Reinhard Suhren, tabled executive officer of U-48 U-48 and later skipper of and later skipper of U-564 U-564. The skippers of U-48 U-48 credited Suhren with aiming and firing the torpedoes that accounted for over 200,000 tons of Allied shipping. credited Suhren with aiming and firing the torpedoes that accounted for over 200,000 tons of Allied shipping.

Jurgen Oeslen, skipper of the Type IXB U-106 U-106, sank ten ships and damaged the British battleship Malaya Malaya.

Eitel-Friedrieh Kentrat, skipper of U-74 U-74, returning to base after a successful cruise.

The unlucky Type IXC U-154 U-154, homebound from a patrol in tropical waters, floats over spare torpedoes to the lucky U-564 U-564.

A German Focke-Wulf 200 Condor, military version of a prewar airliner. Based in France to scout out Allied convoys for the benefit of the U-boats, the Condors were much feared by the Allies but, in reality, achieved little.

British warships capture the Type IXB U-110 U-110, May 9, 1941. The attempt to tow her to port failed and she sank, but not before an Allied boarding party got her naval Enigma machine, codebooks, and other priceless intelligence booty.

The Type IXB U-109 U-109 returning from a war cruise. returning from a war cruise.

Safely berthed in the massive U-boat pens at St. Nazaire, Occupied France, two Type VIIs undergo refits.

When Hitler indefinitely postponed the invasion of England in mid-September, two oceangoing boats of the August group were still on patrol: U-47 U-47 (Prien) on weather-reporting station at 20 degrees west longitude, and (Prien) on weather-reporting station at 20 degrees west longitude, and U-65 U-65 (von Stockhausen). Ready or not for combat, twelve oceangoing boats sailed in September: five from Germany and seven from Lorient. All were assigned to interdict North Atlantic convoys in the Northwest Approaches, attacking whenever possible at night on the surface to avoid being pinned down by escorts and, at the same time, radioing contact reports and beacon signals to bring in other boats. (von Stockhausen). Ready or not for combat, twelve oceangoing boats sailed in September: five from Germany and seven from Lorient. All were assigned to interdict North Atlantic convoys in the Northwest Approaches, attacking whenever possible at night on the surface to avoid being pinned down by escorts and, at the same time, radioing contact reports and beacon signals to bring in other boats.

The Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Otto Kretschmer in holder Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 was the first to sail from Lorient. To help indoctrinate Italian submarine skippers in Atlantic warfare, Kretschmer took along Primo Longobardo, skipper of the was the first to sail from Lorient. To help indoctrinate Italian submarine skippers in Atlantic warfare, Kretschmer took along Primo Longobardo, skipper of the Torelli Torelli. Near Rockall Bank Kretschmer promptly sank two medium-size freighters, one British, one Norwegian. Alerted by von Stockhausen in U-65 U-65, who had found an inbound convoy, Halifax 71, and had sunk two ships from it, Hird Hird and and Tregenna Tregenna, Kretschmer closed on the scattering convoy and picked off another medium-size British freighter, Crown Arun Crown Arun.

The famous, record-holding U-48 U-48 left Lorient behind Kretschmer. She had yet another new skipper, her third in a year. He was Heinrich Bleichrodt, age thirty, replacing left Lorient behind Kretschmer. She had yet another new skipper, her third in a year. He was Heinrich Bleichrodt, age thirty, replacing Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Hans-Rudolf Rosing, whom Donitz had sent to Bordeaux to work with the Italian submarine command. On September 15, near Rockall Bank, Bleichrodt intercepted an inbound convoy, SC 3. In his first attack as skipper, Bleichrodt assured holder Hans-Rudolf Rosing, whom Donitz had sent to Bordeaux to work with the Italian submarine command. On September 15, near Rockall Bank, Bleichrodt intercepted an inbound convoy, SC 3. In his first attack as skipper, Bleichrodt assured U-48 U-48's first-place standing by sinking four ships for 12,500 tons, including one of the escorts, the sloop Dundee Dundee, but no other boats made contact.

Proceeding westward, beyond the escort "chop line" at 17 degrees west longitude, on the morning of September 18 Bleichrodt found an unescorted outbound convoy. He tracked the ships during the daylight hours and attacked in bright moonlight on the surface. For his first target he chose a large "passenger ship" in the center of the convoy. He fired two torpedoes at her, but both were poorly aimed and missed. In a second attack, he fired one torpedo at the "passenger ship" and one at a 5,000-ton freighter. Both torpedoes hit and both ships sank.

The "passenger ship" was the convoy flagship, the 11,000-ton British liner City of Benares City of Benares, crowded with 400 passengers. Among these were ninety English children who were being resettled in Canada to escape the Blitz. In the rush to abandon the sinking ship in darkness and heavy seas, the crew let go some lifeboats haphazardly. These crashed down upon others, killing or throwing passengers or crew into the icy waters, and holing some boats. Some lifeboats drifted for many days before they were found. Altogether about 300 passengers-including seventy-seven of the ninety children-died in the sinking.

Although the City of Benares City of Benares was unmarked and darkened, and the Admiralty had not requested safe passage for her, the cries of outrage ("Hitler's foulest deed") from London for this sinking exceeded those evoked by the sinking of was unmarked and darkened, and the Admiralty had not requested safe passage for her, the cries of outrage ("Hitler's foulest deed") from London for this sinking exceeded those evoked by the sinking of Athenia Athenia a year earlier. The impact was heightened by the release of the grim lifeboat stories of the thirteen surviving children. As a result of this tragedy and the near-disaster on the liner a year earlier. The impact was heightened by the release of the grim lifeboat stories of the thirteen surviving children. As a result of this tragedy and the near-disaster on the liner Volendam Volendam three weeks earlier, the British government canceled the Children's Overseas Resettlement Scheme. Having no idea of the pain and suffering he had caused, Bleichrodt went on to sink yet another British freighter the following night, bringing his total bag to seven confirmed ships for 31,800 tons sunk within four days, another new record for three weeks earlier, the British government canceled the Children's Overseas Resettlement Scheme. Having no idea of the pain and suffering he had caused, Bleichrodt went on to sink yet another British freighter the following night, bringing his total bag to seven confirmed ships for 31,800 tons sunk within four days, another new record for U-48 U-48.

Still at his weather-reporting station, on September 20 Gunther Prien in U-47 U-47 was nearly run down by the forty-ship convoy, Halifax 72. Having only one torpedo left, Prien broadcast an alert to Donitz and abandoned his weather station to track the convoy. Upon receiving the alert, Donitz directed five other boats-all from Lorient-to converge on Prien's beacon signals. The five boats found Prien on the night of September 21, forming a pack of six, the largest number of U-boats ever concentrated against a convoy. was nearly run down by the forty-ship convoy, Halifax 72. Having only one torpedo left, Prien broadcast an alert to Donitz and abandoned his weather station to track the convoy. Upon receiving the alert, Donitz directed five other boats-all from Lorient-to converge on Prien's beacon signals. The five boats found Prien on the night of September 21, forming a pack of six, the largest number of U-boats ever concentrated against a convoy.

The boats attacked doggedly over a period of about twenty-six hours. Bleichrodt in U-48 U-48 went in first. Firing his last torpedoes, he sank a 4,400-ton British freighter and damaged another. He then replaced Prien as the convoy "shadower," radioing beacon signals and position reports. Kretschmer in went in first. Firing his last torpedoes, he sank a 4,400-ton British freighter and damaged another. He then replaced Prien as the convoy "shadower," radioing beacon signals and position reports. Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 attacked next, damaging attacked next, damaging Elmbank Elmbank and sinking two British ships, the 9,200-ton tanker Inver- and sinking two British ships, the 9,200-ton tanker Inver-shannon and the 3,700-ton freighter and the 3,700-ton freighter Baron Blythswood Baron Blythswood* Prien came up to fire his one remaining torpedo, but it malfunctioned or missed. He then joined Kretschmer for a joint gun attack to sink the damaged Prien came up to fire his one remaining torpedo, but it malfunctioned or missed. He then joined Kretschmer for a joint gun attack to sink the damaged Elmbank Elmbank. On the second night, Joachim Schepke in U-100 U-100 boldly maneuvered on the surface into the center of the convoy. In one of the most astonishing and fruitful U-boat attacks of the war, Schepke sank seven confirmed ships for 50,300 tons, in a mere four hours. His victims included the 10,000-ton British tankers boldly maneuvered on the surface into the center of the convoy. In one of the most astonishing and fruitful U-boat attacks of the war, Schepke sank seven confirmed ships for 50,300 tons, in a mere four hours. His victims included the 10,000-ton British tankers Torinia Torinia and and Frederick S. Fales Frederick S. Fales. Hans Jenisch in U-32 U-32 damaged a 7,900-ton freighter, but von Stockhausen's attack failed. damaged a 7,900-ton freighter, but von Stockhausen's attack failed.

Based on reports from the boats and B-dienst B-dienst intercepts, Donitz believed the pack had sunk thirteen ships of the convoy, thus for the first time emphatically validating his tactical theories. The confirmed score was not far off: eleven ships for 72,700 tons sunk and two damaged for 13,000 tons. intercepts, Donitz believed the pack had sunk thirteen ships of the convoy, thus for the first time emphatically validating his tactical theories. The confirmed score was not far off: eleven ships for 72,700 tons sunk and two damaged for 13,000 tons.

