That afternoon there was a change-up in the escorts of Halifax 133. The Canadian group (the destroyer Ottawa Ottawa, five corvettes) peeled off and went into Iceland, where it was criticized-and even ridiculed-for "losing" five ships of the convoy and accomplishing nothing in return. It was replaced at sea by C. D. Howard-Johnston's British Escort Group 12, bringing the total escorts for the final leg to thirteen.

The U-boats continued to track and attack Halifax 133. In the early hours of June 29, Peter Lohmeyer in the new U-651 U-651 caught up again after a four-day chase. Closing submerged, he fired two torpedoes and hit the 6,300-ton British freighter caught up again after a four-day chase. Closing submerged, he fired two torpedoes and hit the 6,300-ton British freighter Grayburn Grayburn, the convoy flagship, which was loaded with 10,000 tons of steel. It sank in four minutes. But the next ship in the column, the 8,000-ton British tanker Anadara Anadara, plowed into the submerged U-651 U-651 with a heavy jolt that threw the boat out of control and weakened seams. with a heavy jolt that threw the boat out of control and weakened seams.

The more battle-wise warships of Escort Group 12 deployed in a fighting mood. As a deterrent they first dropped depth charges at random. However, two escorts, (destroyer Scimitar Scimitar, minesweeper Speedwell) Speedwell) soon reported firm sonar contacts and they conducted deliberate attacks. Some of the depth charges fell close to soon reported firm sonar contacts and they conducted deliberate attacks. Some of the depth charges fell close to U-651 U-651, doubtless opening seams weakened by the collision with Anadara Anadara. Flooding aft, U-651 U-651 slid down to 525 feet and Lohmeyer exhausted his battery in a vain effort to regain control of the boat with the motors. In a last desperate effort to escape on the diesels, he blew all ballast tanks and surfaced. slid down to 525 feet and Lohmeyer exhausted his battery in a vain effort to regain control of the boat with the motors. In a last desperate effort to escape on the diesels, he blew all ballast tanks and surfaced.

When Lohmeyer lit off the diesels they emitted small puffs of black smoke. The destroyer Malcolm Malcolm saw the smoke six miles off, gave the alarm, and charged in, firing her main batteries. Four other escorts, including the destroyer saw the smoke six miles off, gave the alarm, and charged in, firing her main batteries. Four other escorts, including the destroyer Scimitar Scimitar and the corvette and the corvette Nasturtium Nasturtium, came up, firing guns. In the face of the fire, Lohmeyer scuttled and abandoned ship. Rigging scramble nets, Malcolm Malcolm picked up Lohmeyer and all forty-four of his men, but picked up Lohmeyer and all forty-four of his men, but Scimitar Scimitar closed closed Malcolm Malcolm and snatched one of the Germans from the net. The Admiralty credited Escort Group 12 with the kill, but in later years, Admiralty historians withdrew the credit and bestowed it upon and snatched one of the Germans from the net. The Admiralty credited Escort Group 12 with the kill, but in later years, Admiralty historians withdrew the credit and bestowed it upon Anadara Anadara, which retroactively became the first merchant ship to be credited with sinking a U-boat.

As the convoy drew closer to the heavily patrolled Northwest Approaches, Donitz called off the boats, directed them elsewhere, and asked for reports. He calculated that in all, about fourteen U-boats had made contact with Halifax 133, including four more new boats from Germany which joined near the end of the chase. The confirmed results were shockingly low: five U-boats sank six ships for 38,000 tons* and damaged two tankers, and damaged two tankers, Tibia Tibia and and Kongsgaard Kongsgaard. In return, two boats, U-556 U-556 and and U-651 U-651, had been lost, and U-71 U-71 very nearly lost, a ruinous "exchange rate" of three ships sunk for each boat lost. Two boats had sunk three ships for 11,300 tons from convoy Outbound 336. Grand total: nine ships for 49,300 tons, three of them by Mutzelburg in very nearly lost, a ruinous "exchange rate" of three ships sunk for each boat lost. Two boats had sunk three ships for 11,300 tons from convoy Outbound 336. Grand total: nine ships for 49,300 tons, three of them by Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, who, Donitz logged, conceded his "mistake" in launching an impulsive attack on Outbound 336 and of aborting before any other boats arrived.

The battle with Halifax 133 led to important changes in the U-boat strategy and tactics, including, most notably, a withdrawal of the boats from the Greenland area to more easterly hunting grounds. The reasons were several: * Although the ocean west of Iceland and south of Greenland was still devoid of ASW aircraft and experienced escorts and was therefore safer for U-boat operations, the area was simply too large for effective convoy hunting by patrol lines with the few boats then available. The U-203 U-203 discovered convoy Halifax 133 only after Donitz had disbanded the western patrol line and scattered the boats over a huge area. But in scattering the boats, Donitz foreswore the ability to quickly bring them up for a pack attack-to mass maximum strength at the point of contact with the enemy. discovered convoy Halifax 133 only after Donitz had disbanded the western patrol line and scattered the boats over a huge area. But in scattering the boats, Donitz foreswore the ability to quickly bring them up for a pack attack-to mass maximum strength at the point of contact with the enemy.

* Operations in this very distant area were extremely difficult for the relatively short-ranged Type VII boats. The fuel expended going out and back left little for patrolling the area for any appreciable time, or for confidently engaging in extended convoy chases. Apart from that, the expenditure of all torpedoes or a simple mechanical failure-such as U-203 U-203's defective muffler valve-forced a costly termination of the patrol. Until the U-tankers, or "supply boats," which were still under construction,* became operational and the Type VIIs could be replenished and obtain medical help and spare parts at sea, thus greatly extending time on patrol station and reducing the number of aborts, operations in the Greenland area were simply not efficient. became operational and the Type VIIs could be replenished and obtain medical help and spare parts at sea, thus greatly extending time on patrol station and reducing the number of aborts, operations in the Greenland area were simply not efficient.

* The higher speed of Halifax convoys posed great difficulties for the U-boats. The Type VIIs had a maximum (engine-straining) speed of 17 knots; the Type IXs, 18 knots. Unless held down by surface or air escorts, the boats could shadow effectively, but to overtake overtake even a zigzagging fast Halifax convoy to gain favorable shooting positions from ahead or the flanks required much time (as well as fuel), increasing the chances of being discovered and counterattacked by escorts and thus losing the element of surprise. even a zigzagging fast Halifax convoy to gain favorable shooting positions from ahead or the flanks required much time (as well as fuel), increasing the chances of being discovered and counterattacked by escorts and thus losing the element of surprise.

* The weather conditions and the onset of the summer solstice were not favorable for U-boat operations in the Greenland area. Returning boats reported dense, blinding fog during half the patrol days. The fog restricted not only reconnaissance but also navigation (by sun and star sights), leaving many skippers with only a vague idea of where they were. When not fogbound, the very long days-and very short nights-in those north latitudes restricted the available hours for night surface attacks, when the boat was most effective and mobile, and compelled skippers to resort in many instances to submerged daylight attacks, when the boat was least mobile and most vulnerable to sonar detection.

