From this it follows that the natural order of things cannot be maintained without right; for this fundamental principle of right is inseparably joined to the natural order of things. It is necessary, therefore, that it is of right that this order is preserved.

The Roman people was ordained for empire, by nature, and this may be shown as follows: The man would come short of perfection in his art, who aimed only to produce his ultimate form, and neglected the means of reaching it; in the same way, if nature only aimed at reproducing in the world the universal form of the divine likeness, and neglected the means of doing so, she would be imperfect. But nature, which is the work of the divine intelligence, is wholly perfect; she therefore aims at all the means by which her final end is arrived at.

Since then mankind has a certain end, and since there is a certain means necessary for the universal end of nature, it necessarily follows that nature aims at obtaining that means. And therefore the Philosopher, in the second book of _Natural Learning_,[241] well shows that nature always acts for the end. And since nature cannot reach this end through one man, because that there are many actions necessary to it, which need many to act, therefore nature must produce many men and set them to act. And besides the higher influence,[242]

the powers and properties of inferior spheres contribute much to this.

And therefore we see not only that individual men, but also that certain races are born to govern, and certain others to be governed and to serve, as the Philosopher argues in the _Politics_;[243] and for the latter, as he himself says, subjection is not only expedient, but just, even though they be forced into subjection.

[Footnote 241: Arist. _Phys. Ausc._ ii. 1.--(W.)]

[Footnote 242: _I.e._ of the heavens. Witte quotes _Parad._ viii. 97, _Purg._ xiv. 38.]

[Footnote 243: I. 5, 11; 6, 9.--(W.)]

And if this is so, it cannot be doubted that nature ordained in the world a country and a nation for universal sovereignty; if this were not so, she would have been untrue to herself, which is impossible.

But as to where that country is, and which is that nation, it is sufficiently manifest, both from what we have said and from what we shall say, that it was Rome and her citizens or people; and this our poet very skilfully touches on in the sixth _aeneid_, where he introduces Anchises prophesying to aeneas, the ancestor of the Romans: "Others may mould the breathing bronze more delicately--I doubt it not; they may chisel from marble the living countenance; they may surpa.s.s thee in pleading causes; they may track the course of the heavens with the rod, and tell when the stars will rise; but thou, Roman, remember to rule the nations with thy sway. These shall be thy endowments--to make peace to be the custom of the world; to spare thy foes when they submit, and to crush the proud."[244] And again, Virgil skilfully notes the appointment of the _place_, in the fourth _aeneid_, when he brings in Jupiter speaking to Mercury concerning aeneas: "His fair mother did not promise him to us to be such as this: it was not for this that twice she rescues him from Grecian arms; but that there should be one to rule over Italy, teeming with empires, tempestuous with wars." It has, therefore, sufficiently been shown that the Roman people was by nature ordained to empire. Therefore it was of right that they gained empire, by subduing to themselves the world.

[Footnote 244: _aen._ vi. 848, iv. 227.--(W.)]

VIII.--But in order properly to discover the truth in our inquiry, we must recognise that the judgment of G.o.d is sometimes made manifest to men, and sometimes hidden from them.

It may be made manifest in two ways, namely, by reason and by faith.

There are some judgments of G.o.d to which the human reason, by its own paths, can arrive; as, that a man should risk death to save his country. For a part should always risk itself to save its whole, and each man is a part of his State, as is clear from the Philosopher in his _Politics_.[245] Therefore every man ought to risk himself for his country, as the less good for the better; whence the Philosopher says to Nicomachus: "The end is desirable, indeed, even for an individual, but it is better and more divine for a nation and State."[246] And this is the judgment of G.o.d, for if it were not so, right reason in men would miss the intention of nature, which is impossible.

[Footnote 245: Arist. _Pol._ i. 2, 12.--(W.)]

[Footnote 246: _Ethics_, i. 1.]

There are also some judgments of G.o.d to which, though human reason cannot reach them by its own powers, yet, by the aid of faith in those things which are told us in Holy Scripture it can be lifted up: as, for instance, that no one, however perfect he may be in moral and intellectual virtues, both in habit and in action, can be saved without faith; it being supposed that he never heard aught of Christ.

For human reason cannot of itself see this to be just, yet by faith it can. For in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is written, "without faith it is impossible to please G.o.d;"[247] and in Leviticus, "what man soever there be of the House of Israel that killeth an ox, or lamb, or goat in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle to offer an offering unto the Lord, blood shall be imputed to that man."[248] The door of the tabernacle stands for Christ, who is the door of the kingdom of heaven, as may be proved from the Gospel: the killing of animals represents men's actions.[249]

[Footnote 247: Cf. _Parad._ xix. 70.--(W.)]

