Winston Churchill was especially shocked and enraged by the losses in this convoy. In a "rocket" to First Sea Lord Dudley Pound he expressed his displeasure and criticized the absence of destroyers in the escort, especially since Malaya Malaya was in the formation. Pound replied that the destroyers at hand did not have sufficient range to sail with Sierra Leone convoys, and refueling at sea was deemed to be too dangerous since the ships involved were virtually unmaneuverable during the process. To this Churchill responded: "Nonsense!" If there were four destroyers present, three could protect the other one while it refueled from a tanker in the convoy. was in the formation. Pound replied that the destroyers at hand did not have sufficient range to sail with Sierra Leone convoys, and refueling at sea was deemed to be too dangerous since the ships involved were virtually unmaneuverable during the process. To this Churchill responded: "Nonsense!" If there were four destroyers present, three could protect the other one while it refueled from a tanker in the convoy.

The third IXB in southern waters, Georg-Wilhelm Schulz's U-124 U-124, attempted to rejoin the others after resupplying from Kormoran Kormoran, but she had a catastrophic failure in both engines, which left her helpless. After the engines were repaired, she closed the coast of Africa and sank a lone 3,800-ton British freighter, bringing Schulz's total credited sinkings, including substantial overclaims, to 100,117 tons, earning him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. While Schulz was closing on Freetown, Schewe in U-105 U-105 and Oesten in and Oesten in U-106 U-106 downloaded deck torpedoes and then hauled westward and resupplied from downloaded deck torpedoes and then hauled westward and resupplied from Kormoran Kormoran and the supply ship and the supply ship Nordmark Nordmark, respectively. En route to the rendezvous, Oesten claimed sinking a 5,000-ton freighter, bringing his total claims to about 82,000 tons. Having heard from B-dienst B-dienst that Oesten had hit that Oesten had hit Malaya Malaya, Donitz awarded him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz*

To then Donitz, unshakably convinced that the decisive naval battleground lay along the convoy routes in the Northwest Approaches-between Iceland and the British Isles-had resisted to the utmost any "diversion" of U-boats from that area. But the poor returns and the loss of five boats to "obscure" (i.e., unexplained) causes (three of them commanded by his most experienced and notable skippers) led him to a profound decision: He would withdraw all all U-boats from that rich target area for the time being and disperse them to more distant areas where British ASW was less intense, such as the waters west of Iceland and in the South Atlantic. U-boats from that rich target area for the time being and disperse them to more distant areas where British ASW was less intense, such as the waters west of Iceland and in the South Atlantic.

This little-noted decision was a milestone in the U-boat war against the British Empire: the first clear-cut defeat for the German submarines.

The principal reason for that defeat was the paucity of U-boats. Counting all gains and losses, at the end of March 1941, Donitz still controlled only twenty-seven combat-ready oceangoing boats, the number with which he began the war nineteen months earlier. Three of these boats were temporarily unavailable because of battle or other damage; three were patrolling off West Africa. That left only twenty-one boats to patrol the North Atlantic convoy routes, and half of these were new. Owing to the travel and refit time, only a third-seven boats-could be in the hunting grounds at one time. In view of the clever diversion of convoys and the ever-growing numbers of experienced, aggressive-minded surface escorts, there were simply not enough U-boats to find, track, and carry out successful pack attacks on enemy convoys in the Northwest Approaches.

The decision to disperse the U-boats to distant waters west of Iceland and to the South Atlantic entailed a severe penalty. The Type VIIBs and VIICs in the North Atlantic did not have sufficient fuel capacity for extended patrolling at long ranges, especially if required to chase one or more convoys at high speed. The fuel limitations were to reduce the number of boats available to form a pack in the more westerly North Atlantic hunting grounds. Similarly, the extreme distances involved in South Atlantic patrolling were to reduce the combat availability of the bigger boats sent to that area. Notwithstanding the prospective increase in the size of the Atlantic U-boat force, the number of boats that could be brought to bear on enemy shipping on any given day was to decline.

It was at this time-March 1941-that Lend-Lease was enacted and that President Roosevelt transferred the ten Coast Guard cutters to the Royal Navy (in addition to the fifty destroyers), and authorized other measures to provide the British cargo ships and tankers, to reinforce the British oil "shuttle" in American waters, and to repair British warships in American shipyards. Donitz characterized these measures as "a chain of breaches of international law" and urged Hitler to lift the tight restrictions on attacking American ships. Absorbed with planning operations in the Soviet Union, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean Basin, Hitler was still wary of antagonizing the Americans and risking open warfare with them, and rejected the proposal.

DECLINING P PROSPECTS.

Hitler launched Operation Marita, the rescue of the Italian armies in Greece, on April 6. Attacking from Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, German ground and air forces simultaneously overran Yugoslavia and attacked the northeastern Greek frontier. Within three weeks, the Germans conquered most of the Hellenic Peninsula, forcing the recently arrived British ground and air forces to evacuate to the island of Crete and to North Africa, where Rommel's modest Afrika Korps Afrika Korps had pushed the Army of the Nile, renamed the British Eighth Army, back into Egypt. had pushed the Army of the Nile, renamed the British Eighth Army, back into Egypt.

The U-boat war in the Atlantic proceeded in conformity to Donitz's decision to withdraw from the Northwest Approaches. On April 1 he shifted the nine boats in the hunting ground very far to the west. They formed a north-south patrol line at 30 west longitude-about equidistant between Iceland and Greenland-where Donitz assumed British ASW measures to be less intense. At the same time, he ordered four big boats to sail to West African waters to reinforce the three boats already patrolling that area.

Infuriatingly, the OKM insisted that the U-boat force carry out three special missions during April. Two boats were to occupy weather-reporting stations for the benefit of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe at all times. Another two boats were to conduct hunts for British auxiliary cruisers, which had been reported in the Denmark Strait. Yet another two boats (of the southern group) were to escort a German blockade runner, at all times. Another two boats were to conduct hunts for British auxiliary cruisers, which had been reported in the Denmark Strait. Yet another two boats (of the southern group) were to escort a German blockade runner, Lech Lech, which was loaded with a "valuable cargo," from Rio de Janeiro to the Bay of Biscay. "These tasks," Donitz complained in his diary, "will probably result in less tonnage sunk and I am bound to call attention to this fact...."

Donitz had only just established the nine-boat patrol line to the southwest of Iceland on April 1 when U-76 U-76, a new VIIB outbound from Germany, discovered the fifty-one-ship convoy Outbound 305 in the Northwest Approaches area, 400 miles to the east! The U-76 U-76 was commanded by Friedrich von Hippel, age twenty-six, who had begun the war as a watch officer on Werner Hartmann's was commanded by Friedrich von Hippel, age twenty-six, who had begun the war as a watch officer on Werner Hartmann's U-37 U-37 but had been beached because of chronic stomach problems. The boat had been delayed in training by the Baltic ice and, after sailing from Kiel, had aborted to Bergen with mechanical difficulties. She had been in the Atlantic merely two days. but had been beached because of chronic stomach problems. The boat had been delayed in training by the Baltic ice and, after sailing from Kiel, had aborted to Bergen with mechanical difficulties. She had been in the Atlantic merely two days.