The British sailed 383 loaded ships in convoys from Halifax and Sydney to the British Isles in the month of June. The U-boats found only one convoy that month, Halifax 133, from which they sank six loaded ships of the forty-nine. No other loaded eastbound ship from Canada fell victim to the U-boats in June; hence 377 loaded ships (or about 99 percent) reached destinations. In the first two weeks of June, before convoying on the Iceland-Canada leg was fully in effect, the U-boats had better luck in sinking singles, most of them empty ships from disbursing Outbound convoys south of Greenland. They destroyed twenty-two such singles, plus two from convoy Outbound 336, a total of twenty-four empty ships for 134,754 tons. In the second two weeks, after the Iceland-Canada leg was afforded better protection by the Canadian escort groups and aircraft and the Halifax convoy speed was increased to accommodate the 12- to 15-knot vessels, the U-boats sank only five singles in that area.*

The failure of the U-boats to find eastbound convoys in the North Atlantic and to inflict greater damage on the only one they found, Halifax 133, and Donitz's decision to withdraw the boats from the Greenland area, was a clear victory of the British defense over German offense. It was due, in part, to radio intelligence (Ultra, DFing, Traffic Analysis, RFP, TINA), which enabled the Royal Navy to sink the supply ship Belchen Belchen and to divert most convoys around the U-boat patrol lines; in part to the initiation of "end-to-end" surface escorts (however green the Canadians) and air escort from Newfoundland and Iceland; in part to the higher speed of the Halifax convoys, in part to the inability of the boats to operate effectively in far western areas, and in no small part to the steady decline in the experience level of the U-boat skippers and crews. Not for sixteen more months (October 1942) did the U-boats again inflict any appreciable damage on a Halifax convoy. and to divert most convoys around the U-boat patrol lines; in part to the initiation of "end-to-end" surface escorts (however green the Canadians) and air escort from Newfoundland and Iceland; in part to the higher speed of the Halifax convoys, in part to the inability of the boats to operate effectively in far western areas, and in no small part to the steady decline in the experience level of the U-boat skippers and crews. Not for sixteen more months (October 1942) did the U-boats again inflict any appreciable damage on a Halifax convoy.

COASTAL C COMMAND.

The British attack on the U-boat force in Atlantic waters by aircraft of Coastal Command had produced virtually zero kills by June 1, 1941. Two Sunderlands had shared credit with surface ships in the destruction of two U-boats (U-26, U-55 U-55), but no Coastal Command aircraft flying in the Atlantic area had sunk a U-boat unassisted.

There were numerous reasons for this abysmal showing. Chief among these was that Coastal Command remained a poor stepchild of the RAF, still in third place in weaponry, electronics, and manpower. As one consequence, Coastal Command was still unable to mount a credible attack on the U-boat force. An official study showed that in mid-1941 Coastal Command had only about two hundred ASW aircraft in frontline squadrons.*

The principal contribution Coastal Command had made thus far in the Battle of the Atlantic was to thwart single and pack U-boat operations in the Northwest Approaches and Icelandic waters out to about 300 miles. This was primarily the doing of the hundred American-built twin-engine Lockheed Hudsons flying on convoy escort or offensive ASW patrols. However, the Hudsons could carry only three or four 250-pound depth charges and did not have sufficient fuel to safely patrol much beyond 300 miles or to loiter for very long at that distance from home. The best they could do was to force a U-boat to submerge and hold it down. This was also true of the forty British-built twin-engine Whitleys. They could carry twice the depth-charge load of the Hudsons (six), but they could not fly on one engine, a severe handicap for over-water operations. Hence the Hudsons and Whitleys, which made up about 70 percent of Coastal Command's frontline strength, were not really satisfactory for offensive actions against U-boats.

What Coastal Command urgently needed for convoy escort and offensive ASW patrols was a long-range aircraft with a large bomb load. The twenty four-engine Sunderland flying boats partially filled that need. They could carry eight 250-pound depth charges on patrols out to about 700 miles. However, the huge Sunderland was not an efficient aircraft; its four engines required much maintenance. A Coastal Command study showed that each of the Sunderlands flew an average of only two sorties per month. The British would continue producing Sunderlands on a modest scale, but no one favored anything more than that.

Better yet was the American-built Catalina, of which Coastal Command had thirty. They could carry twice the bomb load of a Sunderland (sixteen 250-pound depth charges) out to about 900 miles. The Americans were gearing up to produce Catalinas at a high rate, but in view of its two-ocean force deployment and large new responsibilities in the Atlantic, the U.S. Navy had first call on Catalinas and only a trickle could be diverted to the British and Canadians. At the end of 1941, Coastal Command still had only thirty-six Catalinas in four frontline squadrons (209, 210, 240, 413) based in and around the British Isles. but in view of its two-ocean force deployment and large new responsibilities in the Atlantic, the U.S. Navy had first call on Catalinas and only a trickle could be diverted to the British and Canadians. At the end of 1941, Coastal Command still had only thirty-six Catalinas in four frontline squadrons (209, 210, 240, 413) based in and around the British Isles.

In June 1941, Coastal Command got a new chief, Philip Joubert de la Ferte, replacing Bowhill. He urged an expansion of Coastal Command to provide for increased emphasis on offensive offensive patrolling, especially in the Bay of Biscay, a choke point through which U-boats had to transit inbound and outbound to French bases. However, Bomber Command, gearing up for the supposed war-winning strategic air assault on Germany, stoutly resisted the diversion of any aircraft to Coastal Command. patrolling, especially in the Bay of Biscay, a choke point through which U-boats had to transit inbound and outbound to French bases. However, Bomber Command, gearing up for the supposed war-winning strategic air assault on Germany, stoutly resisted the diversion of any aircraft to Coastal Command.

Nonetheless, for a brief time Joubert appeared to have won at least part of his case. The War Cabinet allotted Coastal Command the first nine of the new four-engine B-24 Liberator bombers arriving from America. The B-24 had about the same operating radius as a Catalina (900 to 1,000 miles), but it was twice as fast (205 knots versus 105 knots), could carry twice the bomb load (8,000 pounds versus 4,000 pounds), was more rugged and more heavily armed with defensive machine guns and 20mm cannons, and, of course, it was a land plane that could base at existing airfields. These nine B-24s went to a new Coastal Command squadron, 120, based at Nutt's Corner, Northern Ireland, commanded by Terence M. Bulloch, but all other B-24s arriving from America went to Bomber Command.

PLATE 8 8.

PLATE 9 9.

Joubert turned to the scientific community for assistance to improve Coastal Command's operations, especially the miserable U-boat kill rate. The Admiralty sent him a brilliant physicist, Patrick M. S. Blackett, who was to win a Nobel Prize in the postwar years. Utilizing a statistically oriented method of applied science initially devised for the RAF, which came to be called "Operations Research," Blackett and a small team analyzed thousands of U-boat contact and attack reports. Based on this analysis ("quantitative, analytic thinking with empirical checking"), the Blackett team advised that: * Navigation in Coastal Command was appallingly bad. Aircraft crews seldom knew precisely where they were, did not actually patrol designated areas, and too often failed to meet convoys they were assigned to escort.

