* Alan Osborne Long. Alan Osborne Long.

* En route to the Atlantic, Wohlfarth attacked by gun and sank the unarmed 166-ton Faeroe fishing schooner En route to the Atlantic, Wohlfarth attacked by gun and sank the unarmed 166-ton Faeroe fishing schooner Emanual Emanual. His gunfire killed three of the eight fishermen. Later in a Berlin radio address, he described how he set the schooner ablaze: "a most beautiful sight to see." The British characterized this attack as a "revolting incident" and cold-blooded "murder" but did not introduce the affair at Donitz's trial at Nuremberg.

Kuppisch's confirmed sinkings on the duck Kuppisch's confirmed sinkings on the duck U-58 U-58 and on and on U-94 U-94 were seventeen ships for 87,282 tons. Wohlfarth's confirmed sinkings on the ducks were seventeen ships for 87,282 tons. Wohlfarth's confirmed sinkings on the ducks U-14 U-14 and and U-137 U-137 and the VIIC and the VIIC U-556 U-556 were nineteen ships for 47,919 tons, including the fishing schooner Emanual. were nineteen ships for 47,919 tons, including the fishing schooner Emanual.

The crews of The crews of Bulldog Bulldog, Broadway Broadway, and Aubrietia Aubrietia, as well as the rescued crew of Esmond on board Aubrietia Aubrietia, who had witnessed or participated in the boarding of U-110 U-110, in total some 400 men, were sworn to secrecy. Remarkably, no word of the boarding leaked. An account of it was not officially released by the Admiralty until 1959, when the official naval historian Stephen Roskill published a slim book, The Secret Capture The Secret Capture.

The current The current Heimisch Heimisch keys for May, printed on water-soluble paper, had apparently been destroyed by the Germans or possibly lost or ruined during the transfer to keys for May, printed on water-soluble paper, had apparently been destroyed by the Germans or possibly lost or ruined during the transfer to Bulldog Bulldog. Hence it was not possible for Bletchley Park to read Heimisch Heimisch currently until June. Duplicate currently until June. Duplicate Heimisch Heimisch keys for June were obtained when, in a well-planned action, a British naval task force captured the 300-ton German weather-reporting trawler keys for June were obtained when, in a well-planned action, a British naval task force captured the 300-ton German weather-reporting trawler Munchen Munchen on May 7. on May 7.

* The British continued to work on Loewe to an extraordinary degree. Later, in April 1942, when he was transferred to a POW camp in Canada, the British arranged that he meet another The British continued to work on Loewe to an extraordinary degree. Later, in April 1942, when he was transferred to a POW camp in Canada, the British arranged that he meet another U-110 U-110 survivor, who told him: "I know that two men saw the ship go down." This prompted another encoded letter from Loewe to Donitz amending the first: "U-E-O was sunk. It is possible that the enemy was aboard at one time." Still later, in February 1944, the British arranged for Loewe to meet yet another survivor, who told him: "I know that two men saw the ship go down." This prompted another encoded letter from Loewe to Donitz amending the first: "U-E-O was sunk. It is possible that the enemy was aboard at one time." Still later, in February 1944, the British arranged for Loewe to meet yet another U-110 U-110 crewman, who told him that the British boarded crewman, who told him that the British boarded U-110 U-110 topside and rigged a towing hawser but did not get inside and the boat "sank vertically, stern first." This prompted another message from Loewe to Donitz in April 1944: "Submarine sunk. Enemy did not get inside submarine." Having finally persuaded Loewe to accept the cover story by these artifices, the British let that message pass, and furthermore, they returned Loewe to Germany in a POW swap, so that he could tell Donitz face-to-face that the topside and rigged a towing hawser but did not get inside and the boat "sank vertically, stern first." This prompted another message from Loewe to Donitz in April 1944: "Submarine sunk. Enemy did not get inside submarine." Having finally persuaded Loewe to accept the cover story by these artifices, the British let that message pass, and furthermore, they returned Loewe to Germany in a POW swap, so that he could tell Donitz face-to-face that the U-110 U-110 had sunk, that the British did not get inside had sunk, that the British did not get inside U-110 U-110, and that therefore, Enigma had not been compromised.

* Moehle had sunk 1972 confirmed ships for 84,301 tons on the duck Moehle had sunk 1972 confirmed ships for 84,301 tons on the duck U-20 U-20 and the IXB and the IXB U-123 U-123.

Korth's confirmed sinkings on the duck Korth's confirmed sinkings on the duck U-57 U-57 and the VII and the VII U-93 U-93 were 1672 ships for 76,782 tons. were 1672 ships for 76,782 tons.

* Undetected but bedeviled by engine problems, Undetected but bedeviled by engine problems, Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen was forced to abort, reaching Brest on June 1 without having attacked any enemy ships. was forced to abort, reaching Brest on June 1 without having attacked any enemy ships.

The IXC was identical in all respects to the IXB, except that the fuel tanks held forty-three more tons of oil: 208 versus 165.tons. This gave the IXC an added 2,300 miles range at 12 knots: 11,000 miles versus 8,700. The IXC was identical in all respects to the IXB, except that the fuel tanks held forty-three more tons of oil: 208 versus 165.tons. This gave the IXC an added 2,300 miles range at 12 knots: 11,000 miles versus 8,700.

