"THE B BATTLE OF THE A ATLANTIC"

In early March, Churchill met with First Sea Lord Dudley Pound to discuss merchant-shipping losses in the Atlantic. In order to "concentrate all minds and all departments concerned" on the U-boat war, Churchill told Pound he was going to proclaim a "Battle of the Atlantic," just as he had proclaimed the "Battle of Britain" during the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe assault the previous August. assault the previous August.

Forthwith Churchill established a Battle of the Atlantic Committee and named himself (in his capacity as Minister of Defense) chairman. Composed of ministers and "high functionaires concerned," the body met once a week for several hours or more. On March 6, Churchill distributed a Directive for the Committee, which listed thirteen steps he believed were necessary to win the Battle of the Atlantic. In part: * Hunt and kill U-boats and Condors at sea. Bomb U-boats in building yards and naval bases and Condors on Luftwaffe Luftwaffe airfields. airfields.

* Give "extreme priority" to fitting out 200 merchant ships (later reduced to 35) with catapults to launch fighters against Condors, so that every convoy could sail with four such ships.

* Concentrate the bulk of the air strength of Coastal Command over the main convoy routes in the Northwest Approaches.

* On a trial basis, allow all merchant ships that could make 12 knots or faster (rather than 13 knots or faster) to sail unescorted-outside the convoys.

* Give "first claim" (priority) to arming merchant ships with short-range antiaircraft guns to ward off Condors.

* Provide British seaports (e.g., Mersey, Clyde, Bristol Channel) with "maximum" antiaircraft defense to counter the ongoing Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Blitz, which had reached as far as the Liverpool docks. Blitz, which had reached as far as the Liverpool docks.

* Within four months, reduce by at least 400,000 gross tons the 2.6 million gross tons of merchant shipping idled in British ports with storm, battle, or other damage, even at the expense of new construction.*

* Speed up by every conceivable means the "terrible slowness" of the turnaround time of merchant ships in British ports and ports abroad.

An important factor underlying Churchill's resounding proclamation was the abysmal (but concealed) failure of the British military to kill U-boats. In all of 1940, British forces had positively destroyed only twelve oceangoing German submarines. In the six months between September 1, 1940, and March 1, 1941, British forces had sunk only three confirmed German U-boats-none at all in December, January, and February. Given that poor performance, U-boat production was far outpacing U-boat losses.

Under the impetus provided by the Battle of the Atlantic Committee, the British took several further important measures to increase the U-boat kill rate. These were: First, improvements in U-boat tracking by exploiting secret intelligence from old-and new-sources.

Up to the outbreak of the war, the Naval Intelligence Division (NID) of the Royal Navy had atrophied. Since then a newcomer to the job-and the arcane world of intelligence as well-John H. Godfrey, had revived the branch by dint of his own innate talent and by an infusion of outside help from academe, the legal profession, and Fleet Street. One of his reserve lieutenants, Patrick Beesly, wrote that Godfrey was "a man of wide interests, great energy and determination, an innovator and original thinker" as well as "a practical and successful seaman." that Godfrey was "a man of wide interests, great energy and determination, an innovator and original thinker" as well as "a practical and successful seaman."

Inasmuch as the Admiralty was an operating command as well as a policymaking, administrative, and procurement agency, like RAF Fighter and Bomber Commands, it had a central "war room." It was located in a new, low-ceilinged, bombproofed concrete structure, jokingly called "Lenin's Tomb" or "The Citadel," but officially, the Operational Intelligence Center (OIC). It was manned twenty-four hours a day by personnel of Godfrey's intelligence division, under the leadership of a called-up admiral, J. W. (Jock) Clayton, described by Beesly as "a man of unruffled calmness, impossible to rattle and with very shrewd judgment" and close friends in high places.

One of the main tasks of the OIC was to keep track of Axis naval forces. For this purpose there were four sections: German Surface Ship Plot (Patrick Barrow-Green); Italian-Japanese Surface Ship Plot (Norman Denning, later vice admiral); Axis Submarine Plot; all supported by the DF Section (Peter Kemp, a journalist, later a popular naval historian).

Of these sections, the Axis Submarine Plot, or U-boat Tracking Room, was the busiest. At the outset of the war it was commanded by an old hand from Room 40, Ernest W. C. Thring, a regular naval officer. He was fortunate early on to have gained the services of a thirty-seven-year-old lawyer, Rodger Winn, a called-up reservist. Crippled as a young boy by poliomyelitis, Winn was left with a twisted back and a limp, but by a "tremendous triumph of willpower," as Beesly put it, he had overcome these physical disabilities and created a successful legal practice. In OIC he demonstrated an uncanny-even eerie-ability to read German minds and predict the behavior of U-boats.

After observing Winn at close quarters for a year, the commander of OIC, Jock Clayton, recommended to John Godfrey that Winn replace Thring as head of the U-boat Tracking Room. Clayton's recommendation to appoint a "civilian" rather than a career officer to lead this vital section was so "revolutionary" and "unprecedented," Beesly remembered, it had to be bucked all the way up to First Sea Lord Dudley Pound. He approved the recommendation and at the beginning of 1941 Winn assumed the post, "a stroke of singular good fortune," Beesly judged.

Soon after Winn took over the U-boat Tracking Room, the British captured Enigma materials from the trawler Krebs Krebs and broke the hand cipher and broke the hand cipher Werft Werft. David Kahn wrote that on March 12, Bletchley Park teletyped the first ten decrypted naval Enigma messages to Winn, the next day thirty-four, and subsequently many more. Indeed, there was soon a virtual flood. These first decrypts were dated and of no immediate tactical value to Winn, but they greatly enhanced his knowledge of the U-boat arm, its strategy, and its tactics.

The next important measure to increase U-boat kills was the shift of Western Approaches Command from Plymouth to Derby House in Liverpool. This took place on February 7, 1941, at which time a new commander, Percy Noble, age fifty, replaced Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, who remained at Plymouth.

Noble and his chief of staff, J. M. Mansfield, soon built up a naval contingent at Derby House of about one thousand men and women. They created a huge "war room" with a wall map of the North Atlantic Ocean over two stories high. This operations center was linked twenty-four hours a day by secure teletype and telephone to the OIC in London, so that at all times the former was as up-to-the-minute on enemy naval operations as the latter.

At this same time, in response to Churchill's directive, RAF Coastal Command concentrated its main air strength in the Northwest Approaches. Its 15 Group, commanded by J. M. Robb (later by Leonard H. Slatter), also moved from Plymouth to Derby House, Liverpool. There its staff virtually merged with that of Western Approaches and utilized the same "war room," insuring the closest possible air-navy coordination and cooperation. In his memoir,* the RAF's John C. Slessor, then serving in Bomber Command, wrote that as a further result of Churchill's March 6 directive, no less than seventeen squadrons of aircraft were transferred from Bomber Command to Coastal Command in 1941 and 1942, and that a "critical proportion of the effort of Bomber Command itself was devoted to the war at sea." the RAF's John C. Slessor, then serving in Bomber Command, wrote that as a further result of Churchill's March 6 directive, no less than seventeen squadrons of aircraft were transferred from Bomber Command to Coastal Command in 1941 and 1942, and that a "critical proportion of the effort of Bomber Command itself was devoted to the war at sea."

The notorious neglect of Coastal Command had led to a proposal that it be transferred from the Air Ministry to the Admiralty. Churchill was not in favor of this drastic proposal, but he had ordered a full investigation which brought to light in shocking detail the shortcomings of the command. The upshot was a far-reaching decision (to take effect April 15, 1941) to leave Coastal Command in the Air Ministry for administrative purposes, but to transfer operational control of the organization to the Admiralty. Thereafter naval requirements-U-boat hunting in particular-were to take precedence over all other missions.

One of Percy Noble's first and most vigorous initiatives was to provide unstinting support for the training of convoy escorts. This important activity had been concentrated at Tobermory on the island of Mull in the Inner Hebrides the previous July. The headquarters ashore, like other British naval schools, was named as though it were a ship-in this case, H.M.S. Western Isles Western Isles. The school was commanded by a notoriously tough and smart called-up vice admiral, G. O. Stephenson. Every new escort vessel had to spend a month under Stephenson's lash, an ordeal well depicted by Nicholas Monsarrat in his famous novel of life aboard the fictional wartime corvette of life aboard the fictional wartime corvette Compass Rose Compass Rose.

