The Americans continued to observe the slaughter of this "Happy Time" with awe and concealed contempt. The U-boat successes in the pitched convoy battles of the fall reinforced their belief that a poorly escorted convoy was worse than no convoy at all, inasmuch as it presented the German packs a convenient mass of targets-too many eggs in one very vulnerable basket. The absence of surface-ship escorts to protect the convoys also reinforced the American view that Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, which drained off substantial British naval assets from the home waters, was a foolish diversion at a most critical time. Above all, the Americans faulted the British authorities for failing to direct Bomber Command to mount a maximum effort to prevent the construction of the U-boat pens in the French Atlantic ports.

Prime Minister Churchill was keenly alive to the looming shipping crisis. He wrote in his war memoir: Amid the torrent of violent events, one anxiety reigned supreme. Battles might be won or lost, enterprises might succeed or miscarry, territories might be gained or quitted, but dominating all our power to carry on the war, or even keep ourselves alive, lay our mastery of the ocean routes and the free approach and entry to our ports.... How willingly would I have exchanged a full-scale [German] attempt at invasion [of the British Isles] for this shapeless, measureless [u-boat] peril, expressed in charts, curves and statistics....

Apart from the measures taken in late 1940 to obtain new merchant ships in the United States and Canada, Churchill directed the Admiralty to drastically improve its handling of convoys and fast independent ships. As one measure, the Admiralty rerouted all transatlantic convoys farther northward to outdistance the supposedly efficient German convoy-spotter planes. As another, it released ships that could cruise at 13 knots or faster from the obligation to sail in convoy.*

In addition, the British took steps to beef up the protection of the poorly escorted transatlantic convoys. With the threat of a German invasion reduced to nil by the victory of the RAF over the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe and the onset of foul winter weather, the Admiralty released a number of fleet and other destroyers from anti-invasion duties and assigned them to convoy escort. Even so, there remained an acute shortage of escort destroyers, caused in part by the heavy destroyer battle losses and damage, and by the failure of the first twenty-three new, small and the onset of foul winter weather, the Admiralty released a number of fleet and other destroyers from anti-invasion duties and assigned them to convoy escort. Even so, there remained an acute shortage of escort destroyers, caused in part by the heavy destroyer battle losses and damage, and by the failure of the first twenty-three new, small Hunt Hunt-class vessels to measure up for duty in the North Atlantic, and by the delays in the arrival or readiness of the fifty four-stack destroyers from the U.S. Navy. In November, Churchill vented his frustrations in a memo to the Admiralty: Action This Day. What is disconcerting is that out of 151 destroyers, only 84 are available for service and out of 60 for [convoy escort and ASW in] Northwest Approaches only 33 [are available]. More than a month ago, the Admiral [at Northwest Approaches] was found with only 24 available.... I cannot understand why such an immense proportion of destroyers are laid up from one cause or another.

In order to increase the availability of convoy escorts, the Admiralty initiated several other changes. On the western end, the transatlantic convoy sailings from America were "opened out" or delayed. Rather than every four days, about half of the important Halifax convoys sailed every six days. Rather than every eight days, all the Sydney (or Slow) convoys sailed (from Halifax after ice closed Sydney) every ten days. On the eastern end, the Admiralty shifted convoy destroyer bases from Bristol and Liverpool to Loch Ewe in North Scotland and Belfast in Northern Ireland. These changes enabled more escorts to remain with the convoys farther out to sea on both ends of the routes.

By this time the 205-foot British and Canadian-built single-screw Flower-class corvettes had begun to enter service in substantial numbers.* Although they were intended originally only for inshore coastal-convoy duty, out of dire necessity the Admiralty was forced to employ them on both ends of the transatlantic routes. An Admiralty naval architect, David K. Brown, wrote recently: Although they were intended originally only for inshore coastal-convoy duty, out of dire necessity the Admiralty was forced to employ them on both ends of the transatlantic routes. An Admiralty naval architect, David K. Brown, wrote recently: The Flower Flower-class ... had many drawbacks in ocean work. They were short so that pitch and heave motions were severe, which led to a high incidence of [sea] sickness and, in all probability, of poor decision-making, while their standard of habitability was low. Inadequate bilge keels led to heavy rolling, and they were too slow either to keep up with a surfaced submarine or to return quickly to station.... The Flowers were not a good design.... The early short-forecastle Flowers Flowers were the worst. They had bunks in the forecastle, where the motion was worst. To reach the bridge or engine room meant crossing the open well deck, inevitably getting wet in bad weather. Worse still, the galley was aft and food had to be brought along the open upper deck to the mess, getting cold, if not spilt on the way. were the worst. They had bunks in the forecastle, where the motion was worst. To reach the bridge or engine room meant crossing the open well deck, inevitably getting wet in bad weather. Worse still, the galley was aft and food had to be brought along the open upper deck to the mess, getting cold, if not spilt on the way.

Coastal Command, led by Frederick Bowhill, had matured considerably since the beginning of the war, but it was still a poor stepchild of the RAF. Its daylight aircraft patrols with Sunderlands and Hudsons had been useful in forcing down U-boats, but no aircraft of Coastal Command had yet sunk a German U-boat unassisted by a surface craft. From July 1940, when the U-boats shifted to night surface attacks, these Coastal Command air patrols had been virtually useless inasmuch as it was almost impossible to spot a U-boat at night by eye.

