But it must be carefully observed that when we say that mankind may be ruled by one supreme prince, we do not mean that the most trifling judgments for each particular town are to proceed immediately from him. For munic.i.p.al laws sometimes fail, and need guidance, as the Philosopher shows in his fifth book to Nicomachus, when he praises equity.[191] For nations and kingdoms and states have, each of them, certain peculiarities which must be regulated by different laws. For law is the rule which directs life. Thus the Scythians need one rule, for they live beyond the seventh climate,[192] and suffer cold which is almost unbearable, from the great inequality of their days and nights. But the Garamantes need a different law, for their country is equinoctial, and they cannot wear many clothes, from the excessive heat of the air, because the day is as long as the darkness of the night. But our meaning is that it is in those matters which are common to all men, that men should be ruled by one Monarch, and be governed by a rule common to them all, with a view to their peace. And the individual princes must receive this rule of life or law from him, just as the practical intellect receives its major premiss from the speculative intellect, under which it places its own particular premiss, and then draws its particular conclusion, with a view to action. And it is not only possible for one man to act as we have described; it is necessary that it should proceed from one man only to avoid confusion in our first principles. Moses himself wrote in his law that he had acted thus. For he took the elders of the tribes of the children of Israel, and left to them the lesser judgments, reserving to himself such as were more important, and wider in their scope; and the elders carried these wider ones to their tribes, according as they were applicable to each separate tribe.

[Footnote 191: _Eth._ v. 14.--(W.)]

[Footnote 192: Ptolemy, the mediaeval authority on geography, divided the known world into [Greek: klimata], zones of slope towards the pole, or belts of lat.i.tude, eight of which from the equinoctial to the mouths of the Tanais and the Riphaean mountains. The seventh "clima"

pa.s.sed over the mouths of the Borysthenes. See Mercator's map in Bertius' _Theatrum Geographiae Veteris_ (1618), art. "Ptolemy" in Smith's _Dictionary of Biography_, p. 577. Dictionary of Antiquities, art. "Clima."]

Therefore it is better for the human race to be ruled by one than by many, and therefore there should be a Monarch, who is a single prince; and if it is better, it is more acceptable to G.o.d, since G.o.d always wills what is best. And since of these two ways of government the one is not only the better, but the best of all, it follows not only that this one is more acceptable to G.o.d as between one and many, but that it is the most acceptable. Therefore it is best for the human race to be governed by one man; and Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

XV.--I say also that Being, and Unity, and the Good come in order after the fifth mode of priority.[193] For Being comes by nature before Unity, and Unity before Good. Where Being is most, there Unity is greatest; and where Unity is greatest, there Good is also greatest; and in proportion as anything is far from Being in its highest form, is it far from Unity, and therefore from Good. Therefore in every kind of things, that which is most one is best, as the Philosopher holds in the treatise about simple Being. Therefore it appears that to be one is the root of Good, and to be many the root of Evil. Therefore, Pythagoras in his parallel tables placed the one, or Unity, under the line of good, and the many under the line of Evil; as appears from the first book of the _Metaphysics_.[194] Hence we may see that to sin is nothing else than to pa.s.s on from the one which we despise and to seek many things, as the Psalmist saw when he said: "By the fruit of their corn and wine and oil, are they multiplied."[195]

[Footnote 193: Arist. _Categ._, _e.g._: Priority is said in five ways--1. First in _time_. 2. First in _pre-supposition_. 3. First in _order_. 4. First in _excellence_. 5. First in _logical sequence_.]

[Footnote 194: _V._ Arist. _Metaph._ 1, 5; _Ethics_ i. 4; cf. Ritter and Preller, _Hist. Philos._ sec. 105.]

[Footnote 195: Ps. iv. 8 (vulg.).]

Hence it is plain that whatever is good, is good for this reason, that it consists in unity. And because concord is a good thing in so far as it is concord, it is manifest that it consists in a certain unity, as its proper root, the nature of which will appear if we find the real nature of concord. Concord then is the uniform motion of many wills; and hence it appears that a unity of wills, by which is meant their uniform motion, is the root of concord, nay, concord itself. For as we should say that many clods of earth are concordant, because that they all gravitate together towards the centre; and that many flames are concordant because that they all ascend together towards the circ.u.mference, if they did this of their own free will, so we say that many men are in concord because that they are all moved together, as regards their willing, to one thing, which one thing is formally in their wills just as there is one quality formally in the clods of earth, that is gravity, and one in the flame of fire, that is lightness. For the force of willing is a certain power; but the quality of good which it apprehends is its form; which form, like as others, being one is multiplied in itself, according to the multiplication of the matters which receive it, as the soul, and numbers, and other forms which belong to what is compound.[196]

[Footnote 196: On the scholastic doctrine of forms, _v._ Thom. Aquin.