Up to this time, British and Canadian convoy escorts had been assigned to duty in a helter-skelter fashion, based on availability and combat readiness. With the influx of new destroyers, sloops, and corvettes, and the sixty ex-American destroyers and sloops in early 1941, it became possible to commence a long-sought goal: the formation of British and Canadian "Escort Groups." These groups were to be composed of ships, more or less permanently teamed up and assigned as a single entity to convoys. The Admiralty believed that when so permanently organized and trained, the groups could better protect convoys-and kill U-boats-than randomly assigned single vessels. Fostered by Percy Noble and trained by Stephenson, there were soon a dozen such groups, each consisting on paper of ten destroyers, sloops, or corvettes, of which six to eight were maintained at readiness to sail. The performance of the groups, manned almost solely by wartime conscripts or volunteers, was ragged at first and never perfect, but gradually became quite proficient.

All Americans who visited British military agencies in 1941 were impressed by the degree of unification that had been achieved in the Battle of the Atlantic. From the War Cabinet to the Battle of the Atlantic Committee to the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, to Bletchley Park and the OIC and Derby House, all hands worked with an extraordinary singleness of purpose. The tight control and the canalization of the growing body of intelligence on U-boat operations and the shrewd exploitation of that intelligence at all levels were in a sense unheralded and unquatifiable weapons of the highest order, and they were to make a very big difference in the naval war.

THE L LOSS OF P PRIEN.

Ironically, at the time Churchill proclaimed the "Battle of the Atlantic," the U-boat force was in the worst shape since the beginning of the war. On March 1, 1941, there were only eight German U-boats in the North Atlantic, including a new Type IID duck, U-147 U-147. Five U-boats, including U-147 U-147, patrolled between Iceland and Scotland. Two others patrolled near Rockall Bank: Prien in U-47 U-47 and Kretschmer in and Kretschmer in U-99 U-99. The eighth U-boat, Heilmann in U-97 U-97, was out of torpedoes and assigned to weather reporting.

There was no help on March 1 from the Condors, but after dark, Erich Topp in the VIIC U-552 U-552 ran into the inbound convoy Halifax 109, which was approaching the coast of Scotland, leaving little sea room. Topp broadcast an alarm and with his last three internal torpedoes sank a 12,000-ton British tanker, ran into the inbound convoy Halifax 109, which was approaching the coast of Scotland, leaving little sea room. Topp broadcast an alarm and with his last three internal torpedoes sank a 12,000-ton British tanker, Cadillac Cadillac, his first success in U-552 U-552. A new VIIC, U-70 U-70, commanded by Joachim Matz, age twenty-seven, from the duck U-59 U-59, merely eight days out of Helgoland, arrived and set up on the Cadillac Cadillac, only to see Topp blow it up in his face. Gerd Schreiber came up in the VIIC U-95 U-95 and sank two ships for 11,100 tons. Reinhard Hardegen in the duck and sank two ships for 11,100 tons. Reinhard Hardegen in the duck U-147 U-147 sank a 4,800-ton Norwegian freighter, then returned to Germany. sank a 4,800-ton Norwegian freighter, then returned to Germany.

One of two Condors staging from Norway reported an outbound convoy and attacked on the morning of March 2. Donitz directed six of the seven oceangoing boats in the hunting grounds to form a north-south patrol line west of Rockall Bank. While the boats were moving into position through a dense fog on March 3, Condors scoured the probable course of the convoy but saw nothing. Nor did the near-blind boats.

After a hurried analysis of this failed operation, Donitz ordered a drastic-and "lamentable"-change in Condor operations. Concluding that when Condors openly attacked a convoy they forced it to make a drastic alteration in course to avoid the converging U-boats, Donitz barred Condors from attacking convoys. Henceforth they were only to spot and report convoys and make every possible effort to remain undetected, restrictions that hardly pleased the Condor crews.

The next day, March 4, a Condor reported another outbound convoy. It was not clear from the position report whether this was the same outbound convoy or a new one or if the position report was accurate. Nonetheless, Donitz redeployed the six boats in a patrol line farther west, adding to it the U-A U-A, commanded by Hans Eckermann, en route from Germany to Lorient to stage to West African waters. After the line was in place, on March 5, Gerd Schreiber in U-95 U-95, in the center of the line, inexplicably broke radio silence to report his accumulated sinkings. Assuming the British had DFed U-95 U-95's report and would alter the convoy's course to avoid him-as well as the whole patrol line-Donitz logged that Schreiber had made "an extremely clumsy mistake." Donitz may have been correct; the convoy got away.

The failure to intercept either of these two outbound convoys led to a more detailed analysis of Condor/U-boat operations. The study revealed that in two months the U-boats had benefited only once (February 19-20) from Condor convoy reports. Almost without exception, Condor reports were incorrect as to the positions and courses of the convoys. Besides that, it took too long to redeploy the boats. By the time they reached the most likely interception line based on the reported convoy course (whether accurate or not), the report was twenty-four hours old and not reliable. Donitz therefore directed that until better means of submarine/aircraft position reporting and cooperation could be found, "no more U-boat operations" were to be "undertaken on aircraft reports." Condors were to continue patrolling and reporting convoys for the benefit of all German forces and they were again allowed to attack convoys on sight.

On March 6, Donitz redeployed the boats. Five VIIs formed a north-south patrol line west of Rockall Bank, and the U-A U-A went west to relieve went west to relieve U-97 U-97 as the weather reporter. The patrol line had only just formed when Prien in as the weather reporter. The patrol line had only just formed when Prien in U-47 U-47 encountered and reported an outbound convoy. He shadowed and broadcast beacon signals to bring up the other boats. Donitz directed three other boats of the patrol line- encountered and reported an outbound convoy. He shadowed and broadcast beacon signals to bring up the other boats. Donitz directed three other boats of the patrol line-U-37 (Clausen), (Clausen), U-70 U-70 (Matz), (Matz), U-99 U-99 (Kretschmer)-and also the westbound (Kretschmer)-and also the westbound U-A U-A to converge on Prien's signals. This was convoy Outbound 293, escorted by two destroyers, to converge on Prien's signals. This was convoy Outbound 293, escorted by two destroyers, Wolverine Wolverine and and Verity Verity, and two corvettes, Arbutus Arbutus and and Camellia Camellia.

Prien in U-47 U-47 and Kretschmer in and Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 met in moderate, misty seas at 6:00 met in moderate, misty seas at 6:00 P.M. P.M. Talking by megaphone across the water, they planned a joint attack on the convoy. As they were talking, the two destroyers-both with Type 286M radar-loomed out of the mist: Talking by megaphone across the water, they planned a joint attack on the convoy. As they were talking, the two destroyers-both with Type 286M radar-loomed out of the mist: Wolverine Wolverine, commanded by James M. Rowland, and Verity Verity. Patrolling ahead of the convoy, the destroyers caught Prien and Kretschmer by surprise, forcing both U-boats to crash-dive. The destroyers found Prien and worked him over with depth charges. Kretschmer went deep and slipped away. Later in the night, both boats surfaced.

Meanwhile, Joachim Matz in the new U-70 U-70 arrived, taking up position in the dark ahead of the convoy. Matz had been in the Atlantic all of two weeks and had yet to fire a torpedo. At 0430 hours on March 7, he attacked, firing all four bow torpedoes at four different ships. He later claimed that he had hit and sunk all four (for 35,500 tons) but in reality, he had hit but only damaged the 6,400-ton British freighter arrived, taking up position in the dark ahead of the convoy. Matz had been in the Atlantic all of two weeks and had yet to fire a torpedo. At 0430 hours on March 7, he attacked, firing all four bow torpedoes at four different ships. He later claimed that he had hit and sunk all four (for 35,500 tons) but in reality, he had hit but only damaged the 6,400-ton British freighter Delilian Delilian and possibly the 6,600-ton British tanker and possibly the 6,600-ton British tanker Athelbeach Athelbeach. Ten minutes later, Prien, who was low on torpedoes, radioed Donitz an updated position report, then attacked, choosing the largest ship in the convoy, the 20,640-ton Norwegian whale-factory ship, Terje Viken Terje Viken, converted to a tanker. Prien hit her with two torpedoes, but she was in ballast and thus very hard to sink. Although damaged, she sailed on.

Having reloaded his four bow tubes, at 0600 Matz came in for a second attack. He saw the damaged Terje Viken Terje Viken and fired three torpedoes at her, but all three missed. He was on the point of firing his fourth bow tube when another boat hit the factory ship with one torpedo. That shot came from Kretschmer in and fired three torpedoes at her, but all three missed. He was on the point of firing his fourth bow tube when another boat hit the factory ship with one torpedo. That shot came from Kretschmer in U-99 U-99. Kretschmer then fired one torpedo at another ship, but missed. Swinging about, he shot three torpedoes at the possibly damaged tanker Athelbeach Athelbeach, which hit but did not sink her. To save torpedoes, Kretschmer went after the crippled Athelbeach Athelbeach with his deck gun, but the gunners were not successful and he was forced to expend another torpedo, which finally put the tanker under. with his deck gun, but the gunners were not successful and he was forced to expend another torpedo, which finally put the tanker under.