What was needed was ASW radar. At the beginning of 1940, the Air Ministry had provided a few 1.5-meter-wavelength ASV (airborne radar sets) for a handful of Coastal Command and Navy aircraft types (Hudson, Swordfish, Walrus) to be used to track big enemy surface ships. However, since these sets were not capable of detecting U-boats, Coastal Command and the Royal Navy had requested the "crash" production of 4,000 improved 1.5-meter-wavelength sets (ASV-II). "Unfortunately," Admiralty historian J. David Brown wrote recently, "the Air Ministry bureaucracy failed to recognize the importance of the program" and pigeonholed the request, giving priority to Fighter Command for Air Interception (A-I) radar to help find enemy bombers. The upshot was that by the end of 1940, only forty-nine Coastal Command aircraft and a few experimental Navy Swordfish biplanes had the improved ASV-II radar sets, an appalling lapse second only to the British failure to prevent the building of U-boat pens in French Atlantic ports.

Even when properly calibrated and working at peak efficiency, the improved 1.5-meter-wavelength Mark II ASV radar in these Coastal Command aircraft was almost useless for killing a U-boat at night. For complicated electronic reasons apart from ground or sea "clutter," the radar went "blind" when the aircraft got within a mile of the U-boat. An alert U-boat watch thus had time to maneuver left or right off the flight path of the "blind" aircraft, avoiding its bombs or depth charges.

What the aircrews needed was some means of "seeing" during that last mile to the U-boat. In late October 1940, an officer in Coastal Command headquarters, Humphrey de Verde Leigh, proposed one possible solution: a very powerful, steerable searchlight, mounted on a retractable bed in the underside of the fuselage. Bowhill enthusiastically endorsed the proposal and detached Leigh to work on it full time. But owing to technical problems, bureaucratic inertia, and indifference, it was to take Leigh a full eighteen months to work out the bugs, to gain full approval from the Air Ministry, and to get the searchlight into combat, yet another serious British lapse.

Radar for British escort ships was similarly slow in coming. It was not until June 19, 1940, that a British destroyer put to sea with a test ASW radar. She was Verity Verity, fitted with a 1.5-meter-wavelength set, designated Type 286M. It had a "fixed" antenna, which could only "look ahead." In order to search a wider path in the seas, it was necessary to swing the ship to port and to starboard. British engineers were at work on a rotating antenna and a cathode-ray display tube (Planned Position Indicator, or PPI), which presented the host vessel at the center and other vessels as "lingering blips" on a flat screen.

The 286M was useful for stationkeeping in convoys, but to detect U-boats the ships-no less than the aircraft-required a more powerful radar based on the Randall and Boot cavity magnetron. This was coming, but also slowly. On August 12, 1940, at Swanage Bay, British scientists carried out the first successful test of a 10-centimeter-wavelength radar against a submarine. However, as with the improved 1.5-meter-wavelength ASV-II radar, the Air Ministry gave highest priority for centimetric radar to Fighter Command to facilitate bomber interception. Six months passed before a naval vessel put to sea to test a (fixed-antenna) shipboard 10-centimeter radar designated Type 271M.

On the other side of the hill, it soon became apparent that the handful of German U-boats could not sustain the slaughter of the "Happy Time." The captains and crews, worked to exhaustion, had to have R&R, and their vessels required refits and overhauls. The winter weather was ever more forbidding. It and the short winter days drastically reduced visibility and therefore the chance of spotting exhaust smoke from ships in convoy. Notwithstanding British beliefs to the contrary, meaningful assistance in convoy spotting from the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe was still virtually nonexistent. Moreover, the shortage of U-boats had become even worse. All the old Type VIIs and all the ducks had been lost or withdrawn from the Atlantic to the Training Command. Several other oceangoing boats had returned to Germany for overhaul and upgrading. Many of the new U-boats in Baltic workup incurred delays owing to mechanical failures. The big Italian submarines at Bordeaux were less than useless. was still virtually nonexistent. Moreover, the shortage of U-boats had become even worse. All the old Type VIIs and all the ducks had been lost or withdrawn from the Atlantic to the Training Command. Several other oceangoing boats had returned to Germany for overhaul and upgrading. Many of the new U-boats in Baltic workup incurred delays owing to mechanical failures. The big Italian submarines at Bordeaux were less than useless.

Hard times lay ahead.

* The British salvaged The British salvaged U-13 U-13 and recovered a set of "standing orders" issued by Donitz in which he explicitly prohibited the rescue of enemy survivors in the waters of the British Isles. ("Do not rescue any men; do not take them along; and do not take care of any boats of the ship.") The prosecutors at Nuremberg introduced these orders to buttress the charge that Donitz waged inhumane and illegal submarine warfare. Donitz rebutted that this forceful and drastic order was necessary because too many of his skippers were wont to carry out humane rescues, which, in the heavily patrolled waters of the British Isles, risked "suicide for the U-boat." and recovered a set of "standing orders" issued by Donitz in which he explicitly prohibited the rescue of enemy survivors in the waters of the British Isles. ("Do not rescue any men; do not take them along; and do not take care of any boats of the ship.") The prosecutors at Nuremberg introduced these orders to buttress the charge that Donitz waged inhumane and illegal submarine warfare. Donitz rebutted that this forceful and drastic order was necessary because too many of his skippers were wont to carry out humane rescues, which, in the heavily patrolled waters of the British Isles, risked "suicide for the U-boat."

