This convoy, Halifax 129, would be recorded as the first transatlantic east-bound convoy to be escorted "clear-across" or "end-to-end." That is, a Canadian escort group from St. John's to 35 degrees west; an Iceland-based British escort group from 35 degrees west to 20 degrees west; a British escort group from 20 degrees west to North Channel. Canadian and British aircraft in Newfoundland and Iceland provided limited air escort to the convoy but, as will be seen, no U-boats were available to attack Halifax 129. In a reverse procedure, convoy Outbound 331 was recorded as the first transatlantic westbound convoy to be escorted "end-to-end." To field enough escort groups to provide this "end-to-end" transatlantic service, it was necessary to reduce the number of ships in each group, a calculated risk but one deemed worth running.

RICH T TROPHIES IN W WEST A AFRICAN W WATERS.

Thinly stretched in every theater, the Royal Navy was not prepared physically or mentally to fight U-boats in equatorial West African waters. Reginald ("Bob") Whinney, a career officer who had specialized in ASW, was appalled by what he found when he arrived in Freetown to train the local escort force. The senior officer, Admiral Algernon Willis, Whinney wrote in his memoir, was "severe, unbending, and very thin, ashen, unhappy-looking, possibly operationally tired, possibly not fit. What a choice where the crying need was for driving, but essentially benign, encouraging leadership." Summing up the situation, Whinney continued: With few exceptions, the officers at Freetown were then the unhappiest collection I had ever met or was to meet in my whole Service career. There were several reasons for this. Certainly the climate was one of them. It was very debilitating due to the heat, the humidity and the prevalence of malaria. The living conditions were appalling; recreation was almost nil and social life did not exist. To cap this, it appeared that it was to Freetown, where the drink was duty-free-gin two pence a glass-that a number of officers who had been in recent trouble, including over drink, were sent. In many cases, these poor chaps had not enough to do. (Let it hastily be added that I was not in such a category.) Finally, Freetown was not an area of hot war and so got little priority from the Admiralty; and to cap the lot again, there was no inspiring lead from the top.

By early May five large boats patrolled in South Atlantic waters. One, Oesten's U-106 U-106, escorted the blockade-runner Lech from Brazil, a mission that took her to 50 degrees west longitude, the deepest penetration of the Western Hemisphere by any U-boat to then. At the insistence of the OKM, U-106 U-106 remained in Brazilian waters to escort a second blockade runner, remained in Brazilian waters to escort a second blockade runner, Windhuk Windhuk, but the sailing of that ship was delayed indefinitely. When the OKM finally released U-106 U-106 on May 7, Oesten was low on fuel and had engine problems and had to rendezvous with the supply ship on May 7, Oesten was low on fuel and had engine problems and had to rendezvous with the supply ship Egerland Egerland, which had been prepositioned in the South Atlantic to support Bismarck Bismarck.

The other four boats patrolled off the African coast, resupplying from Egerland and another supply ship, Nordmark Nordmark. Schewe in U-105 U-105 and Hessler in and Hessler in U-107 U-107 were the last boats to refuel from were the last boats to refuel from Nordmark Nordmark. While they were doing so, on May 3 and 4, the new arrivals, Heinrich Liebe in U-38 U-38 and Viktor Schutze in and Viktor Schutze in U-103 U-103, patrolled off Freetown, picking off unescorted ships with little fear of ASW measures. Liebe sank two for 10,200 tons; Schutze sank six for 28,800 tons.

These four boats then switched places. After replenishing,- Schewe's U-105 U-105 and Hessler's and Hessler's U-107 U-107 closed on Freetown, while Liebe's closed on Freetown, while Liebe's U-38 U-38 and Schutze's and Schutze's U-103 U-103 hauled off to mid-Atlantic to find hauled off to mid-Atlantic to find Egerland Egerland. Schewe sank four ships for 28,400 tons, including the 11,800-ton British freighter Rodney Star Rodney Star; Hessler sank two ships for 16,300 tons. Counting past overclaims, Schewe's victories earned a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz* While Schewe was sinking the fourth ship on May 16, a torpedo misfired and a crewman was seriously injured. On instructions from Donitz, Schewe hauled out and transferred the injured man to While Schewe was sinking the fourth ship on May 16, a torpedo misfired and a crewman was seriously injured. On instructions from Donitz, Schewe hauled out and transferred the injured man to Egerland Egerland, then refueled and set course for Lorient.

Three boats rendezvoused with Egerland Egerland from May 13 to May 17, then set off for Freetown waters to join Hessler in from May 13 to May 17, then set off for Freetown waters to join Hessler in U-107 U-107. After they departed, on May 18, Egerland Egerland reported she had only six torpedoes left. Another reported she had only six torpedoes left. Another Bismarck Bismarck supply ship, Gedania, was therefore ordered to relieve supply ship, Gedania, was therefore ordered to relieve Egerland Egerland. Two other boats sailed from Lorient for African waters in May: Eckermann's U-A U-A and Jost Metzler's and Jost Metzler's U-69 U-69, the first Type VII to attempt a very long-range cruise.

During his service in the merchant marine, Metzler had often called at West African ports, as had his leading seaman, Bade, "an old sea dog." Metzler and Bade got the idea that two ports on the African Gold Coast in the Gulf of Guinea-Takoradi and Lagos-could be mined by a medium-sized U-boat. When Metzler proposed the scheme to Donitz, it was approved, and U-69 U-69 sailed on May 5, crammed with sixteen TMB mines and eight torpedoes-the mines and six torpedoes below and two torpedoes in topside canisters. sailed on May 5, crammed with sixteen TMB mines and eight torpedoes-the mines and six torpedoes below and two torpedoes in topside canisters.

To conserve fuel, Metzler inched south on one diesel, rigged to turn the other motor. It was a long, slow, monotonous trip during which they saw not a single ship worth a torpedo. When they reached the equatorial latitudes, Metzler wrote, "the moist heat was almost unbearable," even at night. Two weeks later, on May 19, Metzler rendezvoused with Egerland Egerland. He refueled in a mere three hours, turned over his Enigma and all secret papers (as required of boats on a mining mission), and set a course for the Gold Coast.

Inbound to Africa to lay the mines, on the evening of May 21 the watch spotted a lighted southbound ship. The lights indicated she was a neutral, but Metzler believed she might be a disguised U-boat hunter. He cautiously approached her and asked for identification by signal light. When she replied "Robin Moor," Metzler's suspicions intensified because he could find no such ship in Lloyd Lloyd's Register. Moreover, when daylight came, Metzler saw the name Exmoor on her stern, listed in Lloyd Lloyd's as a 5,000-ton American ship. Was she Robin Moor Robin Moor, Exmoor Exmoor, or a disguised hunter?

The captain came across to U-69 U-69 in a whaler, bringing his ship's papers and cargo manifest. He explained that the ship had only just been bought by Americans and that as a consequence, her name had been changed from in a whaler, bringing his ship's papers and cargo manifest. He explained that the ship had only just been bought by Americans and that as a consequence, her name had been changed from Exmoor Exmoor to to Robin Moor Robin Moor. Metzler claimed he saw "radio apparatus" and "guns" on the manifest and that the ship was therefore "a neutral carrying contraband" and thus fair game under the prize rules. Despite the explicit orders from Hitler, the OKM, and Donitz to avoid any contact with American ships, Metzler decided to sink her. After the crew had abandoned ship in lifeboats, Metzler put her under with one torpedo and thirty rounds from his deck gun. Robin Moor Robin Moor was the first American ship to be sunk by a U-boat in the war. was the first American ship to be sunk by a U-boat in the war.

Metzler wrote that he then extended every effort to assure the safety of the survivors, according to the prize rules. He rounded up all the lifeboats, stocked them with "food, bread, butter, brandy and medical supplies." He then towed them toward Africa "for several hours," to a "spot where in a few days they would be driven by the gentle current on to the African shore." In fact, the currents took the survivors, including a woman and a two-year-old child, the other way (toward South America). They spent about two weeks in the open boats-a terrible ordeal-before reaching shore.

By coincidence, Churchill had chosen this moment to further stir up Americans-and draw them closer to war-with another Lusitania Lusitania or or Athenia Athenia incident. The Admiralty announced that the Germans had sunk the Egyptian passenger liner incident. The Admiralty announced that the Germans had sunk the Egyptian passenger liner Zamzam Zamzam, en route from New York to Egypt, with "196 American passengers" on board, all of whom were presumed to be lost. To heighten the impact of this "atrocity," the Admiralty spokesman stressed that the lost Americans were volunteer ambulance drivers; hence, in journalese, Zamzam Zamzam became a "mercy ship." became a "mercy ship."

As intended, the story was shocking. The New York World-Telegram New York World-Telegram carried it with a double-bank front-page banner headline: carried it with a double-bank front-page banner headline: 196 AMERICANS FEARED LOST WITH EGYPTIAN MERCY SHIP.