The four escorts, under tactical command of James Rowland in the destroyer Wolverine Wolverine, reacted aggressively. While the convoy was making a sharp evasive turn to port, they lit up the area with star shells and commenced hunting U-47 U-47, U-70 U-70, and U-99 U-99, all of which were in close proximity. The corvette Arbutus Arbutus got the first sonar contact at 0448 hours and dropped depth charges, calling up the other corvette, got the first sonar contact at 0448 hours and dropped depth charges, calling up the other corvette, Camellia Camellia. The destroyers Wolverine Wolverine and and Verity Verity spotted U-boats and drove them under, dropping depth charges. spotted U-boats and drove them under, dropping depth charges.

Matz, who still had one torpedo in a bow tube, closed submerged on the 7,500-ton Dutch tanker Mijdrecht Mijdrecht. He hit and damaged the ship, but the Dutch captain saw U-70 U-70's periscope ahead and turned at it to ram. His aim was good; Mijdrecht Mijdrecht's bow cleaved into U-70 U-70's conning tower, smashing the bridge and periscopes and throwing the boat down and under as though it had been hit by a huge wave. Mijdrecht Mijdrecht was not seriously damaged; her crew repaired the hole made by the torpedo and sailed on. was not seriously damaged; her crew repaired the hole made by the torpedo and sailed on.

The collision caused leaks in U-70 U-70's conning tower but no serious damage to the pressure hull. Matz hauled off into the mist to surface and assess the topside damage. At 0815 hours, the corvette Camellia Camellia spotted spotted U-70 U-70 about four miles ahead and charged, forcing Matz to crash-dive. about four miles ahead and charged, forcing Matz to crash-dive. Camellia Camellia radioed an alarm, which brought up the other corvette, radioed an alarm, which brought up the other corvette, Arbutus Arbutus. Camellia Camellia's sonar failed, but she fired a salvo of six depth charges "by eye." At 0925, Arbutus Arbutus arrived, got a firm sonar contact, and in two quick successive attacks, fired twelve depth charges. Acting on arrived, got a firm sonar contact, and in two quick successive attacks, fired twelve depth charges. Acting on Arbutus Arbutus's sonar information, Camellia Camellia also attacked again, firing another six charges, but lacking sonar, also attacked again, firing another six charges, but lacking sonar, Camellia Camellia was of little help and she was ordered off to protect the damaged ships and to rescue survivors. was of little help and she was ordered off to protect the damaged ships and to rescue survivors.

Arbutus doggedly pursued doggedly pursued U-70 U-70, firing five more salvos of six charges over the next three hours. In all, U-70 U-70 took fifty-four charges from took fifty-four charges from Arbutus Arbutus and and Camellia Camellia. The last three attacks by Arbutus Arbutus fatally wrecked fatally wrecked U-70 U-70. She flooded aft and went out of control, assuming a 45-degree up-angle. Matz crammed all available men into the bow compartment, but to no avail. The boat slipped down by the stern to 656 feet. Unable to regain control, Matz blew all ballast tanks with his last bit of high-pressure air and surfaced to scuttle. Seeing her, Arbutus Arbutus came in to ram, firing her 4" deck gun and other weapons. came in to ram, firing her 4" deck gun and other weapons.

When Matz opened the conning-tower hatch, the pressure inside the boat was so great that it blew him and five other men straight up into the smashed bridge. Seeing the U-70 U-70 crew jumping into the water, crew jumping into the water, Arbutus Arbutus veered off and dropped two life rafts. With hatches and sea cocks open, the veered off and dropped two life rafts. With hatches and sea cocks open, the U-70 U-70 plunged down by the bow and sank. plunged down by the bow and sank. Arbutus Arbutus fished Matz and twenty-five other men from the water. Twenty Germans died in the sinking. fished Matz and twenty-five other men from the water. Twenty Germans died in the sinking.

The movements of Prien's U-47 U-47 and Kretschmer's and Kretschmer's U-99 U-99 that day are not certain. The destroyers that day are not certain. The destroyers Wolverine Wolverine and and Verity Verity apparently made sonar contact and repeatedly attacked both boats. Kretschmer reported later that an "old type" destroyer drove him under and held him down for about nine hours, delivering fifty-one depth charges. It is possible that Prien in apparently made sonar contact and repeatedly attacked both boats. Kretschmer reported later that an "old type" destroyer drove him under and held him down for about nine hours, delivering fifty-one depth charges. It is possible that Prien in U-47 U-47 was caught in the same barrage and was destroyed. was caught in the same barrage and was destroyed.

Nothing more was ever heard from Prien. That night Prien-as well as Matz-failed to respond to requests from Donitz for position and sinking reports.

Later that same evening, March 7, at 10:00 P.M. P.M., Hans Eckermann in U-A U-A made contact with the convoy farther west and radioed a position report. Nikolaus Clausen in made contact with the convoy farther west and radioed a position report. Nikolaus Clausen in U-37 U-37, who had not yet found the convoy, requested beacon signals. Eckermann broadcast another position report a half hour after midnight, March 8. Soon after that, he closed the convoy and attacked, firing two torpedoes at the lead ship in the starboard column. Eckermann believed both torpedoes had hit, but only one did, causing slight damage to the 5,300-ton British freighter Dunaff Head Dunaff Head.

At that time the destroyers Wolverine Wolverine and and Verity Verity were steaming on the starboard side of the convoy. The were steaming on the starboard side of the convoy. The U-A U-A lay directly in the path of lay directly in the path of Wolverine Wolverine. Hoping to catch the U-boat by surprise and ram her, Wolverine Wolverine's, captain, James Rowland, refrained from firing star shells or speeding up or changing course. Thirteen minutes later Rowland saw "smoke resembling diesel exhaust" dead ahead and his sonar operator reported a contact. Three minutes later Wolverine Wolverine spotted a wake, then the U-boat itself "zigzagging wildly at high speed." Rowland rang up full speed but withheld gunfire, still hoping to ram. But spotted a wake, then the U-boat itself "zigzagging wildly at high speed." Rowland rang up full speed but withheld gunfire, still hoping to ram. But Verity Verity spoiled the plan, firing star shells, which lit up the area and forced the U-boat to crash-dive about three-quarters of a mile ahead of spoiled the plan, firing star shells, which lit up the area and forced the U-boat to crash-dive about three-quarters of a mile ahead of Wolverine Wolverine.

Rowland reduced speed but was unable to make sonar contact or estimate where the boat had dived. He and Verity Verity reversed course. Seven minutes later reversed course. Seven minutes later Wolverine Wolverine and and Verity Verity obtained "firm" sonar contacts. Rowland ran in and fired two separate salvos, comprising eighteen depth charges. He followed up with three more modified salvos, a total of six depth charges, and dropped a flare to mark the U-boat's position. There was no apparent result from these twenty-four depth charges, but Rowland's engineer reported that he had "unmistakably seen and smelt shale oil," indicating possible damage to the U-boat's fuel tanks. obtained "firm" sonar contacts. Rowland ran in and fired two separate salvos, comprising eighteen depth charges. He followed up with three more modified salvos, a total of six depth charges, and dropped a flare to mark the U-boat's position. There was no apparent result from these twenty-four depth charges, but Rowland's engineer reported that he had "unmistakably seen and smelt shale oil," indicating possible damage to the U-boat's fuel tanks.

In an analysis of this attack, the British, unaware that U-A U-A had torpedoed had torpedoed Dunaff Head Dunaff Head, were to claim that the U-boat Wolverine Wolverine and and Verity Verity attacked was Prien's attacked was Prien's U-47 U-47, which they sank. No positive evidence ever developed to support this claim. Possibly it was true. Possibly Prien chased the convoy westward during that evening. But it does not seem likely. He had already attacked five ships by torpedo on this patrol (four on February 26); he could not have had enough torpedoes left to justify pursuit and another attack. He made no contact reports that night; if his radio was out of commission, there would have been no point in chasing the convoy, unless Prien thought the radio might be repaired in time to be of use. Significantly, Otto Kretschmer, who had an ample supply of torpedoes, did not chase the convoy westward that night.