* The Germans assaulted Crete on May 20 with 20,000 paratroopers and infantry in gliders, in 600 air transports, supported by 630 bombers and fighters. Forewarned from breaks in The Germans assaulted Crete on May 20 with 20,000 paratroopers and infantry in gliders, in 600 air transports, supported by 630 bombers and fighters. Forewarned from breaks in Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Enigma, the 40,000 British defenders slaughtered the Germans, killing 4,000 men. Nonetheless, the Germans finally prevailed, killing 2,000 Commonwealth troops and capturing 12,000. During the battle and evacuation, the Enigma, the 40,000 British defenders slaughtered the Germans, killing 4,000 men. Nonetheless, the Germans finally prevailed, killing 2,000 Commonwealth troops and capturing 12,000. During the battle and evacuation, the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe inflicted devastating losses on the Royal Navy: the cruisers inflicted devastating losses on the Royal Navy: the cruisers Gloucester Gloucester, Fiji Fiji, and Calcutta Calcutta and six destroyers sunk; the battleships and six destroyers sunk; the battleships Warspite Warspite and and Barham Barham, the carrier Formidable Formidable, the cruisers Perth Perth, Orion Orion, Ajax Ajax, Carlisle Carlisle, Naiad Naiad, and eight destroyers damaged.

* Hitler, who was angry that Lutjens had not sunk the Hitler, who was angry that Lutjens had not sunk the Prince of Wales Prince of Wales the morning he sank Hood and returned the morning he sank Hood and returned Bismarck Bismarck and and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen directly to Germany, replied coolly: "I thank you in the name of the German people." Hitler appended a word to the directly to Germany, replied coolly: "I thank you in the name of the German people." Hitler appended a word to the Bismarck Bismarck crew: "The whole of Germany is with you. What can still be done will be done. The performance of your duty will strengthen our people in the struggle for their existence." In response to an earlier request from Lutjens in the same series of messages, Hitler awarded crew: "The whole of Germany is with you. What can still be done will be done. The performance of your duty will strengthen our people in the struggle for their existence." In response to an earlier request from Lutjens in the same series of messages, Hitler awarded Bismarck Bismarck's gunnery officer, Adalbert Schneider, a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for sinking for sinking Hood Hood.

* Coming to rest on the sea bottom, standing perfectly upright on her keel, according to photographs obtained in 1989 by a remote-control deep submergence vehicle. Her upright posture appeared to confirm the assertion of several British and German naval historians that Coming to rest on the sea bottom, standing perfectly upright on her keel, according to photographs obtained in 1989 by a remote-control deep submergence vehicle. Her upright posture appeared to confirm the assertion of several British and German naval historians that Bismarck Bismarck's captain, Ernst Lindemann, scuttled her.

* One Italian submarine, One Italian submarine, Otaria Otaria, sank the 4,700-ton British freighter Starcross Starcross from the northbound convoy Sierra Leone 73; another, from the northbound convoy Sierra Leone 73; another, Marconi Marconi, sank the 8,100-ton British tanker Cairndale Cairndale off Spain. off Spain.

* His confirmed score on the duck His confirmed score on the duck U-60 U-60 and and U-105 U-105 was fifteen ships for 86,232 tons. was fifteen ships for 86,232 tons.

* A A Life Life magazine photographer and a magazine photographer and a Fortune Fortune magazine writer were among the passengers on magazine writer were among the passengers on Zamzam Zamzam. After the Germans released them, they collaborated on an article for Life Life, which included some surreptitious photographs of the affair.

* Hessler testified in defense of Donitz at Nuremberg that he gave the survivors of one of these ships, the Greek Hessler testified in defense of Donitz at Nuremberg that he gave the survivors of one of these ships, the Greek Papalemos Papalemos, water and precise instructions for reaching land.

At Donitz's trial, he cited the At Donitz's trial, he cited the Alfred Jones Alfred Jones as another example of the perils confronting U-boat skippers who were tempted to offer assistance to survivors. as another example of the perils confronting U-boat skippers who were tempted to offer assistance to survivors.

* An attempt in late May to capture Enigma keys for July from the weather-reporting trawlers An attempt in late May to capture Enigma keys for July from the weather-reporting trawlers August Wriedt August Wriedt and and Heinrich Freese Heinrich Freese failed. Confronted by their attackers, the Germans jettisoned all Enigma materials. failed. Confronted by their attackers, the Germans jettisoned all Enigma materials.

* On June 6, aircraft from the carrier On June 6, aircraft from the carrier Eagle Eagle intercepted and bombed the inbound 9,200-ton blockade runner intercepted and bombed the inbound 9,200-ton blockade runner Elbe Elbe near the Azores, forcing her to scuttle. near the Azores, forcing her to scuttle.

* His total confirmed score-all on His total confirmed score-all on U-38 U-38-was thirty-one ships for 168,506 tons, ranking him ninth in the war.

This second act of assistance to survivors on this patrol was also entered by Hessler in defense of Donitz at the Nuremberg trials. This second act of assistance to survivors on this patrol was also entered by Hessler in defense of Donitz at the Nuremberg trials.

Schutze's confirmed score on Schutze's confirmed score on U-25 U-25 and and U-103 U-103 was 36 ships for 187,179 tons, ranking him fourth in the war. was 36 ships for 187,179 tons, ranking him fourth in the war.

