The projected large growth in the Atlantic U-boat force did not occur in the fall of 1941. There were several reasons. Problems had mounted at home. There was a shortage of shipyard workers (estimated at 20,000) and torpedo-recovery vessels in the Training Command (only 300 rather than the 1,000 needed). The shortage of shipyard workers resulted in shoddy workmanship in some yards, and many U-boats had to return for extensive and time-consuming repairs before sailing to the Atlantic. The shortage of torpedo-recovery vessels delayed the boats in workup and reduced practice shooting from forty-three to twenty-six torpedoes. The shifting of some Agru Front Agru Front training flotilla from the eastern Baltic to Norwegian waters caused other delays and the workup period had to be lengthened from 90 days back to 120 days. As a result, many new U-boats were backing up in the Baltic and Norway, not yet fully fit for combat. In addition, eleven more new VIICs were diverted to the Arctic during the fall. training flotilla from the eastern Baltic to Norwegian waters caused other delays and the workup period had to be lengthened from 90 days back to 120 days. As a result, many new U-boats were backing up in the Baltic and Norway, not yet fully fit for combat. In addition, eleven more new VIICs were diverted to the Arctic during the fall.

On September 3, about half the Atlantic force was at sea on combat operations in the Atlantic. Apart from the boats in refit at French bases or routinely returning from patrol, many boats were unavailable for various reasons: * In response to orders from Hitler, six of the most experienced Type VIIs were being prepped at French bases for transfer to the Mediterranean.

* On orders from the OKM, six new VIIs were assigned to patrol the Arctic.

The first two, U-132 U-132 and and U-576 U-576, replaced the U-81 U-81 and and U-652 U-652, which transferred to the Atlantic force.

* On orders from the OKM, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Jurgen Oesten's holder Jurgen Oesten's U-106 U-106 was diverting to the Azores to escort the blockade-runner was diverting to the Azores to escort the blockade-runner Annaliese Essberger Annaliese Essberger into Bordeaux. into Bordeaux.*

* Three boats, commanded by veteran skippers, were aborting: Helmut Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73 with heavy bomb damage incurred off Iceland; Ernst Mengersen in with heavy bomb damage incurred off Iceland; Ernst Mengersen in U-101 U-101 with disabled engines; Nikolaus Clausen in the new with disabled engines; Nikolaus Clausen in the new U-129 U-129 with a suspected case of diphtheria. with a suspected case of diphtheria.

* Herbert Opitz's new U-206 U-206 was also aborting. Opitz had rescued six British airmen who had ditched their aircraft. Although Opitz insisted otherwise, Kerneval believed this act of humanity cramped the boat's fighting ability. was also aborting. Opitz had rescued six British airmen who had ditched their aircraft. Although Opitz insisted otherwise, Kerneval believed this act of humanity cramped the boat's fighting ability.

The assignment of fourteen new boats and two Arctic transfers to the Atlantic force in August enabled Donitz to deploy an unprecedented number of U-boats to the Atlantic areas. On September 3, thirty-six boats were on patrol or proceeding to patrol in three sectors: * A group, Markgraf Markgraf (fourteen boats), southeast of Greenland, to attack east-bound and westbound convoys on the North Atlantic run. (fourteen boats), southeast of Greenland, to attack east-bound and westbound convoys on the North Atlantic run.

* Two groups, Bosemuller Bosemuller (seven boats) and (seven boats) and Kurfurst Kurfurst (eight boats), well to the southwest of the British Isles and west of the Bay of Biscay and the Iberian Peninsula, to attack convoys inbound to or outbound from Gibraltar and Sierra Leone. (eight boats), well to the southwest of the British Isles and west of the Bay of Biscay and the Iberian Peninsula, to attack convoys inbound to or outbound from Gibraltar and Sierra Leone.

* Seven boats, patrolling independently in the South Atlantic, to attack shipping off Sierra Leone and elsewhere on the West African coast.

* Donitz and his staff were hopeful that notwithstanding the decreasing level of combat experience, the boats would find convoys and turn in good results. After a full year of blindness, German codebreakers at B-dienst B-dienst had penetrated the Royal Navy's main operational code (Number 2, had penetrated the Royal Navy's main operational code (Number 2, Koln Koln in Germany) and had made some progress in cracking a special naval code (Number 3, in Germany) and had made some progress in cracking a special naval code (Number 3, Munchen Munchen in Germany) employed jointly by Great Britain, Canada, and the United States for convoy operations. Although in Germany) employed jointly by Great Britain, Canada, and the United States for convoy operations. Although B-dienst B-dienst incurred the inevitable delays and failures of all codebreakers, the flow of information was deemed sufficient and timely enough to help in finding convoys. It was also hoped that the intelligence picture could be improved by the sighting and tracking reports of the Norwegian- and Bordeaux-based Condors, whose crews had become somewhat more proficient in navigation. incurred the inevitable delays and failures of all codebreakers, the flow of information was deemed sufficient and timely enough to help in finding convoys. It was also hoped that the intelligence picture could be improved by the sighting and tracking reports of the Norwegian- and Bordeaux-based Condors, whose crews had become somewhat more proficient in navigation.

To ensure the secrecy of the U-boat positions from the British, Donitz had introduced new and stringent measures. All U-boats were to be addressed by the surname of the skipper rather than by number (U-Topp for for U-552 U-552). Naval grid squares were to be double-enciphered, using encoding tables which were to be closely held and changed frequently. Shore stations were forbidden to keep charts of U-boat positions. A new Enigma for U-boats, employing a fourth internal rotor that vastly increased possible permutations, was nearly ready.*

Lacking naval Enigma keys for September, the British codebreakers could not read Heimisch Heimisch (Dolphin) traffic currently and fluently. But they had mastered the dockyard code, (Dolphin) traffic currently and fluently. But they had mastered the dockyard code, Werft Werft, and some weather-reporting codes. These and other sources provided sufficient cribs to enable Bletchley Park's bombes to break back into Heimisch Heimisch (Dolphin) with a delay of one or two days. This intelligence, combined with more sophisticated land-based HF/DF stations, Traffic Analysis, and RFP and TINA, and U-boat sightings by merchant ships, warships, and Coastal Command aircraft, and the knowledge of and insights into U-boat operations and tactics gained by complete access to Enigma traffic during the summer, enabled the Admiralty to continue evading the U-boats through the fall of 1941 with an astonishing degree of success. (Dolphin) with a delay of one or two days. This intelligence, combined with more sophisticated land-based HF/DF stations, Traffic Analysis, and RFP and TINA, and U-boat sightings by merchant ships, warships, and Coastal Command aircraft, and the knowledge of and insights into U-boat operations and tactics gained by complete access to Enigma traffic during the summer, enabled the Admiralty to continue evading the U-boats through the fall of 1941 with an astonishing degree of success.

THE N NORTH A ATLANTIC R RUN.

Owing to the great distance to Greenland waters, which severely limited the patrol time of the Type VII boats, to the fog on the Newfoundland Bank and other hazards to navigation, and to radio interference, Donitz had curtailed U-boat operations in that distant area in the summer of 1941. However, the intensified British ASW measures in Icelandic waters and in the Northwest Approaches-in particular the air patrols-persuaded Donitz to again shift the weight of North Atlantic operations westward toward Greenland, beyond reach of Iceland-based short-range Hudsons and the long-range Catalinas and Mariners. There was another advantage. Donitz knew that the inexperienced Canadians now escorted Sydney (or Slow) convoys between Canada and Iceland. The many green U-boat skippers and crews entering the Atlantic on maiden patrols stood a far better chance of success and survival against these convoys than others. There was another advantage. Donitz knew that the inexperienced Canadians now escorted Sydney (or Slow) convoys between Canada and Iceland. The many green U-boat skippers and crews entering the Atlantic on maiden patrols stood a far better chance of success and survival against these convoys than others.

