(M489) The great and disastrous war between the two leading States of Greece broke out about two years and a half before the death of Pericles, but the causes of the war can be traced to a period shortly after the Persians were driven out of the Ionian cities. It arose primarily from the rapid growth and power of Athens, when, as the leader of the maritime States, it excited the envy of Sparta and other republics. A thirty years'

truce was made between Athens and Sparta, B.C. 445, after the revolution in Botia, when the ascendency of Pericles was undisputed, which forced his rival, Thucydides, a kinsman of Cimon, to go into temporary exile. The continuance of the truce is identical with the palmy days of Athens, and the glory of Pericles, during which the vast improvements to the city were made, and art and literature flourished to a degree unprecedented in the history of the ancient world.

(M490) After the conquest of Samos the jealousy of Sparta reached a point which made it obvious that the truce could not much longer be maintained, though both powers shrunk from open hostilities, foreseeing the calamities which would result. The storm burst out in an unexpected quarter. The city of Epid.a.m.nus had been founded by colonists from Corcyra, on the eastern side of the Adriatic. It was, however, the prey of domestic factions, and in a domestic revolution a part of the inhabitants became exiles. These appealed to the neighboring barbarians, who invested the city by sea and land. The city, in distress, invoked the aid of Corcyra, the parent State, which aid being disregarded, the city transferred its allegiance to Corinth. The Corinthians, indulging a hatred of Corcyra, took the distressed city under their protection. This led to a war between Corcyra and Corinth, in which the Corinthians were defeated. But Corinth, burning to revenge the disaster, fitted out a still larger force against Corcyra.

The Corcyraeans, in alarm, then sent envoys to Athens to come to their a.s.sistance. The Corinthians also sent amba.s.sadors to frustrate their proposal. Two a.s.semblies were held in Athens in reference to the subject.

The delegates of Corcyra argued that peace could not long be maintained with Sparta, and that in the coming contest the Corcyraeans would prove useful allies. The envoys of Corinth, on the other hand, maintained that Athens could not lend aid to Corcyra without violating the treaty with Corinth. The Athenians decided to a.s.sist Corcyra, and ten ships were sent, under the command of Lacedaemonieus, the son of Cimon. This was considered a breach of faith by the Corinthians, and a war resulted between Corinth and Athens. The Corinthians then invited the Lacedaemonians to join them and make common cause against an aggressive and powerful enemy, that aimed at the supremacy of Greece. In spite of the influence of Athenian envoys in Sparta, who attempted to justify the course their countrymen had taken, the feeling against Athens was bitter and universally hostile. Instant hostilities were demanded in defense of the allies of Sparta, and war was decided upon.

Thus commenced the Peloponnesian war, which led to such disastrous consequences, and which was thus brought about by the Corinthians, B.C.

433, sixteen years before the conclusion of the truce.

(M491) To Athens the coming war was any thing but agreeable. It had no hopes of gain, and the certainty of prodigious loss. But the Spartans were not then prepared for the contest, and hostilities did not immediately commence. They contented themselves, at first, with sending envoys to Athens to multiply demands and enlarge the grounds of quarrel. The offensive was plainly with Sparta. The first requisition which Sparta made was the expulsion of the Alcmaeonidae from Athens, to which family Pericles belonged-a mere political manuvre to get rid of so commanding a statesman. The enemies of Pericles, especially the comic actors at Athens, seized this occasion to make public attacks upon him, and it was then that the persecution of Aspasia took place, as well as that against Anaxagoras, the philosopher, the teacher, and friend of Pericles. He was also accused of peculation in complicity with Phidias. But he was acquitted of the various charges made by his enemies. Nor could his services be well dispensed with in the great crisis of public affairs, even had he been guilty, as was exceedingly doubtful.

