Arguably, the ultimate ideal sought should be that of flourishing lives for all. The call for s.e.xual equality has led to increased awareness of women's differing needs concerning flourishing lives.There is also increasing awareness more generally of the significance of parenthood for many. Parenthood is often promoted through maternity and paternity leave - and promoted in some countries not fearing, well, not obviously fearing, significant population decline. The question then arises whether the special provisions for parenting should take priority over, say, special provision for the childless, male or female. The childless, to flourish, may require careers undamaged through taking long breaks for travel, voluntary work, even champagne drinking. There are different ways of flourishing and different groups, for various reasons, typically secure more opportunities and more flourishing than others. Societies muddle through selecting some groups to promote over others, but which deserve that promotion? Which discriminations are fair? Which equalities are worth seeking? - be they s.e.xual, educational, or even by way of monetary income and outcome regarding quality of life.

Most people accept that at least a reasonable lifespan is a central element in flourishing. Over this, in many countries, men are worse off than women, as, for that matter, are the poor compared with the wealthy. Improving the male lifespan would typically benefit both s.e.xes. So, should resources be diverted to promote s.e.xual equality in that regard? Perhaps the answer is 'yes'. Perhaps, then, men need a lower retirement age than women or extra health care or leisure hours. Should that be a high priority? Should that be up for discussion?

Knowledge/Evidence

13.

HUMPTY DUMPTY ADVISES MS TURKEY.

MS TURKEY: Isn't the world a wonderful place! Fast food delivery service each morning, courtesy of good friend Farmer McDonald; sustained gobbling throughout the day; well-fed night's sleep - up and ready for next morning's delivery at first c.o.c.k crow.

HUMPTY DUMPTY: Ah, but I have to tell you, Ms T, past farmer performance is no guide to the future.

MS T: How on earth do you know?

HD: Over the years, I've known lots of your relatives. Initially, things go splendidly for them, but* Well, speaking as a friend, let me just say that, were I you, Ms T, I'd quit the farm once December's snows snow, sleigh bells sound, and fairy lights sparkle on fir trees high.

MS T [gulping] [gulping]:Thank you, HD - I understand. But you're still relying on past performance as a guide for your kindly advice; yet you said the past was no guide at all.

HD:Your mistake is in thinking that I meant what I said. As I told that silly girl, Alice - she once met me through the looking gla.s.s, you know - when I use a word, I make it mean just what I want it to mean.

MS T: Isn't that terribly confusing?

HD: Maybe it is; maybe it isn't. It all depends on whether you take past meanings to be a guide to future meanings.

MS T: But, but, but*

Let us, for the moment, skate round questions of whether meanings are frozen or fluid. Here is a basic question:

Is the past ever a good guide to the future?

This puzzle is most closely a.s.sociated with the eighteenth- century philosopher David Hume. Hume was Scottish; but English philosophers sometimes bathe in his glory with Hume as 'British'. Of course, when it comes to John Locke, who was English, well, he is often allowed to remain English. English.

Just because various things have regularly happened it does not follow that they will carry on, regularly so, into the future. Famously, crudely yet rightly, over perhaps centuries, Europeans observed swans - always white swans. From those experiences, they concluded that all swans are white. But, had they nipped to Australia, they could have encountered black swans. From the fact that all observed swans are white, it does not follow that all swans are white. From the fact that I have been breathing for many years, it does not follow that I shall always be breathing.

The puzzle is not solely of what justifies our moving from past cases to future, but what justifies us in moving from some observed cases to the un.o.bserved. At heart, the puzzle rests on the gap between 'some' and 'all' or 'these' and 'those'. It is the problem of induction.Whatever the number of instances of experienced combinations, are we ever justified in expecting similar such combinations, and, if so, why? This is an 'epistemic' question, one concerning knowledge or belief. The underlying metaphysical problem - one of 'what there is in the world' - is: if there are certain regularities, over here, or in the past, are they likely to be repeated over there or in the future?