Because of the "strong" ASW measures in the Northwest Approaches, Donitz was reluctant to bring the other boats back to the east. He therefore instructed von Hippel not to attack but to track the convoy 400 miles to westward, into the waiting arms of the patrol line, a challenging and risky assignment for a green skipper. The British were almost certain to DF von Hippel's position reports, go after him, and divert the convoy. Von Hippel hung on, but during that day he ran into "sailing vessels and trawlers" south of Iceland and was forced to run submerged for nine hours to evade detection. When he surfaced to report losing the convoy, Donitz directed him to "press on" to the west and to do his "utmost" to regain contact.

Meanwhile, one of the new boats in the western patrol line, Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat's U-74 U-74, encountered inbound Slow Convoy 26, twenty-two ships escorted by the 11,400-ton auxiliary cruiser Worcestershire Worcestershire. When Donitz received this contact report, he instructed Kentrat to shadow and send beacon signals and not to attack until the other boats came up. Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48, who had only one torpedo left and was low on fuel, could not respond, but the other eight boats did, forming the largest pack yet.

The pack commenced attacking late in the evening of April 2. Engelbert Endrass in U-46 U-46, who had previously sunk two ships for 10,500 tons, including the 8,700-ton Swedish tanker Castor, on this patrol, led the assault. He sank another tanker, the 7,000-ton British Reliance British Reliance, and a 4,30Q-ton freighter, but a torpedo that hit the 4,900-ton British freighter Thirlby failed to detonate and another missed the 5,400-ton British freighter Athenic Athenic. Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat in U-74 U-74 attacked second, sinking a 5,400-ton Belgian freighter and a 4,300-ton Greek freighter and damaging the single escort, the auxiliary cruiser attacked second, sinking a 5,400-ton Belgian freighter and a 4,300-ton Greek freighter and damaging the single escort, the auxiliary cruiser Worcestershire Worcestershire. Helmut Rosenbaum in the new U-73 U-73 attacked third, sinking a 5,800-ton freighter and a 6,900-ton tanker, attacked third, sinking a 5,800-ton freighter and a 6,900-ton tanker, British Viscount British Viscount, which exploded in flames, brilliantly lighting the seascape.

The British were stunned to learn of U-boats attacking so far west. On orders of the convoy commander, the surviving sixteen ships scattered, some firing guns at real or imagined U-boats. The British, meanwhile, directed other escorts to the scene. A destroyer, Hurricane Hurricane, escorted the damaged auxiliary cruiser Worcestershire Worcestershire on to Liverpool. Two destroyers, on to Liverpool. Two destroyers, Havelock Havelock and Hesperus, searched for survivors of the six sunken ships. Five other warships, including the destroyers and Hesperus, searched for survivors of the six sunken ships. Five other warships, including the destroyers Veteran Veteran and and Wolverine Wolverine, rounded up the other scattered ships and reformed them into a convoy.

By happenstance, the new boat, von Hippel's U-76 U-76, which was still westbound in search of convoy Outbound 305, ran across the tracks of the scattered ships of Slow Convoy 26. At 0630 on the morning of April 3, von Hippel fired two torpedoes at one of the ships, the 2,000-ton Finnish freighter Daphne Daphne. Both missed, but von Hippel tracked submerged and five hours later he sank her.

The other U-boats pursued the reforming convoy eastward. That night, April 3-4, two of the boats caught up and attacked. Herbert Kuppisch in U-94 U-94 sank a 5,400-ton British freighter. Robert Gysae, age thirty, in the new VIIC sank a 5,400-ton British freighter. Robert Gysae, age thirty, in the new VIIC U-98 U-98, on his maiden patrol, sank two other freighters. While the destroyer Veteran Veteran rescued survivors, the destroyer rescued survivors, the destroyer Wolverine Wolverine counterattacked the U-boats, driving them off and holding them down, preventing further attacks. counterattacked the U-boats, driving them off and holding them down, preventing further attacks.

Late in the afternoon of April 4, while running submerged, von Hippel in U-76 U-76 sighted another ship from the convoy, the 5,400-ton British freighter sighted another ship from the convoy, the 5,400-ton British freighter Athenic Athenic, sailing alone. Von Hippel attacked, firing one torpedo, which hit. The crew of Athenic Athenic radioed an alarm and then abandoned ship. Still submerged, von Hippel came in from the other side and fired two more torpedoes. Both hit; radioed an alarm and then abandoned ship. Still submerged, von Hippel came in from the other side and fired two more torpedoes. Both hit; Athenic Athenic blew up with a thunderous roar. blew up with a thunderous roar.

Upon hearing Athenic Athenic's submarine alarm-SSS-four escorts that were shepherding the remnants of the convoy raced to the scene: the destroyers Havelock Havelock and and Wolverine Wolverine (credited with sinking Prien in (credited with sinking Prien in U-47 U-47), the corvette Arbutus Arbutus (credited with sinking Matz in (credited with sinking Matz in U-70 U-70), and the sloop Scarborough Scarborough. When they closed the area early on the morning of April 5, von Hippel in U-76 U-76 was on the surface, charging batteries. The watch saw one of the escorts and crash-dived. was on the surface, charging batteries. The watch saw one of the escorts and crash-dived. Wolverine Wolverine obtained sonar contact and notified obtained sonar contact and notified Arbutus Arbutus and and Scarborough Scarborough. Bedeviled by a sonar malfunction, Wolverine Wolverine dropped only two depth charges, one at a time. dropped only two depth charges, one at a time. Arbutus Arbutus got sonar contact but lost it in the noise of got sonar contact but lost it in the noise of Wolverine Wolverine's attack. Coming up, the sloop Scarborough Scarborough gained a firm sonar contact and fired off eight depth charges. gained a firm sonar contact and fired off eight depth charges.

The ten charges dropped on U-76 U-76 fell close. The first single charge from fell close. The first single charge from Wolverine Wolverine smashed all the instruments. The next caused a welded seam to give way, bent a stanchion, and put out all the lights. The eight charges from smashed all the instruments. The next caused a welded seam to give way, bent a stanchion, and put out all the lights. The eight charges from Scarborough Scarborough caused severe flooding aft. Believing the boat to be doomed, at 0925, merely four minutes after caused severe flooding aft. Believing the boat to be doomed, at 0925, merely four minutes after Scarborough Scarborough's attack, von Hippel surfaced to scuttle.

In compliance with the Admiralty's standing orders, the corvette Arbutus Arbutus boldly ran in to try to capture a U-boat. While von Hippel and his crew were leaping into the water, boldly ran in to try to capture a U-boat. While von Hippel and his crew were leaping into the water, Arbutus Arbutus nuzzled alongside nuzzled alongside U-76 U-76. The first lieutenant of Arbutus Arbutus, Geoffrey Angus, and three seamen jumped on the forward deck of U-76 U-76-the first British in the war to board a German U-boat. While they raced to the bridge to enter the boat and grab the Enigma and secret papers, other hands from Arbutus Arbutus tied cables and an 8" hawser to tied cables and an 8" hawser to U-76 U-76 in an attempt to prevent her from sinking. When Angus reached the conning-tower hatch, he saw the boat was "half full" of seawater. The water had mixed with the battery acid, causing strong chlorine gas. Deciding it would be fatal to enter the boat, Angus slammed down and dogged shut the conning-tower hatch to stop the escape of air and to keep the boat afloat. in an attempt to prevent her from sinking. When Angus reached the conning-tower hatch, he saw the boat was "half full" of seawater. The water had mixed with the battery acid, causing strong chlorine gas. Deciding it would be fatal to enter the boat, Angus slammed down and dogged shut the conning-tower hatch to stop the escape of air and to keep the boat afloat.