While five of the six boats of the pack were inbound to Lorient, Donitz and Berlin propagandists hastened to gloat over the victory and shower fulsome praise and awards on the skippers. Donitz credited Prien in U-47 U-47 with sinking 43,130 tons on this patrol, bringing his credited total to twenty-four ships for 151,400 tons. That tied Rollmann in numbers of ships credited, but put Prien ahead of Rollmann by about 25,000 in tonnage. Overcredited with one sinking, for a total of eight ships for 61,300 tons on this patrol, counting past claims, Joachim Schepke in with sinking 43,130 tons on this patrol, bringing his credited total to twenty-four ships for 151,400 tons. That tied Rollmann in numbers of ships credited, but put Prien ahead of Rollmann by about 25,000 in tonnage. Overcredited with one sinking, for a total of eight ships for 61,300 tons on this patrol, counting past claims, Joachim Schepke in U-100 U-100 qualified for a qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Also overcredited with one sinking, for a total of nine ships for 61,300 tons, Bleichrodt in U-48 U-48 received unstinting praise. Otto Kretschmer in received unstinting praise. Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 was accurately credited six and a half ships for 22,600 tons. was accurately credited six and a half ships for 22,600 tons.*

The first three boats to sail from Germany in September were aging clunkers: the VII U-29 U-29, commanded by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Otto Schuhart; the salvaged and recommissioned VII holder Otto Schuhart; the salvaged and recommissioned VII U-31 U-31, commanded by Wilfred Prellberg, age twenty-seven; and the IX U-43 U-43, commanded by the old hand Wilhelm Ambrosius, returning to the Atlantic after three months of battle-damage repairs. Outbound, two of the three boats were compelled to abort temporarily to Bergen: U-29 U-29 with periscope problems, with periscope problems, U-43 U-43 with leaks. with leaks.

After reaching the Atlantic, Schuhart in U-29 U-29 came upon convoy Outbound 217. He gave the alarm and tracked, bringing up the nearby came upon convoy Outbound 217. He gave the alarm and tracked, bringing up the nearby U-31 U-31 (Prellberg) and (Prellberg) and U-43 U-43 (Ambrosius). Schuhart and Ambrosius sank one British freighter each, but Prellberg's torpedoes malfunctioned or missed. Thereafter, Schuhart in (Ambrosius). Schuhart and Ambrosius sank one British freighter each, but Prellberg's torpedoes malfunctioned or missed. Thereafter, Schuhart in U-29 U-29 had an engine malfunction and was forced to abort to Lorient. Several days later, Prellberg in had an engine malfunction and was forced to abort to Lorient. Several days later, Prellberg in U-31 U-31 found another outbound convoy, from which he sank a ship, but a second attack was thwarted by an Allied submarine escorting the convoy, which drove off found another outbound convoy, from which he sank a ship, but a second attack was thwarted by an Allied submarine escorting the convoy, which drove off U-31 U-31 with a salvo of torpedoes. Also forced to abort with mechanical problems, while approaching Lorient Prellberg was attacked by another Allied submarine ( with a salvo of torpedoes. Also forced to abort with mechanical problems, while approaching Lorient Prellberg was attacked by another Allied submarine (Trident) and very nearly sunk. Ambrosius in U-43 U-43 conducted what Donitz characterized as an "unsatisfactory" patrol, and upon arrival in Lorient he was sent to command a training flotilla in the Baltic. conducted what Donitz characterized as an "unsatisfactory" patrol, and upon arrival in Lorient he was sent to command a training flotilla in the Baltic.

Responding to Schuhart's report of the outbound convoy, a Lorient boat, U-32 U-32 (Jenisch), which had just sunk a ship traveling alone, found convoy Outbound 217 on September 26. Jenisch torpedoed the 6,900-ton British freighter (Jenisch), which had just sunk a ship traveling alone, found convoy Outbound 217 on September 26. Jenisch torpedoed the 6,900-ton British freighter Corrientes Corrientes, and doggedly clung to the convoy, going ever westward. The abandoned Corrientes Corrientes did not sink, but two days later another Lorient boat, Oehrn's did not sink, but two days later another Lorient boat, Oehrn's U-37 U-37, found the hulk and put it under with gunfire and a torpedo. Pursuing the convoy far to the west, Jenisch sank two more ships from it near 25 degrees west longitude, as well as four more ships on his return leg to Lorient. Crediting Jenisch with sinking eight ships for 42,644 tons on this patrol, Donitz awarded him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz.

After polishing off the hulk Corrientes Corrientes, Oehrn in U-37 U-37 sank five other ships for 23,200 tons, including the 7,000-ton tanker sank five other ships for 23,200 tons, including the 7,000-ton tanker British General British General, giving him a confirmed score of twenty-three and a half ships for 101,414 tons, for which he was awarded a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Upon his return to Lorient, Oehrn relinquished command of U-37 U-37 and resumed his former job as first staff officer to Donitz, replacing Werner Hartmann, who was itching to return to sea with a new boat. and resumed his former job as first staff officer to Donitz, replacing Werner Hartmann, who was itching to return to sea with a new boat.*

THE O OCTOBER S SLAUGHTER.

Still in Paris, on the first day of October 1940, Donitz had eighteen oceangoing boats under his direct command, ten of them captained by ten of them captained by Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders. But that modest force was to be pared by one-third during the month. Four aged and unreliable Type VIIs were to be withdrawn from combat to the training command, and two VIIBs were to patrol home for extended overhaul and modification. On orders of the OKM, one IXB, holders. But that modest force was to be pared by one-third during the month. Four aged and unreliable Type VIIs were to be withdrawn from combat to the training command, and two VIIBs were to patrol home for extended overhaul and modification. On orders of the OKM, one IXB, U-65 U-65, was to make an extended cruise to Freetown, Sierra Leone, replicating U-A U-A's impressive lone voyage to that area.

To help fill the gap created by these diversions, the OKM directed that most of the Italian boats arriving at Bordeaux were to patrol northward into the zones theretofore reserved for the German boats. Donitz greeted this decision with skepticism. At Hitler's personal order, the Italian boats were to remain under operational command of the Italian U-boat chief, Vice Admiral Angelo Perona, in Bordeaux. No Italian boat had ever operated in the cold, rugged North Atlantic; none had trained for the difficult tasks of convoy tracking and pack attacks. Donitz believed the Italian boats might prove useful for reconnaissance-convoy spotting-but until the skippers and crews had received intensive training under German supervision, he doubted they would make any significant contribution. His skepticism was to be borne out. No Italian boat had ever operated in the cold, rugged North Atlantic; none had trained for the difficult tasks of convoy tracking and pack attacks. Donitz believed the Italian boats might prove useful for reconnaissance-convoy spotting-but until the skippers and crews had received intensive training under German supervision, he doubted they would make any significant contribution. His skepticism was to be borne out.

Two new boats which had sailed from Germany in late September reached the hunting grounds in early October. One was the VIIB U-103 U-103, commanded by Viktor Schutze, who had made several Atlantic patrols in old U-25 U-25. The other was the IXB U-123 U-123, commanded by Karl-Heinz Moehle, age thirty, from the duck U-20 U-20. Both boats were first assigned to weather-reporting duty at 26 degrees west, to indoctrinate the green crews to the Atlantic and to satisfy the demands of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe. On October 6, Schutze in U-103 U-103 sank the 7,000-ton Norwegian tanker sank the 7,000-ton Norwegian tanker Nina Borthen Nina Borthen; Moehle in U-123 U-123 sank a 6,000-ton freighter. sank a 6,000-ton freighter.

Two days later Donitz ordered the U-124 U-124 (Schulz), outbound from Lorient on his second patrol, to relieve (Schulz), outbound from Lorient on his second patrol, to relieve U-103 U-103 and and U-123 U-123 on weather duty. The latter two boats were to form a patrol line west of Rockall Bank with two other boats from Lorient, Liebe's on weather duty. The latter two boats were to form a patrol line west of Rockall Bank with two other boats from Lorient, Liebe's U-38 U-38, which had sunk the 14,100-ton British steamer Highland Patriot, and Bleichrodt's U-48 U-48. Bucking foul, heavy weather, Schutze in U-103 U-103 found inbound Slow Convoy 6, from which he sank two ships and damaged another, the 3,700-ton found inbound Slow Convoy 6, from which he sank two ships and damaged another, the 3,700-ton Graigwen Graigwen. Bedeviled by the mountainous seas and fog, Moehle in U-123 U-123 could not find the convoy, but he came across the damaged could not find the convoy, but he came across the damaged Graigwen Graigwen and sank her with a torpedo. Nor could and sank her with a torpedo. Nor could U-38 U-38 or or U-48 U-48 find the convoy. find the convoy.

While searching for Schutze's convoy, Bleichrodt in U-48 U-48 ran straight into another big inbound convoy, Halifax 77. He radioed an alert and beacon signals. Then, in his third well-executed night surface attack in a month, Bleichrodt sank three ships for 21,900 tons, including the 10,000-ton British steamer ran straight into another big inbound convoy, Halifax 77. He radioed an alert and beacon signals. Then, in his third well-executed night surface attack in a month, Bleichrodt sank three ships for 21,900 tons, including the 10,000-ton British steamer Port Gisborne Port Gisborne and the 7,100-ton Norwegian tanker and the 7,100-ton Norwegian tanker Davanger Davanger. In response to Bleichrodt's alert, Fritz Frauenheim in U-101 U-101, coming up from Lorient, found a straggler from the convoy and sank it.

Farther north, the brand-new U-93 U-93, commanded by Claus Korth, age twenty-nine, entered the operating area. Commissioned merely two months earlier, July 30, 1940, the U-93 U-93 was the first of the new Type VIICs to reach the Atlantic. The VIICs were nearly identical to the VIIBs, but they were two feet longer and incorporated some internal design and mechanical refinements. The VIIC was to become the standard "production line" medium U-boat. was the first of the new Type VIICs to reach the Atlantic. The VIICs were nearly identical to the VIIBs, but they were two feet longer and incorporated some internal design and mechanical refinements. The VIIC was to become the standard "production line" medium U-boat.

Korth found convoy Outbound 227 on October 14. He gave the alarm, drawing U-103 U-103 (Schutze) and others into the chase. In his attack, Korth in (Schutze) and others into the chase. In his attack, Korth in U-93 U-93 missed his targeted ships, but hit and sank the 9,300-ton British freighter missed his targeted ships, but hit and sank the 9,300-ton British freighter Hurunui Hurunui. Coming up, Schutze in U-103 U-103 picked off one 4,700-ton ship from this convoy with his last torpedoes, then turned about for Lorient. Korth lost that convoy but found yet another outbound convoy. In two attacks on the night of October 16-17, he again missed his targeted ships but hit and sank two others. picked off one 4,700-ton ship from this convoy with his last torpedoes, then turned about for Lorient. Korth lost that convoy but found yet another outbound convoy. In two attacks on the night of October 16-17, he again missed his targeted ships but hit and sank two others.