_Summ._ I. 105, art. 4.]

To explain our a.s.sumption as we proposed, let us argue thus: All concord depends on unity which is in wills; the human race, when it is at its best, is a kind of concord; for as one man at his best is a kind of concord, and as the like is true of the family, the city, and the kingdom; so is it of the whole human race. Therefore the human race at its best depends on the unity which is in will. But this cannot be unless there be one will to be the single mistress and regulating influence of all the rest. For the wills of men, on account of the blandishments of youth, require one to direct them, as Aristotle shows in the tenth book of his _Ethics_.[197] And this cannot be unless there is one prince over all, whose will shall be the mistress and regulating influence of all the others. But if all these conclusions be true, as they are, it is necessary for the highest welfare of the human race that there should be a Monarch in the world; and therefore Monarchy is necessary for the good of the world.

[Footnote 197: Arist. _Eth._ x. 5.--(W.)]

XVI.--To all these reasons alleged above a memorable experience adds its confirmation. I mean that condition of mankind which the Son of G.o.d, when, for the salvation of man, He was about to put on man, either waited for, or, at the moment when He willed, Himself so ordered. For if, from the fall of our first parents, which was the turning point at which all our going astray began, we carry our thoughts over the distribution of the human race and the order of its times, we shall find that never but under the divine Augustus, who was sole ruler, and under whom a perfect Monarchy existed, was the world everywhere quiet. And that then the human race was happy in the tranquillity of universal peace, this is the witness of all writers of history; this is the witness of famous poets; this, too, he who wrote the story of the "meekness and gentleness of Christ" has thought fit to attest. And last of all, Paul has called that most blessed condition "the fulness of the times." For then, indeed, time was full, and all the things of time; because no office belonging to our felicity wanted its minister. But how the world has fared since that "seamless robe" has suffered rending by the talons of ambition, we may read in books; would that we might not see it with our eyes. Oh, race of mankind! what storms must toss thee, what losses must thou endure, what shipwrecks must buffet thee, as long as thou, a beast of many heads, strivest after contrary things. Thou art sick in both thy faculties of understanding; thou art sick in thine affections.

Unanswerable reasons fail to heal thy higher understanding; the very sight of experience convinces not thy lower understanding; not even the sweetness of divine persuasion charms thy affections, when it breathes into thee through the music of the Holy Ghost: "Behold, how good and how pleasant a thing it is, brethren, to dwell together in unity."[198]

[Footnote 198: Ps. cx.x.xii. 1.--(W.)]

BOOK II.

I.--"Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together against the Lord and against His anointed, saying: 'Let us break their bonds asunder, and cast away their cords from us.'"[199] As we commonly wonder at a new effect, when we have never been face to face with its cause; so, as soon as we understand the cause, we look down with a kind of scorn on those who remain in wonder. I, myself, was once filled with wonder that the Roman people had become paramount throughout all the earth, without any to withstand them; for when I looked at the thing superficially I thought that this supremacy had been obtained, not by any right, but only by arms and violence. But after that I had carefully and thoroughly examined the matter, when I had recognised by the most effectual signs that it was divine providence that had wrought this, my wonder ceased, and a certain scornful contempt has taken its place, when I perceive the nations raging against the pre-eminence of the Roman people; when I see the people imagining a vain thing, as I of old imagined; when, above all, I grieve that kings and princes agree in this one matter only, in opposing their Lord, and His one only Roman Emperor. Wherefore in derision, yet not without a touch of sorrow, I can cry on behalf of the glorious people and for Caesar, together with him who cried on behalf of the Prince of heaven: "Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together against the Lord and against His anointed." But the love which nature implants in us allows not scorn to last for long; but, like the summer sun that when it has dispersed the morning clouds shines with full brightness, this love prefers to put scorn aside, and to pour forth the light which shall set men right. So, then, to break the bonds of the ignorance of those kings and princes, and to show that mankind is free from _their_ yoke, I will comfort myself in company with that most holy prophet, whom I follow, taking the words which come after: "Let us break their bonds asunder, and cast away their yoke from us."

[Footnote 199: Ps. ii. 1-3.--(W.)]

These two things will be sufficiently performed, if I address myself to the second part of the argument, and manifest the truth of the question before us. For thus, if we show that the Roman Empire is _by right_, not only shall we disperse the clouds of ignorance from the eyes of those princes who have wrongly seized the helm of public government, falsely imputing this thing to the Roman people; but all men shall understand that they are free from the yoke of these usurpers. The truth of the question can be made clear not only by the light of human reason, but also by the ray of G.o.d's authority; and when these two coincide, then heaven and earth must agree together.