* Hartmann's claimed sinkings had reached the requisite 100,000 tons for a Hartmann's claimed sinkings had reached the requisite 100,000 tons for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. His confirmed tonnage was 78,500. Schuhart claimed about 65,000 tons, including Courageous Courageous. His confirmed score was seven ships for 53,300 tons. However, Schuhart's record 41,905 tons sunk in a single patrol had not been topped.

* The prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials cited Oehrn's refusal to assist the survivors of The prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials cited Oehrn's refusal to assist the survivors of Sheaf Sheaf Mead Mead as another example of Nazi brutality at sea, charging that Oehrn behaved "in an exceptionally callous manner." In rebuttal, Donitz argued that as another example of Nazi brutality at sea, charging that Oehrn behaved "in an exceptionally callous manner." In rebuttal, Donitz argued that Sheaf Sheaf Mead Mead was "probably no merchant ship but [rather] a submarine trap," that in any case the ship was "heavily" armed, and that since Oehrn was under the impression that she was, at the least, an (armed) auxiliary cruiser, the sinking on sight was completely justified. Donitz did not, however, condone Oehrn's indifference to the survivors. Inasmuch as there was no apparent danger to the boat, Oehrn should have "helped," he conceded. was "probably no merchant ship but [rather] a submarine trap," that in any case the ship was "heavily" armed, and that since Oehrn was under the impression that she was, at the least, an (armed) auxiliary cruiser, the sinking on sight was completely justified. Donitz did not, however, condone Oehrn's indifference to the survivors. Inasmuch as there was no apparent danger to the boat, Oehrn should have "helped," he conceded.

* The Berlin-based American radio journalist William Shirer, and others, speculated that the Germans had intended to sink The Berlin-based American radio journalist William Shirer, and others, speculated that the Germans had intended to sink Washington Washington clandestinely and blame it on a British submarine in order to poison Anglo-American relations. No documents have come to light supporting this improbable scenario. clandestinely and blame it on a British submarine in order to poison Anglo-American relations. No documents have come to light supporting this improbable scenario.

* Four new and formidable 35,000-ton battleships were under construction. Two, Four new and formidable 35,000-ton battleships were under construction. Two, Littorio Littorio and and Vittorio Vittorio Veneto Veneto, were nearly finished.

* Reinforced by the forthcoming German super-battleships Reinforced by the forthcoming German super-battleships Bismarck Bismarck and and Tirpitz Tirpitz, the five new King George V V-class British battleships and the six British carriers under construction, the four new 35,000-ton Italian battleships, and the new French battleships Jean Bart Jean Bart and and Richelieu Richelieu.

* Walter Simon, who was caught and arrested within hours. Walter Simon, who was caught and arrested within hours.

* A 6,700-ton Greek, the Estonian A 6,700-ton Greek, the Estonian Merkur Merkur, and the Norwegian Belmoira Belmoira, the latter two wrongly accredited to U-102 U-102.

* Clearton Clearton was wrongly credited to Lemp's was wrongly credited to Lemp's U-30 U-30.

* On September 27, 1940, Japan was to be formally welded into the Axis by the Tripartite Pact. On September 27, 1940, Japan was to be formally welded into the Axis by the Tripartite Pact.

* According to postwar analysis, Kretschmer's confirmed sinkings on the duck According to postwar analysis, Kretschmer's confirmed sinkings on the duck U-23 U-23 and and U-99 U-99 to then were fifteen and a half ships for 70,740 tons. to then were fifteen and a half ships for 70,740 tons.

* Berlin termed the relaxed U-boat rules to 20 degrees west longitude a "counterblockade" of Great Britain in reprisal for the British blockade of Germany. Berlin termed the relaxed U-boat rules to 20 degrees west longitude a "counterblockade" of Great Britain in reprisal for the British blockade of Germany.

Later, First Sea Lord. Later, First Sea Lord.

General Sean Russell, Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army, who, von Stockhausen reported, died of a bleeding ulcer. Russell was buried at sea. The other agent, Frank Ryan, remained with the boat. General Sean Russell, Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army, who, von Stockhausen reported, died of a bleeding ulcer. Russell was buried at sea. The other agent, Frank Ryan, remained with the boat.

* Including Liebe's two sinkings and one ship each sunk by the aborting Including Liebe's two sinkings and one ship each sunk by the aborting U-37 U-37 and and U-51 U-51, inbound to Lorient. U-51 U-51's victim was the 5,700-ton British tanker Sylvafield Sylvafield.

* In five patrols under Herbert Schultze, including Norway, and two under Rosing, the In five patrols under Herbert Schultze, including Norway, and two under Rosing, the U-48 U-48 had sunk thirty confirmed ships for 169,823 tons, putting her far ahead of all other boats. had sunk thirty confirmed ships for 169,823 tons, putting her far ahead of all other boats.

* From February 12, 1940, HX convoys sailed from Halifax every four days at a fixed speed of 9 knots. Faster ships (15 knots plus) sailed alone. SC convoys sailed from Sydney every eight days. From February 12, 1940, HX convoys sailed from Halifax every four days at a fixed speed of 9 knots. Faster ships (15 knots plus) sailed alone. SC convoys sailed from Sydney every eight days.