Eckermann in U-A U-A later reported that immediately after firing his torpedoes (at later reported that immediately after firing his torpedoes (at Dunaff Head Dunaff Head) the boat was subjected to a brutal depth-charge attack. This was doubtless delivered by Wolverine Wolverine and and Verity Verity. The U-A U-A's first watch officer, Carl Emmermann, remembered: "We got away and surfaced in the dark close by the destroyers. Eckermann wanted to run off at high speed on the diesels, but I persuaded him to creep away quietly on the electric motors, so we wouldn't make smoke or noise. We escaped by the skin of our teeth." Later, when he was well-clear, Eckermann radioed Donitz that U-A U-A had suffered "heavy" depth-charge damage and that he was compelled to abort to Lorient. had suffered "heavy" depth-charge damage and that he was compelled to abort to Lorient.

Wolverine continued the hunt tenaciously. Rowland wrote that at about 0410 continued the hunt tenaciously. Rowland wrote that at about 0410 Wolverine Wolverine picked up the noise of a U-boat on the surface and commenced a chase at 20 knots, slowing occasionally to 8 knots to listen on sonar in order to reestablish the U-boat's bearing. After one hour-a twenty-mile chase- picked up the noise of a U-boat on the surface and commenced a chase at 20 knots, slowing occasionally to 8 knots to listen on sonar in order to reestablish the U-boat's bearing. After one hour-a twenty-mile chase-Wolverine spotted the U-boat dead ahead and Rowland prepared to ram at full speed. But the U-boat crash-dived "200-300 yards" ahead. Passing over the spot, Rowland saw a V-shaped "rush of bubbles" intensified by "phosphorescence." Based on six years of prior duty in submarines, Rowland was positive the bubbles were caused by air from venting ballast tanks and that he had a U-boat at shallow depth, directly under his keel. He turned hard to port, and at four-second intervals he fired ten depth charges set for 100 feet. spotted the U-boat dead ahead and Rowland prepared to ram at full speed. But the U-boat crash-dived "200-300 yards" ahead. Passing over the spot, Rowland saw a V-shaped "rush of bubbles" intensified by "phosphorescence." Based on six years of prior duty in submarines, Rowland was positive the bubbles were caused by air from venting ballast tanks and that he had a U-boat at shallow depth, directly under his keel. He turned hard to port, and at four-second intervals he fired ten depth charges set for 100 feet.

Unless Rowland had been chasing a phantom or a whale or a school of porpoises, his depth-charge salvo should have blown the U-boat to smithereens, releasing wreckage and bodies. But to Rowland's "great disappointment," no wreckage of any kind rose to the surface. Rowland saw a mysterious "faint orange light" for "about ten seconds" near the spot where the depth charges exploded, but he could not pause to investigate because sonar still had "firm contact" on the target. He circled around, maintaining the sonar contact, and continued dropping single depth charges sporadically until 0755, but ceased further attacks when "porpoises were sighted in the vicinity at daylight."

So many false claims of U-boat sinkings had been made that the Admiralty had established strict criteria for crediting a positive kill. Wolverine Wolverine's evidence was not sufficient to meet the criteria. However, when it discovered from Matz and others captured from U-70 U-70, and from other sources, that Prien had been in the vicinity and had not returned from this patrol, the Admiralty's Assessment Committee accepted this "circumstantial evidence" and ruled that Wolverine Wolverine "probably sunk ... "probably sunk ... U-47 U-47, commanded by Prien." Doubtless another factor that entered into this weak and uncertain assessment was the propaganda benefit to be gained by crediting a British captain and crew with destroying Germany's most famous U-boat ace. It is more likely that Prien was lost on March 7 by depth-charge attack, by a circular-running torpedo, by a crew error, or by a catastrophic structural failure in U-47 U-47. It is also possible that U-47 U-47 was lost by unknown causes (mine, crew error, etc.) en route to Lorient with a defective radio. was lost by unknown causes (mine, crew error, etc.) en route to Lorient with a defective radio.

Whatever the case, the four escorts of convoy Outbound 293 deserved highest praise and awards. Their aggressive U-boat attacks had not only fended off Germany's two foremost U-boat aces with slight losses in ships* but also had sunk one of them, as well as the but also had sunk one of them, as well as the U-70 U-70, and had nearly sunk U-A U-A. No other escort team had ever done as well. Moreover, U-47 U-47 and and U-70 U-70 were the first confirmed U-boat kills by British forces since the loss of were the first confirmed U-boat kills by British forces since the loss of U-31 U-31 on November 2, ending a humiliating dry spell of more than four months. on November 2, ending a humiliating dry spell of more than four months.

Donitz felt "great anxiety" when U-47 U-47 and and U-70 U-70 failed to respond to inquiries. But he could not permit himself to believe that both boats-the invincible Prien in particular-had been lost. He consoled himself with the possibility that Prien and Matz had radio failures, that any day Prien would appear off Lorient with new battle pennants flying from his raised periscope. And yet ... failed to respond to inquiries. But he could not permit himself to believe that both boats-the invincible Prien in particular-had been lost. He consoled himself with the possibility that Prien and Matz had radio failures, that any day Prien would appear off Lorient with new battle pennants flying from his raised periscope. And yet ...

There was better news from southern waters. Very, very good news, in fact. The three Type IXB boats en route to Freetown, Sierra Leone, U-105 U-105, U-106 U-106, and U-124 U-124, had refueled March 4 to March 6 from the German tanker Corrientes Corrientes, in the Spanish Canaries, then continued southward. On March 6 the lead boat, U-124 U-124, commanded by Georg-Wilhelm Schulz, met Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst off the African coast. The next day, the battle cruisers found inbound convoy Sierra Leone 67, escorted by the British battleship off the African coast. The next day, the battle cruisers found inbound convoy Sierra Leone 67, escorted by the British battleship Malaya Malaya and other vessels. Inasmuch as the German ships were still under orders not to engage British capital ships, they pulled off and and other vessels. Inasmuch as the German ships were still under orders not to engage British capital ships, they pulled off and U-124 U-124 was alerted. The plan that evolved was for was alerted. The plan that evolved was for U-124 U-124 and and U-105 U-105 to close the convoy and sink to close the convoy and sink Malaya Malaya, so that Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst could return and attack the merchant ships. If any ships survived this combined assault and slipped by, the could return and attack the merchant ships. If any ships survived this combined assault and slipped by, the U-106 U-106, which was trailing the other boats by several days, might intercept them farther north.

The plan did not work out, but the U-boats nonetheless had great success. Attacking first in the early hours of March 8, Georg Schewe in U-105 U-105 sank a 5,200-ton British freighter. Sailing into the middle of the panicked convoy, Schulz in sank a 5,200-ton British freighter. Sailing into the middle of the panicked convoy, Schulz in U-124 U-124 fired all six tubes (four forward, two aft) over a period of twenty-one minutes, at six different ships. He claimed sinking five of them for 33,000 tons and leaving another of 6,000 tons "in sinking condition." Postwar analysis credited him with sinking four British freighters for 23,300 tons, a remarkable salvo. Later, Jurgen Oesten in fired all six tubes (four forward, two aft) over a period of twenty-one minutes, at six different ships. He claimed sinking five of them for 33,000 tons and leaving another of 6,000 tons "in sinking condition." Postwar analysis credited him with sinking four British freighters for 23,300 tons, a remarkable salvo. Later, Jurgen Oesten in U-106 U-106 arrived at the same place and sank a 7,500-ton British freighter. Total confirmed results: six ships sunk for 36,000 tons. arrived at the same place and sank a 7,500-ton British freighter. Total confirmed results: six ships sunk for 36,000 tons.

The Malaya Malaya was not touched, therefore was not touched, therefore Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst could not attack the convoy. They refueled from their supply ships and set a course northwestward to attack Halifax convoys. The could not attack the convoy. They refueled from their supply ships and set a course northwestward to attack Halifax convoys. The U-124 U-124 cruised west to meet the merchant-ship raider cruised west to meet the merchant-ship raider Kormoran Kormoran to obtain torpedoes and fuel, and to await a rendezvous with the Germany-bound "pocket" battleship to obtain torpedoes and fuel, and to await a rendezvous with the Germany-bound "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, to deliver her a spare part for her primitive radar. The U-105 U-105 and and U-106 U-106 proceeded directly to Freetown. proceeded directly to Freetown.

THE L LOSS OF S SCHEPKE AND K KRETSCHMER.

