And now that we have marked these things for evidence of our a.s.sertion, who will not rest persuaded that the father of the Romans, and therefore the Romans themselves, were the n.o.blest people under heaven? Who can fail to see the divine predestination shown forth by the double meeting of blood from every part of the world in the veins of one man?

IV.--Again, that which is helped to its perfection by miracles is willed by G.o.d, and therefore it is of right. This is manifestly true, for as Thomas says in his third book against the Gentiles, "a miracle is something done by G.o.d beyond the commonly established order of things."[214] And so he proves that G.o.d alone can work miracles; and his proof is strengthened by the authority of Moses; for on the occasion of the plague of lice, when the magicians of Pharaoh used natural principles artfully, and then failed, they said: "This is the finger of G.o.d."[215] A miracle therefore being the immediate working of the first agent, without the co-operation of any secondary agents, as Thomas himself sufficiently proves in the book which we have mentioned, it is impious to say where a miracle is worked in aid of anything, that that thing is not of G.o.d, as something well pleasing to him, which he foresaw. Therefore it is religious to accept the contradictory of this. The Roman Empire has been helped to its perfection by miracles; therefore it was willed by G.o.d, and consequently was and is by right.[216]

[Footnote 214: _Contra Gent._ iii. 101.--(W.)]

[Footnote 215: Exod. vii. 12-15.--(W.)]

[Footnote 216: Witte refers to the _Ep. ad Reges_, -- 8, for the same thought.]

It is proved by the testimony of ill.u.s.trious authors that G.o.d stretched forth His hand to work miracles on behalf of the Roman Empire. For Livy, in the first part of his work, testifies that a shield fell from heaven into the city chosen of G.o.d in the time of Numa Pompilius, the second king of Rome, whilst he was sacrificing after the manner of the Gentiles. Lucan mentions this miracle in the ninth book of his Pharsalia, when he is describing the incredible force of the South wind. He says: "Surely it was thus, while Numa was offering sacrifices, that the shield fell with which the chosen patrician youth moves along. The South wind, or the North wind, had spoiled the people that bore our shields."[217] And when the Gauls had taken all the city, and, under cover of the darkness, were stealing on to attack the Capitol itself, the capture of which was all that remained to destroy the very name of Rome, then as Livy, and many other ill.u.s.trious writers agree in testifying, a goose, which none had seen before, gave a warning note of the approach of the Gauls, and aroused the guards to defend the Capitol.[218] And our poet commemorates the event in his description of the shield of aeneas in the eighth book. "Higher, and in front of the temple stood Manlius, the watchman of the Tarpeian keep, guarding the rock of the Capitol.

The palace stood out clear, rough with the thatch which Romulus had laid; here the goose, inlaid in silver, fluttered on the portico of gold, as it warned the Romans that the Gauls were even now on the threshold."[219]

[Footnote 217: Luc. ix. 477.--(W.)]

[Footnote 218: V. Liv. v. 47, and the _Convito_, iv. 5.--(W.)]

[Footnote 219: _aen._ viii. 652.--(W.)]

And when the n.o.bility of Rome had so fallen under the onset of Hannibal, that nothing remained for the final destruction of the Roman commonwealth, but the Carthaginian a.s.sault on the city, Livy tells us in the course of his history of the Punic war, that a sudden dreadful storm of hail fell upon them, so that the victors could not follow up their victory.[220]

[Footnote 220: Liv. xxvi. 11; Oros. iv. 17.--(W.)]

Was not the escape of Cloelia wonderful, a woman, and captive in the power of Porsenna, when she burst her bonds, and, by the marvellous help of G.o.d, swam across the Tiber, as almost all the historians of Rome tell us, to the glory of that city?[221]

[Footnote 221: Liv. ii. 13; Oros. ii. 5.--(W.)]

Thus was it fitting that He should work who foresaw all things from the beginning, and ordained them in the beauty of His order; so that He, who when made visible was to show forth miracles for the sake of things invisible, should, whilst invisible, also show forth miracles for the sake of things visible.

V.--Further, whoever works for the good of the state, works with Right as his end. This may be shown as follows. Right is that proportion of man to man as to things, and as to persons, which, when it is preserved, preserves society, and when it is destroyed, destroys society.[222] The description of Right in the Digest does not give the essence of right, but only describes it for practical purposes.[223]

If therefore our definition comprehends well the essence and reason of Right, and if the end of any society is the common good of its members, it is necessary that the end of all Right is the common good, and it is impossible that that can be Right, which does not aim at the common good. Therefore Cicero says well in the first book of his _Rhetoric_: "Laws must always be interpreted for the good of the state."[224] If laws do not aim at the good of those who live under them, they are laws only in name; in reality they cannot be laws. For it behoves them to bind men together for the common good; and Seneca therefore says well in his book "on the four virtues:" "Law is the bond of human society."[225] It is therefore plain that whoever aims at the good of the state, aims at the end of Right; and therefore, if the Romans aimed at the good of the state, we shall say truly that they aimed at the end of Right.