About six to eight new corvettes were commissioned each month. The Battle of the Atlantic Committee judged this production rate "not satisfactory," especially since the first batches of corvettes were due for extensive overhauls, to be carried out under Lend-Lease in American shipyards. About six to eight new corvettes were commissioned each month. The Battle of the Atlantic Committee judged this production rate "not satisfactory," especially since the first batches of corvettes were due for extensive overhauls, to be carried out under Lend-Lease in American shipyards.

* Probably acting on Enigma intelligence, on June 13 Coastal Command launched fourteen torpedo-carrying Beauforts at Probably acting on Enigma intelligence, on June 13 Coastal Command launched fourteen torpedo-carrying Beauforts at Lutzow Lutzow in Norwegian waters. One plane got a hit that knocked in Norwegian waters. One plane got a hit that knocked Lutzow Lutzow out of action for the next seven months. out of action for the next seven months.

* Schultze's confirmed score-all on Schultze's confirmed score-all on U-48 U-48-was twenty-eight ships for 183,435 tons, ranking him fifth among the German aces in the war. The U-48 U-48 remained the leading boat of the war, sinking fifty-four and a half ships for 320,429 tons under Schultze, Rosing, and Bleichrodt. Kretschmer's remained the leading boat of the war, sinking fifty-four and a half ships for 320,429 tons under Schultze, Rosing, and Bleichrodt. Kretschmer's U-99 U-99 ranked second. ranked second.

Endrass's confirmed score-all on Endrass's confirmed score-all on U-46 U-46-was twenty-four ships for 134,566 tons.

In defense of Donitz at Nuremberg, Scholtz's first watch officer, Heinz-Konrad Fenn, submitted a document-and photographs-asserting that after Scholtz sank the 4,200-ton Greek freighter In defense of Donitz at Nuremberg, Scholtz's first watch officer, Heinz-Konrad Fenn, submitted a document-and photographs-asserting that after Scholtz sank the 4,200-ton Greek freighter Dirphys Dirphys on June 8, he gave the survivors in the lifeboats twenty loaves of bread, plenty of water, and instructions for sailing to land, and temporarily brought one of the survivors on board on June 8, he gave the survivors in the lifeboats twenty loaves of bread, plenty of water, and instructions for sailing to land, and temporarily brought one of the survivors on board U-108 U-108 for medical treatment. for medical treatment.

* Topp's confirmed sinkings on the duck Topp's confirmed sinkings on the duck U-57 U-57 and on and on U-552 U-552 were fourteen and a half ships for 94,076 tons. were fourteen and a half ships for 94,076 tons.

* Earlier, the aggressive Earlier, the aggressive Gladiolus Gladiolus also had been erroneously credited with sinking also had been erroneously credited with sinking U-65: U-65: * His total score on the ducks His total score on the ducks U-14 U-14 and and U-137 U-137, and U-556 U-556 was 20 ships for 56,389 tons. was 20 ships for 56,389 tons.

* An assertion by Herbert A. Werner, first watch officer of the new boat An assertion by Herbert A. Werner, first watch officer of the new boat U-557 U-557, in his 1969 best-selling book Iron Coffins Iron Coffins, that the boat attacked Halifax Convoy 133 on June 24 and sank 30,000 tons of shipping from it (and was forced to abort after a brutal depth-charge attack), is not substantiated in German records.

* Six large Type XIV supply boats were under construction. The first two, Six large Type XIV supply boats were under construction. The first two, U-459 U-459 and and U-460 U-460, were to be completed in November and December 1941, the other four in early 1942. A plan was under consideration to convert the big Type XB minelayers to supply boats. The first three of these, U-116 U-116, U-117 U-117, and U-118 U-118, were to be completed in July, October, and December of 1941. Allowing time for extensive acceptance trials, shakedowns, and workups, none of these supply boats could be expected to reach the Atlantic before the spring of 1942.

* In addition, U-boats off North Channel sank five ships for 29,200 tons, and near the Azores, In addition, U-boats off North Channel sank five ships for 29,200 tons, and near the Azores, U-553 U-553 sank two ships for 8,000 tons, including the Norwegian tanker sank two ships for 8,000 tons, including the Norwegian tanker Ranella Ranella. The Italian submarines in southern waters sank six ships for 24,700 tons, including the 8,000-ton British tanker Auris Auris. British destroyer Wishart Wishart sank the Italian submarine sank the Italian submarine Glauco Glauco, which was withdrawing from Bordeaux to Italy.

See Plate 9. RAF aircraft in the Mediterranean had sunk two Italian submarines ( See Plate 9. RAF aircraft in the Mediterranean had sunk two Italian submarines (Argonauta, Rubino) unassisted and shared credit for two others (Gondar, Durbo) with British surface ships.

* See Plate 8. Of these, 130 were American-built Catalinas (30) and Hudsons (100). See Plate 8. Of these, 130 were American-built Catalinas (30) and Hudsons (100).

In the war, American factories built 3,290 Catalinas. In the war, American factories built 3,290 Catalinas.

* The Admiralty's minimum depth-charge setting was fifty feet, to protect the launching vessel from backblast. Commencing in the summer of 1941, Coastal Command set aerial depth charges at fifty feet, pending the development of the twenty-five-foot hydrostatic fuse. The focus on this problem revealed that the fuses on the 250-pound aerial depth charges were unreliable, doubtless a contributing factor to the low kill rate. A high-priority R&D program soon provided reliable fuses. The Admiralty's minimum depth-charge setting was fifty feet, to protect the launching vessel from backblast. Commencing in the summer of 1941, Coastal Command set aerial depth charges at fifty feet, pending the development of the twenty-five-foot hydrostatic fuse. The focus on this problem revealed that the fuses on the 250-pound aerial depth charges were unreliable, doubtless a contributing factor to the low kill rate. A high-priority R&D program soon provided reliable fuses.

