel and the fourth, group were very low on fuel and the fourth, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Bleichrodt's holder Bleichrodt's U-109 U-109, was again beset with mechanical difficulties.

The new group Stosstrupp Stosstrupp, which was to patrol southeast of Greenland replacing Reisswolf Reisswolf, was to consist initially of eight boats: three on maiden patrols from Germany; two left over from the Reisswolf Reisswolf group; and three boats newly sailed from France, all commanded by group; and three boats newly sailed from France, all commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock in holders: Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96, Erich Topp in U-552 U-552, and the U-567 U-567, commanded by Engelbert Endrass, who had replaced the boat's original skipper in France.

Group Stosstrupp Stosstrupp, however, was stillborn. Upon arriving at his assigned grid square in the early hours of October 31, Erich Topp in U-552 U-552 sighted a fast, east-bound convoy. This was Halifax 156, composed of forty-four ships, escorted by five American destroyers. Topp simultaneously attacked one of the destroyers with two torpedoes and got off a contact report. sighted a fast, east-bound convoy. This was Halifax 156, composed of forty-four ships, escorted by five American destroyers. Topp simultaneously attacked one of the destroyers with two torpedoes and got off a contact report.

Topp's target was the four-stack destroyer Reuben James Reuben James, commanded by Heywood L. Edwards. One of the two torpedoes hit the "Rube" "Rube" on the port side, splitting her in half. The bow blew up and sank instantly; the stern remained afloat about five minutes. The other four American destroyers, on the port side, splitting her in half. The bow blew up and sank instantly; the stern remained afloat about five minutes. The other four American destroyers, Benson, Hilary P. Jones, Niblack Benson, Hilary P. Jones, Niblack, and Tarbell Tarbell, rescued forty-five of the 160-man crew from the oil-covered waters, leaving 115 men of Reuben James Reuben James, including skipper Edwards and all of his officers, unaccounted for.

The Reuben James Reuben James was the first U.S. Navy vessel to be sunk by enemy forces in World War II. The loss caused profound shock. The Chief of Naval Operations, Harold R. Stark, said: "Whether the country knows it or not, was the first U.S. Navy vessel to be sunk by enemy forces in World War II. The loss caused profound shock. The Chief of Naval Operations, Harold R. Stark, said: "Whether the country knows it or not, we are at war." we are at war." The folksinger Woody Guthrie memorialized the sinking in a ballad. President Roosevelt seized upon the loss to build further support for his intervention in the Atlantic and his request for repeal of the Neutrality Act. The Congress responded quickly but cautiously to the proposed legislation and after a lively debate, passed several amendments to the Neutrality Act that satisfied Roosevelt. The folksinger Woody Guthrie memorialized the sinking in a ballad. President Roosevelt seized upon the loss to build further support for his intervention in the Atlantic and his request for repeal of the Neutrality Act. The Congress responded quickly but cautiously to the proposed legislation and after a lively debate, passed several amendments to the Neutrality Act that satisfied Roosevelt.*

Topp shadowed convoy Halifax 156, but there were only two other boats close by: Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 and Endrass in and Endrass in U-567 U-567. On the morning of November 1, Topp and Endrass mounted a second attack on the convoy but failed to hit their targets. That same morning a British escort group, which included the ex-American four-stack destroyer Buxton Buxton and the destroyer and the destroyer Wolverine Wolverine, came up to take over from the Americans. Buxton Buxton reported that one or two U-boats fired torpedoes at her, but she evaded and launched a counterattack, dropping sixteen depth charges before losing sonar contact. Undamaged, Topp and Endrass continued to shadow and Donitz sent out Condors, but British air and surface escorts thwarted further attacks on Halifax 156. reported that one or two U-boats fired torpedoes at her, but she evaded and launched a counterattack, dropping sixteen depth charges before losing sonar contact. Undamaged, Topp and Endrass continued to shadow and Donitz sent out Condors, but British air and surface escorts thwarted further attacks on Halifax 156.

In the meantime, Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96, responding to Topp's contact, had run into another convoy, Outbound South 10, en route to Sierra Leone. He shadowed it southward, bringing up some boats of group Stosstrupp Stosstrupp in that area. With Topp, Endrass, Lehmann-Willenbrock, and other in that area. With Topp, Endrass, Lehmann-Willenbrock, and other Stosstrupp Stosstrupp boats chasing convoys in opposite directions, Donitz canceled plans to form boats chasing convoys in opposite directions, Donitz canceled plans to form Stosstrupp Stosstrupp and sent the two holdover boats from and sent the two holdover boats from Reisswolf, U-77 Reisswolf, U-77 and and U-751 U-751, to join group Schlagetod Schlagetod northeast of Newfoundland and-confusingly-renamed group northeast of Newfoundland and-confusingly-renamed group Schlagetod Schlagetod group group Raubritter. Raubritter.

By the end of October, the four-boat group Mordbrenner Mordbrenner, the first pack to patrol "American waters," had achieved nothing. Groping through fog, outwitted by British codebreakers, harassed by green Canadian aircraft crews, not one of the boats had sunk a ship. In response to orders from Kerneval, the pack had moved southeast in an attempt to intercept Outbound North 28. But no Mordbrenner Mordbrenner boat found that convoy. Two Type VIIs of the pack, critically low on fuel, had to break off and head for France, and boat found that convoy. Two Type VIIs of the pack, critically low on fuel, had to break off and head for France, and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in U-109 U-109, bedeviled by mechanical problems, had to withdraw well to sea to make repairs. Homebound, Alfred Schlieper, age twenty-six, in the new VII U-208 U-208, sank a 3,900-ton British freighter. When he reported that he could not fully repair U-109 U-109, Bleichrodt was assigned to escort blockade runners.

Only one Mordbrenner boat was left in Newfoundland waters by October 31. She was the new VIIC U-374 U-374, commanded by Unno von Fischel, age twenty-five, son of a World War I U-boat commander who was an admiral in the Kriegsmarine. Kriegsmarine. Thirty-three days out from Kiel on his maiden patrol, von Fischel was also critically low on fuel. The luckless hunt for Outbound North 28 had drawn him about fifty miles southeast of Cape Race, Newfoundland. There, while preparing to depart for France, he found and hit a lone 5,100-ton British freighter, Thirty-three days out from Kiel on his maiden patrol, von Fischel was also critically low on fuel. The luckless hunt for Outbound North 28 had drawn him about fifty miles southeast of Cape Race, Newfoundland. There, while preparing to depart for France, he found and hit a lone 5,100-ton British freighter, King Malcolm King Malcolm, which sank in thirty seconds.

Apparently this ship went down before it could radio an alarm, for only a few hours later a big eastbound convoy sailed directly into U-374 U-374's path. This was Slow Convoy 52, comprised of thirty-six ships, which had sailed from Sydney, Nova Scotia, on October 29, with nine Canadian escorts. After it had cleared Cape Race-the most southeasterly point of Newfoundland-the Admiralty had diverted it due north, apparently in an effort to avoid the U-boats that had been stalking Outbound North 28. The diversion unwittingly pointed the convoy toward group Raubritter Raubritter (ex- (ex-Schlagetod) and-by another happenstance-at von Fischel's U-374. U-374.

Upon receiving von Fischel's contact report on November 1, Donitz directed him to shadow and withhold attack until the eight boats of group Raubritter Raubritter and all other available boats in the Newfoundland waters could be brought up. The other boats included Kentrat's and all other available boats in the Newfoundland waters could be brought up. The other boats included Kentrat's U-74 U-74 and Rasch's and Rasch's U-106 U-106, which had chased Outbound North 28, and Hardegen's U-123 U-123, which had been detached from Raubritter Raubritter to scout Belle Isle Strait. These orders put twelve boats on the trail of Slow Convoy 52, including the shadowing to scout Belle Isle Strait. These orders put twelve boats on the trail of Slow Convoy 52, including the shadowing U-374 U-374. But four of the eight Raubritter Raubritter boats and the boats and the U-374 U-374 were so low on fuel that they could not pursue for more than a day or two. were so low on fuel that they could not pursue for more than a day or two.

