Schepke still had two torpedoes and was determined to sink at least one more big ship. In the early dark hours of December 22, the watch spotted a likely possibility: a 10,000-ton vessel sailing alone, possibly an armed merchant cruiser. Schepke bent on full speed for a surface attack, but as he was preparing to shoot, both diesels broke down. Exasperated, he submerged to finish the attack on electric motors, but at the climactic moment in the approach, the periscope malfunctioned. When the engineer reported the diesels were back in commission, Schepke surfaced in very heavy seas and continued the chase, pulling around and getting ahead in the dark. While he was closing for a third attack, the ship sighted U-100 U-100 and "maneuvered wildly," denying Schepke a good shooting angle. Believing it to be "now or never," as he described the situation, Schepke fired his last two torpedoes, but both missed. and "maneuvered wildly," denying Schepke a good shooting angle. Believing it to be "now or never," as he described the situation, Schepke fired his last two torpedoes, but both missed.

These failures, Schepke logged on his twenty-first day at sea, caused morale on U-100 U-100 to fall "pretty low." Having sunk "only" three ships for 18,000 tons, Schepke wrote in self-flagellation, they had been out all that time "for nothing." Moreover, Christmas was merely three days away. Seeking some means of lifting morale, Schepke hit on the idea of requesting permission to go to Kiel rather than Lorient for to fall "pretty low." Having sunk "only" three ships for 18,000 tons, Schepke wrote in self-flagellation, they had been out all that time "for nothing." Moreover, Christmas was merely three days away. Seeking some means of lifting morale, Schepke hit on the idea of requesting permission to go to Kiel rather than Lorient for U-100 U-100's scheduled overhaul. Perhaps sensing that the U-100 U-100 crew needed cheer-or feeling they deserved it-Donitz approved the request. Schepke's return to Germany (to huge acclaim) left only one of the eighteen "aces" (or crew needed cheer-or feeling they deserved it-Donitz approved the request. Schepke's return to Germany (to huge acclaim) left only one of the eighteen "aces" (or Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders) in the Atlantic: Heinrich Liebe in holders) in the Atlantic: Heinrich Liebe in U-38 U-38, who relieved Schepke as weather reporter.*

On Christmas Day 1940, there were eight U-boats in the Atlantic: six in northern waters and the Type IXs U-65 U-65 and and U-37 U-37 returning to Lorient from African waters. All celebrated the holiday by decorating the boats with miniature Christmas trees, gorging on special meals and sweets, and, on some of the boats, enjoying tots of alcoholic beverages. returning to Lorient from African waters. All celebrated the holiday by decorating the boats with miniature Christmas trees, gorging on special meals and sweets, and, on some of the boats, enjoying tots of alcoholic beverages.

The hunting in the North Atlantic during the last week of the year remained poor. The four U-boats fresh to the area sank only three ships. The only Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder at sea, Heinrich Liebe in holder at sea, Heinrich Liebe in U-38 U-38, sank two, generously sharing credit for one with the Italian boat Tazzoli Tazzoli. Gerd Schreiber in U-95 U-95 sank the other, a 12,800-ton British freighter. sank the other, a 12,800-ton British freighter.

The poor hunting during most of December was not the fault of the cruiser Hipper Hipper. She had entered the Atlantic convoy lanes on December 9, but she had not found a Halifax convoy or any other target. After ten days of futile searching, she had suffered an engine malfunction, forcing her to abort to France. Inbound to Brest on Christmas Day, she came across a military convoy outbound for Egypt, escorted by several cruisers and the carriers Furious Furious and and Argus Argus, which were ferrying aircraft. Hipper Hipper mounted an ineffective, glancing attack, then ran in to Brest. As intended, her sudden appearance drew Home Fleet units into the Atlantic, enabling mounted an ineffective, glancing attack, then ran in to Brest. As intended, her sudden appearance drew Home Fleet units into the Atlantic, enabling Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst to sortie undetected. But all for naught. to sortie undetected. But all for naught. Gneisenau Gneisenau incurred wave damage off Norway and both ships aborted to Kiel, another humiliating setback for the incurred wave damage off Norway and both ships aborted to Kiel, another humiliating setback for the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine.

Returning from African waters, von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65 had a run of luck, sinking four unescorted ships for about 27,000 tons, including two tankers, the 9,000-ton Panamanian had a run of luck, sinking four unescorted ships for about 27,000 tons, including two tankers, the 9,000-ton Panamanian Charles Pratt Charles Pratt and the 5,900-ton and the 5,900-ton British Premier British Premier. This raised his total claims for this ninety-day patrol to Freetown-the longest cruise on record to then-to eight ships (four tankers) for 52,800 tons, confirmed in Allied records as eight sinkings (four tankers) for 47,785 tons. Adding past overclaims, including generous credit for sinking the 28,000-ton French liner Champlain Champlain, which had been wrecked by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, von Stockhausen's total bag reached 100,000 tons and he qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. After extended home leave while U-65 U-65 was in overhaul, he went to a job in the Training Command. was in overhaul, he went to a job in the Training Command.

The return of U-65 U-65 raised anew the issue of sending German U-boats to African waters, provided the resupply problem could be solved. To some staffers at the OKM and Kerneval, the total score for raised anew the issue of sending German U-boats to African waters, provided the resupply problem could be solved. To some staffers at the OKM and Kerneval, the total score for U-65 U-65's patrol-eight ships-was impressive. Besides that, the presence of the boat in southern waters had drawn some convoy escorts and warships from the Mediterranean and North Atlantic and compelled the British to mount extensive ASW air and surface patrols off Freetown. But Donitz was still not persuaded. The sinking of eight ships in a ninety-day patrol-an average of one ship every eleven days-was a "barely acceptable" return, he logged. Counting prepatrol preparations, the patrol itself, and the postpatrol overhaul, the total investment in time for U-65 U-65's African foray was about six months. In that time she might have conducted several patrols in the North Atlantic, possibly sinking double the number of ships, as well as spotting convoys for other boats.

The results achieved by U-boats in December were predictably disappointing. In the six patrols in the North Atlantic, the oceangoing U-boats sank thirteen and one-half ships for about 90,000 tons, a further decline to about 2.3 ships for 15,000 tons per boat per patrol.

There was little hope for improvement of merchant-ship sinkings in the immediate future. Only four U-boats were left in the hunting grounds on December 31, 1940, two of these assigned to weather reporting and all attempting to cope with the worst winds and seas anyone had ever experienced. Owing to the delays in the refits and the overhauls and the readiness dates of new boats, only ten boats were to be available to replace those four in January. Moreover, Germany was in the grip of a winter even more frigid than the last, again raising the probability of thick ice in the Baltic, Kiel Canal, the Elbe, and the Jade, which would severely curtail or prevent submarine-school training and delay the workups of the newly commissioned boats.

KNITTING A ANGLO-AMERICAN R RELATIONS.

By New Year's Day 1941, Winston Churchill had made good progress on what he viewed as the most important measure necessary to defeat the Germans: to draw the United States, spiritually and physically, deeper into the war on Britain's side.

After winning election to an unprecedented third term in November 1940, President Roosevelt declared that the United States must become an "Arsenal of Democracy," guaranteeing freedom of speech and worship, and freedom from fear and want, to all peoples. In response to Roosevelt's request, and to another from Churchill ("Give us the tools and we will finish the job"), Congress debated, then overwhelmingly approved a radical scheme called "Lend-Lease." In effect, the Lend-Lease Act rescinded the "Cash and Carry" policy of the amended Neutrality Act and gave Roosevelt sweeping powers to "transfer title to, exchange, lease or lend or otherwise dispose of military supplies to any nation whose "defense was vital to the defense of the United States."*

In public Roosevelt continued to insist the United States would not go to war. The "Destroyer Deal," Lend-Lease, and other measures were merely helping hands to a friend-like lending a fire hose to a neighbor whose house was burning down-or prudent defensive measures to insure the security of the United States. Behind the scenes, however, Roosevelt was nudging the United States ever closer to direct military intervention. During a visit to the British Isles in January 1941, Roosevelt's most trusted and influential White House advisor, Harry L. Hopkins, told Churchill: "The President is determined that we shall win the war together." The top-secret joint military war planning begun in August 1940 by the Ghormley Mission in London resumed in earnest in Washington in February 1941, resulting in a detailed joint plan (ABC-1) for waging war against the Axis, which, with the signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, included Japan.