The Committee met weekly from March 19 to May 8, thereafter every fortnight, then less frequently. Altogether it held sixteen sessions in 1941, the last on October 22. The Committee met weekly from March 19 to May 8, thereafter every fortnight, then less frequently. Altogether it held sixteen sessions in 1941, the last on October 22.

* Benson, Bernadou, Buck, Charles F. Hughes, Ellis, Gleaves, Hilary P. Jones, Lansdale, Lea, Mayo, Niblack, Plunkett, Upshur. Benson, Bernadou, Buck, Charles F. Hughes, Ellis, Gleaves, Hilary P. Jones, Lansdale, Lea, Mayo, Niblack, Plunkett, Upshur.

A British destroyer came upon one of the two Ireland-bound lifeboats of Vigrid and rescued two more American nurses. The two other lifeboats were never found. A British destroyer came upon one of the two Ireland-bound lifeboats of Vigrid and rescued two more American nurses. The two other lifeboats were never found.

With twice the engine power and twice the fuel capacity and about the same range, the Mariner could carry four times the bomb or depth-charge payload as the Catalina. With twice the engine power and twice the fuel capacity and about the same range, the Mariner could carry four times the bomb or depth-charge payload as the Catalina.

Anderson, Hammann, Hughes, Morris, Mustin, O'Brien, Russell, Sims, Walke. Anderson, Hammann, Hughes, Morris, Mustin, O'Brien, Russell, Sims, Walke.

* The Admiralty alerted the new battleship The Admiralty alerted the new battleship Prince of Wales Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser Repulse Repulse, and the new carrier Indomitable Indomitable (on shakedown in the Caribbean) for this task. (on shakedown in the Caribbean) for this task.

* The Finnish boats included the German duck prototype The Finnish boats included the German duck prototype Vesikko Vesikko, the German Type VII prototype Vetehinen Vetehinen, and two others.

* During the same three-week period, three Italian boats, During the same three-week period, three Italian boats, Malaspina, Morosini Malaspina, Morosini, and Torelli Torelli, operating west of Gibraltar, sank five ships for 30,400 tons.

* Unlike the North Atlantic convoys, ships in Gibraltar convoys were usually quite small, misleading U-boat skippers into substantial overclaims. Unlike the North Atlantic convoys, ships in Gibraltar convoys were usually quite small, misleading U-boat skippers into substantial overclaims.

* Berlin claimed that U-boats sank twenty-four ships for 140,500 tons, plus a destroyer and a corvette. Berlin claimed that U-boats sank twenty-four ships for 140,500 tons, plus a destroyer and a corvette.

Mutzelburg in Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, credited with sinking a total of five ships for 31,000 tons plus a "destroyer," earned a propaganda interview on Berlin radio. His confirmed score was three small merchant ships for 4,305 tons. The Italian submarine Torelli Torelli sank the 8,900-ton Norwegian tanker sank the 8,900-ton Norwegian tanker Ida Knudsen. Ida Knudsen.

* The United States maintained a small and aged naval force in the Far East, grandiosely designated the Asiatic Fleet. For years its principal striking force-designed to defend the Philippines from a Japanese naval assault-was a flotilla of six 800-ton World War I The United States maintained a small and aged naval force in the Far East, grandiosely designated the Asiatic Fleet. For years its principal striking force-designed to defend the Philippines from a Japanese naval assault-was a flotilla of six 800-ton World War I S S-class submarines. In 1939 and 1940 the flotilla had been reinforced by eleven modern fleet submarines. Roosevelt's order sent another twelve fleet submarines to Manila, increasing the total submarine force of the Asiatic Fleet to twenty-nine boats, twenty-three of them modern fleet boats. In event of hostilities, all were to be provided with super-secret magnetic torpedo pistols similar to the ill-designed German magnetic pistols.

* At this time nine newly arrived VIIs in the Atlantic force were also commanded by young skippers from the crews of 1934 and 1935: Horst Uphoff, age twenty-four, in At this time nine newly arrived VIIs in the Atlantic force were also commanded by young skippers from the crews of 1934 and 1935: Horst Uphoff, age twenty-four, in U-84 U-84; Eberhard Greger, age twenty-five, in U-85 U-85; Fritz Meyer, age twenty-five, in U-207 U-207; Heinz-Otto Schultze, age twenty-five, in U-432 U-432; Hans Ey, age twenty-five, in U-433 U-433; Ottokar Paulshen, age twenty-five, in U-557 U-557; Reinhard Suhren, age twenty-five, in U-564 U-564; Johann Jebsen, age twenty-five, in U-565 U-565; Georg-Werner Fraatz, age twenty-four, in U-652 U-652.

* The American technicians who examined The American technicians who examined U-570 U-570 urged the Navy Department to copy the seat, but this was not done during the war. urged the Navy Department to copy the seat, but this was not done during the war.

