The battle of Arginusae now gave the Athenians the control of the Asiatic seas, and so discouraged were the Lacedaemonians, that they were induced to make proposals of peace. This is doubted, indeed, by Grote, since no positive results accrued to Athens.

(M566) The Chians and other allies of Sparta, in conjunction with Cyrus, now sent envoys to the ephors, to request the restoration of Lysander to the command of the fleet. They acceded to the request substantially, and Lysander reached Ephesus, B.C. 405, to renovate the Lacedaemonian power and turn the fortunes of war.

(M567) The victorious Athenian fleet was now at aegospotami, in the h.e.l.lespont, opposite Lampsacus, having been inactive for nearly a year.

There the fleet was exposed to imminent danger, which was even seen by Alcibiades, in his forts opposite, on the Chersonese. He expostulated with the Athenian admirals, but to no purpose, and urged them to retire to Sestos. As he feared, the Athenian fleet was surprised, at anchor, on this open sh.o.r.e, while the crews were on sh.o.r.e in quest of a meal. One hundred and seventy triremes were thus ingloriously captured, without the loss of a man-the greatest calamity which had happened to Athens since the beginning of the war, and decisive as to its result. The captive generals were slaughtered, together with four thousand Athenian prisoners. Conon, however, made his escape. So disgraceful and unnecessary was this great calamity, that it is supposed the fleet was betrayed by its own commanders; and this supposition is strengthened by its inactivity since the battle of Arginusae. This crowning disaster happened in September, B.C.

405, and caused a dismay at Athens such as had never before been felt-not even when the Persians were marching through Attica. Nothing was now left to the miserable city but to make what preparation it could for the siege, which everybody foresaw would soon take place. The walls were put in the best defense it was possible, and two of the three ports were blocked up.

Not only was Athens deprived of her maritime power, but her very existence was now jeopardized.

(M568) Lysander was in no haste to march upon Athens, since he knew that no corn ships could reach the city from the Euxine, and that a famine would soon set in. The Athenian empire was annihilated, and nothing remained but Athens herself! The Athenians now saw that nothing but union between the citizens could give them any hope of success, and they made a solemn pledge in the Acropolis to bury their dissensions and cultivate harmonious feelings.

(M569) In November, Lysander, with two hundred triremes, blockaded the Piraeus. The whole force of Sparta, under King Pausanias, went out to meet him, and encamped at the gates of Athens. The citizens bore the calamity with fort.i.tude, and, when they began to die of hunger, sent propositions for capitulation. But no proposition was received which did not include the demolition of the long walls which Pericles had built. As famine pressed, and the condition of the people had become intolerable, Athens was obliged to surrender on the hard conditions that the Piraeus should be destroyed, the long walls demolished, all foreign possessions evacuated, all ships surrendered, and, most humiliating of all, that Athens should become the ally of Sparta, and follow her lead upon the sea and upon the land.

(M570) Thus fell imperial Athens, after a glorious reign of one hundred years. Lysander entered the city as a conqueror. The ships were surrendered, all but twelve, which the Athenians were allowed to retain; the unfinished ships in the dockyards were burned, the fortifications demolished, and the Piraeus dismantled. The const.i.tution of the city was annulled, and a board of thirty was nominated, under the dictation of Lysander, for the government of the city. The conqueror then sailed to Samos, which was easily reduced, and oligarchy was restored on that island, as at Athens.

(M571) The fall of Athens virtually closed the Peloponnesian war, after a bitter struggle between the two leading States of Greece for thirty years.

Lysander became the leading man in Greece, and wielded a power greater than any individual Greek before or after him. Sparta, personified in him, became supreme, and ruled over all the islands, and over the Asiatic and Thracian cities. The tyrants whom he placed over Athens exercised their power with extreme rigor-sending to execution all who were obnoxious, seizing as spoil the property of the citizens, and disarming the remaining hoplites in the city. They even forbade intellectual teaching, and shut the mouth of Socrates. Such was Athens, humbled, deprived of her fleet, and rendered powerless, with a Spartan garrison occupying the Acropolis, and discord reigning even among the Thirty Tyrants themselves.