(M492) The reluctance on the part of the Athenians to go to war was very great, but Pericles strenuously urged his countrymen to resent the outrageous demands of Sparta, which were nothing less than the virtual extinction of the Athenian empire. He showed that the Spartans, though all-powerful on the Peloponnesus, had no means of carrying on an aggressive war at a distance, neither leaders nor money, nor habits of concert with allies; while Athens was mistress of the sea, and was impregnable in defense; that great calamities would indeed happen in Attica, but even if overrun by Spartan armies, there were other territories and islands from which a support could be derived. "Mourn not for the loss of land," said the orator, "but reserve your mourning for the men that acquire land." His eloquence and patriotism prevailed with a majority of the a.s.sembly, and answer was made to Sparta that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all grounds of complaint pursuant to the truce, by arbitration, but that they would yield nothing to authoritative command. This closed the negotiations, which Pericles foresaw would be vain and useless, since the Spartans were obstinately bent on war. The first imperious blow was struck by the Thebans-allies of Sparta. They surprised Plataea in the night. The gates were opened by the oligarchal party; a party of Thebans were admitted into the agora; but the people rallied, and the party was overwhelmed. Meanwhile another detachment of Thebans arrived in the morning, and, discovering what had happened, they laid waste the Plataean territory without the walls. The Plataeans retaliated by slaughtering their prisoners. Messengers left the city, on the entrance of the Thebans, to carry the news to Athens, and the Athenians issued orders to seize all the Botians who could be found in Attica, and sent re-enforcements to Plataea. This aggression of the Thebans silenced the opponents of Pericles, who now saw that the war had actually begun, and that active preparations should be made. Athens immediately sent messengers to her allies, tributary as well as free, and contributions flowed in from all parts of the Athenian empire. Athens had soon three hundred triremes fit for service, twelve hundred hors.e.m.e.n, sixteen hundred bowmen, and twenty-nine thousand hoplites. The Acropolis was filled with the treasure which had long been acc.u.mulating, not less than six thousand talents-about $7,000,000 of our money-an immense sum at that time, when gold and silver were worth twenty or thirty times as much as at present. Moreover, the various temples were rich in votive offerings, in deposits, plate, and sacred vessels, while the great statue of the G.o.ddess, lately set up in the Parthenon by Phidias, composed of gold and ivory, was itself valued at four hundred talents. The contributions of allies swelled the resources of Athens to one thousand talents, or over $11,000,000.

(M493) Sparta, on the other hand, had but few ships, no funds, and no powers of combination, and it would seem that success would be on the side of Athens, with her unrivaled maritime skill, and the unanimity of the citizens. Pericles did not promise successful engagements on the land, but a successful resistance, and the maintenance of the empire. His policy was purely defensive. But if Sparta was weak in money and ships, she was rich in allies. The entire strength of the Peloponnesus was brought out, a.s.sisted by Megarians, Botians, Phocians, Locrians, and other States.

Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Elis, and other maritime cities furnished ships while Botians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry. Not even to resist the Persian hosts was so large a land force collected, as was now a.s.sembled to destroy the supremacy of Athens. And this great force was animated with savage hopes, while the Athenians were not without desponding antic.i.p.ations, for there was little hope of resisting the Spartans and their allies on the field. The Spartans, moreover, resolved, by means of their allies, to send a fleet able to cope with that of Athens, and even were so transported with enmity and jealousy as to lay schemes for invoking the aid of Persia.

(M494) The invasion of Attica was the primary object of Sparta and her allies; and at the appointed time the Lacedaemonian forces were mustered on the Isthmus of Corinth, under the command of Archidamus. Envoys were sent to Athens to summon a surrender, but Pericles would not receive them, nor allow them to enter the city, upon which the Lacedaemonian army commenced its march to Attica. It required all the eloquence and tact of Pericles to induce the proprietors of Attica to submit to the devastation of their cultivated territory, and fly with their families and movable property to Athens or the neighboring islands, without making an effort to resist the invaders. But this was the policy of Pericles. He knew he could not contend with superior forces on the land. It was hard for the people to submit to the cruel necessity of seeing their farms devastated without opposition. But they made the sacrifice, and intrenched themselves behind the fortifications of Athens. Then was seen the wisdom of the long walls which connected Athens with the Piraeus.