* The 1.5-meter-wavelength ASV II radar, installed in three quarters of Coastal Command's frontline aircraft, was not being properly exploited. Radar operators were undertrained and overworked. Radar sets were not properly maintained and calibrated.

* Aircraft were flying too high to get the most from the sets. Based on exaggerated claims of radar proponents, air crews expected too much of ASV II radar, and when it failed to perform as advertised, they denounced it.

* In the majority of U-boat contacts, the Germans saw the aircraft first and dived to safety. Aircraft spent too much time and too many assets futilely depth-charging elusive targets.

* The usual depth settings on the standard 250-pound depth charge were too deep and the explosive in the warhead was too feeble.

* A prevailing view that a monster 2,000-pound depth charge was required to compensate for aiming errors was absolutely wrong.

The Blackett reports contained many recommendations to correct the deficiencies. Among them: thorough training for navigators and radar-maintenance personnel and radar operators, and a lowering of expectations about the sets; comfortable work stations and frequent eye rest for radar operators; an altitude limit of 4,000 feet for convoy spotting and 2,000 feet for U-boat spotting when using radar; the use of beacon signals to improve convoy locating; the camouflaging of the undersides of aircraft with white paint to decrease visibility; the mounting of binoculars on pedestals for daytime searching; a twenty-five-foot fuse for depth charges; a larger "stick" of 100-pound depth charges utilizing the more powerful explosive RDX or Torpex (TNT and cyclonite, enhanced with aluminum powder).

Some of these recommendations touched off intense controversy. The most heated was the debate over depth-charge size. Most airmen refused to believe that larger numbers of small depth charges were preferable to a smaller number of one-ton "killer" depth charges. As a result, R&D on the 2,000-pound and also less powerful weaponry, as well as a depth-charge bombsight, was pursued. Meanwhile, the standard airborne ASW weapon remained the 250-pound depth charge dropped by eye. However, Blackett's recommendations that the spacing of the stick be lengthened threefold and the warhead be beefed up with Torpex, and the twenty-five-foot fuse were followed.*

In an oft-quoted assertion, Winston Churchill wrote that the only thing that really frightened him in World War II was the U-boat peril. If that were the case, the failure of the British at this time to see the potential of the B-24 as a highly effective ASW weapon and to insist that all arriving B-24s be assigned to ASW missions is all the more difficult to understand. The usual explanation is that the War Cabinet was so firmly wedded to the concept that Germany could and must be defeated by strategic bombing alone that every single big bomber had to be reserved for Bomber Command. Therefore, the War Cabinet denied Coastal Command any further four-engine bombers for a long time to come.

Numerous other important factors entered into this decision, not the least of which was the inability of Coastal Command to convince a majority in the War Cabinet that a proper aircraft such as the B-24 was potentially an effective U-boat killer. As will be seen, this decision was most unfortunate, one of the worst mistakes the British War Cabinet made in the war. A number of studies would show that a Coastal Command ASW force of merely a hundred B-24s could well have decisively crushed the U-boat peril in the summer of 1941, sparing the Allies the terrible shipping losses in the years ahead.

INDIGO.

In a secret speech to the House of Commons on June 25, Prime Minister Churchill expressed satisfaction at the changing fortunes of the British in the Battle of the Atlantic. His decision to establish the Battle of the Atlantic Committee to focus utmost attention on that struggle had paid dividends. In spite of the increase in the size of the U-boat force, merchant-ship losses in the vital North Atlantic convoys had actually declined, as had shipping losses to enemy aircraft. Moreover, British shipyards were making astonishing progress in clearing out the backlog of ships idled with damage; the German air raids on the docks at Bristol Channel, Liverpool, Firth of Clyde, and elsewhere had tapered off to nearly zero; a new organization, the Ministry of War Transport, presided over by the business tycoon Frederick Leathers, had already developed more efficient methods of handling shipping and rail traffic. to focus utmost attention on that struggle had paid dividends. In spite of the increase in the size of the U-boat force, merchant-ship losses in the vital North Atlantic convoys had actually declined, as had shipping losses to enemy aircraft. Moreover, British shipyards were making astonishing progress in clearing out the backlog of ships idled with damage; the German air raids on the docks at Bristol Channel, Liverpool, Firth of Clyde, and elsewhere had tapered off to nearly zero; a new organization, the Ministry of War Transport, presided over by the business tycoon Frederick Leathers, had already developed more efficient methods of handling shipping and rail traffic.

There were two other big reasons for Churchill's optimism in his secret appraisal to the House on June 25. These were: * Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, launched three days before on June 22. Although the British believed the Germans would defeat the ragged Soviet Army within several months, the military effort put into Barbarossa appeared to preclude any German invasion of the British Isles in 1941. If indeed this proved to be the case, the destroyers and other light ships of the Home Fleet on anti-invasion duty could be reassigned to convoy escort and also, possibly, to hunter-killer groups. This added commitment of naval power to the North Atlantic would doubtless bring about the long-sought and necessary increase in U-boat kills.

* Indigo, the American occupation of Iceland. Even as Churchill spoke to the House, a powerful American task force was about to set sail for that purpose.

President Roosevelt had set Indigo in motion on June 6. A momentous American enterprise, its main purpose was to absolutely secure air and naval bases for the American forces that were to assume responsibility for escorting convoys between Canada and Iceland, and for British escort forces working on the middle and eastern legs of the route. London also expected that the arrival of the Americans in Iceland would free up the British occupation forces there for duty in North Africa.

Admiral Stark in Washington ordered Atlantic Fleet commander Admiral King to carry out Indigo on June 16. This was the first large-scale American military operation of World War II and, of course, the first major American expeditionary force to embark for overseas duty. It was carried out with dispatch and with naval professionalism, a credit to King and all concerned. Doubtless this new feather in King's cap was a factor in his selection to lead the U.S. Navy throughout World War II.

Inasmuch as Washington and London had to guard against an angry Axis reaction to Indigo, the American amphibious force was very strong and the troops designated for occupation duty were well-trained regular U.S. Marines rather than Army draftees. Proud of the Navy's remarkably successful achievement in moving troops overseas in World War I, Admiral King was absolutely determined to repeat that success in World War II. Therefore he had ruled that whenever it fell to the Navy to move troops at sea (whether U.S. Marines, U.S. Army forces, or foreign), the troopships were to be massively guarded by American battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.

The importance and rigidity of the American troopship convoy policy cannot be overstated. Neither at the time nor later did the British appear to understand-or accept-the policy. This led to many misunderstandings between the British and American naval authorities and to unintentional-or intentional-distortions and misstatements in most British and many American accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic: for example, the outright falsehood that King was oblivious to or disdainful of the U-boat threat and therefore transferred most American destroyers to the Pacific.