It was a heroic try, but U-76 U-76 was still flooding aft and sinking rapidly. To save herself from capsizing, was still flooding aft and sinking rapidly. To save herself from capsizing, Arbutus Arbutus had to let go the wires and hawser, and the boat sank. had to let go the wires and hawser, and the boat sank. Wolverine Wolverine picked up von Hippel and thirty-nine of his crew; picked up von Hippel and thirty-nine of his crew; Scarborough Scarborough and and Arbutus Arbutus rescued one man each, for a total of forty-two. The British noted that a seaman on rescued one man each, for a total of forty-two. The British noted that a seaman on U-76 U-76 died when saltwater leaked into the potash cartridge of his escape apparatus, producing a toxic gas that he inhaled. died when saltwater leaked into the potash cartridge of his escape apparatus, producing a toxic gas that he inhaled.

Counting the survivors of U-70 U-70, U-76 U-76, U-99 U-99, and U-100 U-100, the British had captured 113 German submariners (fourteen officers, ninety-nine enlisted men) within one month. Some of these POWs talked freely (or were coerced or tricked into talking freely) and revealed many technical details about the Type VII boats, the organization of the U-boat arm, and the French bases. One of the officers even told the British about the rift that had occurred between Donitz and Goring over command of the Condors. According to a British intelligence report, another German officer revealed the "astonishing" successes B-dienst B-dienst had achieved in breaking British naval codes, but that was old stuff. had achieved in breaking British naval codes, but that was old stuff.

When Donitz queried the boats for sinking reports on Slow Convoy 26, he calculated the pack attack had been highly successful: twelve (of twenty-two) ships sunk for 80,000 tons, plus damage to the auxiliary cruiser Worcestershire Worcestershire. He was close. Unknown to Donitz, the lost U-76 U-76 had sunk two ships of the convoy for 7,400 tons, which brought the confirmed total to eleven ships sunk (of twenty-two) for 54,000 tons. The other eleven ships eventually reached port. had sunk two ships of the convoy for 7,400 tons, which brought the confirmed total to eleven ships sunk (of twenty-two) for 54,000 tons. The other eleven ships eventually reached port.*

The retreat from the dangerous Northwest Approaches to more distant waters westward appeared to be not a defeat but a stroke of genius in the case of Slow Convoy 26. For the loss of only one (green) boat, U-76 U-76, the pack had sunk eleven confirmed ships inbound to the British Isles with full and valuable loads. But the discovery of and success against that convoy was really beginner's luck. The big expenditure of fuel to get to westward of Iceland severely restricted the ability of the VIIs to hunt and chase the enemy.

A number of those westerly boats had all but exhausted fuel and torpedoes. As a consequence, five boats followed U-48 U-48 to France. The high scorer of this returning group was Herbert Schultze in the famous, record-holding to France. The high scorer of this returning group was Herbert Schultze in the famous, record-holding U-48 U-48, credited with sinking six ships for 40,000 tons on this patrol (confirmed score: five ships for 27,256 tons). Next was Engelbert Endrass in U-46 U-46, credited with five ships for 32,000 tons (confirmed score: four ships for 21,778 tons). Two skippers making maiden patrols received high praise: Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat in U-74 U-74, who discovered Slow Convoy 26, sank a freighter, and damaged the auxiliary cruiser Worcestershire Worcestershire, and Robert Gysae in U-98 U-98, who sank four ships for 15,588 tons. Two skippers making second patrols from France were criticized for failing to make the most of opportunities: Udo Heilmann in U-97 U-97, who sank three confirmed ships for 20,500 tons, including two British tankers, the 8,000-ton Chama Chama and 8,100-ton and 8,100-ton Conus Conus, but had failed to home other U-boats to convoy Outbound 289; and Jost Metzler in U-69 U-69, who sank but one confirmed ship for 3,800 tons.

The departure of these boats left only three in the North Atlantic hunting grounds. Three others sailed from France, but two of them were assigned to the OKM-ordered special mission of hunting British auxiliary cruisers in the Denmark Strait. Klaus Scholtz in U-108 U-108 carried out this mission successfully, sinking the 16,400-ton carried out this mission successfully, sinking the 16,400-ton Rajputana Rajputana. Herbert Kuppisch in U-94 U-94 had mixed results. On the way into Denmark Strait, he sank the 5,600-ton Norwegian tanker had mixed results. On the way into Denmark Strait, he sank the 5,600-ton Norwegian tanker Lincoln Ellsworth Lincoln Ellsworth, but when he shot at his principal target, an unidentified 15,000-ton auxiliary cruiser, the torpedoes malfunctioned.

The loss of eleven ships (two tankers) in Slow Convoy 26 so far to the west of Iceland speeded up a plan to base substantial British ASW forces in Iceland to extend strong convoy protection farther to the west of that island. This decision, in effect, filled a gap caused by the postponement of the U.S. Navy plan to provide convoy escort on the Iceland-Canada leg and the delays in readiness of the Canadian corvettes.

The Admiralty sent three of the newly formed Escort Groups to Iceland: B-3, B-6, and B-12. These groups were, so to speak, spliced into the center of the North Atlantic convoy run. They were to meet the escorts of westbound convoys at about 20 degrees west and relieve them. Then they were to escort those convoys to about 35 degrees west (900 miles or about five days), whereupon they were to turn about and escort eastbound convoys (Slow, Halifax) back to about 20 degrees west, where they were to hand over convoy protection to those escorts returning to the British Isles. Inasmuch as these escorts had limited range, especially in heavy weather, and had to run into Iceland to refuel, three groups were required to carry out this scheme.

In addition, the Admiralty transferred Coastal Command Sunderlands and Hudsons to Iceland. These planes, equipped with 1.5-meter-wavelength ASV II radar sets, were to provide air protection for the convoys. Although ground facilities were as yet primitive, the aircrews were able to take advantage of the improved April flying weather and the longer days (and shorter nights), which increased opportunities to sight by eye surfaced U-boats.

It should not be imagined that the British suddenly put in place a strong and reliable splice in the North Atlantic convoy run. The new system required terribly rigid convoy routing and escort scheduling. Working on an overly intricate timetable unforgiving of error, the surface and air escort, manned by green crews, often became lost and were unable to find the convoys, throwing everything into confusion. Ships and planes broke down or ran short of fuel and had to abort missions. Inclement weather and the presence of icebergs complicated the linkups. Moreover, the extreme rigidity of the scheme raised the possibility that the Germans might divine the convoy routes and rendezvous and take advantage of the weak links in the splice.

Donitz had laid plans for a major U-boat campaign in West African waters during April, employing seven large boats, which were to replenish, as required, from the German supply ships Nordmark Nordmark and and Egerland Egerland, parked in mid-Atlantic. But the OKM insisted that two of the boats already in African waters, U-105 U-105 (Schewe) and (Schewe) and U-106 U-106 (Oesten), be detached to escort the blockade-runner (Oesten), be detached to escort the blockade-runner Lech Lech from Brazil. Accordingly, the two boats withdrew to waiting stations near the from Brazil. Accordingly, the two boats withdrew to waiting stations near the Nordmark Nordmark, refueling numerous times. While milling around in mid-ocean waiting for Lech Lech to sail, Schewe in to sail, Schewe in U-105 U-105 encountered and sank a lone 5,200-ton British freighter, but had no further luck in April. Jurgen Oesten in encountered and sank a lone 5,200-ton British freighter, but had no further luck in April. Jurgen Oesten in U-106 U-106 sank no ships in April. In response to repeated protests of this waste of firepower from Donitz, the OKM finally agreed to release one boat, sank no ships in April. In response to repeated protests of this waste of firepower from Donitz, the OKM finally agreed to release one boat, U-105 U-105, but insisted that the other, U-106 U-106, remain on standby for the Lech Lech voyage. voyage.