(M495) Meanwhile the Spartan forces-sixty thousand hoplites, advanced through Attica, burning and plundering every thing on their way, and reached Acharnae, within seven miles of Athens. The Athenians, pent up behind their walls, and seeing the destruction of their property, were eager to go forth and fight, but were dissuaded by Pericles. Then came to him the trying hour. He was denounced as the cause of the existing sufferings, and was reviled as a coward. But nothing disturbed his equanimity, and he refused even to convene the a.s.sembly. As one of the ten generals he had this power; but it was a remarkable thing that the people should have respected the democratic const.i.tution so far as to submit, when their a.s.sembly would have been justified by the exigency of the crisis. But while the Athenians remained inactive behind their walls, the cavalry was sent out on skirmishing expeditions, and a large fleet was sent to the Peloponnesus with orders to devastate the country in retaliation. The Spartans, after having spent thirty or forty days in Attica, retired for want of provisions. aegina was also invaded, and the inhabitants were expelled and sent to the Peloponnesus. Megara was soon after invaded by an army under Pericles himself, and its territory was devastated-a retribution well deserved, for both Megara and aegina had been zealous in kindling the war.

(M496) Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for putting Attica in permanent defense, both by sea and land, and set apart one thousand talents, out of the treasure of the Acropolis, which was not to be used except in certain dangers previously prescribed, and a law was pa.s.sed making it a capital offense for any citizen to propose its use for any other purpose.

(M497) The first year of the war closed without decisive successes on either side. The Athenians made a more powerful resistance than was antic.i.p.ated. It was supposed they could not hold out against the superior forces of their enemies more than a year. They had the misfortune to see their territory wasted, and their treasures spent in a war which they would gladly have avoided. But, on the other hand, they inflicted nearly equal damages upon the Peloponnesus, and still remained masters of the sea. Pericles p.r.o.nounced a funeral oration on those who had fallen and stimulated his countrymen to continued resistance, and excited their patriotic sentiments. Thus far the antic.i.p.ations of the statesman and orator had been more than realized.

(M498) The second year of the war opened with another invasion of Attica by the Spartans and their allies. They inflicted even more injury than in the preceding year, but they found the territory deserted, all the population having retired within the defenses of Athens.

(M499) But a new and unforeseen calamity now fell upon the Athenians, and against which they could not guard. A great pestilence broke out in the city, which had already overrun Western Asia. Its progress was rapid and destructive, and the overcrowded city was but too favorable for its ravages. Thucydides has left a graphic and mournful account of this pestilence, a.n.a.logous to the plague of modern times. The victims generally perished on the seventh or ninth day, and no treatment was efficacious.

The sufferings and miseries of the people were intense, and the calamity by many was regarded as resulting from the anger of the G.o.ds. The pestilence demoralized the population, who lost courage and fort.i.tude. The sick were left to take care of themselves. The utmost lawlessness prevailed. The bonds of law and morality were relaxed, and the thoughtless people abandoned themselves to every species of folly and excess, seeking, in their despair, to seize some brief moments of joy before the hand of destiny should fall upon them. For three years did this calamity desolate Athens, and the loss of life was deplorable, both in the army and among private citizens. Pericles lost both his children and his sister; four thousand four hundred hoplites died, and a greater part of the hors.e.m.e.n.

(M500) And yet, amid the devastation which the pestilence inflicted, Pericles led another expedition against the coasts of the Peloponnesus.

But the soldiers carried infection with them, and a greater part of them died of the disease at the siege or blockade of Potidaea. The Athenians were nearly distracted by the double ravages of pestilence and war, and became incensed against Pericles, and sent messengers to Sparta to negotiate peace. But the Spartans turned a deaf ear, which added to the bitterness against their heroic leader, whose fort.i.tude and firmness were never more effectively manifested. He was accused, and condemned to pay a fine, and excluded from re-election. Though he was restored to power and confidence, his affliction bore heavily upon his exalted nature, and he died, B.C. 430, in the early period of the war. He had, indeed, many enemies, and was hunted down by the comic writers, whose trade it was to deride all political characters, yet his wisdom, patriotism, eloquence, and great services are indisputable, and he died, leaving on the whole, the greatest name which had ever enn.o.bled the Athenians.