Sometimes people - even philosophers - cheat. 'That big black bird merely looks looks like a swan. Its feathers are not white, so it's not really a swan.' In that move, we are making 'having white feathers' a necessary condition for being a swan. But if swans are defined as being white, then earlier searches to see whether all swans were white turn out to be pointless. I have told the story before of Mrs Thatcher, when British Prime Minister, announcing that nurses did not go on strike. When striking nurses were pointed out to her, she responded to the effect that, 'Oh, they're not true nurses.' like a swan. Its feathers are not white, so it's not really a swan.' In that move, we are making 'having white feathers' a necessary condition for being a swan. But if swans are defined as being white, then earlier searches to see whether all swans were white turn out to be pointless. I have told the story before of Mrs Thatcher, when British Prime Minister, announcing that nurses did not go on strike. When striking nurses were pointed out to her, she responded to the effect that, 'Oh, they're not true nurses.'

Accidental a.s.sociations, white and swan, for example, may well not continue into the future or the spatial elsewhere, but perhaps there are some necessities in nature. Consider: all gla.s.s is brittle. Under standard conditions, gla.s.s smashes when struck by concrete blocks. We may insist that, if this transparent pane does not smash, then it cannot be gla.s.s. Well, all right, let us accept that; but we have merely swept the puzzle to elsewhere. We were wondering whether we could be sure that the next piece of gla.s.s we encountered would smash. Now, we know that it will, if - if if - it really is gla.s.s. The new puzzle is: how can we be sure that this transparent material is gla.s.s, until we see whether it smashes? - it really is gla.s.s. The new puzzle is: how can we be sure that this transparent material is gla.s.s, until we see whether it smashes?

Once again, we have to make a leap to what will happen.

MS T: I see that we ought not to reason from the past being a certain way to the future continuing that way. There's a gap. Perhaps we should just rely on our experience that often things have continued in the same way. The reasoning - inductive reasoning - has typically been successful in the past; so, it is reasonable to expect its continuing success.

HD: Circularity, dear Ms T. How can past successes of inductive reasoning justify future ones?

MS T: Well, I guess we just accept that they do. You continue to balance on that wall, HD - as you know in the past that you can.

HD [looking nervous] [looking nervous]:Well, sort of* But, yes, that excellent egg, Hume, made your point. Habit is key. We simply have certain expectations. Perhaps that we have evolved with such expectations is a mark of their reliability.

MS T:That success, though, is only success to date. It may not be success in the future. The human race has expanded over the past, but who knows about the future? Think of current tales of climate warming; yet, who knows? Think of past predictions of global freezes and population explosions.

HD: Point taken, Ms T. But, without reliance on the past, how can we make informed judgements about the future, about fine wall-balancing by eggs such as myself, about tastes of unopened pinot noir wine - and the succulence of the yet to be carved roast turk* Ooops! Sorry Ms T.

MS T: An easy enough slip, HD. But are we getting confused? Just because past regularities are no guarantee of similar future regularities, may they not offer some likelihood? Is that not reasonable? Mind you, in the investment world, many advertis.e.m.e.nts proclaim that the past is no guide to the future, yet display fine past performances. Some claim that the past is not necessarily necessarily a guide. a guide.

HD:Yes, even if the past does not have to be a guide - is not necessarily a guide - it may still happen to be one. After all, humans do not have to be so keen on roast potatoes and turkey, yet they* Sorry, I've put my egg-head in it again.

MS T: My, this is getting to be a habit, HD. I'll soon be eggs-pecting it - on the basis of your past performance. Perhaps we simply need to accept that, in this world, past regularities do happen to be pretty good guides to future ones.

HD: We may even toy with the brilliant thought that the past is necessarily a good guide to the future. If things have been irregular - highly higgledy-piggledy - in the past, that is evidence, though not conclusive evidence, pointing to irregularities in the future.

MS T: I'll need to think on it further.

HD: I shouldn't hang round, thinking for much longer, Ms T. Whatever we may think think about the past not properly justifying beliefs about the future, I know, just know, that you should listen out for those farmer footsteps with some trepidation, when those December snows snow. And you'll be right to listen - because of what has happened in the past. about the past not properly justifying beliefs about the future, I know, just know, that you should listen out for those farmer footsteps with some trepidation, when those December snows snow. And you'll be right to listen - because of what has happened in the past.

