In addition, the aircraft tender In addition, the aircraft tender Pegasus Pegasus, which Prien missed in Scapa Flow, and four other warships fitted with catapults patrolled as hunter-killer vessels in the Condor zones of operations.

* The 2.6 million gross tons translates to about 520 ships of 5,000 gross tons. Remarkably, British shipyards more than doubled the goal, sending 975,000 gross tons (the equivalent of 195 ships of 5,000 gross tons) back to sea by July 31, reducing the idled, damaged shipping to about 1.6 million gross tons. The 2.6 million gross tons translates to about 520 ships of 5,000 gross tons. Remarkably, British shipyards more than doubled the goal, sending 975,000 gross tons (the equivalent of 195 ships of 5,000 gross tons) back to sea by July 31, reducing the idled, damaged shipping to about 1.6 million gross tons.

Very Special Intelligence Very Special Intelligence (1977) and (1977) and Very Special Admiral: The Life of J. H. Godfrey Very Special Admiral: The Life of J. H. Godfrey (1980). (1980).

* The Central Blue The Central Blue (1956). (1956).

The Cruel Sea The Cruel Sea (1951). (1951).

* The four boats that attacked the convoy sank but one ship, the tanker The four boats that attacked the convoy sank but one ship, the tanker Athelbeach Athelbeach-by Kretschmer-in ballast. Prien and Kretschmer torpedoed and wrecked the whale-factory ship Terje Viken Terje Viken, also in ballast, but the hulk was finally sunk on March 14 by gunfire from two British destroyers and a corvette. Matz damaged Delilian Delilian and and Mijdrecht Mijdrecht but they reached port, as did but they reached port, as did Dunaff Head Dunaff Head, torpedoed by Eckermann in U-A U-A.

* In the postwar years, a popular naval historian. In the postwar years, a popular naval historian.

* The 6,600-ton and 8,100-ton Norwegians The 6,600-ton and 8,100-ton Norwegians Fern Fern and and Beduin Beduin and the 5,700-ton British and the 5,700-ton British Venetia Venetia. Assigning full credit for Terje Viken Terje Viken and and Athelbeach Athelbeach (probably damaged by (probably damaged by U-47 U-47 and and U-70 U-70), Kretschmer sank a total of five tankers for 47,663 tons in ten days!

* The Berlin communique credited Kretschmer with sinking 313,611 tons, plus three destroyers, and Schepke with 233,871 tons. Donitz had misread Kretschmer's final message to mean that he had sunk two destroyers plus 53,000 tons on the patrol. Kretschmer's final, confirmed score (on The Berlin communique credited Kretschmer with sinking 313,611 tons, plus three destroyers, and Schepke with 233,871 tons. Donitz had misread Kretschmer's final message to mean that he had sunk two destroyers plus 53,000 tons on the patrol. Kretschmer's final, confirmed score (on U-23 U-23 and and U-99 U-99) was forty-three and a half ships for 247,012 tons (half credit for the whale-factory ship cum tanker Terje Viken Terje Viken), including three auxiliary cruisers, the destroyer Daring, and one prize. On March 21, Kretschmer was promoted to Korvettenkapitan Korvettenkapitan (Commander). Schepke's final confirmed score (on (Commander). Schepke's final confirmed score (on U-3 U-3, U-19 U-19, and U-100 U-100) was thirty-seven ships for 155,882 tons. Kretschmer's score was never equaled; he remained the "Tonnage King" of the war. Schepke was to be outgunned by many skippers, winding up in 13th place. A Kapitanleutnant Kapitanleutnant, he was not posthumously promoted.

Prien's total confirmed score, all on Prien's total confirmed score, all on U-47 U-47, was thirty-two and a third ships for 202,514 tons, including the battleship Royal Oak Royal Oak, and half credit for Terje Viken Terje Viken. He stood third among all skippers in tonnage sunk. Hitler's decision to withhold news of his loss led to numerous wild-and persistent-rumors, such as that Prien and his crew had mutinied and as punishment had been sent to a labor camp on the Russian front, where all were killed. On March 19, Prien was posthumously promoted to Korvettenkapitan Korvettenkapitan.

* Because of winter ice, Sydney, Nova Scotia, was closed and Sydney, or Slow, Convoys sailed from Halifax. Because of winter ice, Sydney, Nova Scotia, was closed and Sydney, or Slow, Convoys sailed from Halifax.

* Schulz's confirmed score-all in Schulz's confirmed score-all in U-124 U-124-was thirteen ships for 57,683 tons. Oesten's confirmed score, including six ships for 20,754 tons in the duck U-61 U-61, was twelve ships for 58,723 tons, plus damage to Malaya Malaya.

* The 4,900-ton The 4,900-ton Thirlby Thirlby escaped the U-boats but was hit and severely damaged by a German aircraft while entering North Channel. escaped the U-boats but was hit and severely damaged by a German aircraft while entering North Channel.

* Some of the larger Type IXs sailing to African waters carried physicians, who were regarded as noncombatants. Schulz's decision to render assistance to these British survivors, he said later, was "approved" by Donitz, and Schulz submitted an official account of it to the tribunal at Nuremberg to assist in Donitz's defense. Some of the larger Type IXs sailing to African waters carried physicians, who were regarded as noncombatants. Schulz's decision to render assistance to these British survivors, he said later, was "approved" by Donitz, and Schulz submitted an official account of it to the tribunal at Nuremberg to assist in Donitz's defense.

* This dubious distinction is often accorded the destroyer Greer later in the fall. This dubious distinction is often accorded the destroyer Greer later in the fall.

* The Admiralty credited The Admiralty credited Gladiolus Gladiolus with sinking Hoppe's with sinking Hoppe's U-65 U-65 in this attack, but after further research in the postwar years, the credit was withdrawn and reassigned to the destroyer in this attack, but after further research in the postwar years, the credit was withdrawn and reassigned to the destroyer Douglas Douglas.

In addition, the duck In addition, the duck U-147 U-147 in British waters and the Italian submarine in British waters and the Italian submarine Tazzoli Tazzoli near Gibraltar each sank a freighter. As related, the IXB near Gibraltar each sank a freighter. As related, the IXB U-108 U-108, on a special mission in the Denmark Strait, sank a big auxiliary cruiser.

* The Italians commenced withdrawing submarines from the North Atlantic in May. The high scorer was Primo Longobardo in The Italians commenced withdrawing submarines from the North Atlantic in May. The high scorer was Primo Longobardo in Torelli Torelli, who sank four confirmed ships for 17,489 tons. Second was Adalberto Giovannini in Bianchi Bianchi, with three confirmed ships for 14,705 tons. The four boats lost in the North Atlantic were Tarantini Tarantini, Marcello, Faa Di Bruno Marcello, Faa Di Bruno, and Nani Nani.

Eight for 77,000 tons in the last quarter of 1940 and first quarter of 1941. Eight for 77,000 tons in the last quarter of 1940 and first quarter of 1941.

* U-boats radioed contact and shadow reports to Kerneval using high-frequency bands. If Kerneval so ordered, the shadowers "homed" other boats to the local scene in medium frequencies. To prevent a pack attack, convoy escorts had to react to the high-frequency contact and shadow reports because the local "homing" signals came too late in the game. Inclusion of Huff Duff on escort ships presented a problem, however, because ships with surface-search radar could not accommodate both, and no ship wanted to leave radar behind. As a result, most Huff Duff was to be installed on convoy rescue ships and fighter catapult ships, and later on jeep carriers. U-boats radioed contact and shadow reports to Kerneval using high-frequency bands. If Kerneval so ordered, the shadowers "homed" other boats to the local scene in medium frequencies. To prevent a pack attack, convoy escorts had to react to the high-frequency contact and shadow reports because the local "homing" signals came too late in the game. Inclusion of Huff Duff on escort ships presented a problem, however, because ships with surface-search radar could not accommodate both, and no ship wanted to leave radar behind. As a result, most Huff Duff was to be installed on convoy rescue ships and fighter catapult ships, and later on jeep carriers.

* Thirteen destroyers (six Canadian, seven British), four British sloops, and twenty-one corvettes (seventeen Canadian, four British). Thirteen destroyers (six Canadian, seven British), four British sloops, and twenty-one corvettes (seventeen Canadian, four British).

Squadron 10 at Gander with fifteen Digbys, the Canadian version of the USAAF B-18 twin-engine bomber; Squadron 116 at Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, with nine ex-British Catalinas, which the Canadians called Cansos. At this time there were eighteen U.S. Navy Catalinas at Argentia and six USAF B-18s at Gander available, for reconaissance but, of course, not overt combat. The Catalinas had an effective range of 600 miles, the B-18s 350 miles. Squadron 10 at Gander with fifteen Digbys, the Canadian version of the USAAF B-18 twin-engine bomber; Squadron 116 at Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, with nine ex-British Catalinas, which the Canadians called Cansos. At this time there were eighteen U.S. Navy Catalinas at Argentia and six USAF B-18s at Gander available, for reconaissance but, of course, not overt combat. The Catalinas had an effective range of 600 miles, the B-18s 350 miles.