The diversion of U-105 U-105 and and U-106 U-106 left only one boat off Freetown in, the first half of April: left only one boat off Freetown in, the first half of April: U-124 U-124, commanded by Georg-Wilhelm Schulz. After replenishing from Kormoran Kormoran, Schulz closed the coast and sank three ships for 11,000 tons between April 4 and 8. The last was the 2,700-ton British freighter, Tweed Tweed. Coming up to investigate the wreckage, Schulz found that one of Tweed Tweed's two lifeboats had capsized and that several men clinging to it were injured. Schulz fished the survivors from the water and righted the lifeboat. A doctor on U-124 U-124, Hubertus Goder, tended the wounded.* Schulz stocked the lifeboat with food, water, cognac, and cigarettes, gave the survivors a course to Freetown, then proceeded with the patrol, sinking three more ships for 15,000 tons off Freetown. He returned to Lorient on May 1, completing a voyage of sixty-seven days. He was credited with sinking twelve ships for about 62,000 tons. Although the confirmed sinkings were reduced to eleven ships for 52,397 tons, it remained one of the outstanding patrols of the war. Schulz stocked the lifeboat with food, water, cognac, and cigarettes, gave the survivors a course to Freetown, then proceeded with the patrol, sinking three more ships for 15,000 tons off Freetown. He returned to Lorient on May 1, completing a voyage of sixty-seven days. He was credited with sinking twelve ships for about 62,000 tons. Although the confirmed sinkings were reduced to eleven ships for 52,397 tons, it remained one of the outstanding patrols of the war.

Donitz's son-in-law, Gunter Hessler in the new IXB U-107 U-107, led the parade of reinforcements to African waters in April. Following Hessler came Viktor Schutze in U-103 U-103 and Heinrich Liebe in the weary IX and Heinrich Liebe in the weary IX U-38 U-38, then lastly Hans Eckermann in U-A U-A. The U-103 U-103 and and U-A U-A were forced to abort with mechanical problems. The were forced to abort with mechanical problems. The U-103 U-103 resailed in April, but resailed in April, but U-A U-A was delayed for weeks. was delayed for weeks.

Southbound, Hessler in U-107 U-107 encountered heavy, unescorted traffic. Between April 8 and April 21, he sank five British ships for 30,600 tons, including the 8,500-ton British tanker encountered heavy, unescorted traffic. Between April 8 and April 21, he sank five British ships for 30,600 tons, including the 8,500-ton British tanker Duffield Duffield. The fifth ship was Calchas Calchas, a 10,300-ton freighter. Seeing the crew abandon the sinking ship, or so he believed, Hessler said later, he closed submerged to offer assistance to those in the lifeboats. But "a feeling which I could not explain," he went on, deterred him from surfacing. As he raised his periscope for a close look, "sailors who had been hiding under the guns and behind the bulwarks, jumped up, manned the guns and opened fire at the periscope." Hessler pulled down the scope and went deep at full speed, leaving the British gunners an empty sea. This close call cooled Hessler's humanitarian instincts.

The British were deeply disturbed by these German successes in West African waters. At the peak of Hessler's onslaught, April 9, the War Cabinet approved a bold and risky plan (Operation Puma) to seize the Spanish Canary Islands. The purpose of the operation was both to deny the Germans use of the islands and to turn them into a British naval base, in part as a facility to counter U-boats in southern waters. The Admiralty formed a strong task force (three aircraft carriers, a battleship, three heavy cruisers, nineteen destroyers), which was to put 10,000 British troops ashore. However, Puma was postponed (and eventually canceled) in favor of tough diplomacy. Churchill demanded that Franco bar German U-boats (and other naval vessels) from the Canaries-or else. Confronted with this pressure, Franco obliged the British.

The denial of the Canaries as a clandestine refueling base did not cause Donitz to lose sleep. He did not like sending U-boats into the Canaries. British naval forces were closely watching the islands; earlier they had twice denied Clausen in U-37 U-37 entry. Franco was not trustworthy. In the uncertain political climate, he might at any time seize and intern any U-boat found in those waters. Donitz preferred replenishing the boats from German supply ships in the South Atlantic. entry. Franco was not trustworthy. In the uncertain political climate, he might at any time seize and intern any U-boat found in those waters. Donitz preferred replenishing the boats from German supply ships in the South Atlantic.

In what was developing into a remarkable patrol, Hessler in U-107 U-107 sank his sixth British ship, a 7,400-tonner, on April 30. He then withdrew to the mid-Atlantic to replenish from sank his sixth British ship, a 7,400-tonner, on April 30. He then withdrew to the mid-Atlantic to replenish from Nordmark Nordmark and and Egerland Egerland. Behind him to African waters came Liebe in U-38 U-38 and Schutze in the resailed and Schutze in the resailed U-103 U-103. Schutze sank a 2,300-ton freighter on April 25.

A SLIGHT B BRITISH L LEAD.

In mid-April there were nine U-boats in the North Atlantic hunting grounds. Six patrolled a line well southwest of Iceland. Two patrolled directly south of Iceland. A new VIIB, U-75 U-75, commanded by Helmuth Ringelmann, age twenty-nine, was westbound through the Northwest Approaches. Three of the eight boats were low on fuel and poised to return to France; three others, including a new VIIC, U-553 U-553, commanded by Karl Thurmann, age thirty-one, sailed to replace them. However, U-553 U-553 was compelled to abort to Bergen with engine problems. was compelled to abort to Bergen with engine problems.

The hunting in these distant western waters was disastrously poor. In the three-week period April 4 to April 25, the boats attacked no convoys. In the two-week period April 10 to April 25, only three boats had successes: Otto Salmann in U-52 U-52 (two ships for 14,000 tons), Helmut Rosenbaum in (two ships for 14,000 tons), Helmut Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73 (one ship for 8,600 tons), and Karl-Heinz Moehle in (one ship for 8,600 tons), and Karl-Heinz Moehle in U-123 U-123 (one ship for 7,300 tons). (one ship for 7,300 tons).

One of the ships sunk by Salmann in U-52 U-52 was the 6,600-ton Dutch freighter was the 6,600-ton Dutch freighter Saleir Saleir, an empty straggler from convoy Outbound 306. She went down on April 10 near 31 degrees west. As it happened, a new (1940) American destroyer of the Argentia-based American Support Force, Niblack Niblack, commanded by Edward R. Durgin, was close by on a reconnaissance patrol. Durgin rescued three boatloads of survivors and while doing so, his sonar operator reported contact on a U-boat. Durgin went to battle stations and drove off the U-boat with three depth charges. According to Niblack Niblack's official history, "This bloodless battle apparently was the first action between American and German forces in World War II."*

The complete absence of convoy contacts aroused suspicion in Kerneval. Donitz became convinced there must be a spy in the German or Italian armed forces giving away U-boat positions. He imposed drastic new restrictions on the number of people at Kerneval, Bordeaux, Berlin, and elsewhere who were authorized to know the position of U-boats, or to tune in on U-boat radio traffic. At his request, Admiral Raeder sent the following tough message to all Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine commands: commands: The U-boat campaign makes it necessary to restrict severely the reading of signals by unauthorized persons. Once again I forbid all authorities who have not express orders from the operations division or the admiral commanding U-boats to tune in on the operational U-boat [radio] wave. I shall in the future consider all transgressions of this order as a criminal act endangering national security.