Still pressing the case for intensified warfare against Britain, Admiral Raeder persuaded Hitler to mount Luftwaffe Luftwaffe mass bombing raids on the British seaports of Portsmouth, Bristol, Liverpool, and the Firth of Clyde. In preparation for this heavy assault, to take place between March 10 and 20, mass bombing raids on the British seaports of Portsmouth, Bristol, Liverpool, and the Firth of Clyde. In preparation for this heavy assault, to take place between March 10 and 20, Luftwaffe Luftwaffe planners demanded detailed U-boat weather reporting between those dates. When this demand reached Donitz on March 9, he had only four U-boats in the North Atlantic and one of them, planners demanded detailed U-boat weather reporting between those dates. When this demand reached Donitz on March 9, he had only four U-boats in the North Atlantic and one of them, U-95 U-95, had no torpedoes. He assigned a Germany-bound boat, Clausen in U-37 U-37, to a "north" weather station and Schreiber in U-95 U-95 to a "south" weather station. That left only two boats to wage the North Atlantic convoy war: Otto Kretschmer's to a "south" weather station. That left only two boats to wage the North Atlantic convoy war: Otto Kretschmer's U-99 U-99 and a brand-new VIIC, and a brand-new VIIC, U-74 U-74, commanded by Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat, age thirty-four, from the duck U-8 U-8. It was a "fantastic situation," Donitz complained in his diary.

But reinforcements were on the way. On March 11 Fritz-Julius Lemp sailed from Germany in the new IXB U-110 U-110, manned by many seasoned Veterans Veterans of Lemp's of Lemp's U-30 U-30. Lemp had been absent from the Atlantic for six months; the U-110 U-110 had been caught temporarily in Baltic ice and as a result, the boat had had only ten days of crew training "in freezing weather" and no torpedo, gunnery, or pack attack drills. The next day Joachim Schepke, the second-ranking tonnage ace after Kretschmer, sailed in had been caught temporarily in Baltic ice and as a result, the boat had had only ten days of crew training "in freezing weather" and no torpedo, gunnery, or pack attack drills. The next day Joachim Schepke, the second-ranking tonnage ace after Kretschmer, sailed in U-100 U-100, having enjoyed ten weeks of home leave, vacation, and publicity tours. The ice in home waters had also prevented Schepke from conducting refresher drills.

While Lemp and Schepke were rounding the British Isles, the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe commenced its devastating mass bombing raids on British seaports, and the big German surface ships in the Atlantic were on the move. Sailing far to the west into Canadian waters (near Newfoundland Bank) on March 15 and 16, the battle cruisers commenced its devastating mass bombing raids on British seaports, and the big German surface ships in the Atlantic were on the move. Sailing far to the west into Canadian waters (near Newfoundland Bank) on March 15 and 16, the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst again attacked dispersing outbound convoys, sinking sixteen merchant ships for 82,000 tons, then headed for Brest. The heavy cruiser again attacked dispersing outbound convoys, sinking sixteen merchant ships for 82,000 tons, then headed for Brest. The heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper sailed from Brest on March 15 to join the "pocket" battleship sailed from Brest on March 15 to join the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer for a break back to Germany through the Denmark Strait. Getting wind of some of these movements, the Admiralty deployed heavy units from the Home Fleet and from Halifax to intercept the ships, but the Germans cleverly eluded the pursuers. for a break back to Germany through the Denmark Strait. Getting wind of some of these movements, the Admiralty deployed heavy units from the Home Fleet and from Halifax to intercept the ships, but the Germans cleverly eluded the pursuers.

Three days after reaching the Atlantic, on the afternoon of March 15, Lemp in U-110 U-110 took up a position about 150 miles south of Iceland. Since the visibility was very poor, he submerged every four hours to listen on hydrophones for convoy propeller noises. At 10:00 that night, the sonar operator reported the heavy, slow thump-thump-thump of distant propellers. Lemp surfaced and ran down the bearing. He saw "15-to-20 steamers" and "several large tankers" and "at least two destroyers." At ten minutes past midnight, March 16, Lemp got off a contact report to Donitz and prepared to attack. took up a position about 150 miles south of Iceland. Since the visibility was very poor, he submerged every four hours to listen on hydrophones for convoy propeller noises. At 10:00 that night, the sonar operator reported the heavy, slow thump-thump-thump of distant propellers. Lemp surfaced and ran down the bearing. He saw "15-to-20 steamers" and "several large tankers" and "at least two destroyers." At ten minutes past midnight, March 16, Lemp got off a contact report to Donitz and prepared to attack.

This was convoy Halifax 112, composed of forty-one fully laden merchant ships and tankers. It was guarded by Escort Group (EG) 5, which had joined it that morning. Commanded by Donald Macintyre* in the World War I destroyer Walker, EG-5 was composed of four other old destroyers ( in the World War I destroyer Walker, EG-5 was composed of four other old destroyers (Vanoc, Volunteer, Sardonyx, Scimitar) and two new corvettes (Bluebell, Hydrangea). Hastily formed in early March, EG-5 had sailed on its maiden voyage with an outbound convoy and was then on its homebound leg. It had had no tactical drills before sailing.

Lemp chose what he believed to be a 10,000-ton tanker for his first target. Actually, it was the 6,200-ton British tanker Erodona Erodona. He fired two bow torpedoes at her. The first broached and ran erratically; the second missed. A third torpedo from a stern tube hit, causing an immense explosion which led Lemp (and Donald Macintyre in Walker Walker) to believe Erodona had been "blown to bits." In reality, the ship was only severely damaged and it was later towed into Iceland.

The flames lit up the area "like daylight." The destroyer Scimitar Scimitar saw saw U-110 U-110 and charged, bringing up Walker and and charged, bringing up Walker and Vanoc Vanoc, the latter equipped with a nonrotating Type 286M radar. Seeing the destroyers, Lemp dived and went deep under the convoy at high speed. The destroyers dropped twenty-four depth charges where he had dived, to no effect. Walker Walker rejoined the convoy, leaving rejoined the convoy, leaving Vanoc Vanoc and and Scimitar Scimitar to "hold down" the U-boat until the convoy was safely past-or so it was thought. to "hold down" the U-boat until the convoy was safely past-or so it was thought.

An hour later, Lemp surfaced and chased the convoy. At 0410 he sent Donitz another report, then mounted a second attack. Having reloaded his tubes, Lemp fired four bow torpedoes, two at a freighter, two at a tanker. One broached; the other three missed. A fifth torpedo, he claimed, hit an 8,000-ton tanker, but that hit could not be confirmed. EG-5 was unaware of this second attack by U-110 U-110.

Lemp tracked doggedly during the early morning of March 16, broadcasting positions. When Donitz ordered all boats in the vicinity to report their positions, he heard from the north weather boat, Clausen in U-37 U-37, Kretschmer in U-99 U-99, Schepke in U-100 U-100, and, surprisingly, Kentrat in U-74 U-74, who was under orders to relieve U-95 U-95 as the south weather boat. Donitz ordered Lemp to send beacon signals for the benefit of the nearest boats, as the south weather boat. Donitz ordered Lemp to send beacon signals for the benefit of the nearest boats, U-37 U-37 and and U-99 U-99. Lemp did so, but then a mechanical problem and later a Sunderland forced him to run submerged and he lost contact. However, at noon Clausen in U-37 U-37 made contact and broadcast beacons which brought up Kretschmer's made contact and broadcast beacons which brought up Kretschmer's U-99 U-99 and Schepke's and Schepke's U-100 U-100.

At about sunset that evening, Lemp regained contact with the convoy and broadcast a position report and beacon signals. This brought in Kentrat's U-74 U-74, but in the interim, Lemp lost contact again. When Kentrat came alongside to confer by megaphone, Lemp, believing the convoy had zigged sharply northeast, suggested both boats should search in that direction. This assumption took U-74 U-74 and and U-110 U-110 off in the wrong direction. By then off in the wrong direction. By then U-37 U-37, U-99 U-99, and U-100 U-100 had made contact, but none broadcast any beacon signals to help Lemp and Kentrat. had made contact, but none broadcast any beacon signals to help Lemp and Kentrat.

The three boats in contact with Halifax 112 closed to attack. The original alarm from Lemp had reported "at least two destroyers" in the escort, an estimate that had not been revised. Clausen, Schepke, and Kretschmer were therefore astonished to find not two but seven escorts-five destroyers and two corvettes. One of the destroyers, Scimitar Scimitar, sighted Schepke in U-100 U-100 and drove him under, calling up the destroyers and drove him under, calling up the destroyers Walker Walker and and Vanoc Vanoc. When Schepke came up an hour later, a destroyer was still present. It drove him down a second time and dropped depth charges.