Eight boats in January, eight in February, thirteen in March, and fourteen in April. However, seven new boats were held in the Baltic for R&D or for repairs or for duty with the Training Command. So great were the demands of the Training Command that eight submarines captured from the Allies were commissioned for training purposes: H.M.S. Eight boats in January, eight in February, thirteen in March, and fourteen in April. However, seven new boats were held in the Baltic for R&D or for repairs or for duty with the Training Command. So great were the demands of the Training Command that eight submarines captured from the Allies were commissioned for training purposes: H.M.S. Seal Seal, the Norwegian B-5 B-5 and and B-6 B-6, the Dutch O-8 O-8, O-12 O-12, O-25 O-25, O-26 O-26, and O-27 O-27.

FIVE.

FLOWER P PETALS OF R RARE B BEAUTY.

The diversion of German military power to the Balkans to rescue the Italians and for the conquest of the Hellenic Peninsula and Crete delayed Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, by about five weeks. Hitler set a new D day, June 22. Although it was late in the year to launch this immense military operation, he was confident that the ragtag Red Army would collapse before the onset of winter.

After that, he would deal with Great Britain. In the meantime, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine was to continue pressure on the British, tying down naval and air forces and blocking any and all British attempts to assist the Soviets, such as another invasion of Norway. All U-boats and merchant-ship raiders were to take special pains to avoid any "incident" with the United States that might provoke Washington to open intervention during Barbarossa. was to continue pressure on the British, tying down naval and air forces and blocking any and all British attempts to assist the Soviets, such as another invasion of Norway. All U-boats and merchant-ship raiders were to take special pains to avoid any "incident" with the United States that might provoke Washington to open intervention during Barbarossa.

Commencing in late May 1941, newly commissioned Type VII U-boats departed the Baltic for battlefronts in ever increasing numbers: twelve in June, nine in July, twelve in August. This was a far cry from the "twenty-five to thirty" new U-boats per month envisioned in the construction programs of 1939 but double or triple the usual monthly rate of new arrivals in the Atlantic, and therefore the first significant increase in force levels since the onset of war. Owing to the slight battle losses incurred frpm December 1940 to May 1, 1941 (seven), and to a continuation of that modest trend through the summer months, Donitz had the means not only to intensify the U-boat war in the "decisive" North Atlantic arena, but also to send another wave of Type IXs to the promising waters of West Africa.

Nineteen U-boats sailed to the North Atlantic in May. The first, U-94 U-94, a VIIC commanded by Herbert Kuppisch, reported a convoy south of Iceland on May 7. This was Outbound 318, which had sailed from the British Isles with thirty-eight ships. It was heavily guarded by Escort Group 7, commanded by I. H. Bockett-Pugh, composed of ten warships: three destroyers (including the ex-American four-stacks Campbeltown Campbeltown and and Newmarket Newmarket), five corvettes, a sloop, and an ASW trawler. Coastal Command aircraft from Iceland and Scotland provided air cover. Per plan, three ships had left the convoy earlier that day to put into Iceland. Five other ships, including the 10,000-ton liner Ranpura Ranpura, an armed merchant cruiser, had joined, making a total of forty ships.

At the time Kuppisch detected the convoy, a complicated change-up in the escort for Outbound 318 was in progress. Escort Group 3, commanded by Addison Joe Baker-Cresswell, had sailed from Iceland to relieve Bockett-Pugh's Escort Group 7 for the middle leg of the trip. Composed of nine warships (three destroyers, three corvettes, three ASW trawlers), Escort Group 3 had in company the auxiliary cruiser Ranpura Ranpura and four freighters that were also en route from Iceland to join Outbound 318. To assure a safe changeover of the escort groups, the sloop and four freighters that were also en route from Iceland to join Outbound 318. To assure a safe changeover of the escort groups, the sloop Rochester Rochester and five corvettes of Bockett-Pugh's Escort Group 7 were to remain with the convoy for an extra twenty-four hours before going to other duties. Hence there were fifteen warships in the vicinity of Outbound 318. and five corvettes of Bockett-Pugh's Escort Group 7 were to remain with the convoy for an extra twenty-four hours before going to other duties. Hence there were fifteen warships in the vicinity of Outbound 318.

It was a bright moonlit night and, after broadcasting the convoy contact, Kuppisch elected to attack submerged. He let the lead escorts pass and gained a position in the middle of the convoy, "between two 10,000-ton liners," probably the British ships Ranpura Ranpura and and Ixion Ixion. He then fired four torpedoes into the columns of ships. He claimed sinking four vessels for 20,000 tons, but actually only two sank: the 10,300-ton Ixion and a 5,700-ton Norwegian freighter. The flagship of Escort Group 3, the destroyer Bulldog Bulldog, joined by the destroyer Amazon Amazon and the Escort Group 7 sloop and the Escort Group 7 sloop Rochester Rochester, pounced on U-94 U-94 and, during four hours, dropped eighty-nine depth charges, "a severe and accurate counterattack," Kuppisch logged, "which caused considerable damage." The counterattack prevented a second attack by and, during four hours, dropped eighty-nine depth charges, "a severe and accurate counterattack," Kuppisch logged, "which caused considerable damage." The counterattack prevented a second attack by U-94 U-94, but Kuppisch repaired the damage and continued his patrol.

Acting on Kuppisch's contact report, Donitz alerted six other boats that were patrolling west of Iceland. Two boats found the convoy in bright moonlight during the night of May 8: Fritz-Julius Lemp in U-110 U-110, from Lorient on its second patrol, and the new VIIC U-201 U-201, commanded by Adalbert ("Adi") Schnee, who began the war as first watch officer of Kretschmer's U-23 U-23 and later commanded the ducks and later commanded the ducks U-6 U-6 and and U-60 U-60. Lemp had been on patrol three weeks and had sunk one 2,500-ton freighter. Sailing from Bergen, Schnee had been on patrol one week. He had polished off the abandoned hulk of the tanker Capulet Capulet (wrecked by Topp in (wrecked by Topp in U-552 U-552) and possibly a 2,000-ton steamer.

Lemp and Schnee met on the morning of May 9, ahead of the convoy, which at that time had no air cover. Since a bright moon was expected again that night, they agreed that a surface attack would be dangerous. And since they assumed that by then the escorts had left the convoy, the two skippers (communicating by signal flags) elected to attack submerged in daylight as soon as possible, to avoid the pos- sibility of losing the convoy. The senior man (and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder) Lemp was to go first; Schnee was to attack half an hour later, after the convoy had been thrown into confusion by Lemp's attack. holder) Lemp was to go first; Schnee was to attack half an hour later, after the convoy had been thrown into confusion by Lemp's attack.

Lemp submerged and let the convoy come on. Surprised to see the escorts, he nonetheless decided to continue with the attack. At about noon, he hit the convoy's right flank, setting up on four different ships, three of which he believed he sank. In actuality, two British freighters, the 5,000-ton Esmond Esmond and the 2,600-ton and the 2,600-ton Bengore Head Bengore Head, went down. The fourth torpedo misfired, but after it had been readjusted, Lemp prepared to shoot at a tanker. The convoy executed an emergency turn to port and when Schnee attacked about thirty minutes later, he shot into what was then the rear of the formation. He hit two 5,900-ton freighters, the Gregalia Gregalia, which sank, and the Empire Cloud Empire Cloud, which was severely damaged and abandoned, but later salvaged and towed to Scotland.

At the time of these attacks, the convoy was guarded by the nine warships of Baker-Cresswell's Iceland-based Escort Group 3. The flagship, the destroyer Bulldog Bulldog, along with the ex-American four-stack destroyer Broadway Broadway and one of the three corvettes, and one of the three corvettes, Aubrietia Aubrietia, hunted U-110 U-110, which was still at periscope depth, preparing to shoot at the tanker. All three escorts obtained firm sonar contacts. Broadway Broadway attacked, dropping a single depth charge. Seeing Lemp's periscope, attacked, dropping a single depth charge. Seeing Lemp's periscope, Aubrietia Aubrietia, commanded by V. F. Smith, attacked it twice, dropping sixteen well-placed depth charges set for 100 and 200 feet.

The depth charges from Aubrietia Aubrietia fell very close to fell very close to U-110 U-110. The blasts smashed the diving gauges and other instruments, knocked out the electric motors, diving planes, rudder, and compass, ruptured an aft fuel or ballast tank, sheared off the high-pressure air valves in the control room, and generated chlorine gas in the forward battery. Flooding aft, the boat went out of control and slid stern first to 300 feet. Seeing that U-110 U-110 was beyond all hope, Lemp ordered the engineer to "prepare for emergency blow," which would bring them up. But before he could give the order, Lemp and the crew felt an "unexpected rocking motion," indicating that the boat had surfaced of its own accord, perhaps owing to a rupture in a high-pressure air line, which blew the ballast tanks. was beyond all hope, Lemp ordered the engineer to "prepare for emergency blow," which would bring them up. But before he could give the order, Lemp and the crew felt an "unexpected rocking motion," indicating that the boat had surfaced of its own accord, perhaps owing to a rupture in a high-pressure air line, which blew the ballast tanks.