During November 2, von Fischel in U-374 U-374 shadowed the convoy through fog and attempted to attack. He was repulsed by the Canadian corvette shadowed the convoy through fog and attempted to attack. He was repulsed by the Canadian corvette Buctouche Buctouche, which forced him off and down. Buctouche Buctouche threw off six depth charges, which caused minor damage, but von Fischel's biggest worry was his fuel shortage. To conserve oil, he bottomed at 305 feet and lay doggo. Later he surfaced and set a course for France. threw off six depth charges, which caused minor damage, but von Fischel's biggest worry was his fuel shortage. To conserve oil, he bottomed at 305 feet and lay doggo. Later he surfaced and set a course for France.

Group Raubritter Raubritter and Hardegen in and Hardegen in U-123 U-123 raced south to intercept the Slow Convoy 52. Late on the afternoon of November 2, Hardegen made contact and radioed his position and shadowed for nine hours, but he did not attack, a curious and unexplained lapse for which he was later criticized. However, his reports and beacons brought several raced south to intercept the Slow Convoy 52. Late on the afternoon of November 2, Hardegen made contact and radioed his position and shadowed for nine hours, but he did not attack, a curious and unexplained lapse for which he was later criticized. However, his reports and beacons brought several Raubritter Raubritter boats into shooting position in the early hours of November 3. Hans-Heinz Linder in boats into shooting position in the early hours of November 3. Hans-Heinz Linder in U-202 U-202 sank two ships for 6,600 tons and Hans-Peter Hinsch in sank two ships for 6,600 tons and Hans-Peter Hinsch in U-569 U-569 sank one for 3,300 tons. Later that same day, Rolf Mutzelburg in sank one for 3,300 tons. Later that same day, Rolf Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 sank two other ships for 10,500 tons, but a depth-charging escort prevented him from making a second attack. Fleeing U-boats in the fog, two other ships of the convoy ran aground, but they were salvaged. Total damage to Slow Convoy 52 by U-boats: five confirmed ships sunk for 20,400 tons. sank two other ships for 10,500 tons, but a depth-charging escort prevented him from making a second attack. Fleeing U-boats in the fog, two other ships of the convoy ran aground, but they were salvaged. Total damage to Slow Convoy 52 by U-boats: five confirmed ships sunk for 20,400 tons.

When the Admiralty realized that it had erred in rerouting Slow Convoy 52 northward, it made the unprecedented decision to abort the convoy. The remaining twenty-nine disorganized and confused ships groped through fogbound Belle Isle Strait into the Gulf of St. Lawrence and returned to Sydney, Nova Scotia, to sail later with Slow Convoys 53 and 54. The nine Canadian escorts proceeded eastward, per schedule, in order to meet a preassigned westbound convoy. This was the only instance in the war that an entire convoy on the North Atlantic run was aborted.

While racing up to join the battle on November 3, Kentrat in U-74 U-74 came upon an unidentified outbound convoy in foggy seas. This was probably a Halifax convoy eastbound at 10 knots. In response to Kentrat's report, Donitz directed a came upon an unidentified outbound convoy in foggy seas. This was probably a Halifax convoy eastbound at 10 knots. In response to Kentrat's report, Donitz directed a Raubritter Raubritter boat, Horst Uphoff's boat, Horst Uphoff's U-84 U-84, and the three newly arrived boats (originally assigned to the stillborn Stosstrupp Stosstrupp group) to home on Kentrat's beacon. But Uphoff in group) to home on Kentrat's beacon. But Uphoff in U-84 U-84 was too low on fuel to carry out these orders and the new boats could not find Kentrat in was too low on fuel to carry out these orders and the new boats could not find Kentrat in U-74 U-74. He, too, soon lost the convoy in the fog and having expended a great deal of fuel in his dogged chase of Outbound North 28, Kentrat set a course for France. On the way home he found and sank the 8,500-ton British steamer Nottingham Nottingham, which was sailing alone.

After Slow Convoy 52 aborted, Donitz withdrew all U-boats from the far distant Newfoundland waters. Four boats of group Raubritter Raubritter, including three that had sunk ships from that convoy-Linder in U-202 U-202, Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, and Hinsch in U-569 U-569-headed for France on one diesel to stretch fuel. Upon reaching Brest, Mutzelburg was awarded a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.*

Eight boats that still had fuel, including Rasch in the IXB U-106 U-106 and Hardegen in the IXB and Hardegen in the IXB U-123 U-123, and the three new VIIs from Germany, reconstituted group Raubritter Raubritter on a line south of Greenland. British intelligence pinpointed the location of the group and diverted convoys. Rasch in on a line south of Greenland. British intelligence pinpointed the location of the group and diverted convoys. Rasch in U-106 U-106 had fleeting contact with a convoy escort (described as a "destroyer") but he was not able to capitalize on the encounter. While en route from France to join had fleeting contact with a convoy escort (described as a "destroyer") but he was not able to capitalize on the encounter. While en route from France to join Raubritter Raubritter, the U-561 U-561, commanded by Robert Bartels, sank two stragglers for 8,500 tons from Slow Convoy 53. However, no boat of the reconstituted Raubritter Raubritter group found a convoy. Little by little the group fell away as the boats ran low on fuel. The famous old Type IX group found a convoy. Little by little the group fell away as the boats ran low on fuel. The famous old Type IX U-38 U-38, commanded by Heinrich Schuch, who had sunk only one 1,700-ton ship since taking over from Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Liebe four months earlier, followed holder Heinrich Liebe four months earlier, followed U-101 U-101 home to the Training Command. home to the Training Command.*

In the early days of November, Berlin issued orders that had the effect of shutting down the U-boat war on the North Atlantic run again. Twenty U-boats were to be diverted to special missions: * Eight boats were to support a proposed sortie of the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer into the North Atlantic. into the North Atlantic.

* Six boats were to escort incoming or outgoing prize ships, raiders, or blockade runners.

* Six more Type VIIs were to go to the western Mediterranean to thwart a rumored British amphibious landing in Algeria.

Donitz was dismayed. The diversions to these special tasks, he logged in vast understatement, was "most injurious to our cause." They meant that the U-boat war against North Atlantic and Gibraltar convoys would "practically have to cease." He flew to Berlin to protest directly to Admiral Raeder, but he gained only a minor technical concession on the escort missions, which slightly reduced the commitment of U-boats for that purpose.

The eight boats assigned to the Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer sortie consisted of four boats already on Arctic patrol, three boats newly sailed from Germany, and one boat from France. The four Arctic boats were to explore and report on the outer limits of the ice fields and broadcast weather reports. The other four boats were to patrol the Denmark Strait and the waters around Iceland to report-and attack-British and American ships of the Home Fleet attempting to intercept sortie consisted of four boats already on Arctic patrol, three boats newly sailed from Germany, and one boat from France. The four Arctic boats were to explore and report on the outer limits of the ice fields and broadcast weather reports. The other four boats were to patrol the Denmark Strait and the waters around Iceland to report-and attack-British and American ships of the Home Fleet attempting to intercept Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer.

British codebreakers closely followed German preparations for the Scheer Scheer breakout. Suspecting that breakout. Suspecting that Bismarck' Bismarck's sister ship, the super-battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz, might accompany Scheer Scheer, the Admiralty laid an intricate joint British-American trap to sink both ships, a la Bismarck. Bismarck. In early November, Home Fleet commander Admiral Tovey moved his most powerful ships In early November, Home Fleet commander Admiral Tovey moved his most powerful ships After the Scheer Scheer breakout was canceled, the OKM released the four boats on reserve near Iceland, but not the boats in the Arctic. Two of the four released boats provided Donitz a cadre around which to build a small (six-boat) pack, breakout was canceled, the OKM released the four boats on reserve near Iceland, but not the boats in the Arctic. Two of the four released boats provided Donitz a cadre around which to build a small (six-boat) pack, Steuben Steuben, for a top-secret special operation of his own: a new-possibly sensational-assault on Allied shipping in Newfoundland waters. Two Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders in Type IXs, Wolfgang Luth in holders in Type IXs, Wolfgang Luth in U-43 U-43 and Georg Schewe in and Georg Schewe in U-105 U-105, were to go right into the convoy anchorage and iron-ore loading docks at St. John's and Conception Bay, New-foundland, respectively, and attack shipping. Four other boats were to remain offshore to provide emergency assistance or rescue, if required, and to capitalize on the havoc and panic that seemed certain to ensue.

This last, feeble offensive U-boat thrust on the North Atlantic run in November also had to be canceled. A new order from Berlin directed Donitz to prepare to send virtually every combat-ready Type VII of the Atlantic force to the Mediterranean to support the land warfare in North Africa. This new order was to shut down the U-boat offensive on the North Atlantic run for a considerable time.