(M572) In considering the downfall of Athens, we perceive that the unfortunate Sicilian expedition which Alcibiades had stimulated proved the main cause. Her maritime supremacy might have been maintained but for this aggression, which Pericles never would have sanctioned, and which Nicias so earnestly disapproved. After that disaster, the conditions of the State were totally changed, and it was a bitter and desperate struggle to retain the fragments of empire. And the catastrophe proved, ultimately, the political ruin of Greece herself, since there was left no one State sufficiently powerful to resist foreign attacks. The glory of Athens was her navy, and this being destroyed, Greece was open to invasion, and to the corruption brought about by Persian gold. It was Athens which had resisted Persia, and protected the maritime States and islands. When Athens was crippled, the decline of the other States was rapid, for they had all exhausted themselves in the war. And the war itself has few redeeming features. It was a wicked contest carried on by rivalry and jealousy. And it produced, as war generally does, a cla.s.s of unprincipled men who aggrandize themselves at the expense of their country. Nothing but war would have developed such men as Alcibiades and Lysander, and it is difficult to say which of the two brought the greatest dishonor on their respective States. Both were ambitious, and both hoped to gain an ascendency incompatible with free inst.i.tutions. To my mind, Alcibiades is the worst man in Grecian history, and not only personally disgraced by the worst vices, but his influence was disastrous on his country. Athens owed her political degradation more to him than any other man. He was insolent, lawless, extravagant, and unscrupulous, from his first appearance in public life. He incited the Sicilian expedition, and caused it to end disastrously by sending Gylippus to Syracuse. He originated the revolt of Chios and Miletus, the fortification of Decelea, and the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. And though he partially redeemed his treason by his three years' services, after his exile, yet his vanity, and intrigues, and prodigality prevented him from accomplishing what he promised. It is true he was a man of great resources, and was never defeated either by sea or land; "and he was the first man in every party he espoused-Athenian, Spartan, or Persian, oligarchial or democratical, but he never inspired confidence with any party, and all parties successively threw him off."

The end of such a man proclaims the avenging Nemesis in this world. He died by the hands of Persian a.s.sa.s.sins at the instance of both Lysander and Cyrus, who felt that there could be nothing settled so long as this restless schemer lived. And he died, unlamented and unhonored, in spite of his high birth, wealth, talents, and personal accomplishments.

(M573) Lysander was more fortunate; he gained a great ascendency in Sparta, but his ambition proved ruinous to his country, by involving it in those desperate wars which are yet to be presented.

CHAPTER XX.

MARCH OF CYRUS AND RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

(M574) The Peloponnesian war being closed, a large body of Grecian soldiers were disbanded, but rendered venal and restless by the excitements and changes of the past thirty years, and ready to embark in any warlike enterprise that promised money and spoil. They were unfitted, as is usually the case, for sober and industrial pursuits. They panted for fresh adventures.

(M575) This restless pa.s.sion which war ever kindles, found vent and direction in the enterprise which Cyrus led from Western Asia to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes from the throne of Persia. Some fourteen thousand Greeks from different States joined his standard-not with a view of a march to Babylon and an attack on the great king, but to conquer and root out the Pisidian mountaineers, who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the southeast of Asia Minor. This was the ostensible object of Cyrus, and he found no difficulty in enlisting Grecian mercenaries, under promise of large rewards. All these Greeks were deceived but one man, to whom alone Cyrus revealed his real purpose. This was Clearchus, a Lacedaemonian general of considerable ability and experience, who had been banished for abuse of authority at Byzantium, which he commanded. He repaired to Sardis and offered his services to Cyrus, who had been sent thither by his father Darius to command the Persian forces. Cyrus accepted the overtures of Clearchus, who secured his confidence so completely that he gave him the large sum of ten thousand darics, which he employed in hiring Grecian mercenaries.