In essence, ABC-1 specified that should the United States be drawn into the war, the Allies were to defeat Germany and Italy first, Japan second. In the meantime, or "short of war," the United States was to assume as soon as practicable certain large military responsibilities in the Atlantic Ocean area, the most important of which was convoy escort between Canada and Iceland, which the British had occupied after the fall of Denmark and were developing into a halfway station for surface-ship escorts and a base for Coastal Command aircraft. In preparation for taking on that and other tasks, on February 1, 1941, Roosevelt established the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by Ernest J. King; authorized construction of a naval base at Argentia, Newfoundland, and several in the British Isles; and approved the transfer to the Atlantic Fleet of three battleships (Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico), a carrier (Yorktown), four light cruisers, and Destroyer Squadrons 8 and 9 from the Pacific Fleet, which was still based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to deter Japanese aggression in the Pacific.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Harold Stark, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Ernest King, chose the best and the brightest of the young officers to formulate plans for the escorting of Atlantic convoys. These officers included three who became heads of the uniformed Navy in the postwar years: Robert B. Carney, Louis E. Denfeld, and Forrest P. Sherman. On February 15, 1941, Stark approved the plans and named one of the most competent of the senior naval officers, Arthur Leroy Bristol, Jr., to command the convoy organization they had proposed: Support Force, Atlantic Fleet,* which reported to King. which reported to King.

Soon after the creation of the Support Force, President Roosevelt ruled that American naval vessels should not escort eastbound North Atlantic convoys from United States soil nor should they go beyond Iceland. Accordingly, Bristol established his headquarters on the magnificent new 16,500-ton destroyer tender Prairie Prairie and moved her to Argentia, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, where, under terms of the "Destroyer Deal," hundreds of American workers were feverishly building ship and aircraft bases for the U.S. Navy. Soon thereafter, Washington executed a deal with the exiled Danish government in which the Americans agreed to protect Greenland and Iceland from Axis forces. In return, the Danes gave the Americans the right to develop air and ship bases on Greenland and Iceland, the eastern terminus of the proposed new convoy-escort scheme. and moved her to Argentia, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, where, under terms of the "Destroyer Deal," hundreds of American workers were feverishly building ship and aircraft bases for the U.S. Navy. Soon thereafter, Washington executed a deal with the exiled Danish government in which the Americans agreed to protect Greenland and Iceland from Axis forces. In return, the Danes gave the Americans the right to develop air and ship bases on Greenland and Iceland, the eastern terminus of the proposed new convoy-escort scheme.

Stark and King assigned substantial combat forces to Bristol's support force. These included, in addition to the tender Prairie Prairie, a destroyer flotilla (twenty-seven ships), a patrol wing (forty-eight Catalina flying boats*), a submarine squadron (fifteen tf-class boats), two new 8,700-ton seaplane tenders (Albemarle, Curtiss), and two destroyers that had been converted to seaplane tenders (Belknap, George E. Badger). Bristol also controlled the American naval vessels assigned to the Northern Patrol off Greenland waters. Most of his forces were based at the new facilities at Argentia, but some ventured to Iceland to begin the development of an Anglo-American anchorage at Hvalfjord, near Reykjavik in the Denmark Strait.

From the beginning of the war, the Prime Minister of Canada, W. L. Mackenzie King, had willingly placed Canada's seven British-built destroyers under absolute control of the British Royal Navy. The Canadian destroyers had served as convoy escorts and with the anti-invasion naval forces. By the end of 1940, Canada had also placed at the disposal of the Royal Navy her seven ex-American Town Town-class four-stack destroyers and the sixteen Canadian-built Flower Flower-class corvettes which had been commissioned by that time. In all, thirty Canadian ships (fourteen destroyers) were placed under the command of the Royal Navy.

Although Canada was a vibrantly growing nation of the Commonwealth, the British ruling establishment continued to view Canadians as crude "country cousins" in a Third World nation. This was especially the case in the high circles of the Royal Navy. When Anglo-American war planners secretly convened in early 1941 to work out war plan ABC-1, no one bothered to include the chief of the Canadian Navy, Percy W. Nelles. Under terms of the ABC-1 agreement, the Atlantic Ocean was divided into two spheres of responsibility, a British one in the east and an American one in the west. The British, who regarded the Canadian Navy as merely another subordinate command of the Royal Navy (and not a very good one at that), casually pledged that when America came into the war, covertly or overtly, Canadian naval forces would automatically come under American command.

The failure of the war planners to even consult the Canadians outraged Percy Nelles and other Canadian naval authorities. When Bristol and staff actually arrived in Argentia on Prairie Prairie to take over North Atlantic convoy escort in the western zone, the Canadians quietly boiled. Bristol added insult to injury by assuming emperor-like status in Newfoundland, even "relocating" about two hundred families from the Argentia area. Inasmuch as Newfoundland had not yet formally joined the Canadian government and the British had leased it to the Americans for bases in the "Destroyer Deal," Bristol was perfectly within his rights and he exercised them as he saw fit, apparently without due regard for Canadian sensitivities. to take over North Atlantic convoy escort in the western zone, the Canadians quietly boiled. Bristol added insult to injury by assuming emperor-like status in Newfoundland, even "relocating" about two hundred families from the Argentia area. Inasmuch as Newfoundland had not yet formally joined the Canadian government and the British had leased it to the Americans for bases in the "Destroyer Deal," Bristol was perfectly within his rights and he exercised them as he saw fit, apparently without due regard for Canadian sensitivities.

PLATE 7 7.

For various reasons the American convoy-escort service to be provided by Bristol and staff was delayed from April to September 1941. When it finally came into being, the Americans presented the Canadians with a fait accompli fait accompli and took virtual command of most Canadian naval elements in the western Atlantic, in accordance with the terms the British had offered. Seniors in the swelling Canadian Navy were naturally and took virtual command of most Canadian naval elements in the western Atlantic, in accordance with the terms the British had offered. Seniors in the swelling Canadian Navy were naturally Furious Furious at this blatant and arrogant assumption of authority in their home waters and launched a bureaucratic campaign to right what they saw as an egregious wrong. However, they failed, and this command inequity remained in place for a long time to come. at this blatant and arrogant assumption of authority in their home waters and launched a bureaucratic campaign to right what they saw as an egregious wrong. However, they failed, and this command inequity remained in place for a long time to come.

In due course, the slowly maturing Canadian Navy was to play a vital role in the Battle of the Atlantic, contributing scores of warships and escorting about half of all the convoys on the North Atlantic run. Most histories of this naval struggle fail to stress the important Canadian role; some do not mention it at all; a few even ridicule the Canadians.*

From this planning and activity, it can be seen that the Americans well understood that convoying was a vital measure in countering the U-boat threat and by early 1941 had placed convoying requirements at the very top of Atlantic Fleet priorities. However, as will be seen, the "loan" (gift) of fifty four-stack destroyers to the British and Canadians gutted the available American escort forces severely in the Atlantic-so severely that for the next two years (1941-1942) in return for their generosity, the Americans were to pay a heavy price in lost seamen and ships.

That was only the beginning of President Roosevelt's generosity to the British on the Atlantic naval front. The increasingly sympathetic attitude in America for the British, who were enduring the horrors of The Blitz in the winter of 1940-1941, and the enactment of Lend-Lease relaxed many political constraints on the President. In the early weeks of 1941, he further assisted the British in the following specific ways: * The transfer of ten Lake Lake-class United States Coast Guard cutters to the Royal Navy. Commissioned in the years 1928-1932, these beamy, long-range vessels were 250 feet in length, displaced about 2,000 tons, and had a top speed of 17 knots, about the same as that of a Type VII U-boat and slightly faster than a corvette. At the time of transfer, the main armament consisted of two 3" guns and depth-charge throwers and tracks. Most of these Coast Guard vessels were in good condition. The British designated them sloops and put them into immediate service as convoy escorts on the routes between Sierra Leone and the British Isles. The gift of these warships was also to be costly to the Americans.

* The allotment of about fifty first-class American tankers to the British maritime "shuttle," which transported oil and petroleum products from the Caribbean to ports on America's East Coast for onward shipment to the British Isles in armed British tankers. This measure freed up a like number of British tankers which were used for the Atlantic crossing. In effect, this Lend-Lease gift made good the forty-two British tanker losses to U-boats since the onset of war. To replace the American tankers, a few weeks later Congress authorized Roosevelt to "requisition" (i.e., seize) "refugee tankers" of French, Danish, and other flags that were in American ports.