Lemp rushed to the bridge to find a terrifying sight: Bulldog Bulldog, Broadway Broadway, and Aubrietia Aubrietia close at hand, all firing at close at hand, all firing at U-110 U-110 with every available weapon. with every available weapon. Bulldog Bulldog and and Broadway Broadway were coming in at full speed to ram. Lemp shouted: "All hands abandon ship as fast as possible!" There was no time to connect the detonation charges for scuttling. The fastest way to scuttle was to open the ballast-tank vents. The first watch officer, Dietrich Loewe, who was in the control room with the engineer, Hans-Joachim Eichelborn, remembered that Lemp next shouted: "Open the vents" and that Eichelborn did so. But something went wrong. Either Eichelborn failed to carry out the order or the controls malfunctioned. The vents remained closed. were coming in at full speed to ram. Lemp shouted: "All hands abandon ship as fast as possible!" There was no time to connect the detonation charges for scuttling. The fastest way to scuttle was to open the ballast-tank vents. The first watch officer, Dietrich Loewe, who was in the control room with the engineer, Hans-Joachim Eichelborn, remembered that Lemp next shouted: "Open the vents" and that Eichelborn did so. But something went wrong. Either Eichelborn failed to carry out the order or the controls malfunctioned. The vents remained closed.

There were forty-seven men on board U-110 U-110. In response to the cry "abandon ship," all hands rushed pell-mell to the bridge in such haste that the radio operator did not take time to destroy or bring the Enigma and code materials with him, and a war correspondent, Helmut Ecke, left behind his still and movie cameras and film. Climbing down on deck through murderous British gunfire, the men dived over the side into the icy water. Loewe remembered that although two men had been wounded, all hands got away from the boat "alive" and that he and Lemp and Eichelborn were the last to leave the bridge. They did not do so, he said, until the water was "one meter above the base of the conning tower" and they were certain that U-110 U-110 was going down. was going down.

Coming in to ram with all weapons blazing, the Escort Group commander, Baker-Cresswell in Bulldog Bulldog, noted that U-110 U-110 was down by the stern but did not appear to be sinking. Believing he might get a boarding party on her or even capture the boat, he ordered full-speed astern to cancel the ramming and in the same breath summoned the boarding party. At about the same time T. Taylor, skipper of was down by the stern but did not appear to be sinking. Believing he might get a boarding party on her or even capture the boat, he ordered full-speed astern to cancel the ramming and in the same breath summoned the boarding party. At about the same time T. Taylor, skipper of Broadway Broadway, got the same idea and also canceled his ramming. To panic the German crew, hasten the evacuation of the boat, and thereby possibly prevent scuttling, Taylor came right up to U-110 U-110's bow and dropped two shallow-set depth charges. In the process, however, Broadway Broadway fouled fouled U-110 U-110's bow plane, which cut a deep gash in the destroyer's thin side plating (flooding ten oil tanks and the forward magazine) and damaged the port propeller. The terrific blast of Broadway Broadway's two depth charges may well have caused panic inside U-110 U-110 and added momentum to an already frenzied evacuation. and added momentum to an already frenzied evacuation.

Exactly what transpired in the next few minutes is a matter of lasting controversy. Loewe stated that after he and Lemp were in the water, they saw the bow and conning tower of U-110 U-110 lift "high out of the water," indicating that she had not sunk! "Let's swim back on board ship," Lemp yelled, according to Loewe. Lemp's apparent aim was to open the vents or set off the demolition charges to assure scuttling or, perhaps, at least to throw the Enigma and coding materials over the side. But lift "high out of the water," indicating that she had not sunk! "Let's swim back on board ship," Lemp yelled, according to Loewe. Lemp's apparent aim was to open the vents or set off the demolition charges to assure scuttling or, perhaps, at least to throw the Enigma and coding materials over the side. But U-110 U-110 had drifted off too far; they could not return to the boat. They turned around, Loewe said, and swam toward had drifted off too far; they could not return to the boat. They turned around, Loewe said, and swam toward Bulldog Bulldog, which was lowering a whaler manned by a heavily armed boarding party.

At this point, Lemp disappeared from the scene. Some German submarine veterans, most recently Peter Hansen, insist that the boarding party, en route to U-110 U-110 in the whaler, spotted Lemp in the water and that one of the members of the party "promptly shot" him to prevent any interference with the mission and to conceal the fact that the British boarded in the whaler, spotted Lemp in the water and that one of the members of the party "promptly shot" him to prevent any interference with the mission and to conceal the fact that the British boarded U-110 U-110. (The correspondent, Helmut Ecke, claimed that the British shot at him while he was in the water.) Others say that Lemp threw up his arms in despair and disappeared beneath the waves, an apparent suicide. The Admiralty has said only that Lemp and fourteen enlisted men died in the sinking.*

Intent on raiding or capturing U-110 U-110, Baker-Cresswell in Bulldog Bulldog and Taylor in and Taylor in Broadway Broadway made no effort to fish the Germans from the icy waters. Smith in made no effort to fish the Germans from the icy waters. Smith in Aubrietia Aubrietia, who had temporarily lost his sonar, hauled out of the area to make repairs. While doing so, he rescued forty-nine survivors from the lifeboats of the freighter Esmond, sunk by Lemp. The Germans were left to fend for themselves for about two hours. Many died of wounds, hypothermia, and shock, or drifted out of sight.

The boarding party from Bulldog Bulldog, commanded by twenty-year-old Sub-Lieutenant David E. Balme, rowed the whaler right up on the forward deck of U-110 U-110. Carrying rifles and pistols, the nine men jumped out and spread around the deck and bridge to shoot any Germans who might attempt to interfere with the mission. To Balme's astonishment, both the conning-tower and control-room hatches were dogged shut, not what one would expect of a scuttling U-boat. Pistol drawn, he opened the hatches, expecting to confront crewmen below. But the boat was deserted. All hands had abandoned ship. All the lights were on, burning brightly; there was no sign of flooding or any indication of chlorine gas.

After a hurried inspection, Balme signaled Baker-Cresswell on Bulldog Bulldog that the U-boat appeared to be "seaworthy and towable" and requested that he send an engineering party to operate that the U-boat appeared to be "seaworthy and towable" and requested that he send an engineering party to operate U-110 U-110's machinery. Baker-Cresswell directed Taylor on Broadway to send an engineer to U-110 U-110 via whaler, then eased via whaler, then eased Bulldog Bulldog close to close to U-110 U-110 to receive an old, rusty 2" steel cable that two of Balme's men had found in a topside locker on the U-boat. to receive an old, rusty 2" steel cable that two of Balme's men had found in a topside locker on the U-boat.

Meanwhile, belowdecks, Balme and the other six members of his party were collecting intelligence items of incalculable value. Balme described that work in a secret report to the Admiralty. In part: The U-boat had obviously been abandoned in great haste as books and gear were strewn about the place. A chain of men was formed to pass up all books, charts, etc. As speed was essential owing to the possibility of the U-boat sinking (although dry throughout) I gave orders to send all all books, except obviously reading books, so consequently a number of comparatively useless navigational books, etc., were recovered. All charts were in drawers under the chart table in the control room; there were also some signal books, log books, etc. here.... Meanwhile the telegraphist books, except obviously reading books, so consequently a number of comparatively useless navigational books, etc., were recovered. All charts were in drawers under the chart table in the control room; there were also some signal books, log books, etc. here.... Meanwhile the telegraphist* went to the W/T [radio] office just forward of the control room on the starboard side. This was in perfect condition, apparently no attempt having been made to destroy any books or apparatus. Here were found C.B.s [codebooks], Signal Logs, pay books, and general correspondence, looking as if this room had been used as a ship's office. Also the coding machine [Enigma] was found here, plugged in as though in actual use when abandoned. The general appearance of this machine being that of a typewriter, the telegraphist pressed the keys and finding results peculiar, sent it up the hatch. went to the W/T [radio] office just forward of the control room on the starboard side. This was in perfect condition, apparently no attempt having been made to destroy any books or apparatus. Here were found C.B.s [codebooks], Signal Logs, pay books, and general correspondence, looking as if this room had been used as a ship's office. Also the coding machine [Enigma] was found here, plugged in as though in actual use when abandoned. The general appearance of this machine being that of a typewriter, the telegraphist pressed the keys and finding results peculiar, sent it up the hatch.

The convoy, meanwhile, had pressed on, guarded by the destroyer Amazon, two corvettes, and two-ASW trawlers. Amazon Amazon got a sonar contact on Schnee's got a sonar contact on Schnee's U-201 U-201 and called in the corvette and called in the corvette Nigella Nigella and the trawler and the trawler St. Apollo St. Apollo. The three vessels fixed U-201 U-201 on sonar and pounded her with depth charges for about four hours. Schnee and his men counted ninety-nine explosions. Some of these caused extensive damage to on sonar and pounded her with depth charges for about four hours. Schnee and his men counted ninety-nine explosions. Some of these caused extensive damage to U-201 U-201, including a serious leak in an external fuel-oil tank, which helped the escorts track the boat. Finally, Schnee got away-without again having seen U-110 U-110. That night he reported his successes and battle damage to Kerneval, adding that since he had seven torpedoes left, he would make every effort to repair the leak and continue the patrol. And he did.