It also occurred to Donitz that the British had possibly improved DFing and-inconceivable as it seemed-broken the naval Enigma. He therefore ordered the boats to maintain strict radio silence, except when reporting weather or convoy contacts, and requested the OKM to introduce "a new U-boat cipher." The OKM, Donitz logged, "approved" his request for a new cipher, but putting it into service was to take a long time.

Donitz was correct on both counts. The British had improved DFing and, no less important, the processing of DF information. Moreover, commencing April 22, the codebreakers at Bletchley Park, utilizing the material captured from the Krebs in the Norway raid and "cryptanalytical methods," broke "the whole of the [Enigma] traffic of April 1941," the official historian wrote. Hence Rodger Winn in the U-boat Tracking Room of the O.I.C. was privy to all all U-boat traffic for the months of February (previously broken) and April. That traffic, plus traffic from the hand cipher U-boat traffic for the months of February (previously broken) and April. That traffic, plus traffic from the hand cipher Werft Werft, provided him with a complete picture of U-boat operations for those two months, including Donitz's decision to shift the boats out of the Northwest Approaches to the waters west of Iceland.

From the February and April Enigma traffic, Bletchley Park learned for the first time that the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine maintained a fleet of eight trawlers in the Atlantic for weather reporting. At least two of the trawlers were at sea at any given time, one north of Iceland, one in mid-Atlantic. The trawlers carried naval Enigma. They broadcast weather reports in a special cipher, maintained a fleet of eight trawlers in the Atlantic for weather reporting. At least two of the trawlers were at sea at any given time, one north of Iceland, one in mid-Atlantic. The trawlers carried naval Enigma. They broadcast weather reports in a special cipher, Wetterkruzschlussel Wetterkruzschlussel, and also carried "short signal" books. A naval officer at Bletchley Park, Harry Hinsley (later the distinguished historian of British intelligence), suggested that the Admiralty attempt to capture one of these trawlers at the earliest possible date to gain more Enigma keys and material.

The Admiralty looked upon this suggestion favorably and commenced drawing plans. This proposed capture "at sea" was not out of the ordinary. Over a year prior, the commander of the Home Fleet, Charles Forbes, had urged all light Royal Navy vessels to form a "boarding party" for the purpose of capturing a U-boat. His advisory on how to go about this was a bit ferocious and hardly in keeping with the humane customs of the sea.

The first and overriding objective was, of course, to prevent the U-boat crew from scuttling the boat by opening the ballast-tank vents or by setting demolition charges and then jumping overboard. This objective might be achieved, Forbes suggested, by trapping Germans belowdecks, thus forcing them to close the vents or defuse the charges in order to preserve their own lives. The prospective British captors, Forbes went on, should therefore come up to the surfaced U-boat at full speed and open fire with Lewis machine guns at the personnel as they came up through the conning-tower hatch and appeared on the bridge. "The object will be most effectively achieved," Forbes continued callously, "if a body gets jammed in the mouth of the hatch at an early stage." Those Germans already up and clear of the hatch and who did not appear to be taking hostile action were to be spared and captured, except those seen to be throwing papers overboard. Machine gunners should "open immediate and effective fire" on those particular Germans, Forbes said, advancing a policy that was tantamount to murder.

The next step was to put a small, armed party on the deck of the U-boat. The boarding party was to evacuate "all the officers and most of the men" from the U-boat to prevent them from diving the vessel and escaping. The party was to leave "two or three of the crew" belowdecks and keep them there "continuously" under supervision to ensure that no live demolition charges were in place and to get the boat shipshape. If all Germans had already left the boat, "one or more of the crew should be forced to reenter it" for the same purpose.

Frustrated by the lack of successes on the North Atlantic run and believing that he might have overreacted to the British ASW threat, in the waning days of April Donitz shifted the bulk of the North Atlantic U-boat force eastward toward the British Isles. Late on the afternoon of April 27, Erich Topp in U-552 U-552 found a big target at about 17 degrees west longitude: the 10,100-ton British freighter found a big target at about 17 degrees west longitude: the 10,100-ton British freighter Beacon Grange Beacon Grange, sailing alone. Topp attacked submerged, firing all four bow tubes. The ship went down; the crew broadcast the submarine alarm, SSS SSS, then took to the lifeboats.

Nine hours later, April 28, Karl-Heinz Moehle in U-123 U-123 found convoy Halifax 121 at about 17 degrees west. It was composed of forty-seven ships and was guarded by nine escorts. The convoy offered the Germans in that area the first opportunity in almost four weeks to mount another pack attack. Donitz instructed Moehle to shadow and broadcast beacons, so the other boats in the area and Condors from France and Norway could converge. found convoy Halifax 121 at about 17 degrees west. It was composed of forty-seven ships and was guarded by nine escorts. The convoy offered the Germans in that area the first opportunity in almost four weeks to mount another pack attack. Donitz instructed Moehle to shadow and broadcast beacons, so the other boats in the area and Condors from France and Norway could converge.

The British DFed Moehle's shadow reports and warned the convoy commander as well as the commander of convoy Outbound 314, which was passing close by on a westerly course. The warning helped some. The escorts attempted to drive Moehle off for good, but he hung on tenaciously, regaining contact at dawn. The Condors failed to locate the convoy and the escorts forced Moehle off again and he lost contact, but three other boats made contact with it later in the day.

The convoy commander was fully aware that U-boats were converging, but he did not expect an attack before dark. Erich Topp in U-552 U-552, who had submerged ahead of the convoy, did not wait. In mid-afternoon, he let the lead escorts pass, then fired at the 8,200-ton British tanker Capulet Capulet. Some torpedoes hit, wrecking the ship, but it did not sink. Admiralty intelligence noted later that this was the first daylight attack by a submerged U-boat on a fully escorted convoy since the summer of 1940. Later, some ASW experts speculated that in view of the strengthened convoy escort and the coming of short nights, all the U-boats in the northern area might revert to strictly daylight submerged attacks.

The escorts counterattacked. Two destroyers, Maori Maori and and Inglefield Inglefield, found U-552 U-552 on sonar and delivered five depth-charge attacks. These held Topp down for hours while the convoy proceeded and, as a result, Topp was unable to mount a second attack. Meanwhile, three escorts from convoy Outbound 314 joined convoy Halifax 121, raising the total escorts to twelve. One of the joining escorts, the destroyer on sonar and delivered five depth-charge attacks. These held Topp down for hours while the convoy proceeded and, as a result, Topp was unable to mount a second attack. Meanwhile, three escorts from convoy Outbound 314 joined convoy Halifax 121, raising the total escorts to twelve. One of the joining escorts, the destroyer Douglas Douglas, attempted to sink the wrecked tanker Capulet Capulet by gunfire, but failed, then joined in the U-boat hunt. by gunfire, but failed, then joined in the U-boat hunt.