* The gradual transfer to British charter of about seventy-five Norwegian and Panamanian tankers then under charter by oil companies in the Americas. Counting the "shuttle" and these chartered vessels, the British tanker fleet in effect exceeded its size at the beginning of the war. Washington paid the whole of the charter costs in Lend-Lease dollars, a currency the Norwegians prized above all others.

* Construction of a 13,000-ton "escort" aircraft carrier, Archer, for the Royal Navy. Conceived originally to provide convoys air cover against enemy aircraft, the "escort" or "jeep" carriers had a flight deck about 500 feet long and could carry fifteen to twenty fighter aircraft. Prodded by President Roosevelt, in early 1941 the Maritime Commission converted two new sister ships of the Moore Macormack line to prototype "jeep" carriers, H.M.S. Archer for the British and U.S.S. Long Island Long Island for the U.S. Navy. for the U.S. Navy.*

* In an especially broad interpretation of the Lend-Lease Act, President Roosevelt authorized British warships to put into American naval shipyards for repairs and upgrading. This gesture helped ease the pressures in British naval shipyards, already jammed with ships awaiting attention. The British battleships Malaya Malaya and and Resolution Resolution, which incurred battle damage, were the first capital ships to take advantage of this gift.

* In addition to all kinds of aircraft and ships and weaponry, President Roosevelt promised the British that among the "tools" to be provided in quantity by the Arsenal of Democracy was centimetric-wavelength radar for aircraft and ships. In anticipation, some quarters of the vast American electronics industry were retooling.

Scientists at the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory were vigorously pushing R&D on all radar but especially centimetric-wavelength radar, employing the Randall and Boot cavity magnetron, paralleling the work of British scientists. By January 1941, the lab and its many subcontractors had produced an experimental model for ships with a revolving antenna and a single cathode-ray display screen (PPI), which produced lingering "blips." By March 1941, when the British mounted the first experimental centimetric-wavelength radar in a Fighter Command Beaufighter night interceptor, American engineers mounted a similar experimental version in a B-18 bomber. When the first British warship, the corvette Orchis Orchis, put to sea with Type 271M centimetric radar in March 1941, the American destroyer Semmes Semmes was similarly fitted with an American-made model, Type SG. was similarly fitted with an American-made model, Type SG.*

In addition to the foregoing, Roosevelt directed the Maritime Commission to provide the British with a substantial number of newly built tankers in addition to the sixty Ocean Ocean-class dry-cargo ships already under construction for the British. Jerry Land estimated that he could deliver to the British about twenty-one new tankers in 1941, most of them toward the end of the year. The need to provide these tankers as well as the sixty Ocean Ocean-class ships as soon as possible infused the Maritime Commission with a sense of urgency that was to benefit not only the British but also the Americans.

Furthermore, in late winter and early spring of 1941, Land proposed two new merchant-ship building programs, which President Roosevelt promptly approved. Under the first, of March 1941, in addition to the sixty Ocean Ocean-class ships and twenty-one tankers earmarked for Britain and 200 Liberty ships in the works for the American merchant marine, Land added 200 more ships for the American merchant marine, half of them Liberty ships. Under the second program, of April 1941, Land added yet another 306 merchant ships, bringing the total of approved new merchant-ship orders to about 800. This was over and above the 2,000 ships under contract for the U.S. Navy and other American military forces.

UNHAPPY T TIMES.

While Donitz took leave in the month of January 1941, his chief of staff, Eberhard Godt, directed the U-boat war.

At the beginning of the year, four December boats were still on patrol, two on weather-reporting station. These four were joined by five others: two new IXBs, U-105 U-105 and and U-106 U-106, which sailed from Germany, and three boats from Lorient. All were handicapped by winter darkness and by a seemingly endless parade of brutal storms. The only Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder on patrol, Heinrich Liebe in the aging Type IX holder on patrol, Heinrich Liebe in the aging Type IX U-38 U-38, who had sunk two ships in December (sharing one with Tazzoli Tazzoli), incurred "heavy" depth-charge damage and was forced to abort to Lorient. At mid-month there were seven U-boats in the North Atlantic and a number of Italian boats, including Torelli Torelli, commanded by Primo Longobardo, who had trained in combat under Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99.

The hunting continued to be very poor. The glancing attack by Hipper Hipper on the military convoy on Christmas Day and the hideous weather had led the British to delay again the sailing of Halifax convoys. For example, when convoy Halifax 103 was ready to put to sea, the bad weather forced thirty-one ships to abort the voyage. In the whole month of January, only 243 ships crossed from Canada to the British Isles in convoys, 170 of them in Halifax convoys, seventy-three in Slow Convoys. on the military convoy on Christmas Day and the hideous weather had led the British to delay again the sailing of Halifax convoys. For example, when convoy Halifax 103 was ready to put to sea, the bad weather forced thirty-one ships to abort the voyage. In the whole month of January, only 243 ships crossed from Canada to the British Isles in convoys, 170 of them in Halifax convoys, seventy-three in Slow Convoys.

In the first half of January, Axis submarines in the North Atlantic sank only six ships, all sailing alone or stragglers from storm-tossed convoys. Primo Longobardo in Torelli accounted for three of the sinkings for 12,291 tons, the most successful patrol by an Italian submarine to then. The new Type IXB U-105 U-105, commanded by Georg Schewe, age thirty-one, from the duck U-60 U-60, sank the 4,800-ton British freighter Bassano. The new IXB U-106 U-106, commanded by Jurgen Oesten, age twenty-eight, from the duck U-61 U-61, sank the 10,600-ton British freighter Zealandic Zealandic. The promising new skipper, Georg-Wilhelm Schulz in U-124 U-124, sank the 6,000-ton British freighter Empire Thunder Empire Thunder, an exasperating and near-fatal victory requiring the expenditure of five torpedoes. The first two missed, the third hit, and the fourth missed and circled back, missing U-124 U-124 by "a few meters." by "a few meters."* The fifth hit and finally sank the ship. After thirty-eight miserable days at sea, Schulz returned to Lorient in ill humor. The fifth hit and finally sank the ship. After thirty-eight miserable days at sea, Schulz returned to Lorient in ill humor.

At this time, a third Italian boat was lost in the North Atlantic. She was the Nani Nani, commanded by Gioacchino Polizzi. She was sunk on January 7 by depth charges from the British corvette Anemone Anemone. There were no survivors from this boat either.

One of the new VIICs, U-96 U-96, commanded by Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock who had sunk five ships on his first patrol, sailed from Lorient on January 9, after merely twelve days in port. He arrived off Rockall Bank on January 16, and that day and the next U-96 U-96 found and attacked two big British freighters, which were sailing unescorted: one for 14,118 tons and one for 15,000 tons. found and attacked two big British freighters, which were sailing unescorted: one for 14,118 tons and one for 15,000 tons.

Lehmann-Willenbrock expended all twelve torpedoes to sink these ships and returned to Lorient on January 22, having been out only fourteen days. His score of 29,000 tons sunk was far and away the best performance by any U-boat in the month of January.

In conformance with Hitler's personal order, Luftwaffe gruppe Luftwaffe gruppe 40, based in Bordeaux, commenced convoy-spotting in January. An average of two Condors per day patrolled the area near Rockall Bank. The airmen found convoys on January 11, 16, and 20, but owing to the unfavorable weather, the scarcity of U-boats, and the incorrect position reports from the Condors, Godt was not able to put a single boat in contact with any of the convoys. When it was discovered that the position reporting from the Condors could not be relied upon, the airmen were directed to shadow the convoys and send beacon signals to home in the U-boats. 40, based in Bordeaux, commenced convoy-spotting in January. An average of two Condors per day patrolled the area near Rockall Bank. The airmen found convoys on January 11, 16, and 20, but owing to the unfavorable weather, the scarcity of U-boats, and the incorrect position reports from the Condors, Godt was not able to put a single boat in contact with any of the convoys. When it was discovered that the position reporting from the Condors could not be relied upon, the airmen were directed to shadow the convoys and send beacon signals to home in the U-boats.