The American troopship escort policy was initiated with the occupation of Iceland. In late June about four thousand Marines boarded four Navy troopships (APs). Their impedimenta filled two attack cargo ships (AKs). Admiral King directed seventeen warships to protect the force: old battleships Arkansas and New York; Arkansas and New York; light cruisers light cruisers Brooklyn and Nashville; Brooklyn and Nashville; and thirteen destroyers and thirteen destroyers* of Squadron 7, of which nine were new (1940) and four were aged four-stacks. of Squadron 7, of which nine were new (1940) and four were aged four-stacks.

Designated Task Force 19, the convoy sailed from the United States on July 1. En route, one of the new destroyers, Charles F. Hughes Charles F. Hughes, came upon one of the two Greenland-bound lifeboats from the Norwegian freighter Vigrid Vigrid, sunk from convoy Halifax 133 by U-371 U-371. The Hughes rescued the fourteen survivors of that boat, who included four of the ten American Red Cross nurses, who had been in the boat for twelve miserable days.

The convoy arrived in Reykjavik harbor on the evening of July 7. Ironically, the debarking American Marines-the First Provisional Marine Brigade-were greeted by the surviving American Marines of the 12th Provisional Company who were torpedoed by U-564 U-564 while on the Dutch freighter while on the Dutch freighter Maasdam Maasdam, also in convoy Halifax 133.

The Americans promptly set about building bases on Iceland. The next important contingent to arrive, on August 6, was the U.S. Navy's Patrol Wing 7, consisting of a squadron (VP 73) of Consolidated Catalinas and a squadron (VP 74) of Martin Mariners, a newer, more powerful, and heavily armed twin-engine flying boat. These three dozen aircraft were supported by two aviation destroyer tenders (AVDs), These three dozen aircraft were supported by two aviation destroyer tenders (AVDs), George E. Badger and Goldsborough. George E. Badger and Goldsborough.

At that time there were three squadrons of RAF Coastal Command aircraft based in Iceland. These squadrons flew about fifty American-built aircraft: nine Catalinas in Squadron 209, twenty-six Hudsons in the (overstrength) Squadron 269, and eighteen Northrop scout bombers in Squadron 330, manned by Norwegian pilots. In addition, the RAF had provided about ten Hurricanes to counter possible German air strikes.

Two weeks after the arrival of the Marines, Admiral King further reinforced the Iceland force by the creation of Task Force 1 and, on September 1, by the creation of the Denmark Strait Patrol. The first was composed of the old battleships Arkansas Arkansas, New York New York, and Texas; Texas; the Denmark Patrol by the newer first-line battleships recently transferred from the Pacific fleet: the Denmark Patrol by the newer first-line battleships recently transferred from the Pacific fleet: Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico, plus Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Squadron 2, composed of nine new vessels. These warships moored in the anchorage at Hvalfjord or in Reykjavik. Should These warships moored in the anchorage at Hvalfjord or in Reykjavik. Should Tirpitz Tirpitz and/or the "pocket" battleships and/or the "pocket" battleships Lutzow Lutzow and and Scheer Scheer or the heavy cruiser or the heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper attempt to break into the Atlantic via the Denmark Strait, or attempt to break into the Atlantic via the Denmark Strait, or Prinz Eugen, Gneisenau Prinz Eugen, Gneisenau, and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst attempt to return from Brest to Germany by that route, the American warships were to operate in a "reconnaissance" role under direction of the British Home Fleet. The presence of these big American ships in Iceland enabled the British to dilute the strength of the Home Fleet and send a big-ship force to the Far East to deter possible Japanese advances on Hong Kong, Singapore, and other British outposts. attempt to return from Brest to Germany by that route, the American warships were to operate in a "reconnaissance" role under direction of the British Home Fleet. The presence of these big American ships in Iceland enabled the British to dilute the strength of the Home Fleet and send a big-ship force to the Far East to deter possible Japanese advances on Hong Kong, Singapore, and other British outposts.*

The unprecedented peacetime American Selective Training and Service Act, passed in September 1940, limited draftees to one year's service in the United States only. At Roosevelt's request, in August 1941, Congress revised and extended it, removing the restriction on overseas assignments and lengthening the term of service to eighteen months. Roosevelt thereupon directed the War Department to send about 5,000 Army troops to Iceland to reinforce the Marines and the British forces.

Admiral King organized a second large Navy Task Force, 15, to carry out this mission. Guarded by the battleship Mississippi Mississippi, four light cruisers (Quincy, Tuscaloosa, Vincennes, Wichita), and fifteen destroyers, the twenty-one-ship convoy sailed September 5. The new carrier Wasp Wasp (1940) ferried the 33rd Pursuit Squadron of the Army Air Forces to Iceland. On September 25, the American Army commander assumed responsibility for the defense of Iceland, but the Marine brigade and all but a handful of the British ground forces remained for the time being. (1940) ferried the 33rd Pursuit Squadron of the Army Air Forces to Iceland. On September 25, the American Army commander assumed responsibility for the defense of Iceland, but the Marine brigade and all but a handful of the British ground forces remained for the time being.

In very short order the Americans turned Iceland into a virtually impregnable military fortress. As a base for the Denmark Patrol, for air and surface-ship escorts for convoys and, later, for offensive air and surface-ship ASW patrols, as well as a way station for transoceanic military air transports, Iceland was to become the most vital of Allied outposts in the Atlantic Ocean area.

German naval authorities were incensed. Believing this latest American move in the Atlantic was a provocation too brazen to ignore, Donitz proposed to Admiral Raeder and the OKM that it be countered by a U-boat assault. He found willing ears in Berlin, and Raeder set off at once to petition Hitler to lift the restrictions against attacking American warships and merchant ships (and British warships smaller than cruisers) in Icelandic waters.

Raeder met with Hitler on July 9, the eighteenth day of the offensive against Russia, Barbarossa. The American occupation of Iceland, Raeder insisted, "greatly affects our U-boats as well as surface vessels in the execution of the war in the Atlantic." But Hitler refused to lift the restrictions. The stenographer recorded his views thus: The Fuhrer explains that everything depends on the U.S.A.'s entry into the war being delayed another month or two. First, because the Eastern Campaign must be carried out with all the aircraft allotted for that purpose, and the Fuhrer does not wish to deplete their numbers; secondly, because the effects of the victorious Eastern Campaign on the whole situation, even on the attitude of the U.S.A., would be tremendous. For the present, therefore, he desires that no alteration be made in the instructions, and that all incidents should be avoided.

The American occupation of Iceland thus drew scant naval reaction from Germany.

BARBAROSSA: THE B BALTIC AND THE A ARCTIC.

One prime objective of the German invasion of the Soviet Union was the great city of Leningrad (St. Petersburg), which is at the extreme eastern end of the Baltic on the Gulf of Finland. Army Group North struck out for Leningrad from East Prussia, angling northeast through the Russian-occupied Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. At the same time, a pro-Hitler, German-equipped Finnish Army struck at Leningrad from the northwest. The German blitzkrieg quickly overran the Baltic States, but the German-Finnish attack on Leningrad bogged down on the outskirts of the city.