The Zamzam Zamzam had been sunk on April 16 by the merchant raider had been sunk on April 16 by the merchant raider Atlantis Atlantis, but only after all 340 passengers (138 Americans) and all their baggage had been brought on board Atlantis Atlantis. Subsequently, all the passengers-and the baggage-had been transferred to the German freighter Dresden Dresden, which in due course landed them safely in France.* Berlin propagandists trumped London propagandists by immediately revealing the humanity and consideration shown the Berlin propagandists trumped London propagandists by immediately revealing the humanity and consideration shown the Zamzam Zamzam passengers, but the news of the sinking of passengers, but the news of the sinking of Robin Moor Robin Moor pushed the Berlin version of the pushed the Berlin version of the Zamzam Zamzam story off the front pages, leaving the casual American reader with the impression that the Germans had "killed 196" Americans on the "mercy ship" story off the front pages, leaving the casual American reader with the impression that the Germans had "killed 196" Americans on the "mercy ship" Zamzam Zamzam and had callously sunk the and had callously sunk the Robin Moor Robin Moor as well; all within a matter of days. Thanks to Metzler, London won the propaganda battle after all. as well; all within a matter of days. Thanks to Metzler, London won the propaganda battle after all.

When Donitz heard the news of the Robin Moor Robin Moor sinking, he was sinking, he was Furious Furious. Metzler remembered that Donitz sent "rocket after rocket to me, bombarding me with questions about the details and the reasons for the sinking." No explanation seemed to satisfy Donitz. "The Admiral's tone conjured up a picture for me of a court-martial on my return," Metzler wrote.

The hunting off Freetown remained good.

* After refueling from Egerland Egerland, Heinrich Liebe in U-38 U-38 sank five ships for 29,400 tons, bringing his total to seven. sank five ships for 29,400 tons, bringing his total to seven.

* Jost Metzler in U-69 U-69 bravely laid his TMB mines in the harbors of Takoradi on May 27, and Lagos on May 29. Later, Metzler lightheartedly described these extremely hazardous missions as "crazy exploits," but they were successful. The British were forced to close both harbors. One mine damaged a 5,400-ton freighter in Takoradi; another sank a 2,900-ton freighter in Lagos. bravely laid his TMB mines in the harbors of Takoradi on May 27, and Lagos on May 29. Later, Metzler lightheartedly described these extremely hazardous missions as "crazy exploits," but they were successful. The British were forced to close both harbors. One mine damaged a 5,400-ton freighter in Takoradi; another sank a 2,900-ton freighter in Lagos.

* Viktor Schutze in U-103 U-103 sank four ships for 22,500 tons, including the 6,900-ton tanker British sank four ships for 22,500 tons, including the 6,900-ton tanker British Grenadier Grenadier, bringing his total to eleven.

* Homebound to Lorient, Georg Schewe in U-105 U-105 sank another ship, bringing his confirmed total to twelve for 70,500 tons. sank another ship, bringing his confirmed total to twelve for 70,500 tons.

* Jurgen Oesten in U-106 U-106, who had been sidetracked on escort missions for almost seven weeks, sank two ships for 13,200 tons, bringing his total to seven, plus the hit on the battleship Malaya Malaya.

* Gunther Hessler in U-107 U-107 sank three more ships for 14,500 tons, bringing his total to eleven, including a second tanker, the 8,000-ton Dutch sank three more ships for 14,500 tons, bringing his total to eleven, including a second tanker, the 8,000-ton Dutch Marisa Marisa.*

* After refueling from Egerland Egerland on May 29, Hans Eckermann in on May 29, Hans Eckermann in U-A U-A, conducting an exceedingly cautious patrol, sank no ships.

* The Italian submarine Tazzoli Tazzoli sank the 8,800-ton Norwegian tanker sank the 8,800-ton Norwegian tanker Alfred Olsen Alfred Olsen.

By the first day of June, Gunther Hessler had sunk fifteen confirmed ships for 101,000 tons, counting the four sunk in his first patrol in the North Atlantic. That day, he came upon a lone British freighter, the 5,000-ton Alfred Jones Alfred Jones, off Freetown. There was something about the way this ship looked and behaved that aroused Hessler's suspicions, leading him to conclude she might be a disguised U-boat killer. He therefore approached her with extreme caution and attacked with two torpedoes. Both hit, severely damaging the ship, and the crew appeared to abandon in lifeboats. Still wary, Hessler approached submerged, resisting the temptation to surface for a gun attack and to offer assistance to the survivors. Upon closing, he saw dozens of sailors hiding on her tilting deck, prepared to leap to a half dozen 4" to 6" guns, depth-charge chutes, and other weapons, which were camouflaged by wood crates. He pulled back and fired a third torpedo, which put her under.

This sinking raised Hessler's score on U-107 U-107 to sixteen ships for 106,000 tons-twelve sunk in the South Atlantic, to tie Georg Schewe's memorable patrol in to sixteen ships for 106,000 tons-twelve sunk in the South Atlantic, to tie Georg Schewe's memorable patrol in U-105 U-105. By custom, Hessler should have received a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, but there was no word from Kerneval. The reason, Donitz wrote later, was that "I found it a little difficult to recommend him because he was my son-in-law." When Admiral Raeder learned of the delay, Donitz continued, Raeder said that "if I did not recommend Hessler at once, he would." But still Donitz held back.

The aggregate sinkings of the boats in the South Atlantic in May were more than sufficiently impressive to justify the "diversion" of these boats from the North Atlantic. The sinkings served another purpose as well: They compelled the British to drastically curb the unescorted ship traffic in that area, to increase convoying from Freetown, and to draw a substantial number of surface escorts from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic. Accordingly, Donitz directed two more IXBs, U-66 U-66 and and U-123 U-123, to sail to West Africa in June.

Thanks to the priceless intelligence haul from Lemp's U-110 U-110, British codebreakers could read naval Enigma fluently and currently throughout the month of June.* The torrent of information, which the British called Most Secret Ultra (shortened to Ultra), gave a select few in the Admiralty an astounding view of the The torrent of information, which the British called Most Secret Ultra (shortened to Ultra), gave a select few in the Admiralty an astounding view of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine's innermost secrets, including everything about U-boat operations. Rodger Winn's assistant in the U-boat Tracking Room, Patrick Beesly, remembered: "We rapidly learned the exact number of U-boats at sea, and not only the contents of their own signals but, even more important, the instructions constantly being pumped out to them by Donitz from his headquarters in Lorient."

The radio traffic between Donitz and his skippers also revealed to the Admiralty day-by-day positions of nearly all the U-boats. Hence the Admiralty had an opportunity to organize task forces and "pounce" these boats by surface ship and aircraft and destroy them, putting an end to the U-boat menace in one simultaneous operation. But to attack twenty-odd U-boats in diverse locations simultaneously, the Admiralty believed, would tip off the Germans that Enigma had been broken and lead them to take corrective measures, such as changing the keys, or perhaps even introducing a new code machine.

Rather than attack the U-boats frontally, the Admiralty elected to impede their operations in indirect ways. These were principally two: by routing convoys away from the known U-boat positions and by thwarting the plan to use Bismarck Bismarck's supply ships for refueling U-boats at sea.

The refueling scheme was to be thwarted by directly confronting the supply ships and capturing or sinking them, as if the British had come upon them as a result of comprehensive and diligent blue-water patrolling. To be sure, there was a risk of arousing German suspicion, but less so in sinking big surface ships because the surface ships were easier to detect by radar than U-boats. The Admiralty knew, from breaking Enigma dispatches from Bismarck Bismarck, that Lutjens had informed the OKM that British surface-ship radar was amazingly effective, capable of picking up a surface ship at a range of "at least 35,000 meters," or about twenty miles.

The assault on Bismarck Bismarck's supply ships began on June 3 in the North Atlantic. The cruisers Aurora Aurora and and Kenya Kenya attacked the 10,000-ton tanker attacked the 10,000-ton tanker Belchen Belchen, which was parked eighty miles southwest of Greenland. Belchen Belchen had refueled Kleinschmidt's had refueled Kleinschmidt's U-111 U-111 and Paulshen's and Paulshen's U-557 U-557, and when the cruisers struck, she was in the process of refueling Korth's U-93 U-93. Belchen threw off the hoses and scuttled. Korth dived but he shied from attacking the cruisers.