(M576) Other Greeks of note also joined the army of Cyrus with a view of being employed against the Pisidians. Among them were Aristippus and Menon, of a distinguished family in Thessaly; Proxenus, a Botian; Agis, an Arcadian; Socrates, an Achaean, who were employed to collect mercenaries, and who received large sums of money. A considerable body of Lacedaemonians were also taken under pay.

The march of these men to Babylon, and their successful retreat, form one of the most interesting episodes in Grecian history, and it is this march and retreat which I purpose briefly to present.

(M577) Cyrus was an extraordinary man. The younger son of the Persian king, he aimed to secure the sovereignty of Persia, which fell to his elder brother, Artaxerxes, on the death of Darius. During his residence at Sardis, as satrap or governor, he perceived and felt the great superiority of the Greeks to his own countrymen, not only intellectually, but as soldiers. He was brave, generous, frank, and ambitious. Had it been his fortune to have achieved the object of his ambition, the whole history of Persia would have been changed, and Alexander would have lived in vain.

Perceiving and appreciating the great qualities of the Greeks, and learning how to influence them, he sought, by their aid, to conquer his way to the throne.

(M578) But he dissembled his designs so that they were not suspected, even in Persia. As has been remarked, he communicated them only to the Spartan general, Clearchus. Neither Greek nor Persian divined his object as he collected a great army at Sardis. At first he employed his forces in the siege of Miletus and other enterprises, which provoked no suspicion of his real designs.

(M579) When all was ready, he commenced his march from Sardis, in March, B.C. 401, with about eight thousand Grecian hoplites and one hundred thousand native troops, while a joint Lacedaemonian and Persian fleet coasted around the south of Asia Minor to co-operate with the land forces.

(M580) These Greeks who thus joined his standard under promise of large pay, and were unwittingly about to plunge into unknown perils, were not outcasts and paupers, but were men of position, reputation, and, in some cases, of wealth. About half of them were Arcadians. Young men of good family, ennuied of home, restless and adventurous, formed the greater part, although many of mature age had been induced by liberal offers to leave their wives and children. They simply calculated on a year's campaign in Pisidia, from which they would return to their homes enriched.

So they were a.s.sured by the Greek commanders at Sardis, and so these commanders believed, for Cyrus stood high in popular estimation for liberality and good faith.

(M581) Among other ill.u.s.trious Greeks that were thus to be led so far from home was Xenophon, the Athenian historian, who was induced by his friend Proxenus, of Botia, to join the expedition. He was of high family, and a pupil of Socrates, but embarked against the wishes and advice of his teacher.

When the siege of Miletus was abandoned, and Cyrus began his march, his object was divined by the satrap Tissaphernes, who hastened to Persia to put the king on his guard.

(M582) At Celenae, or Kelaenae, a Phrygian city, Cyrus halted and reviewed his army. Grecian re-enforcements here joined him, which swelled the number of Greeks to thirteen thousand men, of whom eleven thousand were hoplites. As this city was on the way to Pisidia, no mistrust existed as to the object of the expedition, not even when the army pa.s.sed into Lycaonia, since its inhabitants were of the same predatory character as the Pisidians. But when it had crossed Mount Taurus, which bounded Cilicia, and reached Tarsus, the Greeks perceived that they had been cheated, and refused to advance farther. Clearchus attempted to suppress the mutiny by severe measures, but failed. He then resorted to stratagem, and pretended to yield to the wishes of the Greeks, and likewise refused to march, but sent a secret dispatch to Cyrus that all would be well in the end, and requested him to send fresh invitations, that he might answer by fresh refusals. He then, with the characteristic cunning and eloquence of a Greek, made known to his countrymen the extreme peril of making Cyrus their enemy in a hostile country, where retreat was beset with so many dangers, and induced them to proceed. So the army continued its march to Issus, at the extremity of the Issican Gulf, and near the mountains which separate Cilicia from Syria. Here Cyrus was further re-enforced, making the grand total of Greeks in his army fourteen thousand.