Supported, therefore, by this conviction, and trusting in the testimony both of reason and of authority, I proceed to settle the second question.

II.--Inquiry concerning the truth of the first doubt has been made as accurately as the nature of the subject permitted; we have now to inquire concerning the second, which is: Whether the Roman people a.s.sumed to itself _of right_ the dignity of the Empire? And the first thing in this question is to find the truth, to which the reasonings concerning it may be referred as to their proper first principle.

It must be recognised, then, that as there are three degrees in every art, the mind of the artist, his instrument, and the material on which he works, so we may look upon nature in three degrees. For nature exists, first, in the mind of the First Agent, who is G.o.d; then in heaven; as in an instrument, by means of which the likeness of the Eternal Goodness unfolds itself on shapeless[200] matter. If an artist is perfect in his art, and his instrument is perfect, any fault in the form of his art must be laid to the badness of the material; and so, since G.o.d holds the summit of perfection, and since His instrument, which is heaven, admits of no failure of its due perfection (which is manifest from our philosophy touching heaven), it follows that whatever fault is to be found in the lower world is a fault on the part of the subject matter, and is contrary to the intention of G.o.d who makes nature,[201] and of heaven; and if in this lower world there is aught that is good, it must be ascribed first to the artist, who is G.o.d, and then to heaven, the instrument of G.o.d's art, which men call nature; for the material, being merely a possibility, can do nothing of itself.[202]

[Footnote 200: "_Fluitantem._"]

[Footnote 201: "_Dei naturantis._"]

[Footnote 202: Witte refers to _Parad._ xiii. 67, xxix. 32, i.

127-130. Cf. Thom. Aquin. _Summ._ I., q. 66, art. 1-3; q. 110, art. 2; q. 115, art. 3-6. This view satisfied thinkers to the time of Hooker (_E.P._ I. iii.), but was criticised by Bacon, _Nov. Org._ i. 66.]

Hence it is apparent that, since all Right[203] is good, it therefore exists first in the mind of G.o.d; and since all that is in the mind of G.o.d is G.o.d, according to the saying, "What was made, in Him was life;"[204] and as G.o.d chiefly wishes for what is Himself, it follows that Right is the wish of G.o.d, so far as it is in Him. And since in G.o.d the will and the wish are the same, it further follows that this Right is the will of G.o.d. Again it follows that Right in the world is nothing else than the likeness of the will of G.o.d, and therefore whatever does not agree with the divine will cannot be Right, and whatever does agree with the divine will is Right itself. Therefore to ask if a thing be by Right is only to ask in other words if it is what G.o.d wills. It may therefore be a.s.sumed that what G.o.d wills to see in mankind is to be held as real and true Right.

[Footnote 203: "_Jus._"]

[Footnote 204: St. John i. 3.--(W.)]

Besides we must remember Aristotle's teaching in the first book of his _Ethics_, where he says: "We must not seek for cert.i.tude in every matter, but only as far as the nature of the subject admits."[205]

Therefore our arguments from the first principle already found will be sufficient, if from manifest evidence and from the authority of the wise, we seek for the right of that glorious people. The will of G.o.d is an invisible thing, but "the invisible things of G.o.d are seen, being understood by the things which are made." For when the seal is out of sight, the wax, which has its impression, gives manifest evidence of it, though it be unseen; nor is it strange that the will of G.o.d must be sought by signs; for the human will, except to the person himself who wills, is only discerned by signs.[206]

[Footnote 205: _Eth._ i. 7, from Thom. Aq. _Lect._ XI.--(W.)]

[Footnote 206: The image of the wax and seal was a favourite one. V.

_Parad._ vii. 68, viii. 127, xiii. 67-75, quoted by Witte, who also refers to the _Epist. ad Reges_, -- 8, p. 444, ed. Fraticelli.]

III.--My answer then to the question is, that it was by right, and not by usurpation, that the Roman people a.s.sumed to itself the office of Monarchy, or, as men call it, the Empire, over all mankind. For in the first place it is fitting that the n.o.blest people should be preferred to all others; the Roman people was the n.o.blest; therefore it is fitting that it should be preferred to all others. By this reasoning I make my proof; for since honour is the reward of goodness, and since to be preferred is always honour, therefore to be preferred is always the reward of goodness. It is plain that men are enn.o.bled for their virtues; that is, for their own virtues or for those of their ancestors; for n.o.bleness is virtue and ancestral wealth, according to Aristotle in his Politics; and according to Juvenal, "There is no n.o.bleness of soul but virtue,"[207] which two statements refer to two sorts of n.o.bleness, our own and that of our ancestors.[208]

[Footnote 207: Arist. _Pol._ iii. 12; Juv. viii. 20.--(W.)]