Another six boats sailed in the second half of January: four from Lorient, including the IXB U-103 U-103, commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Viktor Schutze, and two from Germany. The latter were the record-holding VIIB, holder Viktor Schutze, and two from Germany. The latter were the record-holding VIIB, U-48 U-48, once more under command of Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Herbert Schultze, and the new IXB holder Herbert Schultze, and the new IXB U-107 U-107. The last was commanded by Donitz's son-in-law Gunter Hessler, age thirty-one, who had married Ursula Donitz in November 1937 and had joined the U-boat arm in April 1940. These boats, too, found poor hunting. The Condors spotted convoys on January 26, 28, and 30, but owing to failures in communications and other factors, none of the U-boats could be brought into play.

In the waning days of this frustrating month, on January 29, a Lorient VIIC, U-93 U-93, commanded by Claus Korth, ran into the heavily escorted inbound Slow Convoy 19. Upon receiving Korth's report, Godt ordered all boats in the vicinity-and the Condors-to home and close on beacon signals from U-93 U-93. Meanwhile, Korth attacked, sinking three ships for 21,300 tons, including the 10,500-ton British tanker W. B. Walker W. B. Walker. Herbert Kuppisch in U-94 U-94 came up and sank two straggling freighters. Oesten in came up and sank two straggling freighters. Oesten in U-106 U-106 sank another straggler. An escort, the crack British destroyer sank another straggler. An escort, the crack British destroyer Antelope Antelope, which had sunk U-31 U-31 and and U-41 U-41, mistook an empty life raft for the U-boat and rammed it, botching the counterattack.

Donitz returned from leave February 1. By then the active "aces" were prepared to resume the Battle of the Atlantic. Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48 and Viktor Schutze in and Viktor Schutze in U-103 U-103 were already in the hunting grounds. Gunther Prien, Otto Kretschmer, and Wolfgang Luth were in Lorient, preparing their boats for combat. Fritz-Julius Lemp, Joachim Schepke, and Engelbert Endrass were in Germany, also preparing their boats for combat. If all went well, by the end of the month all eight "aces" who still commanded U-boats were to be back in action. were already in the hunting grounds. Gunther Prien, Otto Kretschmer, and Wolfgang Luth were in Lorient, preparing their boats for combat. Fritz-Julius Lemp, Joachim Schepke, and Engelbert Endrass were in Germany, also preparing their boats for combat. If all went well, by the end of the month all eight "aces" who still commanded U-boats were to be back in action.

All did not go well, however. In Lorient on February 4, Wolfgang Luth's U-43 U-43 mysteriously flooded and sank at dockside, knocking the boat out of action for three months. A court of inquiry found that a ballast-tank vent valve had been left open by mistake. The court blamed the first and second watch officers, Hinrich-Oskar Bernbeck and Erwin Witte, and ordered them to pay for the repairs out of savings and salaries(!). In Germany, the intense cold and a sudden onset of heavy Baltic ice delayed the overhaul of Schepke's mysteriously flooded and sank at dockside, knocking the boat out of action for three months. A court of inquiry found that a ballast-tank vent valve had been left open by mistake. The court blamed the first and second watch officers, Hinrich-Oskar Bernbeck and Erwin Witte, and ordered them to pay for the repairs out of savings and salaries(!). In Germany, the intense cold and a sudden onset of heavy Baltic ice delayed the overhaul of Schepke's U-100 U-100 and the workup of Lemp's new boat, the IXB and the workup of Lemp's new boat, the IXB U-110 U-110*

Counting six new boats that were to sail from Germany, Donitz had eighteen boats to deploy in February. Notwithstanding the terrible weather and the paltry returns of January, he insisted that the bulk of the boats should operate in the North Atlantic in cooperation with the Condors employing so-called improved communications procedures. But he also agreed to remount German patrols to West African waters, one by Clausen's U-37 U-37, replicating its voyage of December, and another by the U-A U-A, which was entirely unsuitable for anticonvoy operations in the North Atlantic.

Two factors had led Donitz to view patrols to West African waters more favorably. First, the Afrika Korps Afrika Korps, commanded by Erwin Rommel, was en route to North Africa to rescue the reeling Italian Army, half of which (130,000 men) had surrendered to the still small but adept British Army of the Nile. The Italian submarines in West African waters had failed to make any significant dent in the British convoys rounding the Cape of Good Hope to support the Army of the Nile. Any U-boat successes against those convoys would amount to direct German support for Rommel. Second, the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst had finally broken out of the North Sea. The heavy cruiser had finally broken out of the North Sea. The heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper, sailing from Brest, was to join them for raids against the British convoys in the South Atlantic. The supply ships supporting Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst could also supply the U-boats. could also supply the U-boats.

In the North Atlantic, Donitz's son-in-law Gunter Hessler in the new IXB U-107 U-107 found convoy Outbound 279 on February 3. After flashing an alert, Hessler attacked, sinking a 4,700-ton freighter, then shadowed during the day. Donitz relayed the report and ordered six other boats to converge on the convoy. Still shadowing, on the following evening Hessler sank a second ship of 5,000 tons. No other boats found the convoy, but while searching for it, Salmann in found convoy Outbound 279 on February 3. After flashing an alert, Hessler attacked, sinking a 4,700-ton freighter, then shadowed during the day. Donitz relayed the report and ordered six other boats to converge on the convoy. Still shadowing, on the following evening Hessler sank a second ship of 5,000 tons. No other boats found the convoy, but while searching for it, Salmann in U-52 U-52 and Moehle in and Moehle in U-123 U-123 came across the inbound Slow Convoy 20, from which they sank one ship each, as did Hessler in came across the inbound Slow Convoy 20, from which they sank one ship each, as did Hessler in U-107 U-107, responding to their reports. Korth in U-93 U-93 polished off another ship from this convoy with his deck gun, a 2,700-tonner which had been damaged by a Condor. polished off another ship from this convoy with his deck gun, a 2,700-tonner which had been damaged by a Condor.

The Admiralty got wind of the breakout of Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst from the North Sea and positioned powerful Home Fleet forces ( from the North Sea and positioned powerful Home Fleet forces (Nelson, Rodney Rodney, Repulse Repulse, etc.) south of Iceland to intercept them. A British cruiser, Naiad Naiad, got a fleeting glimpse of the German vessels southbound in the Denmark Strait, but the British disbelieved-or discounted-the report. Equipped with primitive radar, Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst evaded Naiad at high speed and withdrew northward into the strait to prepare for a second try on February 3-4. evaded Naiad at high speed and withdrew northward into the strait to prepare for a second try on February 3-4.

The Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst had orders to attack Halifax convoys in the area west of Iceland. Assuming the attack would again draw out the Home Fleet, the OKM directed Donitz to lay a submarine trap south of Iceland to ambush its ships. On February 8, had orders to attack Halifax convoys in the area west of Iceland. Assuming the attack would again draw out the Home Fleet, the OKM directed Donitz to lay a submarine trap south of Iceland to ambush its ships. On February 8, Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst intercepted convoy Halifax 106, but upon seeing that the convoy was escorted by the battleship intercepted convoy Halifax 106, but upon seeing that the convoy was escorted by the battleship Ramillies Ramillies,* the Germans, who were under orders to avoid battles with capital ships, broke off the attack. As anticipated, the Home Fleet sailed west in pursuit of the Germans, who were under orders to avoid battles with capital ships, broke off the attack. As anticipated, the Home Fleet sailed west in pursuit of Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst. Donitz, meanwhile, had positioned eight German U-boats to the submarine trap south of Iceland. One of these, Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48, sighted-and reported-a "battle cruiser and a light cruiser," but he was unable to get into shooting position. On February 10, a Whitley of Coastal Command Squadron 502, piloted by J. A. Walker, caught Korth in U-93 U-93 on the surface and bombed the boat, hastening her return to Lorient. The repairs to on the surface and bombed the boat, hastening her return to Lorient. The repairs to U-93 U-93 were to take three months. No other boats intercepted Home Fleet units. The submarine trap was thus a failure. were to take three months. No other boats intercepted Home Fleet units. The submarine trap was thus a failure.

Donitz was not displeased by this diversion. He believed the Condor reconnaissance flights near Rockall Bank had forced the British to divert convoys well to the north to avoid aerial detection. Later, when the OKM released the boats of the submarine trap, he left six boats on patrol lines due south of Iceland. Since this area was beyond range of the Bordeaux-based Condors, Donitz requested that Condor flights be staged to that area from Norway.