Beginning with group Markgraf Markgraf, for the next seventy days-early September into early November-Donitz attempted to maintain one or more large groups in the waters southeast of Greenland. Because of the fuel limitations of the Type VIIs, the makeup of these wolf packs changed often, the new boats from Germany or France replacing the boats that were forced to terminate patrols.

Two new boats that had pioneered Arctic patrols in the summer, U-81 U-81 and and U-652 U-652, sailed from Trondheim to join the Markgraf Markgraf group. On the morning of September 4, an Iceland-based Coastal Command Hudson of British Squadron 269 spotted group. On the morning of September 4, an Iceland-based Coastal Command Hudson of British Squadron 269 spotted U-652 U-652, but her young skipper, George-Werner Fraatz, age twenty-four, crash-dived before the Hudson could mount an attack.

As it happened, there was a lone American destroyer about ten miles to the south-Greer, a four-stack, similar to the fifty American destroyers given to Britain. Commanded by Laurence H. Frost, Greer Greer was en route to Iceland with mail and freight for the American occupation forces. Sighting was en route to Iceland with mail and freight for the American occupation forces. Sighting Greer Greer, the Hudson signaled that a U-boat lay along her track. As a precaution Frost ordered general quarters and increased speed to 22 knots. The Hudson returned to the place where U-652 U-652 had dived and dropped four 250-pound depth charges and notified Iceland headquarters, which later sent to the scene relief planes and three destroyers, had dived and dropped four 250-pound depth charges and notified Iceland headquarters, which later sent to the scene relief planes and three destroyers, Malcolm, Sardonyx Malcolm, Sardonyx, and Watchman Watchman.

Under the ambiguous orders then in force for American warships, Greer Greer could defend herself, but she was not specifically authorized to mount an unprovoked attack on a U-boat. Coming up, could defend herself, but she was not specifically authorized to mount an unprovoked attack on a U-boat. Coming up, Greer Greer slowed to 10 knots and got slowed to 10 knots and got U-652 U-652 on sonar and held the contact, maneuvering to keep the U-boat on her bows. Why Frost elected to act aggressively against on sonar and held the contact, maneuvering to keep the U-boat on her bows. Why Frost elected to act aggressively against U-652 U-652 is not certain; perhaps to drill his crew, perhaps to hold the U-boat in place until other British ASW forces arrived. Unable to evade and doubtless fearing the arrival of other ASW forces, after three hours of harassment Fraatz, who may have believed is not certain; perhaps to drill his crew, perhaps to hold the U-boat in place until other British ASW forces arrived. Unable to evade and doubtless fearing the arrival of other ASW forces, after three hours of harassment Fraatz, who may have believed Greer Greer was one of the fifty four-stack destroyers transferred to Britain, shot a torpedo at her. It was the first German U-boat attack on an American warship in the war. was one of the fifty four-stack destroyers transferred to Britain, shot a torpedo at her. It was the first German U-boat attack on an American warship in the war.

Fully alert to a possible attack, Frost evaded the torpedo and counterattacked, dropping eight depth charges. Fraatz responded with a second torpedo, which Frost also evaded. During the evasion, Frost lost sonar contact, and Fraatz escaped, temporarily. Frost regained contact two hours later and mounted a second attack, dropping eleven more depth charges. None fell close and Fraatz again eluded Greer Greer. Frost hunted for another four hours, then gave up and proceeded to Iceland. Greer Greer's failure to pursue more aggressively-and to call in other ASW forces-drew angry comments from Atlantic Fleet commander Ernest King.

To this time the United States had publicly maintained a pretense of neutrality. That pose, however, could not be sustained for long. American destroyers were preparing to escort their first fast convoy, Halifax 150, from Canada to Iceland. Partly to justify that overt intervention in the war, Roosevelt indignantly denounced U-652 U-652's attack on Greer Greer as unprovoked "piracy" and revealed that he had issued what the media described as orders to "shoot on sight" any Axis submarines or ships that threatened the freedom of the seas. "When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike," Roosevelt explained in a "Fireside Chat" radio broadcast, "you do not wait until he has struck you before you crush him." as unprovoked "piracy" and revealed that he had issued what the media described as orders to "shoot on sight" any Axis submarines or ships that threatened the freedom of the seas. "When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike," Roosevelt explained in a "Fireside Chat" radio broadcast, "you do not wait until he has struck you before you crush him."

Admirals Raeder and Donitz seized upon Roosevelt's public declaration to urge Hitler to rescind the complicated restrictions on U-boats. Meeting with the Fuhrer at his headquarters, Wolfsschanze Wolfsschanze, they proposed, in effect, that U-boats be permitted to wage unrestricted submarine warfare to within twenty miles of the coast of North and South America. But Hitler demurred. Impeded by rain, poor roads, and other factors, the Russian campaign was not going as rapidly as planned. However, "great decisions" were expected by the end of September, Hitler said. Therefore, "care should be taken," he told Raeder and Donitz, "to avoid any incidents in the war on merchant shipping before about the middle of October." Since this would leave German submariners fighting with one hand tied behind their backs, Hitler directed Donitz to tactfully inform his men of "the reason for temporarily keeping to the old orders."

Perhaps put on the scent of a convoy by B-dienst B-dienst, or influenced by the Greer Greer incident, merely hours after the encounter between incident, merely hours after the encounter between U-652 U-652 and and Greer Greer, Donitz shifted the entire Markgraf Markgraf group (fourteen boats) 150 miles farther to the west-toward safer waters southeast of Greenland. On September 9, two of the most recent boats to join the group, group (fourteen boats) 150 miles farther to the west-toward safer waters southeast of Greenland. On September 9, two of the most recent boats to join the group, U-81 U-81 and and U-85 U-85, patrolled close to the ice pack on the east coast of Greenland. Early that day Friedrich Guggenberger in U-81 U-81 found and sank a lone 5,600-ton British freighter. A little to the south of Guggenberger, Eberhard Greger, age twenty-six, in found and sank a lone 5,600-ton British freighter. A little to the south of Guggenberger, Eberhard Greger, age twenty-six, in U-85 U-85 ran into a huge mass of ships. He shot at one British freighter, but missed, and got off a contact report. ran into a huge mass of ships. He shot at one British freighter, but missed, and got off a contact report.

The U-81 U-81 and and U-85 U-85 had found Slow Convoy 42. Composed of sixty-five ships making about 5 knots, it was escorted by the newly formed Canadian Escort Group 24, consisting of the modern Canadian destroyer had found Slow Convoy 42. Composed of sixty-five ships making about 5 knots, it was escorted by the newly formed Canadian Escort Group 24, consisting of the modern Canadian destroyer Skeena Skeena, commanded by the combat-experienced J. C. Hibbard, and corvettes Alberni, Kenogami Alberni, Kenogami, and Orillia Orillia.

Acting on Greger's contact report, Donitz directed the entire Markgraf Markgraf group to close and attack. Three other boats joined group to close and attack. Three other boats joined U-81 U-81 and and U-85 U-85 during the night of September 9-10 and the next day. All five U-boats found good hunting. during the night of September 9-10 and the next day. All five U-boats found good hunting.

* Guggenberger in U-81 U-81 carried out two further attacks, expending all his torpedoes except one. He claimed sinking four more ships (for a total of five ships for 31,000 tons), but only one other of 3,300 tons went down. carried out two further attacks, expending all his torpedoes except one. He claimed sinking four more ships (for a total of five ships for 31,000 tons), but only one other of 3,300 tons went down.