(M501) The war, of course, languished during the prevalence of the epidemic, and much injury was done to Athenian commerce by Peloponnesian privateers, who put to death all their prisoners. It was then that Sparta sent envoys to Persia to solicit money and troops against Athens, which shows that no warfare is so bitter as civil strife, and that no expedients are too disgraceful not to be made use of, in order to gratify malignant pa.s.sions. But the envoys were seized in Thrace by the allies of Athens, and delivered up to the Athenians, and by them were put to death.

(M502) In January, B.C. 429, Potidaea surrendered to the Athenian generals, upon favorable terms, after enduring all the miseries of famine. The fall of this city cost Athens two thousand talents. The Lacedaemonians, after two years, had accomplished nothing. They had not even relieved Potidaea.

(M503) On the third year, the Lacedaemonians, instead of ravaging Attica, marched to the attack of Plataea. The inhabitants resolved to withstand the whole force of the enemies. Archidemus, the Lacedaemonian general, commenced the siege, defended only by four hundred native citizens and eighty Athenians. So unskilled were the Greeks in the attack of fortified cities, that the besiegers made no progress, and were obliged to resort to blockade. A wall of circ.u.mvallation was built around the city, which was now left to the operations of famine.

(M504) At the same time the siege was pressed, an Athenian armament was sent to Thrace, which was defeated; but in the western part of Greece the Athenian arms were more successful. The Spartans and their allies suffered a repulse at Stratus, and their fleet was defeated by Phormio, the Athenian admiral. Nothing could exceed the rage of the Lacedaemonians at these two disasters. They collected a still larger fleet, and were again defeated with severe loss near Naupactus, by inferior forces. But the defeated Lacedaemonians, under the persuasion of the Megarians, undertook the bold enterprise of surprising the Piraeus, during the absence of the Athenian fleet; but the courage of the a.s.sailants failed at the critical hour, and the port of Athens was saved. The Athenians then had the precaution to extend a chain across the mouth of the harbor, to guard against such surprises in the future.

(M505) Athens, during the summer, had secured the alliance of the Odrysians, a barbarous but powerful nation in Thrace. Their king, Sitalces, with an army of fifteen thousand men, attacked Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, and overran his country, and only retired from the severity of the season and the want of Athenian co-operation. Such were the chief enterprises and events of the third campaign, and Athens was still powerful and unhumbled.

(M506) The fourth year of the war was marked by a renewed invasion of Attica, without any other results than such as had happened before. But it was a more serious calamity to the Athenians to learn that Mitylene and most of Lesbos had revolted-one of the most powerful of the Athenian allies. Nothing was left to Athens but to subjugate the city. A large force was sent for this purpose, but the inhabitants of Mitylene appealed to the Spartans for aid, and prepared for a vigorous resistance. But the treasures of Athens were now nearly consumed, and the Athenians were obliged to resort to contributions to force the siege, which they did with vigor. The Lacedaemonians promised succor, and the Mitylenaeans held out till their provisions were exhausted, when they surrendered to the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians advanced to relieve their allies, but were too late. The Athenian admiral pursued them, and they returned to the Peloponnesus without having done any thing. Paches, the Athenian general, sent home one thousand Mitylenaean prisoners, while it was decreed to slaughter the whole remaining population-about six thousand-able to carry arms, and makes slaves of the women and children. This severe measure was prompted by Cleon. But the Athenians repented, and a second decree of the a.s.sembly, through the influence of Diodotus, prevented the barbarous revenge; but the Athenians put to death the prisoners which Paches had sent, razed the fortifications of Mitylene, took possession of all her ships of war, and confiscated all the land of the island except that which belonged to one town that had been faithful. So severe was ancient warfare, even among the most civilized of the Greeks.