To the south of Korth, Georg-Wilhelm Schulz in U-124 U-124 encountered and sank a (1,813-ton) lone British freighter, Trevisa, in the early hours of October 16. Schulz did not know it, but that ship had become separated from Slow Convoy 7, escorted by a single warship, the sloop encountered and sank a (1,813-ton) lone British freighter, Trevisa, in the early hours of October 16. Schulz did not know it, but that ship had become separated from Slow Convoy 7, escorted by a single warship, the sloop Scarborough Scarborough, which was looking for a local escort group comprised of sloops Fowey Fowey and and Leith Leith and two corvettes. Twenty-four hours later, Bleichrodt in and two corvettes. Twenty-four hours later, Bleichrodt in U-48 U-48 sighted SC 7, flashed an alert to Donitz, and immediately attacked, sinking the 9,500-ton British tanker sighted SC 7, flashed an alert to Donitz, and immediately attacked, sinking the 9,500-ton British tanker Languedoc Languedoc, a 3,800-ton British freighter, Scoresby, and damaging a 4,700-ton British freighter. A few hours later, Liebe in U-38 U-38 sank by gun and torpedo another ship that had separated from SC 7, the 3,600-ton Greek sank by gun and torpedo another ship that had separated from SC 7, the 3,600-ton Greek Aenos Aenos. Upon receiving Bleichrodt's contact report, Donitz ordered five other boats to converge on the probable course of the convoy. Meanwhile, Bleichrodt in U-48 U-48 ran across a westbound British freighter which had separated from an outbound convoy. He chased and sank her, but that action took him too far west to again attack SC 7. Liebe in ran across a westbound British freighter which had separated from an outbound convoy. He chased and sank her, but that action took him too far west to again attack SC 7. Liebe in U-38 U-38, believed to be too far north of the convoy, was actually the next to find it, in the early morning hours of October 18. He reported the contact and attacked, damaging the 3,700-ton British freighter Carsbreck Carsbreck.

Based on Liebe's report, the five boats Donitz had ordered to attack SC 7 raced to the northeast. On the evening of October 18, all five made contact with SC 7, which had been reinforced by its local escort. That night all U-boats attacked in calm seas by the light of a full "hunter's moon." It was a chaotic and confusing battle. Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 captured its drama from the U-boat point of view in his log of October 18-19, a legendary document: captured its drama from the U-boat point of view in his log of October 18-19, a legendary document: 1745: Wind, southeast, force 3; sea 3; moderate cloud. Wind, southeast, force 3; sea 3; moderate cloud. U-101 U-101 [Frauenheim] which is 2 or 3 miles north, signals by searchlight: 'Enemy in sight to port.' [Frauenheim] which is 2 or 3 miles north, signals by searchlight: 'Enemy in sight to port.'1749: A warship is sighted, bearing 030, steering east. Soon afterwards, smoke to left of her. Finally the convoy. While hauling ahead to attack, we sight a steamship in the southeast, apparently on a westerly course. A warship is sighted, bearing 030, steering east. Soon afterwards, smoke to left of her. Finally the convoy. While hauling ahead to attack, we sight a steamship in the southeast, apparently on a westerly course.1928: Submerge for attack. Submerge for attack.1950: Surface, as the ship is making off slowly to the east. Haul further ahead: at 2000 [hours] pass within a few hundred meters of a U-boat on the surface, apparently Surface, as the ship is making off slowly to the east. Haul further ahead: at 2000 [hours] pass within a few hundred meters of a U-boat on the surface, apparently U-101 U-101 again. again.2024: Another U-boat has torpedoed the ship. Shortly afterwards, exchange recognition signals with Another U-boat has torpedoed the ship. Shortly afterwards, exchange recognition signals with U-123 U-123 [Moehle]. Convoy again in sight. I am ahead of it, so allow my boat to drop back, avoiding the leading destroyer. [Moehle]. Convoy again in sight. I am ahead of it, so allow my boat to drop back, avoiding the leading destroyer.* The destroyers are constantly firing starshells. From outside, I attack the right flank of the first formation. The destroyers are constantly firing starshells. From outside, I attack the right flank of the first formation.2202: Weather: visibility moderate, bright moonlight. Fire bow torpedo by director. Miss. Weather: visibility moderate, bright moonlight. Fire bow torpedo by director. Miss.2206: Fire stern torpedo by director. At 700 meters, hit forward of amidships. Vessel of some 6,500 tons sinks within 20 seconds. I now proceed head on into the convoy. All ships are zigzagging independently. Fire stern torpedo by director. At 700 meters, hit forward of amidships. Vessel of some 6,500 tons sinks within 20 seconds. I now proceed head on into the convoy. All ships are zigzagging independently.2230: Fire bow torpedo by director. Miss because of error in calculation of gyro-angle. I therefore decide to fire the rest of the torpedoes without the director, especially as the installation has still not been accepted and adjusted by the Torpedo Testing Department. Boat is soon sighted by a ship which fires a white star and turns towards us at full speed, continuing even after we alter course. I have to make off with engines all out. Eventually the ship turns off, fires one of her guns and again takes her place in the convoy. I now attack the right flank of the last formation but one. Fire bow torpedo by director. Miss because of error in calculation of gyro-angle. I therefore decide to fire the rest of the torpedoes without the director, especially as the installation has still not been accepted and adjusted by the Torpedo Testing Department. Boat is soon sighted by a ship which fires a white star and turns towards us at full speed, continuing even after we alter course. I have to make off with engines all out. Eventually the ship turns off, fires one of her guns and again takes her place in the convoy. I now attack the right flank of the last formation but one.2330: Fire a bow torpedo at a large freighter. As the ship turns towards us, the torpedo passes ahead of her and hits an even larger ship after a run of 1,740 meters. This ship of some 7,000 tons is hit abreast the foremast, and the bow quickly sinks below the surface, as two holds are apparently flooded. Fire a bow torpedo at a large freighter. As the ship turns towards us, the torpedo passes ahead of her and hits an even larger ship after a run of 1,740 meters. This ship of some 7,000 tons is hit abreast the foremast, and the bow quickly sinks below the surface, as two holds are apparently flooded.2355: Fire a bow torpedo at a large freighter of some 6,000 tons, at a range of 750 meters. Hit abreast foremast. Immediately after the torpedo explosion, there is another explosion with a high column of flame from the bow to the bridge. The smoke rises some 200 meters. Bow apparently shattered. Ship continues to burn with a green flame. Fire a bow torpedo at a large freighter of some 6,000 tons, at a range of 750 meters. Hit abreast foremast. Immediately after the torpedo explosion, there is another explosion with a high column of flame from the bow to the bridge. The smoke rises some 200 meters. Bow apparently shattered. Ship continues to burn with a green flame.0015: Three destroyers approach the ship and search the area in line abreast. I make off at full speed to the southwest and again make contact with the convoy. Torpedoes from the other boats are constantly heard exploding. The destroyers do not know how to help and occupy themselves by constantly firing starshells, which are of little effect in the bright moonlight. I now start to attack the convoy from astern. Three destroyers approach the ship and search the area in line abreast. I make off at full speed to the southwest and again make contact with the convoy. Torpedoes from the other boats are constantly heard exploding. The destroyers do not know how to help and occupy themselves by constantly firing starshells, which are of little effect in the bright moonlight. I now start to attack the convoy from astern.0138: Fire bow torpedoes at large heavily-laden freighter of about 6,000 tons, range 945 meters. Hit abreast foremast. The explosion sinks the ship. Fire bow torpedoes at large heavily-laden freighter of about 6,000 tons, range 945 meters. Hit abreast foremast. The explosion sinks the ship.0155: Fire bow torpedo at the next large vessel of some 7,000 tons. Range 975 meters. Hit abreast foremast. Ship sinks within 40 seconds. Fire bow torpedo at the next large vessel of some 7,000 tons. Range 975 meters. Hit abreast foremast. Ship sinks within 40 seconds.0240: Miss through aiming error, with torpedo fired at one of the largest vessels of the convoy, a ship of the Miss through aiming error, with torpedo fired at one of the largest vessels of the convoy, a ship of the Glenapp Glenapp class 9,500 tons. class 9,500 tons.0255: Again miss the same target from a range of about 800 meters. No explanation, as the fire control data were absolutely correct. Presume it to be a gyro failure, as we hear an explosion on the other side of the convoy some seven minutes later. Again miss the same target from a range of about 800 meters. No explanation, as the fire control data were absolutely correct. Presume it to be a gyro failure, as we hear an explosion on the other side of the convoy some seven minutes later.0302: Third attempt at the same target from a range of 720 meters. Hit forward of the bridge. Bow sinks rapidly level with the water. Third attempt at the same target from a range of 720 meters. Hit forward of the bridge. Bow sinks rapidly level with the water.0356: Fire at and miss a rather small, unladen ship, which had lost contact with the convoy. We had fired just as the steamer turned towards us. Fire at and miss a rather small, unladen ship, which had lost contact with the convoy. We had fired just as the steamer turned towards us.0358: Turn off and fire a stern torpedo from a range of 690 meters. Hit aft of amidships. Ship drops astern, somewhat lower in the water. As torpedoes have been expended, I wait to see if she will sink further before I settle her by gunfire. Turn off and fire a stern torpedo from a range of 690 meters. Hit aft of amidships. Ship drops astern, somewhat lower in the water. As torpedoes have been expended, I wait to see if she will sink further before I settle her by gunfire.0504: Ship is sunk by another vessel by gunfire. I suppose it to be a British destroyer, but it later transpires that it was Ship is sunk by another vessel by gunfire. I suppose it to be a British destroyer, but it later transpires that it was U-123 U-123 [Moehle]. Some of her shells land very close, so that I have to leave the area quickly. The ship was [Moehle]. Some of her shells land very close, so that I have to leave the area quickly. The ship was Clintonia Clintonia, 3,106 tons.