Later that day, Korth surfaced and rescued all fifty survivors of Belchen Belchen. Donitz instructed him to make for another Bismarck Bismarck supply ship, supply ship, Friedrich Friedrich Breme, offload the survivors, refuel, and resume his patrol. But Korth demurred on the grounds that should that rendezvous fail, he did not have enough fuel to reach France. Halfway back to Lorient, on June 6, Korth spotted and reported a southbound convoy, but owing to his shortage of fuel and the presence on board of the fifty Breme, offload the survivors, refuel, and resume his patrol. But Korth demurred on the grounds that should that rendezvous fail, he did not have enough fuel to reach France. Halfway back to Lorient, on June 6, Korth spotted and reported a southbound convoy, but owing to his shortage of fuel and the presence on board of the fifty Belchen Belchen survivors, he did not attack or shadow it for the benefit of other boats. Although Korth had won his survivors, he did not attack or shadow it for the benefit of other boats. Although Korth had won his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz earlier on this patrol, when he arrived in Lorient, Donitz upbraided him for not attacking and tracking the convoy, regardless of the presence of the earlier on this patrol, when he arrived in Lorient, Donitz upbraided him for not attacking and tracking the convoy, regardless of the presence of the Belchen Belchen survivors. Logging that Korth seemed to be losing his fighting edge, Donitz decided to send him to West African waters on his next patrol. survivors. Logging that Korth seemed to be losing his fighting edge, Donitz decided to send him to West African waters on his next patrol.

The loss of Belchen Belchen was a stiff blow to Donitz. She had been ideally situated to resupply the western patrol line, enabling those boats to double the time in the operating area. After Korth in was a stiff blow to Donitz. She had been ideally situated to resupply the western patrol line, enabling those boats to double the time in the operating area. After Korth in U-93 U-93, Walter Kell, age twenty-seven, commanding the VIIC U-204 U-204 on his maiden patrol from Germany, had been next in line to refuel from on his maiden patrol from Germany, had been next in line to refuel from Belchen Belchen. So that operation, and several others as well, had to be canceled.

In the two days following the destruction of Belchen Belchen, June 4 and 5, British naval forces struck at four other German supply ships in the North and South Atlantic. Aircraft from Victorious Victorious, the battleship Nelson Nelson, and the cruiser Neptune teamed up with the armed merchant ship Esperance Bay Esperance Bay, forcing the 4,000-ton Gonzenheim to scuttle. In the same area, the destroyer Marsdale Marsdale, trained for boarding, captured the 9,000-ton tanker Gedania Gedania before she could scuttle. In southern waters, the cruiser before she could scuttle. In southern waters, the cruiser London London and the destroyer and the destroyer Brilliant Brilliant forced the 9,900-ton tanker forced the 9,900-ton tanker Esso Hamburg Esso Hamburg and the 9,800-ton tanker and the 9,800-ton tanker Egerland Egerland to scuttle. to scuttle.

In the capture of Gedania Gedania, which was en route to relieve Egerland Egerland, the British and Germans fought a pitched battle, during which several Gedania Gedania crewmen were killed. After the victory the British found numerous secret papers, including Enigma materials and the operational orders issued to crewmen were killed. After the victory the British found numerous secret papers, including Enigma materials and the operational orders issued to Gedania Gedania. These orders contained a wealth of new information: instructions for conducting a rendezvous with a U-boat (coded meeting points, communications procedures, recognition signals), precise (coded) routes to be followed by supply ships and blockade runners when approaching French ports,* and, not incidentally, the location of the North Atlantic weather-reporting trawler during June. and, not incidentally, the location of the North Atlantic weather-reporting trawler during June.

Donitz learned of the loss of Egerland Egerland from Heinrich Liebe in from Heinrich Liebe in U-38 U-38, who was approaching her to replenish when she was scuttled and who then searched unsuccessfully for survivors. It was another blow. Her loss and the loss of her relief, Gedania Gedania, meant that the highly rewarding U-boat operations off the West African coast were to be interrupted until a substitute resupply ship could be stationed in those waters. Donitz therefore directed the five boats remaining in the Freetown area to replenish, if necessary, from another Bismarck Bismarck supply ship, the 10,700-ton tanker supply ship, the 10,700-ton tanker Lothringen Lothringen, which had parked farther north.

Continuing this secret campaign, the British had five more successes. On June 12 the cruiser Sheffield Sheffield forced the 10,400-ton tanker forced the 10,400-ton tanker Friedrich Breme Friedrich Breme to scuttle. On June 15 the carrier to scuttle. On June 15 the carrier Eagle Eagle and the cruiser and the cruiser Dunedin Dunedin captured the captured the Lothringen Lothringen, obtaining Enigma materials and wiping out the proposed resupply of the U-boats in the Freetown area. On June 21 the cruiser London London forced the 4,400-ton forced the 4,400-ton Babitonga Babitonga, a merchant-raider supply ship, to scuttle. On June 23 destroyers of the 8th Flotilla and the Marsdale Marsdale teamed with aircraft and forced another merchant-raider supply ship, the 3,000-ton teamed with aircraft and forced another merchant-raider supply ship, the 3,000-ton Alstertor Alstertor, to scuttle.

Nor was that all. On June 28 the cruiser Nigeria Nigeria and three destroyers of the Home Fleet pounced on the 136-foot, 344-ton weather-reporting trawler and three destroyers of the Home Fleet pounced on the 136-foot, 344-ton weather-reporting trawler Lauenburg Lauenburg, commanded by fifty-eight-year-old Hinrich Gewald. A boarding party from the destroyer Tartar Tartar, commanded by T. Hugh P. Wilson and advised by codebreaker Allon Bacon, captured the trawler and intelligence materials of "inestimable value" (as the Admiralty later put it), including the daily Enigma ring and plugboard keys for July. These enabled Bletchley Park to continue reading naval Enigma fluently and currently through that month.

All these sinkings again aroused deepest suspicion at Kerneval. As a consequence, on June 16, Donitz introduced a complicated new system for disguising U-boat positions from outsiders. He issued the boats a set of fixed "reference points" (Franz, Oscar, Herbert, etc.) to use in directing them to new areas. In place of ordering a boat to go to the standard Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine grid square BC-64 (for example), he ordered it to go to a grid square which lay (for example) 250 degrees, 150 miles and 050 degrees, 200 miles, respectively, from reference point "Franz." To thwart British DFing, the boats were to respond to a change in position or an attack order by a simple "yes" or "no" (in Short Signal code), depending upon their ability to comply. grid square BC-64 (for example), he ordered it to go to a grid square which lay (for example) 250 degrees, 150 miles and 050 degrees, 200 miles, respectively, from reference point "Franz." To thwart British DFing, the boats were to respond to a change in position or an attack order by a simple "yes" or "no" (in Short Signal code), depending upon their ability to comply.

Both Bletchley Park and the U-boat skippers found this new system difficult to master. The official British historian wrote that the delays encountered in breaking the new system, "reduced during [the second half of] June the operational value of what was derived from reading Enigma currently," but that by July, "the problem had largely been overcome." The U-boat skippers criticized the system as "too cumbersome"; many made errors or miscalculations that took them to the wrong place.

Denied the services of the supply ships Egerland, Gedania Egerland, Gedania, and Lothringen Lothringen, which, as related, the British wiped out, and badly in need of refits or overhauls and rest for the crews, one by one the boats in West African waters returned to France. Georg Schewe in U-105 U-105 and Jurgen Oesten in and Jurgen Oesten in U-106 U-106 arrived on June 13 and June 18, having been out for 112 and 110 days, respectively. Donitz had high praise for both skippers. Schewe's score of twelve ships for 70,500 tons established a new record for a single patrol. arrived on June 13 and June 18, having been out for 112 and 110 days, respectively. Donitz had high praise for both skippers. Schewe's score of twelve ships for 70,500 tons established a new record for a single patrol.

Trailing U-105 U-105 homeward by about a week, Heinrich Liebe in homeward by about a week, Heinrich Liebe in U-38 U-38 sank his eighth ship, the 7,600-ton British freighter sank his eighth ship, the 7,600-ton British freighter Kingston Hill Kingston Hill. This sinking put Liebe over the 200,000-ton mark and he thus became the sixth skipper to earn Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.* Having commanded Having commanded U-38 U-38 since the outbreak of war, Liebe had been in continuous Atlantic combat longer than any other skipper. When he reached Lorient, Donitz sent him to a job in the Training Command, but the weary since the outbreak of war, Liebe had been in continuous Atlantic combat longer than any other skipper. When he reached Lorient, Donitz sent him to a job in the Training Command, but the weary U-38 U-38 was retained in the Atlantic. was retained in the Atlantic.

While he was homebound, Gunther Hessler in U-107 U-107 sank two more ships, his thirteenth and fourteenth. The last was the 5,000-ton Greek freighter sank two more ships, his thirteenth and fourteenth. The last was the 5,000-ton Greek freighter Pandias Pandias. Despite his earlier close call with the Alfred Jones Alfred Jones, Hessler remembered that he helped the Greeks square away the lifeboats and gave them food and water and instructions for reaching the African coast.