(M507) The surrender of Plataea to the Lacedaemonians took place not long after; but not until one-half of the garrison had sallied from the city, scaled the wall of circ.u.mvallation, and escaped safely to Athens. The Plataeans were sentenced to death by the Spartan judges, and barbarously slain. The captured women were sold as slaves, and the town and territory were handed over to the Thebans.

(M508) Scenes not less b.l.o.o.d.y took place in the western part of Greece, in the island of Corcyra, before which a naval battle was fought between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. The island had been governed by oligarchies, under the protection of Sparta, but the retirement of the Lacedaemonian fleet enabled the Athenian general to wreak his vengeance on the party which had held supremacy, which was exterminated in the most cruel manner, which produced a profound sensation, and furnished Thucydides a theme for the most profound reflections on the acerbity and ferocity of the political parties, which, it seems, then divided Greece, and were among the exciting causes of the war itself-the struggle between the advocates of democratic and aristocratic inst.i.tutions.

(M509) A new character now appears upon the stage at Athens-Nicias-one of the ten generals who, in rank and wealth, was the equal of Pericles. He belonged to the oligarchal party, and succeeded Cimon and Thucydides in the control of it. But he was moderate in his conduct, and so won the esteem of his countrymen, that he retained power until his death, although opposed to the party which had the ascendency. He was incorruptible as to pecuniary gains, and adopted the conservative views of Pericles, avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, or creating new enemies. He surrounded himself, not as Pericles did, with philosophers, but religions men, avoided all scandals, and employed his large fortune in securing popularity. Pericles disdained to win the people by such means, cultivated art, and patronized the wits who surrounded Aspasia. Nicias was zealous in the worship of the G.o.ds, was careful to make no enemies, and conciliated the poor by presents. Yet he increased his private fortune, so far as he could, by honorable means, and united thrift and sagacity with honesty and piety. He was not a man of commanding genius, but his character was above reproach, and was never a.s.sailed by the comic writers. He was the great opponent of Alcibiades, the oracle of the democracy-one of those memorable demagogues who made use of the people to forward his ambitious projects.

He was also the opponent of Cleon, whose office it was to supervise official men for the public conduct-a man of great eloquence, but fault-finding and denunciatory.

(M510) The fifth year of the war was not signalized by the usual invasion of Attica, which gave the Athenians leisure to send an expedition under Nicias against the island of Melos, inhabited by ancient colonists from Sparta. Demosthenes, another general, was sent around the Peloponnesus to attack Acarnania, and he ravaged the whole territory of Leueas. He also attacked aetolia, but was completely beaten, and obliged to retire with loss; but this defeat was counterbalanced by a great victory, the next year, over the enemy at Olpae, when the Lacedaemonian general was slain. He returned in triumph to Athens with considerable spoil. The attention of the Athenians was now directed to Delos, the island sacred to Apollo, and a complete purification of the island was made, and the old Delian festivals renewed with peculiar splendor.

(M511) The war had now lasted six years, without any grand or decisive results on either side. The expeditions of both parties were of the nature of raids-destructive, cruel, irritating, but without bringing any grand triumphs. Though the seventh year was marked by the usual enterprise on the part of the Lacedaemonians-the invasion of Attica-Corcyra promised to be the princ.i.p.al scene of military operations. Both an Athenian and Spartan fleet was sent thither. But an unforeseen incident gave a new character to the war. In the course of the voyage to Corcyra, Demosthenes, the Athenian general, stopped at Pylus, with the intention of erecting a fort on the uninhabited promontory, since it protected the s.p.a.cious basin now known as the bay of Navarino, and was itself easily defended.