* Siegfried Rollmann, age twenty-six, in the new U-82 U-82, sank one ship, the 7,500-ton Empire Hudson Empire Hudson, equipped with a catapult and aircraft.

* Although Eberhard Greger in U-85 U-85 reported five torpedo failures in two attacks, he claimed sinking three ships for 15,000 tons, and possibly one other, but only one for 4,700 tons could be confirmed. He sank her during a submerged periscope attack. In response, skipper Hibbard in the destroyer reported five torpedo failures in two attacks, he claimed sinking three ships for 15,000 tons, and possibly one other, but only one for 4,700 tons could be confirmed. He sank her during a submerged periscope attack. In response, skipper Hibbard in the destroyer Skeena Skeena and Reginald Jackson in and Reginald Jackson in Kenogami Kenogami (on her first combat cruise), aggressively pounced on (on her first combat cruise), aggressively pounced on U-85 U-85, dropping depth charges which inflicted such serious engine damage that Greger was forced to abort.

* Heinz-Otto Schultze, age twenty-six, in the new U-432 U-432, sank three ships for 9,500 tons and shadowed aggressively.

* Georg-Werner Fraatz in U-652 U-652 damaged the 6,500-ton British tanker damaged the 6,500-ton British tanker Tahchee Tahchee and the 3,500-ton British freighter and the 3,500-ton British freighter Baron Pentland Baron Pentland. Owing to a mix-up in signals, the corvette Orillia Orillia, commanded by W.E.S. (Ted) Briggs, took the tanker Tahchee Tahchee in tow and set off for Iceland, leaving only three escorts. The in tow and set off for Iceland, leaving only three escorts. The Baron Pentland Baron Pentland was abandoned, but her cargo of lumber kept her afloat. was abandoned, but her cargo of lumber kept her afloat.

Total bag in the first assault by these five boats: seven ships for 30,600 tons sunk; two for 9,900 tons damaged.

Upon receiving the news that Slow Convoy 42 was under attack, Western Approaches ordered surface and air escorts to rush to its assistance. The first reinforcements were two Canadian corvettes, Chambly and Moosejaw Chambly and Moosejaw, Canada's first "Support Group."* The two corvettes caught up with some ships of the disorganized convoy at about 2200 on the night of September 10. Mere minutes after arriving on station, The two corvettes caught up with some ships of the disorganized convoy at about 2200 on the night of September 10. Mere minutes after arriving on station, Chambly Chambly, commanded by J. D. Prentice, got a "good" sonar contact, ran down the bearing, and attacked with four depth charges. Moosejaw Moosejaw, commanded by F. E. Grubb, maneuvering to assist, saw a U-boat surface dead ahead and opened fire with her 4" gun. However, the gun jammed and Grubb put on speed to ram.

The boat was the new Type IXC U-501 U-501, commanded by Hugo Forster, age thirty-six, thirty-five days out from Trondheim. In that long, arduous time, Forster had sunk one freighter, a 2,000-ton Norwegian, on September 5, expending six torpedoes and forty rounds from his deck gun to do so. Chambly's Chambly's depth charges caught the boat at 131 feet, putting out lights, smashing dials and valves, and blowing off the port diving plane. Although depth charges caught the boat at 131 feet, putting out lights, smashing dials and valves, and blowing off the port diving plane. Although U-501 U-501 was faster than the corvettes and Forster might well have escaped in the dark, he made the decision to scuttle. was faster than the corvettes and Forster might well have escaped in the dark, he made the decision to scuttle.

As Moosejaw Moosejaw closed closed U-501 U-501 to ram, Forster put on rudder and ran parallel with the corvette, the sides of the two vessels merely inches apart. To the astonishment of Germans and Canadians alike, Forster suddenly leaped from the deck of to ram, Forster put on rudder and ran parallel with the corvette, the sides of the two vessels merely inches apart. To the astonishment of Germans and Canadians alike, Forster suddenly leaped from the deck of U-501 U-501 to the deck of to the deck of Moosejaw Moosejaw. "It is not clear how he did it," Grubb reported, "but he did not get wet in the process." That Forster had given up the fight so quickly and was first, rather than last, to leave his ship caused deep resentment among the Germans. Forster later justified his action as the first step in a process to "negotiate the surrender of the crew," but few Canadians believed that.

Unprepared "to repel boarders," Grubb veered off before any more Germans could leap on his ship. Abandoned by the captain, U-501's U-501's first watch officer, Werner Albring, assumed command and ordered the boat scuttled. In the ensuing minutes, first watch officer, Werner Albring, assumed command and ordered the boat scuttled. In the ensuing minutes, Chambly Chambly sent across a nine-man boarding party, led by Edward T. Simmons, to grab secret papers. Simmons found eleven Germans still on the deck of sent across a nine-man boarding party, led by Edward T. Simmons, to grab secret papers. Simmons found eleven Germans still on the deck of U-501 U-501 and forced two of them at gunpoint to the bridge to help him, but it was all for naught. Flooding swiftly by the stern, the boat literally sank beneath Simmons's feet. and forced two of them at gunpoint to the bridge to help him, but it was all for naught. Flooding swiftly by the stern, the boat literally sank beneath Simmons's feet. Moosejaw Moosejaw and and Chambly Chambly rescued thirty-seven Germans, including all six officers and midshipmen; about eleven German enlisted men were never accounted for. One man of the boarding party, William I. Brown, was swept away and could not be found. rescued thirty-seven Germans, including all six officers and midshipmen; about eleven German enlisted men were never accounted for. One man of the boarding party, William I. Brown, was swept away and could not be found.

British intelligence officers noted the youth, the lack of experience and training of U-501's U-501's crew, the exceptional seniority of Forster, and his newness to the U-boat arm. Only seven men of the forty-eight-man crew had made prior patrols in U-boats. One enlisted man was merely seventeen years old. According to the British author Terence Robertson, when Forster was delivered to the officers' POW camp at Grizedale Hall, Otto Kretschmer convened the Council of Honor to try Forster for cowardice, as he had tried Rahmlow and Berndt of crew, the exceptional seniority of Forster, and his newness to the U-boat arm. Only seven men of the forty-eight-man crew had made prior patrols in U-boats. One enlisted man was merely seventeen years old. According to the British author Terence Robertson, when Forster was delivered to the officers' POW camp at Grizedale Hall, Otto Kretschmer convened the Council of Honor to try Forster for cowardice, as he had tried Rahmlow and Berndt of U-570 U-570. But when camp officials got wind of the plan, they isolated Forster and sent him to another POW camp.

While Chambly Chambly and and Moosejaw Moosejaw were sinking were sinking U-501 U-501, a half dozen other U-boats of group Markgraf Markgraf commenced a second assault on the main body of Slow Convoy 42. commenced a second assault on the main body of Slow Convoy 42.

* Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Wolfgang Luth in the weary IX holder Wolfgang Luth in the weary IX U-43 U-43 fired a salvo of six torpedoes, but four broached and ran erratically and the other two missed. fired a salvo of six torpedoes, but four broached and ran erratically and the other two missed.

* Siegfried Rollmann in U-82 U-82 carried out a second and third attack, claiming four more ships sunk for 26,000 tons. Postwar accounting credited three ships for 16,900 tons, including the 7,500-ton British tanker carried out a second and third attack, claiming four more ships sunk for 26,000 tons. Postwar accounting credited three ships for 16,900 tons, including the 7,500-ton British tanker Bulysses Bulysses sunk, and damage to the 2,000-ton Swedish freighter sunk, and damage to the 2,000-ton Swedish freighter Scania Scania.