The Type VII acoustic gear: very sensitive multi-unit hydrophones, consisting of 48 sensors arrayed on the port and starboard bow section; underwater "telephones" for communication between U-boats; shallow and deep water fathometers; experimental mine-detecting gear with a range of about 500 yards, which, however, had been "sabotaged" by the Germans. There was no "active" or "search" sonar ("pinging gear"). The Type VII acoustic gear: very sensitive multi-unit hydrophones, consisting of 48 sensors arrayed on the port and starboard bow section; underwater "telephones" for communication between U-boats; shallow and deep water fathometers; experimental mine-detecting gear with a range of about 500 yards, which, however, had been "sabotaged" by the Germans. There was no "active" or "search" sonar ("pinging gear").

The British gave the Americans one of the G7a "air" torpedoes from The British gave the Americans one of the G7a "air" torpedoes from U-570 U-570, together with all technical information derived from the tests. crew, which had arrived in Alexandria, Egypt, in a boat unfit for further combat service. "I rather like the idea of the Yugoslavs working a captured German U-boat," Churchill wrote. However, the Admiralty's view was that, having declined to give the boat to the Americans, it would "perhaps be undesirable for political reasons" to give her to the Yugoslavs. Finally U-570 U-570 was commissioned in the Royal Navy as H.M.S. was commissioned in the Royal Navy as H.M.S. Graph Graph, a playful allusion to the reams of charts her tests had generated. Commanded by Peter B. Marriot, she was overhauled and made ready for ASW patrols.

* The Council absolved the engineer, Mensel, who had no "command" responsibility, and the very junior officer, Christiansen, of any blame for the surrender. The Council absolved the engineer, Mensel, who had no "command" responsibility, and the very junior officer, Christiansen, of any blame for the surrender.

* The OKM reserved judgment. It advised Donitz that, based on the scanty information in hand, it was inadvisable to assume that Rahmlow had become incapable of command, or that Berndt surrendered the boat, or that Berndt did not realize "the enormity of his behavior until later." Until more information was available, the OKM concluded, neither man should be condemned as "guilty." The OKM reserved judgment. It advised Donitz that, based on the scanty information in hand, it was inadvisable to assume that Rahmlow had become incapable of command, or that Berndt surrendered the boat, or that Berndt did not realize "the enormity of his behavior until later." Until more information was available, the OKM concluded, neither man should be condemned as "guilty."

* To accommodate this massive traffic, Halifax and Slow convoys now sailed every six days. The established speed for Halifax convoys (from HX 147 onward) was 10 knots; for Slow convoys, still 7 knots. To accommodate this massive traffic, Halifax and Slow convoys now sailed every six days. The established speed for Halifax convoys (from HX 147 onward) was 10 knots; for Slow convoys, still 7 knots.

* The Italian submarine The Italian submarine Tazzoli Tazzoli sank the 7,300-ton Norwegian tanker sank the 7,300-ton Norwegian tanker Sildra Sildra off Freetown. This was the seventh tanker to fall victim to the Italians in the Atlantic and the only Allied tanker lost to the enemy that month. off Freetown. This was the seventh tanker to fall victim to the Italians in the Atlantic and the only Allied tanker lost to the enemy that month.

SIX.

ALLIED N NAVAL O OPERATIONS.

At the beginning of the third year of war, on September 3, 1941, the British Admiralty was overburdened by urgent operational tasks. Among the most important: * The management and defense of military and merchant-ship convoys in the North and South Atlantic.

* The inauguration and defense of a new convoy system from Iceland to northern Russia ("Murmansk Convoys").

* Maintenance of an adequate force in the Home Fleet to cope with raids by big German surface ships and merchant-ship raiders.

* The continuing naval struggle for mastery of the Mediterranean Sea.

* The deployment of an Eastern Fleet to help deter Japanese aggression in the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

The most demanding and difficult of these tasks was the protection of Atlantic convoys, Britain's lifeline. Amid great secrecy in September 1941, important modifications in that mission took place.

The most significant was the assumption by the Americans of responsibility for escort of convoys on the Canada-Iceland leg of the North Atlantic run. The entry of the "neutral" Americans into this "undeclared war" also greatly affected the deployment and operations of Canadian naval forces.

When Atlantic Fleet commander Ernest King took on responsibility for this escort service in early September, he committed most of his Atlantic Fleet to the job: all six battleships, five heavy cruisers, fifty destroyers (twenty-seven new; twenty-three old), and forty-eight Catalina and Mariner patrol planes. Two of the three newer battleships and two heavy cruisers were to maintain the Denmark Strait Patrol from Hvalfjord; two of the three older battleships and two heavy cruisers, basing at Argentia, were to provide backup. In addition, two of the three aircraft carrier task forces in the Atlantic were to be kept on standby in Bermuda or Argentia.

By terms of the Anglo-American agreement, ABC-1, King's resources included the entire Atlantic-based Canadian Navy. The Canadians warmly welcomed the entry of the Americans into the war, but, as related, resented the fact that a nonbelligerent or neutral nation now commanded their Atlantic naval forces. Moreover, being offensive-minded, they were not overjoyed with the strictly defensive tasks King assigned to all Canadian warships.