Southbound to African waters, on the morning of February 9, Nikolaus Clausen in U-37 U-37 ran into convoy Home Gibraltar 53. Comprised of twenty-one ships, the convoy was thinly escorted by one destroyer and one sloop. Clausen gave the alarm, then attacked, claiming three ships for 13,500 tons sunk, but again he inflated the tonnage. His confirmed score was two ships for 3,300 tons. ran into convoy Home Gibraltar 53. Comprised of twenty-one ships, the convoy was thinly escorted by one destroyer and one sloop. Clausen gave the alarm, then attacked, claiming three ships for 13,500 tons sunk, but again he inflated the tonnage. His confirmed score was two ships for 3,300 tons.

There were no other German U-boats in Iberian waters, but the heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper, southbound from Brest to join Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst, was within easy reach, as were the Condors basing at Bordeaux. Sensing a "historic" opportunity to mount a combined U-boat, aircraft, and surface-ship attack on the same convoy, Donitz directed Clausen to shadow the convoy and to send beacon signals. Meanwhile, Donitz instructed Gruppe Gruppe 40 to fly as many Condors as possible to the scene and invited the OKM to bring up 40 to fly as many Condors as possible to the scene and invited the OKM to bring up Hipper Hipper. Five Condors took off. The OKM initially refused to commit Hipper Hipper but, on second thought, did so. but, on second thought, did so.

Homing on U-37 U-37's beacon signals, audible at 150 miles, the Condors reached the convoy late in the afternoon of February 9. In this first successful joint aircraft/submarine operation, the Condor pilots reported damage to nine ships for 45,000 tons. The confirmed score was five ships sunk. One Condor was damaged and crash-landed in Spain, but the crew survived and eventually returned to Bordeaux.

Still shadowing the shattered convoy for Hipper Hipper's benefit, in the early hours of February 10, Clausen in U-37 U-37 struck again. His targets this time were two "big tankers." His six torpedoes missed the tankers but, Clausen believed, struck and sank two ships behind the tankers for 7,500 tons. Actually, he hit only one ship, a 1,473-ton freighter, which sank, making his total confirmed score three ships sunk for 4,773 tons. struck again. His targets this time were two "big tankers." His six torpedoes missed the tankers but, Clausen believed, struck and sank two ships behind the tankers for 7,500 tons. Actually, he hit only one ship, a 1,473-ton freighter, which sank, making his total confirmed score three ships sunk for 4,773 tons.*

The riddled convoy Home Gibraltar 53 was scheduled to merge with an inbound unescorted convoy of nineteen ships from Sierra Leone. Racing up from the southwest, Hipper Hipper came upon this convoy on February 12 and sank seven ships for 32,800 tons, her first clear success in the Atlantic. She then found another freighter which had separated from the Gibraltar convoy. She took off the crew and sank the freighter, but was then compelled to abort to Brest with engine problems for the second time. Condors escorted her into port. came upon this convoy on February 12 and sank seven ships for 32,800 tons, her first clear success in the Atlantic. She then found another freighter which had separated from the Gibraltar convoy. She took off the crew and sank the freighter, but was then compelled to abort to Brest with engine problems for the second time. Condors escorted her into port.

Donitz was enormously pleased with this unique operation. The combined German forces had savaged two convoys, sinking sixteen confirmed ships: eight by Hipper Hipper, five by the Condors, three by U-37 U-37. Foreseeing the possibility of combined submarine and surface-ship operations with Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst, he directed that three IXBs (U-105, U-106 U-106, U-124 U-124) prepare for departure to West African waters to be followed by the U-A U-A, which was sailing from Germany. Having expended all torpedoes, Clausen in U-37 U-37 aborted his trip to Africa and returned to Lorient, where he received unstinting praise and the news that the famous but weary aborted his trip to Africa and returned to Lorient, where he received unstinting praise and the news that the famous but weary U-37 U-37 was to patrol home for retirement to the Training Command. was to patrol home for retirement to the Training Command.

The diversion of Condors to the U-37 U-37-Hipper operation and a decision to put Condor crews through a crash course in navigation and communications delayed the staging of these aircraft from Norway. Hence the boats hunting south of Iceland had no help from the Condors for many days. They found no convoys, but several of them picked off lone ships and convoy stragglers in heavy weather. Lehmann-Willenbrock in operation and a decision to put Condor crews through a crash course in navigation and communications delayed the staging of these aircraft from Norway. Hence the boats hunting south of Iceland had no help from the Condors for many days. They found no convoys, but several of them picked off lone ships and convoy stragglers in heavy weather. Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 sank the 8,100-ton British tanker Clea and a freighter, and teamed up with Viktor Schutze in sank the 8,100-ton British tanker Clea and a freighter, and teamed up with Viktor Schutze in U-103 U-103 to sink the 10,500-ton British tanker to sink the 10,500-ton British tanker A. F. Corwin A. F. Corwin. Schutze went on to sink three other ships for 23,000 tons, including another 10,500-ton British tanker, E. R. Brown E. R. Brown. A new VIIC from Germany, U-69 U-69, commanded by Jost Metzler, age thirty-two, another former merchant marine officer, sank two unescorted ships for 14,100 tons. Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48, Otto Salmann in U-52 U-52, and Ernst Mengersen in U-101 U-101 also sank two ships each. Karl-Heinz Moehle in also sank two ships each. Karl-Heinz Moehle in U-123 U-123, on weather-reporting duty, sank one.

Finally, on the afternoon of February 19, a lone Condor staging from Norway found a convoy, Outbound 287. Donitz ordered five boats to converge on the position and Gruppe Gruppe 40 to send out more Condors at first light the following morning. But the operation was a failure. Three Condors reached the area, but all gave different positions, leading to the belief that a second or perhaps even a third convoy had been detected. Adding further confusion, 40 to send out more Condors at first light the following morning. But the operation was a failure. Three Condors reached the area, but all gave different positions, leading to the belief that a second or perhaps even a third convoy had been detected. Adding further confusion, B-dienst B-dienst picked up distress calls from a ship reporting a Condor attack in yet another position. One boat, Lehmann-Willenbrock's picked up distress calls from a ship reporting a Condor attack in yet another position. One boat, Lehmann-Willenbrock's U-96 U-96, homed on a Condor beacon signal, came upon the convoy in foul weather, and sank a straggler, the 7,000-ton British tanker Scottish Standard. But no other boats could find the convoy.

Several days later, on February 22, a Norway-based Condor reported a convoy near the Orkneys. Donitz directed two boats, outbound from Germany in the North Sea, to the scene: the VIIB U-46 U-46, commanded by Engelbert Endrass, returning from a long overhaul, and a new VIIC, U-552 U-552, commanded by Erich Topp, whose duck, U-57 U-57, had been rammed and sunk in the Elbe. But, many hours later, the airmen corrected the contact report: The convoy was not near the Orkneys but two hundred miles or more west of the Orkneys, en route to Halifax. It was Outbound 288.

Upon receiving the corrected position report, Donitz ordered four boats to intercept the convoy and, if possible, three additional, including the weather boat, Moehle's U-123 U-123. The operation was temporarily thrown into confusion when B-dienst B-dienst reported another distress call from a ship being attacked by a Condor in a position that in no way corresponded to the "corrected" position report. Donitz rightly dismissed this last report, logging in his diary that reported another distress call from a ship being attacked by a Condor in a position that in no way corresponded to the "corrected" position report. Donitz rightly dismissed this last report, logging in his diary that B-dienst B-dienst reports could no longer be relied upon. reports could no longer be relied upon.

A new VIIB from Germany, U-73 U-73, commanded by Helmut Rosenbaum, age twenty-seven, from the duck U-2 U-2, made contact with the convoy Outbound 288 and flashed a report. Donitz instructed Rosenbaum to radio beacon signals and hang on "at all costs" while the other boats-and more Condors-attempted to converge. During the night of February 23-24, five German boats and the Italian Bianchi Bianchi attacked. Lehmann-Willenbrock in attacked. Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 sank three ships for 18,400 tons, including the 11,000-ton auxiliary cruiser sank three ships for 18,400 tons, including the 11,000-ton auxiliary cruiser Huntingdon Huntingdon. Gerd Schreiber in the VIIC U-95 U-95 sank three ships for 13,900 tons. Moehle in sank three ships for 13,900 tons. Moehle in U-123 U-123 sank one, as did Metzler in sank one, as did Metzler in U-69 U-69, Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73, and Adalberto Giovannini in Bianchi. In retaliation, a Sunderland and three corvettes delivered a determined depth-charge attack on the green U-69 U-69, but the damage was not serious.