* The The U-A U-A sank six other vessels for a total bag of seven for 40,706 tons. sank six other vessels for a total bag of seven for 40,706 tons.

* These unwisely included a dozen old These unwisely included a dozen old O O-, P P-, and R R- class fleet submarines, and minelayers, which because of their age and size were entirely unsuited for Mediterranean operations. Ill-equipped, ill-trained Italian ASW forces promptly sank seven of them, with heavy loss of life. In return, one British submarine, Parthian Parthian, sank the Italian submarine Diamante Diamante. warships were pressed into service to escort the convoys which went the long way to Egypt via the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean.

* See See Appendix 9 Appendix 9.

In 1940, the Maritime Commission produced fifty-four new ships, including sixteen tankers. Forty-one of these ships went to the Army and Navy and thirteen to the private sector. In 1940, the Maritime Commission produced fifty-four new ships, including sixteen tankers. Forty-one of these ships went to the Army and Navy and thirteen to the private sector.

Henry J. Kaiser's Todd-California company in Richmond, California, built thirty ships; his Todd-Maine company built the other thirty in Portland, Maine. The first American-built ship, Henry J. Kaiser's Todd-California company in Richmond, California, built thirty ships; his Todd-Maine company built the other thirty in Portland, Maine. The first American-built ship, Ocean Vanguard Ocean Vanguard, was launched ten months later, August 17, 1941.

* The first American-built Liberty ship, The first American-built Liberty ship, Patrick Henry Patrick Henry, was launched on September 27, 1941. She could carry 2,800 jeeps or 300 freight cars.

* In In The Ultra-Magic Deals The Ultra-Magic Deals (1993). (1993).

* Commemorated as "Battle of Britain Day." Commemorated as "Battle of Britain Day."

* See See Appendix 8 Appendix 8.

Developed between the wars, German acoustic mines were laid on the bottom in shallow water, like magnetic mines, but actuated by the "noise" of a ship's propeller, rather than its magnetic field. They were immune to magnetic sweepers and could be set to "sleep" for many days, or to allow several ships to pass before exploding. Developed between the wars, German acoustic mines were laid on the bottom in shallow water, like magnetic mines, but actuated by the "noise" of a ship's propeller, rather than its magnetic field. They were immune to magnetic sweepers and could be set to "sleep" for many days, or to allow several ships to pass before exploding.

* Kretschmer rescued from a sinking raft a single survivor of the freighter, Joseph Byrne. After giving him food and medical assistance, Kretschmner turned him over to a lifeboat under sail. Since Kretschmer and Longobardo had chosen English as their common language, Byrne thought he had been rescued by a British submarine! Kretschmer rescued from a sinking raft a single survivor of the freighter, Joseph Byrne. After giving him food and medical assistance, Kretschmner turned him over to a lifeboat under sail. Since Kretschmer and Longobardo had chosen English as their common language, Byrne thought he had been rescued by a British submarine!

* Counting one half credit for the Elmbank, Prien's confirmed score on this patrol was six and a half ships for 37,585 tons, bringing his confirmed total to twenty-two and a half ships for 151,652 tons. Schepke's confirmed score for this patrol was seven ships for 50,300 tons, bringing his confirmed total to twenty-four ships (tying Rollmann) for 94,175 tons. Bleichrodt's confirmed score for this patrol was eight ships for 34,588 tons. Kretschmer's total confirmed score, counting one half credit for the Counting one half credit for the Elmbank, Prien's confirmed score on this patrol was six and a half ships for 37,585 tons, bringing his confirmed total to twenty-two and a half ships for 151,652 tons. Schepke's confirmed score for this patrol was seven ships for 50,300 tons, bringing his confirmed total to twenty-four ships (tying Rollmann) for 94,175 tons. Bleichrodt's confirmed score for this patrol was eight ships for 34,588 tons. Kretschmer's total confirmed score, counting one half credit for the Elmbank Elmbank, was twenty-two ships for 110,683 tons.

Counting one half credit for Counting one half credit for Corrientes Corrientes, Jenisch had sunk seven and a half confirmed ships for 39,250 tons in seven days. Over credited with sinking 82,644 tons on this and his prior patrol, Jenisch now had a total credited score of 104,818 tons. His confirmed score was seventeen and a half ships for 76,290 tons.

* While commanding While commanding U-37 U-37, Hartmann and Oehrn had sunk forty-two and a half confirmed ships for 180,000 tons. This ranked the boat first in total number of ships sunk. But since total tonnage sunk counted for more, the U-48 U-48, which had sunk thirty-six confirmed ships for 204,411 tons under three skippers, was still regarded as the top boat, about 53,000 tons ahead of Prien's U-47 U-47.

Seven boats at sea; ten in Lorient or St. Nazaire undergoing refits; the new Type VIIC Seven boats at sea; ten in Lorient or St. Nazaire undergoing refits; the new Type VIIC U-93 U-93 preparing to sail from Germany. preparing to sail from Germany.

Hitler was concerned that if Donitz took direct control of the Italian submarines, the Italians might demand direct control of the Hitler was concerned that if Donitz took direct control of the Italian submarines, the Italians might demand direct control of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe squadrons that had been sent to North Africa to support the Italian Army's attack on Egypt. squadrons that had been sent to North Africa to support the Italian Army's attack on Egypt.