No one could ever precisely sort out who sank what from SC 7 that night. Some boats obviously torpedoed-and claimed-the same ships. When Donitz asked for reports, some boats included ships sunk in earlier actions, adding to the confusion. Based on flash reports while the boats were still at sea, Donitz concluded that the six boats he believed to have engaged SC 7 had sunk thirty ships for 196,000 tons. In the postwar years, German U-boat scholar Jurgen Rohwer, working in collaboration with the Admiralty, determined that the U-boats had sunk considerably less: twenty ships for 79,646 tons. The comparison: Four boats in the Atlantic that were out of torpedoes or low on fuel headed for Lorient. Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 arrived on October 23, having been out but nine days-the shortest war patrol on record. Frauenheim in arrived on October 23, having been out but nine days-the shortest war patrol on record. Frauenheim in U-101 U-101 came in the next day, having been out only twenty days. Kretschmer got a new load of torpedoes, topped off his fuel tanks, and resailed a week later, October 30, the fastest turnaround time yet recorded at Lorient. Apparently exhausted, came in the next day, having been out only twenty days. Kretschmer got a new load of torpedoes, topped off his fuel tanks, and resailed a week later, October 30, the fastest turnaround time yet recorded at Lorient. Apparently exhausted, Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Fritz Frauenheim, who had overclaimed by five ships for 42,200 tons, left holder Fritz Frauenheim, who had overclaimed by five ships for 42,200 tons, left U-101 U-101 and went to the training command. and went to the training command.

Gunther Prien in U-47 U-47, who had sailed from Lorient too late to engage in the action with SC 7, arrived in the hunting grounds on October 19. Within mere hours he found the large, heavily escorted inbound convoy Halifax 79. In response to his alert, Donitz directed four other boats to converge on Prien and attack.

A second savage convoy battle ensued on the night of October 19-20. All five boats tore into the formation, shooting left, right, and center, also hitting ships hit by others. Fresh from Lorient with a full load of torpedoes and fuel, Prien was the most aggressive shooter, claiming eight ships for 50,500 tons. Based on flash reports, Donitz concluded that the other four boats sank an additional nine ships for a grand total of seventeen ships for 113,100 tons. The confirmed total was also much less. Again, it was difficult to establish who had sunk what. Donitz's credits and Rohwer's postwar analysis: * Shared credit for two ships with Shared credit for two ships with U-46 U-46 and and U-48 U-48.

Donitz and the Berlin propagandists groped for adjectives to gloat over these successes. Combining the attacks on SC 7 and Halifax 79 into one prolonged battle ("The Night of the Long Knives"), Donitz logged that eight U-boats, manned by about 300 men, had sunk forty-seven ships for 310,000 tons, "a colossal success." The propagandists credited Prien with his claim of 50,500 tons, elevating his credited total to 200,000 tons, a new milestone for a single skipper, which drew a telegram of congratulations from Hitler and yet another exalted award: a cluster of Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Credited with sinking 105,396 tons in two brief patrols on U-48 U-48 (plus the sloop Dundee), Bleichrodt earned a (plus the sloop Dundee), Bleichrodt earned a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Frauenheim in U-101 U-101 was credited with 51,000 tons; Kretschmer in was credited with 51,000 tons; Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 with 45,000 tons; Moehle in with 45,000 tons; Moehle in U-123 U-123 with 44,500 tons; and Schepke in with 44,500 tons; and Schepke in U-100 U-100 with 34,200 tons. with 34,200 tons.

When Bleichrodt in U-48 U-48 was awarded the was awarded the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, an unusual problem arose. He refused to wear the medal unless a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz was also presented to Reinhard Suhren, age twenty-four, who had been the first watch officer on was also presented to Reinhard Suhren, age twenty-four, who had been the first watch officer on U-48 U-48 since the beginning of the war. The since the beginning of the war. The U-48 U-48's total bag then stood at a record 42 ships for 244,411 tons. Bleichrodt insisted that Suhren was deserving of the medal because he had fired torpedoes from the bridge that had accounted for at least 200,000 of the tons. Bleichrodt's case was strengthened by the fact that Viktor Oehrn in U-37 U-37 had recently obtained a had recently obtained a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz for another nonskipper, Suhren's older brother Gerd, the engineer on the for another nonskipper, Suhren's older brother Gerd, the engineer on the U-37 U-37, who had kept the boat running in spite of numerous defects. Donitz agreed with Bleichrodt, and Reinhard Suhren got his medal.*

The numbers pouring out of Berlin were dizzying and inflated. Nonetheless, there was no denying that SC 7 and Halifax 79 had been savaged. The nine boats engaged in those actions had sunk a total of thirty-three confirmed ships for 154,709 tons. The Allied losses included five big, valuable, fully loaded tankers: the British Longuedoc, Shirak, Caprella Longuedoc, Shirak, Caprella, and Sitala Sitala, and the Swede Janus Janus. In addition, Prien had severely damaged another big British tanker.

Three of the five boats engaged in the attack on Halifax 79 returned to Lorient: U-38 U-38 (Liebe), (Liebe), U-47 U-47 (Prien), merely eight days out, and (Prien), merely eight days out, and U-100 U-100 (Schepke), merely eleven days out. The other two, (Schepke), merely eleven days out. The other two, U-46 U-46 (Endrass) and (Endrass) and U-48 U-48 (Bleichrodt), proceeded to Germany for scheduled yard overhauls and modifications. While passing near the coast of Norway on October 25, Endrass in (Bleichrodt), proceeded to Germany for scheduled yard overhauls and modifications. While passing near the coast of Norway on October 25, Endrass in U-46 U-46 was caught on the surface by three Hudson aircraft of Coastal Command Squadron 233. One aircraft, piloted by Arthur T. Maudsley and a Canadian, Everett Baudoux, was riddled by was caught on the surface by three Hudson aircraft of Coastal Command Squadron 233. One aircraft, piloted by Arthur T. Maudsley and a Canadian, Everett Baudoux, was riddled by U-46 U-46 gunners but dropped ten 100-pound bombs; another, flown by Pilot Officer Winnicott, dropped two 250-pound bombs; the bombs of the third plane, commanded by Pilot Officer Walsh, failed to release. The bombs fell close, inflicting severe damage on gunners but dropped ten 100-pound bombs; another, flown by Pilot Officer Winnicott, dropped two 250-pound bombs; the bombs of the third plane, commanded by Pilot Officer Walsh, failed to release. The bombs fell close, inflicting severe damage on U-46 U-46 and fatally injuring one crewman. Unable to dive, Endrass limped into Kris-tiansand, Norway, escorted by the German minesweeper and fatally injuring one crewman. Unable to dive, Endrass limped into Kris-tiansand, Norway, escorted by the German minesweeper M-18 M-18. From there he went on to Germany with an air and surface escort. The high-scoring U-46 U-46 and and U-48 U-48 were to remain in German shipyards for the next three months. were to remain in German shipyards for the next three months.

Relieved of weather reporting, Georg-Wilhelm Schulz in U-124 U-124 was directed to patrol against shipping. On October 20, he intercepted convoy Outbound 229 and sank two big freighters for 11,000 tons. In return, the escorts pounded was directed to patrol against shipping. On October 20, he intercepted convoy Outbound 229 and sank two big freighters for 11,000 tons. In return, the escorts pounded U-124 U-124 with a prolonged and dogged depth-charge attack, the second for the boat in as many patrols. When the cook pointed out that both depth-charge attacks had occurred on the day he served chocolate pudding, Schulz banned that dessert on with a prolonged and dogged depth-charge attack, the second for the boat in as many patrols. When the cook pointed out that both depth-charge attacks had occurred on the day he served chocolate pudding, Schulz banned that dessert on U-124 U-124. Cruising east to fill the void northwest of Rockall Bank, Schulz expended the rest of his torpedoes to sink two more lone ships, then headed for Lorient, having put down a total of five confirmed ships for 20,000 tons, in what Donitz praised as a "well-executed" patrol.

The four old Type VIIs in Lorient, crammed with French goodies for families and friends, sailed home to the training command in October. Outbound from Lorient the U-31 U-31 (Prellberg) was attacked for the third time by an enemy submarine, but evaded. The (Prellberg) was attacked for the third time by an enemy submarine, but evaded. The U-29 U-29 (Schuhart), plagued with engine problems, was diverted to the Bay of Biscay to escort the inbound German merchant-ship raider (Schuhart), plagued with engine problems, was diverted to the Bay of Biscay to escort the inbound German merchant-ship raider Widder Widder (which had sunk or captured ten ships for 58,645 tons) into Brest, and resailed later. The (which had sunk or captured ten ships for 58,645 tons) into Brest, and resailed later. The U-28 U-28, U-31 U-31, and U-32 U-32 patrolled homeward through British waters in heavy, foul weather. patrolled homeward through British waters in heavy, foul weather.

On October 26 a Luftwaffe Luftwaffe plane attacked and set on fire the huge 42,348-ton British ocean liner plane attacked and set on fire the huge 42,348-ton British ocean liner Empress of Britain Empress of Britain off the northwest coast of Ireland. Upon learning of the attack-and that the ship was being salvaged-Donitz directed off the northwest coast of Ireland. Upon learning of the attack-and that the ship was being salvaged-Donitz directed U-28 U-28, U-31 U-31, and U-32 U-32 to find and sink her. to find and sink her.

Prellberg in U-31 U-31 was most ideally positioned to intercept the was most ideally positioned to intercept the Empress Empress, but Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Hans Jenisch in holder Hans Jenisch in U-32 U-32 poached into Prellberg's area in the early hours of October 28 and found her first. Two seagoing tugs had the poached into Prellberg's area in the early hours of October 28 and found her first. Two seagoing tugs had the Empress Empress in tow; two destroyers provided escort. Jenisch lay doggo on the surface in the dark, allowing the destroyers and tugs to pass, then coolly fired a fan of three torpedoes at in tow; two destroyers provided escort. Jenisch lay doggo on the surface in the dark, allowing the destroyers and tugs to pass, then coolly fired a fan of three torpedoes at Empress Empress from a point-blank range of 656 yards. Two hit, and the from a point-blank range of 656 yards. Two hit, and the Empress Empress went down-the largest ship sunk in the war to then. Berlin propagandists released the news that same day, glorifying Jenisch as the shooter and crediting him with a grand total of 146,816 tons. went down-the largest ship sunk in the war to then. Berlin propagandists released the news that same day, glorifying Jenisch as the shooter and crediting him with a grand total of 146,816 tons.*

Two days later, on October 30, in rainy and foggy weather, Jenisch found a lone British freighter, Balzac Balzac, and attacked submerged, firing one torpedo, which prematured close aboard. Believing she was being shelled, Balzac Balzac broadcast an alarm, which brought up two British destroyers, broadcast an alarm, which brought up two British destroyers, Harvester Harvester and and Highlander Highlander. Unaware of the destroyers, Jenisch attempted a second submerged attack on Balzac Balzac. Harvester Harvester spotted spotted U-32 U-32's periscope and turned to ram, but when Jenisch saw the destroyer, he broke off the attack and went deep. Fixing U-32 U-32 on sonar, on sonar, Harvester Harvester ran in and dropped six depth charges, all wide. ran in and dropped six depth charges, all wide. Highlander Highlander followed with a salvo of fourteen. followed with a salvo of fourteen.