Left far behind with U-110 U-110, Baker-Cresswell in Bulldog Bulldog believed he had a good chance of towing the boat to Iceland. He finally got the 2" steel cable from believed he had a good chance of towing the boat to Iceland. He finally got the 2" steel cable from U-110 U-110 and attached it to his own ship. Upon boarding the boat, the engineering party from Broadway, led by G. E. Dodds, found her to be fully "intact," with a "negligible quantity of water in the bilges." However, there were two problems: the port shaft of and attached it to his own ship. Upon boarding the boat, the engineering party from Broadway, led by G. E. Dodds, found her to be fully "intact," with a "negligible quantity of water in the bilges." However, there were two problems: the port shaft of U-110 U-110 was turning over slowly, and there was a "slight bubbling noise" aft. Unable to read German, Dodds could not stop the port electric motor or start the starboard motor to equalize the forward motion. He attributed the "bubbling noise" to a leaking ballast- or fuel-tank vent, perhaps damaged by the depth charges. Unfamiliar with submarines, he could not blow that tank. If the venting continued, the tank would flood completely, taking was turning over slowly, and there was a "slight bubbling noise" aft. Unable to read German, Dodds could not stop the port electric motor or start the starboard motor to equalize the forward motion. He attributed the "bubbling noise" to a leaking ballast- or fuel-tank vent, perhaps damaged by the depth charges. Unfamiliar with submarines, he could not blow that tank. If the venting continued, the tank would flood completely, taking U-110 U-110 down by the stern. down by the stern.

Meanwhile, Aubrietia Aubrietia returned to the scene and commenced fishing the Germans from the water. Altogether she rescued thirty-four men, including the first watch officer, Loewe, the engineer Eichelborn, the second watch officer Ulrich Wehrhrofer, and the war correspondent Ecke. All the Germans were hurried belowdecks to distance them from the angry survivors of returned to the scene and commenced fishing the Germans from the water. Altogether she rescued thirty-four men, including the first watch officer, Loewe, the engineer Eichelborn, the second watch officer Ulrich Wehrhrofer, and the war correspondent Ecke. All the Germans were hurried belowdecks to distance them from the angry survivors of Esmond Esmond and to conceal from them the boarding of and to conceal from them the boarding of U-110 U-110. Two Germans died on board Aubrietia Aubrietia, leaving a net bag of thirty-two prisoners.

As Aubrietia Aubrietia was pulling the last German on board, was pulling the last German on board, Bulldog Bulldog reported a firm sonar contact. Baker-Cresswell cast loose the steel towing cable and called up the damaged reported a firm sonar contact. Baker-Cresswell cast loose the steel towing cable and called up the damaged Broadway Broadway and the and the Aubrietia Aubrietia. The three vessels attacked the contact for an hour and a half, dropping thirty-two depth charges, and causing some anxious moments for the British boarding parties inside U-110 U-110. However, no evidence of a kill could be found and later this contact was classified as "doubtful." The hunt was terminated and the salvaging of U-110 U-110 resumed. To conceal the capture of the U-boat from the survivors of resumed. To conceal the capture of the U-boat from the survivors of Esmond Esmond and and U-110 U-110, Baker-Cresswell ordered Aubrietia Aubrietia to leave the area and find the destroyer to leave the area and find the destroyer Amazon Amazon, and transfer all survivors and prisoners to her.

Baker-Cresswell in Bulldog Bulldog reattached the old, rusty steel cable to reattached the old, rusty steel cable to U-110 U-110, which by then was heavily down by the stern. Having been aboard U-110 U-110 for about five hours and having ransacked her of everything useful and interesting (including six sextants and ten pairs of Zeiss binoculars, Ecke's cameras, and Lemp's for about five hours and having ransacked her of everything useful and interesting (including six sextants and ten pairs of Zeiss binoculars, Ecke's cameras, and Lemp's Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz), Balme's boarding party-and engineer Dodds's party from Broadway Broadway-closed all watertight doors, dogged down all hatches, and returned to their ships. Escorted by the damaged Broadway Broadway, Bulldog Bulldog headed for Iceland-400 miles distant-towing the yawing headed for Iceland-400 miles distant-towing the yawing U-110 U-110 at a speed of 6 knots. All went well for about seventeen hours-about 100 miles-but at 11:00 the following morning, March 10, at a speed of 6 knots. All went well for about seventeen hours-about 100 miles-but at 11:00 the following morning, March 10, U-110 U-110 suddenly upended and sank, "her bow standing vertically out of the water." The loss, Baker-Cresswell wrote, was a "bitter blow." suddenly upended and sank, "her bow standing vertically out of the water." The loss, Baker-Cresswell wrote, was a "bitter blow."

In the dark of that same morning, March 10, far to the west, a new VIIC, U-556 U-556, commanded by Herbert Wohlfarth, from the ducks U-14 U-14 and and U-137 U-137, caught up with the convoy.* Wohlfarth attacked on the surface, firing two torpedoes at two different ships. He claimed both ships sank, but in fact, he had hit only one, for damage. The convoy dispersed, but Wohlfarth hung on looking for strays, and later that day, attacking submerged, he torpedoed and sank a 4,900-ton British freighter. Still later he stopped a 5,100-ton Belgian freighter with one torpedo and finished her off with his deck gun. Wohlfarth attacked on the surface, firing two torpedoes at two different ships. He claimed both ships sank, but in fact, he had hit only one, for damage. The convoy dispersed, but Wohlfarth hung on looking for strays, and later that day, attacking submerged, he torpedoed and sank a 4,900-ton British freighter. Still later he stopped a 5,100-ton Belgian freighter with one torpedo and finished her off with his deck gun.

Based on flash reports from three of the boats and from distress calls picked up by B-dienst B-dienst, Donitz concluded that the four boats which had attacked convoy Outbound 318 had sunk thirteen ships for 76,248 tons. The confirmed result was about half the claim, seven ships sunk for 39,255 tons: two by Kuppisch in U-94 U-94; two by Lemp in U-110 U-110; two by Wohlfarth in U-556 U-556; and one by Schnee in U-201 U-201. As a result of these and past overclaims and credits, Kuppisch and Wohlfarth were awarded the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz Baker-Cresswell in Bulldog Bulldog reached Iceland late on March 10. He transferred the thirty-two German prisoners from reached Iceland late on March 10. He transferred the thirty-two German prisoners from Amazon Amazon to to Bulldog Bulldog and the next day set off for Scapa Flow, making 25 knots to avoid any possibility of a U-boat attack. En route he talked individually and cagily with the three German officers and the correspondent Ecke, to see if any of them had an inkling that and the next day set off for Scapa Flow, making 25 knots to avoid any possibility of a U-boat attack. En route he talked individually and cagily with the three German officers and the correspondent Ecke, to see if any of them had an inkling that U-110 U-110 had been boarded or taken in tow. Apparently none did. Nor did any of the enlisted men, who were canvassed in a similar manner by the crewmen of had been boarded or taken in tow. Apparently none did. Nor did any of the enlisted men, who were canvassed in a similar manner by the crewmen of Bulldog Bulldog. Since some of the Germans had seen Bulldog Bulldog launch the whaler with the boarding party, Baker-Cresswell and his crew put about a "cover story" that launch the whaler with the boarding party, Baker-Cresswell and his crew put about a "cover story" that U-110 U-110 had "sunk" before it could be boarded. had "sunk" before it could be boarded.

The intelligence haul from U-110 U-110, which filled "two packing crates," was eye-popping and historic: a working naval Enigma, the keys for Heimisch Heimisch (the Home Waters or Dolphin code) for April and June, (the Home Waters or Dolphin code) for April and June, the keys to the double-enciphered the keys to the double-enciphered Offizierte Offizierte (Officers-Only) code, a book containing the (Officers-Only) code, a book containing the Kurzsignale Kurzsignale (Short Signal) code, and (Short Signal) code, and Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine grid charts, as well as special charts showing the safe routes through German minefields in the North Sea and along the French coast, decoded U-boat traffic (in grid charts, as well as special charts showing the safe routes through German minefields in the North Sea and along the French coast, decoded U-boat traffic (in Heimisch Heimisch) for the period April 15-May 9, administrative correspondence, a complete set of technical manuals and diagrams of all the Type IXB fuel, air, hydraulic and other systems, and hundreds of mundane items, down to the citation for the award of the Iron Cross Second Class to the engineer, Eichel-born. After he had been briefed on the haul, First Sea Lord Dudley Pound telexed Baker-Cresswell, who had codenamed the boarding Operation Primrose: "Hearty congratulations. The petals of your flower are of rare beauty."

The Admiralty showered praise and awards on all those concerned with the victory over U-110 U-110. Pound immediately promoted Baker-Cresswell from commander to captain. In a special ceremony at Buckingham Palace, King George VI appointed Baker-Cresswell and the Aubrietia Aubrietia captain, Smith, Companions of the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). He awarded Balme, Dodds, and the captain of captain, Smith, Companions of the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). He awarded Balme, Dodds, and the captain of Broadway Broadway, Taylor, the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC). Three others received the Distinguished Service Medal (DSM) and fourteen officers and men were "Mentioned in Dispatches." When the King gave Dodds his DSC, the official naval historian wrote, the King told Dodds the operation "was perhaps the most important single event in the whole war at sea."