During October, about 900 ships in twenty convoys crossed the North Atlantic east and west. The many U-boats on patrol were able to mount a telling attack on only one, Slow Convoy 48, from which they sank nine of the fifty merchant ships for 51,000 tons, caused the destruction of two British escorts (four-stack destroyer Broadwater; Broadwater; corvette corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus), and severely damaged the new American destroyer Kearny. Kearny. In addition, Eric Topp in In addition, Eric Topp in U-552 U-552 sank the American four-stack destroyer sank the American four-stack destroyer Reuben James Reuben James from convoy Halifax 156. Five other U-boats sank five singles, bringing the total sinkings in this month in the North Atlantic to seventeen ships. from convoy Halifax 156. Five other U-boats sank five singles, bringing the total sinkings in this month in the North Atlantic to seventeen ships.

In November the U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic sputtered out almost completely. About 850 merchant ships crossed east and west. Before the withdrawal of the U-boats, the Germans sank five ships from Slow Convoy 52 and forced it to abort, and later two stragglers from Slow Convoy 53, a total of seven ships for about 29,000 tons. In addition, two U-boats sank two singles for a total of 12,400 tons. There were no further losses to enemy action in the eastbound convoys, but in convoy Halifax 161, a Norwegian freighter rammed the American destroyer Du Pont. Du Pont. She survived, but repairs in a Boston shipyard required two months. There were no casualties in the ten Outbound North convoys, but violent gales battered and scattered ships in four of those convoys. Many westbound vessels, including the Canadian destroyer She survived, but repairs in a Boston shipyard required two months. There were no casualties in the ten Outbound North convoys, but violent gales battered and scattered ships in four of those convoys. Many westbound vessels, including the Canadian destroyer St. Laurent St. Laurent (of Outbound North 33), incurred heavy damage from the howling winds and mountainous seas. On November 25, Western Approaches reported there were twenty-six stragglers from Outbound North 37. (of Outbound North 33), incurred heavy damage from the howling winds and mountainous seas. On November 25, Western Approaches reported there were twenty-six stragglers from Outbound North 37.

In addition to all other urgent tasks in November, Admiral King had to provide eighteen ships of his Atlantic Fleet for a prolonged special mission in behalf of the British. This was the transport of about 20,000 Commonwealth troops to Cape Town and beyond to the Far East. Designated WS 12X, this convoy of six U.S. Navy troopships sailed from Halifax on November 10. In keeping with King's policy of providing massive escort for troop convoys whether American or foreign, WS 12X was guarded by eleven warships: the carrier Ranger Ranger, the heavy cruisers Quincy Quincy and and Vincennes Vincennes, and eight destroyers.* The big Navy tanker The big Navy tanker Cimarron Cimarron was included to refuel the warships at sea. was included to refuel the warships at sea.

In December, the story on the North Atlantic run was much the same as in November. About 815 ships crossed the North Atlantic east and west in appalling weather. Two new Type IXCs outbound from Germany sank four loaded ships: Ernst Kals, age thirty-five, in U-130 U-130, got three for 15,000 tons from Slow Convoy 57, which was nearing the British Isles under British escort; Arend Baumann, age thirty-seven, in U-131 U-131, sank a 4,000-ton straggler from convoy Halifax 166, also under British escort. No other U-boat sank a loner. For the third month in a row, there were no casualties in Outbound North convoys. But terrible gales scattered seven of these eleven westbound convoys, severely damaging many more cargo ships and escorts.

The U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic in the last third of 1941 was thus a flop, an unheralded victory for the British and a grim setback for the Germans. During this period about eighty convoys, comprising about 3,700 ships, crossed east and west. The U-boats mounted notable attacks on only four of the 80 convoys, all Slow (or Sydney) escorted by the new, green, ill-equipped Canadian groups: 42, 44, 48, and 52. The Germans sank forty-two merchant ships for about 173,800 tons from those four convoys, plus twelve independents and stragglers for about 60,000 tons, as well as four escorts: the corvettes Levis Levis and and Gladiolus Gladiolus, and the destroyers Broadwater Broadwater and and Reuben James. Reuben James. The first group foray into "American waters" forced Slow Convoy 52 into an unprecedented abort, but the majority of its ships promptly resailed. The first group foray into "American waters" forced Slow Convoy 52 into an unprecedented abort, but the majority of its ships promptly resailed.

For the effort expended, this was a shockingly low return for the U-boats-a far cry from the rich harvest of Allied shipping a year earlier during the same time period by half or fewer U-boats. Moreover, the damage to the American destroyer Kearny Kearny and tanker and tanker Salinas Salinas and the sinking of the American destroyer and the sinking of the American destroyer Reuben James Reuben James had actually worked against the Germans, making it less difficult for Roosevelt to gain the important amendments to the Neutrality Act and drawing the United States ever closer to overt war with the U-boat force. had actually worked against the Germans, making it less difficult for Roosevelt to gain the important amendments to the Neutrality Act and drawing the United States ever closer to overt war with the U-boat force.

The lack of success in the North Atlantic led strategists at the OKM and not a few planners in Kerneval to wonder if the U-boat war was any longer worth the large expenditure of manpower and resources, especially in view of the enormous drain caused by the lagging campaign in the Soviet Union. In rebuttal, Donitz again argued that the mere presence of U-boats in the North Atlantic forced the Allies to continue convoying, which by itself significantly reduced British imports and required a large counterforce of Allied manpower and resources that might otherwise be diverted to other theaters of war. Moreover, the North Atlantic patrolling provided combat experience at remarkably small cost (merely two new boats, U-501 U-501 and and U-207 U-207, lost in the last third of 1941) for the new generations of German submariners who were to man the scores of new U-boats coming off the production lines in 1942 to deliver Great Britain the final crushing naval blow.

PATROLS TO W WEST A AFRICA.

Although the patrols to West African waters during the late summer of 1941 had produced scant returns and there were no German resupply ships immediately available, and British diplomatic pressure had closed the Spanish Canaries to U-boats, Donitz believed patrols to this area should be continued. The presence of U-boats in the South Atlantic forced the British to convoy and to draw ASW forces from elsewhere, and kept pressure on the flow of British supplies to Egypt and the Middle East going via the Cape of Good Hope. Accordingly, two waves of four Type IXs sailed for the Freetown area in the early fall.

The first wave achieved very little. Believing that British ships might be taking cover in the American hemispheric defense zone, which extended to South American waters, Donitz sent two of the four boats across the "narrow neck" of the South Atlantic to Brazil: Richard Zapp's U-66 U-66 and Wilhelm Kleinschmidt's and Wilhelm Kleinschmidt's U-III U-III, the first two U-boats to go south of the Equator.* Kleinschmidt sank two big freighters sailing alone: a 5,700-ton Dutchman bound for Egypt with a cargo of aircraft, and an 8,400-ton Britisher bound for England with a cargo of pig iron and manganese. Kleinschmidt sank two big freighters sailing alone: a 5,700-ton Dutchman bound for Egypt with a cargo of aircraft, and an 8,400-ton Britisher bound for England with a cargo of pig iron and manganese. Zapp in Zapp in U-66 U-66 sank the 7,000-ton Panamanian tanker sank the 7,000-ton Panamanian tanker I. C. White I. C. White 600 miles south of the Equator. Patrolling the once-rich hunting grounds off Freetown, Klaus Scholtz in 600 miles south of the Equator. Patrolling the once-rich hunting grounds off Freetown, Klaus Scholtz in U-108 U-108 and and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Gunter Kuhnke in holder Gunter Kuhnke in U-125 U-125 were outwitted by British intelligence and ASW forces. Neither boat sank a single ship. were outwitted by British intelligence and ASW forces. Neither boat sank a single ship.

The second wave of four boats had better luck-at first. Southbound off the coast of Africa on September 21, Donitz's son-in-law Gunter Hessler in U-107 U-107 found a northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 87. It was composed of eleven big ships and five ill-trained, ill-equipped escorts, led by the ex-Coast Guard cutter found a northbound convoy, Sierra Leone 87. It was composed of eleven big ships and five ill-trained, ill-equipped escorts, led by the ex-Coast Guard cutter Gorleston. Gorleston. Inexplicably, the escorts had not topped off fuel tanks in Freetown; none was fully combat-ready. Inexplicably, the escorts had not topped off fuel tanks in Freetown; none was fully combat-ready.