Some of Highlander Highlander's charges exploded close to U-32 U-32, knocking out the electric motors and rupturing the stern ballast tank and high-pressure air lines. After assessing the damage, Jenisch rushed all hands to the bow compartment to take the up angle off the boat and surfaced on diesel power, hoping to escape in the rain and darkness. But Harvester Harvester and and Highlander Highlander spotted the boat with searchlights and opened fire at point-blank range with 4.7" guns and machine guns. Upon learning that all high-pressure air lines were ruptured and the boat could not dive, Jenisch gave orders to abandon ship and scuttle. spotted the boat with searchlights and opened fire at point-blank range with 4.7" guns and machine guns. Upon learning that all high-pressure air lines were ruptured and the boat could not dive, Jenisch gave orders to abandon ship and scuttle. Harvester Harvester and and Highlander Highlander fished thirty-three survivors from the icy waters, including Jenisch. Nine of the crew perished. fished thirty-three survivors from the icy waters, including Jenisch. Nine of the crew perished.

The British were glad to have captured Jenisch and most of his crew, the first U-boat POWs to be recovered after those of U-26 U-26, four months earlier. British propagandists hastened to boast of capturing a U-boat "ace" (or Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder), stressing that Jenisch had sunk the holder), stressing that Jenisch had sunk the Empress Empress of Britain. In a vain attempt to undercut the British-and perhaps to reassure the German public-Berlin propagandists promptly and vehemently denied the claim. To buttress their denial, the Germans resorted to the bizarre step of broadcasting a fictional account of Jenisch's "victorious homecoming," including a detailed firsthand report from "Jenisch," describing His sinking of the of Britain. In a vain attempt to undercut the British-and perhaps to reassure the German public-Berlin propagandists promptly and vehemently denied the claim. To buttress their denial, the Germans resorted to the bizarre step of broadcasting a fictional account of Jenisch's "victorious homecoming," including a detailed firsthand report from "Jenisch," describing His sinking of the Empress Empress.

Resuming his voyage home, Prellberg in U-31 U-31 found an outbound convoy and chased it westward. At that time there were four Italian boats patrolling near the path of the convoy and three more approaching the area. Donitz relayed word to the seven Italian boats through his liaison in Bordeaux, Hans-Rudolf Rosing, but none of the Italian boats found the convoy and Prellberg soon lost it in the foul weather. Breaking off the chase, Prellberg came upon the abandoned hulk of the 5,400-ton British freighter found an outbound convoy and chased it westward. At that time there were four Italian boats patrolling near the path of the convoy and three more approaching the area. Donitz relayed word to the seven Italian boats through his liaison in Bordeaux, Hans-Rudolf Rosing, but none of the Italian boats found the convoy and Prellberg soon lost it in the foul weather. Breaking off the chase, Prellberg came upon the abandoned hulk of the 5,400-ton British freighter Matina Matina, torpedoed earlier by Kuhnke's homebound U-28 U-28. Prellberg shot five torpedoes at the drifting hulk; three missed, but two hit and she went down.

On the morning of November 2 Prellberg spotted a British destroyer and crash-dived. Intending to attack the destroyer, Prellberg went to battle stations and commenced tracking, but the seas were too heavy to fire torpedoes. His would-be victim was Antelope Antelope, which had single-handedly sunk U-41 U-41 in February and was then maintaining an alert watch. in February and was then maintaining an alert watch.

Picking up U-31 U-31 on sonar, on sonar, Antelope Antelope immediately carried out a "pounce attack," firing a full pattern of six depth charges. At the same time, she broadcast an alert, which brought up the destroyer immediately carried out a "pounce attack," firing a full pattern of six depth charges. At the same time, she broadcast an alert, which brought up the destroyer Achates Achates, but the sonar set on Achates failed. Carrying on alone, Antelope Antelope conducted a second attack, dropping another six depth charges which severely jarred the boat, but did no serious damage. Prellberg skillfully evaded conducted a second attack, dropping another six depth charges which severely jarred the boat, but did no serious damage. Prellberg skillfully evaded Antelope Antelope for the next two hours, but the destroyer found him again and carried out another carefully organized attack, dropping another pattern of six depth charges, followed immediately by three more. for the next two hours, but the destroyer found him again and carried out another carefully organized attack, dropping another pattern of six depth charges, followed immediately by three more.

Antelope's third and fourth attacks fatally damaged U-31 U-31. The charges ruptured the stern ballast tanks, flooded the after tube and main induction, leaving the boat with a steep up-angle. In an attempt to regain the trim, Prellberg packed every available man into the bow compartment, but this had no effect and U-31 U-31 slid down by the stern to 311 feet. The boat's engineer believed he could overcome the damage but, as Prellberg later told the British, he believed "a hero's death to be an overrated gesture" and ordered the engineer to surface and scuttle. slid down by the stern to 311 feet. The boat's engineer believed he could overcome the damage but, as Prellberg later told the British, he believed "a hero's death to be an overrated gesture" and ordered the engineer to surface and scuttle.

When Antelope Antelope saw saw U-31 U-31, she opened fire and lowered away a whaleboat, intending to board and capture secret documents. But U-31 U-31, with sea cocks open, was making speed on her electric motors and the whaleboat could not catch up. While Prellberg and his men were diving over the side into the heavy seas, Antelope Antelope resumed gunfire and attempted to come alongside resumed gunfire and attempted to come alongside U-31 U-31 in order to board. But the flooding and unmanned in order to board. But the flooding and unmanned U-31 U-31 suddenly turned sharply to port and rammed suddenly turned sharply to port and rammed Antelope Antelope, holing two fuel tanks and a boiler room and causing other damage. The collision, however, pushed U-31 U-31 over. Flooding through the conning-tower hatch, she sank like a stone. over. Flooding through the conning-tower hatch, she sank like a stone.

The Antelope Antelope whaleboat fished Prellberg and forty-three others of the forty-five-man crew from the water. One panicked whaleboat fished Prellberg and forty-three others of the forty-five-man crew from the water. One panicked U-31 U-31 crewman, who "had used [up] his energy by continually screaming," the British diagposed, fell into a coma and died aboard crewman, who "had used [up] his energy by continually screaming," the British diagposed, fell into a coma and died aboard Antelope Antelope. During subsequent interrogation of the survivors, the British learned that U-31 U-31 had been sunk earlier off Wilhelmshaven by a British aircraft and salvaged. She had earned the dubious distinction of being the only U-boat in the war to be "sunk twice." had been sunk earlier off Wilhelmshaven by a British aircraft and salvaged. She had earned the dubious distinction of being the only U-boat in the war to be "sunk twice."

Only one of the four old Type VIIs that had set off for Germany in October got there on schedule: Kuhnke's U-28 U-28. Under his command, the U-28 U-28 had sunk a total of thirteen and a half confirmed ships for 59,000 tons. had sunk a total of thirteen and a half confirmed ships for 59,000 tons. Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Kuhnke turned the boat over to the training command and went on to commission a new boat. The other homebound Type VII, Schuhart's holder Kuhnke turned the boat over to the training command and went on to commission a new boat. The other homebound Type VII, Schuhart's U-29 U-29-the last Type VII to serve in the combat zone-finally got home in early December, after a stint at weather reporting. Under Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Schuhart, holder Schuhart, U-29 U-29 had sunk twelve confirmed ships for 84,588 tons, including the carrier had sunk twelve confirmed ships for 84,588 tons, including the carrier Courageous Courageous, but none on her final patrol. Schuhart went to a job in the training command. Partly as a result of their many defects, the ten Type VIIs had lasted only about one year in the Atlantic.

During September and October, four Emsmann Flotilla ducks patrolled home via North Channel to join the training command. Two of the four, U-58 U-58 and and U-59 U-59, sank three ships for 17,500 tons; the others had no luck. Two of the new Type IID ducks patrolled from Germany to Lorient via North Channel to temporarily replace the withdrawing ducks. Both had great success. Outbound to Lorient, the U-137 U-137, commanded by Herbert Wohlfarth, age twenty-five, from the old duck U-14 U-14 (on which he had sunk nine confirmed ships), sank three ships for 12,000 tons, including the 4,753-ton British tanker (on which he had sunk nine confirmed ships), sank three ships for 12,000 tons, including the 4,753-ton British tanker Stratford Stratford, and damaged a 5,000-ton freighter. On a second patrol from Lorient, Wohlfarth hit the 10,500-ton auxiliary cruiser Cheshire Cheshire, putting her out of action for six months. Outbound to Lorient, the U-138 U-138, commanded by Wolfgang Luth, from the duck U-9 U-9 (on which he had sunk or captured eight confirmed ships), sank four ships for 34,600 tons, including the 13,900-ton British tanker (on which he had sunk or captured eight confirmed ships), sank four ships for 34,600 tons, including the 13,900-ton British tanker New Sevilla New Sevilla, during a single and remarkable three-hour night surface action. On a second patrol from Lorient, Luth sank a 5,300-ton British freighter and damaged a 7,000-ton British tanker. Believing the latter had sunk, Donitz credited Luth with a total score (on U-9 U-9 and and U-138 U-138) of 87,236 tons,* plus the French submarine Doris, and awarded him a plus the French submarine Doris, and awarded him a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz-the only commander of a duck to be so honored-and promoted him to command the lackluster Type IX U-43 U-43, in Lorient.