Eurymedon, the admiral, insisted on going directly to Corcyra, but the fleet was driven by a storm into the very harbor which Demosthenes proposed to defend. The place was accordingly fortified by Demosthenes, where he himself remained with a garrison, while the fleet proceeded to Corcyra. Intelligence of this insult to Sparta-the attempt to plant a hostile fort on its territory-induced the Lacedaemonians to send their fleet to Pylus, instead of Corcyra. Forty-three triremes, under Thrasymelidas, and a powerful land force, advanced to attack Demosthenes, intrenched with his small army on the rocky promontory. When the news of this new diversion reached the Athenian fleet at Corcyra, it returned to Pylus, to succor Demosthenes. Here a naval battle took place, in which the Lacedaemonians were defeated. This defeat jeopardized the situation of the Spartan army which had occupied the island of Shacteria, cut off from supplies from the main land, as well as the existence of the fleet. So great was this exigency, that the ephors came from Sparta to consult on operations. They took a desponding view, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace. But Athens demanded now her own terms, elated by the success. Cleon, the organ of the popular mind, excited and sanguine, gave utterance to the feelings of the people, and insisted on the restoration of all the territory they had lost during the war. The Lacedaemonian envoys, unable to resist a vehement speaker like Cleon, which required qualities they did not possess, and which could only be acquired from skill in managing popular a.s.semblies, to which they were unused, returned to Pylus. And it was the object of Cleon to prevent a hearing of the envoys by a select committee (what they desired) for fear that Nicias and other conservative politicians would accede to their proposals. Thus the best opportunity that could be presented for making an honorable peace and reuniting Greece was lost by the arts of a demagogue, who inflamed and shared the popular pa.s.sions. Had Pericles been alive, the treaty would probably have been made, but Nicias had not sufficient influence to secure it.

(M512) War therefore recommenced, with fresh irritation. The Athenian fleet blockaded the island where the Spartan hoplites were posted, and found in the attempt, which they thought so easy, unexpected obstacles.

Provisions clandestinely continually reached the besieged. Week after week pa.s.sed without the expected surrender. Demosthenes, baffled for want of provisions and water for his own fleet, sent urgently to Athens for re-enforcements, which caused infinite mortification. The people now began to regret that they had listened to Cleon, and not to the voice of wisdom.

Cleon himself was sent with the re-enforcements demanded, against his will, although he was not one of the ten generals. The island of Sphacteria now contained the bravest of the Lacedaemonian troops-from the first families of Sparta-a prey which Cleon and Demosthenes were eager to grasp. They attacked the island with a force double of that of the defenders, altogether ten thousand men, eight hundred of whom were hoplites. The besieged could not resist this overwhelming force, and retreated to their last redoubt, but were surrounded and taken prisoners.

This surrender caused astonishment throughout Greece, since it was supposed the Spartan hoplites would die, as they did at Thermopylae, rather than allow themselves to be taken alive, and this calamity diminished greatly the l.u.s.tre of the Spartan arms. A modern army, surrounded with an overwhelming force, against which all resistance was madness, would have done the same as the Spartans. But it was a sad blow to them. Cleon, within twenty days of his departure, arrived at Athens with his three hundred Lacedaemonian prisoners, amid universal shouts of joy, for it was the most triumphant success which the Athenians had yet obtained. The war was prosecuted with renewed vigor, and the Lacedaemonians again made advances for peace, but without effect. The flushed victors would hear of no terms but what were disgraceful to the Spartans. The chances were now most favorable to Athens. Nicias invaded the Corinthian territory with eighty triremes, two thousand hoplites, and two hundred hors.e.m.e.n, to say nothing of the large number which supported these, and committed the same ravages that the Spartans and their allies had inflicted upon Attica.

Among other events, the Athenians this year captured the Persian amba.s.sador, Artaphernes, on his way to Sparta. He was brought to Athens, and his dispatches were translated and made public. He was sent back to Ephesus, with Athenian envoys, to the great king, to counteract the influence of the Spartans, but Artaerxes had died when they reached Susa.