Otto Kretschmer commenced his attack at about 10:00 P.M. P.M. He boldly steamed into the middle of the convoy on the surface and fired his eight remaining torpedoes. It was another remarkable performance by Kretschmer. One torpedo missed, but the other seven slammed into six different ships, four of them tankers, which exploded in searing flames. Kretschmer believed that all six ships, totaling 59,000 tons, had sunk, making this salvo the single most destructive of the war and, counting earlier sinkings, bringing his total bag on this patrol-to a record-setting 86,000 tons. But he had overestimated his latest sinkings by one vessel. Five ships, including three tankers He boldly steamed into the middle of the convoy on the surface and fired his eight remaining torpedoes. It was another remarkable performance by Kretschmer. One torpedo missed, but the other seven slammed into six different ships, four of them tankers, which exploded in searing flames. Kretschmer believed that all six ships, totaling 59,000 tons, had sunk, making this salvo the single most destructive of the war and, counting earlier sinkings, bringing his total bag on this patrol-to a record-setting 86,000 tons. But he had overestimated his latest sinkings by one vessel. Five ships, including three tankers* for 34,500 tons, sank, but the sixth, the 9,300-ton British tanker for 34,500 tons, sank, but the sixth, the 9,300-ton British tanker Franche Comte Franche Comte, got her fires under control and survived. Hiding in the dense smoke from the burning tankers and dodging the seven escorts, Kretschmer plotted a course to take him out of the area and on to Lorient.

The other boats, meanwhile, were attempting to attack. It was not an easy setup. The flames from the burning tankers brightly lit the area. The seven escorts swarmed hither and yon, adding more light with star shells and dropping depth charges. At fifty minutes after midnight, Donald Macintyre in Walker Walker spotted a U-boat close ahead and put on full speed to ram. This was probably Clausen in spotted a U-boat close ahead and put on full speed to ram. This was probably Clausen in U-37 U-37, who had not yet fired torpedoes. He crash-dived U-37 U-37 100 yards ahead of Walker. Macintyre ran right over the boat and dropped ten depth charges set for 250 feet. He heard a "heavy explosion" and saw "orange flames" in his wake and believed he had sunk his first U-boat. But he had not. Clausen in 100 yards ahead of Walker. Macintyre ran right over the boat and dropped ten depth charges set for 250 feet. He heard a "heavy explosion" and saw "orange flames" in his wake and believed he had sunk his first U-boat. But he had not. Clausen in U-37 U-37 reported heavy collision damage which forced him to resume his voyage to Germany. reported heavy collision damage which forced him to resume his voyage to Germany.

Headed off in the wrong direction, Lemp in U-110 U-110 and Kentrat in and Kentrat in U-74 U-74 saw the flames and explosions. They turned about and ran full speed toward the battle scene. Coming up, both saw escorts everywhere firing star shells and dropping depth charges. Nonplussed by the sight of all these escorts-many more than he had reported-Lemp logged that the convoy "must have been reinforced" by other destroyers. Both boats had narrow escapes with destroyers; neither could get in. saw the flames and explosions. They turned about and ran full speed toward the battle scene. Coming up, both saw escorts everywhere firing star shells and dropping depth charges. Nonplussed by the sight of all these escorts-many more than he had reported-Lemp logged that the convoy "must have been reinforced" by other destroyers. Both boats had narrow escapes with destroyers; neither could get in.

Macintyre in Walker Walker got a "firm" sonar contact at 0130, March 17. This was Schepke in got a "firm" sonar contact at 0130, March 17. This was Schepke in U-100 U-100, who had not yet fired any torpedoes either. Macintyre called up the destroyer Vanoc Vanoc and let loose a salvo of nine depth charges, set for 500 feet. When the noise subsided, Macintyre regained contact and fired off eight more depth charges with deep settings. and let loose a salvo of nine depth charges, set for 500 feet. When the noise subsided, Macintyre regained contact and fired off eight more depth charges with deep settings. Vanoc Vanoc arrived, gained contact, and almost immediately fired six depth charges, set for 150, 250, and 500 feet. arrived, gained contact, and almost immediately fired six depth charges, set for 150, 250, and 500 feet. Walker Walker then went off to rescue some survivors, but then went off to rescue some survivors, but Vanoc Vanoc continued the hunt. After she regained sonar contact, continued the hunt. After she regained sonar contact, Vanoc Vanoc fired six more depth charges with the same settings. fired six more depth charges with the same settings.

Some of these twenty-nine depth charges fell very close to U-100 U-100. The explosions smashed instruments, knocked out the pumps, and caused heavy flooding. The boat went out of control and slid, stern first, to 750 feet-deeper than any U-boat had ever gone. Fearing that the pressure hull might implode, and believing that he could torpedo Vanoc Vanoc, Schepke ordered the engineer to blow all ballast tanks and surface.

Schepke came up at about 0300. By then Walker Walker had rejoined had rejoined Vanoc Vanoc. The technicians manning the Type 286M radar on Vanoc Vanoc picked up a contact at 1,000 yards-the first verifiable British surface-ship radar contact on a U-boat. At about the same time, Schepke saw picked up a contact at 1,000 yards-the first verifiable British surface-ship radar contact on a U-boat. At about the same time, Schepke saw Vanoc Vanoc, which was coming on at full speed to ram. To back the boat around and fire torpedoes, Schepke called for full power, but the diesels wouldn't start, nor, at first, the electric motors. When the motors finally came on the line, Schepke mistakenly ordered full speed ahead, rather than astern, on the starboard motor, ruining any chance of firing torpedoes.

Schepke thought Vanoc Vanoc would miss astern, but he was wrong. Killing her engines to minimize damage to herself, would miss astern, but he was wrong. Killing her engines to minimize damage to herself, Vanoc Vanoc hit the hit the U-100 U-100 at a perfect right angle on the conning tower at 0318. Schepke shouted "Abandon ship!" They were his last words. at a perfect right angle on the conning tower at 0318. Schepke shouted "Abandon ship!" They were his last words. Vanoc Vanoc's huge sharp bow crushed him to death on the bridge. The U-100 U-100 sank almost immediately. sank almost immediately. Vanoc Vanoc signaled signaled Walker: Walker: "Have rammed and sunk U-boat." "Have rammed and sunk U-boat."

After picking up thirty-eight survivors of the freighter J. B. White J. B. White, sunk by Kretschmer, Walker Walker rushed up to circle rushed up to circle Vanoc Vanoc protectively while Vance's men fished survivors of protectively while Vance's men fished survivors of U-100 U-100 from the water. from the water. Vanoc Vanoc found six, including Siegfried Flister, who was making an indoctrination cruise with Schepke before taking command of his own boat, and five enlisted men. found six, including Siegfried Flister, who was making an indoctrination cruise with Schepke before taking command of his own boat, and five enlisted men.

Close by, Kretschmer in U-99 U-99, was still trying to slip out of the area undetected and go home. His onetime quartermaster, Heinrich Petersen, for whom Kretschmer had obtained a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz and who had been promoted to lieutenant and second watch officer, had the bridge watch. One lookout was not alert. Glancing into the lookout's zone, Petersen saw and who had been promoted to lieutenant and second watch officer, had the bridge watch. One lookout was not alert. Glancing into the lookout's zone, Petersen saw Walker Walker merely a few yards off. Believing that merely a few yards off. Believing that U-99 U-99 must have been seen, Petersen made a serious mistake and ordered a crash dive, rather than running off in darkness at full speed. must have been seen, Petersen made a serious mistake and ordered a crash dive, rather than running off in darkness at full speed.

No one on Walker Walker had seen had seen U-99 U-99, but while Walker Walker was still circling was still circling Vanoc Vanoc, the sonar operator picked up a contact. Macintyre disbelieved the report-a third U-boat contact in as many hours was simply too much to credit-but when the operator insisted it was a moving U-boat, Macintyre ordered an attack. Walker Walker ran down the bearing and dropped six depth charges at ran down the bearing and dropped six depth charges at U-99 U-99, which was trying to run off at about 400 feet. The charges exploded close beneath the boat, tossing it wildly and smashing air, fuel, and ballast tanks. Flooding and out of control, the U-99 U-99 slid down to 700 feet or more. Realizing the boat could not survive submerged, Kretschmer blew all ballast tanks and the slid down to 700 feet or more. Realizing the boat could not survive submerged, Kretschmer blew all ballast tanks and the U-99 U-99 shot to the surface. Kretschmer had no torpedoes; he hoped to escape in darkness. shot to the surface. Kretschmer had no torpedoes; he hoped to escape in darkness.