The four Bordeaux-based Italian boats that pioneered the way into the rugged North Atlantic performed poorly, as expected. One, Malaspina Malaspina, reported and attacked a convoy, but her skipper, Mario Leoni, missed and-worse-failed to radio the convoy's course and speed. As a result, Donitz was not able to direct other Italian or German boats to the scene. Moreover, it was discovered that Italian operations were restricted by a design flaw in the boats. They were not equipped with external main air-induction pipes for the diesel engines. The air for the diesels was drawn through the conning-tower hatch, which had to be open at all times when the boat was on the surface. In the rough Atlantic, torrents of seawater spilled down the hatch, flooding poorly located electrical panels in the control room.*

SERIOUS B BRITISH L LAPSES.

In early November Donitz commenced the relocation of U-boat headquarters from Paris to Lorient. The official opening date was not without significance: November 11, Armistice Day. He established living and working quarters in a large chateau in adjacent Kerneval, overlooking the Scorff River, the main waterway into Lorient. His personal staff remained unusually small: Eberhard Godt, chief of staff; Viktor Oehrn, first staff officer; Hans Meckel, from the duck U-19 U-19, communications officer; and a few others-so few that visitors from Berlin invariably expressed astonishment.

At about this same time the Todt Organization, which had built Germany's autobahns autobahns, commenced work on massive submarine "bunkers" or "pens" at Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, and La Pallice. Designed to provide a bombproof shelter for refitting and overhauling the U-boats, those huge structures were built of steel-reinforced concrete, and had walls and roofs twelve feet thick. The four pens could accommodate a total of about eighty U-boats. Some of the slips in the bunkers had locks so they could be pumped out, to provide dry-docking.

RAF reconnaissance aircraft took photographs of the foundations of the first bunkers at Lorient and La Pallice. Thus the British had fair warning, but they did not take advantage of the knowledge. RAF Bomber Command gave priority to targets in Germany. The U-boat bunkers were never high on the RAF target list in 1940 and 1941 and the construction proceeded with only sporadic and ineffective interference from Bomber Command, a serious lapse the British were to regret and one the Americans could never fathom.

By November, Donitz had every reason to expect increased assistance from the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe in locating convoys. But it was not forthcoming. The in locating convoys. But it was not forthcoming. The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe air air gruppes gruppes in France designated for this purpose were still scandalously ill-equipped. On November 16 Donitz logged that one in France designated for this purpose were still scandalously ill-equipped. On November 16 Donitz logged that one gruppe gruppe could provide no help because "one aircraft crashed." Another could provide no help because "one aircraft crashed." Another gruppe gruppe reported that all planes were grounded for two months with "mechanical defects." A reported that all planes were grounded for two months with "mechanical defects." A gruppe gruppe based in Bordeaux, equipped with the long-range, four-engine Focke-Wulf 200 Condor, the military version of a civilian airliner, which flew between France and Norway, could provide only one aircraft daily. But the few Condor crews were no help. On the rare occasions when they spotted a convoy, they invariably gave erroneous position reports and attacked the convoys, forcing them to divert to new courses (or even scatter) before Donitz could assemble the available boats for a pack attack. based in Bordeaux, equipped with the long-range, four-engine Focke-Wulf 200 Condor, the military version of a civilian airliner, which flew between France and Norway, could provide only one aircraft daily. But the few Condor crews were no help. On the rare occasions when they spotted a convoy, they invariably gave erroneous position reports and attacked the convoys, forcing them to divert to new courses (or even scatter) before Donitz could assemble the available boats for a pack attack.

Fourteen oceangoing U-boats sailed to attack the North Atlantic convoy routes in November, four from Germany, ten from France. The Italians added nine boats from Bordeaux. All Axis submarine operations during the month were hampered by foul, cold weather and by the temporary suspension of Allied convoys caused by the Atlantic sortie of the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, which sailed from Kiel undetected by the British in late October.

The heroes Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 and Gunther Prien in and Gunther Prien in U-47 U-47 were the first two skippers to leave from France. Both carried journalists (or propagandists) whose job it was to glorify the skippers and crews-and the U-boat arm-in words and pictures in order to stimulate a flow of volunteers to the submarine school. Prien welcomed his passenger, Wolfgang Frank were the first two skippers to leave from France. Both carried journalists (or propagandists) whose job it was to glorify the skippers and crews-and the U-boat arm-in words and pictures in order to stimulate a flow of volunteers to the submarine school. Prien welcomed his passenger, Wolfgang Frank*; Kretschmer, who disdained publicity (he was known as "Silent Otto"), did not.

Going up the west side of Ireland to North Channel on the afternoon of November 3, Kretschmer sighted the smoke of a lone inbound, zigzagging British freighter, the 5,400-ton Casanare. After dark he closed on the surface and sank her with a single torpedo. During the attack Kretschmer spotted another lone ship which turned out to be the 18,700-ton British liner Laurentic Laurentic, converted to an armed merchant cruiser for the Northern Patrol. Swinging around, Kretschmer fired a single torpedo at Laurentic Laurentic. It hit with a solid thwack, but the ship did not sink. Closing to point-blank range (580 meters), Kretschmer fired another torpedo, which missed, and yet another, which hit, but, Kretschmer logged, the third torpedo had "no particular effect."

In the midst of this attack, yet another big ship appeared on the scene: the 11,300-ton armed merchant cruiser Patroclus Patroclus. She had unwisely come up to rescue survivors of Casanare Casanare and and Laurentic Laurentic. Closing her, Kretschmer fired two torpedoes from 1,200 meters. Both hit but with "no particular effect." Easing in to 850 meters, Kretschmer fired a third torpedo, then, to save torpedoes, attacked Patroclus Patroclus with his deck gun. But when with his deck gun. But when Patroclus Patroclus fired back "with accurate time-fuse shells," Kretschmer hauled out of range and shot yet another torpedo, which hit, but again "with no particular effect." fired back "with accurate time-fuse shells," Kretschmer hauled out of range and shot yet another torpedo, which hit, but again "with no particular effect."

Although both Laurentic Laurentic and and Patroclus Patroclus were badly holed and doomed, Kretschmer was determined to hasten their end. While the torpedomen reloaded the tubes, he cruised about until a Sunderland appeared and drove him down. An hour and a half later he surfaced to resume the shooting, only to find two fleet destroyers, were badly holed and doomed, Kretschmer was determined to hasten their end. While the torpedomen reloaded the tubes, he cruised about until a Sunderland appeared and drove him down. An hour and a half later he surfaced to resume the shooting, only to find two fleet destroyers, Achates Achates and and Hesperus Hesperus, racing into the area. Dodging them, Kretschmer hit Laurentic Laurentic with one torpedo and with one torpedo and Patroclus Patroclus with two. Both ships then sank quickly. with two. Both ships then sank quickly.

Hauling off into the darkness, Kretschmer broke radio silence to accurately report sinking three ships for 35,414 tons and three internal torpedoes remaining. An exultant Donitz ("another great success") ordered Kretschmer to return to Lorient. Since Kretschmer's credited score totaled 217,198 tons-the second skipper after Prien to be credited 200,000 tons or more-Hitler awarded Kretschmer Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz and Berlin propagandists rushed out the news. En route to Lorient on November 5, Kretschmer ran across convoy Halifax 83 and sank the 7,000-ton British tanker and Berlin propagandists rushed out the news. En route to Lorient on November 5, Kretschmer ran across convoy Halifax 83 and sank the 7,000-ton British tanker Scottish Maiden Scottish Maiden with his last torpedoes, elevating his total for the patrol to four ships for 42,400 tons. with his last torpedoes, elevating his total for the patrol to four ships for 42,400 tons.* Hitler invited Kretschmer to Berlin for presentation of the Oak Leaves and asked him to stay for lunch at the Reichs Chancellery. When the Fuhrer asked what he could do to help the U-boat arm, Kretschmer was blunt: Give us many more U-boats and Hitler invited Kretschmer to Berlin for presentation of the Oak Leaves and asked him to stay for lunch at the Reichs Chancellery. When the Fuhrer asked what he could do to help the U-boat arm, Kretschmer was blunt: Give us many more U-boats and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe reconnaissance. reconnaissance.

Kretschmer had scarcely got off his radio report to Donitz on November 5 when the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, passing unseen in the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland, found and attacked the thirty-eight-ship convoy Halifax 84 near 32 degrees west longitude. This was the first time in fourteen months of war that any German surface warship had found and attacked a North Atlantic convoy. Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer sank the lone convoy escort, the 14,000-ton armed merchant cruiser sank the lone convoy escort, the 14,000-ton armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay Jervis Bay, then five other ships, for a total of 47,300 tons, and damaged two others.

Caught utterly unawares by this attack, the Admiralty went to full battle stations. The Home Fleet (Nelson, Rodney Rodney, Repulse Repulse, Hood Hood, etc.) deployed into the Atlantic to intercept Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, should she turn about for Germany or head for a French Atlantic port. All in vain; Scheer Scheer slipped away to the South Atlantic. In the meantime, the Admiralty aborted three inbound convoys from Halifax; the normal convoy cycle did not resume until November 17, with the sailing of Halifax 89. "The loss of imports," the Admiralty historian wrote, "caused to this country by the pocket-battleship's sudden appearance on our principal convoy route was, therefore, far greater than the cargoes actually sunk by her." slipped away to the South Atlantic. In the meantime, the Admiralty aborted three inbound convoys from Halifax; the normal convoy cycle did not resume until November 17, with the sailing of Halifax 89. "The loss of imports," the Admiralty historian wrote, "caused to this country by the pocket-battleship's sudden appearance on our principal convoy route was, therefore, far greater than the cargoes actually sunk by her."

The suspension of North Atlantic convoys during the period November 5 to about November 17 frustrated the U-boats. None sank a ship between November 5 and November 21, the longest "dry spell" of the war to then. During it, only a duck returning to Germany via North Channel and two Italian boats had any luck. In a well-executed night surface attack against a homebound Gibraltar convoy, Herbert Wohlfarth in the duck U-137 U-137 sank four ships for 13,300 tons. sank four ships for 13,300 tons. The Italian boat Marconi sank a 2,700-ton ship from Halifax 84, The Italian boat Marconi sank a 2,700-ton ship from Halifax 84, Vingaland Vingaland, which had been damaged by a Condor after Scheer Scheer's attack. The Baracca Baracca sank a 4,900-ton British freighter. sank a 4,900-ton British freighter.