Although British intelligence officers stressed to the German prisoners the cover story that U-110 U-110 had sunk before it could be boarded, the first watch officer, Loewe, was not fully convinced. He remembered that he had talked to six of the had sunk before it could be boarded, the first watch officer, Loewe, was not fully convinced. He remembered that he had talked to six of the U-110 U-110 crewmen on crewmen on Amazon Amazon or or Bulldog Bulldog and that "none" had actually seen the boat sink. Loewe's suspicions were fully aroused when the British gave the engineer, Eichelborn, the citation for his Iron Cross Second Class, which, Eichelborn believed, he had possibly left "in a folder in the control room." If so, the British had certainly boarded and that "none" had actually seen the boat sink. Loewe's suspicions were fully aroused when the British gave the engineer, Eichelborn, the citation for his Iron Cross Second Class, which, Eichelborn believed, he had possibly left "in a folder in the control room." If so, the British had certainly boarded U-110 U-110. Loewe remembered that he then discussed the matter with the senior German POWs, Otto Kretschmer and Hans Jenisch, and that it was decided that Loewe should inform Donitz.

Before the war, Donitz had adopted a coding system which officer POWs could incorporate in letters to their families. It was a duplication of a World War I submarine POW code, in which the arrangement of the first letters of certain words stood for the dots and dashes of Morse code. The families were under instructions to forward all POW mail to Donitz, who would examine the letters for important encoded information, such as the cause of the loss of the boat, torpedo failures, and so on.

The British had broken this relatively simple code in World War I and were not surprised when it resurfaced in World War II. Hence they "read" all encoded information going back to Donitz. From this flow of encoded mail, they gleaned inside information not otherwise revealed, some of it quite useful. They also used the mail code as a channel to funnel "disinformation" to Donitz and for other purposes.

Very likely the British returned Eichelborn's medal citation to test if the cover story on U-110 U-110 was working among the Germans. That is, to provoke a reaction of some kind that would indicate what the Germans really knew. Falling for this gambit, Loewe encoded a letter to his family for Donitz, employing the prearranged designation for was working among the Germans. That is, to provoke a reaction of some kind that would indicate what the Germans really knew. Falling for this gambit, Loewe encoded a letter to his family for Donitz, employing the prearranged designation for U-110 U-110, which was U-E-O. In his letter Loewe encoded the message: "Suspicion U-E-0 in enemy hands." The British, of course, confiscated this letter and intensified efforts to persuade the U-110 U-110 survivors that the boat had not been boarded. survivors that the boat had not been boarded.*

Unaware of what had transpired on U-110 U-110, Lemp died a hero hero in German eyes and, as was customary, Donitz named a barracks in his honor in Lorient. But when the true story of what had happened gradually emerged in the postwar years, some German U-boat veterans were outraged. One, Peter Hansen, wrote that Lemp's "irresponsible disregard of the standing orders to destroy all secret matters is directly responsible that [sic] thousands of U-boat men died needlessly and hundreds of U-boats were destroyed also as a consequence. While the radio shack staff and officers were also partially responsible for this disaster, the principal culprit was Fritz-Julius Lemp himself. If the English did not shoot Lemp, then he should have been put up against a wall by the Germans for his irresponsibility and neglection of duty." in German eyes and, as was customary, Donitz named a barracks in his honor in Lorient. But when the true story of what had happened gradually emerged in the postwar years, some German U-boat veterans were outraged. One, Peter Hansen, wrote that Lemp's "irresponsible disregard of the standing orders to destroy all secret matters is directly responsible that [sic] thousands of U-boat men died needlessly and hundreds of U-boats were destroyed also as a consequence. While the radio shack staff and officers were also partially responsible for this disaster, the principal culprit was Fritz-Julius Lemp himself. If the English did not shoot Lemp, then he should have been put up against a wall by the Germans for his irresponsibility and neglection of duty."

Harsh words, these, but the thrust is correct. Lemp had a duty to protect Enigma at all costs, including, if necessary, his life. He should not have left U-110 U-110 until he was certain beyond any doubt that she was going down-and going down fast. In the final line of his secret report on the boarding, David Balme posed a key question with all words of it capitalized for emphasis. If until he was certain beyond any doubt that she was going down-and going down fast. In the final line of his secret report on the boarding, David Balme posed a key question with all words of it capitalized for emphasis. If U-110 U-110 was properly rigged for scuttling, he wrote, "WHY WERE BOTH CONNING TOWER HATCHES CLOSED?" was properly rigged for scuttling, he wrote, "WHY WERE BOTH CONNING TOWER HATCHES CLOSED?"

Altogether the U-boats sank seven empty freighters for about 40,000 tons from convoy Outbound 318 and damaged two other freighters, both of which made port. But after that battle, the boats in the North Atlantic were again hard-pressed to find targets. Between May 10 and May 20, they sank only four ships. The most notable of these was the 10,500-ton auxiliary cruiser Salopian Salopian, by Robert Gysae in U-98 U-98; the least notable was a 500-ton French sailing ship gunned under by Wolfgang Luth in the old Type IX U-43 U-43, which had sunk at dockside in Lorient in early February and was finally back in action. Returning to Lorient after a thirty-two-day patrol, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Karl-Heinz Moehle in holder Karl-Heinz Moehle in U-123 U-123 reported sinking merely one ship (in April). Judging that Moehle had "health" problems, Donitz relieved him of command and sent him to the Training Command. reported sinking merely one ship (in April). Judging that Moehle had "health" problems, Donitz relieved him of command and sent him to the Training Command.*

In search of convoys beyond reach of Iceland-based air and surface escorts, Donitz moved the bulk of the boats ever westward. By May 19, nine patrolled a line at 41 degrees west, directly south of Greenland. Late that afternoon, Herbert Kuppisch in U-94 U-94-who had earlier fdund convoy Outbound 318 and won a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz-intercepted convoy Halifax 126, escorted by only one auxiliary cruiser. Upon receiving the report, Donitz instructed Kuppisch to shadow and withhold attack until the other boats came up.

Commencing at 0400, May 20, the boats struck, Kuppisch first. He fired two torpedoes at one target but both missed. Speeding onward into the center of the convoy, the torpedoes hit two other ships, both of which sank. Later that afternoon Kuppisch sank a 6,100-ton Norwegian tanker, John R Pedersen John R Pedersen.

Five other boats had successes. Herbert Wohlfarth in U-556 U-556, still on his first patrol, sank the 8,500-ton tanker British Security British Security and a 5,000-ton freighter, and damaged a 13,000-ton British tanker. Hans-Georg Fischer in a new IXB, and a 5,000-ton freighter, and damaged a 13,000-ton British tanker. Hans-Georg Fischer in a new IXB, U-109 U-109, sank a 7,400-ton freighter. Wilhelm Kleinschmidt in another new IXB, U-111 U-111, sank a 6,000-ton freighter. Robert Gysae in U-98 U-98 sank a 5,400-ton freighter and damaged another. Claus Korth in sank a 5,400-ton freighter and damaged another. Claus Korth in U-93 U-93 wrecked and set on fire the 6,200-ton tanker wrecked and set on fire the 6,200-ton tanker Elusa Elusa. Counting past overclaims, the sinking earned Korth a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.

Upon receiving the first distress call from the convoy, the Iceland-based Escort Group 12, commanded by C. D. Howard-Johnston, raced west. Consisting of eleven warships (five destroyers, four corvettes, two ASW trawlers), it arrived to find the convoy dispersed and utterly disorganized. Howard-Johnston, in the destroyer Malcolm Malcolm, deployed the escort group to round up the scattered ships and reform them into a convoy.

One of the corvettes, Verbena Verbena, commanded by Denys Arthur Raynor, was ordered to tow the smoldering hulk of the tanker Elusa Elusa to Iceland, if at all possible. Closing on the hulk, Raynor was astonished to see a U-boat on the surface also approaching to Iceland, if at all possible. Closing on the hulk, Raynor was astonished to see a U-boat on the surface also approaching Elusa Elusa. Giving the alarm, Verbena Verbena opened fire, forcing the boat to dive. Upon reaching the site of the dive, opened fire, forcing the boat to dive. Upon reaching the site of the dive, Verbena Verbena dropped five depth charges, while the ex-American four-stack destroyer dropped five depth charges, while the ex-American four-stack destroyer Churchill Churchill came up to assist. Both ships got a firm sonar contact and both conducted repeated depth-charge attacks. The records are not clear, but the U-boat was probably Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat's came up to assist. Both ships got a firm sonar contact and both conducted repeated depth-charge attacks. The records are not clear, but the U-boat was probably Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat's U-74 U-74, fresh from France. At this time Kentrat reported such "heavy" depth-charge damage that he was forced to abort to Lorient.

When Donitz learned from one of the U-boats that "five destroyers" had come up to escort the convoy, he ordered all boats to break off the attack and reform a patrol line farther south. He left one boat in northern waters, Kleinschmidt's new U-111 U-111, to transmit a series of "dummy" radio messages, designed to make the British think the pack was still stalking convoy Halifax 126 eastward and trick them into routing the next convoy south, into the arms of the reformed patrol line. This was the first known instance in which Donitz employed "radio deception." While carrying out the deception on May 22, Kleinschmidt encountered and sank a 4,800-ton freighter sailing alone. Based on flash reports from the boats, Donitz concluded that the pack had dealt convoy Halifax 126 a severe blow: nine ships sunk for 71,484 tons. He was correct. The six boats had sunk nine ships, but, as usual, the tonnage was inflated. The confirmed total was 54,451 tons sunk, including the tanker Elusa Elusa, which could not be salvaged, and the other two tankers, plus damage to another tanker.