(M583) He expected to find the pa.s.ses over the mountains, a day's journey from Issus, defended, but the Persian general Abrocomas fled at his approach, and Cyrus easily crossed into Syria by the pa.s.s of Beilan, over Mount Ama.n.u.s. He then proceeded south to Myriandus, a Phnician maritime town, where he parted from his fleet. Eight days' march brought his army to Thapsacus, on the Euphrates, where he remained five days to refresh his troops. Here again the Greeks showed a reluctance to proceed, but, on the promise of five minae a head, nearly one hundred dollars more than a year's pay, they consented to advance. It was here Cyrus crossed the river un.o.bstructed, and continued his march on the left bank for nine days, until he came to the river Araxes, which separates Syria from Arabia. Thus far his army was well supplied with provisions from the numerous villages through which they pa.s.sed; but now he entered a desert country, entirely without cultivation, where the astonished Greeks beheld for the first time wild a.s.ses, antelopes, and ostriches. For eighteen days the army marched without other provisions than what they brought with them, parched with thirst and exhausted by heat. At Pylae they reached the cultivated territory of Babylonia, and the alluvial plains commenced. Three days'

further march brought them to Cunaxa, about seventy miles from Babylon, where the army of Artaxerxes was marshaled to meet them. It was an immense force of more than a million of men, besides six thousand horse-guards and two hundred chariots. But so confident was Cyrus of the vast superiority of the Greeks and their warfare, that he did not hesitate to engage the overwhelming forces of his brother with only ten thousand Greeks and one hundred thousand Asiatics. The battle of Cunaxa was fatal to Cyrus; he was slain and his camp was pillaged. The expedition had failed.

(M584) Dismay now seized the Greeks, as well it might-a handful of men in the midst of innumerable enemies, and in the very centre of the Persian empire. But such men are not driven to despair. They refused to surrender, and make up their minds to retreat-to find their way back again to Greece, since all aggressive measures was madness.

This retreat, amid so many difficulties, and against such powerful and numerous enemies, is one of the most gallant actions in the history of war, and has made those ten thousand men immortal.

(M585) Ariaeus, who commanded the Asiatic forces on the left wing of the army at the battle of Cunaxa, joined the Greeks with what force remained, in retreat, and promised to guide them to the Asiatic coast, not by the route which Cyrus had taken, for this was now impracticable, but by a longer one, up the course of the Tigris, through Armenia, to the Euxine Sea. The Greeks had marched ninety days from Sardis, about fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles, and rested ninety-six days in various places. Six months had been spent on the expedition, and it would take more than that time to return, considering the new difficulties which it was necessary to surmount. The condition of the Greeks, to all appearance, was hopeless. How were they to ford rivers and cross mountains, with a hostile cavalry in their rear, without supplies, without a knowledge of roads, without trustworthy guides, through hostile territories?

(M586) The Persians still continued their negotiations, regarding the advance or retreat of the Greeks alike impossible, and curious to learn what motives had brought them so far from home. They replied that they had been deceived, that they had no hostility to the Persian king, that they had been ashamed to desert Cyrus in the midst of danger, and that they now desired only to return home peaceably, but were prepared to repel hostilities.

(M587) It was not pleasant to the Persian monarch to have thirteen thousand Grecian veterans, whose prestige was immense, and whose power was really formidable, in the heart of the kingdom. It was not easy to conquer such brave men, reduced to desperation, without immense losses and probable humiliation. So the Persians dissembled. It was their object to get the Greeks out of Babylonia, where they could easily intrench and support themselves, and then attack them at a disadvantage. So Tissaphernes agreed to conduct them home by a different route. They acceded to his proposal, and he led them to the banks of the Tigris, and advanced on its left bank, north to the Great Zab River, about two hundred miles from Babylon. The Persians marched in advance, and the Greeks about three miles in the rear. At the Great Zab they halted three days, and then Tissaphernes enticed the Greek generals to his tent, ostensibly to feast them and renew negotiations. There they were seized, sent prisoners to the Persian court, and treacherously murdered.