* In the confusion of night actions, U-boat skippers often misidentified sloops, frigates, and corvettes as "destroyers." For a British account of the battle see Lund and Ludlam, Night of the In the confusion of night actions, U-boat skippers often misidentified sloops, frigates, and corvettes as "destroyers." For a British account of the battle see Lund and Ludlam, Night of the U-boats U-boats (1973). (1973).

Prien's confirmed total was twenty-six and a half ships for 173,552 tons. Bleichrodt's score for the patrol was six and a half ships for 40,000 tons, raising his confirmed total to fourteen and a half ships for 74,682 tons. Prien's confirmed total was twenty-six and a half ships for 173,552 tons. Bleichrodt's score for the patrol was six and a half ships for 40,000 tons, raising his confirmed total to fourteen and a half ships for 74,682 tons.

* Kretschmer in Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 argued similarly and successfully that his quartermaster, Heinrich Petersen, deserved a argued similarly and successfully that his quartermaster, Heinrich Petersen, deserved a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz- Although the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz was normally awarded only to officers, Donitz made an exception in this case. was normally awarded only to officers, Donitz made an exception in this case.

Pilot Maudsley was killed later in the war. Baudoux rose to the rank of wing commander in the RCAF. Pilot Maudsley was killed later in the war. Baudoux rose to the rank of wing commander in the RCAF.

* His confirmed total was eighteen and a half ships for 118,638 tons. His confirmed total was eighteen and a half ships for 118,638 tons.

* Luth's confirmed score was thirteen ships for 57,192 tons. Luth's confirmed score was thirteen ships for 57,192 tons.

* British air and surface forces had sunk another six Italian submarines in the Mediterranean area since June: British air and surface forces had sunk another six Italian submarines in the Mediterranean area since June: Iride, Gondar, Berillo, Foca, Durbo Iride, Gondar, Berillo, Foca, Durbo, and Lafole Lafole. Another, Gemma Gemma, was mistakenly sunk by another Italian submarine. A British boarding party recovered valuable intelligence documents from Durbo Durbo before she sank. Total Italian submarine losses in the first five months of combat: seventeen. before she sank. Total Italian submarine losses in the first five months of combat: seventeen.

* In addition to his articles, Frank published a propaganda book in 1942 about Prien's war patrols, In addition to his articles, Frank published a propaganda book in 1942 about Prien's war patrols, Prien Attacks Prien Attacks. In the 1950s, Frank also published an anecdotal history of the U-boat war, translated as The Sea Wolves The Sea Wolves, as well as other works.

* Making his confirmed total score thirty-two and a half ships for 182,032 tons. Making his confirmed total score thirty-two and a half ships for 182,032 tons.

Berlin propagandists crowed that Wohlfarth had sunk a grand total of 61,500 tons in "small submarines" (the ducks Berlin propagandists crowed that Wohlfarth had sunk a grand total of 61,500 tons in "small submarines" (the ducks U-14 U-14 and and U-137 U-137). His confirmed total was a duck record of sixteen ships sunk, plus severe damage to the auxiliary cruiser Cheshire and another ship, but the total confirmed tonnage sunk was only 36,800.

* After After U-102 U-102, she was the second new IXB to disappear without a trace on her first patrol.

Kretschmer's confirmed total was thirty-five and a fraction ships for 191,515 tons. to write a propaganda book (as had Prien and Werner Hartmann), but "Silent Otto" refused. When Donitz granted him and his crew home leave extending through Christmas, Kretschmer took the whole crew on a skiing holiday. Kretschmer's confirmed total was thirty-five and a fraction ships for 191,515 tons. to write a propaganda book (as had Prien and Werner Hartmann), but "Silent Otto" refused. When Donitz granted him and his crew home leave extending through Christmas, Kretschmer took the whole crew on a skiing holiday.

* Schutze's confirmed score for the patrol was seven ships for 38,465 tons; his confirmed total, nineteen and a half ships for 93,801 tons. Schutze's confirmed score for the patrol was seven ships for 38,465 tons; his confirmed total, nineteen and a half ships for 93,801 tons.

Two Spanish, one Yugoslav, one Swede, and a Greek. Two Spanish, one Yugoslav, one Swede, and a Greek.

At this time the Admiralty wrongly credited the British destroyer At this time the Admiralty wrongly credited the British destroyer Havelock Havelock for this kill. for this kill.

* Does not include two tankers and two freighters sunk by Does not include two tankers and two freighters sunk by U-65 U-65, patrolling in West African waters.

* Theretofore only ships that could cruise at 15 knots or faster were permitted to sail outside the 9-knot Halifax convoys. The new and riskier procedure allowed scores of newer, faster, armed merchant ships such as tankers to sail alone, reducing the travel time. Theretofore only ships that could cruise at 15 knots or faster were permitted to sail outside the 9-knot Halifax convoys. The new and riskier procedure allowed scores of newer, faster, armed merchant ships such as tankers to sail alone, reducing the travel time.

* The first British-built The first British-built Flower Flower-class corvette, Gladiolus Gladiolus, was launched January 24, 1940. By the end of 1940, British yards had launched seventy-six. The first Canadian-built corvette, Dunvegan Dunvegan, was launched February 11, 1940. By the end of 1940, Canadian yards had launched forty-five. Total corvettes completed by the end of 1940: 121.

FOUR.

A BRUTAL W WINTER.