"SINK THE B BISMARCK"

U-boat operations in the North Atlantic were interrupted on May 22 by the most dramatic event in the naval war to that time: the Atlantic sortie of the super battleship Bismarck Bismarck.

Accompanied by the new heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, Bismarck Prinz Eugen, Bismarck sailed from Kiel in the early hours of May 19. Bletchley Park could not read naval Enigma on a current basis in May; thus the Admiralty had no advance warning from that source. But the British naval attache in Stockholm learned of the sortie on the night of May 20 and alerted the Admiralty. The next day, British reconnaissance planes spotted the two ships near Bergen. Bletchley Park broke an old (April) Enigma message which stated that sailed from Kiel in the early hours of May 19. Bletchley Park could not read naval Enigma on a current basis in May; thus the Admiralty had no advance warning from that source. But the British naval attache in Stockholm learned of the sortie on the night of May 20 and alerted the Admiralty. The next day, British reconnaissance planes spotted the two ships near Bergen. Bletchley Park broke an old (April) Enigma message which stated that Bismarck Bismarck had taken on board "five prize crews" and "appropriate charts," which led the Admiralty to believe, correctly, that had taken on board "five prize crews" and "appropriate charts," which led the Admiralty to believe, correctly, that Bismarck Bismarck and and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen were embarked on a convoy-raiding sortie in the North Atlantic. When he got the news, Winston Churchill gave a simple-but legendary-order: "Sink the were embarked on a convoy-raiding sortie in the North Atlantic. When he got the news, Winston Churchill gave a simple-but legendary-order: "Sink the Bismarck Bismarck!" All available capital ships of the Home Fleet and Force H from Gibraltar put to sea.

Bismarck and and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen, equipped with primitive radar, entered fog-shrouded Denmark Strait on May 23, hugging the ice pack off Greenland. Two 10,000-ton heavy cruisers, Suffolk Suffolk and and Norfolk Norfolk, also equipped with primitive radar, were patrolling the passage. Suffolk Suffolk, which had better radar than Bismarck Bismarck, found the Germans late that evening and brought up Norfolk Norfolk. Bismarck Bismarck detected detected Norfolk Norfolk on radar and fired her first salvos of the war. She got no hits; moreover, the shock of her 15" guns damaged her radar. As a consequence, on radar and fired her first salvos of the war. She got no hits; moreover, the shock of her 15" guns damaged her radar. As a consequence, Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen moved into the van. Tracking by radar, moved into the van. Tracking by radar, Suffolk Suffolk and and Norfolk Norfolk hung on tenaciously. hung on tenaciously.

In response to the alert, the new commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey, sent the big (42,000-ton) battle cruiser Hood Hood and the new battleship and the new battleship Prince Prince of of Wales Wales, with destroyer screens, to intercept the German ships in the south end of the Denmark Strait. The four converging British ships significantly outgunned the German ships. Hood Hood, like Bismarck Bismarck, had eight 15" guns; Prince of Wales Prince of Wales had ten 14" guns. had ten 14" guns. Suffolk Suffolk and and Norfolk Norfolk, like Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen, each had eight 8" guns. But Hood was ancient and thinly armored, and Prince of Wales Prince of Wales was still in workup and some of her guns were not yet firing properly. was still in workup and some of her guns were not yet firing properly. Suffolk Suffolk and and Norfolk Norfolk, also ancient, were less well-armored than Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen.

In the early morning hours of May 24, the opposing naval forces met. The British made the mistake of opening the attack on a slanting course, which prevented them from bringing all guns to bear simultaneously, and which offered the Germans a better target. Mistaking Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen for for Bismarck, Hood Bismarck, Hood opened fire on the former at a range of fourteen miles. opened fire on the former at a range of fourteen miles. Bismarck Bismarck and and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen responded immediately with deadly accurate fire. Taking a hit in her magazines, Hood blew up and sank within minutes. The British destroyer responded immediately with deadly accurate fire. Taking a hit in her magazines, Hood blew up and sank within minutes. The British destroyer Electra Electra could find only three of her 1,419-man crew. Badly damaged by two hits and bedeviled with malfunctioning guns, could find only three of her 1,419-man crew. Badly damaged by two hits and bedeviled with malfunctioning guns, Prince of Wales Prince of Wales disengaged and retired behind a smoke screen. But she had got two or three 14" hits in disengaged and retired behind a smoke screen. But she had got two or three 14" hits in Bismarck Bismarck's forward fuel tanks and a fuel-transfer station, which deprived Bismarck Bismarck of a crucial thousand tons of fuel oil. of a crucial thousand tons of fuel oil.

In view of the damage to Bismarck Bismarck, the German commander, Admiral Gunther Lutjens, changed plans. The Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen was to separate from was to separate from Bismarck Bismarck and raid British shipping alone. and raid British shipping alone. Bismarck Bismarck was to go directly to St. Nazaire for repairs. Before the new plan could be executed, however, Lutjens had first to shake his shadowers, was to go directly to St. Nazaire for repairs. Before the new plan could be executed, however, Lutjens had first to shake his shadowers, Suffolk Suffolk, Norfolk Norfolk, and the damaged Prince of Wales Prince of Wales, and the destroyers. He swung Bismarck Bismarck at the shadowers-as if to attack-and during the resulting confusion, at the shadowers-as if to attack-and during the resulting confusion, Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen slipped away, southbound into the vast Atlantic. slipped away, southbound into the vast Atlantic.*

When Donitz learned that Bismarck Bismarck had been hit, he volunteered the entire Atlantic U-boat arm to assist. Lutjens hastened to accept the offer and, as a first step, he requested that Donitz set a submarine trap in grid square AJ-68, 360 miles due south of Greenland. The plan was that Lutjens would "lure" his shadowers into the square on the morning of May 25 so that the U-boats could attack them, causing sufficient diversion for had been hit, he volunteered the entire Atlantic U-boat arm to assist. Lutjens hastened to accept the offer and, as a first step, he requested that Donitz set a submarine trap in grid square AJ-68, 360 miles due south of Greenland. The plan was that Lutjens would "lure" his shadowers into the square on the morning of May 25 so that the U-boats could attack them, causing sufficient diversion for Bismarck Bismarck to elude them. to elude them.

On the afternoon of May 24, Donitz directed five boats to form the trap. Three of the boats were commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Luth in the old Type IX holders: Luth in the old Type IX U-43 U-43, Endrass in the old Type VIIB U-47 U-47, and Kuppisch in the Type VIIC U-94 U-94, who had only a few torpedoes. The other two boats, fresh from Germany on maiden patrols, had not fired any torpedoes: the first Type IXC to reach the Atlantic, to reach the Atlantic, U-66 U-66, commanded by Richard Zapp, age thirty-seven, and the VIIC U-557 U-557, commanded by Ottokar Paulshen, age twenty-five. Kleinschmidt's IXB U-111 U-111 was to join the trap after refueling from one of was to join the trap after refueling from one of Bismarck Bismarck's supply ships, Belchen. Two other boats, Helmut Rosenbaum's U-73 U-73, fresh from Lorient, and Claus Korth's U-93 U-93, took stations slightly to the east of the trap.

Donitz set a second submarine trap in the Bay of Biscay, 420 miles due west of Lorient. It was comprised initially of four Type VII boats: Herbert Schultze's U-48 U-48, outbound from Lorient, and three inbound boats. One was Udo Heilmann in U-97 U-97, who had sunk three ships for 17,852 tons, including the 6,466-ton tanker Sangro, an ex-Italian prize. The others were Robert Gysae's U-98 U-98, and Herbert Wohlfarth's U-556 U-556, who had no torpedoes; they were to serve as "lookouts" for the other boats. Two other boats in Lorient which were nearly ready for patrols, Klaus Scholtz's U-108 U-108 and Erich Topp's and Erich Topp's U-552 U-552, were alerted to sail on the night of May 25 to reinforce this trap, if necessary. Another boat, Kentrat's U-74 U-74, inbound with severe depth-charge damage, voluntarily joined the trap.

By late afternoon, May 24, Donitz logged proudly, "all available" forces of the U-boat arm had been committed to assist Bismarck Bismarck: a total of fifteen boats, seven in western waters, eight in the Bay of Biscay. This was the largest commitment of the U-boat force to a single task since the invasion of Norway, fourteen months earlier. Every skipper and crew involved was keenly aware of the historic nature of the mission and determined to do everything possible to support Bismarck Bismarck.

Late that evening, May 24, Bismarck Bismarck's shadowers drew the new aircraft carrier Victorious Victorious onto her track. When onto her track. When Victorious Victorious had closed to within 120 miles of had closed to within 120 miles of Bismarck Bismarck, she launched nine old Swordfish biplanes, each armed with a single 18" aerial torpedo and fitted with primitive ASV radar. The Swordfish picked up a contact and prepared to attack, but the "blip" turned out to be the Norfolk Norfolk, which by radio put the planes back on the correct course. A second "blip" proved to be three U.S. Coast Guard cutters, Modoc, Northland, and General Greene Modoc, Northland, and General Greene, on "neutrality patrol." Immediately afterward, however, the planes found Bismarck Bismarck. Courageously flying into a wall of antiaircraft fire, the Swordfish attacked within view of the Coast Guard cutters, scoring one hit. Astonishingly, all nine Swordfish survived and returned to Victorious Victorious.