At this time, moreover, the Canadian Navy was all but invalided with severe growing pains. It was swamped with commissioned warships to man: three 6,000-ton Prince Prince-class ocean liners that had been converted to armed merchant cruisers, thirteen destroyers from various sources,* about fifty Canadian-built corvettes, and numerous other smaller Canadian-built vessels, such as minelayers and minesweepers. Excepting a handful of career sailors, almost all of its 19,000 men and women were just off the streets of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, or the farms in the "prairie provinces." There had been no time to properly train these volunteers; many men reported for duty still wet behind the ears. Moreover, even before new ships completed workups, Ottawa siphoned away up to a third of their personnel to man other new ships, such as the corvettes, which Canada was turning out at the rate of about five to six a month. about fifty Canadian-built corvettes, and numerous other smaller Canadian-built vessels, such as minelayers and minesweepers. Excepting a handful of career sailors, almost all of its 19,000 men and women were just off the streets of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, or the farms in the "prairie provinces." There had been no time to properly train these volunteers; many men reported for duty still wet behind the ears. Moreover, even before new ships completed workups, Ottawa siphoned away up to a third of their personnel to man other new ships, such as the corvettes, which Canada was turning out at the rate of about five to six a month.

In September 1941, the 10-knot Halifax convoys and the 7-knot Sydney (or Slow) convoys departed Canada every six days. The fastest ships and those with the most valuable cargoes, such as oil or petroleum products, sailed in Halifax convoys. The slower, smaller ships were in Sydney (or Slow) convoys. Logically the Americans with their fifty fast destroyers took over escort of Halifax convoys and delegated escort of Slow convoys to the Canadian Navy.

Initially, the Canadians were able to provide only twenty thinly trained warships to ocean-convoy escort: five destroyers and fifteen corvettes. The British contributed five ex-American four-stack destroyers and some corvettes to the Canadian contingent, but this was not sufficient naval force for proper escort of the Slow convoys. The Canadians asked the Americans for additional help, but Admiral King said no. He did not have enough destroyers to carry out his own high-priority tasks. These included escort for the Halifax convoys, escort for the Denmark Strait Patrol and its big-ship back up in Argentia, escort of the three carrier task forces, in the Atlantic fleet, plus numerous special missions, such as a force of fifteen destroyers to escort Task Force 15 (taking U.S. Army troops to Iceland) and a force of eight destroyers to escort a special British troopship convoy to Cape Town, South Africa, and beyond.

Furthermore, King and other Americans did not believe in and refused to countenance "mixed" naval forces: ships of different nationalities operating in a single unit, such as an escort group. Although outwardly similar in many respects, American and British-Canadian warships operated by different tactical and communications doctrines and had different sonar, radar, weapons, and machinery, such as boilers. As a result, the "mixed" naval forces suggested a high probability of collisions and other disasters in the brutal North Atlantic, and a low probability of efficient combat operations against the enemy. They required a cumbersome double pipeline for spare parts, ammunition, and other items of supply, as well as double administrative staffs to oversee housekeeping matters, such as pay, leave, medical care, disciplinary measures, etc.

The Canadian warships were not on a par with the British and American warships in detection equipment. The British had let the Canadians in on the secrets of shipboard 1.5-meter-wavelength search radar (Type 286) and the Canadian electronic firms were turning out sets slowly. However, even by the end of 1941, only fifteen of the seventy Canadian corvettes had Type 286 radar. Canadian development of the more sophisticated centimetric-wavelength radar (Type 271) lagged badly. Canadian vessels were fitted with a prewar British sonar that had none of the advanced capabilities and refinements of the latest British wartime models.

Admiral King, in consultation with the Admiralty, made substantial changes in convoy procedures in the western North Atlantic. Chief among these was to move the Mid-Ocean Meeting Point (MOMP) eastward to an area between 26 degrees and 22 degrees west, and about 300 miles south of Iceland. This enabled the Allies to eliminate the cumbersome "middle leg" escort by the three Iceland-based British escort groups (3d, 7th, 12th), which, in any case, could not base in Iceland in winter months owing to the lack of supporting facilities and to the ghastly weather. This change eliminated one North Atlantic mid-ocean convoy-escort rendezvous, difficult in fair weather, almost impossible in foul winter weather, and it enabled the Admiralty to strengthen escort forces in the South Atlantic.

After these changes, the Atlantic convoy-escort system worked as follows: * Sailing from Argentia, the American escort groups, composed of five destroyers, accompanied the fast (10-knot) Halifax convoys from Canadian waters to the MOMP at 26-22 degrees west. After handing over to a British escort group, the Americans put into Iceland, escorting ships bound only to Iceland (if any) and ships which were to join convoys sailing to northern Russia. Following brief voyage repairs, the American group sailed back to the MOMP at 26-22 degrees west to take over escort of even-numbered (fast) Outbound North convoys to Canadian waters. Upon dispersal of the convoy at about 55 degrees west, the Americans put into Boston or Portland for repairs and R&R. Thereafter the Americans sailed back to Canadian waters to repeat the cycle. American Catalinas and Mariners based at Argentia and Iceland provided air escort.

Three American destroyer tenders supported the American groups. These were the magnificent Prairie Prairie at Argentia, also serving as headquarters ship for Admiral Bristol's Support Force, and two smaller tenders, the at Argentia, also serving as headquarters ship for Admiral Bristol's Support Force, and two smaller tenders, the Melville Melville at Argentia and the at Argentia and the Vulcan Vulcan at Iceland. The latter vessels also accommodated destroyer squadron headquarters. at Iceland. The latter vessels also accommodated destroyer squadron headquarters.