[Footnote 248: Heb. ii. 6; Levit. xvii. 3, 4.--(W.).]

[Footnote 249: Witte quotes from Isidore of Seville, a writer much used in the middle ages, the following: "In a moral sense, we offer a calf when we conquer the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we correct our irrational impulses; a kid, when we master impurity; a dove, when we are simple; a turtle-dove, when we observe chast.i.ty; unleavened bread, 'when we keep the feast not in the leaven of malice, but in the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.'"]

But the judgment of G.o.d is a hidden one, when man cannot arrive at the knowledge of it either by the law of nature or by the written law, but only occasionally by a special grace. This grace comes in several ways: sometimes by simple revelation, sometimes by revelation a.s.sisted by a certain kind of trial or debate. Simple revelation, too, is of two kinds: either G.o.d gives it of his own accord, or it is gained by prayer. G.o.d gives it of his own accord in two ways, either plainly, or by a sign. His judgment against Saul was revealed to Samuel plainly; but it was by a sign that it was revealed to Pharaoh what G.o.d had judged touching the setting free of the children of Israel. The judgment of G.o.d is also given in answer to prayer, as he knew who spoke in the second book of Chronicles:[250] "When we know not what we ought to do, this only have we left, to direct our eyes to Thee."

[Footnote 250: 2 Chron. xx. 12 (Vulg.).]

Revelation by means of trial is also of two kinds. It is given either by casting lots, or by combat; for "to strive" (_certare_), is derived from a phrase which means "to make certain" (_certum facere_). It is clear that the judgment of G.o.d is sometimes revealed to men by casting lots, as in the subst.i.tution of Matthias in the Acts of the Apostles.

Again the judgment of G.o.d is revealed to men by combat in two ways: either it is by a trial of strength, as in the duels of champions who are called "_duelliones_," or it is by the contention of many men, each striving to reach a certain mark first, as happens in the contests of athletes who run for a prize. The first of these methods was prefigured among the Gentiles by the contests between Hercules and Antaeus, which Lucan mentions in the fourth book of his _Pharsalia_, and Ovid in the ninth book of his _Metamorphoses_. The second is prefigured by the contest between Atalanta and Hippomenes, described in the tenth book of Ovid's _Metamorphoses_.[251]

[Footnote 251: _Phars._ iv. 593; _Metam._ ix. 183, x. 569.--(W.).]

Moreover, it ought not to pa.s.s unnoticed concerning these two kinds of strife, that while in the first each champion may fairly hinder his antagonist, in the second this is not so; for athletes must not hinder one another in their strife, though our poet seems to have thought differently in the fifth _aeneid_ where Euryalus so receives the prize.[252] But Cicero has done better in forbidding this practice in the third book of the _De Officiis_, following the opinion of Chrysippus.[253] He there says: "Chrysippus is right here, as he often is, for he says that he who runs in a race should strive with all his might to win, but in no way should he try to trip up his compet.i.tor."

[Footnote 252: V. 335--(W.)]

[Footnote 253: III. 10.--(W.)]

With these distinctions, then, we may a.s.sume that there are two ways in which men may learn the judgment of G.o.d, as we have on this point stated; first by the contests of athletes, and secondly by the contests of champions. These ways of discovering the judgment of G.o.d I will treat of in the chapter following.

IX.--That people then, which conquered when all were striving hard for the Empire of the world, conquered by the will of G.o.d. For G.o.d cares more to settle a universal strife than a particular one; and even in particular contests the athletes sometimes throw themselves on the judgment of G.o.d, according to the common proverb: "To whom G.o.d makes the grant, him let Peter also bless."[254] It cannot, then, be doubted that the victory in the strife for the Empire of the world followed the judgment of G.o.d. The Roman people, when all were striving for the Empire of the world, conquered; it will be plain that so it was, if we consider the prize or goal, and those who strove for it.

The prize or goal was the supremacy over all men; for it is this that we call the Empire. None reached this but the Roman people. Not only were they the first, they were the only ones to reach the goal, as we shall shortly see.

[Footnote 254: Witte only gives a query (?). The saying expresses the Ghibelline view of the relation of the Empire to the Pope; it may have originated with the coronation of Charles the Great.]