With the sinking of Pandias Pandias, Donitz finally authorized a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for his son-in-law. The reckoning for this patrol was the most conservative of the war: fourteen ships (including two tankers) for 90,793 tons. Postwar accounting confirmed fourteen ships for 86,699 tons, which was to stand as the best single patrol of the war by any submarine of any nation. The announcement of the award by the German propagandists was also conservative. Berlin credited Hessler with eighteen ships for 111, 272 tons in two patrols, whereas his confirmed total was eighteen ships for 118,862 tons. Upon arrival in Lorient on July 2, after ninety-six days at sea, for his son-in-law. The reckoning for this patrol was the most conservative of the war: fourteen ships (including two tankers) for 90,793 tons. Postwar accounting confirmed fourteen ships for 86,699 tons, which was to stand as the best single patrol of the war by any submarine of any nation. The announcement of the award by the German propagandists was also conservative. Berlin credited Hessler with eighteen ships for 111, 272 tons in two patrols, whereas his confirmed total was eighteen ships for 118,862 tons. Upon arrival in Lorient on July 2, after ninety-six days at sea, U-107 U-107, like the other "south boats," went into the yards for a long overhaul.

Viktor Schutze in the homebound U-103 U-103 trailed trailed U-107 U-107 by a week. Schutze sank two more ships, bringing his confirmed total for this patrol to thirteen ships (one tanker) for 65,172 tons. The last sinking, on June 29, proved to be an embarrassment. She was the 6,600-ton Italian blockade-runner by a week. Schutze sank two more ships, bringing his confirmed total for this patrol to thirteen ships (one tanker) for 65,172 tons. The last sinking, on June 29, proved to be an embarrassment. She was the 6,600-ton Italian blockade-runner Ernani Ernani, disguised as a Dutch vessel. After sinking her, Schutze was compelled to make a secret emergency refueling stop from the German tanker Corrientes Corrientes, moored in the Spanish Canaries. Counting his earlier sinkings on U-25 U-25 and and U-103 U-103, this patrol also put Schutze over the 200,000-ton mark, earning Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Upon arrival in Lorient, July 12, Schutze was promoted to command a training flotilla in the Baltic. Upon arrival in Lorient, July 12, Schutze was promoted to command a training flotilla in the Baltic.

Of the boats returning from West African waters, the VIIC U-69 U-69, commanded by Jost Metzler, had the most difficult time. By mid-June Metzler was running out of food and fuel, and confronted problems with the fresh-water distillers. To augment the thin food supply, Metzler violated a maritime superstition and killed porpoises. The cook minced the porpoise meat and made fish cakes. At first the crew was reluctant to eat porpoise, but it finally gave in, pronouncing the cakes "delicious." After Gedania Gedania and and Lothringen Lothringen were lost, Donitz directed Metzler to refuel secretly from were lost, Donitz directed Metzler to refuel secretly from Corrientes Corrientes, but Metzler had doubts that he could get to the Canaries before he ran out of fuel.

While inching along on one diesel, late on the afternoon of June 26, U-69 U-69 happened upon convoy Sierra Leone 76 northbound from Freetown. These were the first enemy ships happened upon convoy Sierra Leone 76 northbound from Freetown. These were the first enemy ships U-69 U-69 had seen in almost a month and although Metzler had little fuel, he reported the convoy to Kerneval and closed on two diesels to make a night surface attack. Sneaking into the columns of ships, Metzler fired his last four torpedoes at four different ships. He claimed two ships for 17,500 tons sunk and one of 6,000 tons probably sunk, but postwar records confirmed only two British freighters sunk for 13,000 tons, the had seen in almost a month and although Metzler had little fuel, he reported the convoy to Kerneval and closed on two diesels to make a night surface attack. Sneaking into the columns of ships, Metzler fired his last four torpedoes at four different ships. He claimed two ships for 17,500 tons sunk and one of 6,000 tons probably sunk, but postwar records confirmed only two British freighters sunk for 13,000 tons, the Empire Ability Empire Ability and the and the River Lugar River Lugar. In the ensuing chaos, a couple of corvettes or sloops chased and fired guns at U-69 U-69, but Metzler hauled away with no damage. Donitz instructed Metzler to shadow and report for the benefit of two southbound boats, the Type IXs U-123 U-123 and and U-66 U-66, but owing to the lack of fuel, he could not comply.

The U-123 U-123, until recently under command of Karl-Heinz Moehle, was now in the hands of a new skipper, Reinhard Hardegen, age twenty-eight, from the duck U-147 U-147, which was sunk with the loss of all hands on June 2. A onetime naval aviator, Hardegen had incurred injuries in a plane crash (shortened right leg; bleeding stomach) that would have disqualified him from submarine duty. But he had concealed the injuries and got a berth as first watch officer on Georg-Wilhelm Schulz's U-124 U-124, then command of U-147 U-147 for one indoctrination patrol to North Channel before Donitz, unaware of his disqualifying injuries, gave Hardegen command of for one indoctrination patrol to North Channel before Donitz, unaware of his disqualifying injuries, gave Hardegen command of U-123 U-123.

Southbound to Freetown on June 20, Hardegen came upon what appeared to be a lone British ship and attacked submerged, firing one torpedo. It missed. After a long submerged chase, Hardegen fired again. This time the torpedo hit and the crew abandoned ship, which, however, remained afloat. Closing, Hardegen gave her a "finishing shot," a solid hit, but still the ship would not sink. Refusing to expend yet another torpedo, Hardegen surfaced for a gun action. He finally sank the ship with his 4.1" gun, but upon approaching the lifeboats, he discovered she was not a British ship, but rather the 4,333-ton Portuguese neutral Ganda Ganda. Later, when a diplomatic squall ensued, the Germans blamed the sinking on a British submarine and Donitz ordered Hardegen-as he had Lemp in the Athenia Athenia incident-to alter his patrol report to conceal the sinking. incident-to alter his patrol report to conceal the sinking.

After secretly replenishing from the Corrientes Corrientes in the dark, early hours of June 25, Hardegen left the Canaries and continued southbound, the crew wilting under the unfamiliar heat and humidity of the tropics. On the following day, Kerneval relayed Metzler's contact on Sierra Leone Convoy 76 to Hardegen, who plotted a course to intercept and found it in the afternoon of June 27. But the convoy was then escorted by "several destroyers" and corvettes and a Sunderland. Hardegen tracked until dark, then surfaced to report the convoy (twenty-three ships) to Donitz, who authorized Hardegen to attack, but also to track for the benefit of the southbound in the dark, early hours of June 25, Hardegen left the Canaries and continued southbound, the crew wilting under the unfamiliar heat and humidity of the tropics. On the following day, Kerneval relayed Metzler's contact on Sierra Leone Convoy 76 to Hardegen, who plotted a course to intercept and found it in the afternoon of June 27. But the convoy was then escorted by "several destroyers" and corvettes and a Sunderland. Hardegen tracked until dark, then surfaced to report the convoy (twenty-three ships) to Donitz, who authorized Hardegen to attack, but also to track for the benefit of the southbound U-66 U-66.

Hardegen launched his attack shortly before midnight, shooting three torpedoes at three different ships. Two hit the intended targets, the third missed and may have hit a ship-or may not have. Hardegen claimed sinking a 10,000-ton tanker and two 5,000-ton freighters in this salvo, but Admiralty records show that only two freighters, a 5,600-ton Britisher and a 2,000-ton Dutchman, went down. The escorts hunted and found U-123 U-123 and attacked her with depth charges for eleven hours, but Hardegen escaped serious damage by diving to 654 feet, well below the maximum settings for British depth charges. and attacked her with depth charges for eleven hours, but Hardegen escaped serious damage by diving to 654 feet, well below the maximum settings for British depth charges.

The next day Hardegen raced north to regain the convoy and reported his successes ("20,000 tons" sunk) to Kerneval. He made contact in the afternoon and reported, but a Sunderland drove him off. He continued pursuing northward through that night and the following day, June 29, by which time the other southbound boat, U-66 U-66, commanded by Richard Zapp, had made contact. That day and the next Zapp sank three stragglers, two Greeks and a Britisher, for 15,600 tons. Hardegen attacked the main body of the convoy that day, sinking the 4,000-ton British freighter Rio Azul Rio Azul, which he reported to be an auxiliary cruiser.

Upon learning that the convoy had been reinforced with air and surface escorts and that Hardegen had chased it about 400 miles to the north, on July 1 Donitz ordered both Hardegen and Zapp to turn about and resume patrols toward Freetown. However, by the time the boats reached Freetown, the Admiralty had strengthened ASW measures and, apparently with Ultra help, had routed convoys and individual ships away from that area. As a result, Hardegen and Zapp sank only one more British freighter each before returning to Lorient. Except U-A U-A, which sank no ships at all in a seventy-six-day patrol, these were the least productive patrols to Freetown that summer.

Meanwhile, Jost Metzler in the VIIC U-69 U-69, who had put Hardegen and Zapp onto convoy Sierra Leone 76, continued on to the Canaries to refuel from Corrientes Corrientes. To Metzler's amazement, Berlin Radio announced-by name-his claimed successes "off the coast of Africa": 31,500 tons. That counted the results of the mining missions but not Robin Moor Robin Moor, Metzler noted. On the night of June 28-29, U-69 U-69 nosed alongside nosed alongside Corrientes Corrientes, "with her last drops of fuel." After the crew had gorged on food and the fuel tanks had been topped off, the U-69 U-69 proceeded onward to Lorient. On the way Metzler-who had no torpedoes-boldly attacked and sank the heavily armed 3,000-ton British freighter proceeded onward to Lorient. On the way Metzler-who had no torpedoes-boldly attacked and sank the heavily armed 3,000-ton British freighter Robert L. Holt Robert L. Holt with his deck gun, a running artillery duel which Metzler described as the "craziest exploit" of this long and unusual patrol. with his deck gun, a running artillery duel which Metzler described as the "craziest exploit" of this long and unusual patrol.