(M513) The capture of Sphacteria, and the surrender of the whole Lacedaemonian fleet, not only placed Athens, on the opening of the eighth year of the war, in a situation more commanding than she had previously enjoyed, but stimulated her to renewed operations on a grander scale, not merely against Sparta, but to recover the ascendency in Botia, which was held before the thirty years' truce. The Lacedaemonians, in concert with the revolted Chalcidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, also made great preparations for more decisive measures. The war had dragged out seven years, and nothing was accomplished which seriously weakened either of the contending parties.

(M514) The first movement was made by the Athenians on the Laconian coast.

The island of Cythera was captured by an expedition led by Nicias, of sixty triremes and two thousand hoplites, beside other forces, and the coast was ravaged. Then Thyrea, an aeginetan settlement, between Laconia and Argolis, fell into the hands of the Athenians, and all the aeginetans were either killed in the a.s.sault, or put to death as prisoners. These successive disasters alarmed the Lacedaemonians, and they now began to fear repeated a.s.saults on their own territory, with a discontented population of Helots. This fear prompted an act of cruelty and treachery which had no parallel in the history of the war. Two thousand of the bravest Helots were entrapped, as if especial honors were to be bestowed upon them, and barbarously slain. None but the five ephors knew the b.l.o.o.d.y details. There was even no public examination of this savage inhumanity, which shows that Sparta was governed, as Venice was in the Middle Ages, by a small but exceedingly powerful oligarchy.

After this cruelty was consummated, envoys came from Perdiccas and the Chalcidians of Thrace, invoking aid against Athens. It was joyfully granted, and Brasidas, at the request of Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, was sent with a large force of Peloponnesian hoplites.

(M515) Meanwhile the Athenians formed plans to attack Megara, whose inhabitants had stimulated the war, and had been the greatest sufferers by it. A force was sent under Hippocrates and Demosthenes to surprise the place, and also Nisaea. The long walls of Megara, similar to those of Athens, were taken by surprise, and the Athenians found themselves at the gates of the city, which came near falling into their hands by treachery.

Baffled for the moment, the Athenians attacked Clisaea, which lay behind it, and succeeded.

(M516) But Brasidas, the Lacedaemonian general, learning that the long walls had fallen into the hands of the Athenians, got together a large force of six thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry, and relieved Megara, and the Athenians were obliged to retire. Ultimately the Megarians regained possession of the long walls, and inst.i.tuted an oligarchal government.

(M517) The Athenians, disappointed in getting possession of Megara, which failed by one of those accidents ever recurring in war, organized a large force for the attack of Botia, on three sides, under Hippocrates and Demosthenes. The attack was first made at Siphae, by Demosthenes, on the Corinthian Gulf, but failed. In spite of this failure by sea, Hippocrates marched with a land force to Delium, with seven thousand hoplites, and twenty-five thousand other troops, and occupied the place, which was a temple consecrated to Apollo, and strongly fortified it. When the work of fortification was completed, the army prepared to return to Athens.

(M518) Forces from all parts of Botia rallied, and met the Athenians.

Among the forces of the Botians was the famous Theban band of three hundred select warriors, accustomed to fight in pairs, each man attached to his companion by peculiar ties of friendship. At Delium was fought the great battle of the war, in which the Athenians were routed, and the general, Hippocrates, with a thousand hoplites, were slain. The victors refused the Athenians the sacred right of burying their dead, unless they retired altogether from Delium-the post they had fortified on Botian territory. To this the Athenians refused to submit, the consequence of which was the siege and capture of Delium.

Among the hoplites who fought in this unfortunate battle, which was a great discouragement to the Athenian cause, was the philosopher Socrates.

The famous Alcibiades also served in the cavalry, and helped to protect Socrates in his retreat, after having bravely fought.