MS T: Just as, in view of your past performances, I am justified in believing in your wall-balancing abilities, HD. Musing more, that I understand your words is a tribute to the fact that the past guides us. We cannot even speak or think about these matters without accepting the linguistic past as guide to the future, maybe even necessarily so after all, and*

Law/Politics

14.

MAN OR SHEEP?.

Thomas Hobbes, a key political philosopher of the seventeenth century, wrote that man's life was 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'.The obvious reply is, 'It could have been worse, Thomas; it could have been solitary, poor, nasty, brutish - and long.'

Hobbes was describing life before the existence of a state, government, and law. Humans are compet.i.tive. They lack reason to trust each other, unless there is a powerful authority that sets laws and punishes law-breakers. In a state of nature, individuals would be in constant conflict or, at least, always on their guard, insecure, and ready for battle. The state of nature, of life pre-government, is a state of war. With the state of nature so horrible, human beings would obviously want to get out, into something better. According to Hobbes, they would come together and agree on a sovereign, an absolute authority, to represent and rule over them, giving them security and opportunity to lead reasonable lives.

There are many puzzles, not least why individuals in the state of nature would risk trusting each other to keep to any agreement. Let us, though, not worry about how government arises. Here we are, living within a state. Let us a.s.sume we have a government democratically elected. However, whatever the degree of democracy, laws are imposed that restrict what we may do. We may disapprove of some laws because of some moral or religious principles; we may disapprove of other laws simply because they prevent us from getting what we want. The general concern becomes: by what authority does any government rightfully rule over us?

Why should we obey the state and its laws?

We may answer in practical terms. We obey the law because we are scared of the consequences of disobedience, not wanting to risk fines and imprisonment. The rational thing to do, given the aim of getting on with our lives as best we can, is to obey. When asked whether man or mouse, some of us tend to squeak and take the cheese. Even more so may most of us squeak, when the tentacles of the law and the long arm of the police take hold.We mice may, indeed, be more akin to sheep, sheepishly following each other in our general obedience. Our puzzle though is what, if anything, makes obeying the law the right right thing to do - even if we could get away with disobeying. thing to do - even if we could get away with disobeying.

Many of us benefit because of the state's existence: we are defended from others, receive state education, health services, in return for paying taxes. We are better off with law than without. So, we are obligated, in return, to obey the laws that confer those benefits. One immediate objection is that this justification for lawful obedience fails to work for those who overall do not benefit. A significant number do very badly, sleeping rough, being denied state benefits, and being avoided by those better off. Why should they obey? Also, some at society's top may argue that they contribute more than they receive - probably forgetting that they secured the more because of society's stability and protection of gross inequalities often inherited.

Even when overall we do benefit from the state's existence, it does not follow that we are under any obligation to the benefactor. Did we ever sign up, agreeing that we would accept benefits in return for obeying the law? If someone buys us a drink, without our asking, are we under an obligation to buy one in return?

Reference to 'signing up' casts us along another line, a line orientated towards the 'social contract'. What justifies the state and our obedience is that we consented to the set-up. Some philosophers, John Locke and arguably Hobbes, believed that historically some individuals made contracts to be governed by an authority acting in their interests, leading to our societies. Of course, there is no reason to believe in such historical events; but, even if they occurred, whatever relevance do they have for us today? We were not around hundreds of years ago, engaged in any contractual deals.

The response to that last thought is to spot features of our current lives that may indicate consent. We make use of the state's services; we travel freely on the King's highway, notes Locke - well, today the Queen's highway. This shows that we tacitly consent to the state - or does it? Just because we remain in this country, using its facilities, it does not follow that we consent: after all, what other options are available? Can most people afford to go elsewhere? Would other countries, with acceptable laws, permit entry? It is as if we find ourselves on a ship in the middle of the ocean, with the captain making the point that we are free to leave.