During this melee, the Italian submarine Marcello Marcello, commanded by Carlo Alberto Teppati, arrived on the scene. One of the convoy escorts, the ex-American four-stack destroyer Montgomery Montgomery, merely a month out of her overhaul and upgrade, spotted Marcello Marcello and attacked with guns and depth charges. The attack was successful; and attacked with guns and depth charges. The attack was successful; Marcello Marcello sank with all hands. She was the first Axis submarine to fall victim to one of the American warships transferred to the Royal Navy in the "Destroyer Deal." sank with all hands. She was the first Axis submarine to fall victim to one of the American warships transferred to the Royal Navy in the "Destroyer Deal."*

Having exhausted all torpedoes, most of the U-boats headed for Lorient. Based on flash reports, Donitz calculated that the German boats had sunk ten ships for 77,000 tons from convoy Outbound 288. In actuality, the U-boats sank eight ships for 42,282 tons. Claiming seven ships for 55,600 tons sunk on this patrol, Lehmann-Willenbrock qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. As a result of sinking four more ships on his patrol, Karl-Heinz Moehle also qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz* The new skippers, Gunter Hessler in The new skippers, Gunter Hessler in U-107 U-107 and Jost Metzler in and Jost Metzler in U-69 U-69, having sunk four and three ships, respectively, on their maiden patrols from Germany, received warm praise.

South of Iceland on February 24, Erich Topp in the new VIIC U-552 U-552, who had sunk six ships for 37,000 tons on the duck U-57 U-57, found the next convoy, Outbound 289. Donitz ordered three boats to join Topp, including two other new boats from Germany: the VIIC U-97 U-97, commanded by Udo Heilmann, age twenty-seven, from the duck U-24 U-24, and the new IXB U-108 U-108, commanded by Klaus Scholtz, age thirty-two. Topp shadowed tenaciously, then attacked, firing all five torpedoes in his bow and stern tubes. All missed. Before he could reload and attack again, an aircraft drove the boat under and the convoy got away.

When Topp surfaced after dark with all tubes reloaded, he saw a big ship coming up unescorted. He set up quickly and fired a fan of three torpedoes, estimating the range at about 1,600 yards. All missed. As the ship approached U-552 U-552, Topp saw that he had vastly underestimated her size and therefore the range; it was the huge 43,000-ton French luxury liner (in Allied service) Ile de France Ile de France. Topp quickly fired his remaining bow torpedo at this fast-moving behemoth, but it too missed. That shot made nine torpedoes fired for nine misses; only three torpedoes remained.

Meanwhile, Udo Heilmann in the new boat U-97 U-97 came up in response to Topp's reports and found Outbound 289. Perhaps wrongly assuming that Topp was in contact, or wishing to have the convoy all to himself, Heilmann attacked it in the early hours of February 24, without broadcasting a contact report. In five hours he sank a 6,900-ton tanker, British Gunner, and two freighters and damaged a 9,700-ton tanker in ballast. When he reported the result, Donitz was angry at Heilmann for not sending beacon signals and attempted to bring Topp in again, as well as Gerd Schreiber in came up in response to Topp's reports and found Outbound 289. Perhaps wrongly assuming that Topp was in contact, or wishing to have the convoy all to himself, Heilmann attacked it in the early hours of February 24, without broadcasting a contact report. In five hours he sank a 6,900-ton tanker, British Gunner, and two freighters and damaged a 9,700-ton tanker in ballast. When he reported the result, Donitz was angry at Heilmann for not sending beacon signals and attempted to bring Topp in again, as well as Gerd Schreiber in U-95 U-95. Topp regained contact with the convoy off Iceland in a raging gale, but the weather defeated him and Schreiber as well.

The ranking tonnage "aces" of the U-boat arm, Gtinther Prien in U-47 U-47 and Otto Kretschmer in and Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99, sailed from Lorient on February 20 and 22, respectively. Prien had been in port seventy-six days; Kretschmer for seventy-two. There had been a substantial turnover in the crews on these two famous boats. The first watch officers on both had left for commanding officers school; other officers had been promoted and assigned to new boats. Owing to British mines and submarines and sporadic air attacks on Lorient, there had not been much opportunity to drill the crew replacements. Both skippers had refused repeated suggestions from Donitz to take safe jobs in the Training Command.

While Prien was en route to the hunting grounds on February 22, the Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst reappeared off Newfoundland. The two battle cruisers attacked a westbound convoy which was approaching the dispersal point in Canadian waters. Between them they sank five ships for 25,784 tons, their first kills since entering the Atlantic on February 4. The battle cruisers then proceeded to the South Atlantic to attack convoys off Sierra Leone. Their appearance off Newfoundland caused great consternation in Ottawa, London, and Washington and yet another disruption and further delays in the convoys departing Halifax. For Admiral Bristol and other Americans in the Support Force who were preparing to escort North Atlantic convoys, this attack by two battle cruisers in what was soon to be the American area of responsibility was a sobering reminder that U-boats were not the only threat and gave rise to the idea of basing some of the old and the new American battleships reappeared off Newfoundland. The two battle cruisers attacked a westbound convoy which was approaching the dispersal point in Canadian waters. Between them they sank five ships for 25,784 tons, their first kills since entering the Atlantic on February 4. The battle cruisers then proceeded to the South Atlantic to attack convoys off Sierra Leone. Their appearance off Newfoundland caused great consternation in Ottawa, London, and Washington and yet another disruption and further delays in the convoys departing Halifax. For Admiral Bristol and other Americans in the Support Force who were preparing to escort North Atlantic convoys, this attack by two battle cruisers in what was soon to be the American area of responsibility was a sobering reminder that U-boats were not the only threat and gave rise to the idea of basing some of the old and the new American battleships* at Argentia and at Hvalfjord, Iceland, on the Denmark Strait. at Argentia and at Hvalfjord, Iceland, on the Denmark Strait.

Prien in U-47 U-47 sailed directly up the west coast of Ireland. On the afternoon of February 25 he ran into convoy Outbound 290, composed of thirty-nine ships and seven escorts. Prien reported, shadowed, and broadcast beacon signals. Donitz ordered Kretschmer in sailed directly up the west coast of Ireland. On the afternoon of February 25 he ran into convoy Outbound 290, composed of thirty-nine ships and seven escorts. Prien reported, shadowed, and broadcast beacon signals. Donitz ordered Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 and two boats on first patrols to join: Heilmann in and two boats on first patrols to join: Heilmann in U-97 U-97, who was out of torpedoes en route to Lorient, and Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73, who was on weather station. He alerted Gruppe Gruppe 40 to fly Condors on the following day. 40 to fly Condors on the following day.

Shortly after midnight on February 26, Prien attacked the convoy alone. There was no moon, but the northern lights provided excellent visibility. His first salvo sank a 5,300-ton Belgian freighter and damaged an 8,100-ton British tanker in ballast. After reloading his tubes, he came in and fired a second salvo, sinking two more freighters, a 3,200-ton Swede and a 3,600-ton Norwegian. While again reloading his tubes he continued to track and send beacon signals, adding that he had sunk 20,000 tons. But no other U-boat came up that night.

Later that day, February 26, guided by Prien's beacon signals, the Condors found and attacked the convoy. One Condor appeared at noon; five in late afternoon. Astonishingly, they sank seven ships for 36,250 tons and damaged another one of 20,755 tons. All the while Prien doggedly and bravely tracked and sent beacon signals. In his last message of the day, Prien reported that he had been "beaten off' by Allied aircraft and had been depth-charged by escorts. He revised his sinking report upward slightly to 22,000 tons. In actuality, Prien had sunk 12,000 tons.

Heilmann in U-97 U-97, who had no torpedoes, made contact with the convoy that evening and took over as shadower. He attempted to bring up Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73 and Kretschmer in and Kretschmer in U-99 U-99, but the attempt failed and the convoy dispersed. Donitz ordered Prien, Kretschmer, and Rosenbaum to rake the ocean westward. Prien sank a lone 4,200-ton British freighter, but neither Rosenbaum nor Kretschmer had any luck. Adalberto Giovannini in Bianchi Bianchi found two stragglers from the convoy and positively sank one. found two stragglers from the convoy and positively sank one.* Altogether Prien and Giovannini sank four confirmed ships from Outbound 290 and Prien also damaged a tanker in ballast. Altogether Prien and Giovannini sank four confirmed ships from Outbound 290 and Prien also damaged a tanker in ballast.