When Hessler reported the convoy, Donitz ordered him to shadow until he could bring up the other three southbound boats of the second wave. The first to arrive was Karl Friedrich Merten in U-68 U-68, making his first patrol in South Atlantic waters. In the early hours of September 22, Hessler and Merten attacked the convoy. All four of Hessler's torpedoes malfunctioned or missed, after which an engine failed, forcing him to withdraw for repairs. Merten fired three torpedoes. He claimed sinking two ships for 14,000 tons and damage to a 7,000-ton tanker. In fact, he sank no ships, but hit and severely damaged the 5,300-ton British freighter Silverbelle Silverbelle.

The escorts fired star shells and churned around, but they mounted no organized counterattack. Three of the five, including Gorleston Gorleston, stood by the damaged Silverbelle Silverbelle, whose crew was desperately attempting to make repairs. Falling well behind the convoy, Gorleston Gorleston took took Silverbelle Silverbelle in tow until Derby House ordered her, as well as the corvette in tow until Derby House ordered her, as well as the corvette Gardenia Gardenia, to rejoin the convoy forthwith. Another of the escorts, the small Free French minesweeper Commandant Duboc Commandant Duboc, took Silverbelle Silverbelle in tow. A week later in tow. A week later Duboc Duboc ran low on fuel and was forced to return to Freetown with ran low on fuel and was forced to return to Freetown with Silverbelle Silverbelle's crew, leaving the hulk still afloat.

Early the following night a third southbound boat caught up with the convoy. She was U-103 U-103, commanded by Werner Winter, age twenty-nine, making his first full Atlantic patrol as a skipper. He closed the formation after dark, fired a salvo of five torpedoes, and claimed sinking four ships for 24,000 tons and damage to another of 6,000 tons. In reality, he hit and sank two big freighters for 10,600 tons. The three escorts, including the corvette Gardenia Gardenia, rescued survivors, but again conducted no counterattacks. Low on fuel, Gardenia Gardenia departed when the departed when the Gorleston Gorleston caught up, leaving a total of three escorts and eight merchant ships. caught up, leaving a total of three escorts and eight merchant ships.

Merten in U-68 U-68 closed that night for his second attack. He saw a damaged freighter and a damaged tanker, he reported later, but he bravely chose to attack one of the "destroyers." He set up on and fired at one "destroyer," but both torpedoes missed. It was then discovered that closed that night for his second attack. He saw a damaged freighter and a damaged tanker, he reported later, but he bravely chose to attack one of the "destroyers." He set up on and fired at one "destroyer," but both torpedoes missed. It was then discovered that U-68 U-68's batteries were too low to permit a dive, so Merten was forced to break off the attack, withdraw, and commence a battery charge.

The fourth and last boat to arrive was the U-67 U-67, commanded by Gunther Muller-Stockheim, age twenty-seven. Commissioned on January 22, 1941, under the command of Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt (who later went to holder Heinrich Bleichrodt (who later went to U-109 U-109), the U-67 U-67 had been diverted during the spring and summer to R&D experiments. had been diverted during the spring and summer to R&D experiments.* Until now, she had not made a real war patrol and her long-suffering crew was eager for a kill. Until now, she had not made a real war patrol and her long-suffering crew was eager for a kill.

As Muller-Stockheim closed to attack, a valve in the main ballast-tank air manifold failed. The engineer logged in his personal diary: "I had to report to the commander that other minor defects had occurred and that the boat was not fully fit to dive." Undeterred, Muller-Stockheim pressed the attack, firing three torpedoes at what he believed to be a 7,000-ton ship. He hit and sank a 3,800-ton British freighter, which went down so quickly that it capsized and sucked under its three lifeboats. The escorts rescued the survivors but again conducted no counterattack.

Having repaired his engines, Gunter Hessler in U-107 U-107 caught up with the convoy in the early hours of September 24. In this second attack, he claimed sinking three ships for 26,000 tons, including a 13,000-ton tanker. He actually sank three freighters for 13,600 tons. In his report to Kerneval, Hessler stated that only one ship of the convoy remained and that it was closely guarded by escorts. caught up with the convoy in the early hours of September 24. In this second attack, he claimed sinking three ships for 26,000 tons, including a 13,000-ton tanker. He actually sank three freighters for 13,600 tons. In his report to Kerneval, Hessler stated that only one ship of the convoy remained and that it was closely guarded by escorts.

Upon receiving Hessler's report, Donitz called off the attack, well pleased at the results. Based on reports from the four boats, he estimated they had positively sunk five ships for 41,000 tons, possibly sunk four more for 24,000 tons, and damaged two for 12,000 tons. Hence, he logged, the entire convoy, "except one ship," was "wiped out." In reality, the four U-boats had sunk only about half of the convoy: six of the eleven ships for 28,000 tons. At that time a seventh ship, Silver-belle Silver-belle, under tow by Duboc Duboc, was still struggling to stay afloat.

In due course the remaining four ships of Sierra Leone 87, escorted by Gorleston Gorleston and two other escorts, reached the British Isles. The failure of the escorts to prepare properly for the mission and to carry out vigorous counterattacks drew harsh criticism from Derby House. An account of the failures was circulated to ASW forces as an example of what not to do, and Derby House took steps to ensure that the skipper of and two other escorts, reached the British Isles. The failure of the escorts to prepare properly for the mission and to carry out vigorous counterattacks drew harsh criticism from Derby House. An account of the failures was circulated to ASW forces as an example of what not to do, and Derby House took steps to ensure that the skipper of Gorleston Gorleston did not again command an escort group. did not again command an escort group.

The four boats that had attacked Sierra Leone 87 went separate ways. Winter in U-103 U-103 and Hessler in and Hessler in U-107 U-107 proceeded independently to patrol off Freetown. Also outwitted by British intelligence and ASW forces, neither boat sank another ship. Muller-Stockheim in proceeded independently to patrol off Freetown. Also outwitted by British intelligence and ASW forces, neither boat sank another ship. Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 and Merten in and Merten in U-68 U-68 could not immediately go further south. A man on could not immediately go further south. A man on U-67 U-67 was ill with a venereal disease; Merten in was ill with a venereal disease; Merten in U-68 U-68 had fired most of his torpedoes. had fired most of his torpedoes.

When apprised of the situations on U-67 U-67 and and U-68 U-68, Kerneval directed the two boats to rendezvous with Kleinschmidt's U-111 U-111, which was en route home from the South Atlantic. The plan was that a doctor on board U-68 U-68 was to examine the sick man on was to examine the sick man on U-67 U-67. If the doctor could not administer a cure, the man was to return to France on U-111. U-111. At the same time, Merten in At the same time, Merten in U-68 U-68 was to take on torpedoes from was to take on torpedoes from U-111. U-111. In that way both In that way both U-67 U-67 and and U-68 U-68 could resume their voyages to the South Atlantic. could resume their voyages to the South Atlantic.

Kerneval ordered the three boats to rendezvous in a remote area: Tarafal Bay, Santo Anto Island, in the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands. The British codebreakers intercepted several messages relating to the rendezvous, including an indiscreet one from Kleinschmidt in U-111 U-111, which mentioned Tarafal Bay by name. The Admiralty ordered the big River River-class submarine Clyde Clyde, commanded by David Ingram, which was on ASW patrol in the Canary Islands, to go to Tarafal Bay and attempt to sink all three U-boats.

This order to act tactically on Enigma information was risky. Until then the Germans had not used the Cape Verde Islands for U-boat operations. Should Clyde Clyde fail to sink all three boats, a report of her appearance in remote Tarafal Bay at the exact moment of the first U-boat rendezvous there was certain to raise deep suspicion in Germany that Enigma had been compromised. fail to sink all three boats, a report of her appearance in remote Tarafal Bay at the exact moment of the first U-boat rendezvous there was certain to raise deep suspicion in Germany that Enigma had been compromised.

As scheduled, Merten in U-68 U-68 and Kleinschmidt in and Kleinschmidt in U-111 U-111 arrived in the bay on the evening of September 27. The boats anchored side by side about 200 yards offshore. While Merten and Kleinschmidt had dinner, the crews transferred four torpedoes from arrived in the bay on the evening of September 27. The boats anchored side by side about 200 yards offshore. While Merten and Kleinschmidt had dinner, the crews transferred four torpedoes from U-111 U-111's topside canisters to U-68 U-68. Neither skipper felt quite at ease in those confined, unknown waters. Shortly before midnight both boats got under way and stood out to sea, intending to return the following night to meet Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67.