(M588) Utter despair now seized the Greeks. They were deprived of their generals, in the heart of Media, with unscrupulous enemies in the rear, and the mountains of Armenia in their front, whose pa.s.ses were defended by hostile barbarians, and this in the depth of winter, deprived of guides, and exposed to every kind of hardship, difficulty, and danger. They were apparently in the hands of their enemies, without any probability of escape. They were then summoned to surrender to the Persians, but they resolved to fight their way home, great as were their dangers and insurmountable the difficulties-a most heroic resolution. And their retreat, under these circ.u.mstances, to the Euxine, is the most extraordinary march in the whole history of war.

(M589) But a great man appeared, in this crisis, to lead them, whose prudence, sagacity, moderation, and courage can never be sufficiently praised, and his successful retreat places him in the ranks of the great generals of the world. Xenophon, the Athenian historian, now appears upon the stage with all those n.o.ble qualities which inspired the heroes at the siege of Troy-a man as religious as he was brave and magnanimous, and eloquent even for a Greek. He summoned together the captains, and persuaded them to advance, giving the a.s.surance of the protection of Zeus.

He then convened the army, and inspired them by his spirit, with surpa.s.sing eloquence, and acquired the ascendency of a Moses by his genius, piety, and wisdom. His military rank was not great, but in such an emergency talents and virtues have more force than rank.

(M590) So, under his leadership, the Greeks crossed the Zab, and resumed their march to the north, hara.s.sed by Persian cavalry, and subjected to great privations. The army no longer marched, as was usual, in one undivided hollow square, but in small companies, for they were obliged to cross mountains and ford rivers. So long as they marched on the banks of the Tigris, they found well-stocked villages, from which they obtained supplies; but as they entered the country of the Carducians, they were obliged to leave the Tigris to their left, and cross the high mountains which divided it from Armenia. They were also compelled to burn their baggage, for the roads were nearly impa.s.sable, not only on account of the narrow defiles, but from the vast quant.i.ties of snow which fell. Their situation was full of peril, and fatigue, and privation. Still they persevered, animated by the example and eloquence of their intrepid leader. At every new pa.s.s they were obliged to fight a battle, but the enemies they encountered could not withstand their arms in close combat, and usually fled, contented to hara.s.s them by rolling stones down the mountains on their heads, and discharging their long arrows.

(M591) The march through Armenia was still more difficult, for the inhabitants were more warlike and hardy, and the pa.s.sage more difficult.

They also were sorely troubled for lack of guides. The sufferings of the Greeks were intense from cold and privation. The beasts of burden perished in the snow, while the soldiers were frost-bitten and famished. It was their good fortune to find villages, after several days' march, where they halted and rested, but a.s.sailed all the while by hostile bands. Yet onward they pressed, wearied and hungry, through the country of the Taochi, of the Chalybes, of the Scytheni, of the Marones, of the Colchians, and reached Trapezus (Trebizond) in safety. The sight of the sea filled the Greeks with indescribable joy after so many perils, for the sea was their own element, and they could now pursue their way in ships rather than by perilous marches.

(M592) But the delays were long and dreary. There were no ships to transport the warriors to Byzantium. They were exposed to new troubles from the indifference or hostility of the cities on the Euxine, for so large a force created alarm. And when the most pressing dangers were pa.s.sed, the license of the men broke out, so that it was difficult to preserve order and prevent them from robbing their friends. They were obliged to resort to marauding expeditions among the Asiatic people, and it was difficult to support themselves. Not being able to get ships, they marched along the coast to Cotyora, exposed to incessant hostilities. It was now the desire of Xenophon to found a new city on the Euxine with the army; but the army was eager to return home, and did not accede to the proposal. Clamors arose against the general who had led them so gloriously from the heart of Media, and his speeches in his defense are among the most eloquent on Grecian record. He remonstrated against the disorders of the army, and had sufficient influence to secure reform, and completely triumphed over faction as he had over danger.