Metzler arrived in St. Nazaire on July 8, having been continuously at sea for sixty-four days, an extraordinary record-setting voyage for a Type VIIC. By that time the furor over the Robin Moor Robin Moor had been all but forgotten, obscured by the smashing successes of the had been all but forgotten, obscured by the smashing successes of the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe in the Russian campaign. Donitz dutifully noted that "the sinking of the American ship S.S. in the Russian campaign. Donitz dutifully noted that "the sinking of the American ship S.S. Robin Moor Robin Moor was contrary to the orders given," but the court-martial Metzler had feared did not materialize. To the contrary, Donitz warmly praised Metzler for a "well-executed" patrol, citing especially the minelaying and the dogged gun attack on the was contrary to the orders given," but the court-martial Metzler had feared did not materialize. To the contrary, Donitz warmly praised Metzler for a "well-executed" patrol, citing especially the minelaying and the dogged gun attack on the Robert L. Holt Robert L. Holt. He credited U-69 U-69 with sinking six ships for 36,224 tons, including the British with sinking six ships for 36,224 tons, including the British Sangara Sangara, which was salvaged, but not counting Robin Moor Robin Moor. Postwar records credited Metzler with sinking six ships for 28,400 tons, including Robin Moor Robin Moor and a ship sunk by a mine, plus the damage to and a ship sunk by a mine, plus the damage to Sangara Sangara. After Donitz had learned all the details of this unusual and arduous patrol, he awarded Metzler a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.

Excepting U-A U-A, the eight boats that patrolled African waters from March to June achieved some of the most outstanding results of the U-boat war. All seven skippers earned a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz or Oak Leaves to the or Oak Leaves to the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. The confirmed totals: * Plus damage to the battleship Plus damage to the battleship Malaya Malaya.

These seventy-two sinkings, reported in May and June 1941, substantially raised the total U-boat successes for those months. The figures also tended to obscure the relatively thin hunting in the "decisive" North Atlantic area.

The depredations in the South Atlantic finally forced the Admiralty to intensify ASW measures in that area. One important step was the initiation of "end-to-end" escort for the Sierra Leone convoys. Under the new plan, approved on July 1, each Sierra Leone convoy was to be guarded from Freetown to Gibraltar waters by at least five corvettes. There the convoy was to merge with the Gibraltar convoys, inbound to the British Isles with another group of corvettes. The complete plan required sixty-six corvettes, thirty-six for the Freetown to Gibraltar leg, thirty for the Gibraltar to the British Isles leg. Since there were only ninety-nine corvettes in service, the plan could not be fully implemented without drawing corvettes from the North Atlantic convoy routes. Hence the urgent need for the U.S. Navy to assume responsibility for escorting North Atlantic convoys from Canada to Iceland at the earliest possible time. the plan could not be fully implemented without drawing corvettes from the North Atlantic convoy routes. Hence the urgent need for the U.S. Navy to assume responsibility for escorting North Atlantic convoys from Canada to Iceland at the earliest possible time.

JUNE P PATROLS TO THE N NORTH A ATLANTIC.

The Bismarck Bismarck affair had disrupted the U-boat patrol cycles in the Atlantic and gutted the western patrol line south of Greenland. By June 1, the line consisted of merely four boats. However, seven of the twenty boats that sailed in June were en route to reinforce it, plus affair had disrupted the U-boat patrol cycles in the Atlantic and gutted the western patrol line south of Greenland. By June 1, the line consisted of merely four boats. However, seven of the twenty boats that sailed in June were en route to reinforce it, plus U-557 U-557, which had withdrawn, temporarily, to refuel from the scuttled Bismarck Bismarck supply ship supply ship Belchen Belchen. At the request of the OKM, two other new VIIs sailing from Germany to join the patrol line, U-79 U-79 and and U-559 U-559, were temporarily diverted to the Denmark Strait to assist in a proposed sortie of the "pocket" battleship Lutzow Lutzow (ex- (ex-Deutschland).*

Positioned beyond range of ASW aircraft based in Iceland or Newfoundland and close enough to Belchen Belchen for refueling, Donitz expected great results from the western patrol line. But problems arose. for refueling, Donitz expected great results from the western patrol line. But problems arose. Belchen Belchen was lost almost immediately and Korth's was lost almost immediately and Korth's U-93 U-93 took took Belchen's Belchen's survivors to Lorient. In addition, another boat, Richard Zapp's new IXB, survivors to Lorient. In addition, another boat, Richard Zapp's new IXB, U-66 U-66, lost all four of its torpedo-tube bow caps and aborted-unnecessarily soon, Donitz logged. The remaining ten boats, thinly spread across possible convoy routes, were bedeviled by heavy fog, caused when cold Arctic air masses met the warm waters of the Gulf Stream.

From Ultra the Admiralty knew the approximate position and strength of the U-boat patrol line. Working in close harmony, Rodger Winn in the U-boat Tracking Room and officials of the Admiralty Trade Division and those at Derby House in Liverpool routed the eastbound Halifax convoys well around the line. Thus the only ships the boats encountered were the (mostly empty) unescorted westbound singles or doubles, which had dispersed from the outbound convoys west of Iceland before the "end-to-end" escort came into being.

The absence of any Halifax convoys was deeply puzzling to the Germans. Suspecting that the Admiralty might be routing them well to the north of the patrol line, along the edge of the ice pack between Newfoundland and Greenland, Donitz obtained permission from the OKM to send Kleinschmidt's U-111 U-111-which had refueled from the now-scuttled Belchen Belchen-to explore the coast of Newfoundland from Cape Race north to Belle Isle Strait. Since this was to be the first penetration of "American" waters by a U-boat, and Hitler wanted no unnecessary provocations during Barbarossa, Kleinschmidt was barred from shooting at anything except "especially valuable ships" (cruisers or larger warships or huge liners, such as the Queen Mary Queen Mary, converted to troop transports) and was to maintain absolute radio silence during the reconnaissance.

This was a challenging assignment for a boat on its maiden patrol, doubly so because Kleinschmidt had no navigational charts of the Newfoundland area. Upon closing the coast, he encountered heavy pack ice, icebergs, and dense fog. He explored the area for a week, during which he incurred ice damage to two torpedotube caps, then withdrew well to the east to radio a report to Donitz. He had seen no traffic. Because of the extensive ice pack, Kleinschmidt believed it improbable that the convoys were being routed that way. After reflecting on this report, Donitz moved the patrol line further south-to no avail.

Although the patrol line found no Halifax convoys, the boats encountered and continued to sink a number of westbound singles and doubles. The top shooter was the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Herbert Schultze, who was taking the famous but weary holder Herbert Schultze, who was taking the famous but weary U-48 U-48 home to the Training Command. In merely nine days, Schultze sank five ships for 38,462 tons, including three tankers: the 9,500-ton British home to the Training Command. In merely nine days, Schultze sank five ships for 38,462 tons, including three tankers: the 9,500-ton British Inversuir Inversuir, the 6,000-ton British Wellfield Wellfield, and the 10,700-ton Dutch Pendrecht Pendrecht. This tonnage put Schultze over the 200,000-ton mark and Donitz awarded him Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, the fourth skipper after Prien, Kretschmer, and Schepke to earn that high honor in the North Atlantic.* Schultze left Schultze left U-48 U-48 in Germany and returned to France to command the 3d Combat Flotilla at La Pallice. in Germany and returned to France to command the 3d Combat Flotilla at La Pallice.

No less aggressive was the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Engelbert Endrass in the equally weary VIIB holder Engelbert Endrass in the equally weary VIIB U-46 U-46. But he was bedeviled by torpedo failures-four, he reported. On June 2 and 6, he attacked and hit a freighter and a tanker, but each time the torpedo failed to detonate. On June 8 he simultaneously attacked a tanker and a freighter. Two more torpedoes failed to detonate, but nonetheless Endrass damaged the 6,200-ton British tanker Ensis Ensis and sank a 5,300-ton freighter. In retaliation, and sank a 5,300-ton freighter. In retaliation, Ensis Ensis turned on turned on U-46 U-46 and rammed her, knocking out the attack periscope. Endrass put and rammed her, knocking out the attack periscope. Endrass put Ensis Ensis under with a finishing shot, then aborted to France. Inbound to Lorient he sank a 5,600-ton freighter by torpedo and gun. His overclaims of 16,500 tons sunk also put Endrass beyond the 200,000-ton mark and he, too, was awarded Oak Leaves to his under with a finishing shot, then aborted to France. Inbound to Lorient he sank a 5,600-ton freighter by torpedo and gun. His overclaims of 16,500 tons sunk also put Endrass beyond the 200,000-ton mark and he, too, was awarded Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.