Rationality is often wheeled out, to come to the rescue.True, we were not involved in any original social contract; true, our remaining within our society fails to establish consent. But suppose we were rational, not yet in a society, and needing to create society's laws. Suppose, too, we were ignorant of our s.e.x, race, abilities, and the position we probably would reach in society, be it through chance or talent. In such an original position, behind a veil of ignorance, where everything is fair between us, our thinking, even though we remain as individuals, would not be distorted by a distinctive self-interest differing from the self-interest of others. Rather, our common rationality and interests should lead us to see and accept what would be fair laws, benefits, and rights for all. Behind the veil of ignorance, it would seem rational to consent to a society that permitted basic freedoms, did not discriminate between individuals on irrelevant grounds, and provided welfare benefits for when things go badly. After all, behind the veil of ignorance, we have no idea whether we may end up belonging to minority groups or hitting on hard times. If our current society possesses the features it would be rational to consent to behind the veil, then our obedience today is justified by this hypothetical consent, by what is seen as a hypothetical contract.

The response, by way of jibe, is that hypothetical contracts are not worth the paper they are not written upon. Hypothetical consent is not consent. The jibe, though, misses the point. Justifications can rightly involve hypotheticals. Why did you battle with the man, yanking him from the cliff's path, despite his protests? 'Because, had he been sober, he would have consented to the yanking, to save him from risking a fatal fall.'

The resort to the veil of ignorance, to rationality and the hypothetical, though, raises its own puzzles. Quite what does rationality involve behind such a veil? Is it rational, for example, to place liberty higher than greater welfare benefits requiring higher levels of taxation?

Whatever justifications are offered for general obedience to the state, sometimes we morally ought to disobey. Had only many, many consulted their conscience instead of the law, various atrocities, inst.i.tuted by governments, could have been avoided. Had only many, many been aware of their humanity rather than going along with the mice and the sheep.

Life/Values

15.

* AND THE LIVING IS EASY.

Summertime - and, yes, the living is easy, well, easy for some. Our roving reporter is experiencing rural life, interviewing the locals - but what's this? It's bizarre* She's interviewing a gra.s.shopper and ant.

What do you do all day, Miss Gra.s.shopper?

'I sing and dance, and dance and sing, across meadows of green, under skies of blue, the sun a-light, a-blazing upon my wing.'

You smile blissfully, Gra.s.shopper, but Ant, I hear you dispute Gra.s.shopper's lifestyle.

'That's right.You should reject it too. The living is easy for this young lady and other gra.s.shoppers - but we workers don't have time for such trivial leisure stuff. We work our socks off day and night - well, we would, if we had socks. Notfor us all the flimsy and fluttering finery of lazy Gra.s.shopper here with her game-playing. We trek out, day after day, food to be gathered, then painstakingly stored for those cold, cold winter days ahead.'

'Hey, no need to rant, dear, dear Ant. Join in with us. Sing and dance, and dance and sing; all your utility is futility, futility. What's the point to your labours, your work, your toils of woe? They're all so, so without point, you know.'

'I'll tell you the point, young lady.You'll come a cropper, believe me. Work is what you have to do to survive. And you listen here: don't you come knocking at my door when you're cold and hungry, freezing in winter's frost - then you'll be sorry. Mark my words!'

'But that's all tomorrow, tomorrow, tomorrow. Think of today - come here, come hither, come play.'

'Frivolity - time wasting. Why am I wasting my time even talking to you? I must get on - must get on.'

Here, I'd better return us to the studio for a time check and traffic news. We mustn't let listeners lapse into gra.s.shop- ping mode. They have their work to get to, money to earn, bills to pay; but.

Is it better to be the gra.s.shopper?

The Aesop fable alluded to here encourages prudence. If you waste time today, what becomes of you tomorrow? And would Ant be morally obliged to help Gra.s.shopper if she knocks at his door in winter, desperate for food? She would have wittingly allowed herself to slide into winter starvation. Her starvation would have been her own fault. She could have toiled under the summer's sun as Ant did so toil. She brought any winter misfortune upon herself. The fable may, though, generate a puzzle different from that of our moral responsibility for f.e.c.kless others. This different puzzle asks: what is most valuable in life?