(M593) At last ships were provided, and the army pa.s.sed by sea to Sinope-a Grecian colony-where the men were hospitably received, and fed, and lodged. From thence the army pa.s.sed by sea to Heracleia, where the soldiers sought to extort money against the opposition of Xenophon and Cherisophus, the latter of whom had n.o.bly seconded the plans of Xenophon, although a Spartan of superior military rank. The army, at this opposition, divided into three factions, but on suffering new disasters, reunited. It made a halt at Calpe, where new disorders broke out. Then Cleander, Spartan governor of Byzantium, arrived with two triremes, who promised to conduct the army, and took command of it, but subsequently threw up his command from the unpropitious sacrifices. Nothing proved the religious character of the Greeks so forcibly as their scrupulous attention to the rites imposed by their pagan faith. They undertook no enterprise of importance without sacrifices to the G.o.ds, and if the auguries were unfavorable, they relinquished their most cherished objects.

(M594) From Calpe the army marched to Chalcedon, turning into money the slaves and plunder which it had collected. There it remained seven days.

But nothing could be done without the consent of the Spartan admiral at Byzantium, Anaxibius, since the Lacedaemonians were the masters of Greece both by sea and land. This man was bribed by the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, who commanded the north-western region of Asia Minor, to transport the army to the European side of the Bosphorus. It accordingly crossed to Byzantium, but was not allowed to halt in the city, or even to enter the gates.

(M595) The wrath of the soldiers was boundless when they were thus excluded from Byzantium. They rushed into the town and took possession, which conduct gave grave apprehension to Xenophon, who mustered and harangued the army, and thus prevented antic.i.p.ated violence. They at length consented to leave the city, and accepted the services of the Theban Coeratidas, who promised to conduct them to the Delta of Thrace, for purposes of plunder, but he was soon dismissed. After various misfortunes the soldiers at length were taken under the pay of Seuthes, a Thracian prince, who sought the recovery of his princ.i.p.ality, but who cheated them out of their pay. A change of policy among the Lacedaemonians led to the conveyance of the Cyrenian army into Asia in order to make war on the satraps. Xenophon accordingly conducted his troops, now reduced to six thousand men, over Mount Ida to Pergamus. He succeeded in capturing the Persian general Asidates, and securing a valuable booty, B.C. 399. The soldiers whom he had led were now incorporated with the Lacedaemonian army in Asia, and Xenophon himself enlisted in the Spartan service. His subsequent fortunes we have not room to present. An exile from Athens, he settled in Scillus, near Olympia, with abundant wealth, but ultimately returned to his native city after the battle of Leuctra.

(M596) The impression produced on the Grecian mind by the successful retreat of the Ten Thousand was profound and lasting. Its most obvious effect was to produce contempt for Persian armies and Persian generals, and to show that Persia was only strong by employing h.e.l.lenic strength against the h.e.l.lenic cause. The real weakness of Persia was thus revealed to the Greeks, and sentiments were fostered which two generations afterward led to the expeditions of Alexander and the subjection of Asia to Grecian rule.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE LACEDaeMONIAN EMPIRE.

(M597) I have already shown that Sparta, after a battle with the Argives, B.C. 547, obtained the ascendency in the southern part of the Peloponnesus, and became the leading military State of Greece. This prestige and power were not lost. The severe simplicity of Spartan life, the rigor of political and social inst.i.tutions, the aristocratic form of government, and above all the military spirit and ambition, gave permanence to all conquests, so that in the Persian wars Sparta took the load of the land forces. The great rival power of Sparta was Athens, but this was founded on maritime skill and enterprise. It was to the navy of Athens, next after the hoplites of Sparta, that the successful resistance to the empire of Persia may be attributed.