(M519) The disasters of the Athenians in Thrace were yet more considerable. Brasidas, with a large force, including seventeen hundred hoplites, rapidly marched through Thrace and Thessaly, and arrived in Macedonia safely, and attacked Acanthus, an ally of Athens. It fell into his hands, as well as Stageirus, and he was thus enabled to lay plans for the acquisition of Amphipolis, which was founded by Athenian colonists. He soon became master of the surrounding territory. He then offered favorable terms of capitulation to the citizens of the town, which were accepted, and the city surrendered-the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens. The bridge over the Strymon was also opened, by which all the eastern allies of Athena were approachable by land. This great reverse sent dismay into the hearts of the Athenians, greater than had before been felt. The b.l.o.o.d.y victory at Delium, and the conquests of Brasidas, more than balanced the capture of Sphacteria. Sparta, under the victorious banner of Brasidas, a general of great probity, good faith, and moderation, now proclaimed herself liberator of Greece. Athens, discouraged and baffled, lost all the prestige she had gained.

(M520) But Amphipolis was lost by the negligence of the Athenian commanders. Encles and Thucydides, the historian, to whom the defense of the place was intrusted, had means ample to prevent the capture had they employed ordinary precaution. The Athenians, indignant, banished Thucydides for twenty years, and probably Eucles also-a just sentence, since they did not keep the bridge over the Strymon properly guarded, nor retained the Athenian squadron at Eion. The banishment of Thucydides gave him leisure to write the history on which his great fame rests-the most able and philosophical of all the historical works of antiquity.

(M521) Brasidas, after the fall of Amphipolis, extended his military operations with success. He took Torone, Lecythus, and other places, and then went into winter quarters. The campaign had been disastrous to the Athenians, and a truce of one year was agreed upon by the belligerent parties-Athens of the one party, and Sparta, Corinth, Sicyon, Epidaurus, and Megara, of the other.

(M522) The conditions of this truce stipulated that Delphi might be visited by all Greeks, without distinction; that all violations of the property of the Delphian G.o.d should be promptly punished; that the Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Cythera, Nisaea, and Methana, should remain unmolested; that the Lacedaemonians should be free to use the sea for trading purposes; and that neither side should receive deserters from the other-important to both parties, since Athens feared the revolt of subject allies, and Sparta the desertion of Helots.

But two days had elapsed after the treaty was made before Scione in Thrace revolted to Brasidas-a great cause of exasperation to the Athenians, although the revolt took place before the treaty was known. Mendes, a neighboring town, also revolted. Brasidas sent the inhabitants a garrison to protect themselves, and departed with his forces for an expedition into the interior of Macedonia, but was soon compelled to retreat before the Illyrians.

(M523) An Athenian force, under Nicias and Nicostratus, however, proceeded to Thrace to recover the revolted cities. Everywhere else the truce was observed. It was intended to give terms for more complete negotiations.

This was the policy of Nicias. But Cleon and his party, the democracy, was opposed to peace, and wished to prosecute the war vigorously in Thrace.

Brasidas, on his part, was equally in favor of continued hostilities. And this was the great question of the day in Greece.

(M524) The war party triumphed, and Cleon, by no means an able general, was sent with an expedition to recover Amphipolis, B.C. 422. He succeeded in taking Torone, but Amphipolis, built on a hill in the peninsula formed by the river Strymon, as it pa.s.ses from the Strymonic Gulf to Lake Kerkernilis, was a strongly fortified place in which Brasidas intrenched.

He was obliged to remain inactive at Eion, at the mouth of the river, three miles distant from Amphipolis, which excited great discontent in his army, but which was the wiser course, until his auxiliaries arrived. But the murmur of the hoplites compelled him to some sort of action, and while he was reconnoitering, he was attacked by Brasidas. Cleon was killed, and his army totally defeated. Brasidas, the ablest general of the day, however, was also mortally wounded, and carried from the field. This unsuccessful battle compelled the Athenians to return home, deeply disgusted with their generals. But they embarked in the enterprise reluctantly, and with no faith in their leader, and this was one cause of their defeat. The death of Brasidas, however, converted the defeat into a substantial victory, since there remained no Spartan with sufficient ability to secure the confidence of the allies. Brasidas, when he died, was the first man in Greece, and universally admired for his valor, intelligence, probity, and magnanimity.