After dark Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 broadcast another position report, then attacked on the surface. In a well-aimed salvo of four bow torpedoes, he sank three big loaded ships: the 8,500-ton British tanker broadcast another position report, then attacked on the surface. In a well-aimed salvo of four bow torpedoes, he sank three big loaded ships: the 8,500-ton British tanker Oilfield Oilfield, the 9,900-ton Norwegian tanker Caledonia Caledonia, and the 8,900-ton British freighter Port Hardy Port Hardy. The Oilfield Oilfield burst into flames which lit up the scene and forced Lehmann-Willenbrock to dive, losing an opportunity for a second attack. All three ships, totaling 27,300 tons, sank. burst into flames which lit up the scene and forced Lehmann-Willenbrock to dive, losing an opportunity for a second attack. All three ships, totaling 27,300 tons, sank.

The twelve escorts hunted relentlessly. The corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus got a sonar contact and dropped ten depth charges. Joined by two ex-American four-stack destroyers from convoy Outbound 314, got a sonar contact and dropped ten depth charges. Joined by two ex-American four-stack destroyers from convoy Outbound 314, Leamington Leamington and and Roxborough Roxborough, the three ships carried out four further depth-charge attacks. The other newly arrived escort, the British destroyer Douglas Douglas, delivered a punishing depth-charge attack on what proved to be IXB U-65 U-65, under a new skipper, Joachim Hoppe, age twenty-six, who had commanded the boat merely sixteen days and had not yet fired any torpedoes. The attack destroyed U-65 U-65. There were no survivors. She was the seventh U-boat lost in the waters of the Northwest Approaches in as many weeks.

Donitz made every conceivable effort to mount continuing attacks on Halifax 121 by U-boat and Condor, but the British cleverly routed the convoy away from the boats and all efforts to find it again failed. In total, four boats had made contact. Two boats had shot torpedoes which had resulted in the sinking or destruction of four ships, three of them loaded tankers. That was a blow, but the other forty-three ships of convoy Halifax 121 reached port safely.

On the day after the attack, April 29, the corvette Gladiolus Gladiolus was detached from the convoy to rescue survivors of the freighter was detached from the convoy to rescue survivors of the freighter Beacon Grange Beacon Grange, sunk by U-552 U-552 two days earlier. Directed to the lifeboats by a Sunderland, two days earlier. Directed to the lifeboats by a Sunderland, Gladiolus Gladiolus picked up forty-one men. After the last man came aboard, picked up forty-one men. After the last man came aboard, Gladiolus Gladiolus saw a puff of smoke on the horizon. Racing toward it at full speed, saw a puff of smoke on the horizon. Racing toward it at full speed, Gladiolus Gladiolus spotted the conning tower of a U-boat and what was described as a "kite" flying above the boat. spotted the conning tower of a U-boat and what was described as a "kite" flying above the boat. Gladiolus Gladiolus came up but the boat (and "kite") disappeared beneath the sea. came up but the boat (and "kite") disappeared beneath the sea. Gladiolus Gladiolus got sonar contact and made three attacks, dropping thirty-one depth charges. These brought up a large air bubble and an inflatable life raft, which, however, sank or disappeared before it could be recovered. got sonar contact and made three attacks, dropping thirty-one depth charges. These brought up a large air bubble and an inflatable life raft, which, however, sank or disappeared before it could be recovered. Gladiolus Gladiolus proudly claimed a kill, but no U-boat was lost on this day. proudly claimed a kill, but no U-boat was lost on this day.*

During April, 307 loaded ships sailed in convoys from Halifax to the British Isles. German U-boats sank sixteen vessels (five tankers) from these convoys-eleven from Slow Convoy 26, four from convoy Halifax 121, and a small straggler from Halifax 117. Besides that, the oceangoing U-boats sank eleven other ships (one tanker) for about 70,000 tons, which were sailing alone per the new policy that allowed ships of 12 knots or faster to go it alone. Total sinkings by U-boats in the North Atlantic area in April therefore came to twenty-seven. In return, two U-boats, In return, two U-boats, U-65 U-65 and and U-76 U-76, had been lost. As before, the very great successes of the U-boats in the waters off West Africa tended to obscure the lean convoy hunting on the North Atlantic run.

At this time, Donitz confronted yet another possible diminution of the Atlantic U-boat force. Berlin war planners suggested that U-boats should be sent to the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean seas to support German ground forces in Greece and North Africa. The boats were to operate against British naval and merchant shipping, which was evacuating British forces from Greece to Crete and to North Africa, and resupplying the British in those places, as well as British forces in Palestine.

Since this suggestion appealed to Hitler and his senior advisers, Admiral Raeder and Donitz had to mount a major campaign to kill it. Meeting with Hitler on April 20, Raeder argued that the plan was not advisable because, first, it would divert U-boats from the decisive North Atlantic battleground where Donitz had a total force of but thirty boats, of which barely eight to ten were in the hunting grounds at any given time; second, because the confined Mediterranean was a dangerous place for submarine operations and only the most experienced skippers and crews could be sent there, robbing the North Atlantic force of its most productive boats; and third, because a U-boat base would have to be created in Italy or Yugoslavia, draining scarce submarine technicians from France or Germany.

In place of German boats, Raeder suggested, Berlin should propose to Rome that the Bordeaux-based Italian boats operating unproductively in the Atlantic be withdrawn and sent to the eastern Mediterranean. The stenographer recorded that Hitler roundly approved this proposal: "The Fuhrer is in complete agreement with the decision not to send German submarines into the Mediterranean, likewise with the withdrawal of Italian submarines from the Atlantic." When he heard the news, Donitz rejoiced. But the idea of sending German U-boats to the Mediterranean in support of German ground forces was not as dead as he thought.

By then, as related, four Bordeaux-based Italian submarines had been lost in the North Atlantic, leaving a net force of twenty-three. Most of these now patrolled southward to the Azores or beyond to West African waters. Four medium boats fleeing the Red Sea (via the Cape of Good Hope) were to join the Bordeaux force in May. Under the recall plan, ten boats were to commence the return to Italy in June. In nine months of operations to May 1, 1941, all Atlantic-based Italian submarines had positively sunk thirty-three ships (including five neutrals and a ship shared with U-38 U-38 and a ship shared with and a ship shared with U-107 U-107), and had severely damaged the Canadian destroyer Saguenay Saguenay.*

The U-boat campaign in the decisive North Atlantic area in the winter of 1940-1941 fell well short of what the Germans had expected. The U-boats sailing to that area in the five months from December 1 to May 1 sank only about 125 merchant ships for about 752,658 tons. This was an average of about 150,500 tons a month, sharply less than the monthly average attained in the "Happy Time," May through November, 1940. Patrols to the South Atlantic area raised the total sinkings substantially, disguising the declining results in the north. The patrols to the south added about sixty-five ships for about 364,215 tons, raising the total of sinkings by all U-boats sailing in that five-month period to 194 ships for about 1.1 million tons. British shipyards in that same period produced less than half that tonnage, but the total loss was more than made up by the return to service of nearly 1 million gross tons of damaged shipping that had been idled in British shipyards.

London continued to bemoan loudly the loss of tankers but in fact, the tanker losses in that five months were not overwhelming: twenty-seven ships for about 231,500 tons. Twenty-three of these tankers were lost in the North Atlantic; four in the South Atlantic. Of the total, twenty were British-owned; six were foreign ships on charter, and one was the Vichy French Rhone Rhone, sunk in error. Owing to the construction of new tankers in British yards, and to various Lend-Lease measures to supply American and foreign tankers to the British, and to the participation of American ships in the Caribbean-East Coast "shuttle," the oft-predicted oil crisis in the British Isles did not yet occur, according to the official British oil historian, D. J. Payton-Smith. and to various Lend-Lease measures to supply American and foreign tankers to the British, and to the participation of American ships in the Caribbean-East Coast "shuttle," the oft-predicted oil crisis in the British Isles did not yet occur, according to the official British oil historian, D. J. Payton-Smith.