At that same moment, Clyde Clyde nosed into Tarafal Bay on the surface. Her bridge watch saw nosed into Tarafal Bay on the surface. Her bridge watch saw U-68 U-68 and Ingram turned to shoot a bow salvo. Before he could fire, however, he caught sight of and Ingram turned to shoot a bow salvo. Before he could fire, however, he caught sight of U-111 U-111. Believing U-111 U-111 was coming in to ram, Ingram broke off the attack on was coming in to ram, Ingram broke off the attack on U-68 U-68 and turned to deal with and turned to deal with U-111 U-111. But when Kleinschmidt in U-111 U-111 saw saw Clyde Clyde, he elected to crash-dive rather than ram, a decision that drew harsh criticism from his men. Clyde Clyde passed directly over passed directly over U-111 U-111, with mere inches between the two hulls.

When U-111 U-111 disappeared from view, Ingram resumed his attack on disappeared from view, Ingram resumed his attack on U-68 U-68, which was still unaware of his presence. Remaining on the surface, Ingram fired all six bow tubes at U-68 U-68, but Merten's alert bridge watch saw the torpedoes approaching and he turned U-68 U-68 on a parallel course and crash-dived. The torpedoes missed, but two hit the distant shore and exploded. Confronting two alerted, submerged U-boats, Ingram dived on a parallel course and crash-dived. The torpedoes missed, but two hit the distant shore and exploded. Confronting two alerted, submerged U-boats, Ingram dived Clyde Clyde to reload his torpedo tubes and search for his quarry by hydrophone. to reload his torpedo tubes and search for his quarry by hydrophone.

While the three submarines were submerged in the bay, groping blindly for one another, a fourth was entering on the surface. She was Muller-Stockheim's U-67 U-67. When he heard the two torpedo detonations, he was shocked and puzzled-and promptly dived. He picked up the swish of propellers on his hydrophones, but could see nothing through his periscope. Prudently he decided to surface and withdraw to open sea.

Shortly after U-67 U-67 surfaced, Muller-Stockheim caught sight of a "shadow" on his port bow. This was surfaced, Muller-Stockheim caught sight of a "shadow" on his port bow. This was Clyde Clyde, which had reloaded tubes and surfaced with her deck gun manned. Ingram saw U-67 U-67 at the same moment and turned at the same moment and turned Clyde Clyde to ram. Recognizing the "shadow" as a big to ram. Recognizing the "shadow" as a big River River-class British submarine on a collision course, Muller-Stockheim backed his engines emergency power and put the rudder hard over. The result was that U-67 U-67 avoided being rammed but unintentionally hit avoided being rammed but unintentionally hit Clyde Clyde a glancing blow in her stern. a glancing blow in her stern.

The two submarines broke clear and dived. Clyde Clyde was not seriously damaged; was not seriously damaged; U-67 U-67 was a mess. Her bow was bent around at a 90 degree angle and three of her-four bow torpedo tubes were inoperable and leaking. Since the crew could not repair the damage, she had to abort and return to France, taking the man with venereal disease who was partly responsible for this disastrous rendezvous. was a mess. Her bow was bent around at a 90 degree angle and three of her-four bow torpedo tubes were inoperable and leaking. Since the crew could not repair the damage, she had to abort and return to France, taking the man with venereal disease who was partly responsible for this disastrous rendezvous.

During the ensuing day-September 28-the four submarines hauled out to sea and scattered. Muller-Stockheim in U-67 U-67 got off the first report to Kerneval: He had heard "two explosions" in the bay and had collided with a British submarine and had to abort. Fearing that got off the first report to Kerneval: He had heard "two explosions" in the bay and had collided with a British submarine and had to abort. Fearing that Clyde Clyde had sunk had sunk U-68 U-68 or or U-111 U-111 or both, Donitz asked for position reports. Kleinschmidt spoke up to report that a British submarine had indeed fouled the rendezvous and that it had attacked and may have sunk or both, Donitz asked for position reports. Kleinschmidt spoke up to report that a British submarine had indeed fouled the rendezvous and that it had attacked and may have sunk U-68 U-68. Merten in U-68 U-68 finally reported that he was finally reported that he was not not sunk or damaged and that he had taken on torpedoes from sunk or damaged and that he had taken on torpedoes from U-111 U-111 and wished to continue his patrol to the South Atlantic. Since the damaged and wished to continue his patrol to the South Atlantic. Since the damaged U-67 U-67 had to return to France, Merten requested a second rendezvous with her to take off whatever fuel and torpedoes she could spare. Kerneval arranged the second meet in a remote cove on the coast of Africa in Vichy French Mauritania. The had to return to France, Merten requested a second rendezvous with her to take off whatever fuel and torpedoes she could spare. Kerneval arranged the second meet in a remote cove on the coast of Africa in Vichy French Mauritania. The U-67 U-67 then limped back to France and the then limped back to France and the U-68 U-68 proceeded to the South Atlantic. proceeded to the South Atlantic.

After leaving the Cape Verde Islands, Kleinschmidt in the homebound U-111 U-111 set a course for France. Since his track was to take him west of the Canary Islands, close to the place where the boats of the second wave had attacked Sierra Leone 87, Kerneval directed him to be on the lookout for the abandoned hulk of set a course for France. Since his track was to take him west of the Canary Islands, close to the place where the boats of the second wave had attacked Sierra Leone 87, Kerneval directed him to be on the lookout for the abandoned hulk of Silverbelle Silverbelle, wrecked by Merten in U-68 U-68.

While looking for the hulk on the morning of October 4, Kleinschmidt saw smoke on the horizon. Believing he had found a big freighter, he turned U-111 U-111 to attack. The smoke was coming from a coal-burning armed trawler, to attack. The smoke was coming from a coal-burning armed trawler, Lady Shirley Lady Shirley, which had come out from Gibraltar to salvage Silverbelle Silverbelle or, possibly acting on Ultra information (the records are not clear), to intercept or, possibly acting on Ultra information (the records are not clear), to intercept U-111 U-111. As U-111 U-111 closed, the lookout on closed, the lookout on Lady Shirley Lady Shirley spotted her conning tower at a distance of about ten miles. The lookout thought it was the funnel of a merchant ship, but spotted her conning tower at a distance of about ten miles. The lookout thought it was the funnel of a merchant ship, but Lady Shirley Lady Shirley's captain, A. H. Callaway, turned toward the object on the "off chance" that it might be a U-boat. Still believing the trawler was a big freighter, Kleinschmidt dived to position U-111 U-111 for a submerged torpedo attack. Listening to for a submerged torpedo attack. Listening to Lady Shirley Lady Shirley's screws, the hydrophone operator warned Kleinschmidt that the target was a small ship drawing very close, but Kleinschmidt stubbornly clung to his conviction that she was big and pretty far off.

Coming up pinging, Lady Shirley Lady Shirley got a good sonar contact at 1,600 yards. She ran in and dropped four depth charges, two set for 150 feet, two set for 250 feet. These exploded while got a good sonar contact at 1,600 yards. She ran in and dropped four depth charges, two set for 150 feet, two set for 250 feet. These exploded while U-111 U-111 was still at periscope depth-fifty feet-and did little damage. In response to this rude and shocking development, Kleinschmidt ordered a gun action. He surfaced was still at periscope depth-fifty feet-and did little damage. In response to this rude and shocking development, Kleinschmidt ordered a gun action. He surfaced U-111 U-111 close to close to Lady Shirley Lady Shirley, but both diesels malfunctioned and the engine room filled with dense choking smoke, impeding repairs and making another dive inadvisable.

Thus crippled, Kleinschmidt attempted to proceed with the gun action. But Lady Shirley Lady Shirley was bearing in, firing her 4" gun and smaller weapons. Kleinschmidt got his 20mm gun on the bridge manned, but the close, accurate, and continuous fire from was bearing in, firing her 4" gun and smaller weapons. Kleinschmidt got his 20mm gun on the bridge manned, but the close, accurate, and continuous fire from Lady Shirley Lady Shirley prevented the Germans from running down onto the main deck to man prevented the Germans from running down onto the main deck to man U-111 U-111's 4.1" gun.