The devastating storms in the North Atlantic raged all through the month of February. A "hurricane" hit convoy Halifax 106, sinking two ships and disabling numerous others. Even so, a total of 307 ships crossed from Canada to the British Isles in convoys. During the month, Axis submarines in the North Atlantic sank eleven loaded eastbound vessels, all stragglers from convoys Halifax 106 and 107 and Slow Convoys 20 and 21.

ATTACKING N NAVAL E ENIGMA.

The original plan for the Americans to provide convoy escort on the Canada-Iceland leg of the North Atlantic run starting in April 1941 raised anew the issue of exchanges of intelligence information between the British and Americans. In particular the Americans wanted all available information on German and Italian naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean area. In addition to the growing number of U-boats, which were patrolling ever westward toward Canada, four powerful German warships and five merchant-ship raiders plus twenty-three Italian submarines posed a serious threat to American convoy-escort operations. Moreover, an even greater menace was in the offing: the super-battleships Moreover, an even greater menace was in the offing: the super-battleships Bismarck Bismarck and and Tirpitz Tirpitz.

As related, the senior civilian officials of the British and American governments had agreed (in writing, December 1940) to exchange data on breaking Axis codes. What the Americans needed most at that time were the fruits of British successes in breaking German and Italian naval codes. In return, the Americans were to share the fruits of their successes in breaking Japanese codes, in particular the recent sensational cryptographic triumph of duplicating the Purple code machine.

Not all Allied codebreakers on both sides of the Atlantic were keen on the proposed exchange. By nature codebreakers are an obsessively secretive lot, loath to divulge technology to those outside of their respective circles. Each side had misgivings about the trustworthiness of the other, and not without reason. After World War I, the British had indiscreetly and boastfully revealed the secrets of Room 40. Codebreaker Herbert Yardley had indiscreetly and boastfully revealed the secrets of American cryptography. Moreover, each side had been breaking codes of the other for years, an activity justified as spying on a potential "enemy."

That said, it is also probable that some American codebreakers were quite eager to foster the exchange. Most Americans believed the British Isles were still at great risk, that the Germans might invade in the spring of 1941. They thought it was possible that during the winter Blitz, or the intense preinvasion bombing, or the invasion itself, the British codebreaking establishment could be wiped out or compromised. Others believed that based on the success with the Purple machine codes, the Americans could more effectively exploit existing Enigma technology than the British could, especially by bringing into play appropriate sectors of the vast American electronics and calculating-machine industries.

Whatever the case, the Americans initiated the first step in the Anglo-American codebreaking exchange in early 1941. In Chesapeake Bay on January 25, four Americans-two Army, two Navy*-boarded the new British battleship, King George V King George V, which had just brought the new British Ambassador, Edward F. L. Wood (Lord Halifax), to America. These Americans had with them a Purple machine (or perhaps two machines; sources conflict) and other important materials relating to the decoding of Japanese diplomatic and naval transmissions.

The King George V King George V cautiously crossed the Atlantic during the sortie of cautiously crossed the Atlantic during the sortie of Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst into those waters. She arrived at Scapa Flow in a snowstorm on February 6. A British brigadier, John H. Tiltman, an expert on nonmachine ciphers who had been designated escort for the Americans, transferred them to a cruiser which took them to the Thames Estuary. From there the deputy director of the Government Code and Cipher School, Edward W. Travis, accompanied the party by automobile to the British codebreaking facility at Bletchley Park. Its commander, Alastair Denniston, welcomed the Americans warmly and courteously. into those waters. She arrived at Scapa Flow in a snowstorm on February 6. A British brigadier, John H. Tiltman, an expert on nonmachine ciphers who had been designated escort for the Americans, transferred them to a cruiser which took them to the Thames Estuary. From there the deputy director of the Government Code and Cipher School, Edward W. Travis, accompanied the party by automobile to the British codebreaking facility at Bletchley Park. Its commander, Alastair Denniston, welcomed the Americans warmly and courteously.

The American party remained in England about five weeks. Historians of Allied codebreaking still dispute exactly what transpired. Beyond doubt, the Americans turned over the Purple machine (or two of them) and instructed the British in its use. It is what the Americans got in return for this extraordinary gift that is disputed. Some historians say the British disclosed all they knew about Enigma and Italian codes; others say that the British did not-that they were secretive, told little, and kept the Americans at arm's length. The most astute of these historians, Bradley Smith, leans to the view that the British withheld too much and thereby shortchanged the Americans. What is not in dispute is the fact that the Americans got no Enigma machine or a clone of one in exchange for the Purple machine. leans to the view that the British withheld too much and thereby shortchanged the Americans. What is not in dispute is the fact that the Americans got no Enigma machine or a clone of one in exchange for the Purple machine.

The Purple machine helped the British enormously. With it they read high-grade Japanese diplomatic traffic for the rest of the war. Of particular benefit to the British (and, of course, the Americans) was the Purple traffic between the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Baron Hiroshi shima, and Tokyo. In a previous tour of duty in Berlin, shima had gained the confidence of Hitler, Goring, von Ribbentrop, and other leaders in the Third Reich. The Germans again talked freely of their military plans and weaponry. shima frequently relayed the gist of these talks to Tokyo in Purple code, providing the British-and the Americans-a sort of peephole into Hitler's mind as well as much specific information on German weaponry.

At this time the British did not have a whole lot of Enigma technology to give the Americans, especially in the naval field. With the assistance of the Turing-Welchman bombas and cribs from various sources, the British were able to read Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Red consistently, but even that was a tense daily struggle. As has been revealed by numerous British codebreakers, Red consistently, but even that was a tense daily struggle. As has been revealed by numerous British codebreakers,* little to no progress had been made on breaking naval Enigma. Some did not think naval Enigma could ever be broken without the capture of the daily key settings and other aids. little to no progress had been made on breaking naval Enigma. Some did not think naval Enigma could ever be broken without the capture of the daily key settings and other aids.

At the time the Americans arrived in England, the British in fact had afoot an elaborate plan to capture naval Enigma materials. This proposed theft was a high-risk proposition not favored by all concerned. If the Germans became aware of or even got a hint of the theft, they might tighten Enigma security and/or increase its complexity, causing the British to lose-and never regain-Luftwaffe Red. However, the depredations of Red. However, the depredations of Hipper Hipper, Gneisenau Gneisenau, and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and the merchant-ship raiders, the prospect of a sharp increase in the number of U-boats, the looming threat of and the merchant-ship raiders, the prospect of a sharp increase in the number of U-boats, the looming threat of Bismarck Bismarck and and Tirpitz Tirpitz, and perhaps pressures from Washington for naval intelligence persuaded the British to go ahead with the theft.

The Germans had thinly occupied the Lofoten Islands off Narvik to exploit the local cod and herring fisheries. Advocates of the theft were persuaded that a strong and well-organized commando raid on the islands might result in the capture of Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine Enigma and other codes. The operation, Claymore, was staged from Scapa Flow on March 1, 1941. The commando force was substantial: 600 men in two channel steamers, escorted by five big Enigma and other codes. The operation, Claymore, was staged from Scapa Flow on March 1, 1941. The commando force was substantial: 600 men in two channel steamers, escorted by five big Tribal Tribal-class destroyers, which were covered by two cruisers and, more distantly, by stronger elements of the Home Fleet.

Landing in the early hours of March 4, the commandos caught the Germans by complete surprise. To cover the real purpose of the raid, the British blew up the fisheries. In the brisk, brief battle, they captured 213 German prisoners, but disappointingly, they found no Enigmas. The five Tribal Tribal destroyers attacked German shipping in the fjords, sinking a 9,800-ton fish factory ship, destroyers attacked German shipping in the fjords, sinking a 9,800-ton fish factory ship, Hamburg Hamburg, and several coasters. One German armed trawler, Krebs, bravely fought back. Her skipper, Hans Kupfinger, and thirteen other men were killed in the one-sided fight. Boarding the wrecked vessel, three British officers from the destroyer Somali Somali discovered that Kupfinger had thrown his Enigma machine overboard, but he had died before he could destroy all the Enigma documents, two extra rotors, and some German naval hand ciphers. discovered that Kupfinger had thrown his Enigma machine overboard, but he had died before he could destroy all the Enigma documents, two extra rotors, and some German naval hand ciphers.