It was not yet apparent, but by the end of April 1941, the Battle of the Atlantic in northern waters had turned slightly in favor of the British, at least for the nonce. Under operational control of the Admiralty, Coastal Command had built air bases in Iceland and the Faeroes, extending daytime air escort of inbound and outbound convoys ever westward. No Coastal Command aircraft had yet sunk a U-boat unassisted, but the increased air coverage gave warning of U-boats to the convoy surface escorts, drove the U-boats off, and held them down, frustrating shadowers and the assembly of packs. The Escort Groups shuttling between the British Isles and Iceland, and those based at Iceland, likewise presented a menacing obstacle. With increasing numbers of escorts available, it was now possible to detach one or more warships to hunt and drive off the convoy shadower and to counterattack and hold down the attacking U-boats, preventing a second attack while the convoy evasively altered course. Inasmuch as U-boats avoided rather than attacked enemy air and surface escorts, with each passing month the escort crews gained more experience and skill in U-boat hunting, while the experience and skill of the U-boat crews declined, a trend that was certain to continue unless the Germans found some means of attacking the escorts.

More difficulties lay ahead for the U-boats. The British had penetrated naval Enigma. Should the Admiralty's other planned captures succeed, Bletchley Park, employing increased numbers of Turing-Welchman bombes, stood a good chance of a really decisive break into naval Enigma. The number of primitive (but useful) 1.5-meter-wavelength radar sets in Coastal Command aircraft and surface escorts was steadily increasing. New electronic devices were nearly ready for mass production: the greatly improved centimetric-wavelength radar for aircraft and surface vessels, employing the Randall and Boot cavity magnetron; miniaturized High Frequency Direction Finding (HF/DF, or Huff Duff) sets, suitable for installation on convoy vessels, enabling them to home on high-frequency radio transmissions from nearby U-boats*; and greatly improved radio gear for communications between the surface escorts (Talk Between Ships, or TBS) and between the surface escorts and air escorts, the latter an important advance usually overlooked in accounts of the U-boat war.

Week by week the United States had become more deeply involved in the Battle of the Atlantic. In addition to the measures already described, on April 18 Atlantic Fleet commander Ernest King grandly declared that the waters of the "Western Hemisphere," for which he was responsible, now extended eastward to approximately 26 degrees west longitude (a line just west of Iceland and south to the Azores) and stated in effect that any transgression of that line by the Axis powers would be viewed as "unfriendly."

In response to requests (read directives from London, the Canadians, too, were poised to enter the Battle of the Atlantic for the first time in an important way. Pending the arrival of the destroyers of the American Support Force, the Canadians were to assume responsibility for convoy escort in Atlantic home waters and out to 35 degrees west, where the spliced-in Iceland-based British escort groups took over the convoys. For this purpose, the Canadians established the Newfoundland Escort Force, some thirty-eight warships,* commanded by a Canadian, L. W. Murray, based at St. John's. It was supported by twenty-four American-built aircraft in two squadrons of the Canadian Eastern Air Command. commanded by a Canadian, L. W. Murray, based at St. John's. It was supported by twenty-four American-built aircraft in two squadrons of the Canadian Eastern Air Command.

Since improved British ASW measures in the Northwest Approaches made it necessary to again operate the Type VIIs ever farther westward, incurring the penalties imposed by fuel limitations, Donitz needed far more U-boats to regain the upper hand than he or anyone had ever envisioned. Not just 300, but perhaps twice that number. U-boat production was increasing dramatically: Forty-three new boats were commissioned in the four-month period January-April 1941, but owing to the usual four months required for workup, these were not to reach the Atlantic in substantial numbers until June and beyond. Even assuming modest combat losses and a maximum production rate, rising to twenty or more boats per month in the second half of 1941, by the beginning of 1942 Donitz could expect to have no more than about 100 oceangoing boats of all types for Atlantic operations. but owing to the usual four months required for workup, these were not to reach the Atlantic in substantial numbers until June and beyond. Even assuming modest combat losses and a maximum production rate, rising to twenty or more boats per month in the second half of 1941, by the beginning of 1942 Donitz could expect to have no more than about 100 oceangoing boats of all types for Atlantic operations.

Given the accelerating rate of aircraft, escort, and ship production in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, the late-starting and lagging U-boat production, and ever-declining experience levels of U-boat crews, Donitz was to be hard-pressed to regain the upper hand in the Battle of the Atlantic by 1943 or ever. And yet there was not the slightest sense of defeat among the staff at Kerneval. Even discounting the skipper overclaims, it was clear that the small U-boat arm was causing terror and significant harm to British maritime assets and forcing a great expenditure of Allied resources to counter the threat. Convoying alone-as Churchill repeatedly lamented-had reduced Great Britain's imports by "one-third." It was not actually that bad, but bad enough.

* The normal workup period at that time for a new boat was about four months. The normal workup period at that time for a new boat was about four months.

* Three of the sinkings were awkward "mistakes": a Spanish trawler, the 2,800-ton Vichy tanker Rhone, and-worst of all-the 1,400-ton Vichy submarine Three of the sinkings were awkward "mistakes": a Spanish trawler, the 2,800-ton Vichy tanker Rhone, and-worst of all-the 1,400-ton Vichy submarine Sfax Sfax.

* His confirmed score was thirty-seven ships for 155,882 tons. His confirmed score was thirty-seven ships for 155,882 tons.

* Remarkably, all eighteen skippers who had won the Remarkably, all eighteen skippers who had won the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz to then were still alive: Prien, Kretschmer, Luth, and Schutze on leave from their boats in Lorient; Schepke and Endrass on leave from their boats in Germany; Rollmann, Schuhart, Frauenheim, Rosing, Kuhnke, and Oehrn in staff or training jobs; Hartmann, Lemp, and Bleichrodt fitting out new boats in Germany; Jenisch in a British POW camp. Herbert Schultze, hospitalized after Norway, had returned to command of to then were still alive: Prien, Kretschmer, Luth, and Schutze on leave from their boats in Lorient; Schepke and Endrass on leave from their boats in Germany; Rollmann, Schuhart, Frauenheim, Rosing, Kuhnke, and Oehrn in staff or training jobs; Hartmann, Lemp, and Bleichrodt fitting out new boats in Germany; Jenisch in a British POW camp. Herbert Schultze, hospitalized after Norway, had returned to command of U-48 U-48, which was undergoing overhaul in Germany.

His confirmed total, including His confirmed total, including Champlain Champlain, was twelve ships for 87,278 tons.

* Lend-Lease was signed into law on March 11, 1941. Designed primarily to help Great Britain, which had run out of gold and credits, by war's end American outlays for Lend-Lease totaled $50.6 billion, of which $31 billion went to Britain. Lend-Lease was signed into law on March 11, 1941. Designed primarily to help Great Britain, which had run out of gold and credits, by war's end American outlays for Lend-Lease totaled $50.6 billion, of which $31 billion went to Britain.

* The main element of the Support Force was Task Force 4, later redesignated Task Force 24. The main element of the Support Force was Task Force 4, later redesignated Task Force 24.