Like two sailing ships of yore, the Lady Shirley Lady Shirley and and U-111 U-111 lay side by side, pumping shells at one another from point-blank range. Having seized the initiative, Callaway in lay side by side, pumping shells at one another from point-blank range. Having seized the initiative, Callaway in Lady Shirley Lady Shirley never relinquished it, and the German gunners could not get to the big deck gun. In the exchange of fire, never relinquished it, and the German gunners could not get to the big deck gun. In the exchange of fire, Lady Shirley Lady Shirley incurred five casualties (one killed, four wounded) in her fourteen-man crew, but she killed seven Germans, including the 20mm gunner and all three line officers: Kleinschmidt, first watch officer Helmut Fuchs, and second watch officer Friedrich Wilhelm Rosing, younger brother of incurred five casualties (one killed, four wounded) in her fourteen-man crew, but she killed seven Germans, including the 20mm gunner and all three line officers: Kleinschmidt, first watch officer Helmut Fuchs, and second watch officer Friedrich Wilhelm Rosing, younger brother of Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Hans-Rudolf Rosing, who was then commanding Combat Flotilla 3 in La Pallice. holder Hans-Rudolf Rosing, who was then commanding Combat Flotilla 3 in La Pallice.

Upon the death of the three officers, a prospective commanding officer, Hans Joachim Heinecke, who had been helping with the malfunctioning diesels, assumed command of U-111 U-111 and ordered her abandoned and scuttled. The engineer opened the vents and the forty-five survivors, including five wounded, jumped overboard. Nineteen minutes after the start of the gun battle, and ordered her abandoned and scuttled. The engineer opened the vents and the forty-five survivors, including five wounded, jumped overboard. Nineteen minutes after the start of the gun battle, U-111 U-111 plunged under for the last time. plunged under for the last time.

The triumphant little Lady Shirley Lady Shirley fished the survivors from the water and set a course for Gibraltar. One of the wounded Germans who had lost a leg died en route and was buried at sea, leaving forty-four of the fifty-two-man crew. The survivors were shocked and humiliated that Kleinschmidt, a merchant marine veteran, had mistaken a trawler for a big freighter and that the big and powerful fished the survivors from the water and set a course for Gibraltar. One of the wounded Germans who had lost a leg died en route and was buried at sea, leaving forty-four of the fifty-two-man crew. The survivors were shocked and humiliated that Kleinschmidt, a merchant marine veteran, had mistaken a trawler for a big freighter and that the big and powerful U-111 U-111 had been bested by a lowly British trawler manned by fourteen men. had been bested by a lowly British trawler manned by fourteen men.

As in the case of U-570 U-570 and and U-501 U-501, from which German prisoners had been taken recently, British intelligence officers noted well the inexperience of the U-111 U-111 crew. Kleinschmidt, who came from torpedo boats and cruisers, had been in the submarine arm only one year. The first watch officer, Fuchs, age twenty-four, had been in the Navy only four years. Normally a second watch officer, Fuchs was temporarily serving in the higher post because the regular first watch officer had injured himself ashore and did not sail. Rosing, crew of 1936, was actually a year senior to Fuchs, but he had only recently transferred from the crew. Kleinschmidt, who came from torpedo boats and cruisers, had been in the submarine arm only one year. The first watch officer, Fuchs, age twenty-four, had been in the Navy only four years. Normally a second watch officer, Fuchs was temporarily serving in the higher post because the regular first watch officer had injured himself ashore and did not sail. Rosing, crew of 1936, was actually a year senior to Fuchs, but he had only recently transferred from the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe and had no prior experience in submarines and was therefore serving as second watch officer. Among the petty officers, only five had served in submarines before joining and had no prior experience in submarines and was therefore serving as second watch officer. Among the petty officers, only five had served in submarines before joining U-111 U-111 but, as a British report put it, only two of the five would have been considered "experienced" by prewar standards. Some of the enlisted men had been in the Navy only ten months. but, as a British report put it, only two of the five would have been considered "experienced" by prewar standards. Some of the enlisted men had been in the Navy only ten months.

Despite repeated assurances from the OKM to the contrary, the appearance of the British submarine Clyde Clyde in Tarafal Bay fouling the rendezvous of in Tarafal Bay fouling the rendezvous of U-67, U-68 U-67, U-68, and U-111 U-111 convinced Donitz that the British were reading naval Enigma. He logged on September 28: "It appears improbable that an English submarine would be in such an isolated area by convinced Donitz that the British were reading naval Enigma. He logged on September 28: "It appears improbable that an English submarine would be in such an isolated area by accident. accident. It is more likely that our cipher material is compromised or that there has been a break of security." Accordingly, an emergency modification to naval Enigma was put into effect on October 1, which blinded Bletchley Park. But within seven days British codebreakers broke back into Enigma and read it currently until October 12, when, as related, another blackout of two days occurred. It is more likely that our cipher material is compromised or that there has been a break of security." Accordingly, an emergency modification to naval Enigma was put into effect on October 1, which blinded Bletchley Park. But within seven days British codebreakers broke back into Enigma and read it currently until October 12, when, as related, another blackout of two days occurred.

Prodded by Donitz, the chief of Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine communications, Vice Admiral Maertens, intensified his new and supposedly comprehensive investigation into Enigma security. On October 24 Maertens turned in an eighteen-page report to the OKM and Donitz in which he reaffirmed Berlin's unshakable belief that Enigma was safe. Maertens dismissed the appearance of communications, Vice Admiral Maertens, intensified his new and supposedly comprehensive investigation into Enigma security. On October 24 Maertens turned in an eighteen-page report to the OKM and Donitz in which he reaffirmed Berlin's unshakable belief that Enigma was safe. Maertens dismissed the appearance of Clyde Clyde at Tarafal Bay as doubtless the result of a routine ASW patrol. Had the British planned a "trap" based on Enigma decryptions, he wrote, they would certainly have sent more than one submarine. He likewise dismissed other worrisome events that Donitz had described, attributing them to British DFing or sightings by enemy and neutral ships and aircraft. As to the possibility that the British had recovered the Enigma from the captured at Tarafal Bay as doubtless the result of a routine ASW patrol. Had the British planned a "trap" based on Enigma decryptions, he wrote, they would certainly have sent more than one submarine. He likewise dismissed other worrisome events that Donitz had described, attributing them to British DFing or sightings by enemy and neutral ships and aircraft. As to the possibility that the British had recovered the Enigma from the captured U-570 U-570, he could not say positively one way or the other, but there was as yet no evidence they had, and in any case, U-570 U-570 carried Enigma keys that were to expire soon. carried Enigma keys that were to expire soon.

The Maertens investigation was slipshod. The American historian Timothy Mulligan, who unearthed the Maertens report, aptly wrote in his analysis that by focusing narrowly on the Tarafal Bay incident and several others, Maertens altogether neglected the main point: the difficulty U-boats had in finding convoys on the North Atlantic run from Canada to the British Isles and vice versa.

It may well be that Maertens viewed the investigation as a waste of time-old history. Two steps were already afoot to greatly increase the security of U-boat codes: * Commencing about October 5, U-boats were to begin using a special Enigma net, separate from the standard Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine Home Waters net ( Home Waters net (Heimisch; Dolphin in Britain). The Germans called the new U-boat net Dolphin in Britain). The Germans called the new U-boat net Triton; Triton; the British called it Shark. Access to the British called it Shark. Access to Triton Triton (Shark) other than by operating U-boats was to be severely limited to eight naval commands and the six Atlantic U-boat combat flotillas. U-boat crewmen not on patrol were barred from listening to the circuit. No weather ships, of course, were to use the (Shark) other than by operating U-boats was to be severely limited to eight naval commands and the six Atlantic U-boat combat flotillas. U-boat crewmen not on patrol were barred from listening to the circuit. No weather ships, of course, were to use the Triton Triton (Shark) net, so the chance of again capturing the keys, other than from a U-boat (a la (Shark) net, so the chance of again capturing the keys, other than from a U-boat (a la U-110 U-110), was remote.

* A new Enigma machine employing four rotors on the axle (rather than three) was nearly ready for distribution to U-boats for use on the Triton Triton (Shark) net. The Germans believed that by employing a fourth rotor and by changing the selection and order of all four rotors frequently, the naval Enigma would be even more difficult-indeed, impossible-to break by the most sophisticated and ingenious mathematical theories. The enemy would have to capture both a four-rotor machine and the daily keys. If the keys were also changed frequently, success from captures would be at best short-lived. (Shark) net. The Germans believed that by employing a fourth rotor and by changing the selection and order of all four rotors frequently, the naval Enigma would be even more difficult-indeed, impossible-to break by the most sophisticated and ingenious mathematical theories. The enemy would have to capture both a four-rotor machine and the daily keys. If the keys were also changed frequently, success from captures would be at best short-lived.