[Footnote 208: Witte refers to Dante's commentary on his own Canzone in the _Convito_ iv. 3, and the _Parad._ xvi. 1.]

To be preferred, therefore, is, according to reason, the fitting reward of the n.o.ble. And since rewards must be measured by desert, according to that saying of the Gospel, "with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again;" therefore to the most n.o.ble the highest place should be given. The testimonies of the ancients confirm our opinion; for Virgil, our divine poet, testifies throughout his _aeneid_, that men may ever remember it, that the glorious king, aeneas, was the father of the Roman people. And this t.i.tus Livius, the famous chronicler of the deeds of the Romans, confirms in the first part of his work, which takes its beginning from the capture of Troy. The n.o.bleness of this most unconquerable and most pious ancestor not only in regard to his own great virtue, but also to that of his forefathers and of his wives, the n.o.bleness of whom was combined in their descendant by the rightful law of descent, I cannot unfold at length; "I can but touch lightly on the outlines of the truth."[209]

[Footnote 209: "Sed summa sequar vestigia rerum." Virg. _aen._ i. 342 ("fastigia" in all good MSS. and edd.).]

For the virtue then of aeneas himself, hear what our poet tells us when he introduces Ilioneus in the first _aeneid_, praying thus: "aeneas was our king; in justice and piety he has not left a peer, nor any to equal him in war." Hear Virgil in the sixth _aeneid_, when he speaks of the death of Misenus, who had been Hector's attendant in war, and, after Hector's death, had attached himself to aeneas; for there Virgil says that Misenus "followed as good a man;" thus comparing aeneas to Hector, whom[210] Homer ever praises above all men, as the Philosopher witnesses in his _Ethics_, in what he writes to Nicomachus on habits to be avoided.

[Footnote 210: _aen._ i. 544, vi. 170. _Il._ xxiv. 258, quoted in Aristotle, _Ethics_, vii. 1.--(W.)]

But, as for hereditary virtue, he was enn.o.bled from all three continents both by his forefathers and his wives. From Asia came his immediate ancestor, a.s.saracus, and others who reigned in Phrygia, which is a part of Asia. Therefore Virgil writes in the third _aeneid_: "After that it had seemed good to Heaven to overthrow the power of Asia, and the guiltless race of Priam." From Europe came the male founder of his race, who was Darda.n.u.s; from Africa his grandmother Electra, daughter of the great king Atlas, to both which things the poet testifies in the eighth _aeneid_, where aeneas says to Evander: "Darda.n.u.s, the father of our city, and its founder, whom the Greeks call the son of Atlas and Electra, came to the race of Teucer--Electra, whose sire was great Atlas, on whose shoulders rests the circle of heaven." But in the third _aeneid_ Virgil says that Darda.n.u.s drew his origin from Europe. "There is a land which the Greeks have named Hesperia, an ancient land, strong and wealthy, where the aenotrians dwell; it is said that now their descendants have named the country Italy, from the name of their king. There is our rightful home; from that land did Darda.n.u.s come." That Atlas came from Africa, the mountain called by his name, which stands in that continent, bears witness; and Orosius says that it is in Africa in his description of the world, where he writes: "Its boundary is Mount Atlas, and the islands which are called 'the happy isles.'" "Its"--that is, "of Africa," of which he was speaking.[211]

[Footnote 211: _aen._ iii. 1, viii. 134, iii. 163; Oros. i. 2.--(W.)]

Likewise I find that by marriage also aeneas was enn.o.bled; his first wife, Creusa, the daughter of king Priam, was from Asia, as may be gathered from our previous quotations; and that she was his wife our poet testifies in the third _aeneid_, where Andromache asks aeneas: "What of the boy Ascanius, whom Creusa bore to thee, while the ruins of Troy were yet smoking? Lives he yet to breathe this air?"[212] The second wife was Dido, the queen and foundress of Carthage in Africa.

That she was the wife of aeneas our poet sings in his fourth _aeneid_, where he says of Dido: "No more does Dido think of love in secret.

She calls it marriage, and with this name she covers her sin." The third wife was Lavinia, the mother of Albans and Romans alike, the daughter of king Latinus and his heir, if we may trust the testimony of our poet in his last _aeneid_, where he introduces Turnus conquered, praying to aeneas thus: "Thou hast conquered, and the Ausonians have seen me lift my hands in prayer for mercy; Lavinia is thine."[213]

This last wife was from Italy, the n.o.blest region of Europe.

[Footnote 212: III. 339. The best MSS. of Virgil omit "peperit fumante Creusa."]

[Footnote 213: _aen._ xii. 936.--(W.)]