[Footnote 222: Cf. Aristotle, _Ethics_, v. 6.]

[Footnote 223: "Jus est ars boni et aequi." L. 1, fr. _Dig. De Just.i.tia et Jure_, i. 1.--(W.)]

[Footnote 224: _De Invent._ i. 38.--(W.)]

[Footnote 225: Not Seneca, but Martin, Bp. of Braga, [dagger symbol]580.--(W.) V. _Biog. Univ._]

That in bringing the whole world into subjection, they aimed at this good, their deeds declare. They renounced all selfishness, a thing always contrary to the public weal; they cherished universal peace and liberty; and that sacred, pious, and glorious people are seen to have neglected their own private interests that they might follow public objects for the good of all mankind. Therefore was it well written: "The Roman Empire springs from the fountain of piety."[226]

[Footnote 226: "_Romanum imperium de fonte nascitur pietatis._"--(WITTE.) He has not been able to trace the saying.]

But seeing that nothing is known of the intention of an agent who acts by free choice to any but the agent himself, save only by external signs, and since reasonings must be examined according to the subject matter (as has already been said), it will be sufficient on this point if we set forth proofs which none can doubt, of the intention of the Roman people, both in their public bodies and individually.

Concerning those public bodies by which men seem in a way to be bound to the state, the authority of Cicero alone, in the second book of the _De Officiis_, will suffice. "So long," he says, "as the Empire of the republic was maintained not by injustice, but by the benefits which it conferred, we fought either for our allies or for the Empire. Our wars brought with them an ending which was either indulgent, or else was absolutely necessary. All kings, peoples, and nations found a port of refuge in the Senate. Our magistrates and generals alike sought renown by defending our provinces and our allies with good faith and with justice. Our government might have been called not so much Empire, as a Protectorate of the whole world." So wrote Cicero.[227]

[Footnote 227: _De Off._ ii. 8.--(W.)]

Of individuals I will speak shortly. Shall we not say that they intended the common good, who by hard toil, by poverty, by exile, by bereavement of their children, by loss of limb, by sacrifice of their lives, endeavoured to build up the public weal? Did not great Cincinnatus leave us a sacred example of freely laying down his office at its appointed end, when, as Livy tells us, he was taken from the plough and made dictator? And after his victory, after his triumph, he gave back his Imperator's sceptre to the consuls, and returned to the ploughshare to toil after his oxen.[228] Well did Cicero, arguing against Epicurus, in the volume _De Finibus_, speak in praise of him, mindful of this good deed.[229] "And so," he says, "our ancestors took Cincinnatus from the plough, and made him dictator."

[Footnote 228: Liv. vi. 28, 29; Oros. ii. 12.--(W.)]

[Footnote 229: II. 4.--(W.)]

Has not Fabricius left us a lofty example of resisting avarice, when, poor man as he was, for the faith by which he was bound to the republic, he laughed to scorn the great weight of gold which was offered him, and refused it, scorning it with words which became him well. His story too is confirmed by our poet in the sixth _aeneid_,[230] where he speaks of "Fabricius strong in his poverty."

[Footnote 230: VI. 844.--(W.)]

Has not Camillus left us a memorable example of obeying the laws instead of seeking our private advantage? For according to Livy he was condemned to exile, and then, after that he had delivered his country from the invaders, and had restored to Rome her own Roman spoils, he yet turned to leave the sacred city, though the whole people bade him stay; nor did he return till leave was given him to come back by the authority of the Senate. This high-souled hero also is commended in the sixth _aeneid_, where our poet speaks of "Camillus, that restored to us our standards."[231]

[Footnote 231: Liv. v. 46; _aen._ vi. 826.--(W.)]

Was not Brutus the first to teach that our sons, that all others, are second in importance to the liberty of our country? For Livy tells us how, when he was consul, he condemned his own sons to death, for that they had conspired with the enemy. His glory is made new in our poet's sixth book, where he sings how "The father shall summon the sons to die for the sake of fair liberty, when they seek to stir fresh wars."[232]

[Footnote 232: _aen._ vi. 821.--(W.)]

Has not Mucius encouraged us to dare everything for our country's sake, when after attacking Porsenna unawares, he watched the hand which had missed its stroke being burnt, though it was his own, as if he were beholding the torment of a foe? This also Livy witnesses to with astonishment.