Prien, the Bull of Scapa Flow, had a frustrating patrol. He stopped a small Portuguese neutral with his deck gun, the propagandist Wolfgang Frank wrote, and after inspecting her papers, he let her pass. For the next ten days he saw not a single ship. Unaware that Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer had caused a temporary halt to the convoys, Prien and his first watch officer, Amelung von Varendorff, age twenty-six, concluded that the Admiralty had rerouted convoys away from the Rockall Bank area. Prien thought the convoys were going far to the north; von Varendorff thought they were going far to the south. "Our tempers were getting frayed," Frank wrote. had caused a temporary halt to the convoys, Prien and his first watch officer, Amelung von Varendorff, age twenty-six, concluded that the Admiralty had rerouted convoys away from the Rockall Bank area. Prien thought the convoys were going far to the north; von Varendorff thought they were going far to the south. "Our tempers were getting frayed," Frank wrote.

When the Admiralty resumed convoys on November 18, Wohlfarth in the home-bound duck U-137 U-137 spotted Outbound 244 near North Channel. In response to Wohlfarth's alarm, Donitz directed five Lorient boats to converge on spotted Outbound 244 near North Channel. In response to Wohlfarth's alarm, Donitz directed five Lorient boats to converge on U-137 U-137. Prien found the convoy and attacked, firing five torpedoes. None hit the target: three missed, one misfired and "ran hot" in the torpedo tube, and one broached. Viktor Schutze in U-103 U-103 sank two ships for 10,900 tons. When one ship turned to ram sank two ships for 10,900 tons. When one ship turned to ram U-103 U-103, Schutze fired a "down the throat" shot at her, but the torpedo glanced off the ship's side and did not explode. Maneuvering wildly, Schutze barely managed to escape.

Coming up last, Karl-Heinz Moehle in the IXB U-123 U-123 made contact with the convoy in the early hours of November 22. In a remarkably dogged and aggressive series of attacks over the next thirty hours, Moehle sank six ships for 28,000 tons. In the last action, while firing a finishing shot submerged, Moehle collided with "an unknown object," damaging the conning tower and both periscopes, and was forced to abort to Lorient after merely fifteen days at sea. It was to take fifty days to repair made contact with the convoy in the early hours of November 22. In a remarkably dogged and aggressive series of attacks over the next thirty hours, Moehle sank six ships for 28,000 tons. In the last action, while firing a finishing shot submerged, Moehle collided with "an unknown object," damaging the conning tower and both periscopes, and was forced to abort to Lorient after merely fifteen days at sea. It was to take fifty days to repair U-123 U-123; the crew returned to Germany for leave, which extended through Christmas.

In vain pursuit of the convoy Outbound 244, on November 23 Joachim Schepke in U-100 U-100 happened upon inbound Slow Convoy 11. He gave the alarm, which brought up Klaus Korth in the VIIC happened upon inbound Slow Convoy 11. He gave the alarm, which brought up Klaus Korth in the VIIC U-93 U-93. Korth had no luck, but Schepke pursued and attacked relentlessly over twenty hours, reporting seven ships sunk for 41,400 tons, equaling his dazzling performance on his prior patrol. Postwar analysis confirmed seven ships sunk but reduced the tonnage to 24,601.

A knotty problem arose over Schepke's sinking claims. According to his reckoning, he had sunk eleven ships for 36,372 tons on the ducks U-3 U-3 and and U-19 U-19, and twenty-six ships for 176,938 tons on U-100 U-100, for a total of thirty-seven ships for 213,310 tons. If true, that made Schepke the third skipper to sink over 200,000 tons and to qualify for Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. But Donitz knew from B-dienst B-dienst and other sources that Schepke was a notorious tonnage overclaimer; in fact, his claims were ridiculed throughout the U-boat arm as "Schepke-tonnage." And yet there was no denying that Schepke had positively sunk thirty-four ships-twenty-three of them in a mere ninety days on and other sources that Schepke was a notorious tonnage overclaimer; in fact, his claims were ridiculed throughout the U-boat arm as "Schepke-tonnage." And yet there was no denying that Schepke had positively sunk thirty-four ships-twenty-three of them in a mere ninety days on U-100 U-100-to rank first in number of ships sunk, a feat deserving of an extraordinary award. Accordingly, Donitz recommended Schepke for Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz even though, by Donitz's count, he had not yet sunk 200,000 tons. even though, by Donitz's count, he had not yet sunk 200,000 tons.

Far to the south, off Freetown, von Stockhausen in the IXB U-65 U-65 conducted a one-boat submarine war. His primary task was to interdict cargo ships taking supplies via the Cape of Good Hope to the Army of the Nile in Egypt. On November 11, he reported to Donitz that he had refueled from the conducted a one-boat submarine war. His primary task was to interdict cargo ships taking supplies via the Cape of Good Hope to the Army of the Nile in Egypt. On November 11, he reported to Donitz that he had refueled from the Nordmark Nordmark (serving as a supply ship for (serving as a supply ship for Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer), but in the twenty-eight days since leaving Lorient he had not yet sunk a ship.

This negative news was keenly disappointing. It led Donitz to again protest to the OKM the "diversion" of U-boats to South Atlantic waters. But the OKM insisted on sending yet another boat to that area. Reluctantly, Donitz assigned the mission to the aging Type IX U-37 U-37, commanded by a new skipper, Nikolaus Clausen, age twenty-nine, from the duck U-142 U-142. He sailed on November 28 and was to refuel from a German supply ship in the Spanish Canary Islands.

Donitz was on the point of recalling U-65 U-65 when von Stockhausen spoke up to report "heavy traffic" and the sinking of four independent ships for 21,000 tons between November 15 and 18. These included two tankers, the 7,600-ton Norwegian when von Stockhausen spoke up to report "heavy traffic" and the sinking of four independent ships for 21,000 tons between November 15 and 18. These included two tankers, the 7,600-ton Norwegian Havbur Havbur and the 5,000-ton British and the 5,000-ton British Congonian Congonian. This promising report persuaded Donitz to leave U-65 U-65 in the Freetown area, refueling from in the Freetown area, refueling from Nordmark Nordmark a second time later in the month. But the British, who were aware of a second time later in the month. But the British, who were aware of U-65 U-65's presence from the sinkings and from DFing, gave her a wide berth and intensified the air patrols. Von Stockhausen carried out the second refueling on November 28 (handing over a survivor of one sinking) and yet another on December 7, but he sighted no enemy ships for four full weeks, leading Donitz to again doubt the wisdom of sending boats to this distant area.

In the waning days of November, four boats from Lorient remained on patrol in the stormy, forbidding North Atlantic: the old IX U-43 U-43, with a new skipper, Wolfgang Luth, who had twice aborted with mechanical difficulties before reaching the hunting grounds; the U-47 U-47 (Prien); the (Prien); the U-93 U-93 (Korth); and the IXB (Korth); and the IXB U-103 U-103 (Schutze). Only one of the four had any luck: Viktor Schutze in (Schutze). Only one of the four had any luck: Viktor Schutze in U-103 U-103, who sank three ships for 13,000 tons. Korth in the first VIIC to reach combat, U-93 U-93, who had burned up a lot of fuel to no purpose, was forced to return to France prematurely, earning the dubious distinction of being the first boat to return to Lorient without having sunk a single ship. Adding another dubious first, U-93 U-93 was hit at dockside by a rarely seen RAF bomber. The damage was slight, but it delayed was hit at dockside by a rarely seen RAF bomber. The damage was slight, but it delayed U-93 U-93's readiness to January 1941.

Seven other U-boats sailed in November, raising the number in the hunting grounds to ten. Five came from Germany; two from Lorient. Three of the boats from Germany were new. Almost immediately upon entering the combat zone, two of them, U-95 U-95 and and U-104 U-104, tangled with enemy ships, both sinking one and damaging one. Thereafter, the IXB U-104 U-104, commanded by Harald Jurst, age twenty-seven, from the duck U-59 U-59, disappeared without a trace, perhaps the victim of crew error.* The duck The duck U-140 U-140, commanded by Hans-Peter Hinsch, age twenty-six, sank three ships for 13,200 tons in North Channel and returned to the submarine school.

On the last day of November, eight oceangoing boats remained in the hunting grounds, including Prien, who was low on fuel-and patience-and had set a course for Lorient. One boat, the VIIB U-101 U-101, fresh from Lorient with a new skipper, Ernst Mengersen, age twenty-eight, from the duck U-18 U-18, sank a ship; all others reported "no traffic."

Believing the British had shifted convoy routes to the south, Donitz ordered about half of the boats, including Prien's homebound U-47 U-47, to search in that direction. It was a shrewd guess. Just after dark on December 1, Mengersen in U-101 U-101 spoke up to report contact with a big inbound convoy, Halifax 90. spoke up to report contact with a big inbound convoy, Halifax 90.

Donitz ordered Mengersen to shadow the convoy and delay any attack until other boats could converge. Mengersen tracked and broadcast beacon signals but could not resist the temptation to shoot, and he tore into the convoy, firing all twelve of his torpedoes. He claimed sinking four ships for 33,000 tons and damaging two for 11,000 tons. His confirmed victims included the 8,800-ton British tanker Appalachee Appalachee. Prien in U-47 U-47 attacked next, in the early hours of December 2, claiming one ship of 10,000 tons sunk and damage to the 8,400-ton British tanker attacked next, in the early hours of December 2, claiming one ship of 10,000 tons sunk and damage to the 8,400-ton British tanker Conch Conch. He then attacked an unidentified ship with his deck gun until escorts chased him off. Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99, fresh from Lorient, arrived next and shot five torpedoes to sink the 16,400-ton auxiliary cruiser Forfar Forfar, which was in the process of shifting over to escort convoy Outbound 251. Forfar Forfar was the third big auxiliary cruiser to be sunk by Kretschmer within a month. was the third big auxiliary cruiser to be sunk by Kretschmer within a month.