The Soviet Union's Red Banner (or Baltic) Fleet was based in the Gulf of Finland, guarding the seaward approaches to Leningrad. It comprised two old (1911) but modernized battleships, three heavy cruisers, forty-seven destroyers, and about seventy submarines. Its surface force was no match for the available Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine surface forces in the Baltic, but Admiral Raeder and the OKM were deeply concerned about the possible damage the powerful (but untested) Soviet submarine force could inflict, should it deploy offensively into the Baltic. On the other side, the Soviet naval chief, Commissar Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, anticipated an offensive strike by surface forces in the Baltic, but Admiral Raeder and the OKM were deeply concerned about the possible damage the powerful (but untested) Soviet submarine force could inflict, should it deploy offensively into the Baltic. On the other side, the Soviet naval chief, Commissar Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, anticipated an offensive strike by Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine surface forces in the Gulf of Finland in support of Army Group North. surface forces in the Gulf of Finland in support of Army Group North.

Neither navy, however, was called upon to provide offensive action. Assuming defensive stances, each began the war by laying massive minefields in the narrow mouth of the Gulf of Finland, to hold the opposing naval force at bay. Both navies augmented the minefields with patrolling submarines and destroyers, and other small surface craft. The Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine also mounted destroyer and submarine patrols in the Danish Belts of the western Baltic and in Norwegian waters, to warn of or block a possible naval thrust by Great Britain, which had quickly formed an uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union. also mounted destroyer and submarine patrols in the Danish Belts of the western Baltic and in Norwegian waters, to warn of or block a possible naval thrust by Great Britain, which had quickly formed an uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union.

On the eve of Barbarossa, the OKM had cleared the eastern Baltic waters of U-boat training activities. The workup (Agru Front) flotillas moved operations to distant and inconvenient Norwegian waters, basing at Horten and staging tactical exercises in Oslo Fjord. En route to Norway, the new IXC U-128 U-128, commanded by Ulrich Heyse, who came from the destroyer forces, ran hard aground on an uncharted rock and ripped her bottom open. The depot ship Odin Odin and the light cruiser and the light cruiser Nurnberg Nurnberg rescued the crew and towed the boat into Horten, where she was patched up and then returned to Kiel for major repairs. Ironically, Heyse, age thirty-five, a onetime merchant marine officer, was one of the most mature and experienced ship handlers in the submarine force. He survived the court of inquiry and retained command. rescued the crew and towed the boat into Horten, where she was patched up and then returned to Kiel for major repairs. Ironically, Heyse, age thirty-five, a onetime merchant marine officer, was one of the most mature and experienced ship handlers in the submarine force. He survived the court of inquiry and retained command.

The Germans and pro-German Finns deployed nine submarines behind the minefields spanning the Gulf of Finland on minelaying and torpedo missions. The five German boats were Type IID ducks, temporarily detached from the Submarine School.* Three of the five sank small, coastal-type Soviet submarines. A Three of the five sank small, coastal-type Soviet submarines. A Shchuka Shchuka-class Soviet submarine, 307 307, torpedoed and sank the duck U-144 U-144, commanded by Gert von Mittelstaedt, age twenty-nine, who had earlier sunk one of the Russian submarines, M-78 M-78. After the loss of U-144 U-144, the OKM withdrew the German ducks. A Latvian vessel under Soviet control hit a mine planted by the Finnish boat Vesihiisi Vesihiisi and later sank. The and later sank. The Vesikko Vesikko and and Vetehinen Vetehinen each torpedoed and sank a Soviet freighter. German mines, aircraft, and ASW vessels-and the advancing German ground forces-destroyed a very large number of Soviet submarines, or forced the crews to scuttle. Apart from each torpedoed and sank a Soviet freighter. German mines, aircraft, and ASW vessels-and the advancing German ground forces-destroyed a very large number of Soviet submarines, or forced the crews to scuttle. Apart from 307 307's victory over U-144 U-144, the Soviet submarine force failed abjectly; its survivors fell back to Leningrad.

Barbarossa included a little-known German thrust from northern Norway to capture Murmansk and Archangel. As a gesture of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets, in late July the British War Cabinet sent a carrier task force (Furious, Victorious) to that Arctic area. Carrier-based aircraft struck at German forces in Petsamo, Kirkenes, and Trosmo, incurring heavy losses to little effect.

Ever since the British raid on the Lofoten Islands in early March 1941, Hitler had worried constantly about another British raid or a full-scale amphibious assault in Norway. This British carrier strike at the North Cape intensified his concern. He urged Admiral Raeder to fortify Norway with the Kriegsmarine's Kriegsmarine's big surface ships, but this was not possible. The big surface ships, but this was not possible. The Bismarck's Bismarck's sister ship, sister ship, Tirpitz Tirpitz, was still fitting out; the "pocket" battleships Lutzow and Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer were in German yards for battle-damage repairs and overhaul, respectively; the battle cruisers were in German yards for battle-damage repairs and overhaul, respectively; the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst, as well as the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen, were in French Atlantic ports-the Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst damaged by British air raids. damaged by British air raids.

The only effective German naval vessels available for reconnaissance and offensive strikes in Norwegian and Arctic waters were U-boats. Hitler and Raeder therefore reached the decision that until the big surface ships were again available, U-boats were to patrol those waters. The OKM directed Donitz to maintain at least two ducks in the Shetlands and Orkneys to warn of a possible British sortie from Loch Ewe or Scapa Flow toward Norway and at least two oceangoing boats in the Arctic to support German forces attempting to advance on Murmansk.

Donitz fumed. These new assignments required the diversion of about four ducks and four to six oceangoing boats. Inasmuch as the orders came directly from Hitler, however, Donitz apparently did not challenge or appeal them.

Two new VIICs that had been rushed through workup inaugurated the Arctic patrols off Murmansk in July. These were U-81 U-81, commanded by Friedrich Guggen-berger, age twenty-six, and U-652 U-652, commanded by Georg-Werner Fraatz, age twenty-four. After replenishing in Trondheim, the boats reached the Kola Bay area in early August. Four other new VIIs soon followed. Handicapped by the long Arctic days and very short nights and a scarcity of traffic, these six oceangoing boats operating in the Murmansk area achieved almost nothing. Fraatz in U-652 U-652 sank a 600-ton freighter. Eberhard Hoffmann, age twenty-nine, in sank a 600-ton freighter. Eberhard Hoffmann, age twenty-nine, in U-451 U-451 sank a 550-ton patrol boat. Karl-Ernst Schroeter, age twenty-eight, in sank a 550-ton patrol boat. Karl-Ernst Schroeter, age twenty-eight, in U-752 U-752 sank a 600-ton freighter. Helmut Mohlmann, age twenty-eight, in sank a 600-ton freighter. Helmut Mohlmann, age twenty-eight, in U-571 U-571 damaged a 3,900-ton freighter, which beached herself, a total wreck. Grand total: four ships for 5,600 tons. damaged a 3,900-ton freighter, which beached herself, a total wreck. Grand total: four ships for 5,600 tons.

Barbarossa thus proved to be a costly inconvenience for the U-boat arm. It closed the east Baltic to tactical training, forcing Agru Front Agru Front to move to Norway. It diverted about eight ducks from the submarine school for several months and several others from Atlantic patrols and sent six oceangoing boats to the Arctic, establishing a U-boat presence in that area that was to remain there for the rest of the war and to grow to substantial size. to move to Norway. It diverted about eight ducks from the submarine school for several months and several others from Atlantic patrols and sent six oceangoing boats to the Arctic, establishing a U-boat presence in that area that was to remain there for the rest of the war and to grow to substantial size.

Viewing these disruptions and diversions as a "waste," Donitz was especially incensed over the assignment of oceangoing boats to the Arctic. "I repeatedly protested," to the OKM, he wrote, making his reasons plain: Concrete successes so far have been meager in the extreme and of no account, for the reason that such traffic as there is consists of little ships which cannot be attacked by torpedo with much prospect of success.The decisive factor in the war against Britain is the attack on her imports. The delivery of these attacks is the U-boats' principal task and one which no other branch of the armed forces can take over from them. The war with Russia will be decided on land, and in it the U-boats can play only a very minor role.

Hitler was not dissuaded. His "intuition" that the British would soon again invade Norway became an article of faith. At his specific direction, ever greater numbers of U-boats were to go there to repel this supposed invasion and, later, to take on other tasks.

JULY P PATROLS TO THE N NORTH A ATLANTIC.

Owing to the complicated new restrictions Hitler had placed on U-boats pending the success of Barbarossa, Donitz was compelled to give Iceland and the Northwest Approaches a wide berth. Hence in July 1941, he shifted most of the twenty boats that sailed afresh to more southerly waters to attack Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys. In addition, Donitz sent another wave to Freetown: four boats, all commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders. These four were to refuel secretly from the German tanker holders. These four were to refuel secretly from the German tanker Corrientes Corrientes in the Spanish Canaries. in the Spanish Canaries.

Reading naval Enigma currently and fluently, the British almost completely outwitted Donitz in July. They reinforced the Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys with extra air and surface escorts and cleverly diverted the convoys, taking advantage of an unseasonably dense fog in the central Atlantic. They brought to bear such strong diplomatic pressure on Spain's dictator Francisco Franco that he closed the Canaries to German U-boats, forcing a cancellation of the special four-boat task force to Freetown. As a result, no U-boat discovered a convoy in July. All the initial convoy contacts came from Focke-Wulf Condors basing in Bordeaux, or from the Italian boats based there.

The first Condor contact came on July 1, about 600 miles due west of Lorient. Donitz ordered five boats to operate against the convoy, including the crack U-96 U-96, commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock. The boats established the convoy's precise position by taking widely spaced bearings on the Condor's beacon signals. Late on July 2, Klaus Scholtz, inbound from the Greenland area in holder Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock. The boats established the convoy's precise position by taking widely spaced bearings on the Condor's beacon signals. Late on July 2, Klaus Scholtz, inbound from the Greenland area in U-108 U-108, found the convoy-Gibraltar-bound, he reported. But before Scholtz could bring up the other boats or the aircraft, he lost the ships in a dense fog and put into France, completing a highly satisfactory patrol of forty-one days during which he sank seven ships for 27,000 tons.

Pursuing this contact through fog to the southwest, on the morning of July 5, Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 happened upon a curious formation of five ships: a Royal Navy yacht, happened upon a curious formation of five ships: a Royal Navy yacht, Challenger Challenger, leading a 6,000-ton freighter, Anselm. Anselm. Three corvettes, Three corvettes, Petunia, Lavender Petunia, Lavender, and Starwort Starwort, were deployed to port, starboard, and astern of Anselm Anselm with good reason: with good reason: Anselm Anselm was a troopship with 1,200 soldiers on board. was a troopship with 1,200 soldiers on board.

Braving the menace posed by this unusually heavy escort, Lehmann-Willenbrock closed submerged and fired a full bow salvo at the Challenger Challenger and and Anselm. Anselm. He missed He missed Challenger Challenger but two torpedoes hit but two torpedoes hit Anselm. Anselm. The ship sank in twenty-two minutes, but that was time enough for the crew to launch all but one of the lifeboats. Nonetheless, 254 of the 1,200 soldiers were lost. The yacht The ship sank in twenty-two minutes, but that was time enough for the crew to launch all but one of the lifeboats. Nonetheless, 254 of the 1,200 soldiers were lost. The yacht Challenger Challenger pulled sixty survivors from the water. pulled sixty survivors from the water.

The three corvettes immediately pounced on U-96. Starwort U-96. Starwort's sonar was out of commission, so Petunia Petunia and and Lavender Lavender, which had firm contacts, delivered the attack. Petunia Petunia launched six depth charges and launched six depth charges and Lavender Lavender, twenty. When the attack carried the corvettes close to the survivors in the water, the depth-charging had to be broken off, but it had been deadly accurate. Later in the day Lehmann-Willenbrock reported to Kerneval that he was aborting the patrol with "extreme" depth-charge damage.

The second Condor report came a week later, on July 7: another outbound convoy about 250 miles off North Channel. Donitz alerted all boats in the vicinity, but none was able to find the convoy. Nor any other convoy. As a result, confirmed sinkings in the first three weeks of July were abysmal: Lehmann-Willenbrock's troopship, plus three other ships for 13,300 tons; one by Klaus Scholz in U-108 U-108 and two by Robert Gysae in and two by Robert Gysae in U-98. U-98.*

Donitz was baffled and frustrated. Twice in a period of six days (July 15 to 20) he logged: "The difficult problem as ever is to find find convoys." As usual, he blamed the lack of contacts on the shortage of U-boats. "Only when the number of boats is larger," he logged, "and there are more of them to keep a lookout, will the situation become more favorable." He shifted the boats here and there, forming temporary patrol lines, then dissolving them and reforming new lines in other areas. But the British cleverly countered these moves. Nothing seemed to work for the Germans. convoys." As usual, he blamed the lack of contacts on the shortage of U-boats. "Only when the number of boats is larger," he logged, "and there are more of them to keep a lookout, will the situation become more favorable." He shifted the boats here and there, forming temporary patrol lines, then dissolving them and reforming new lines in other areas. But the British cleverly countered these moves. Nothing seemed to work for the Germans.

The third convoy contact came from the Italian boat Barbarigo Barbarigo on July 22, west of Gibraltar. She called in on July 22, west of Gibraltar. She called in Bagnolini. Barbarigo Bagnolini. Barbarigo sank a confirmed ship, the 8,300-ton British tanker sank a confirmed ship, the 8,300-ton British tanker Horn Shell; Bagnolini Horn Shell; Bagnolini claimed hits on two ships, but no British report confirmed her attack. Upon learning of this contact, Donitz attempted to bring up the four boats of the canceled Freetown special task force. One of these four, the claimed hits on two ships, but no British report confirmed her attack. Upon learning of this contact, Donitz attempted to bring up the four boats of the canceled Freetown special task force. One of these four, the U-109 U-109, commanded by Heinrich Bleichrodt, could not respond. She had put into Cadiz, Spain, for emergency repairs from the German supply ship Thalia. Thalia. Donitz substituted Rolf Mutzelburg's Donitz substituted Rolf Mutzelburg's U-203 U-203, which had come south in vain pursuit of another ship, but the British took prompt evasive action and neither Mutzelburg nor the other three skippers could find Barbarigo Barbarigo's convoy.

The fourth convoy contact came from another Condor on July 25, 400 miles due west of the English Channel. This was a combined outbound Gibraltar-Sierra Leone convoy, designated Gibraltar 69. It was composed of twenty-six ships, escorted by nine corvettes and an armed trawler. Eleven widely dispersed U-boats picked up the Condor's beacon, enabling Kerneval to plot the convoy's position with fair accuracy. Beacons from a second Condor were intercepted by fifteen U-boats, which confirmed the initial position.

Donitz detailed eight U-boats to operate against this southbound convoy. All raced to the plotted position at maximum speed. The U-79 U-79, commanded by Wolfgang Kaufmann, out from Lorient on its second patrol, and the IXC U-126 U-126, commanded by Ernst Bauer, age twenty-seven, fresh from Germany on its first patrol, reached the designated position first. Neither saw any sign of the convoy and after a megaphone conference, Bauer radioed the bad news to Donitz, who in turn directed the eight boats to search along specific bearings to the south and southwest.

On the following morning, July 26, another Condor found the convoy. Six boats picked up its beacon signal and Kerneval plotted a new fix. Presumed to be accurate, the new fix put the convoy 215 miles from the position reported by the Condor. Seven boats were "quite close" to the reported fix and yet, inexplicably, none could find the convoy. Was the Condor's report accurate after all? Were the British transmitting deceptive beacon signals? Another Condor searched both positions later in the day, but saw nothing.

Donitz was at the point of calling off the chase when one of the boats spoke up to report contact. She was the new IXC U-68 U-68, commanded by Karl-Friedrich Merten, age thirty-five, a senior officer from the crew of 1926, twenty-seven days out on his maiden patrol from Germany. Donitz ordered Merten to shadow and send beacon signals. As he was doing so, unknown to Merten, the convoy was in the process of splitting up. Half of the ships-those bound for Sierra Leone-left unescorted, making best speed. Two of the nine corvettes left to join a Gibraltar convoy homebound to the British Isles.

At about midnight three other boats joined Merten's U-68: U-68: Kaufmann's Kaufmann's U-79 U-79, Bauer's U-126 U-126, and Mutzelburg's U-203 U-203. After they had checked in, Donitz directed Bauer to shadow and authorized Merten to shoot at will, but his attack was thwarted by a corvette. When he lost contact, it fell to Kaufmann in U-79 U-79 and Mutzelburg in and Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 to launch the first torpedoes. Kaufmann claimed sinking three ships for 24,000 tons and damage to two others. Mutzelburg claimed sinking two ships for 14,000 tons. In fact, Kaufmann sank one confirmed ship, a 2,500-ton British freighter, and Mutzelburg sank one confirmed ship, a 1,500-ton British freighter. to launch the first torpedoes. Kaufmann claimed sinking three ships for 24,000 tons and damage to two others. Mutzelburg claimed sinking two ships for 14,000 tons. In fact, Kaufmann sank one confirmed ship, a 2,500-ton British freighter, and Mutzelburg sank one confirmed ship, a 1,500-ton British freighter.*

Three of the seven corvettes counterattacked. Rhododendron Rhododendron fired off twenty-four depth charges, probably at Merten's fired off twenty-four depth charges, probably at Merten's U-68. Sunflower U-68. Sunflower and and Pimpernel Pimpernel teamed up on another U-boat. They attempted to ram, but the boat dived. They fired twenty-two depth charges. These timely and aggressive counterattacks, plus defensive action by the other four corvettes, drove the U-boats off and prevented any further attacks that night. teamed up on another U-boat. They attempted to ram, but the boat dived. They fired twenty-two depth charges. These timely and aggressive counterattacks, plus defensive action by the other four corvettes, drove the U-boats off and prevented any further attacks that night.

During the daylight hours on July 27, Bauer in U-126 U-126 continued to shadow and send out beacon signals. These enabled Merten in continued to shadow and send out beacon signals. These enabled Merten in U-68 U-68, Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203, and two other new VIICs from Germany, U-561 U-561, commanded by Robert Bartels, age thirty, and U-562 U-562, commanded by Herwig Collmann, to regain contact. But Bartels suffered a mechanical breakdown and was forced to abort. Yet another boat, U-371 U-371, commanded by Heinrich Driver, making his second patrol, later found the detached, southbound Freetown section of the convoy and sank two 7,000-ton freighters.

At about dark, Donitz authorized the shadower, Bauer in U-126 U-126, to attack. To him and the other boats he sent an exhortatory message: "All boats off the convoy to utilize any chances of attack. If no good chances beforehand, attempt as from 0200 to attack simultaneously. Split up escorts. Escorts probably weaker than in previous night. Continue to report contact and send beacon signals. Bring up other boats, attack yourselves. Press on!"

Bauer in U-126 U-126 did not wait long. Shortly before midnight he closed on the surface and fired six torpedoes-four from the bow tubes and two from the stern tubes. In this, his first attack of the war, Bauer claimed sensational results: four ships for 20,000 tons sunk. In fact, he had sunk two 1,300-ton freighters, the British did not wait long. Shortly before midnight he closed on the surface and fired six torpedoes-four from the bow tubes and two from the stern tubes. In this, his first attack of the war, Bauer claimed sensational results: four ships for 20,000 tons sunk. In fact, he had sunk two 1,300-ton freighters, the British Erato Erato (the convoy flagship) and a Norwegian. The corvettes (the convoy flagship) and a Norwegian. The corvettes Rhododendron Rhododendron and and Begonia Begonia counterattacked; the convoy dispersed. counterattacked; the convoy dispersed.

Two other boats moved in to attack the remaining ships, which were fleeing in all directions. Merten in U-68 U-68 shot at one of the corvettes. He saw a jet of red flame at the side of the corvette and claimed a sinking. He either missed or the torpedo failed; no corvette was hit that night. Bartels in shot at one of the corvettes. He saw a jet of red flame at the side of the corvette and claimed a sinking. He either missed or the torpedo failed; no corvette was hit that night. Bartels in U-561 U-561 claimed sinking two ships (one a 12,000-ton tanker) for 16,000 tons, and damage to a 5,000-ton auxiliary cruiser. But only one ship, a 1,900-ton British freighter, actually went down. claimed sinking two ships (one a 12,000-ton tanker) for 16,000 tons, and damage to a 5,000-ton auxiliary cruiser. But only one ship, a 1,900-ton British freighter, actually went down.

By the evening of July 28, five of the original thirteen Gibraltar-bound ships had reformed into a loose convoy, escorted by five corvettes and a Catalina. Three U-boats were still stalking the ships. Sighting the U-boats, the Catalina and two corvettes swept astern of the convoy, forcing two U-boats off.

Mutzelburg hung on doggedly and launched his second attack after dark. He claimed sinking three ships for 17,000 tons, plus a "destroyer." Actually, he sank only two small freighters for 2,800 tons, one British, one Swedish. The corvette Rhododendron Rhododendron reported that three torpedoes had been fired at her, but she evaded them by "violent maneuvers." She and the corvette reported that three torpedoes had been fired at her, but she evaded them by "violent maneuvers." She and the corvette Fleur de Lys Fleur de Lys counterattacked, each expending all depth charges except three, but Mutzelburg escaped without noteworthy damage. counterattacked, each expending all depth charges except three, but Mutzelburg escaped without noteworthy damage.

Misled by the overclaims from the six boats that had shot at convoy Outbound Gibraltar 69, Donitz believed another "great convoy battle" had taken place. He calculated the skippers had sunk seventeen or eighteen ships for about 108,000 tons, plus a destroyer and a corvette, figures Berlin propagandists hastened to inflate and release.* In reality, the sinkings were half of the Donitz calculation and the tonnage only one-quarter of the claim. Five boats had sunk seven confirmed Gibraltar-bound ships for 11,303 tons and Heinrich Driver in In reality, the sinkings were half of the Donitz calculation and the tonnage only one-quarter of the claim. Five boats had sunk seven confirmed Gibraltar-bound ships for 11,303 tons and Heinrich Driver in U-371 U-371 had sunk two of the thirteen Freetown-bound ships for 14,000 tons. Total: nine ships for 25,300 tons. No destroyer or corvette had been sunk. Seventeen of the twenty-six merchant ships reached port. had sunk two of the thirteen Freetown-bound ships for 14,000 tons. Total: nine ships for 25,300 tons. No destroyer or corvette had been sunk. Seventeen of the twenty-six merchant ships reached port.

During the month of July, 412 loaded merchant ships sailed from Canada in Halifax and Sydney (or Slow) convoys to the British Isles. Remarkably, not one ship fell victim to a U-boat. To avoid possible angry Axis reaction to the American occupation of Iceland, Halifax 135 followed a "southerly" route. Halifax 136 included the first CAM (fighter-plane catapult) ship. At mid-month, Halifax 138 and Slow Convoy 37 sailed experimentally across the Gulf of St. Lawrence and into the Atlantic via Belle Isle Strait, thence to Cape Farewell, then north along the icebound east coast of Greenland. These convoys encountered heavy fog and icebergs and, as a result, a number of collisions occurred.

The heavy ship traffic in the opposite direction on the North Atlantic run also fared well. Altogether eleven outbound convoys comprising 536 vessels sailed from the British Isles. As related, Robert Gysae in U-98 U-98 sank two empty freighters for 10,800 tons from convoy Outbound 341. A Focke-Wulf Condor damaged an empty freighter in Outbound 346. sank two empty freighters for 10,800 tons from convoy Outbound 341. A Focke-Wulf Condor damaged an empty freighter in Outbound 346.

In sum, upward of one thousand Allied ships of about 5 million gross tons sailed the North Atlantic route in east and west convoys in July, virtually unharmed by the oceangoing U-boats.

Toward the end of July, the British instituted a new system for naming these outbound convoys. After Outbound 346, all convoys bound ultimately for the West Indies, Latin America, or West Africa were named Outbound South (OS). Off North Channel on July 26, Philipp Schuler in the duck U-141 U-141 hit two empty freighters in OS 1. One of them, of 5,100 tons, sank; the other limped back to port. After Outbound 349, all convoys bound for Canada or the United States East Coast were named Outbound North (ON). The odd-numbered convoys were slow, the even-numbered convoys were fast. hit two empty freighters in OS 1. One of them, of 5,100 tons, sank; the other limped back to port. After Outbound 349, all convoys bound for Canada or the United States East Coast were named Outbound North (ON). The odd-numbered convoys were slow, the even-numbered convoys were fast.

THE A ATLANTIC C CHARTER.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union introduced vast new complexities for the Allies. Joseph Stalin appealed to both Britain and the United States for massive military supplies (aircraft, tanks, machine guns, rifles, etc.) and demanded that Britain relieve pressure on Russia by opening a "second front"-an invasion of Occupied France. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt relished the idea of helping the odious and untrustworthy Stalin, but as Churchill put it colorfully, "If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil...." A "second front" in Occupied France was out of the question, but both Churchill and Roosevelt pledged to supply Stalin with arms; Churchill without charge, Roosevelt through the Lend-Lease program.

Further complications arose in the Far East. A month after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, on July 24, Japan occupied Vichy French Indochina (Vietnam). This brazen thrust destabilized the Far East, posing a grave new threat to China, to the Philippines, and to British and Dutch possessions or dominions in Southeast Asia and in Australasia. In hawkish reaction, Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the United States, placed an embargo on oil exports to Japan, retained the bulk of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and directed that the Philippines be heavily reinforced with aircraft, submarines,* and other weaponry. The British and Dutch joined in the oil embargo, reducing Japan's oil imports by 90 percent. As related, Churchill directed the Admiralty to send a Royal Navy task force ( and other weaponry. The British and Dutch joined in the oil embargo, reducing Japan's oil imports by 90 percent. As related, Churchill directed the Admiralty to send a Royal Navy task force (Prince of Wales, Repulse, Indomitable, etc.) to the Far East.

The decision to supply the Soviet Union as well as Great Britain with Lend-Lease arms and to reinforce the Philippines put a nearly unbearable strain on the American "Arsenal of Democracy." As a result, the expanding American Army and Army Air Forces could not be properly equipped; Army conscripts drilled with dummy rifles and tanks. The strain led American military leaders to criticize forcefully the British Mediterranean strategy, which they still viewed as a waste of precious military assets in a peripheral theater. Passing through London on his way back from Moscow, Roosevelt's special emissary, Harry Hopkins, conveyed these views to Churchill in no uncertain terms, emphasizing that American strategists believed that "the Battle of the Atlantic would be the final decisive battle of the war, and that everything should be concentrated on it." His message was echoed by the American military representatives in London, whose views strongly influenced Washington strategists.

Given these disputes and the shifting character of the war, Churchill and Roosevelt were persuaded that the time had arrived for a meeting between them and their senior military advisers. It was decided that the meeting was to take place secretly "at sea." Churchill and party departed Scapa Flow on the battleship Prince of Wales Prince of Wales; Roosevelt and party departed the United States on Admiral King's Atlantic Fleet flagship, the heavy cruiser Augusta Augusta. The ships met on August 9 in the mutually convenient, well-defended, and smooth anchorage Placentia Bay, at the newly established American naval base in Argentia, Newfoundland.