Another Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder, Wolfgang Luth in the old but recently rehabilitated Type IX holder, Wolfgang Luth in the old but recently rehabilitated Type IX U-43 U-43, replaced Endrass in the patrol line. He sank two ships for 7,500 tons, but U-43 U-43 was not really combat-worthy. When Luth returned to Lorient, the boat went back into the yard for another overhaul, to remain there until November, having completed only two war patrols in twelve months, during which Luth sank only five ships. was not really combat-worthy. When Luth returned to Lorient, the boat went back into the yard for another overhaul, to remain there until November, having completed only two war patrols in twelve months, during which Luth sank only five ships.

The other skippers of the patrol line-some on maiden voyages-sank another fourteen ships between June 1 and June 18. The most successful of these was Klaus Scholtz in the Type IXB U-108 U-108, making his third Atlantic patrol. He claimed sinking four ships for 27,300 tons, including a 14,000-ton auxiliary cruiser. In reality he sank four freighters for 17,000 tons.

Erich Topp in U-552 U-552, who had made three patrols to North Channel in the duck U-57 U-57 and two in and two in U-552 U-552, requested that dangerous area again. In view of the fact that the duck U-141 U-141, on indoctrination patrol, had been severely damaged there in recent days, Donitz was hesitant, especially since the shortest nights of the year were fast approaching. Finally, Donitz consented.

The plan was for Topp to coordinate operations, if possible, with three Type IID ducks on indoctrination patrols close to the British Isles: the U-141 U-141, repaired in Lorient; the U-143 U-143, sailing from Germany; and the U-147 U-147, which had earlier sailed from Germany. Unknown to Donitz, the U-147 U-147, commanded by Eberhard Wetjen, had been sunk on June 2 by British warships, the destroyer Wanderer Wanderer and corvette and corvette Periwinkle Periwinkle, following Wetjen's bold solo attack on convoy Outbound 329.

Topp found the area teeming with ASW aircraft, forcing him to crash-dive up to ten times a day, a nerve-racking routine during which several of his men broke down. Nonetheless, he found and sank three ships for 24,400 tons, including the 11,000-ton British freighter Norfolk Norfolk. These sinkings brought Topp's claims to 100,000 tons, earning him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.* On June 18, Topp came upon an inbound convoy and attempted to attack and bring in the ducks and other boats, but the escorts drove him off. The duck On June 18, Topp came upon an inbound convoy and attempted to attack and bring in the ducks and other boats, but the escorts drove him off. The duck U-141 U-141 was unable to cooperate with was unable to cooperate with U-552 U-552 but she shot at two ships, sinking one. but she shot at two ships, sinking one.

Another duck, the U-138 U-138, commanded by twenty-five-year-old Franz Gramit-sky, who had served in combat under Schepke and Luth on other ducks, had arrived in Lorient from Germany for a top-secret special mission. Gramitsky was to penetrate the mined British naval base at Gibraltar for the specific purpose of sinking the battleship Renown Renown or an aircraft carrier or, at the very least, a heavy cruiser. Should he succeed in sinking a capital ship-as Prien had at Scapa Flow-he was assured of a or an aircraft carrier or, at the very least, a heavy cruiser. Should he succeed in sinking a capital ship-as Prien had at Scapa Flow-he was assured of a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Should'he run into difficulty, the crew was to scuttle and swim to Spain, where it was to be assisted in making its way back to Lorient.

Gramitsky sailed from Lorient on June 12. Other than he, no one on the boat knew the purpose of the mission. Early on the morning of June 18, when U-138 U-138 was about 100 miles west of the Strait of Gibraltar, inbound on the surface, the bridge watch spotted what was believed to be a "cruiser" and dived. Actually, the "cruiser" was the destroyer was about 100 miles west of the Strait of Gibraltar, inbound on the surface, the bridge watch spotted what was believed to be a "cruiser" and dived. Actually, the "cruiser" was the destroyer Faulkner Faulkner, which in company with four sister ships of the 13th Destroyer Flotilla, Fearless, Forester, Foresight Fearless, Forester, Foresight, and Foxhound Foxhound, was conducting a sonar sweep, probably forewarned by Ultra to be on the lookout for U-138 U-138. The skilled sonar teams on Faulkner Faulkner and and Forester Forester had helped kill the first U-boats of the war, had helped kill the first U-boats of the war, U-27 U-27 and and U-39 U-39.

Faulkner obtained sonar contact on obtained sonar contact on U-138 U-138 and attacked immediately, dropping six depth charges set for 100 to 250 feet. These exploded with uncanny accuracy, wrecking and flooding the boat. Out of control, her internal spaces awash with water, she twice slid down to 650 feet before Gramitsky could blow her ballast tanks and get her to the surface. When she popped up, the entire crew jumped overboard. and attacked immediately, dropping six depth charges set for 100 to 250 feet. These exploded with uncanny accuracy, wrecking and flooding the boat. Out of control, her internal spaces awash with water, she twice slid down to 650 feet before Gramitsky could blow her ballast tanks and get her to the surface. When she popped up, the entire crew jumped overboard. Forester Forester saw the doomed boat on the surface and attacked with guns. She dropped six more close depth charges before she realized saw the doomed boat on the surface and attacked with guns. She dropped six more close depth charges before she realized U-138 U-138 was already sinking, vertically, stern first. was already sinking, vertically, stern first. Faulkner Faulkner fished out the entire crew of twenty-eight men; there were no serious casualties. fished out the entire crew of twenty-eight men; there were no serious casualties.

A REVEALING C CONVOY B BATTLE.

To June 18, none of the boats on the distant western patrol line had seen any sign of a Halifax convoy. "The lull in traffic ... is striking," Donitz logged. He decided to move the line southeastward, to "mislead" the enemy, in case they "had knowledge of the patrol line." At the same time, he directed Kleinschmidt in U-111 U-111, the northernmost boat in the line, to return to the ice pack off Newfoundland, to see if the convoys were sailing far to the north. The shift to the southeast produced no results. On June 19, therefore, Donitz disbanded the patrol line and scattered the twenty boats in the North Atlantic to positions within a huge rectangle, measuring roughly 1,000 by 1,800 miles. The twenty boats included the new VIICs U-79 U-79 and and U-559 U-559, which had been assigned to the Denmark Strait to support the aborted Lutzow Lutzow sortie, but sortie, but U-559 U-559 had bent her periscopes in the ice and was forced to head for Lorient. had bent her periscopes in the ice and was forced to head for Lorient.

While westbound to her designated station, shortly after midnight on June 20, the new VIIC, U-203 U-203, commanded by Rolf Mutzelburg, age twenty-eight, from the duck U-10 U-10, sighted a battleship, escorted by a single destroyer. She was the aged Texas Texas, part of a temporary United States naval task force that included the other two old battleships, New York New York and and Arkansas Arkansas, all deployed to help the British intercept the anticipated sortie of Lutzow. Lutzow. Since Since Texas Texas was then about 800 miles south-southwest of Iceland and ten miles inside a zone in which Hitler had authorized attacks on neutral warships, Mutzelburg boldly went to battle stations and chased the zigzagging giant northeast, wondering if was then about 800 miles south-southwest of Iceland and ten miles inside a zone in which Hitler had authorized attacks on neutral warships, Mutzelburg boldly went to battle stations and chased the zigzagging giant northeast, wondering if Texas Texas (like the fifty destroyers and ten Coast Guard cutters) had been loaned, sold, or given to Great Britain. But (like the fifty destroyers and ten Coast Guard cutters) had been loaned, sold, or given to Great Britain. But Texas Texas was making high speed and after a sixteen-hour pursuit that took the vessels 148 miles inside the zone, Mutzelburg had to give it up, a great disappointment. was making high speed and after a sixteen-hour pursuit that took the vessels 148 miles inside the zone, Mutzelburg had to give it up, a great disappointment.

Later in the day, when Mutzelburg reported his unsuccessful chase, it caused a great stir in Kerneval and Berlin. D day for Operation Barbarossa was merely forty-eight hours away; Hitler had made it clear that U-boats and merchant-ship raiders were to avoid incidents with United States vessels. And yet the appearance of Texas Texas within the "German zone" was a defiant challenge. Since Donitz and Raeder and others at the OKM believed Germany should not show weakness lest the United States transgress further, they concluded that Mutzelburg had acted correctly in attempting to attack within the "German zone" was a defiant challenge. Since Donitz and Raeder and others at the OKM believed Germany should not show weakness lest the United States transgress further, they concluded that Mutzelburg had acted correctly in attempting to attack Texas Texas, and Raeder so informed Hitler, who was in "complete agreement." However, since errors in navigation were more the rule than the exception, it was also agreed that no action against neutral (i.e., American) warships was to be taken within twenty miles of the German boundary line, and Donitz so informed the boats.