* Ritterkreuz holder Georg Schewe in the IXB U-105 U-105 sank a 1,500-ton straggler, but his diesels failed, forcing him to abort. sank a 1,500-ton straggler, but his diesels failed, forcing him to abort.

* Fritz Meyer, age twenty-five, in the new VIIC U-207 U-207 sank two freighters for 9,700 tons, and possibly a small Canadian freighter. sank two freighters for 9,700 tons, and possibly a small Canadian freighter.

* Hans-Heinz Linder, age twenty-eight, in the VIIC U-202 U-202 missed with all five torpedoes in his first attack. In a second attack he finished off the damaged missed with all five torpedoes in his first attack. In a second attack he finished off the damaged Scania Scania with two torpedoes and wrongly claimed sinking an escort. with two torpedoes and wrongly claimed sinking an escort.

* Heinz-Otto Schultze in the new U-432 U-432, making his third attack, sank a 1,200-ton freighter-his third confirmed victim.

* Hans Ey, age twenty-five, in the new U-433 U-433 damaged a 2,200-ton freighter. damaged a 2,200-ton freighter.

* Hans-Peter Hinsch in the new U-569 U-569 was forced to abort with mechanical problems before he could shoot. was forced to abort with mechanical problems before he could shoot.

Total bag in the second assault on Slow Convoy 42: eight ships for 31,300 tons sunk and possibly another for 1,500 tons; one ship for 2,200 tons damaged.

During the morning of September 11, reinforcements arrived from Iceland to assist this besieged convoy escort: Catalinas of British Squadron 209, five destroyers of British Escort Group 2 commanded by W. E. Banks in Douglas Douglas, the smart British corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus, the Canadian corvette Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin, and two British trawlers, Buttermere Buttermere and and Windemere Windemere. These raised the total surface escorts for that day to twelve.

In the early afternoon, a Coastal Command aircraft reported a U-boat lying ahead of the convoy. Banks in Douglas Douglas sent two of his destroyers, sent two of his destroyers, Leamington Leamington and and Veteran Veteran, to investigate. At 3:00 P.M. P.M., both destroyers saw a U-boat on the surface about seven miles dead ahead. This was Fritz Meyer's new VIIC U-207 U-207, merely two weeks out of Trondheim. Leamington Leamington and and Veteran Veteran charged at 22 knots and Meyer crash-dived, but he was too late and both destroyers soon got charged at 22 knots and Meyer crash-dived, but he was too late and both destroyers soon got U-207 U-207 on sonar. In three deliberate, well-planned attacks, on sonar. In three deliberate, well-planned attacks, Leamington Leamington and and Veteran Veteran dropped twenty-one depth charges. Having no tangible proof of a kill, dropped twenty-one depth charges. Having no tangible proof of a kill, Leamington Leamington and and Veteran Veteran did not get credit in wartime for one, but nothing further was ever heard from did not get credit in wartime for one, but nothing further was ever heard from U-207 U-207 after this attack. In the postwar years, the Admiralty gave the two destroyers credit for the kill. after this attack. In the postwar years, the Admiralty gave the two destroyers credit for the kill.

For the next five days, six U-boats stalked Slow Convoy 42 eastward toward Iceland and beyond. But the large force of surface escorts, including three American destroyers (Hughes, Russell, Sims) that came out from Iceland, and Iceland-based aircraft held the U-boats off. Late on September 16, however, as the convoy approached North Channel, Robert Gysae in U-98 U-98 attacked and sank a 4,400-ton British freighter. Still later, Heinz-Joachim Neumann in attacked and sank a 4,400-ton British freighter. Still later, Heinz-Joachim Neumann in U-372 U-372 found the abandoned hulk of the freighter found the abandoned hulk of the freighter Baron Pentland Baron Pentland, damaged by Fraatz in U-652 U-652, and sank her.

Total confirmed damage to Slow Convoy 42 in all the attacks: nineteen of the original sixty-five ships for 73,574 tons sunk (one tanker), and the 6,500-ton tanker Tahchee Tahchee, hit but saved.

In terms of ships sunk, to then this was the second-worst convoy loss of the war after Slow Convoy 7, from which U-boats sank twenty-one ships in October 1940. It came just as the Americans took command of the Canada-Iceland convoy-escort forces and it naturally made a powerful impression on Atlantic Fleet commander King, as well as Support Force commander Bristol. It virtually cast in concrete the prevailing American view that a poorly escorted convoy was much worse than no convoy at all.

The Canadians drew a barrage of official and unofficial criticism for the performance of their Escort Group 24. They could be faulted perhaps for attempting too much too soon, mostly out of nationalistic pride, but the Admiralty was also at fault. It permitted this insufficiently equipped and trained naval force to assume large responsibilities before it was fully qualified and then routed the convoy north, directly into the arms of Markgraf Markgraf, rather than south to avoid this menace.* Although Although Orillia Orillia mistakenly left the convoy prematurely, the other Canadian warships performed well or even better than anyone had any right to expect, all things considered. In this battle, the Canadians sank their first U-boat, mistakenly left the convoy prematurely, the other Canadian warships performed well or even better than anyone had any right to expect, all things considered. In this battle, the Canadians sank their first U-boat, U-501 U-501, and so badly damaged U-85 U-85 that she had to abort. that she had to abort.

One final aspect of this battle should be stressed. It was much easier for U-boats to track and attack a slow convoy, whether eastbound or westbound, as opposed to a convoy that traveled two to four knots faster, such as the Halifax convoys. Although seemingly slight, the edge in speed enjoyed by "fast" convoys was just sufficient to outrun most U-boats converging on a convoy from the more distant areas of a patrol line. Moreover, the fast destroyers escorting fast convoys could drop back to drive down and hold off U-boat shadowers and still catch up with the convoy, whereas the shadower subjected to such harassment could not.

Assuming from the overclaims in the flash battle reports that group Markgraf Markgraf had sunk well over twice the tonnage confirmed in postwar records, for the loss of two boats (both on maiden patrols), Donitz was not unhappy with the results. had sunk well over twice the tonnage confirmed in postwar records, for the loss of two boats (both on maiden patrols), Donitz was not unhappy with the results.

A new patrol line, group Brandenburg Brandenburg, replaced group Markgraf Markgraf. It was composed of nine boats, some of them newly arrived from Germany or France.

One of the boats assigned to Brandenburg Brandenburg was the VIIC was the VIIC U-94 U-94, now commanded by young Otto Ites, age twenty-three, who had been a watch officer on the famous U-48 U-48 for two full years of combat. As such he had served under the boat's four for two full years of combat. As such he had served under the boat's four Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Herbert Schultze, Hans-Rudolf Rosing, Heinrich Bleichrodt, and Reinhard Suhren. Ites had orders to return holders: Herbert Schultze, Hans-Rudolf Rosing, Heinrich Bleichrodt, and Reinhard Suhren. Ites had orders to return U-94 U-94 to the Baltic for a thorough yard overhaul and upgrade. to the Baltic for a thorough yard overhaul and upgrade.

En route to the Brandenburg Brandenburg patrol area on September 15, the patrol area on September 15, the U-94 U-94 came upon elements of convoy Outbound North 14 and/or other lone vessels. Making the most of this lucky find, in a series of skilled night surface attacks, Ites sank three freighters (two British, one Greek) for 16,477 tons, a notable debut for this young skipper who had obviously learned well on came upon elements of convoy Outbound North 14 and/or other lone vessels. Making the most of this lucky find, in a series of skilled night surface attacks, Ites sank three freighters (two British, one Greek) for 16,477 tons, a notable debut for this young skipper who had obviously learned well on U-48 U-48. He had no luck while in Brandenburg Brandenburg but two weeks later, October 1, Ites sank the impressive 12,800-ton British tanker but two weeks later, October 1, Ites sank the impressive 12,800-ton British tanker San Florentino San Florentino, a straggler from the storm-scattered slow convoy Outbound North 19. This success raised his total bag to four ships for 29,300 tons, earning a warm welcome for the boat when it arrived in Kiel for overhaul.