Adolf Hitler, the continentalist, was irrevocably committed to an invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. On December 18, 1940, he issued preparatory orders for that undertaking, Operation Barbarossa.

Planning for Barbarossa was complicated by Mussolini's failures in North Africa and Greece. Before he invaded the Soviet Union, Hitler had first to rescue Mussolini and protect Germany's strategic position in the Balkans by sending ground forces-the Afrika Korps Afrika Korps-to North Africa as soon as possible, and by invading and occupying Greece (Operation Marita) in March. For these reasons, "The Army must be sufficiently strong," Hitler said. "After that everything can be concentrated on the needs of the Air Force and the Navy."

The need to supply these far-flung projects with manpower and materiel slowed U-boat construction. On December 27, ten days after Hitler issued the preparatory orders for Barbarossa, Admiral Raeder conferred with him to make the strongest possible case against Barbarossa. His remarks to Hitler were preserved in abbreviated form by a stenographer: It is absolutely necessary to recognize that the greatest task of the hour is concentration of all our power against Britain. In other words, the means necessary for the defeat of Britain must be produced with energy and speed. All demands not absolutely essential for warfare against Britain must deliberately be set aside. There are serious doubts as to the advisability of Operation Barbarossa before the overthrow of Britain. The fight against Britain is carried on primarily by the Air Force and the Navy. There is therefore the greatest need to produce the weapons used by these two services and to concentrate these weapons on the British supply lines, which are taking on increased significance in view of the fact that the entire armament industry, particularly aircraft and ship construction, is being shifted to America. Britain's ability to maintain her supply lines is definitely the decisive factor for the outcome of the war.... The Naval Staff is firmly convinced that German submarines, as in the World War, are the decisive weapons against Britain.

Hitler was unmoved. The war against Great Britain was to take second or third priority until Mussolini had been rescued, the Balkans had been secured, and the Soviet Union had been conquered. Although these operations were to be carried out primarily by the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine was to have many important responsibilities, such as blocking the Soviet Navy in the Baltic and Black seas and in Arctic waters, defending Norway and Greece against possible British amphibious invasions, and arranging naval transports for the shipment of the was to have many important responsibilities, such as blocking the Soviet Navy in the Baltic and Black seas and in Arctic waters, defending Norway and Greece against possible British amphibious invasions, and arranging naval transports for the shipment of the Afrika Korps Afrika Korps and its impedimenta from Italy to North Africa and a supply line to support that force. and its impedimenta from Italy to North Africa and a supply line to support that force.

Raeder wrote later that Hitler's decision to leave Great Britain undefeated and unoccupied in favor of an attack on the Soviet Union was "sheer madness." Nonetheless, he accepted that decision like a good soldier and put the OKM to work on the various plans.

The naval war in the Atlantic was to be pressed to the fullest possible extent throughout 1941. The U-boats were to bear the main burden but they were to be augmented by the numerous merchant-ship raiders, the heavy cruisers Hipper Hipper and and Prinz Eugen Prinz Eugen, the "pocket" battleships Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer and and Lutzow Lutzow, the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst, and finally, the super-battleships Bismarck Bismarck and and Tirpitz Tirpitz.

The problem-the perennial problem-was the acute shortage of oceangoing U-boats. Thirteen new oceangoing boats had been commissioned between September 1 and December 1, 1940, but three oceangoing boats (U-31, U-32 U-32, U-104 U-104) had been lost in that period and two (U-28 and and U-29 U-29) had been retired to the Training Command. This worked out to a net gain of eight oceangoing boats, for a total of thirty-one commissioned boats, including U-A U-A. However, many new boats were still in workup. Even assuming that Baltic ice did not unduly delay them, it was to be March or April before most of the new boats could reach the Atlantic*

In view of the paucity of U-boats and the absence of reliable tactical information from B-dienst B-dienst and the and the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, Donitz urgently needed intelligence on British convoy movements. He therefore insisted to Raeder that something be done to compel the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe to provide the long-promised, much-needed aerial reconnaissance. Since the reconnaissance would help the planned antishipping raids of the German surface warships as well, Raeder agreed, but he had no influence with the to provide the long-promised, much-needed aerial reconnaissance. Since the reconnaissance would help the planned antishipping raids of the German surface warships as well, Raeder agreed, but he had no influence with the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe chief, Reichsmarshal Goring. Raeder and Goring were scarcely on speaking terms. chief, Reichsmarshal Goring. Raeder and Goring were scarcely on speaking terms.

The course of action taken entailed political risk: Raeder went over Goring's head and sent Donitz to make his case directly to one of Hitler's close staff officers, General Alfred Jodl. The interview, Donitz wrote, "was very satisfactory and Jodl was convinced." The outcome was that Hitler personally directed that Luftwaffe gruppe Luftwaffe gruppe 40, commanded by a former naval officer, Martin Harlinghausen, be placed under Donitz's operational control. Although the 40, commanded by a former naval officer, Martin Harlinghausen, be placed under Donitz's operational control. Although the gruppe gruppe had only a few Condors-and the pilots had much to learn-Donitz optimistically wrote in his diary that Hitler's order was "a great step forward." had only a few Condors-and the pilots had much to learn-Donitz optimistically wrote in his diary that Hitler's order was "a great step forward."