* The PBY Catalina was a twin-engine flying boat, designated Patrol Bomber (PB), built by Consolidated (Y). Combat radius: 600 miles at 103 knots. Bomb load: 4,000 pounds. The PBY Catalina was a twin-engine flying boat, designated Patrol Bomber (PB), built by Consolidated (Y). Combat radius: 600 miles at 103 knots. Bomb load: 4,000 pounds.

See See Appendix 10 Appendix 10.

* Beginning in the 1980s, a crop of Canadian military and naval historians has worked diligently-and successfully-to correct the record. See Bibliography: Douglas, Hadley, Lund, Milner, Sarty, Steury, et al. Beginning in the 1980s, a crop of Canadian military and naval historians has worked diligently-and successfully-to correct the record. See Bibliography: Douglas, Hadley, Lund, Milner, Sarty, Steury, et al.

* Simultaneously, British yards were in process of converting a 467-foot, 5,600-ton German-built prize, Simultaneously, British yards were in process of converting a 467-foot, 5,600-ton German-built prize, Hannover Hannover, into the "jeep" carrier H.M.S. Audacity Audacity, which could carry six fighters. Long Island Long Island and and Audacity Audacity were commissioned in June; were commissioned in June; Archer Archer in November 1941. in November 1941.

* In tests, In tests, Orchis Orchis picked up a surfaced submarine at 5,000 yards, a trimmed-down submarine at 2,800 yards, and-remarkably-an eight-foot-high submarine periscope at 1,300 yards (two thirds of a nautical mile). picked up a surfaced submarine at 5,000 yards, a trimmed-down submarine at 2,800 yards, and-remarkably-an eight-foot-high submarine periscope at 1,300 yards (two thirds of a nautical mile).

* Circular torpedo runs, caused by a malfunctioning gyro or stuck rudder, were experienced by submarines of all navies. It is believed that many submarines that disappeared on patrol for "unknown" reasons were the victims of their own torpedoes. Circular torpedo runs, caused by a malfunctioning gyro or stuck rudder, were experienced by submarines of all navies. It is believed that many submarines that disappeared on patrol for "unknown" reasons were the victims of their own torpedoes.

* Endrass's Endrass's U-46 U-46 and five new boats rushed from Kiel to Helgoland to escape the Baltic ice. Several new oceangoing boats and a number of school ducks were trapped by ice, frozen at dockside until late March. and five new boats rushed from Kiel to Helgoland to escape the Baltic ice. Several new oceangoing boats and a number of school ducks were trapped by ice, frozen at dockside until late March.

* Following Following Hipper's Hipper's convoy attack on Christmas Day, the Admiralty had again assigned battleships and submarines to escort these important ocean convoys: the British tender convoy attack on Christmas Day, the Admiralty had again assigned battleships and submarines to escort these important ocean convoys: the British tender Forth Forth and eight submarines, based at Halifax for this arduous duty, joined by the Free French monster submarine and eight submarines, based at Halifax for this arduous duty, joined by the Free French monster submarine Surcouf Surcouf.

* These three kills brought Clausen's total confirmed sinkings on These three kills brought Clausen's total confirmed sinkings on U-37 U-37 to ten ships for 16,000 tons in about two months. All the ships were small, averaging 1,600 tons. to ten ships for 16,000 tons in about two months. All the ships were small, averaging 1,600 tons.

* Originally the Admiralty credited a Sunderland of Coastal Command Squadron 210 with the kill on Originally the Admiralty credited a Sunderland of Coastal Command Squadron 210 with the kill on Marcello Marcello on January 6, 1941. In a postwar reassessment, credit went to on January 6, 1941. In a postwar reassessment, credit went to Montgomery Montgomery.

* Lehmann-Willenbrock's confirmed score for the patrol was six and a half ships for 44,232 tons, raising his total confirmed score to thirteen and a half ships for 110,322 tons. Including his sinkings on the duck Lehmann-Willenbrock's confirmed score for the patrol was six and a half ships for 44,232 tons, raising his total confirmed score to thirteen and a half ships for 110,322 tons. Including his sinkings on the duck U-20 U-20, Moehle's confirmed score was eighteen and a half ships for 77,310 tons.

* The "old" battleships (1917-1919) capable of carrying out this task were the three on transfer from the Pacific Fleet ( The "old" battleships (1917-1919) capable of carrying out this task were the three on transfer from the Pacific Fleet (Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico). The new 35,000-ton Treaty battleships, North Carolina and Washington Washington, were commissioned April 9 and May 15, respectively. Two aircraft carriers, Ranger (1934) and Yorktown Yorktown (1937), could provide additional scouting and firepower. The new carrier (1937), could provide additional scouting and firepower. The new carrier Hornet Hornet was commissioned on October 20, 1941. was commissioned on October 20, 1941.

* Bianchi Bianchi claimed sinking four ships for 26,800 tons on this patrol, plus a possible hit on another of 7,800 tons. This was an Italian record that stood for some time-and is still credited in some Italian accounts of the war. Jurgen Rohwer credits Giovannini with three ships for 14,705 tons. claimed sinking four ships for 26,800 tons on this patrol, plus a possible hit on another of 7,800 tons. This was an Italian record that stood for some time-and is still credited in some Italian accounts of the war. Jurgen Rohwer credits Giovannini with three ships for 14,705 tons.

Heavy cruiser Heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper; "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer; battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst; merchant-ship raiders Atlantis Atlantis, Kormoran Kormoran, Orion Orion, Penquin Penquin, Thor Thor (each with six 5.9" guns and four torpedo tubes), plus a possible hit on the 5,400-ton British "boarding vessel" Manistee, sunk by Hessler in (each with six 5.9" guns and four torpedo tubes), plus a possible hit on the 5,400-ton British "boarding vessel" Manistee, sunk by Hessler in U-102 U-102.

* The Army's Abraham Sinkov and Leo Rosen; the Navy's Prescott H. Currier and Robert H. Weeks. The Army's legendary codebreaker William F. Friedman was scheduled to head up the party, but after his successful attack on Purple, he had suffered a nervous collapse. The Army's Abraham Sinkov and Leo Rosen; the Navy's Prescott H. Currier and Robert H. Weeks. The Army's legendary codebreaker William F. Friedman was scheduled to head up the party, but after his successful attack on Purple, he had suffered a nervous collapse.

The Ultra-Magic Deals The Ultra-Magic Deals (1993). (1993).

* See writings of Clarke, Denniston, Hinsley, Morris, Welchman, as well as numerous secondary sources. See writings of Clarke, Denniston, Hinsley, Morris, Welchman, as well as numerous secondary sources.

* Seizing the Enigma Seizing the Enigma (1991). (1991).

The Ultra Americans The Ultra Americans (1986). (1986).

* From the President, a coveted Distinguished Service Medal, stressing his "brilliant skill and initiative ... his outstanding professional judgment, astute planning and uncompromising devotion to the fulfillment of an exacting assignment." From British ambassador Halifax on behalf of King George VI, an Order of the British Empire, praising Engstrom's "exceptional character and genius." From the President, a coveted Distinguished Service Medal, stressing his "brilliant skill and initiative ... his outstanding professional judgment, astute planning and uncompromising devotion to the fulfillment of an exacting assignment." From British ambassador Halifax on behalf of King George VI, an Order of the British Empire, praising Engstrom's "exceptional character and genius."