The first man who panted for the prize was Ninus, King of the a.s.syrians; but although for more than ninety years (as Orosius tells[255]) he, with his royal consort Semiramis, strove for the Empire of the world and made all Asia subject to himself, nevertheless he never subdued the West. Ovid mentions both him and his queen in the fourth book of the _Metamorphoses_, when he says, in the story of Pyramus:[256] "Semiramis girdled the round s.p.a.ce with brick-built walls;" and, "let them come to Ninus' tomb and hide beneath in its shade."

[Footnote 255: I. 4.--(W.)]

[Footnote 256: _Metam._ iv. 58, 88.--(W.)]

Secondly, Vesoges, King of Egypt, aspired to this prize; but though he vexed the North and South of Asia, as Orosius relates,[257] yet he never gained for himself one-half of the world; nay, when, as it were, between the judges[258] and the goal, the Scythians drove him back from his rash enterprise.

[Footnote 257: Oros. i. 14.--(W.)]

[Footnote 258: "Athlothetae." The judges or umpires in the Greek games, whose seats were opposite to the goal at the side of the stadium.

_Vide_ Smith's _Dictionary of Antiquities_, s.v. "stadium."]

Then Cyrus, King of the Persians, made the same attempt; but after the destruction of Babylon, and the transference of its Empire to Persia, he did not even reach the regions of the West, but lost his life and his object in one day at the hands of Tamiris, Queen of the Scythians.[259]

[Footnote 259: Oros. ii. 7.--(W.)]

But after that these had failed, Xerxes, the son of Darius and king among the Persians, a.s.sailed the world with so great a mult.i.tude of nations, with so great a power, that he bridged the channel of the sea which separates Asia from Europe, between Sestos and Abydos. And of this wonderful work Lucan makes mention in the second book of his _Pharsalia_:[260] "Such paths across the seas, made by Xerxes in his pride, fame tells of." But finally he was miserably repulsed from his enterprise, and could not attain the goal.

[Footnote 260: _Phars._ ii. 692.--(W.)]

Besides these kings, and after their times, Alexander, King of Macedon, came nearest of all to the prize of monarchy; he sent amba.s.sadors to the Romans to demand their submission, but before the Roman answer came, he fell in Egypt, as Livy[261] tells us, as it were in the middle of the course. Of his burial there, Lucan speaks in the eighth book of his _Pharsalia_,[262] where he is inveighing against Ptolemy, King of Egypt: "Thou last of the Lagaean race, soon to perish in thy degeneracy, and to yield thy kingdom to an incestuous sister; while for thee the Macedonian is kept in the sacred cave...."

[Footnote 261: Not Livy. Cf. ix. 18, 3, where, speaking of Alexander and the Romans, he says: "Quem ne fama quidem illis notum arbitror fuisse." The story is Greek in origin, coming from Cleitarchus (according to Pliny, _Hist. Nat._ iii. 9), who accompanied Alexander on his Asiatic expedition. Cf. Niebuhr, _Lectures on the History of Rome_, lect. 52, Grote, _History of Greece_, vol. xii. p. 70, note, who argue for its truth, and Mommsen, _History of Rome_, vol. i. p.

394, who argues against it. Dante, says Witte, used legends about Alexander now lost. Cf. _Inf._ xiv. 31.]

[Footnote 262: VIII. 692.]

"Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of G.o.d!"

Who will not marvel at thee here? For when Alexander was trying to hinder his Roman compet.i.tor in the race, thou didst suddenly s.n.a.t.c.h him away from the contest that his rashness might proceed no further.

But that Rome has won the crown of so great a victory is proved on the testimony of many. Our poet in his first _aeneid_ says:[263] "Hence, surely, shall one day the Romans come, as the years roll on, to be the leaders of the world, from the blood of Teucer renewed; over the sea and over the land they shall hold full sway."[264] And Lucan, in his first book, writes: "The sword a.s.signs the kingdom; and the fortune of that mighty people that rules o'er sea and land and the whole earth, admitted not two to rule." And Boethius, in his second book,[265]

speaking of the Roman prince says: "With his sceptre he ruled the nations, those whom Phoebus beholds, from his rising afar to where he sinks his beams beneath the waves; those who are benumbed by the frosty Seven Stars of the north, those whom the fierce south wind scorches with his heat, parching the burning sands." And Luke, the Scribe of Christ, bears the same testimony, whose every word is true, where he says: "There went out a decree from Caesar Augustus that all the world should be taxed;" from which words we must plainly understand that the Romans had jurisdiction over the whole world.

[Footnote 263: I. 234.--(W.)]

[Footnote 264: I. 109.--(W.)]