* Sailing from St. John's, the Canadian escort groups, composed of British and Canadian destroyers and corvettes, accompanied the 7-knot Slow convoys from Canadian waters to the same MOMP at 26-22 degrees west. After handing over to a British escort group, the Canadians, like the Americans, put into Iceland for brief voyage repairs. Thereafter they returned to the MOMP to take over escort of slow (odd-numbered) Outbound North convoys and accompanied them to a dispersal point at about 55 degrees west. Then the Canadian and British escorts put into St. John's, Newfoundland, for voyage repairs and R&R, after which they sailed to repeat the cycle. American and Canadian aircraft in Newfoundland and American and British aircraft in Iceland provided air escort.

* Sailing from the British Isles, the British escort groups accompanied the fast and slow Outbound North convoys westward to the MOMP at 26-22 degrees west. Without stopping in Iceland, after handing over to the appropriate American or Canadian escort groups, the British groups accompanied the eastbound fast Halifax and Slow convoys onward to the British Isles. Coastal Command aircraft (Catalinas, Sunderlands, Hudsons, Northrops, Whitleys, etc.) based in Iceland, North Ireland, and Scotland provided air support.

The British were equipping air and surface escorts with improved radar as fast as possible. By September 1941, about thirty escort ships of the Royal Navy had been fitted with Type 271M (fixed antenna) and/or Type 271P (rotating antenna) centimetric-wavelength sets. These vessels included twenty-four corvettes, two four-stack destroyers, and a sloop. If scheduling permitted, Western Approaches included at least one warship fitted with centimetric-wavelength radar with each convoy.

These new radar sets did not immediately provide the British with a war-decisive weapon as some writers have suggested. All radar of that era was notoriously temperamental and prone to breakdown. Most shipboard sets were out of commission half the time. In order to keep the sets running as much as possible and in proper calibration, the Admiralty had to provide the surface ships with trained radar technicians, and these were scarce. The Admiralty also had to train a corps of specialized sailors to operate radar at maximum efficiency.

On paper the new escort procedure in the North Atlantic appeared to be the most efficient use of the few available air and surface craft. In practice, it was a nightmare, especially for the Canadian escort groups. The new route required that all the convoys on the Canada-Iceland leg travel for about eleven days through notoriously frigid and dangerous winter seas, where gales and hurricanes endlessly spawned, ships iced up, and huge waves slammed them hither and yon in a reckless dance, smashing bridge windows and lifeboats, snapping off masts and other top-hamper. No man or ship could withstand this incessant pounding for long, especially the sailors manning the ex-American four-stacks and the little corvettes in British and Canadian service.

After only a few weeks of these operations, it became clear to Admiral Bristol in Argentia and to Admiral Noble in Liverpool that the surface escort forces for convoys in the North Atlantic were woefully inadequate. Bristol notified King that the American Support Force had unavoidably shrunk from fifty to forty-four de- stroyers and that to escort the fast convoys properly on the Canada-Iceland leg he needed at least fifty-six destroyers (for seven escort groups of six ships each, plus reserves) or, preferably, seventy-two (for nine escort groups plus reserves). Furthermore, for proper escort of the Slow convoys, the Canadians needed a minimum of sixty-three ships (for nine escort groups).

Another formidable problem lay just ahead. The forty-eight American Catalinas and Mariners at Argentia and Iceland, and the nine British Catalinas at Iceland, were nonwheeled flying boats. When the waters from which these planes operated iced up, they could no longer take off and land and had to be withdrawn to more hospitable climes. One possible solution was to replace these aircraft with an amphibious Catalina (PBY-5A), which had retractable wheels built in the hull, but there was an acute shortage of these planes.

It was important to keep aircraft patrols in Iceland. Apart from the useful escort services these aircraft provided the convoys, they served another role: "cover" for the priceless British break in naval Enigma. To preserve knowledge of that break from the Germans, the British had decreed that any "operational use" of Enigma information (Ultra), such as evasion of or an attack on a U-boat pack, had to be ostensibly the result of "discovery" of the pack by a routine air patrol.

The second most urgent and difficult responsibility of the Admiralty in the fall of 1941 was the inauguration and defense of convoys between Iceland and northern Russia.

By September 1, 1941, it appeared to Roosevelt and Churchill that the Germans were winning in the Soviet Union; indeed, that the Red Army was on the verge of collapse. Almost daily, Stalin demanded that the British open a "second front" in Occupied France to relieve German pressure on the Soviet forces. Fully committed in North Africa, the British were in no way able to open a "second front." However, in keeping with his belief that the British must do everything they could to assist the Soviets, physically and spiritually, Churchill initiated what were to become famous as the "Murmansk Convoys."

The first such convoy-a hastily assembled formation-sailed from Reykjavik on August 21. It consisted of six merchant ships and the old aircraft carrier, now an aircraft ferry, Argus Argus, escorted by the fully operational fleet carrier Victorious Victorious, the heavy cruisers Devonshire Devonshire and and Norfolk Norfolk, and six destroyers. The most notable military cargo was a batch of thirty-nine Hurricane fighters: twenty-four fully assembled on Argus Argus and fifteen in crates on a merchant ship. Iceland-based Hudsons and Northrops, of Coastal Command Squadrons 269 and 330 provided additional air cover out to 150 miles. and fifteen in crates on a merchant ship. Iceland-based Hudsons and Northrops, of Coastal Command Squadrons 269 and 330 provided additional air cover out to 150 miles.