The contrast between Gra.s.shopper and Ant is presented as that between leisure and work, between doing nothing and doing something. Most people, though, readily accept that doing nothing possesses little value. In fact, what exactly is 'doing nothing? Maybe just lying on a sea-sh.o.r.e, looking into the blue sky, feeling the warmth of the sun; but would that count as the most valuable life? It may be part of a valuable life, but do we not value more, much more?

Gra.s.shopper may be understood as representing those who do things, but who - in contrast to Ant - do not do things that have to be done. Gra.s.shopper plays. Ant toils. Ant toils not because toiling in itself is valuable, but as a necessary means to an end, an end that is valued - namely, being well- fed in winter. Gra.s.shopper plays. In playing, she does something, but the ends of play are neither necessary to achieve nor do they need to be desirable for their own sake. It is the playing that is valuable. Play is typically a.s.sociated with games; and games, some suggest, are voluntary attempts to overcome unnecessary obstacles.

In work and games we accomplish things, but with games, the goals typically lack value other than being parts of the games. Ant would be much worse off, he thinks, if not well-fed in winter. Pure game-players are not much worse off, if golf b.a.l.l.s fail to get holed, footb.a.l.l.s never land in goal, and crosswords remain uncompleted. A charm of games can be the utter pointlessness in the ends that are sought. Of course, further ends may be added, such as winning prizes.

The pointlessness of games' ends is matched by the perverse means required to achieve those ends. Players are not allowed to drop golf b.a.l.l.s in the holes, carry the football into the net, or look up answers in order to solve the crosswords.

Rules constrain how the goals may be achieved. Games can be good - they can be bad - as games. Good games must be neither very easy, yet nor impossible to complete.

Why value Gra.s.shopper's lifestyle over Ant's toil? Well, Ant's activities are undertaken because of the necessity of the ends. They are undertaken not for their own sake, but for something else. Maybe this detracts from the value of Ant's activities. Play and games lack that external pressure. Of course, Ant triumphs in the end because those hard frosts and snows do come along. But at what cost has he triumphed? What is the value of a life of toil, if one toils only to be well- fed - in order to toil yet again and again? Gra.s.shopper's life, albeit short, has been freed of toiling necessities.

We should, in pa.s.sing, question whether play' captures all that can be valuable, without needing external ends. Paintings and music - creating and appreciating - can be valued in themselves, without any further ends in view.

People - even philosophers - often favour black or white answers and sharp distinctions. 'Are you journeying to get from A to B? If so, then it would be better to be at B, without the journeying.' Now, on occasions that may be true; but often, when we journey to B, the journeying is also valuable. We should not forget that activities undertaken for a required end may yet also be valued in themselves; and activities valued in themselves may possess the additional value of being the means to something else that is also valuable. How much better, we may imagine, if Gra.s.shopper's game-playing also helped to store food for the winter. How much better if those who - perversely? - delight in peddling gymnasium exercise machines, at the same time generated electricity.

The discussion above raises two further matters.

The first matter is this. Wittgenstein famously pointed to the term 'game' as an example of how we can successfully understand words, even though they lack a certain type of definition. Some think Wittgenstein mistaken; hence the definition of 'game', summarized above, as a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. However, mountaineering and writing haiku seem to be voluntary attempts to overcome unnecessary obstacles, yet are not usually games; and some necessary work could be nothing but a game for some.

Whether or not Wittgenstein is right about 'game', he is surely right that not all words can be informatively defined by setting out necessary and sufficient conditions for their use. We often need to see how words are used in everyday circ.u.mstances rather than seeking formal definitions.

The second 'further matter' is that of ident.i.ty. Why does Ant in the summer concern himself with how he will be in the winter? Why slave away now, when the future is uncertain - and future fun less likely, as age slows us? More deeply, we have the puzzle of what makes a person today identify herself as being the same person as someone in the past and someone in the future. In my particular case, why do I, Peter Cave, identify with Peter Cave a year ago or twenty years ago, and Peter Cave a year into the future, when my desires and beliefs and character may have radically altered?

Returning to Ant, why does that future ant, as we may view Ant in the future, have a hold over him now, in the summer? 'Because it will still be me,' he replies. But will it? Is that again too much 'black or white?