The British got a priceless haul from Claymore: Enigma key tables and ring and plugboard settings for February 1941. Utilizing this material, in less than a week (by March 10) the codebreakers at Bletchley Park were able to read the whole of Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine home waters code, home waters code, Heimisch Heimisch, or as the British called it, Dolphin, for the month of February. That month-old traffic was of no immediate tactical value, but since 95 percent of all Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine traffic was encoded in traffic was encoded in Heimisch Heimisch (Dolphin), it provided insights into past (Dolphin), it provided insights into past Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine operations and administration and encoding procedures, as well as much specific information on U-boats. operations and administration and encoding procedures, as well as much specific information on U-boats.

At about this same time the British made an important break into a German naval hand cipher, Werftschlussel Werftschlussel (literally, Dockyard Key) or (literally, Dockyard Key) or Werft Werft. This was a "pencil and paper" cipher used by all minor naval vessels and port facilities in German and Norwegian waters. An unglamorous section at Bletchley Park, known as "Cinderella," had been attacking this hand cipher (and others) cryptanalytically with only slight success. However, as Christopher Morris, one of those in the section, has revealed, from "March 1941" the British read Werft Werft traffic "as a rule currently" for the rest of the war. In all, the Cinderella section decoded 33,000 traffic "as a rule currently" for the rest of the war. In all, the Cinderella section decoded 33,000 Werft Werft messages over forty-seven months, an average of about twenty-three signals a day. messages over forty-seven months, an average of about twenty-three signals a day.

Inasmuch as many Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine messages had to be transmitted in both Enigma and messages had to be transmitted in both Enigma and Werft Werft in order to reach the less important ships and the shore stations, the two systems provided cribs into one another. "Indeed," Morris wrote, "the 'cross-ruffing' between the two was for some time the prize exhibit which Naval Section could display to distinguished visitors, such as Winston Churchill...." Transmissions in in order to reach the less important ships and the shore stations, the two systems provided cribs into one another. "Indeed," Morris wrote, "the 'cross-ruffing' between the two was for some time the prize exhibit which Naval Section could display to distinguished visitors, such as Winston Churchill...." Transmissions in Werft Werft from big ships to port authorities or to little ships, such as tugs, or from U-boats in Baltic workup to dockyards or to target ships or tugs, enabled Morris and his fellow codebreakers to pinpoint the locations of the big ships and to identify and track newly commissioned U-boats. When there was a dearth of cribs for. Enigma and from big ships to port authorities or to little ships, such as tugs, or from U-boats in Baltic workup to dockyards or to target ships or tugs, enabled Morris and his fellow codebreakers to pinpoint the locations of the big ships and to identify and track newly commissioned U-boats. When there was a dearth of cribs for. Enigma and Werft Werft, the British resorted to "gardening," or planting mines in specific zones of known German-swept channels. This invariably provided a spate of warning traffic and/or instructions to minesweepers in Enigma and Werft Werft, which could be "cross-ruffed," providing a new source of cribs, which the British called "Kisses."

When the four Americans departed Bletchley Park in late March 1941, they were probably aware of the British Enigma thefts in the Lofotens and the solid break into Werft Werft. They did not return entirely empty-handed. One of the Navy delegates, Robert H. Weeks, has revealed that the British gave them a "paper" Enigma machine (i.e., a detailed drawing) with "all the rotor[s] and umkehrwaltz umkehrwaltz [reflectors] laid out" and some Enigma keys. According to the American codebreaking historian David Kahn, [reflectors] laid out" and some Enigma keys. According to the American codebreaking historian David Kahn,* the two Army delegates, Sinkov and Rosen, wrote in their official report (of April 1941) that "we were invited to ask questions about anything we saw, no doors were closed to us and copies were furnished of any material which we considered of possible assistance to the United States." the two Army delegates, Sinkov and Rosen, wrote in their official report (of April 1941) that "we were invited to ask questions about anything we saw, no doors were closed to us and copies were furnished of any material which we considered of possible assistance to the United States."

On the other hand, based on independent interviews with Sinkov, two American codebreaking historians stress the point that the British did not-repeat not-reveal how they actually broke broke Enigma. In his book, Enigma. In his book, Thomas Parrish, referring to his interview of Sinkov in February 1984, wrote that on "one or two occasions," Thomas Parrish, referring to his interview of Sinkov in February 1984, wrote that on "one or two occasions," the British discussed some "cryptanalytic details" of Enigma with the Americans, but this type of presentation was "essentially an account of some British achievements." Sinkov said, "It was far from enough to enable us to get into the actual process of producing information." Based on a review of Sinkov's papers and an interview with him in October 1990, the aforementioned Bradley Smith wrote that the American party was told only "in a general way" about British decryption processes. "They were not allowed to see a bombe or even told of its existence." Smith concluded: "The American team therefore had no hard evidence to prove the importance of analytic-machine methods in the British cryptanalytic effort, even though they suspected that some machine-calculation method was being used at Bletchley." Thomas Parrish, referring to his interview of Sinkov in February 1984, wrote that on "one or two occasions," Thomas Parrish, referring to his interview of Sinkov in February 1984, wrote that on "one or two occasions," the British discussed some "cryptanalytic details" of Enigma with the Americans, but this type of presentation was "essentially an account of some British achievements." Sinkov said, "It was far from enough to enable us to get into the actual process of producing information." Based on a review of Sinkov's papers and an interview with him in October 1990, the aforementioned Bradley Smith wrote that the American party was told only "in a general way" about British decryption processes. "They were not allowed to see a bombe or even told of its existence." Smith concluded: "The American team therefore had no hard evidence to prove the importance of analytic-machine methods in the British cryptanalytic effort, even though they suspected that some machine-calculation method was being used at Bletchley."

Among those in Washington who felt the British had betrayed the Americans was the U.S. Navy's senior codebreaker, Laurence Safford. In view of the Navy's growing responsibilities-and war risks-in the Atlantic at this time, doubtless Safford was under intense pressure to produce information on German and Italian naval operations in that area. He was bitter toward the British and remained so for the rest of his life, later giving vent to his feelings in several published articles and papers.

As a consequence of this "broken deal," as Bradley Smith characterized this first cryptography "exchange," American codebreakers had to face the possibility of breaking Enigma on their own. This added a huge new burden to Safford's work already in progress, such as solutions to the Japanese naval codes. At that time, the Navy's entire communications-intelligence organization, including radio-intercept stations in the Atlantic and Pacific areas, had only about 550 staffers, of whom only forty-four were commissioned officers.

Safford therefore sought outside help. Chief among those he leaned upon was a thirty-eight-year-old naval reservist, Howard Theodore Engstrom. Although the codebreaking historians have largely overlooked Engstrom, he was to play the key role in the American attack on naval Enigma, an enterprise of vital importance, which in the rush to give all credit to the Poles and British has likewise been neglected.

Engstrom was the middle of three sons of Scandinavian immigrants-a Swedish father and Norwegian mother. His father, a lifeguard in Plymouth and Manomet, Massachusetts, died when he was ten, leaving his mother, a laundress, to raise the boys, the youngest of whom died at age eleven. A brilliant student, Howard graduated from Plymouth High School in 1918, at age sixteen, and from Northeastern University in 1922, age twenty, with a degree in chemical engineering.

Adept at foreign languages and mathematics, Engstrom chose an academic career. He got a master's degree in mathematics from the University of Maine (1925) and a doctorate in mathematics from Yale (1929). For the next two years (1930-1931) he was a National and International Research Fellow at the California Institute of Technology and in Gottingen, Germany, where he became fluent in German. From 1932, he was an assistant, then associate professor of mathematics at Yale University. In 1935, he married a Finnish-born woman, Karin Ekblom, who had obtained a bachelor of nursing degree from Yale the year before.

In response to a recruiting drive by the Navy's Radio Intelligence Organization, which Safford commanded from May 6, 1936, Engstrom accepted a reserve commission as a lieutenant, junior grade. From 1936 to 1940, while on active tours of duty in the summers, he had worked sporadically with Safford. On his stint in the summer of 1940 in Washington, specializing in machine ciphers, he had put in "ten hours a day, seven days a week," he wrote his older brother, Walder, a bank president in Plymouth.

While still at Yale in the early months of 1941, at Safford's request Engstrom began some preliminary theoretical work on naval Enigma, it is believed. Several months later, in July 1941, he was called to full-time active duty in Safford's outfit, with the rank of lieutenant. As will be seen, he rose swiftly to higher rank and responsibilities. His codebreaking achievements, for which both the American and British governments decorated him,* produced results on a par with those of the British mathematicians Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman. produced results on a par with those of the British mathematicians Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman.