(M525) The battle of Amphipolis was decisive; it led to a peace between the contending parties. It is called the peace of Nicias, made in March, B.C. 421. By the provisions of this treaty of peace, which was made for fifty years, Amphipolis was restored to the Athenians, all persons had full liberty to visit the public temples of Greece, the Athenians restored the captive Spartans, and the various towns taken during the war were restored on both sides. This peace was concluded after a ten years' war, when the resources of both parties were exhausted. It was a war of ambition and jealousy, without sufficient reasons, and its consequences were disastrous to the general welfare of Greece. In some respects it must be considered, not merely as a war between Sparta and Athens to gain supremacy, but a war between the partisans of aristocratic and democratic inst.i.tutions throughout the various States.

(M526) The peace made by Nicias between Athens and Sparta for fifty years was not of long continuance. It was a truce rather than a treaty, since neither party was overthrown-but merely crippled-like Rome and Carthage after the first Punic war. The same causes which provoked the contest still remained-an unextinguishable jealousy between States nearly equal in power, and the desire of ascendency at any cost. But we do not perceive in either party that persistent and self-sacrificing spirit which marked the Romans in their conquest of Italy. The Romans abandoned every thing which interfered with their aggressive policy: the Grecian States were diverted from political aggrandizement by other objects of pursuit-pleasure, art, wealth.

(M527) There was needed only a commanding demagogue, popular, brilliant, and unprincipled, to embroil Greece once more in war, and such a man was Alcibiades, who appeared upon the stage at the death of Cleon. And hostilities were easily kindled, since the allies on both sides were averse to the treaty which had been made, and the conditions of the peace were not fulfilled. Athens returned the captive Spartans she had held since the battle of Sphacteria, but Amphipolis was not restored, from the continued enmity of the Thracian cities. Both parties were full of intrigues, and new combinations were constantly being formed. Argos became the centre of a new Peloponnesian alliance. A change of ephors at Sparta favored hostile measures, and an alliance was made between the Botians and Lacedaemonians. The Athenians, on their side, captured Scione, and put to death the prisoners.

(M528) It was in this unsettled state of things, when all the late contending States were insincere and vacillating, that Alcibiades stood forth as a party leader. He was thirty-one years of age, belonged to an ancient and powerful family, possessed vast wealth, had great personal beauty and attractive manners, but above all, was unboundedly ambitious, and grossly immoral-the most insolent, unprincipled, licentious, and selfish man that had thus far scandalized and adorned Athenian society.

The only redeeming feature in his character was his friendship for Socrates, who, it seems, fascinated him by his talk, and sought to improve his morals. He had those brilliant qualities, and luxurious habits, and ostentatious prodigality, which so often dazzle superficial people, especially young men of fashion and wealth, but more even than they, the idolatrous rabble. So great was his popularity and social prestige, that no injured person ever dared to bring him to trial, and he even rescued his own wife from the hands of the law when she sought to procure a divorce-a proof that even in democratic Athens all bowed down to the insolence of wealth and high social position.

(M529) Alcibiades, though luxurious and profligate, saw that a severe intellectual training was necessary to him if he would take rank as a politician, for a politician who can not make a speech stands a poor chance of popular favor. So he sought the instructions of Socrates, Prodicus, Protagoras, and others-not for love of learning, but as means of success, although it may be supposed that the intellectual excitement, which the discourse, cross-examination, and ironical sallies of Socrates produced, was not without its force on so bright a mind.

(M530) Alcibiades commenced his public life with a sullied reputation, and with numerous enemies created by his unbearable insolence, but with a flexibility of character which enabled him to adapt himself to whatever habits circ.u.mstances required. He inspired no confidence, and his extravagant mode of life was sure to end in ruin, unless he reimbursed himself out of the public funds; and yet he fascinated the people who mistrusted and hated him. The great comic poet, Aristophanes, said of him to the Athenians: "You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all, but if you choose to keep him, you must submit to his behavior."

(M531) Alcibiades, in commencing his political life, departed from his family traditions; for he was a relative of Pericles, and became a partisan of the oligarchal party. But he soon changed his polities, on receiving a repulse from the Spartans, who despised him, and he became a violent democrat. His first memorable effort was to bring Argos, then in league with Sparta, into alliance with Athens, in which he was successful.

He then cheated the Lacedaemonian envoys who were sent to protest against the alliance and make other terms, and put them in a false position, and made them appear deceitful, and thus arrayed against them the wrath of the Athenians. As Alcibiades had prevailed upon these envoys, by false promises and advice, to act a part different from what they were sent to perform, Nicias was sent to Sparta to clear up embarra.s.sments, but failed in his object, upon which Athens concluded an alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, which only tended to complicate existing difficulties.

(M532) Shortly after this alliance was concluded, the Olympic games were celebrated with unusual interest, from which the Athenians had been excluded during the war. Here Alcibiades appeared with seven chariots, each with four horses, when the richest Greeks had hitherto possessed but one, and gained two prizes. He celebrated his success by a magnificent banquet more stately and expensive than those given by kings. But while the Athenians thus appeared at the ninetieth Olympiad, the Lacedaemonians were excluded by the Eleians, who controlled the festival, from an alleged violation of the Olympic truce, but really from the intrigues of Alcibiades.

(M533) The subsequent attack of Argos and Athens on Epidaurus proved that the peace between Athens and Sparta existed only in name. It was distinctly violated by the attack of Argos by the Lacedaemonians, Botians, and Corinthians, and the battle of Mantinea opened again the war. This was decided in favor of the Lacedaemonians, with a great loss to the Athenians and their allies, including both their generals, Laches and Nicostratus.

(M534) The moral effect of the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 418, was overwhelming throughout Greece, and re-established the military prestige of Sparta. It was lost by the withdrawal of three thousand Eleians before the battle, ill.u.s.trating the remark of Pericles that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation. One effect of the battle was a renewed alliance between Sparta and Argos, and the re-establishment of an oligarchal government in the latter city. Mantinea submitted to Sparta, and the Achaian towns were obliged to submit to a remodeling of their political inst.i.tutions, according to the views of Sparta. The people of Argos, however, took the first occasion which was presented for regaining their power, a.s.sisted by an Athenian force under Alcibiades, and Argos once again became an ally of Athens.

(M535) The next important operation of the war was the siege and conquest of Melos, a Dorian island, by the Athenians, B.C. 416. The inhabitants were killed, and the women and children were sold as slaves, and an Athenian colony was settled on the island. But this ma.s.sacre, exceeding even the customary cruelty of war in those times, raised a general indignation among the allies of Sparta.

(M536) But an expedition of far greater importance was now undertaken by the Athenians-the most gigantic effort which they ever made, but which terminated disastrously, and led to the ruin and subjugation of their proud and warlike city, as a political power. This was the invasion of Sicily and siege of Syracuse.

Before we present this unfortunate expedition, some brief notice is necessary of the Grecian colonies in Sicily.

(M537) In the eighth century before Christ Sicily was inhabited by two distinct races of barbarians-the Sikels and Sikans-besides Phnician colonies, for purposes of trade. The Sikans were an Iberian tribe, and were immigrants of an earlier date than the Sikels, by whom they were invaded. The earliest Grecian colony was (B.C. 735) at Naxos, on the eastern coast of the island, between the Straits of Messina and Mount aetna, founded by Theocles, a Chalcidian mariner, who was cast by storms upon the coast, and built a fort on a hill called Taurus, to defend himself against the Sikels, who were in possession of the larger half of the island. Other colonists followed, chiefly from the Peloponnesus. In the year following that Naxos was founded, a body of settlers from Corinth landed on the islet Ortygia, expelled the Sikel inhabitants, and laid the foundation of Syracuse. Successive settlements were made forty-five years after at Gela, in the southwestern part of the island. Other settlements continued to be made, not only from Greece, but from the colonies themselves; so that the old inhabitants were gradually h.e.l.lenized and merged with Greek colonists, while the Greeks, in their turn, adopted many of the habits and customs of the Sikels and Sikans. The various races lived on terms of amity, for the native population was not numerous enough to become formidable to the Grecian colonists.

(M538) Five hundred years before Christ the most powerful Grecian cities in Sicily were Agrigentum and Gela, on the south side of the island. The former, within a few years of its foundation, B.C. 570, fell under the dominion of one of its rich citizens, Phalasaris, who proved a cruel despot, but after a reign of sixteen years he was killed in an insurrection, and an oligarchal government was established, such as then existed in most of the Grecian cities. Syracuse was governed in this way by the descendants of the original settlers. Gela was, on the other hand, ruled by a despot called Gelo, the most powerful man on the island. He got possession of Syracuse, B.C. 485, and transferred the seat of his power to this city, by bringing thither the leading people and making slaves of the rest. Under Gelo Syracuse became the first city on the island, to which other towns were tributary. When the Greeks confederated against Xerxes, they sent to solicit his aid as the imperial leader of Sicily, and he could command, according to Herodotus, twenty thousand hoplites, two hundred triremes, two thousand cavalry, two thousand archers, and two thousand light-armed horse. So great was then the power of this despot, who now sought to expel the Carthaginians and unite all the h.e.l.lenic colonies in Sicily under his sway. But the aid was not given, probably on account of a Carthaginian invasion simultaneous with the expedition of the Persian king. The Carthaginians, according to the historian, arrived at Panormus B.C. 480, with a fleet of three thousand ships and a land force of three hundred thousand men, besides chariots and horses, under Hamilcar-a mercenary army, composed of various African nations. Gelo marched against him with fifty thousand foot and five thousand horse, and gained a complete victory, so that one hundred and fifty thousand, on the side of the Carthaginians, were slain, together with their general. The number of the combatants is doubtless exaggerated, but we may believe that the force was very great. Gelo was now supreme in Sicily, and the victory of Himera, which he had gained, enabled him to distribute a large body of prisoners, as slaves, in all the Grecian colonies. It appears that he was much respected, but he died shortly after his victory, leaving an infant son to the guardianship of two of his brothers, Polyzelus and Hiero, who became the supreme governors of the island. A victory gained by Hiero over the tyrant of Agrigentum gave him the same supremacy which Gelo had enjoyed. On his death, B.C. 467, the succession was disputed between his brother, Thrasybulus, and his nephew, the son of Gelo; but Thrasybulus contrived to make away with his nephew, and reigned alone, cruelly and despotically, until a revolution took place, which resulted in his expulsion and the fall of the Gelonian dynasty. Popular governments were now established in all the Sicilian cities, but these were distracted by disputes and confusions. Syracuse became isolated from the other cities, and a government whose powers were limited by the city. The expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty left the Grecian cities to reorganize free and const.i.tutional governments; but Syracuse maintained a proud pre-eminence, and her power was increased from time to time by conquests in the interior over the old population. Agrigentum was next in power, and scarcely inferior in wealth. The temple of Zeus, in this city, was one of the most magnificent in the world. The population was large, and many were the rich men who kept chariots and competed at the Olympic games. In these Sicilian cities the intellectual improvement kept pace with the material, and the little town of Elea supported the two greatest speculative philosophers of Greece-Parmenides and Zeno. Empedocles, of Agrigentum, was scarcely less famous.

(M539) Such was the state of the Sicilian cities on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Being generally of Dorian origin, they sympathized with Sparta, and great expectations were formed by the Lacedaemonians of a.s.sistance from their Sicilian allies. The cities of Sicily could not behold the contest between Athens and Sparta without being drawn into the quarrel, and the result was that the Dorian cities made war on the Ionian cities, which, of course, sympathized with Athens. As these cities were weaker than the Dorian, they solicited aid from Athens, and an expedition was sent to Sicily under Laches, B.C. 426. Another one, under Polydorus, followed, but without decisive results. The next year still another and larger expedition, under Eurymedon and Sophocles, arrived in Sicily, while Athens was jubilant by the possession of the Spartan prisoners, and the possession of Pylus and Cythera. The Sicilian cities now fearing that their domestic strife would endanger their independence and make them subject to Athens, the most ambitious and powerful State in Greece, made a common league with each other. Eurymedon acceded to the peace and returned to Athens, much to the displeasure of the war party, which embraced most of the people, and he and his colleague were banished.

(M540) But wars between the Sicilian cities again led to the intervention of Athens. Egesta especially sent envoys for help in her struggle against Selinus, which was a.s.sisted by Syracuse. Alcibiades warmly seconded these envoys, and inflamed the people with his ambitious projects. He, more than any other man, was the cause of the great Sicilian expedition which proved the ruin of his country. He was opposed by Nicias, who foretold all the miserable consequences of so distant an expedition, when so little could be gained and so much would be jeopardized, and when, on the first reverse, the enemies of Athens would rally against her. He particularly cautioned his countrymen not only against the expedition, but against intrusting the command of it to an unprincipled and selfish man who squandered his own patrimony in chariot races and other extravagances, and would be wasteful of the public property-a man without the experience which became a leader in so great an enterprise. Alcibiades, in reply, justified his extravagance at the Olympic games, where he contested with seven chariots, as a means to impress Sparta with the wealth and power of Athens, after a ten years' war. He inflamed the ambition of the a.s.sembly, held out specious hopes of a glorious conquest which would add to Athenian power, and make her not merely pre-eminent, but dominant in Greece. The a.s.sembly, eager for war and glory, sided with the youthful and magnificent demagogue, and disregarded the counsels of the old patriot, whose wisdom and experience were second to none in the city.

(M541) Consequently the expedition was fitted out for the attack of Syracuse-the largest and most powerful which Athens ever sent against an enemy; for all cla.s.ses, maddened by military glory, or tempted by love of gain, eagerly embarked in the enterprise. Nicias, finding he could not prevent the expedition, demanded more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. He proposed a gigantic force. But in proposing this force, he hoped he might thus discourage the Athenians altogether by the very greatness of the armament which he deemed necessary. But so popular was the enterprise, that the large force he suggested was voted.

Alcibiades had flattered the people that their city was mistress of the sea, and ent.i.tled to dominion over all the islands, and could easily prevail over any naval enemy.

(M542) Three years had now elapsed since the peace of Nicias, and Athens had ample means. The treasury was full, and triremes had acc.u.mulated in the harbor. The confidence of the Athenians was as unbounded as was that of Xerxes when he crossed the h.e.l.lespont, and hence there had been great zeal and forwardness in preparation.

(M543) When the expedition was at last ready, an event occurred which filled the city with gloom and anxious forebodings. The half statues of the G.o.d Hermes were distributed in great numbers in Athens in the most conspicuous situations, beside the doors of private houses and temples, and in the agora, so that the people were accustomed to regard the G.o.d as domiciled among them for their protection. In one night, at the end of May, B.C. 415, these statues were nearly all mutilated. The heads, necks, and busts were all destroyed, leaving the lower part of them-mere quadrangular pillars, without arms, or legs, or body-alone standing. The sacrilege sent universal dismay into the city, and was regarded as a most depressing omen, and was done, doubtless, with a view of ruining Alcibiades and frustrating the expedition. But all efforts were vain to discover the guilty parties.

(M544) And this was not the only means adopted to break down the power of a man whom the more discerning perceived was the evil genius of Athens.

Alcibiades was publicly accused of having profaned and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries. The charge was denied by Alcibiades, who demanded an immediate trial. It was eluded by his enemies, who preferred to have the charge hanging over his head, in case of the failure of the enterprise which he had projected.

(M545) So the fleet sailed from Piraeus amid mingled sentiments of anxiety and popular enthusiasm. It consisted of one hundred triremes, with a large body of hoplites. It made straight for Corcyra, where the contingents of the allies were a.s.sembled, which nearly doubled its force. The Syracusans were well informed as to its destination, and made great exertions to meet this great armament, under Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. The latter commander recommended an immediate attack of Syracuse, as unprepared and dismayed.

(M546) Alcibiades wished first to open negotiations with the Sikels, of the interior, to detach them from the aid of Syracuse. His plan was followed, but before he could carry it into operation he was summoned home to take his trial. Fearing the result of the accusations against him, for, in his absence, the popular feeling had changed respecting him-fear and reason had triumphed over the power of his personal fascination-Alcibiades made his escape to the Peloponnesus.

(M547) The master spirit of the expedition was now removed, and its operations were languid and undecided, for Nicias had no heart in it. The delays which occurred gave the Syracusans time to prepare, and more confidence in their means of defense. So that when the forces of the Athenians were landed in the great harbor, they found a powerful army ready to resist them. In spite of a victory which Nicias gained near Olympeion, the Syracusans were not dejected, and the Athenian fleet was obliged to seek winter quarters at Catana, and also send for additional re-enforcements. Nicias unwisely delayed, but his inexcusable apathy afforded the enemy leisure to enlarge their fortifications. The Syracusans constructed an entirely new wall around the inner and outer city, and which also extended across the whole s.p.a.ce from the outer sea to the great harbor, so that it would be difficult for the Athenians, in the coming siege, to draw lines of circ.u.mvallation around the city. Syracuse also sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta for aid, while Alcibiades, filled now with intense hatred of Athens, encouraged the Lacedaemonians to send a force to the Sicilian capital. He admitted that it was the design of Athens first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks, and then the Italian Greeks; then to make an attempt on Carthage, and then, if that was successful, to bring together all the forces of the subjected States and attack the Peloponnesus itself, and create a great empire, of which Athens was to be the capital. Such an avowal was doubtless the aim of the ambitious Alcibiades when he first stimulated the enterprise, which, if successful, would have made him the most powerful man in Greece; but he was thwarted by his enemies at home, and so he turned all his energies against his native State. His address made a powerful effect on the Lacedaemonians, who, impelled by hatred and jealousy, now resolved to make use of the services of the traitor, and send an auxiliary force to Syracuse.

(M548) That city then consisted of two parts-an inner and an outer city.

The outer city was defended on two sides by the sea, and a sea wall. On the land side a long wall extended from the sea to the fortified high land of Achradina, so that the city could only be taken by a wall of circ.u.mvallation, so as to cut off supplies by land; at the same time it was blockaded by sea. But the delay of Nicias had enabled the Syracusans to construct a new wall, covering both the outer and inner city, and extending from the great port to the high land near the bay of Magnesi, so that any attack, except from a single point, was difficult, unless the wall of circ.u.mvallation was made much larger than was originally intended.

Amid incredible difficulties the Athenians constructed their works, and in an a.s.sault from the cliff of Epipolae, where they were intrenched, their general, Lamachus, was slain. But the Athenians had gained an advantage, and the siege was being successfully prosecuted. It was then that the Lacedaemonians arrived under Gylippus, who was unable to render succor. But Nicias, despising him, allowed him to land at Himera, from whence he marched across Sicily to Syracuse. A Corinthian fleet, under Gorgylus, arrived only just in time to prevent the city from capitulating, and Gylippus entered Syracuse unopposed. The inaction of Nicias, who could have prevented this, is unaccountable. But the arrival of Gylippus turned the scale, and he immediately prosecuted vigorous and aggressive measures.

He surprised an Athenian fort, and began to construct a third counter-wall on the north side of the Athenian circle. The Athenians, now shut up within their lines, were obliged to accept battle, and were defeated, and even forced to seek shelter within their fortified lines. Under this discouragement, Nicias sent to Athens for another armament, and the Athenians responded to his call. But Sparta also resolved to send re-enforcements, and invade Attica besides. Sicilian forces also marched in aid of Syracuse. The result of all these gathering forces, in which the whole strength of Greece was employed, was the total defeat of the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor, in spite of the powerful fleet which had sailed from Athens under Demosthenes. The Syracusans pursued their advantage by blocking up the harbor, and inclosing the whole Athenian fleet. The Athenians resolved then to force their way out, which led to another general engagement, in which the Athenians were totally defeated.

Nicias once again attempted to force his way out, with the remainder of his defeated fleet, but the armament was too much discouraged to obey, and the Athenians sought to retreat by land. But all the roads were blockaded.

The miserable army, nevertheless, began its hopeless march completely demoralized, and compelled to abandon the sick and wounded. The retreating army was hara.s.sed on every side, no progress could be made, and the discouraged army sought in the night to retreat by a different route. The rear division, under Demosthenes, was overtaken and forced to surrender, and were carried captives to Syracuse-some six thousand in number. The next day, the first division, under Nicias, also was overtaken and made prisoners. No less than forty thousand who had started from the Athenian camp, six days before, were either killed or made prisoners, with the two generals who commanded them. The prisoners at first were subjected to the most cruel and inhuman treatment, and then sold as slaves. Both Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death, B.C. 413.

(M549) Such was the disastrous close of the Sicilian expedition. Our limits prevent an extended notice. We can only give the barren outline.

But never in Grecian history had so large a force been arrayed against a foreign power, and never was ruin more complete. The enterprise was started at the instance of Alcibiades. It was he who brought this disaster on his country. But it would have been better to have left the expedition to his management. Nicias was a lofty and religious man, but was no general. He grossly mismanaged from first to last. The confidence of the Athenians was misplaced; and he, after having spent his life in inculcating a conservative policy, which was the wiser, yet became the unwilling instrument of untold and unparalleled calamities. His fault was over-confidence. He was personally brave, religious, incorruptible, munificent, affable-in all respects honorable and respectable, but he had no military genius.

(M550) The Lacedaemonians, at the suggestion of Alcibiades, had permanently occupied Decelea-a fortified post within fifteen miles of Athens, and instead of spending a few weeks in ravaging Attica, now intrenched themselves, and issued out in excursions until they had destroyed all that was valuable in the neighborhood of Athens. The great calamities which the Athenians had suffered prevented them from expelling the invaders, and the city itself was now in the condition of a post besieged. All the acc.u.mulations in her treasury were exhausted, and she was compelled to dismiss even her Thracian mercenaries. They were sent back to their own country under Dotrephes; but after inflicting great atrocities in Botia, were driven back by the Thebans.

(M551) The Athenian navy was now so crippled that it could no longer maintain the supremacy of the sea. The Corinthians were formidable rivals and enemies. A naval battle at Naupactus, at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, between the Athenians and Corinthians, though indecisive, yet really was to the advantage of the latter.

(M552) The full effects of the terrible catastrophe at Syracuse were not at first made known to the Athenians, but gradually a settled despair overspread the public mind. The supremacy of Athens in Greece was at an end, and the city itself was endangered. The inhabitants now put forth all the energies that a forlorn hope allowed. The distant garrisons were recalled; all expenses were curtailed; timber was collected for new ships, and Capo Sunium was fortified. But the enemies of Athens were also stimulated to renewed exertions, and subject-allies were induced to revolt. Persia sent envoys to Sparta. The Eubans and Chians applied to the same power for aid in shaking off the yoke of Athens now broken and defenseless. Although a Peloponnesian fleet was defeated by the Athenians on its way to a.s.sist Chios in revolt, yet new dangers multiplied. The infamous Alcibiades crossed with a squadron to Chios, and the Athenians were obliged to make use of their reserved fund of one thousand talents, which Pericles had set aside for the last extremity, in order to equip a fleet, under the command of Strombichides. Alcibiades pa.s.sed over to Miletus, and induced this city also to revolt. A shameful treaty was made between Sparta and Persia to carry on war against Athens; and the first step in the execution of the treaty was to hand Miletus over to a Persian general. Ionia now became the seat of war, and a victory was gained near Miletus by the Athenians, but this was balanced by the capture of Iasus by the Lacedaemonians. The Athenians rallied at Samos, which remained faithful, and still controlled one hundred and twenty-eight triremes at this island. Alternate successes and defeats happened to the contending parties, with no decided result.

(M553) The want of success on the coast of Asia led the Lacedaemonians to suspect Alcibiades of treachery. Moreover, his intrigue with the wife of Agis made the king of Sparta his relentless enemy. Agis accordingly procured a decision of the ephors to send out instructions for his death.

He was warned in time, and made his escape to the satrap Tissaphernes, who commanded the forces of Persia. He persuaded the Persian not to give a decisive superiority to either of the contending parties, who followed his advice, and kept the Peloponnesian fleet inactive, and bribed the Spartan general. Having now gratified his revenge against Athens and lost the support of Sparta, Alcibiades now looked to his native country as the best field for his unprincipled ambition. "He opened negotiations with the Athenian commanders at Samos, and offered the alliance of Persia as the price of his restoration, but proposed as a further condition the overthrow of the democratic government at Athens."

(M554) Then followed the political revolution which Alcibiades had planned, in conjunction with oligarchal conspirators. The rally of the city, threatened with complete ruin, had been energetic and astonishing, and she was now, a year after the disaster at Syracuse, able to carry on a purely defensive system, though with crippled resources. But for this revolution Athens might have secured her independence.

(M555) The proposal of Alcibiades to change the const.i.tution was listened to by the rich men, on whom the chief burden of the war had fallen. With the treasures of Persia to help them, they hoped to carry on the war against Sparta without cost to themselves. It was hence resolved at Samos, among the Athenians congregated there, to send a deputation to Athens, under Pisander, to carry out their designs. But they had no other security than the word of Alcibiades, that restless and unpatriotic schemer, that they would secure the a.s.sistance of Persia. And it is astonishing that such a man-so faithless-could be believed.

(M556) One of the generals of the fleet at Samos, Phrynichus, strongly opposed this movement, and gave good reasons; but the tide of opinion among the oligarchal conspirators ran so violently against him, that Pisander was at once dispatched to Athens. He laid before the public a.s.sembly the terms which Alcibiades proposed. The people, eager at any cost to gain the Persian king as an ally, in their extremity listened to the proposal, though unwilling, and voted to relinquish their political power. Pisander made them believe it was a choice between utter ruin and the relinquishment of political privileges, since the Lacedaemonians had an overwhelming force against them. It was while Chios seemed likely to be recovered by the Athenians, and while the Peloponnesian fleet was paralyzed at Rhodes by Persian intrigues, that Pisander returned to Ionia to open negotiations with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. But Alcibiades had promised too much, the satrap having no idea of lending aid to Athens, and yet he extricated himself by such exaggerated demands, which he knew the Athenians would never concede to Persia, that negotiations were broken off, and a reconciliation was made between Persia and Sparta. The oligarchal conspirators had, however, gone so far that a retreat was impossible. The democracy of Athens was now subverted. Instead of the Senate of Five Hundred and the a.s.sembled people, an oligarchy of Four Hundred sat in the Senate house, and all except five thousand were disfranchised-and these were not convened. The oligarchy was in full power when Pisander returned to Athens. All democratic magistrates had been removed, and no civil functionaries were paid. The Four Hundred had complete control. Thus perished, through the intrigues of Alcibiades, the democracy of Athens. He had organized the unfortunate expedition to Sicily; he had served the bitterest enemies of his country; and now, he had succeeded in overturning the const.i.tution which had lasted one hundred years, during which Athens had won all her glories. Why should the Athenians receive back to their confidence so bad a man? But whom G.o.d wishes to destroy, he first makes mad, and Alcibiades, it would seem, was the instrument by which Athens was humiliated and ruined as a political power. The revolution was effected in an hour of despair, and by delusive promises. The character and conduct of the insidious and unscrupulous intriguer were forgotten in his promises. The Athenians were simply cheated.

(M557) The Four Hundred, installed in power, solemnized their installation by prayer and sacrifice, put to death some political enemies, imprisoned and banished others, and ruled with great rigor and strictness. They then sought to make peace with Sparta, which was declined. The army at Samos heard of these changes with exceeding wrath, especially the cruelties which were inflicted on all citizens who spoke against the new tyranny. A democratic demonstration took place at Samos, by which the Samians and the army were united in the strongest ties, for the Samians had successfully resisted a like revolution on their island. The army at Samos refused to obey any orders from the oligarchy, and const.i.tuted a democracy by themselves. Yet the man who had been instrumental in creating this oligarchy, with characteristic versatility and impudence, joined the democracy at Samos. He came to Samos by invitation of the armament, and pledged himself to secure Persian aid, and he was believed and again trusted. He then launched into a new career, and professed to take up again the interests of the democracy at Athens. The envoys of the Four Hundred which were sent to Samos were indignantly sent back, and the general indignation against the oligarchy was intensified. Envoys from Argos also appeared at Samos, offering aid to the Athenian democracy.

There was now a strong and organized resistance to the Four Hundred, and their own divisions placed them further in a precarious situation.

Theramenes demanded that the Five Thousand, which body had been thus far nominal, should be made a reality. The Four Hundred again solicited aid from Sparta, and constructed a fort for the admission of a Spartan garrison, while a Lacedaemonian fleet hovered near the Piraeus.

(M558) The long-suppressed energies of the people at length burst forth. A body of soldiers seized the fortress the oligarchy were constructing for a Spartan garrison, and demolished it. The Four Hundred made important concessions, and agreed to renew the public a.s.sembly. While these events occurred a naval battle took place near Eretria between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, in which the latter were defeated. The victory, if they had pushed their success, would have completed the ruin of Athens, since her home fleet was destroyed, and that at Samos was detained by Alcibiades. When it was seen the hostile fleet did not enter the harbor, the Athenians recovered their dismay and prosecuted their domestic revolution by deposing the Four Hundred and placing the whole government in the hands of the Five Thousand, and this body was soon enlarged to that of universal citizenship. The old const.i.tution was restored, except that part of it which allowed pay to the judges. Most of the oligarchal leaders fled, and a few of them were tried and executed-those who had sought Spartan aid. Thus this selfish movement terminated, after the oligarchy had enjoyed a brief reign of only a few months.

(M559) While Athens was distracted by changes of government, the war was conducted on the coasts of Asia between the belligerents with alternate success and defeat. Abydos, connected with Miletus by colonial ties, revolted from Athens, and Lampsacus, a neighboring town, followed its example two days afterward. Byzantium also went over to the Lacedaemonians, which enabled them to command the strait. Alcibiades pursued still his double game with Persia and Athens. An Athenian fleet was sent to the h.e.l.lespont to contend with the Lacedaemonian squadron, and gained an incomplete victory at Cynossema, whose only effect was to encourage the Athenians. The Persians gave substantial aid to the Lacedaemonians, withheld for a time by the intrigues of Alcibiades, who returned to Samos, but was shortly after seized by Tissaphernes and sent to Sardis, from which he contrived to escape. He partially redeemed his infamy by a victory over the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicus, and captured it entirely, which disaster induced the Spartans to make overtures of peace, which were rejected through the influence of Cleophon, the demagogue.

(M560) The Athenian fleet now reigned alone in the Propontis, the Bosphorus, and the h.e.l.lespont, and levied toll on all the ships pa.s.sing through the straits, while Chrysopolis, opposite to Byzantium, was occupied by Alcibiades. Athens now once more became hopeful and energetic.

Thrasyllus was sent with a large force to Ionia, and joined his forces with the fleet which Alcibiades commanded at Sestos, but the conjoined forces were unable to retake Abydos, which was relieved by Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap.

(M561) The absence of the fleet from Athens encouraged the Lacedaemonians, who retook Pylus, B.C. 409, while the Athenians captured Chalcedon, and the following year Byzantium itself. Such was the state of the contending parties when Cyrus the younger was sent by his father Darius as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia, and whose command in Asia Minor was attended by important consequences. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were still left in command of the coast.

(M562) Cyrus, a man of great ambition and self-control, came to Asia Minor with a fixed purpose of putting down the Athenian power, which for sixty years had humbled the pride of the Persian kings. He formed a hearty and cordial alliance with Lysander, the Spartan admiral, and the most eminent man, after Brasidas, whom the Lacedaemonians had produced during the war.

He was a man of severe Spartan discipline and virtue, but ambitious and cruel. He visited Cyrus at Sardis, was welcomed with every mark of favor, and induced Cyrus to grant additional pay to every Spartan seaman.

(M563) Meanwhile Alcibiades re-entered his native city in triumph, after eight years' exile, and was welcomed by all parties as the only man who had sufficient capacity to restore the fallen fortunes of Athens. His confiscated property was restored, and he was made captain-general with ample powers, while all his treasons were apparently forgotten, which had proved so fatal to his country-the sending of Gylippus to Syracuse, the revolt of Chios and Miletus, and the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. The effect of this treatment, so much better than what he deserved, intoxicated this wayward and unprincipled, but exceedingly able man. His first exploit was to sail to Andros, now under a Lacedaemonian garrison, whose fields he devastated, but was unable to take the town. He then went to Samos, and there learned that all his intrigues with Persia had failed, and that Persia was allied still more strongly with the Lacedaemonians under Lysander.

(M564) This great general, now at Ephesus, pursued a cautious policy, and refused to give battle to the Athenian forces under Alcibiades, who then retired to Phocaea, leaving his fleet under the command of Antiochus, his favorite pilot. Antiochus, in the absence of his general, engaged the Lacedaemonian fleet, but was defeated and slain at Notium. The conduct of Alcibiades produced great disaffection at Athens. He had sailed with a fleet not inferior to that which he commanded at Syracuse, and had made great promises of future achievements, yet in three months he had not gained a single success. He was therefore dismissed from his command, which was given to ten generals, of whom Conon was the most eminent, while he retired to the Chersonese. Lysander, at the same time, was superseded in the command of the Lacedaemonians by Callicratidas, in accordance with Spartan custom, his term being expired.

(M565) Callicratidas was not welcomed by Cyrus, and he was also left without funds by Lysander, who returned to the Persians the sums he had received. This conduct so much enraged the Spartan admiral that he sailed with his whole fleet-the largest which had been a.s.sembled during the war, one hundred and forty triremes, of which only ten were Lacedaemonian-the rest being furnished by allies-to Lesbos, and liberated the Athenian captives and garrison at Methymna, and seemed animated by that old Panh.e.l.lenic patriotism which had united the Greeks half a century before against the Persian invaders, declaring that not a single Greek should be reduced to slavery if he could help it. But while he was thus actuated by these n.o.ble sentiments, he also prosecuted the war of his country, which had been intrusted to him to conduct. He blocked up the Athenian fleet at Mitylene, which had no provisions to sustain a siege. The Athenians now made prodigious efforts to relieve Conon, and one hundred and ten triremes were sent from the Piraeus, and sailed to Samos. Callicratidas, apprised of the approach of the large fleet, went out to meet it. At Arginusae was fought a great battle, in which the Spartan admiral was killed, and his forces completely defeated. Sixty-nine Lacedaemonian ships were destroyed; the Athenians lost twenty-five, a severe loss to Greece, since, if Callicratidas had gained the victory, he would, according to Grote, have closed the Peloponnesian war, and united the Greeks once more against Persia.