Unknown to Donitz, one of the Brandenburg Brandenburg boats, Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat's boats, Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat's U-74 U-74, came upon Slow Convoy 44 on September 18. It consisted of sixty-six ships, thinly escorted by another Canadian escort group comprised of one destroyer and four corvettes. Kentrat got off a contact report, but Kerneval did not hear him. Other boats did and while they were converging on his beacon, Kentrat attacked the convoy twice, expending all torpedoes. He claimed sinking four large freighters for 26,000 tons, but only two ships for 8,000 tons were confirmed: a British freighter and the Canadian corvette Levis, commanded by C. W. Gilding. The Canadian corvettes Mayflower Mayflower and and Agassiz Agassiz were able to rescue forty survivors of Levis; seventeen Canadians perished. were able to rescue forty survivors of Levis; seventeen Canadians perished.

Other boats made contact with Slow Convoy 44 late on September 19 and attacked. The first was Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Erich Topp in holder Erich Topp in U-552 U-552. He claimed sinking two tankers and two freighters for 27,000 tons. Postwar records confirmed two tankers, the 8,200-ton British T. J. Williams and 6,300-ton Norwegian Barbro, and one 4,200-ton freighter, a total of 18,700 tons. The U-69 U-69, commanded by Wilhelm Zahn, who had been relieved of command of the duck U-56 U-56 earlier in the year because of nerves, found the blazing earlier in the year because of nerves, found the blazing Barbro Barbro and gave it a finishing shot, but the torpedo failed to detonate and Zahn sank no ships. Nor did any other boat. and gave it a finishing shot, but the torpedo failed to detonate and Zahn sank no ships. Nor did any other boat.

Total damage to Slow Convoy 44 by Kentrat and Topp: seven ships (two tankers) for 26,700 tons.

During this engagement, eastbound convoy Halifax 150 passed several hundred miles to the south. Comprised of fifty fast merchant ships of several nationalities, including the 17,000-ton British liner Empress of Asia Empress of Asia, it was the first Halifax convoy to have an exclusively American escort group. The group consisted of five destroyers, the new Ericsson Ericsson and and Eberle Eberle, and three four-stacks: Dallas Dallas* Ellis Ellis, and Upshur Upshur. Because the nine U-boats of group Markgraf Markgraf had raced north to attack Slow Convoy 44, Halifax 150 encountered no enemy opposition. One freighter of the convoy, had raced north to attack Slow Convoy 44, Halifax 150 encountered no enemy opposition. One freighter of the convoy, Nigaristan Nigaristan, caught fire and had to be abandoned. Per plan, a British escort group composed of two destroyers' arid four corvettes relieved the American escort at the Mid-Ocean Meeting Point (MOMP) south of Iceland and took the convoy onward to the British Isles. The American destroyers put into Iceland to refuel and to prepare for a return voyage to Canada with a fast Outbound North convoy.

The Americans learned numerous lessons on this mission. Chief among them was what the British had found out the hard way: that owing to fuel limitations and instability, the aged American four-stack destroyers, such as Dallas Dallas, were not really suitable for North Atlantic convoy escort.

British codebreakers made some strides in penetrating the double-enciphered German naval grid codes and could plot or guess at the positions of many boats of group Brandenburg Brandenburg and reroute convoys around them. As a consequence, the boats of this group scoured empty seas for days. The lack of contacts convinced Donitz and his staff, as Donitz logged it, that the British had "information obtained by methods undiscovered by us," which enabled them to evade U-boat packs. In view of the intense measures taken recently to safeguard radio security and other factors, Donitz doubted that the British "information" was derived from codebreaking. Moreover, on September 19, and reroute convoys around them. As a consequence, the boats of this group scoured empty seas for days. The lack of contacts convinced Donitz and his staff, as Donitz logged it, that the British had "information obtained by methods undiscovered by us," which enabled them to evade U-boat packs. In view of the intense measures taken recently to safeguard radio security and other factors, Donitz doubted that the British "information" was derived from codebreaking. Moreover, on September 19, B-dienst B-dienst assured Donitz in writing that "a penetration of our codes does not come into the question"; it simply was not possible. Nonetheless, at Donitz's request the chief of the assured Donitz in writing that "a penetration of our codes does not come into the question"; it simply was not possible. Nonetheless, at Donitz's request the chief of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine communications service, Vice Admiral Erhard Maertens, initiated a new and intensive investigation into cipher security. communications service, Vice Admiral Erhard Maertens, initiated a new and intensive investigation into cipher security.

Altogether the Allies sailed nearly 1,000 ships east and west in twenty North Atlantic convoys in September. The U-boat packs mounted successful attacks on two Canadian-escorted Slow convoys, 42 and 44, sinking twenty-six merchant ships (three tankers) for about 100,000 tons and one escort, the Canadian corvette Levis. In return, British and Canadian escorts sank two U-boats, U-207 U-207 and and U-501 U-501, and Canadian escorts forced another, U-85 U-85, to abort with battle damage. The U-boats sank four other lone freighters for 12,800 tons in northern waters, making a total bag of twenty-eight ships for about 110,000 tons. About 970 ships in eighteen transatlantic convoys got through safely. A harsh gale scattered one convoy, Outbound North 19.

For the Germans, an ominous new trend had set in. In August and again in September, about half the U-boats on patrol returned to bases without having sunk a confirmed ship. This was due, in part, to the inexperience and lack of workup time for the skippers and crews of the many new boats; in part to the sharp reduction in Allied merchant ships sailing outside convoys; and in part to the assignment of U-boats to larger and larger groups, or "wolf packs," most of which the Allies shrewdly evaded with the help of Ultra.

On the other side, and no less ominous, British forces had not increased the rate of U-boat kills. They had carried out two sinkings and the capture of U-570 U-570 in August and two sinkings of August-sailing boats in September. However, they sank none of the twenty-six U-boats sailing on war patrol from Germany or France in September. This lack of kills was due in part to the continuing inability of Coastal Command aircraft to sink sighted U-boats, and in part to the "evasive" convoy strategy, which drastically curtailed contacts between surface escorts and U-boats. in August and two sinkings of August-sailing boats in September. However, they sank none of the twenty-six U-boats sailing on war patrol from Germany or France in September. This lack of kills was due in part to the continuing inability of Coastal Command aircraft to sink sighted U-boats, and in part to the "evasive" convoy strategy, which drastically curtailed contacts between surface escorts and U-boats.

It was all well and good to ensure "the safe and timely" arrival of convoys in the British Isles, a strictly defensive policy, but unless the rate of U-boat kills increased sharply and soon by offensive action, the Atlantic U-boat force would grow to be a truly formidable foe.

ANOTHER F FIERCE C CONVOY B BATTLE.

By the beginning of October in the North Atlantic, the luckless Brandenburg Brandenburg pack had dissolved and a new pack, pack had dissolved and a new pack, Mordbrenner Mordbrenner, was in process of formation. Four new boats arriving from Germany were to serve as the cadre. They were to be augmented by four veteran boats sailing from France, including Ernst Mengersen in the VIIB U-101 U-101, which was to be retired to the Training Command. But Mengersen's radio failed two days out from France and he was forced to abort to Lorient.