Goring was Furious Furious that Hitler had given Donitz command of that Hitler had given Donitz command of Luftwaffe Luftwaffe gruppe gruppe 40 without consulting him. Later, when Goring came to France in his private train, he invited Donitz to visit. "This was the first time I had ever seen him," Donitz wrote later. "He did his most to persuade me to agree to a cancellation of the Fuhrer's order, but this I refused to do. He then asked me to stay to dinner, but I declined the invitation, and we parted bad friends." 40 without consulting him. Later, when Goring came to France in his private train, he invited Donitz to visit. "This was the first time I had ever seen him," Donitz wrote later. "He did his most to persuade me to agree to a cancellation of the Fuhrer's order, but this I refused to do. He then asked me to stay to dinner, but I declined the invitation, and we parted bad friends."

By December 1940, the oceangoing boats available for patrol had shrunk to six, the lowest number of any month in 1940. Four sailed from Lorient and two, the VIIC U-96 U-96 and the LXB and the LXB U-105 U-105, embarked from Germany on maiden patrols.

These six boats, as well as the November boats still on patrol, confronted raging westerly gales, the onset of a brutal and frigid winter, which was to be even worse than that of 1939-1940. The parade of gales churned up awesome grey seas which lifted the boats to giddy crests, then dropped them into terrifying troughs. The boats pitched and shuddered, slewing wildly to port and starboard and rolling to impossible angles. The winds flung biting cold spray-or hail and sleet-at the men on the bridge. From time to time huge waves broke over the bridge, submerging the men and bashing them about, putting human lungs and safety belts to the test. More often than not, visibility was nil. Conditions below were pure hell, like living inside a tumbling, wet barrel. It was not possible to cook or serve meals. Few cared. Even the oldest salts felt queasy and disoriented.

The boats also confronted the possibility of another disruption in the convoy cycles. The heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper was en route to the North Atlantic, with specific orders to attack Halifax convoys. The purpose of was en route to the North Atlantic, with specific orders to attack Halifax convoys. The purpose of Hipper Hipper's mission was twofold: to destroy valuable cargoes and to draw heavy elements of the Home Fleet to the western Atlantic so that the battle cruisers Gneisenau Gneisenau and and Scharnhorst Scharnhorst and their supply ships could slip unchallenged through the North Sea into the Atlantic later in the month. If and their supply ships could slip unchallenged through the North Sea into the Atlantic later in the month. If Hipper Hipper succeeded in finding a Halifax convoy, it was probable that the British would again suspend Halifax convoys until the threat had been eliminated. succeeded in finding a Halifax convoy, it was probable that the British would again suspend Halifax convoys until the threat had been eliminated.

Joachim Schepke in U-100 U-100 was the first to sail from Lorient. By then, Berlin had decreed that two boats were to be assigned to weather reporting at all times to assist in the was the first to sail from Lorient. By then, Berlin had decreed that two boats were to be assigned to weather reporting at all times to assist in the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe's Blitz of England. The U-100 U-100 was to relieve one of the two weather boats, broadcasting "short signals" three times a day from about 20 degrees west longitude. was to relieve one of the two weather boats, broadcasting "short signals" three times a day from about 20 degrees west longitude.

This assignment was not welcomed. Gathering the weather data and encrypting the messages for transmission was tedious. Because of atmospheric disturbances, it was often necessary to transmit a signal several times. Repeated broadcasts increased the chances that the British could obtain a DF fix on the boat. Although the broadcast position was beyond the range of most British ASW aircraft, there was always the possibility that the British would send out a destroyer group to hunt down the boat. At the least, the Admiralty would divert merchant ships from the area of the DF fix, decreasing the chances that a weather boat would find targets of opportunity.

En route to his station on December 5, Schepke ran head-on into a raging winter storm. The winds and seas were so hostile that for the next two days he averaged only seventy-two miles westward, more than half of that while running submerged. When he finally reached his station, he received a message from Donitz to all boats to temporarily maintain radio silence except when attacking. B-dienst B-dienst had informed Donitz that the British had definitely DFed the previous weather boat. had informed Donitz that the British had definitely DFed the previous weather boat.

Schepke had been awarded Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz but curiously, the Berlin propagandists had not publicized the award. Possibly Donitz had withheld an announcement until Schepke had sunk several more ships to compensate for his well-known overclaims. If so (the record is not clear), Schepke had good reason to hunt relentlessly in spite of the ghastly weather. but curiously, the Berlin propagandists had not publicized the award. Possibly Donitz had withheld an announcement until Schepke had sunk several more ships to compensate for his well-known overclaims. If so (the record is not clear), Schepke had good reason to hunt relentlessly in spite of the ghastly weather.

Schepke had two opportunities to run up his score on December 8, but both failed. In the early, dark hours, the bridge watch spotted a "large steamer," but an "inexperienced helmsman," Schepke wrote, turned the boat the "wrong way" and the watch lost sight of the ship and could not find it again. Later, in daylight, the bridge watch spotted another ship. Schepke submerged to attack, firing two torpedoes from very close range. When both torpedoes missed-probably because of the mountainous seas-Schepke broke off, intending to attack again after dark on the surface. But when darkness fell, Schepke and the watch lost sight of the ship and it, too, got away. The failures left Schepke and his crew angry and dispirited.