The single torpedo hit on Bismarck Bismarck did no damage, but the attack had important consequences. During did no damage, but the attack had important consequences. During Bismarck Bismarck's violent maneuvering to avoid the torpedoes, the makeshift repairs to the damage sustained earlier in the day from Prince of Wales Prince of Wales fell apart and fell apart and Bismarck Bismarck lost more oil and took on tons of water, which slowed her. This mishap led Lutjens to abandon the plan to "lure" his pursuers into a submarine trap, and he headed directly for Brest, which was closer than St. Nazaire. Accordingly, Donitz shifted seven of the eight boats (leaving lost more oil and took on tons of water, which slowed her. This mishap led Lutjens to abandon the plan to "lure" his pursuers into a submarine trap, and he headed directly for Brest, which was closer than St. Nazaire. Accordingly, Donitz shifted seven of the eight boats (leaving U-111 U-111 to refuel) in western waters east toward the presumed track of to refuel) in western waters east toward the presumed track of Bismarck Bismarck and moved the five boats in the Bay of Biscay trap farther to the north. and moved the five boats in the Bay of Biscay trap farther to the north.

During the early hours of May 25, Bismarck Bismarck shook her pursuers. The Germans rejoiced. If Lutjens could remain undetected and maintain speed, shook her pursuers. The Germans rejoiced. If Lutjens could remain undetected and maintain speed, Bismarck Bismarck would soon reach the Bay of Biscay U-boat patrol line and would be within range of would soon reach the Bay of Biscay U-boat patrol line and would be within range of Luftwaffe Luftwaffe aircraft based in France, which could provide an aerial umbrella. The onset of nasty Atlantic storms would help aircraft based in France, which could provide an aerial umbrella. The onset of nasty Atlantic storms would help Bismarck Bismarck remain undetected. The British wept. The great prize had unaccountably slipped from their grasp. The stormy weather diminished hope that she could be found again. remain undetected. The British wept. The great prize had unaccountably slipped from their grasp. The stormy weather diminished hope that she could be found again.

Unaware of the severity of the damage to Bismarck Bismarck and of her critical loss of fuel, the British did not know where she was going. South in the Atlantic? North back to Germany? East to France? Based on incorrect or botched plotting of DF fixes on and of her critical loss of fuel, the British did not know where she was going. South in the Atlantic? North back to Germany? East to France? Based on incorrect or botched plotting of DF fixes on Bismarck Bismarck's radio transmissions, Admiral Tovey leaned to the view that Bismarck Bismarck was to break back to Germany via the Iceland-Faeroes passage, and wrongly deployed Home Fleet forces accordingly. At the same time, however, First Sea Lord Dudley Pound at the Admiralty directed Force H (the carrier was to break back to Germany via the Iceland-Faeroes passage, and wrongly deployed Home Fleet forces accordingly. At the same time, however, First Sea Lord Dudley Pound at the Admiralty directed Force H (the carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal and the battle cruiser and the battle cruiser Renown Renown), coming up from Gibraltar, to deploy on the assumption that Bismarck Bismarck was headed for France. Thus two of the three possibilities were covered, albeit thinly. But the nasty weather worked in was headed for France. Thus two of the three possibilities were covered, albeit thinly. But the nasty weather worked in Bismarck Bismarck's favor, restricting and blinding carrier- and land-based air patrols.

During the desperate but fruitless hunt for Bismarck Bismarck on May 25, the codebreakers at Bletchley Park, who were reading the on May 25, the codebreakers at Bletchley Park, who were reading the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Red Enigma currently, but not naval Enigma, picked up an important message in Red that related to Red Enigma currently, but not naval Enigma, picked up an important message in Red that related to Bismarck Bismarck. In response to a query from the chief of staff of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, who was in Athens for the German airborne assault on the island of Crete,* Berlin informed him that Berlin informed him that Bismarck Bismarck was "making for the west coast of France." Bletchley Park rushed this vital information to the Admiralty, but by that time both the Admiralty and Admiral Tovey had intuitively concluded that was "making for the west coast of France." Bletchley Park rushed this vital information to the Admiralty, but by that time both the Admiralty and Admiral Tovey had intuitively concluded that Bismarck Bismarck was headed for France and were redeploying all naval forces accordingly. Nonetheless, the information from Bletchley Park was reassuring. was headed for France and were redeploying all naval forces accordingly. Nonetheless, the information from Bletchley Park was reassuring.

In the foulest possible weather, on the morning of May 26, the First Sea Lord Pound directed Coastal Command and carrier-based air to concentrate reconnaissance along a presumed track to Brest. At 10:30-thirty-one hours after Bismarck Bismarck had been lost-a newly arrived, American-built Coastal Command Catalina found her. Ironically, the pilot was a U.S. Navy ensign, Leonard ("Tuck") Smith, who was "on loan" to indoctrinate RAF pilots to the peculiar flying characteristics of the Catalina. While Smith zoomed into the clouds to avoid the heavy ack-ack from had been lost-a newly arrived, American-built Coastal Command Catalina found her. Ironically, the pilot was a U.S. Navy ensign, Leonard ("Tuck") Smith, who was "on loan" to indoctrinate RAF pilots to the peculiar flying characteristics of the Catalina. While Smith zoomed into the clouds to avoid the heavy ack-ack from Bismarck Bismarck, the British pilot, Flying Officer D. A. Briggs, got off a contact report in a simple code, which B-dienst B-dienst quickly broke and transmitted to quickly broke and transmitted to Bismarck Bismarck and to Donitz. and to Donitz.

Bismarck was then 690 miles west of Brest-about thirty-five hours out-but Force H was only seventy-five miles to the east, blocking her way. The Force H commander, James F. Somerville, directed a radar-equipped cruiser, was then 690 miles west of Brest-about thirty-five hours out-but Force H was only seventy-five miles to the east, blocking her way. The Force H commander, James F. Somerville, directed a radar-equipped cruiser, Sheffield Sheffield, and a succession of ASV-radar-equipped Swordfish biplanes from Ark Royal Ark Royal to shadow to shadow Bismarck Bismarck while he prepared to launch a flight of Swordfish with torpedoes. The first flight of fourteen Swordfish mistakenly attacked the while he prepared to launch a flight of Swordfish with torpedoes. The first flight of fourteen Swordfish mistakenly attacked the Sheffield Sheffield, which only escaped destruction by resorting to violent maneuvers. The second flight of Sword-fish (fifteen aircraft), firmly guided by Sheffield Sheffield, attacked Bismarck Bismarck at 8:47 at 8:47 P.M. P.M., launching thirteen torpedoes. Two hit, one amidships on the armor blister to no effect, the other all the way aft, wrecking Bismarck Bismarck's steering gear, propellers, and rudder, leaving her unmaneuverable.

From the contact reports of British aircraft intercepted by B-dienst B-dienst and one message from Lutjens on and one message from Lutjens on Bismarck Bismarck, Donitz was able to plot the probable track of Bismarck Bismarck and her pursuers. He directed the Bay of Biscay submarine trap, which had been reinforced by Rosenbaum's and her pursuers. He directed the Bay of Biscay submarine trap, which had been reinforced by Rosenbaum's U-73 U-73 but less Topp's but less Topp's U-552 U-552, which did not sail (making a total of seven boats), to the most likely point of action and by the evening of May 26, notwithstanding the gale-whipped, raging seas, all were within a few miles of Bismarck Bismarck and Force H. At 8:00 and Force H. At 8:00 P.M. P.M. the carrier the carrier Ark Royal Ark Royal and the battle cruiser and the battle cruiser Renown Renown of Force H, making high speed, nearly ran down one of the boats, Wohlfarth's of Force H, making high speed, nearly ran down one of the boats, Wohlfarth's U-556 U-556. But Wohlfarth, serving as a "lookout," had no torpedoes! In frustration he logged: "If only I had torpedoes now! I should not even have to approach, as I am in exactly the right position for firing. No destroyers and no zigzagging. I could get between them and finish them both off. The carrier has torpedo bombers on board. I might have been able to help Bismarck Bismarck." He reported the contact and shadowed, but the big ships soon outran him.

When Donitz got word that Bismarck Bismarck could not maneuver, he ordered all seven boats of the Biscay trap (including Gysae's could not maneuver, he ordered all seven boats of the Biscay trap (including Gysae's U-98 U-98, critically low on fuel and out of torpedoes) to converge on Bismarck Bismarck and defend her. Gysae in and defend her. Gysae in U-98 U-98 and Wohlfarth in and Wohlfarth in U-556 U-556 were to continue as "lookouts" and guide other U-boats to the enemy. Homing on were to continue as "lookouts" and guide other U-boats to the enemy. Homing on Bismarck Bismarck's beacon signals, Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73 found her first, shortly after midnight May 27. found her first, shortly after midnight May 27. Bismarck Bismarck was then under torpedo attack by a flotilla of five destroyers, commanded by Philip Vian in Cossack (which had a Type 286 radar), responding to was then under torpedo attack by a flotilla of five destroyers, commanded by Philip Vian in Cossack (which had a Type 286 radar), responding to Sheffield Sheffield's shadow reports. Rosenbaum observed and reported this destroyer action, which resulted in two more torpedo hits on Bismarck Bismarck, but he was unable to attack the wildly maneuvering destroyers or to find Sheffield Sheffield, and soon lost contact in the foul weather.

Homing on Bismarck Bismarck's or U-73 U-73's beacons, the "lookout" Wohlfarth in U-556 U-556 arrived next, critically low on fuel. He logged: "What can I do for arrived next, critically low on fuel. He logged: "What can I do for Bismarck Bismarck? I can see her star shells and gun flashes. Sudden bursts of gunfire. It is an awful feeling to be so near, yet unable to help. I can only continue to reconnoiter and guide the U-boats that still have torpedoes." By this time the battleships King George V King George V (ten 14" guns) and " (ten 14" guns) and "Rodney (nine 16" guns) and the heavy cruisers (nine 16" guns) and the heavy cruisers Dorsetshire Dorsetshire and and Norfolk Norfolk were closing on were closing on Bismarck Bismarck in raging seas. Knowing he was doomed, Lutjens sent off a message to Hitler: "We fight to the last in our belief in you my Fuhrer and in the firm faith in Germany's victory." in raging seas. Knowing he was doomed, Lutjens sent off a message to Hitler: "We fight to the last in our belief in you my Fuhrer and in the firm faith in Germany's victory."* The last signal from Lutjens, at 0710 (German time), was: "Send U-boat to save War Diary." The last signal from Lutjens, at 0710 (German time), was: "Send U-boat to save War Diary."

Donitz ordered Wohlfarth in U-556 U-556, who appeared to be closest to Bismarck Bismarck, to carry out the risky mission of picking up the war diary. But Wohlfarth responded that he was so low on fuel that he had to abort to Lorient then and there. The next nearest boat, Kentrat's heavily damaged U-74 U-74, drew the assignment. But before Kentrat could even attempt to carry it out, King George V King George V and and Rodney Rodney opened fire with big guns and the cruisers opened fire with big guns and the cruisers Dorsetshire Dorsetshire and and Norfolk Norfolk hit hit Bismarck Bismarck with one or more torpedoes. Fighting back with all operating guns and flags still flying, the wrecked with one or more torpedoes. Fighting back with all operating guns and flags still flying, the wrecked Bismarck Bismarck sank beneath the waves at 10:40 sank beneath the waves at 10:40 A.M. A.M.,* with the loss of over 2,200 men. with the loss of over 2,200 men.

British ships moved in to rescue Bismarck Bismarck survivors. They fished out 110, but further rescues were broken off when one of the ships radioed a U-boat alarm, forcing all British vessels to evacuate the area, leaving behind hundreds of German survivors in the sea. Later that evening, Kentrat in survivors. They fished out 110, but further rescues were broken off when one of the ships radioed a U-boat alarm, forcing all British vessels to evacuate the area, leaving behind hundreds of German survivors in the sea. Later that evening, Kentrat in U-74 U-74 found three survivors and hauled them aboard, prompting Donitz to mount an organized search by six boats over the next four days. Herbert Schultze in found three survivors and hauled them aboard, prompting Donitz to mount an organized search by six boats over the next four days. Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48 reported finding wreckage and "a number of floating corpses," but no survivors. A German weather-reporting trawler, reported finding wreckage and "a number of floating corpses," but no survivors. A German weather-reporting trawler, Sachsenwald Sachsenwald, found two other survivors, making a total of five recovered by German forces before Admiral Raeder canceled the search on May 31.

Kentrat in the severely damaged U-74 U-74 had a very difficult time returning to Lorient with the had a very difficult time returning to Lorient with the Bismarck Bismarck's survivors. By the time he arrived off the coast, saltwater had leaked into the battery, creating chlorine gas. He was thus unable to dive and make the customary submerged approach to Lorient. An unidentified British submarine spotted U-74 U-74 and fired torpedoes from dead astern, but the bridge watch was keenly alert and managed to "comb" the torpedoes. The necessary repairs kept the boat out of action until late July. and fired torpedoes from dead astern, but the bridge watch was keenly alert and managed to "comb" the torpedoes. The necessary repairs kept the boat out of action until late July.

The loss of Bismarck Bismarck marked a turning point in the German naval war. Its humiliating failure, together with the failure of the battle cruisers marked a turning point in the German naval war. Its humiliating failure, together with the failure of the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst to inflict any substantial damage on British maritime assets, brought to a close the dominance of the big surface ships in the to inflict any substantial damage on British maritime assets, brought to a close the dominance of the big surface ships in the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine. Never again was one to sortie into the Atlantic. Virtually overnight the U-boat became the Kriegs-marine's preferred ship, the only possibility for defeating Great Britain at sea. Admiral Raeder's influence on Hitler declined; that of Donitz rose commensurately.

President Roosevelt seized upon the Bismarck Bismarck sortie to nudge the United States closer to open intervention. On May 27, the day sortie to nudge the United States closer to open intervention. On May 27, the day Bismarck Bismarck went down, he legally declared a state of unlimited national emergency. "The Battle for the Atlantic," Roosevelt said somewhat expansively, "now extends from the icy waters of the North Pole to the frozen continent of the Antarctic." The blunt truth, he went on, was that the Nazis were sinking merchant ships three times faster than British and American shipyards could replace them and everything pointed to an eventual attack on the Western Hemisphere. "It would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard," he concluded. Therefore he had ordered the Army and Navy to intensify air and surface-ship patrols in the North and South Atlantic and had directed the U.S. Maritime Commission to dramatically increase the production of merchant shipping. Two weeks later, he froze German and Italian assets in the United States and closed down all the consulates of those two nations. went down, he legally declared a state of unlimited national emergency. "The Battle for the Atlantic," Roosevelt said somewhat expansively, "now extends from the icy waters of the North Pole to the frozen continent of the Antarctic." The blunt truth, he went on, was that the Nazis were sinking merchant ships three times faster than British and American shipyards could replace them and everything pointed to an eventual attack on the Western Hemisphere. "It would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard," he concluded. Therefore he had ordered the Army and Navy to intensify air and surface-ship patrols in the North and South Atlantic and had directed the U.S. Maritime Commission to dramatically increase the production of merchant shipping. Two weeks later, he froze German and Italian assets in the United States and closed down all the consulates of those two nations.

Behind the scenes, Roosevelt initiated even more warlike measures in the Atlantic area. He directed the Army and Navy to prepare an expeditionary force to join the British, should they decide to seize the Spanish Canaries (and the Portuguese Azores and Cape Verde Islands). When that operation was again deferred, Roosevelt volunteered another expeditionary force to relieve the British garrison in Iceland, an operation (Indigo) that was to be carried out on July 7. As agreed earlier in ABC-1, the U.S. Navy stepped up measures to provide escort of convoys on the leg between Canada and Iceland.

The Bismarck Bismarck affair brought the U-boat war against shipping in the North Atlantic to a virtual standstill in the last ten days of May. The twenty boats in that area sank only two ships. Ottokar Paulshen in the new affair brought the U-boat war against shipping in the North Atlantic to a virtual standstill in the last ten days of May. The twenty boats in that area sank only two ships. Ottokar Paulshen in the new U-557 U-557, which nearly had been lost in an accident during its Baltic workup, got a 7,300-ton freighter; the Type IID duck U-147 U-147, commanded by Eberhard Wetjen, on an indoctrination patrol to the Atlantic, got a 2,500-ton freighter. When the new IXB U-109 U-109, commanded by Hans-Georg Fischer, age thirty-three, reached Lorient on May 29, having sunk only one ship on an eighteen-day patrol, Donitz judged that Fischer was incapable of commanding a U-boat and sacked him. To replace Fischer, Donitz brought back the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Bleichrodt, then commanding holder Heinrich Bleichrodt, then commanding U-67 U-67, which was in the Baltic conducting sonar R&D work.

Altogether 347 loaded ships sailed from Halifax to the British Isles in Slow and Halifax convoys during May. The U-boats sank thirteen (or 4 percent) of these vessels-nine from convoy Halifax 126 and four stragglers from other eastbound convoys. In addition, U-boats in this area sank seven ships from the westbound convoy Outbound 318 plus six other ships that were sailing alone for 31,500 tons. The duck U-138 U-138 sank another lone freighter near North Channel. Total sinkings in the northern area in May: thirty-one ships. sank another lone freighter near North Channel. Total sinkings in the northern area in May: thirty-one ships.*

The successful attack on convoy Halifax 126 near 41 degrees west longitude, hastened the plans of the Admiralty and Western Approaches to deploy convoy-escort groups from Halifax out to 35 degrees west, where they were to hand over to the Iceland-based British escort groups. The first such Canadian escort group (of the Newfoundland Escort Force) sailed from St. John's on June 2 to rendezvous with eastbound convoy Halifax 129. Commanded by J.S.D. (Chummy) Prentice, the group was composed of three Canadian corvettes, Chambly Chambly, Collingwood Collingwood, and Orillia Orillia. Bedeviled by communications and engine problems, this pioneering Canadian force did not shine, according to the British, but all things considered, Prentice judged, his ships performed well, at least individually.