Four boats returning to France in early October came upon single merchant ships and sank three.

* Horst Hamm in the new VIIC U-562 U-562 found the 7,500-ton British freighter found the 7,500-ton British freighter Empire Wave Empire Wave, which had been fitted with a catapult and fighter. She had sailed westward in the storm-scattered convoy Outbound North 19. Hamm hit and sank her with two torpedoes. The crew launched two fifty-foot lifeboats; the port boat held sixteen men. Fifteen days later, an Iceland-based American Catalina found the port boat and later that day a British trawler rescued the sixteen men. The starboard boat was never found.

* Gunther Heydemann in the new VIIC U-575 U-575 found a cluster of four ships, apparently stragglers from a storm-tossed convoy. He shot three torpedoes into the cluster, sinking the 4,700-ton Dutch freighter found a cluster of four ships, apparently stragglers from a storm-tossed convoy. He shot three torpedoes into the cluster, sinking the 4,700-ton Dutch freighter Tuva. Tuva.

* Wilhelm Dommes in the U-431 U-431 sank the 3,200-ton British freighter sank the 3,200-ton British freighter Hatasu. Hatasu.

While en route to join group Mordbrenner off Greenland, one of the four new boats from Germany, the IXC U-502 U-502, commanded by Jurgen von Rosenstiel, age twenty-eight, ran into a fat target sailing alone. She was the 15,000-ton Norwegian whale-factory ship Svend Foyn Svend Foyn, converted to a tanker. Massively laden with 20,000 tons of oil and ten(!) dismantled B-24 Liberator bombers on her main deck, and 220 passengers, she had sailed with convoy Halifax 152, escorted by an American group. When the convoy ran into heavy weather on October 1, Svend Foyn Svend Foyn's cargo shifted, forcing her to heave to for several hours, and during that pause the convoy proceeded without her.

When von Rosenstiel in U-502 U-502 spotted spotted Svend Foyn Svend Foyn on the afternoon of October 7, he fired two torpedoes. One missed but the other hit the starboard side of the ship, blowing a hole in her plates seventy feet long and forty feet wide. When he surfaced on the afternoon of October 7, he fired two torpedoes. One missed but the other hit the starboard side of the ship, blowing a hole in her plates seventy feet long and forty feet wide. When he surfaced U-502 U-502 three-quarters of a mile astern to assess the damage, three-quarters of a mile astern to assess the damage, Svend Foyn Svend Foyn opened fire with her 4" gun and machine guns, forcing the U-boat to dive and evade and forgo a second attack. Although the whale-factory ship was badly smashed up internally, the crew dumped 7,500 tons of oil and in a fine display of seamanship nursed the stricken vessel into Iceland six days later. opened fire with her 4" gun and machine guns, forcing the U-boat to dive and evade and forgo a second attack. Although the whale-factory ship was badly smashed up internally, the crew dumped 7,500 tons of oil and in a fine display of seamanship nursed the stricken vessel into Iceland six days later.

Upon learning that Svend Foyn Svend Foyn had been torpedoed, the American escort commander commenced zigzagging the convoy, Halifax 152, toward the MOMP, where a British escort group awaited. While so maneuvering at dusk, some ships of the convoy missed turn signals. As a result, the "convoy [became] completely broken up," the escort commander wrote later. The ragtag group he turned over to the waiting British was not a pretty sight; however, all eventually reached their destinations. had been torpedoed, the American escort commander commenced zigzagging the convoy, Halifax 152, toward the MOMP, where a British escort group awaited. While so maneuvering at dusk, some ships of the convoy missed turn signals. As a result, the "convoy [became] completely broken up," the escort commander wrote later. The ragtag group he turned over to the waiting British was not a pretty sight; however, all eventually reached their destinations.

At the same time, a British group likewise fouled up. It was the escort for the fast convoy Outbound North 22. Sailing in heavy gale weather, the British had not been able to get a navigational fix on stars or the sun for three days. Relying only on dead reckoning, they arrived on October 7, but they were fifteen miles north of the rendezvous and the Americans could not find them. Most ships in this convoy sailed onward and dispersed, fortunately with no losses.

In the meantime, the German group Mordbrenner Mordbrenner formed up on a line in the "Air Gap," running southeasterly from Greenland. First came three of the four new boats from Germany. They were soon joined by formed up on a line in the "Air Gap," running southeasterly from Greenland. First came three of the four new boats from Germany. They were soon joined by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in the IXB holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in the IXB U-109 U-109 from France, who had yet to sink a ship in his four months in this new command. The next boats from France assigned to the pack, Karl Thurmann in from France, who had yet to sink a ship in his four months in this new command. The next boats from France assigned to the pack, Karl Thurmann in U-553 U-553 and Joachim Preuss in and Joachim Preuss in U-568 U-568, lagged by four days. Another six boats from France, including Mengersen's resailing U-101 U-101, were to join Mordbrenner Mordbrenner at mid-month, bringing the total to thirteen boats. at mid-month, bringing the total to thirteen boats.

The North Atlantic was crowded with convoys: three inbound to the British Isles and two outbound. Aware from Ultra that Mordbrenner Mordbrenner was forming southeasterly from Greenland, the British diverted all five convoys well to the south of the three boats of the cadre already on station. But the codebreakers at Bletchley Park "lost" naval Enigma on October 12 and 13, and the Admiralty's U-boat Tracking Room was reduced to educated guesswork about the exact positions of the lagging fourth boat from Germany, was forming southeasterly from Greenland, the British diverted all five convoys well to the south of the three boats of the cadre already on station. But the codebreakers at Bletchley Park "lost" naval Enigma on October 12 and 13, and the Admiralty's U-boat Tracking Room was reduced to educated guesswork about the exact positions of the lagging fourth boat from Germany, U-502 U-502, and the eight boats en route from France to join the pack.

In the early hours of October 15, Thurmann in U-553 U-553 ran right into one of the five convoys. This was Slow Convoy 48, which had sailed with fifty ships and a Canadian escort group composed of the ex-American four-stack destroyer ran right into one of the five convoys. This was Slow Convoy 48, which had sailed with fifty ships and a Canadian escort group composed of the ex-American four-stack destroyer Columbia Columbia and seven corvettes (five Canadian, one British, one Free French). Several days after sailing, the convoy had run into a storm; about eleven merchant ships were straggling. One Canadian corvette, and seven corvettes (five Canadian, one British, one Free French). Several days after sailing, the convoy had run into a storm; about eleven merchant ships were straggling. One Canadian corvette, Shediac Shediac, whose radio was not properly tuned, had separated and was lost. Columbia Columbia and two other corvettes were attempting to round up the stragglers, leaving only four corvettes with the main body of the convoy. and two other corvettes were attempting to round up the stragglers, leaving only four corvettes with the main body of the convoy.

Thurmann in U-553 U-553 got off a contact report and attacked. He missed his main targets, but claimed his torpedoes sank two ships for 11,000 tons and possibly a third of 4,000 tons. He was credited in postwar records with sinking two ships for 6,000 tons. Upon receiving Thurmann's report, Donitz directed him to shadow and brought up nine other boats-the new got off a contact report and attacked. He missed his main targets, but claimed his torpedoes sank two ships for 11,000 tons and possibly a third of 4,000 tons. He was credited in postwar records with sinking two ships for 6,000 tons. Upon receiving Thurmann's report, Donitz directed him to shadow and brought up nine other boats-the new U-502 U-502 from Germany and the eight veteran boats en route to Greenland from France-to expand from Germany and the eight veteran boats en route to Greenland from France-to expand Mordbrenner. Mordbrenner.