Nine minutes after Walker Walker dropped her depth charges, at 0352, dropped her depth charges, at 0352, Vanoc Vanoc signaled signaled Walker: Walker: "U-boat surfaced astern of me." "U-boat surfaced astern of me." Vanoc Vanoc beamed her searchlight on beamed her searchlight on U-99 U-99 and both ships opened fire with 4" guns. Kretschmer called for full power, but neither the diesels nor electric motors would function. Moreover, the steering gear was broken. With a heavy heart, Kretschmer gave orders to scuttle and abandon ship. He got off a final, terse, confused, plain-language radio message to Donitz: "Two destroyers. Depth charges. 53,000 tons. Capture. Kretschmer." He then notified and both ships opened fire with 4" guns. Kretschmer called for full power, but neither the diesels nor electric motors would function. Moreover, the steering gear was broken. With a heavy heart, Kretschmer gave orders to scuttle and abandon ship. He got off a final, terse, confused, plain-language radio message to Donitz: "Two destroyers. Depth charges. 53,000 tons. Capture. Kretschmer." He then notified Walker Walker with his signal light: "We are sunking [sic]." with his signal light: "We are sunking [sic]." Walker Walker and and Vanoc Vanoc ceased fire after two minutes, having registered no hits, and prepared to capture survivors. ceased fire after two minutes, having registered no hits, and prepared to capture survivors.

Walker closed the flooding closed the flooding U-99 U-99 cautiously, with scramble-nets rigged. She picked up forty men, including the new, twenty-three-year-old first watch officer, Hans-Joachim von Knebel-Doberitz; the second watch officer, cautiously, with scramble-nets rigged. She picked up forty men, including the new, twenty-three-year-old first watch officer, Hans-Joachim von Knebel-Doberitz; the second watch officer, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Heinrich Petersen; a prospective commanding officer, Horst Hesselbarth; two midshipmen on an indoctrination cruise; and, lastly, Kretschmer. The engineer, Gottfried Schroder, who had gone back to open ballast-tank vents-probably needlessly-and two enlisted men were not found. holder Heinrich Petersen; a prospective commanding officer, Horst Hesselbarth; two midshipmen on an indoctrination cruise; and, lastly, Kretschmer. The engineer, Gottfried Schroder, who had gone back to open ballast-tank vents-probably needlessly-and two enlisted men were not found.

At Kerneval, Donitz first learned of the disaster from the crippled, Germany-bound U-37 U-37, which picked up and relayed Kretschmer's final, confused message. It came as a shattering blow; doubly so as nothing had been heard from Prien in U-47 U-47 or Matz in or Matz in U-70 U-70 for ten days (since March 7) and all hope for them had been lost. Nor, ominously, was there any word from Schepke in for ten days (since March 7) and all hope for them had been lost. Nor, ominously, was there any word from Schepke in U-100 U-100.

Winston Churchill helped clear the air. Even before Macintyre's EG-5 reached Liverpool to great acclaim, he announced to the House of Commons that Germany's two leading U-boat aces, Otto Kretschmer and Joachim Schepke, had been captured and killed, respectively. That announcement forced Berlin to concede the loss on March 20.* The communique sent a shock wave through the U-boat arm, for by then it was known that Prien had been lost as well. The communique sent a shock wave through the U-boat arm, for by then it was known that Prien had been lost as well.

British intelligence deduced from the POWs of U-70 U-70, U-99 U-99, and U-100 U-100 that Prien, too, was gone, and those sources played a role in the Admiralty's decision to credit that Prien, too, was gone, and those sources played a role in the Admiralty's decision to credit Wolverine Wolverine with the kill. But the Admiralty did not rush to claim credit for killing Prien and with the kill. But the Admiralty did not rush to claim credit for killing Prien and U-47 U-47. Nor did Berlin have anything to say. Prien's biographer, Wolfgang Frank, wrote that Hitler forbade the release of news of Prien's loss, since it would "have a deleterious effect on the public morale," especially if announced close to the loss of Kretschmer and Schepke. Berlin withheld the news of Prien's loss, Frank wrote, for ten more weeks-to May 23.

MORE B BAD N NEWS.

From the German viewpoint, the U-boat war in the North Atlantic in the last two weeks of March went from bad to worse. Setting off on his second patrol from Lorient in U-69 U-69, Jost Metzler wrote that the weather was "appalling," even worse than it was on his first patrol in February. The "elements seemed to have gone mad," he remembered. It was impossible to conduct organized reconnaissance; visibility was virtually nil.

Nonetheless the Condors, based in Norway and France, flew patrols. On March 19, they reported three convoys, two outbound and one inbound. With merely five boats in the north hunting grounds, all engulfed in raging seas, Donitz was unable to do much about the reports. He ordered Engelbert Endrass, fresh from Lorient in U-46 U-46, and three other boats, including the new VIICs U-98 U-98 and and U-551 U-551 from Germany, to intercept one outbound convoy, but none of the four boats could find it. from Germany, to intercept one outbound convoy, but none of the four boats could find it.

A day later, March 21, Metzler in U-69 U-69 came upon a convoy inbound from Halifax. Donitz directed Herbert Schultze in came upon a convoy inbound from Halifax. Donitz directed Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48 and four Italian boats in the area to converge on Metzler's report. But during that day Metzler, tracking submerged, was detected and driven deep by two aggressive escorts. Working as a team, the two escorts depth-charged and four Italian boats in the area to converge on Metzler's report. But during that day Metzler, tracking submerged, was detected and driven deep by two aggressive escorts. Working as a team, the two escorts depth-charged U-69 U-69 for "several hours," throwing the boat "backwards and forwards," Metzler wrote melodramatically, in "a slow, bitter, life-and-death struggle...." During the struggle, the convoy got away. The destroyers finally broke off the attack to rejoin the convoy, leaving Metzler and his crew thoroughly shaken. for "several hours," throwing the boat "backwards and forwards," Metzler wrote melodramatically, in "a slow, bitter, life-and-death struggle...." During the struggle, the convoy got away. The destroyers finally broke off the attack to rejoin the convoy, leaving Metzler and his crew thoroughly shaken.

Fritz-Julius Lemp in the new U-110 U-110, patrolling far to the west of Iceland on the night of March 23, found a 2,500-ton Norwegian freighter. He tracked her carefully and fired a torpedo at close range. It missed, as did two others, fired singly. These three misses raised Lemp's total misses on this patrol to nine, doubtless reflecting the lack of practice in the Baltic because of the ice conditions. Lemp, however, blamed not himself or his fire-control team, but the torpedoes.

Having "lost confidence" in the torpedoes, Lemp, "fighting mad," attacked the ship with his 4.1" deck gun. In the excitement of this first gun attack, "somebody" (as Lemp put it) forgot to remove the tampion (waterproof plug) from the muzzle of the gun barrel. When the crew fired the first shell, the gun "was blown to bits." No men were killed or seriously hurt, but the hurtling pieces of steel slashed through ballast-tank vents and fuel tanks, causing severe damage and heavy oil leaks which forced Lemp to abort, having sunk no ships that were confirmed in postwar records. He arrived in Lorient in an angry mood, complaining of the lack of training in the Baltic and the unreliability of the torpedoes.

The increasing number of reported torpedo failures caused grave concern at Kerneval and prompted yet another close analysis. The study revealed that six new boats sailing from Germany had experienced twenty-one torpedo failures or misses in the month of February. In spite of the restricted shooting practice in home waters and the unfavorable seas, these failures were not the fault of the skippers, Donitz insisted, but had to be some new "unexplained" defect in the torpedoes. One possible explanation, Donitz speculated, was that the unprecedented extreme cold in Germany was adversely affecting the inner mechanism of the torpedoes. Hence he insisted that boats sailing from Germany not be loaded with torpedoes that had been exposed to extreme cold, and furthermore, that tests of torpedo performance in extreme cold be carried out.

Farther east that same day, the new VIIC U-551 U-551, commanded by Karl Schrott, age thirty, from the duck U-7 U-7, reached her patrol area southeast of Iceland. Commissioned on November 7, the U-551 U-551 had completed her final workup in the ice-free waters off Bergen, sailing on March 18. On this fifth day of his maiden patrol, Schrott found the lone 7,430-ton Belgian freighter had completed her final workup in the ice-free waters off Bergen, sailing on March 18. On this fifth day of his maiden patrol, Schrott found the lone 7,430-ton Belgian freighter Ville de Liege Ville de Liege, and prepared to attack at dawn on the surface. Spotting U-551 U-551, Ville de Liege Ville de Liege radioed an alarm. radioed an alarm.