Later that night, June 21-22, Hitler personally telephoned Raeder to nullify the new policy. During Barbarossa, Hitler stated, attacks on American warships anywhere in the German zone were not not to be undertaken. "Until there is a clear development of the Barbarossa campaign," the OKM logged, Hitler "desires that all incidents with the U.S.A. be avoided." Hitler himself "will decide when attacks on U.S.A. warships are again to be permitted." to be undertaken. "Until there is a clear development of the Barbarossa campaign," the OKM logged, Hitler "desires that all incidents with the U.S.A. be avoided." Hitler himself "will decide when attacks on U.S.A. warships are again to be permitted."

Donitz relayed the new policy to the boats on June 21: "The Fuhrer has ordered, for the next few weeks, avoidance of any incident with the U.S.A. Proceed accordingly in any doubtful case." As a further precaution, Hitler had ordered that the U-boats were to attack only clearly recognizable British cruisers, battleships, or aircraft carriers within and without the zone, bearing in mind that American ships in that category might be blacked out and should not be mistaken for British.

This order, Donitz complained in his memoirs, created "a situation which was unique in the history of war." It meant that "U-boats could no longer attack their most dangerous enemies, the destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, whether British or any other nationality.... The British antisubmarine forces thus had a completely free hand." But this was splitting hairs. Because of the shallow torpedo settings required and the resulting erratic performance, U-boats did not customarily attack convoy escorts. They avoided and evaded escorts and when counterattacked by escorts, they went deep. And yet it rankled to be restricted from attacking escorts, and Donitz did not hesitate to make his views known to the OKM.

Returning to his designated patrol area, on the afternoon of June 23-the second day of Barbarossa-Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 happened upon convoy Halifax 133 at longitude 41 degrees west-400 miles due south of Greenland. His contact report galvanized Kerneval; it was the first Halifax convoy any U-boat had found in thirty-five days. Since it had a very long way to go, there was a good possibility that ten or more boats could be brought up to attack it along its track. Accordingly, Donitz instructed Mutzelburg to shadow and radio beacon signals for the benefit of the other boats, thus launching an epic chase and battle. happened upon convoy Halifax 133 at longitude 41 degrees west-400 miles due south of Greenland. His contact report galvanized Kerneval; it was the first Halifax convoy any U-boat had found in thirty-five days. Since it had a very long way to go, there was a good possibility that ten or more boats could be brought up to attack it along its track. Accordingly, Donitz instructed Mutzelburg to shadow and radio beacon signals for the benefit of the other boats, thus launching an epic chase and battle.

Initially composed of forty-nine ships laden with valuable cargos, Halifax 133 had sailed on June 21. It was the fifth eastbound transatlantic convoy to be provided "end-to-end" or "clear-across" escort and to sail at increased speed to accommodate the 12- to 15-knot ships that theretofore had been sailing outside convoys. A newly formed Canadian escort group (the destroyer Ottawa Ottawa and four corvettes, three Canadian and one British) was to take the convoy east to 35 degrees west, where an Iceland-based British escort group was to shepherd it through the middle leg to about 20 degrees west. In a reverse process, another Canadian escort group (corvette and four corvettes, three Canadian and one British) was to take the convoy east to 35 degrees west, where an Iceland-based British escort group was to shepherd it through the middle leg to about 20 degrees west. In a reverse process, another Canadian escort group (corvette Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin and four others), sailing from Iceland, was to relieve a British escort group at 35 degrees west and shepherd convoy Outbound 336 onward to Canada. and four others), sailing from Iceland, was to relieve a British escort group at 35 degrees west and shepherd convoy Outbound 336 onward to Canada.

Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 tracked Halifax 133 throughout the afternoon and evening of June 23, sending frequent reports. All over the ocean the widely scattered boats plotted the positions by the new "reference point" system and calculated the chances of making an interception. After two other new VIICs, tracked Halifax 133 throughout the afternoon and evening of June 23, sending frequent reports. All over the ocean the widely scattered boats plotted the positions by the new "reference point" system and calculated the chances of making an interception. After two other new VIICs, U-79 U-79 and and U-371 U-371, had made contact and reported, in the early hours of June 24 Donitz authorized U-203 U-203 to attack. to attack.

In his first salvo of the war, Mutzelburg fired at three large ships. He claimed that two sank, but only the 4,400-ton Norwegian freighter Soloy Soloy was confirmed. Heinrich Driver, age twenty-eight, in the new was confirmed. Heinrich Driver, age twenty-eight, in the new U-371 U-371, attacked next, sinking the 4,800-ton Norwegian freighter Vigrid Vigrid, which was straggling. The crew and ten American Red Cross nurses launched four lifeboats. Two boats headed for Greenland, the other two for Ireland. Wolfgang Kaufmann, age twenty-nine, in the new U-79 U-79 had no opportunity to shoot, but he shadowed and reported. had no opportunity to shoot, but he shadowed and reported. Ottawa Ottawa, commanded by Edmond R. Mainguy, and the four corvettes of the Canadian escort group, engaged in the "first Canadian Navy convoy battle," sped hither and yon, unable to communicate and dropping depth charges to little purpose.

At that time, two consecutive convoys, Outbound 335 and Outbound 336, were proceeding westward in this area. Noting that Outbound 336, composed of twenty-three ships and guarded by a Canadian escort group of five corvettes, was to pass close to the besieged Halifax 133, Western Approaches ordered the convoy commander to alter course to avoid that area. The convoy commander's regular radio operator was ill; his substitute, who could not decode the message, mindlessly filed it away. A similar message was sent to the flagship of the Canadian escort group, Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin, but the Canadians had not yet found the convoy and the message could not be delivered. Thus Outbound 336 continued on a converging course with eastbound Halifax 133, bringing together a total of sixty-five merchant ships and two newly formed Canadian escort groups.

Later on the morning of June 24, about seven hours after his attack on Halifax 133, Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 made contact with Outbound 336. The operational orders required that Mutzelburg report the convoy so Kerneval could bring up other boats, withholding an attack until authorized. But Mutzelburg impulsively assaulted the formation, sinking two freighters, the 5,000-ton British made contact with Outbound 336. The operational orders required that Mutzelburg report the convoy so Kerneval could bring up other boats, withholding an attack until authorized. But Mutzelburg impulsively assaulted the formation, sinking two freighters, the 5,000-ton British Kinross Kinross and the 2,000-ton Dutch and the 2,000-ton Dutch Schie Schie. Later that afternoon, he reported this new convoy and the upsetting news that he had already attacked it and that owing to a broken muffler valve he was aborting immediately-before any other boats could make contact. Donitz angrily ordered Mutzelburg to shadow and report, but he had lost contact and could not comply.

From Mutzelburg's reports, and others, Donitz realized that two convoys were passing "in a narrow area," and there was an opportunity for a slaughter. He therefore passed along all information and instructed the converging boats to attack whichever convoy they considered "most favorable." At the same time, Western Approaches, seeking to protect the most valuable (eastbound) ships, ordered the Canadian Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin group, still searching for Outbound 336, and five of the British escorts with convoys Outbound 335 and Outbound 336, to reinforce the eastbound Halifax 133. group, still searching for Outbound 336, and five of the British escorts with convoys Outbound 335 and Outbound 336, to reinforce the eastbound Halifax 133.

By the time these orders were received, the Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin group had picked up the distress calls from and the position of the long-sought Outbound 336. Contrary to orders of Western Approaches, the leader of the group had picked up the distress calls from and the position of the long-sought Outbound 336. Contrary to orders of Western Approaches, the leader of the Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin group, Guy S. Windeyer, elected to divide his force so that Outbound 336 would not be completely unprotected. He sent two corvettes to Halifax 133 and attached group, Guy S. Windeyer, elected to divide his force so that Outbound 336 would not be completely unprotected. He sent two corvettes to Halifax 133 and attached Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin and two other corvettes to Outbound 336. His disobedience of a direct order was to evoke criticism-and ridicule-of the Canadian Navy, but upon investigation at a later date, Derby House approved of the decision. However, by the time the and two other corvettes to Outbound 336. His disobedience of a direct order was to evoke criticism-and ridicule-of the Canadian Navy, but upon investigation at a later date, Derby House approved of the decision. However, by the time the Wetaskiwin Wetaskiwin group finally caught up to the convoy, it had dispersed into a dense fog and the group could not provide meaningful support. group finally caught up to the convoy, it had dispersed into a dense fog and the group could not provide meaningful support.

About six U-boats elected to pursue this dispersing convoy. These included two experienced skippers, Ernst Mengersen in U-101 U-101 and Klaus Scholtz in and Klaus Scholtz in U-108 U-108. But all the U-boats were hampered by fog and fuel shortages. Only Scholtz in U-108 U-108 sank a ship, the 4,400-ton Greek sank a ship, the 4,400-ton Greek Nicolas Pateras Nicolas Pateras.