While Thurmann shadowed during October 15 and the nine other boats homed on his beacon, British codebreakers recovered naval Enigma. They saw that a major U-boat attack against Slow Convoy 48 was developing. In reaction, they launched Catalinas from Iceland and directed numerous American and British surface ships nearby-including escorts of other nonthreatened convoys-to reinforce the Canadian escort group. Meanwhile, the destroyer Columbia Columbia and the two corvettes with her returned to the convoy. In the late afternoon, and the two corvettes with her returned to the convoy. In the late afternoon, Columbia Columbia saw and attacked saw and attacked U-553. U-553. Thurmann responded by shooting torpedoes at Thurmann responded by shooting torpedoes at Columbia Columbia, but he missed.

That night several boats closed on Thurmann's beacon signals. On the way in, Gunther Krech in U-558 U-558, a onetime Luftwaffe Luftwaffe pilot who had served as first watch officer on Schepke's famous pilot who had served as first watch officer on Schepke's famous U-100 U-100, found and sank the 9,500-ton Canadian freighter Vancouver Island Vancouver Island (ex-German (ex-German Weser Weser), which was sailing alone. Joachim Preuss in U-568 U-568, making contact with the convoy itself, sank a 6,000-ton British freighter. The crack British corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus, credited with full or part credit for three U-boat kills (U-26, U-556, and incorrectly so for U-65 U-65), counterattacked and drove Preuss off.

The surface reinforcements arrived on October 16. First came five American destroyers which had escorted Halifax 151 to the MOMP and were returning to Canada with the fast convoy Outbound North 24. Next came two British destroyers from eastbound Troop Convoy 14. Last came two of six British corvettes from the slow convoy Outbound North 25, and a Free French corvette from Iceland. Total escorts, including the scattered Canadian group: eighteen (eight destroyers, ten corvettes), by far the strongest protection ever provided a North Atlantic convoy.

The senior officer in the escort force, the American Navy captain Leo H. The-baud, commander of Destroyer Squadron 13, assumed tactical control. He was not overly pleased with some of the American, skippers and vessels in his outfit. Of the five new destroyers that had so far reported for duty, he wrote later, only one had been properly worked up, only one had ever fired her main battery, and some had not even fired machine guns. Four of his skippers had considerable seniority and rank but no destroyer experience and their "ship handling ability and confidence in command were certainly far from an inspiration to their ship's companies." These "beautiful ships," Thebaud lamented, "were being sent to sea in that condition on escort duty in the North Atlantic winter to pit their ignorance and lack of skill against enemy submarines experienced from two years of warfare."*

The gathering U-boats struck at Slow Convoy 48 again in pitch darkness on the night of October 16-17. In his second attack, Thurmann in U-553 U-553 expended all his torpedoes. He sank a 6,600-ton Panamanian freighter and claimed a "destroyer," but he missed the latter. Gunther Krech in expended all his torpedoes. He sank a 6,600-ton Panamanian freighter and claimed a "destroyer," but he missed the latter. Gunther Krech in U-558 U-558 sank the 9,600-ton British tanker sank the 9,600-ton British tanker W. C. Teagle W. C. Teagle and the 6,600-ton Norwegian tanker and the 6,600-ton Norwegian tanker Erviken Erviken, and probably another 1,400-ton Norwegian freighter. Heinz-Otto Schultze in U-432 U-432 sank the 9,700-ton Norwegian tanker sank the 9,700-ton Norwegian tanker Barfonn Barfonn and a 5,300-ton Greek freighter but missed two others. Schultze described his hit on the Norwegian tanker and a 5,300-ton Greek freighter but missed two others. Schultze described his hit on the Norwegian tanker Barfonn Barfonn, which was loaded with aviation gasoline: A colossal flame leapt from the convoy. In a moment it resolved itself into a tremendous flame which shot upwards from the water, accompanied by a roar like the passing of an express train. The great column of fire, whose diameter might have been equal to the length of the ship from whose tanks it sprang, seemed almost to reach the cloud base. The whole convoy was lit up by its brilliance.

In this chaos, the escorts charged to and fro, hurling depth charges and firing star shells. A torpedo from Schultze's U-432 U-432 or Krech's or Krech's U-558 U-558 hit the gallant corvette hit the gallant corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus, which blew up and disappeared with the loss of all hands. Preuss in U-568 U-568, who had sunk the British corvette Picotee in August Picotee in August, deliberately fired at and hit a "hostile" destroyer, which had slowed to a near dead stop to avoid colliding with a corvette.

The "hostile" destroyer was the new, stoutly built American vessel Kearny Kearny, commanded by Anthony L. Danis, age forty-two. The torpedo hit Kearny Kearny on the starboard side, killing eleven men and injuring twenty-two-the first American casualties of the North Atlantic naval war-and causing immense damage. However, Danis and his chief engineer, Robert J. Esslinger, and others, were able to control the damage on the starboard side, killing eleven men and injuring twenty-two-the first American casualties of the North Atlantic naval war-and causing immense damage. However, Danis and his chief engineer, Robert J. Esslinger, and others, were able to control the damage* and to nurse and to nurse Kearny Kearny out of the danger zone at 10 knots. Subsequently, out of the danger zone at 10 knots. Subsequently, Greer Greer escorted escorted Kearny Kearny into Iceland, where technicians on the tender into Iceland, where technicians on the tender Vulcan Vulcan patched her back together. patched her back together.

The next day, October 17, British Escort Group 3, comprised of four destroyers, several corvettes, and several trawlers, joined Slow Convoy 48 while Catalinas from Iceland provided continuous air cover. The U-boats hung on, dodging aircraft, but they were not able to penetrate the tight escort screen to mount further attacks. The British destroyer Veronica Veronica carried out five depth-charge attacks and claimed a success, but no U-boat was sunk at this time and place. A Catalina bombed Krech in carried out five depth-charge attacks and claimed a success, but no U-boat was sunk at this time and place. A Catalina bombed Krech in U-558 U-558, inflicting damage, but Krech gamely hung on for another twenty-four hours. During the night of October 17-18, Ernst Mengersen in U-101 U-101 hit the ex-American four-stack British destroyer hit the ex-American four-stack British destroyer Broadwater Broadwater, inflicting such damage that she had to be abandoned and sunk.

Total damage to Slow Convoy 48: nine of fifty merchant ships for 51,000 tons definitely sunk (three tankers), plus the corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus sunk; destroyer sunk; destroyer Broadwater Broadwater fatally damaged; and the American destroyer fatally damaged; and the American destroyer Kearny Kearny severely damaged. severely damaged.

President Roosevelt seized upon the Kearny Kearny incident to build public support for his decision to escort North Atlantic convoys and for repeal of the Neutrality Act. In a bellicose Navy Day speech on October 27, he said the United States had tried to avoid shooting but that the "shooting has started" and that "history has recorded who fired the first shot." Although Hitler had insisted that "incidents" with United States ships be avoided, Joachim Preuss in incident to build public support for his decision to escort North Atlantic convoys and for repeal of the Neutrality Act. In a bellicose Navy Day speech on October 27, he said the United States had tried to avoid shooting but that the "shooting has started" and that "history has recorded who fired the first shot." Although Hitler had insisted that "incidents" with United States ships be avoided, Joachim Preuss in U-568 U-568 was not criticized for the hit on was not criticized for the hit on Kearny Kearny. For past victories and for causing the loss of the destroyer Broadwater Broadwater, Ernst Mengersen, who returned U-101 U-101 to the Training Command, was awarded a to the Training Command, was awarded a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz* and promoted to a staff job. and promoted to a staff job.