Add to these those sacred victims the Decii, who laid down their lives by an act of devotion for the public safety, whom Livy glorifies in his narrative, not as they deserve, but as he was able. Add to these the self-sacrifice, which words cannot express, of Marcus Cato, that staunchest champion of true liberty. These were men of whom the one, that he might save his country, did not fear the shadow of death; while the other, that he might kindle in the world the pa.s.sionate love of liberty, showed how dear was liberty, choosing to pa.s.s out of life a free man, rather than without liberty to abide in life.[233] The glory of all these heroes glows afresh in the words of Cicero in his book _De Finibus_; of the Decii he speaks thus: "Publius Decius, the head of the Decii, a consul, when he devoted himself for the state, and charged straight into the Latin host, was he thinking aught of his pleasure, where and when he should take it;--when he knew that he had to die at once, and sought that death with more eager desire than, according to Epicurus, we should seek pleasure? And were it not that his deed had justly received its praise, his son would not have done the like in his fourth consulship; nor would his grandson, again, in the war with Pyrrhus, have fallen, a consul, in battle; and, a third time in continuous succession in that family, have offered himself a victim for the commonwealth." But in the _De Officiis_,[234] Cicero says of Cato: "Marcus Cato was in no different position from his comrades who in Africa surrendered to Caesar. The others, had they slain themselves, would perhaps have been blamed for the act, for their life was of less consequence,[235] and their principles were not so strict. But for Cato, to whom nature had given incredible firmness and who had strengthened this severity by his unremitting constancy to his principles, and who never formed a resolution by which he did not abide, he was indeed bound to die rather than to look on the face of a tyrant."

[Footnote 233: Witte quotes the _Convito_, iv. 5, where all these examples are recounted, almost in the same language. He compares _Parad._ vi. 46 (Cincinnatus), _Purgat._ xx. 25 (Fabricius), _Parad._ vi. 47 (Decii), _Purg._ i. where Cato guards the approach to Purgatory.]

[Footnote 234: I. 31 (W.), carelessly quoted.]

[Footnote 235: "_Levior_" al. "_lenior_."]

VI.--Two things therefore have been made clear: first, that whoever aims at the good of the state aims at right;[236] and secondly, that the Roman people in bringing the world into subjection, aimed at the public weal. Therefore let us argue thus: Whoever aims at right, walks according to right; the Roman people in bringing the world into subjection aimed at right, as we have made manifest in the preceding chapter. Therefore in bringing the world into subjection the Roman people acted according to right, consequently it was by right that they a.s.sumed the dignity of Empire.

[Footnote 236: "_Finem juris intendit._"]

We reach this conclusion on grounds which are manifest to all. It is manifest from this, that whosoever aims at right, walks according to right. To make this clear, we must mark that everything is made to gain a certain end, otherwise it would be in vain, and as we said before this cannot be. And as everything has its proper end, so every end has some distinct thing of which it is the end. And therefore it is impossible that any two things, spoken of as separate things,[237]

and in so far as they are two, should have the same end as their aim, for so the same absurdity[238] would follow, that one of them would exist in vain. Since, then, there is a certain end of right, as we have explained, it necessarily follows that when we have decided what that end is, we have also decided what right is; for it is the natural and proper effect of right. And since in any sequence it is impossible to have an antecedent without its consequent, for instance, to have "man" without "animal," as is evident by putting together and taking to pieces the idea,[239] so also it is impossible to seek for the end of right without right, for each thing stands in the same relation to its proper end, as the consequent does to its antecedent; as without health it is impossible to attain to a good condition of the body.

Wherefore, it is most evidently clear that he who aims at the end of right must aim in accordance with right; nor does the contradictory instance which is commonly drawn from Aristotle's treatment of "good counsel" avail anything.[240] He there says: "It is possible to obtain what is the right result from a syllogism, which is incorrect, but not by an argument which is right, for the middle term is wrong." For if sometimes a right conclusion is obtained from false principles, this is only by accident, and happens only in so far as the true conclusion is imported in the words of the inference. Truth never really follows from falsehood; but the signs of truth may easily follow from the signs of falsehood. So also it is in matters of conduct. If a thief helps a poor man out of the spoils of his thieving, we must not call that charity; but it is an action which would have the form of charity, if it had been done out of the man's own substance. And so of the end of right. If anything, such as the end of right, were gained without right, it would only be the end of right, that is, the common good, in the same sense that the gift, made from evil gains, is charity. And so the example proves nothing, for in our proposition we speak, not of the apparent but of the real end of right. What was sought, therefore, is clear.

[Footnote 237: "_Per se loquendo._"]

[Footnote 238: "_Inconveniens._"]

[Footnote 239: "_Construendo et destruendo._" Technical terms of the conditional syllogism, _constructive_ and _destructive_.]

[Footnote 240: [Greek: Euboulia]. _Ethics_, vi. 10.]

VII.--What nature has ordained is maintained of right. For nature in its providence does not come short of men's providence; for if it were to come short, the effect would excel the cause in goodness, which is impossible. But we see that when public bodies are founded, not only are the relations of the members to each other considered, but also their capacities for exercising offices; and this is to consider the end of right in the society or order which is founded, for right is not extended beyond what is possible. Nature then, in her ordinances, does not come short in this foresight. Therefore it is clear that nature, in ordaining a thing, has regard to its capacities; and this regard is the fundamental principle of right which nature lays down.