The destination of this naval formation was the seaport Archangel, on the White Sea in north Russia, about 600 miles due north of Moscow. The ships went northward through the Denmark Strait, hugging the edge of the late summer ice boundary in the Greenland Sea, passing near Jan Mayen Island. From there they sailed northeastward past Bear Island (south of Spitzbergen Island; north of North Cape, Norway) into the Barents Sea, thence south into the White Sea via the Gourlo, a sort of natural channel connecting these two bodies of water. Argus Argus flew off her fighters to Murmansk; the rest of the ships put into Archangel, where the crated fighters were quickly assembled and flown to Murmansk. flew off her fighters to Murmansk; the rest of the ships put into Archangel, where the crated fighters were quickly assembled and flown to Murmansk.

This first trickle of military supplies to the Soviets was largely a propaganda play to bolster the spirits of the Russians and their will to resist the Germans. It also provided Churchill a response, of sorts, to Stalin's demands for a "second front." To further these psychological and political aims, the British unstintingly publicized the "Murmansk convoys" in articles, books and films, stressing the ever-present danger of enemy aircraft and U-boat attack, the hideous weather and icebergs, the horrible consequences in store for those shipwrecked in these frigid waters. As a result, the Murmansk convoys were to become the most famous of the war, even more so than the much more important and no less perilous North Atlantic convoys.

Churchill directed that Murmansk convoys were to sail from Iceland at ten-day intervals. For Home Fleet commander John Tovey, this new task created a demand for escorts he was not able to fill. He decreed that as a bare minimum, each convoy bound for northern Russia was to be escorted by one heavy cruiser, two destroyers, a minesweeper, and two ASW trawlers, the empty return convoy by the same heavy cruiser, a destroyer, and two minesweepers. In addition to aircraft from Iceland, a second heavy cruiser, based near Bear Island, was to provide backup during the polar transit.

The Russia-bound convoys were designated PQ, the return convoys QP. It proved to be impossible to sail these convoys on a ten-day cycle; the British had to settle on a fortnightly cycle. PQ 1 (ten merchant ships, heavy cruiser Suffolk Suffolk, and two destroyers, etc.) sailed from Iceland to Archangel on September 28 and arrived October 11. At the same time, QP 1 (those first ships which went over in late August) sailed homeward. Neither convoy incurred losses. PQ 2 sailed October 18, PQ 3 November 9, and so on. The sailings of return QP convoys 2, 3, etc., overlapped with the sailings of the PQs.

To the end of 1941, the British escorted fifty-three loaded ships in seven PQ convoys to northern Russia and thirty-four ships in returning QP convoys. These ships delivered 800 fighter aircraft, 750 tanks, 1,400 trucks and other military vehicles, and about 100,000 tons of ammunition and other supplies. Although many were damaged by weather, no ships were lost to German forces.

The Russians had promised to keep Archangel open year-round with icebreakers. However, they failed to keep this promise after December 12, so for the rest of the winter the convoys put into Murmansk (hence "Murmansk convoys"), an ice-free port at the head of the Kola Inlet on the Barents Sea. Less developed than Archangel, Murmansk proved to be an inhospitable place for the Allied sailors to lay over; nor did the Russians go out of their way to show their appreciation. As a consequence, in spite of the extra hazardous-duty pay, Allied merchant sailors came to detest as well as fear the Murmansk convoys, even though, in reality, ship losses were not great by comparison with other convoy routes.

GERMAN N NAVAL O OPERATIONS.

In Berlin at the start of the third year of the war, Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, dominated all else. Hitler personally directed the Germans from a secret hideaway, Wolfsschanze Wolfsschanze (Wolf's Lair), in eastern Prussia. Worried about his far-flung flanks, he rejected a recommendation of his generals for a massive blitzkrieg in the center toward Moscow and strengthened the northeastward drive on Leningrad and the southeastward drive on Kiev. These diversions delayed the drive on Moscow (Operation Typhoon) to October 1, perilously close to the onset of winter. (Wolf's Lair), in eastern Prussia. Worried about his far-flung flanks, he rejected a recommendation of his generals for a massive blitzkrieg in the center toward Moscow and strengthened the northeastward drive on Leningrad and the southeastward drive on Kiev. These diversions delayed the drive on Moscow (Operation Typhoon) to October 1, perilously close to the onset of winter.

By comparison, the Desert War in North Africa was a puny sideshow: about 120,000 Germans and Italians pitted against a like number of British and Commonwealth forces. And yet much was at stake for Hitler in that sideshow: German prestige, the integrity and solidarity of the Pact of Steel, and, not least, control of the Mediterranean Basin, the Balkans, and the Middle East.

The Desert War was governed absolutely by logistics. On September 3, neither side had sufficient strength to crush the other. However, the British had three advantages: Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Ultra, which helped them to intercept and smash the convoys supplying the Axis forces; superior naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea; and use of the less-threatened sea route to Egypt via the Cape of Good Hope. London was confident that by October or early November the British Eighth Army would be strong enough to launch an offensive (Crusader), which would crush the Italians and Erwin Rommel's Ultra, which helped them to intercept and smash the convoys supplying the Axis forces; superior naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea; and use of the less-threatened sea route to Egypt via the Cape of Good Hope. London was confident that by October or early November the British Eighth Army would be strong enough to launch an offensive (Crusader), which would crush the Italians and Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps and rescue a besieged Commonwealth garrison at Tobruk, which Rommel had bypassed. and rescue a besieged Commonwealth garrison at Tobruk, which Rommel had bypassed.