During the daylight hours of June 24, Wolfgang Kaufmann in the new U-79 U-79 continued to track the eastbound Halifax 133. Early that evening Peter Lohmeyer, age thirty, a merchant marine veteran who had trained on the recently sunk duck continued to track the eastbound Halifax 133. Early that evening Peter Lohmeyer, age thirty, a merchant marine veteran who had trained on the recently sunk duck U-138 U-138, came up in his new VIIC U-651 U-651 and attacked three ships. He claimed sinking all three, but only one, the 5,300-ton British freighter and attacked three ships. He claimed sinking all three, but only one, the 5,300-ton British freighter Brockley Hill Brockley Hill, went down. The Canadian escorts counterattacked in confusion, again to no purpose. After Lohmeyer's attack, the British corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus from Outbound 335 and four other escorts from Outbound 336 arrived, raising the total escort force with Halifax 133 to ten. from Outbound 335 and four other escorts from Outbound 336 arrived, raising the total escort force with Halifax 133 to ten.

Shortly after midnight, June 25, Gladiolus Gladiolus saw a U-boat speeding very close across her bow. This was Walter Flachsenberg, age thirty-two, in another new VIIC, saw a U-boat speeding very close across her bow. This was Walter Flachsenberg, age thirty-two, in another new VIIC, U-77 U-77, boldly but unalertly maneuvering to attack the rear of the convoy. Gladiolus Gladiolus put on full speed to ram but, when it was realized on second thought that put on full speed to ram but, when it was realized on second thought that Gladiolus Gladiolus was 600 miles from land and might sink herself in the ramming, the collision was aborted, giving was 600 miles from land and might sink herself in the ramming, the collision was aborted, giving U-71 U-71 time to crash dive. time to crash dive. Gladiolus Gladiolus got a firm sonar contact and carried out five separate attacks, dropping thirty depth charges. The recently arrived British corvette got a firm sonar contact and carried out five separate attacks, dropping thirty depth charges. The recently arrived British corvette Nasturtium Nasturtium joined joined Gladiolus Gladiolus, which was nearly out of depth charges, and dropped six. A half hour later, U-71 U-71, severely damaged internally, surfaced to escape in the darkness. Seeing her, Gladiolus Gladiolus opened fire, but could not use her 4" gun because opened fire, but could not use her 4" gun because Nasturtium Nasturtium was in the way. When she cleared out, was in the way. When she cleared out, Gladiolus Gladiolus brought her gun to bear and claimed a fatal "direct hit" on the conning tower. Although brought her gun to bear and claimed a fatal "direct hit" on the conning tower. Although Gladiolus Gladiolus was criticized for not ramming the boat in the first attack, she was credited with a kill in the second attack. In fact, Flachsenberg got was criticized for not ramming the boat in the first attack, she was credited with a kill in the second attack. In fact, Flachsenberg got U-71 U-71 away, aborting to Lorient with severe damage. away, aborting to Lorient with severe damage.* Donitz heaped praise on Flachsenberg for extricating Donitz heaped praise on Flachsenberg for extricating U-71 U-71 from "a very difficult situation." from "a very difficult situation."

Surrounded by ten escorts, convoy Halifax 133 proceeded eastward on June 26. At nightfall, a half dozen U-boats moved in for the kill. Wolfgang Kaufmann, the patient shadower in the new U-79 U-79, hit and damaged a 10,400-ton British tanker, but she kept on going. Erich Topp in U-552 U-552, who had come west from the North Channel area and was low on fuel and torpedoes, hit a freighter, but the torpedo failed to detonate. Owing to his shortage of fuel, Topp was forced to return to Lorient. Another new VIIC, U-562 U-562, commanded by Herwig Collmann, age twenty-five, which had only just arrived in the Atlantic, tried to attack but was driven off. Yet another new VIIC, U-564 U-564, commanded by Reinhard Suhren, who had won a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz while serving as first watch officer on the famous while serving as first watch officer on the famous U-48 U-48, attacked and hit three big ships in one amazing salvo: the 8,800-ton Dutch freighter Maasdam Maasdam, the 8,700-ton British freighter Malaya II Malaya II, and the 9,500-ton Norwegian tanker Kongsgaard Kongsgaard. The Maasdam Maasdam sank. She had on board a company of American Marines en route to the American Embassy in London. Rescue ships took the Marines to Iceland. The sank. She had on board a company of American Marines en route to the American Embassy in London. Rescue ships took the Marines to Iceland. The Malaya II Malaya II, carrying a load of ammunition, blew up with a horrific blast. The Kongsgaard Kongsgaard was damaged but she kept going. was damaged but she kept going.

Another VIIC, U-556 U-556, commanded by the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Herbert Wohlfarth, fresh from Lorient on his second patrol, joined the attackers in the early hours of June 27. Notwithstanding a noisy coupling in his port motor, Wohlfarth decided to attack submerged during daylight and pulled ahead of the convoy and dived. Before he could shoot, the British corvette holder Herbert Wohlfarth, fresh from Lorient on his second patrol, joined the attackers in the early hours of June 27. Notwithstanding a noisy coupling in his port motor, Wohlfarth decided to attack submerged during daylight and pulled ahead of the convoy and dived. Before he could shoot, the British corvette Nasturtium Nasturtium got got U-556 U-556 on sonar and fired off all her remaining twenty depth charges. Responding to her alarm, the British corvettes on sonar and fired off all her remaining twenty depth charges. Responding to her alarm, the British corvettes Celandine Celandine and and Gladiolus Gladiolus came up, but when neither could get a sonar return, they expressed doubt about the contact. Insisting she had a good contact, came up, but when neither could get a sonar return, they expressed doubt about the contact. Insisting she had a good contact, Nasturtium Nasturtium guided guided Celandine Celandine to the likely spot. to the likely spot. Celandine Celandine dropped twenty-four charges, to no apparent effect. Still skeptical of this "contact," both dropped twenty-four charges, to no apparent effect. Still skeptical of this "contact," both Celandine Celandine and and Gladiolus Gladiolus repeatedly expressed doubt, but finally repeatedly expressed doubt, but finally Gladiolus Gladiolus, too, got a contact and made a ten-charge attack, which brought up a large oil patch.

The charges from Nasturtium, Celandine Nasturtium, Celandine, and Gladiolus Gladiolus had, in fact, severely damaged had, in fact, severely damaged U-556 U-556. Wohlfarth shut down the noisy port motor but heavy flooding aft short-circuited the starboard motor, forcing him to restart the port motor. However, the flooding aft continued to the point that Wohlfarth lost control of the boat, which slipped down to 426 feet. Believing his only chance of survival lay in surfacing to attack the corvettes (in violation of Hitler's orders), Wohlfarth blew ballast tanks and came up almost beneath Gladiolus Gladiolus, which was in the process of firing three of her last ten depth charges. One of these actually hit the aft deck of U-556 U-556 and bounced off. and bounced off.

Gladiolus, Nasturtium, and Celandine Celandine opened fire at point-blank range with 4" guns, scoring hits on opened fire at point-blank range with 4" guns, scoring hits on U-556 U-556's conning tower. The gunfire killed some Germans and persuaded Wohlfarth to scuttle and abandon ship. Believing there was a chance to capture U-556 U-556, Gladiolus Gladiolus launched a whaler with a boarding party, led by Lieutenant J. G. Gifford-Hull, who fished out a "German officer" to "help." However, upon entering the conning tower, the British sailors saw that the control room was flooded and smelled chlorine gas. Since launched a whaler with a boarding party, led by Lieutenant J. G. Gifford-Hull, who fished out a "German officer" to "help." However, upon entering the conning tower, the British sailors saw that the control room was flooded and smelled chlorine gas. Since U-556 U-556 was obviously going down fast, Gifford-Hull abandoned the attempt to capture her, coming away only with a torpedo-maintenance booklet and a Very pistol. was obviously going down fast, Gifford-Hull abandoned the attempt to capture her, coming away only with a torpedo-maintenance booklet and a Very pistol.

Meanwhile, Gladiolus Gladiolus picked up Wohlfarth and thirty-nine of his crew. Four Germans died in the sinking; another died from inhaling toxic gas in his escape apparatus. Wohlfarth was the sixth picked up Wohlfarth and thirty-nine of his crew. Four Germans died in the sinking; another died from inhaling toxic gas in his escape apparatus. Wohlfarth was the sixth Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder to fall, the third to be captured. holder to fall, the third to be captured.* British interrogators did not rate the crew highly. Except for Wohlfarth and a few capable and experienced chiefs and petty officers who had earlier served with him, the senior officers and men, the interrogators reported, were "unreliable" newcomers "of limited experience" who had been "hastily promoted." The junior men were "decidedly poor stuff." British interrogators did not rate the crew highly. Except for Wohlfarth and a few capable and experienced chiefs and petty officers who had earlier served with him, the senior officers and men, the interrogators reported, were "unreliable" newcomers "of limited experience" who had been "hastily promoted." The junior men were "decidedly poor stuff."