In the days following the attack on Slow Convoy 48, Donitz formed the twenty boats in the North Atlantic that were already out or newly sailed into three groups: * MORDBRENNER. MORDBRENNER. Never fully formed, this group of three new boats from Germany plus Bleichrodt's Never fully formed, this group of three new boats from Germany plus Bleichrodt's U-109 U-109 from France was still in place southeast of Greenland and had achieved nothing. After the OKM obtained permission from Hitler, Donitz sent these four boats westward toward Newfoundland to scout out and attack convoys that might be going northeastward through the Strait of Belle Isle. from France was still in place southeast of Greenland and had achieved nothing. After the OKM obtained permission from Hitler, Donitz sent these four boats westward toward Newfoundland to scout out and attack convoys that might be going northeastward through the Strait of Belle Isle.

This was the first U-boat group to deliberately and overtly operate in "American waters," theretofore avoided for political reasons. British codebreakers decrypted the Enigma traffic ordering the assault and the Admiralty warned the Canadians what was afoot. Thus alerted, the Canadians mounted maximum air and surface ASW patrols, but the aircraft and ships available were few, the crews inexperienced, and the weather unfavorable for flying.

* REISSWOLF. REISSWOLF. Composed of the new IXC Composed of the new IXC U-502 U-502 from Germany and the seven veteran boats from France, all of which had attacked Slow Convoy 48, this pack replaced group from Germany and the seven veteran boats from France, all of which had attacked Slow Convoy 48, this pack replaced group Mordbrenner Mordbrenner on a line southeast of Greenland. British code-breakers also noted its formation and rerouted convoys accordingly. on a line southeast of Greenland. British code-breakers also noted its formation and rerouted convoys accordingly.

* SCHLAGETOD. SCHLAGETOD. Composed of nine veteran boats newly sailing from France, this pack was to occupy waters slightly to the southeast of the Composed of nine veteran boats newly sailing from France, this pack was to occupy waters slightly to the southeast of the Reisswolf Reisswolf pack, extending the U-boat line another 200 miles across the supposed convoy routes. pack, extending the U-boat line another 200 miles across the supposed convoy routes.

While outbound from France on the night of October 20, Horst Uphoff in U-84 U-84, a boat of the Schlagetod Schlagetod group, ran into what he reported as "four fast ships" 350 miles west of Ireland. Actually it was a formation of five big, fast armed merchant cruisers, escorted by the British group, ran into what he reported as "four fast ships" 350 miles west of Ireland. Actually it was a formation of five big, fast armed merchant cruisers, escorted by the British Hunt Hunt-class destroyer Croome Croome and the ex-American Coast Guard cutters and the ex-American Coast Guard cutters Sennen Sennen and and Totland Totland, northbound to the British Isles. Doubtful that the other boats of Schlagetod Schlagetod could catch these ships before they came into range of Coastal Command aircraft, Donitz relayed Uphoff's report with instructions that no boat of the group should pursue the contact unless it had "a good chance of success." could catch these ships before they came into range of Coastal Command aircraft, Donitz relayed Uphoff's report with instructions that no boat of the group should pursue the contact unless it had "a good chance of success."

As it happened, at about that time one of the five big ships, Ranpura Ranpura, had an engine failure and was forced to fall out of formation. The cutter Sennen Sennen dropped back to protect dropped back to protect Ranpura Ranpura and the other ships reduced speed from 14 to 11 knots. The reduction in speed enabled Uphoff in and the other ships reduced speed from 14 to 11 knots. The reduction in speed enabled Uphoff in U-84 U-84 to close and shoot a fan of two torpedoes at one of the ships. However, both torpedoes missed and exploded at the end of their runs. Hearing the explosions, the other four big ships and two escorts, to close and shoot a fan of two torpedoes at one of the ships. However, both torpedoes missed and exploded at the end of their runs. Hearing the explosions, the other four big ships and two escorts, Croome Croome and and Totland Totland, increased speed to 14 knots again, leaving Ranpura Ranpura and and Sennen Sennen behind, and spoiling Uphoff's hopes for a second attack on the main body. behind, and spoiling Uphoff's hopes for a second attack on the main body.

After Donitz alerted the Schlagetod Schlagetod group to this contact, one of the boats, Reinhard Hardegen in group to this contact, one of the boats, Reinhard Hardegen in U-123 U-123, was only about seventy miles to the northwest. Believing he had a "good chance of success," Hardegen belayed his voyage to Greenland, reversed course, and homed on U-84 U-84's beacon at maximum speed. When the ships speeded up and left U-84 U-84 behind, Donitz canceled the operation, ordering all behind, Donitz canceled the operation, ordering all Schlagetod Schlagetod boats to resume their journey to Greenland waters. Risking a reprimand-or worse-Hardegen ignored the order and pressed on. His gamble paid off. In the early morning hours of October 21, Hardegen came upon the four fast-moving big ships and the two escorts. Maneuvering around the escorts, Hardegen set up on the third and fourth ships, intending to shoot a fan of three bow torpedoes at the third ship and a stern torpedo at the fourth ship, but an escort got in the way and he only had time to fire the bow torpedoes. boats to resume their journey to Greenland waters. Risking a reprimand-or worse-Hardegen ignored the order and pressed on. His gamble paid off. In the early morning hours of October 21, Hardegen came upon the four fast-moving big ships and the two escorts. Maneuvering around the escorts, Hardegen set up on the third and fourth ships, intending to shoot a fan of three bow torpedoes at the third ship and a stern torpedo at the fourth ship, but an escort got in the way and he only had time to fire the bow torpedoes.

His target was the 14,000-ton Cunard White Star liner Aurania. Aurania. One torpedo hit, causing considerable damage and confusion. When One torpedo hit, causing considerable damage and confusion. When Aurania Aurania took on a heavy list, the crew rigged out lifeboats as a precaution, and one boat, holding six of her 250-man crew, launched prematurely and capsized. However, took on a heavy list, the crew rigged out lifeboats as a precaution, and one boat, holding six of her 250-man crew, launched prematurely and capsized. However, Aurania Aurania was not fatally holed; her captain got the ship under control and escaped at 8 knots, while the was not fatally holed; her captain got the ship under control and escaped at 8 knots, while the Croome Croome and and Totland Totland threw out depth charges. Futilely chasing the other three big ships, Hardegen got off a contact report to Kerneval, then later returned to the scene of his attack to give threw out depth charges. Futilely chasing the other three big ships, Hardegen got off a contact report to Kerneval, then later returned to the scene of his attack to give Aurania Aurania a finishing shot. There he found nothing but a capsized lifeboat and one survivor, Bertie E. Shaw. Hardegen picked up Shaw, who cleverly misled Hardegen into believing a finishing shot. There he found nothing but a capsized lifeboat and one survivor, Bertie E. Shaw. Hardegen picked up Shaw, who cleverly misled Hardegen into believing Aurania Aurania had sunk so that he would not pursue her. had sunk so that he would not pursue her.*

Credited with sinking Aurania Aurania, Hardegen returned to his original westward course to Greenland. Later that day-October 21-his bridge watch spotted smoke puffs. It was inbound convoy Sierra Leone 89, consisting of twenty big freighters and tankers, escorted by three destroyers and three corvettes, as well as Coastal Command Catalinas, which had joined that day. While Hardegen was getting off a contact report, an escort, the sloop Wellington Wellington, spotted the boat and signaled its presence to a Catalina. The plane found and attacked U-123 U-123, dropping four 250-pound depth charges set for fifty feet. These exploded close to the boat, rattling Hardegen and his crew-and Shaw, the English prisoner, as well-but they did no serious damage. Three surface escorts combed the area, holding down U-123 U-123 until the convoy was safely away. until the convoy was safely away.