One of the new boats from Germany, the VIIC U-95 U-95, commanded by Gerd Schreiber, age twenty-eight, from the duck U-3 U-3, came up and found the tanker Conch Conch, which Prien had damaged. Schreiber fired three torpedoes at her. Two glanced off with only slight effect, but one hit solidly. Believing Conch Conch was going under, Schreiber broke off the attack to seek other victims. But the was going under, Schreiber broke off the attack to seek other victims. But the Conch Conch stubbornly refused to sink. stubbornly refused to sink.

Two other boats hurried to the scene: the U-52 U-52 (Salmann), returning to the Atlantic after overhaul in Germany, and the cranky (Salmann), returning to the Atlantic after overhaul in Germany, and the cranky U-43 U-43 (Luth) from Lorient. On the morning of December 2, Salmann sank two British freighters for 7,000 tons and damaged another. Luth's approach course took him right into the path of convoy Outbound 251. He attacked and sank two ships for 19,400 tons, including, the 12,200-ton British tanker (Luth) from Lorient. On the morning of December 2, Salmann sank two British freighters for 7,000 tons and damaged another. Luth's approach course took him right into the path of convoy Outbound 251. He attacked and sank two ships for 19,400 tons, including, the 12,200-ton British tanker Victor Ross Victor Ross.

Two destroyers, the Canadian St. Laurent St. Laurent and the British and the British Viscount Viscount, responded to the convoy distress calls. When daylight came they spotted a U-boat on the surface and drove it under. St. Laurent St. Laurent obtained a sonar contact and commenced attacking with depth charges. Viscount soon joined. In all, the two destroyers made thirteen separate attacks over four hours, dropping a total of eighty-one depth charges variously set at 150," 250, 350, and 500 feet. They did not sink a U-boat (as believed), but their presence-and attacks-held all the boats down and the convoy slipped away. obtained a sonar contact and commenced attacking with depth charges. Viscount soon joined. In all, the two destroyers made thirteen separate attacks over four hours, dropping a total of eighty-one depth charges variously set at 150," 250, 350, and 500 feet. They did not sink a U-boat (as believed), but their presence-and attacks-held all the boats down and the convoy slipped away.

When Donitz learned that the convoy was getting away, he fumed and fretted. Never enough boats! Too little time to concentrate for a mass attack! No help from the Luftwajfel He plotted the probable course of the convoy, exhorted the boats to pursue, and called on the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe for assistance. It dispatched three aircraft-a record, all-out effort-but none of the planes found the convoy. for assistance. It dispatched three aircraft-a record, all-out effort-but none of the planes found the convoy.

Later that afternoon, December 2, the U-94 U-94, another new VIIC from Germany, commanded by Herbert Kuppisch, age thirty-one, from the duck U-58 U-58, overtook and reported the convoy. When he received the- contact report, Donitz directed all skippers, including Mengersen in U-101 U-101, who had no torpedoes, to close the enemy formation. Still tracking, after dark that day Kuppisch moved in on the surface and attacked, sinking two British freighters for 12,700 tons. Attempting to rejoin, Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 torpedoed and sank a 4,300-ton Norwegian straggler and, later, the abandoned British tanker torpedoed and sank a 4,300-ton Norwegian straggler and, later, the abandoned British tanker Conch Conch. No other boats found the convoy on the second day.

Upon receiving flash reports from the six boats that had attacked the convoy, Donitz believed they had achieved another sensational victory. He calculated that the boats had sunk a total of eighteen ships for 120,698 tons, not counting unreported tonnage from Salmann in U-52 U-52. Jurgen Rohwer's postwar analysis reduced the victory considerably. The comparison: * Shared credit for tanker Shared credit for tanker Conch Conch with with U-95 U-95 and and U-99 U-99.

After an analysis of the flash reports and other data, Donitz reduced the total U-boat sinkings in Halifax 90 from eighteen to sixteen. Eager to exploit the victory, on December 3 Berlin propagandists lumped in Luth's two kills in Outbound Convoy 251 and boasted that U-boats had sunk eighteen ships for 148,000 tons within the previous twenty-four hours. Including Conch Conch, not sunk until December 3, the confirmed figures from the two convoys were thirteen ships for 92,855 tons. Ernst Mengersen, who had first spotted Halifax 90 and pulled in the other five boats, was cited by name and credited with sinking five ships for 41,000 tons.

Three of the six boats in these actions returned to Lorient. Prien and his crew and the propagandist Wolfgang Frank in U-47 U-47 were not a happy lot. In thirty-four days of patrolling in foul weather, they had sunk but one confirmed ship, the 7,555-ton Belgian freighter were not a happy lot. In thirty-four days of patrolling in foul weather, they had sunk but one confirmed ship, the 7,555-ton Belgian freighter Ville d'Arlon Ville d'Arlon (plus damage to the tanker (plus damage to the tanker Conch Conch). But Donitz offered good news: U-47 U-47 was to be overhauled at Lorient; all hands were granted home leave extending through Christmas. was to be overhauled at Lorient; all hands were granted home leave extending through Christmas.

Assigned to weather reporting, Otto Kretschmer in U-99 U-99 sank one 5,200-ton freighter, then aborted to Lorient with an engine breakdown. Crediting Kretschmer with sinking four ships for 34,935 tons on this sixteen-day patrol, Berlin propagandists gleefully pronounced that having sunk a total of 252,100 tons, Kretschmer was the new king of the U-boat aces, as indeed he was. sank one 5,200-ton freighter, then aborted to Lorient with an engine breakdown. Crediting Kretschmer with sinking four ships for 34,935 tons on this sixteen-day patrol, Berlin propagandists gleefully pronounced that having sunk a total of 252,100 tons, Kretschmer was the new king of the U-boat aces, as indeed he was.

Of the Lorient boats remaining on patrol, only Viktor Schutze in the IXB U-103 U-103 had any luck. He sank two more ships, then returned to Lorient, also having been out for thirty-four grueling days. Credited with sinking eight ships for 46,000 tons on this patrol, his total claims (on had any luck. He sank two more ships, then returned to Lorient, also having been out for thirty-four grueling days. Credited with sinking eight ships for 46,000 tons on this patrol, his total claims (on U-25 U-25 and and U-103 U-103) were twenty ships for 109,317 tons.* He was awarded a He was awarded a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz and home leave extending through Christmas. and home leave extending through Christmas.

Close by the scene of the battle with Halifax 90, on December 1 the Italian submarine Argo Argo, commanded by Alberto Crepas, came upon another inbound convoy, Home Gibraltar 47. As Crepas shot torpedoes, the Canadian destroyer Saguenay Saguenay, commanded by F. H. Davidson, spotted Argo and turned to ram. A torpedo hit Saguenay Saguenay on the port side forward, blowing off sixty feet of her bow and killing twenty-one men. The British destroyer on the port side forward, blowing off sixty feet of her bow and killing twenty-one men. The British destroyer Highlander Highlander raced up to assist raced up to assist Saguenay Saguenay and took off ninety men, including eighteen wounded. Remarkably, a skeleton crew of Canadians put out fires and saved Saguenay, which was towed into England by British tugs. Credited with preventing attacks on the merchant ships of Home-bound Gibraltar 47, Saguenay remained under repair for many months. and took off ninety men, including eighteen wounded. Remarkably, a skeleton crew of Canadians put out fires and saved Saguenay, which was towed into England by British tugs. Credited with preventing attacks on the merchant ships of Home-bound Gibraltar 47, Saguenay remained under repair for many months.

This near-fatal attack on an enemy destroyer was the highlight of the Italian submarine effort in the fall of 1940. To then, nine of the twenty-seven Italian boats had sunk twelve ships, including five (!) neutrals. In return, one Italian boat, In return, one Italian boat, Faa di Bruno Faa di Bruno, had been lost. This first kill of an Italian boat in the Atlantic was the result of a dogged twenty-hour hunt on November 6/7 by the Canadian destroyer Ottawa Ottawa, commanded by Edmond R. Mainguy, and the British destroyer Harvester Harvester, commanded by M. Thornton. There were no survivors.

During December, five of the Italian submarines, including Argo, sank five more Allied freighters, two of them stragglers from Slow Convoy 15 and two stragglers from convoys Outbound 252 and 260. In return, a second Italian boat was lost. She was the Tarantini Tarantini, torpedoed off Bordeaux by the British submarine Thunderbolt Thunderbolt. There were no survivors of this boat either.

In the three-month period September 2 to December 2, 1940, the second phase of the "Happy Time," German U-boats inflicted yet another appalling slaughter on British-controlled shipping. The twenty-four oceangoing boats sailing to the North Atlantic in this period sank 140 ships for about 760,000 tons. In eleven patrols (three from Germany or Norway; eight from Lorient) the ducks sank another seventeen ships (including two tankers) for about 89,000 tons, making the total 157 ships for about 847,000 tons, of which seventeen for about 140,000 tons were tankers.* Remarkably, in the same period only three U-boats (the marginal VIIs Remarkably, in the same period only three U-boats (the marginal VIIs U-31 U-31 and and U-32 U-32, and the new IXB U-104 U-104) had been lost, making the "exchange rate" of lost ships to lost U-boats about fifty to one!

Numerous factors had contributed to the slaughter: intelligent and intuitive deployment of the few U-boats available, leading to the pack attacks on seven different convoys; boldness, skill, and confidence on the part of two dozen skippers; excellent torpedo performance in night surface attacks; inadequate and inept convoy-escort and ASW measures; and, lastly, not a little luck. "In all cases," Donitz logged, "first contact" with the convoys "was a matter of chance chance. The convoy approached a U-boat."

The British had reason for concern. In the six months of "Happy Time," mid-May 1940, when the U-boats returned to the Atlantic, to December 2, they had sunk an impressive total of 298 ships for more than 1.6 million tons, almost all of them in the Northwest Approaches. The total included thirty-seven tankers, of which twenty-seven were British-owned.

Eighteen U-boat skippers were mainly responsible for the slaughter in this "Happy Time." All were enshrined forever in the pantheon of German naval heroes. Their confirmed successes: U-137 U-137 and and U-138 U-138 were Type IID ducks. were Type IID ducks.