The British armed trawler Visenda Visenda, which was escorting a nearby convoy, responded. Racing up at full speed (13 knots), Visenda Visenda saw saw U-551 U-551 on the surface four miles ahead. The U-boat crash-dived, but on the surface four miles ahead. The U-boat crash-dived, but Visenda Visenda closed and got sonar contact, held it, and during the next hour and a half, fired a total of eighteen depth charges. These charges destroyed closed and got sonar contact, held it, and during the next hour and a half, fired a total of eighteen depth charges. These charges destroyed U-551 U-551. Visenda Visenda-the first ASW trawler to kill a U-boat-brought back proof: a plywood locker door with German lettering, articles of clothing stenciled with six different German names, a novel in German, and "pieces" of a human body, identified by medical authorities as the heart and lung of "an adult but not an old person." German POWs identified the locker door; it came from the port side aft of the bow compartment. Based on this-and other data-the Admiralty's Assessment Committee speculated that one of Visenda Visenda's depth charges must have detonated a torpedo in U-551 U-551's bow compartment, demolishing the forward end of the boat and blowing the locker, clothing, and other debris to the surface.

When U-551 U-551 failed to respond to radio queries that night, Donitz was gravely concerned. If, as he feared, failed to respond to radio queries that night, Donitz was gravely concerned. If, as he feared, U-551 U-551 had met with misfortune, it meant that five U-boats-about 25 percent of the Atlantic operational force-had been lost in the area south southeast of Iceland in a period of merely seventeen days: had met with misfortune, it meant that five U-boats-about 25 percent of the Atlantic operational force-had been lost in the area south southeast of Iceland in a period of merely seventeen days: U-47 U-47 (Prien), (Prien), U-70 U-70 (Matz), (Matz), U-99 U-99 (Kretschmer), (Kretschmer), U-100 U-100 (Schepke), (Schepke), U-551 U-551 (Schrott). Besides that, (Schrott). Besides that, U-37 U-37 (Clausen) had been rammed submerged and had survived only by greatest good luck, and (Clausen) had been rammed submerged and had survived only by greatest good luck, and U-A U-A (Eckermann) had nearly been lost in a depth-charge attack. (Eckermann) had nearly been lost in a depth-charge attack.

The loss and near loss of seven boats in so brief a period in the North Atlantic gave rise to the suspicion that the British had developed some ndw means of locating U-boats. But Donitz had no idea what it might be. Was there a spy in the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine or or Luftwaffe Luftwaffe with access to U-boat positions or radio traffic? Had British scientists achieved some technological breakthrough in radar that enabled them to put sets on escorts? Had British scientists developed a new and tremendously improved sonar? Or DFing gear? Or some wholly new device unknown to German science? with access to U-boat positions or radio traffic? Had British scientists achieved some technological breakthrough in radar that enabled them to put sets on escorts? Had British scientists developed a new and tremendously improved sonar? Or DFing gear? Or some wholly new device unknown to German science?

These suspicions prompted Donitz to withdraw the boats from the Northwest Approaches. On March 25, he repositioned the six boats left in the hunting grounds on a 300-mile north-south line at 20 degrees west longitude. The extreme northern end of the line-closest to Iceland-was occupied by the most experienced skipper and boat: Herbert Schultze in the record-holding U-48 U-48. Engelbert Endrass, in U-47 U-47, occupied a position in the center of the line.

Schultze in U-48 U-48 found an inbound convoy passing south of Iceland on March 29. This was Halifax 115, guarded by eight escorts. With remarkable daring, skill, and calm, Schultze attacked and fired five torpedoes which sank four ships. He claimed 24,500 tons; his confirmed score was four ships for 17,300 tons, plus one tanker damaged. In view of the heavy escort, Donitz ruled against sending the "extremely inexperienced boats" to help Schultze. No other boats found the convoy. found an inbound convoy passing south of Iceland on March 29. This was Halifax 115, guarded by eight escorts. With remarkable daring, skill, and calm, Schultze attacked and fired five torpedoes which sank four ships. He claimed 24,500 tons; his confirmed score was four ships for 17,300 tons, plus one tanker damaged. In view of the heavy escort, Donitz ruled against sending the "extremely inexperienced boats" to help Schultze. No other boats found the convoy.

That same day, farther south in the patrol line, Metzler in U-69 U-69 found convoy Outbound 302. In response to his alarm, Schultze in found convoy Outbound 302. In response to his alarm, Schultze in U-48 U-48 and Endrass in and Endrass in U-47 U-47 attempted to intercept. Endrass found it, but was only able to sink a 1,800-ton freighter. Still tracking far to the west on March 30, Metzler sank what he claimed to be a 7,000-ton freighter, but which in reality was half that size. In this, and a previous action, Metzler reported five electric-torpedo failures, which combined with the nine misses or failures reported by Topp in attempted to intercept. Endrass found it, but was only able to sink a 1,800-ton freighter. Still tracking far to the west on March 30, Metzler sank what he claimed to be a 7,000-ton freighter, but which in reality was half that size. In this, and a previous action, Metzler reported five electric-torpedo failures, which combined with the nine misses or failures reported by Topp in U-552 U-552 and a similar number by Lemp in and a similar number by Lemp in U-110 U-110, intensified the concern at Kerneval about torpedo reliability.

Altogether in March 1941, three hundred loaded ships crossed the North Atlantic, all from Halifax.* Bedeviled by an acute shortage of U-boats, by foul weather, by increasingly aggressive surface and air convoy-escort forces (some with 1.5 meter-wavelength radar), and by the failures of the Condors and Italian submarines, the Germans in that area turned in poor results: a total of twenty-four confirmed ships sunk, half of them loaded ships (four tankers) in eastbound Halifax convoys. Almost half of these had been sunk by two Bedeviled by an acute shortage of U-boats, by foul weather, by increasingly aggressive surface and air convoy-escort forces (some with 1.5 meter-wavelength radar), and by the failures of the Condors and Italian submarines, the Germans in that area turned in poor results: a total of twenty-four confirmed ships sunk, half of them loaded ships (four tankers) in eastbound Halifax convoys. Almost half of these had been sunk by two Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders: Kretschmer in holders: Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 and Schultze in and Schultze in U-48 U-48. In return, British forces had sunk five U-boats, an "exchange rate" of about five British ships for each U-boat lost, a disastrous ratio for the U-boat arm.

In striking contrast to the boats in the north, the three Type IXBs enjoying better weather in the south continued to do very well. Off Freetown, on March 16, Jurgen Oesten in U-106 U-106 made contact with another convoy, Sierra Leone 68, en route to Britain. Oesten radioed an alarm and beacon signals to bring up Georg Schewe in made contact with another convoy, Sierra Leone 68, en route to Britain. Oesten radioed an alarm and beacon signals to bring up Georg Schewe in U-105 U-105, then attacked, sinking a 6,800-ton freighter. Mounting a second attack on the next night, Oesten claimed sinking three freighters for 21,000 tons and damage to another. Schewe in U-105 U-105 made contact, and over the next three days, March 18 to March 21, the two boats chewed away at the convoy, until all fourteen internal torpedoes on each boat had been expended. Schewe sank four ships for 25,500 tons; Oesten in made contact, and over the next three days, March 18 to March 21, the two boats chewed away at the convoy, until all fourteen internal torpedoes on each boat had been expended. Schewe sank four ships for 25,500 tons; Oesten in U-106 U-106 claimed one "freighter" sunk, one damaged. Unknown to Oesten, the "freighter" claimed as sunk was actually the battleship claimed one "freighter" sunk, one damaged. Unknown to Oesten, the "freighter" claimed as sunk was actually the battleship Malaya Malaya, which was escorting the convoy. Slightly damaged, Malaya Malaya limped across the Atlantic to the island of Trinidad, thence to the United States, where, as related, under the provisions of Lend-Lease, she was repaired and refitted along with the battleship limped across the Atlantic to the island of Trinidad, thence to the United States, where, as related, under the provisions of Lend-Lease, she was repaired and refitted along with the battleship Resolution Resolution, which had been badly damaged by the Vichy French submarine Beveziers Beveziers in the abortive Allied attack on Dakar. in the abortive Allied attack on Dakar.

Schewe and Oesten reported great success. In seven days of tenacious attacks, Schewe claimed sinking six ships for 41,000 tons, Oesten five ships for 36,000 tons-a total of eleven ships for 77,000 tons. The confirmed score was less: Schewe five ships for 27,000 tons, Oesten three ships for 17,000 tons-a total of eight ships for 44,000 tons, plus Oesten's hit on Malaya Malaya, which put her out of action for months.