The new VIIC U-96 U-96, commanded by Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock, age twenty-nine, from the ducks U-5 U-5 and and U-8 U-8, was the next boat to sail from Germany. On the afternoon of his eighth day at sea, December 11, while en route to a weather-reporting station, Lehmann-Willenbrock stumbled into the midst of the big inbound convoy, Halifax 92. Attacking submerged, he sank the 10,900-ton British freighter Rotorua Rotorua. Pursuing the convoy after dark on the surface in huge seas, Lehmann-Willenbrock got ahead and sank three more ships for 15,200 tons.

To the west of U-96 U-96, Schepke in U-100 U-100, finally authorized to broadcast weather reports three times a day, had a change in luck. On December 14 the watch spotted two separate ships sailing unescorted. Schepke sank both in surface attacks, but in the rough seas it took five torpedoes to put them under. The first ship was the 3,670-ton British freighter Kyleglen Kyleglen, overclaimed at 4,573 tons. The second was accurately claimed at 3,380 tons. The expenditure of five torpedoes to sink these two modest ships further depressed Schepke, leaving him with a "heavy heart," as he logged.

That same day Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96, patrolling about 100 miles to the northeast of Schepke, also had good luck. He sank an 11,000-ton British steamer and damaged a 5,100-ton freighter. The sinking raised Lehmann-Willenbrock's score to five confirmed ships for 37,000 tons, an outstanding debut, especially in view of the foul weather and the almost complete absence of convoy contacts from the Condors and the other U-boats.

On December 15, Schepke reported that a "hurricane" struck the hunting grounds. It raged for the next forty-eight hours, forcing all the boats to run submerged most of that time, surfacing only to freshen the air supply and to charge batteries. Despite the difficulties, Schepke dutifully broadcast weather reports three times a day.

The terrible weather in the North Atlantic prompted the OKM and Kerneval to consider the possibility of concentrating boats in the southern Atlantic waters, as Donitz had done the winter before. The shift would doubtless please Rome. On December 9 the modest British Army of the Nile had counterattacked and pushed the bloated, inept Italian Army back into Libya. Concentrated U-boat attacks against the convoys taking supplies to the British ground forces in Egypt via Gibraltar, Freetown, and the Cape of Good Hope would not only help the reeling Italians but also force the British to intensify ASW measures in the South Atlantic, thinning out the Mediterranean naval forces.

Donitz opposed a concentration of U-boats in the south for several reasons.

First, he still believed the decisive battleground was the North Atlantic, that U-boat operations elsewhere constituted an unwise diversion of his meager resources. Although U-boat successes in the North Atlantic were declining sharply, the presence of even a few U-boats compelled the British to maintain convoying, which of itself reduced imports to the British Isles significantly.

Second, the returns from the two IXs in southern waters appeared to be even poorer than those in the inhospitable North Atlantic. The U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen) patrolling off Freetown had reported no further successes since November 19. The other, (von Stockhausen) patrolling off Freetown had reported no further successes since November 19. The other, U-37 U-37 (Clausen), had sunk seven ships, but all were small, aggregating merely 11,000 tons. (Clausen), had sunk seven ships, but all were small, aggregating merely 11,000 tons.*

Third, facilities for refueling boats in southern waters were iffy. Nordmark Nordmark, the supply ship for the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, had gone far south, beyond the Cape of Good Hope. The presence of British naval forces in the Canary Islands had twice forced Clausen in U-37 U-37 to abort planned refuelings there and he had to return, to Lorient prematurely. to abort planned refuelings there and he had to return, to Lorient prematurely.

The upshot of those deliberations was a decision to shift not German but Italian submarines from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic. Donitz was not unhappy with this solution. Italian submarine operations in the North Atlantic had failed utterly. Donitz put it this way in his diary: "They do not serve any practical purpose.... I have not received one single enemy report from them on which I could take action.... I am not at all sure that their presence in the operations area of German boats ... does not do more harm than good." He did not think the Italians were "sufficiently hard and determined" or flexible enough for submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. They were "inadequately disciplined" and were unable to "keep calm in the face of the enemy." They had not the faintest idea of how to shadow a convoy, or accurately report its position and course, or how to attack at night. Their attacks were "clumsy," and they let themselves be seen too often.

After the "hurricane" blew through the North Atlantic, on December 18 Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 U-96 continued his outstanding first patrol by detecting and attacking convoy Outbound 259 with his last torpedoes. He damaged but could not sink a 10,000-ton British tanker that was sailing in ballast. He shadowed the convoy and radioed a report to Donitz, who directed Schepke in continued his outstanding first patrol by detecting and attacking convoy Outbound 259 with his last torpedoes. He damaged but could not sink a 10,000-ton British tanker that was sailing in ballast. He shadowed the convoy and radioed a report to Donitz, who directed Schepke in U-100 U-100 and Salmann in and Salmann in U-52 U-52 to close and attack, but neither boat could reach the convoy. to close and attack, but neither boat could reach the convoy.

En route to find the damaged tanker, Schepke came across a lone, outbound 10,100-ton British freighter, Napier Star Napier Star. He tracked the ship during daylight hours, surfaced after dark, and attacked, firing three torpedoes. One missed but two hit, and she went down. Upon receiving word of this sinking-Schepke's third on this patrol-Donitz logged happily that Schepke had become the "third skipper to pass 200,000 tons." He gave this news-and the award of the Oak Leaves to Schepke's Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz-to Berlin propagandists, who released it on December 21, crediting Schepke with sinking forty ships for 208,975 tons.*