British codebreakers at Bletchley Park had found clues in Heimisch Heimisch (Dolphin) traffic that a new Enigma net for U-boats ( (Dolphin) traffic that a new Enigma net for U-boats (Triton, or Shark) and a new machine employing four rotors were in preparation. On October 7, after intercepting some early German tests of Triton Triton (Shark) traffic in four-rotor Enigma, which proved to be unbreakable, they described it as "an ominous sign of worse things to come." They warned that Shark could not be broken without a new, complex, high-speed "four-rotor" bombe, but, the official British historian wrote, they failed to stress the urgency of designing and building such a bombe. Some even doubted that a workable four-rotor bombe could be built. (Shark) traffic in four-rotor Enigma, which proved to be unbreakable, they described it as "an ominous sign of worse things to come." They warned that Shark could not be broken without a new, complex, high-speed "four-rotor" bombe, but, the official British historian wrote, they failed to stress the urgency of designing and building such a bombe. Some even doubted that a workable four-rotor bombe could be built.

In fact, Bletchley Park was neither mentally nor physically capable of confronting a new challenge of this magnitude. Its chief cryptanalysts, Gordon Welch-man and Alan Turing (in Hut 6 and Hut 8), were utterly swamped with work and exhausted; the dozen "three-rotor" bombes in operation were incapable of absorbing further loads. Moreover, owing to the need for utmost secrecy, the importance of the work at Bletchley Park was not appreciated or understood by those not in the picture and, as a result, London bureaucrats had not given the codebreakers the support they required and deserved. On October 21 Welchman and Turing and two other senior cryptanalysts sent an extraordinary letter directly to Churchill, begging for help. They pointed out that owing to "shortage of staff" and "overworking," the naval team in Hut 8 had to cease night shifts, with the result that "the finding of the [Enigma] naval keys is being delayed at least twelve hours every day." A similar situation existed in Hut 6, which was working on Luftwaffe Luftwaffe and and Wehrmacht Wehrmacht Enigma. Enigma.

In response to the letter, Churchill directed that Bletchley Park be given "all they want on extreme priority." The shortages of personnel were swiftly overcome, but the difficult-perhaps impossible-four-rotor bombe was not pursued with vigor. It was not until December that anyone tackled a possible design; another month passed before a technical team could be assembled to pursue this daunting task.

IN S SUPPORT OF R ROMMEL.

Berlin rightly worried about the Mediterranean Basin. The Italian naval and air forces had failed to gain control of this vital strategic area. Capitalizing on breaks in Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Enigma, which directed German aircraft to escort specific convoys, British aircraft, surface ships, and submarines had cut heavily into the flow of supplies from Italy to German and Italian forces in North Africa. The lack of supplies had prevented Rommel's Enigma, which directed German aircraft to escort specific convoys, British aircraft, surface ships, and submarines had cut heavily into the flow of supplies from Italy to German and Italian forces in North Africa. The lack of supplies had prevented Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps from capturing bypassed Tobruk and had undermined the ability of Axis forces to repulse a possible British offensive. Moreover, a belief persisted in Berlin that the British were preparing an amphibious landing behind Axis forces-in Algiers and Oran-to trap Rommel between giant pincers. from capturing bypassed Tobruk and had undermined the ability of Axis forces to repulse a possible British offensive. Moreover, a belief persisted in Berlin that the British were preparing an amphibious landing behind Axis forces-in Algiers and Oran-to trap Rommel between giant pincers.

To cope with this increasingly perilous situation, the OKM directed that in addition to the six U-boats ordered to the Mediterranean in September, Donitz must do everything possible to interdict the flow of British supplies to the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar.

Donitz was reluctant to comply. He continued to view the war in the Mediterranean as a distant second in importance to the war in the North Atlantic. Based on the small size and small number of ships in the Gibraltar convoys, he did not believe the flow of supplies from the British Isles via Gibraltar to be all that significant. The bulk of British supplies, he argued correctly, went to Egypt via Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Cape Town, South Africa. Moreover, the U-boat attacks on Gibraltar Convoys 70 and 71 in August had shown that those convoys were very heavily protected by air and surface escorts, so much so that they could almost be viewed as U-boat traps. Only the most experienced U-boat skippers had any chance of success against them and, as the attacks in August had shown, the chances were slight. Those experienced skippers were urgently needed in the North Atlantic, where the opportunities for delivering a meaningful blow at Great Britain's lifelines were greater and the risks smaller.

The upshot was a compromise. Donitz was to continue the U-boat war against the Gibraltar convoys; however, the boats, organized into smaller groups of about eight, were to be deployed much farther offshore where British air patrols were less intense and where the U-boats might also intercept Outbound South convoys en route to Sierra Leone, inbound Sierra Leone convoys, and military convoys outbound via Cape Town to Egypt, known as Winston Specials. The packs could be temporarily reinforced, as required by boats outbound to the North Atlantic or by those with sufficient fuel and torpedoes homebound to France. The Bordeaux-based Condors were to assist the packs in hunting and tracking convoys.

For the first three weeks of September, the hunt for Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys was fruitless. The boats and Condors found several, but owing to the ability of the British to read naval Enigma and thus to evade U-boat patrol lines and to miserable weather, neither of the first two packs, group Bosemuller Bosemuller (seven boats) and group (seven boats) and group Kurfurst Kurfurst (eight boats) sank a ship. As the boats departed for other tasks or to France, the remainder were regrouped into a single pack, group (eight boats) sank a ship. As the boats departed for other tasks or to France, the remainder were regrouped into a single pack, group Seewolf Seewolf, but it had no success either. On September 14, Coastal Command aircraft (as yet unidentified) bombed and seriously damaged two VIICs of this pack, Gerd Schreiber's veteran U-95 U-95 and Robert Bartels's and Robert Bartels's U-561 U-561, forcing both to abort.

Soon after group Seewolf Seewolf dissolved, an Italian boat operating west of Gibraltar reported a northbound convoy. This was Homebound Gibraltar 73, consisting of twenty-five ships, escorted by a destroyer, two sloops, eight corvettes, and the fighter-catapult ship dissolved, an Italian boat operating west of Gibraltar reported a northbound convoy. This was Homebound Gibraltar 73, consisting of twenty-five ships, escorted by a destroyer, two sloops, eight corvettes, and the fighter-catapult ship Springbank. Springbank. Only three U-boats were close enough to intercept and attack this convoy, but one of these, Only three U-boats were close enough to intercept and attack this convoy, but one of these, U-371 U-371, commanded by Heinrich Driver, was en route to the Mediterranean under orders not to attack any ships in the Atlantic.

Driver passed close to the convoy and reported its position. His report enabled Donitz to put the other two boats on the convoy track. Fresh from France, these boats were U-124 U-124 under command of twenty-five-year-old Johann Mohr, the boat's former first watch officer, and under command of twenty-five-year-old Johann Mohr, the boat's former first watch officer, and U-201 U-201, commanded by Adalbert Schnee, who had won a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for his dogged attack on Gibraltar 71 in August. The for his dogged attack on Gibraltar 71 in August. The U-124 U-124 was a IXB, a type that Donitz considered to be too large, slow-diving, and too clumsy for attacks on the very heavily escorted Gibraltar convoys, but he had utmost confidence in young Mohr. was a IXB, a type that Donitz considered to be too large, slow-diving, and too clumsy for attacks on the very heavily escorted Gibraltar convoys, but he had utmost confidence in young Mohr.

Taking up a waiting position about 600 miles west of the English Channel on the afternoon of September 20, Mohr detected smoke on the horizon. It was a convoy, but not the one he was expecting. This one was Outbound Gibraltar 74, southbound from the British Isles. Composed of twenty-seven ships, it was escorted by a sloop, five corvettes, and the "jeep" carrier Audacity Audacity, on her maiden voyage in convoy duty. Upon receiving Mohr's report, Donitz directed him to shadow and send beacons to bring up the only other boat in the area, Schnee's U-201. U-201.

Mohr shadowed until Schnee made contact, then attacked after dark on September 20. In his first salvo, he fired three torpedoes and got three hits. He claimed sinking two freighters for 15,000 tons and damage to an 8,000-ton tanker. In reality he sank two small freighters for 4,200 tons total and did no harm to the "tanker." The merchant ships lit the sky with brilliant new star shells, called snowflakes,* and chased and chased U-124 U-124 off and down. off and down.

The next day, while Mohr in U-124 U-124 and Schnee in and Schnee in U-201 U-201 maneuvered to close after dark, Donitz sent out Condors to attack the convoy. In response, maneuvered to close after dark, Donitz sent out Condors to attack the convoy. In response, Audacity Audacity launched her six Martlets (the British version of the American-built Grumman Wildcat). One of the Martlets shot down a Condor-the first aerial victory for a "jeep" carrier in the war-and another machine-gunned launched her six Martlets (the British version of the American-built Grumman Wildcat). One of the Martlets shot down a Condor-the first aerial victory for a "jeep" carrier in the war-and another machine-gunned U-124 U-124 or or U-201 U-201, forcing one or the other to dive. However, one of the Condors bombed and sank a freighter that had fallen behind while rescuing the crews of the two ships Mohr had sunk.

Mohr and Schnee closed on the convoy after dark from opposite sides. Mohr set up on three ships, intending to fire two torpedoes at each. As he was on the point of shooting, all three ships blew up and sank. Schnee, as Mohr reported to Donitz, had beat him to the punch. Schnee claimed sinking 14,000 tons, but the three ships totaled only 4,500 tons. Harassed by escorts and the Martlets from Audacity Audacity, neither boat was able to make another attack.

Total damage to Outbound Gibraltar 74 by Mohr and Schnee: five ships for 8,700 tons.

The fortuitous encounter with Outbound Gibraltar 74 was all well and good, but the main assignment for U-124 U-124 and and U-201 U-201 was the heavily escorted, Home-bound Gibraltar 73, which the Italian boats were still stalking and reporting. Astonishingly, the convoy appeared to be headed directly into the area where Mohr and Schnee had attacked Outbound Gibraltar 74. On September 24 Donitz sent Condors out to check on the Italian reports. The aircraft confirmed the convoy's position and course, adding that the Italians had attacked it, sinking and/or damaging three ships. was the heavily escorted, Home-bound Gibraltar 73, which the Italian boats were still stalking and reporting. Astonishingly, the convoy appeared to be headed directly into the area where Mohr and Schnee had attacked Outbound Gibraltar 74. On September 24 Donitz sent Condors out to check on the Italian reports. The aircraft confirmed the convoy's position and course, adding that the Italians had attacked it, sinking and/or damaging three ships.* Two other VIIs sailing from France, Rolf Mutzelburg's Two other VIIs sailing from France, Rolf Mutzelburg's U-203 U-203 and Franz-Georg Reschke's and Franz-Georg Reschke's U-205 U-205, were directed to reinforce Mohr and Schnee.

Homing on the Condor beacon signals, Mohr in U-124 U-124 was first to make contact with Homebound Gibraltar 73, closing the ships in heavy seas and rain on the morning of September 25. First he shot two torpedoes at what he claimed to be a cruiser, but which was probably a destroyer. Both missed. Then he fired one torpedo at what he claimed to be a destroyer. It also missed. Finally, he fired two torpedoes at what he claimed to be a 12,000-ton tanker. Both torpedoes hit the target, but it was a 3,000-ton British freighter and it sank. was first to make contact with Homebound Gibraltar 73, closing the ships in heavy seas and rain on the morning of September 25. First he shot two torpedoes at what he claimed to be a cruiser, but which was probably a destroyer. Both missed. Then he fired one torpedo at what he claimed to be a destroyer. It also missed. Finally, he fired two torpedoes at what he claimed to be a 12,000-ton tanker. Both torpedoes hit the target, but it was a 3,000-ton British freighter and it sank.

Late that night, Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 came up to join Mohr, and both skippers attacked at about the same time. Mohr claimed sinking two more ships for 11,000 tons, but postwar records credited only two small British freighters for 2,700 tons. Mutzelburg claimed sinking a freighter and a tanker for 20,000 tons. Postwar records credited three small freighters for 7,700 tons. The escorts drove Mohr and Mutzelburg off and under. came up to join Mohr, and both skippers attacked at about the same time. Mohr claimed sinking two more ships for 11,000 tons, but postwar records credited only two small British freighters for 2,700 tons. Mutzelburg claimed sinking a freighter and a tanker for 20,000 tons. Postwar records credited three small freighters for 7,700 tons. The escorts drove Mohr and Mutzelburg off and under.

During September 26, Mohr and Mutzelburg doggedly clung to the convoy, bringing up Schnee in U-201 U-201 and Reschke in and Reschke in U-205. U-205. After dark, Mohr and Schnee attacked again. Firing off his remaining torpedoes, Mohr claimed sinking a ship of 3,000 tons and possible damage to another of 5,000 tons. Postwar records credited only a 1,800-ton freighter. Schnee claimed sinking a corvette and two freighters for 8,000 tons. No corvette was hit but the 5,200-ton fighter-catapult ship After dark, Mohr and Schnee attacked again. Firing off his remaining torpedoes, Mohr claimed sinking a ship of 3,000 tons and possible damage to another of 5,000 tons. Postwar records credited only a 1,800-ton freighter. Schnee claimed sinking a corvette and two freighters for 8,000 tons. No corvette was hit but the 5,200-ton fighter-catapult ship Springbank Springbank and another freighter of 2,500 tons went down. Still hanging on, the following night Schnee expended the last of his torpedoes, claiming two more freighters for 8,000 tons, but only one for 3,100 tons was confirmed. Mutzelburg in and another freighter of 2,500 tons went down. Still hanging on, the following night Schnee expended the last of his torpedoes, claiming two more freighters for 8,000 tons, but only one for 3,100 tons was confirmed. Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 had no chance to attack again. An aircraft "with United States markings" caught and bombed Reschke in had no chance to attack again. An aircraft "with United States markings" caught and bombed Reschke in U-205 U-205, forcing him to abort to France for repairs.

When Mohr, Schnee, and Mutzelburg radioed their sinking reports, Donitz was elated. Mohr claimed a total of six ships for 41,000 tons; Schnee seven ships for 30,000 tons plus a corvette; Mutzelburg two ships for 20,000 tons and possibly another. Total claims: fifteen ships for 91,000 tons plus a corvette definitely sunk; two other ships possibly sunk. By postwar accounting, Mohr had sunk six small ships for 11,700 tons, Schnee six small ships for 15,200 tons (and no corvette), and Mutzelburg three small ships for 7,700 tons. Confirmed totals: fifteen ships for 34,500 tons definitely sunk-five for 8,700 tons from Outbound Gibraltar 74 and ten for 25,800 tons from Homebound Gibraltar 73.

On October 2 a Condor found a southbound convoy, Outbound Gibraltar 75, and Donitz launched a half-dozen boats in pursuit. Hans-Werner Kraus in U-83 U-83 and Walter Flachsenberg in and Walter Flachsenberg in U-71 U-71 soon made contact and shadowed doggedly, sending beacon signals, but they were hampered by heavy weather and clever British evasions. Klaus Bargsten in soon made contact and shadowed doggedly, sending beacon signals, but they were hampered by heavy weather and clever British evasions. Klaus Bargsten in U-563 U-563 reestablished contact with the convoy close to the coast of Portugal, but it again evaded pursuit and reached Gibraltar on October 14 without the loss of a single merchant ship. Bravely trailing the ships right into the western approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar, Herbert Opitz in reestablished contact with the convoy close to the coast of Portugal, but it again evaded pursuit and reached Gibraltar on October 14 without the loss of a single merchant ship. Bravely trailing the ships right into the western approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar, Herbert Opitz in U-206 U-206 fired at and hit what he thought was a destroyer, but proved to be the British corvette fired at and hit what he thought was a destroyer, but proved to be the British corvette Fleur de Lys Fleur de Lys, which sank instantly with heavy loss of life.

The Germans had an efficient spy network in place in Algeciras, Spain, and directly across the Gibraltar Strait at Tangier, Morocco. The spies provided Berlin with precise information on Allied ship and convoy movements at Gibraltar and in the strait. Reading the Abwehr Abwehr Enigma net currently and fluently, the British were aware of the spy network, Enigma net currently and fluently, the British were aware of the spy network,* but they could do nothing to thwart its operations or to disguise the ship movements. but they could do nothing to thwart its operations or to disguise the ship movements.