One traditional approach is that beauty is indeed not in beholders' eyes, but resides in certain mathematical proportions, objectively present. Musical harmonies are simple arithmetical ratios between lengths of vibrating strings. a.n.a.logously, there are, it has been said, underlying harmonies in beautiful paintings - and this applies to the nudes. Even recently it has been suggested that such beauty, with its harmony, promotes a sense of justice. Of course, it cannot simply be a matter of harmony; harmony is sometimes merely boring. Also, the simple may be beautiful, yet be so simple that it lacks parts to be in harmony.

Whatever the details, there results, it is claimed, a distinctive aesthetic appreciation of the nude, far removed from s.e.xual desire. And so, both s.e.xes can appreciate the beauty of proportion in human bodies and their representation. The desire to experience the beauty of the nude is a disinterested desire. A clear difference exists between, for example, the enjoyment aroused by p.o.r.nography or photographs of glamour models and those by paintings of nudes, even though the scenes portrayed may be similar. A clear difference exists between a burglar pretending to be a window cleaner and a real window cleaner, even when in both cases the windows get cleaned.

Aesthetic appreciation involves pleasure. When we find nudes beautiful, we experience certain pleasurable sensations, even sensual; and presumably those sensations depend on our biology. Were we disembodied, spiritual, in some non-earthly realm, yet viewing the paintings, could we experience the beauty? Perhaps we could be intellectually aware of the harmonies - but would not appreciation require bodily sensations? Could we sense a sunset's beauty, yet without pleasurable feelings? Simply measuring lines and recognizing proportions do not thereby generate aesthetic appreciation. The body, the feelings, the emotions, are essential to our awareness of the beautiful - bringing us back down to earth. In particular, our s.e.xual const.i.tution would seem to have something to do with which curves and flesh tones are thought beautiful - be it because we identify with them or seek them. If so, the aesthetic delights that men take in female nudes may not be so utterly divorced from other feelings, feelings not directly a.s.sociated with the eye. However, this fact - if it is a fact - can lead people to draw mistaken conclusions.

One mistaken conclusion concerns beauty. People often conclude that the beautiful is relative to our biological make-up. Whether gin is nice depends on 'nice for whom ' for whom '; whether something is beautiful - well, that depends on 'beautifulfor whom'. Indeed, evolutionary psychologists, ever fond of the 'just', sometimes say that beautiful features are Indeed, evolutionary psychologists, ever fond of the 'just', sometimes say that beautiful features are just just those indicative of health; being drawn to the beautiful is those indicative of health; being drawn to the beautiful is nothing but nothing but being drawn to the healthy, to hand down our genes. I urge resistance to the relativity claim, to the 'just' and 'nothing but'. Compare with the following. being drawn to the healthy, to hand down our genes. I urge resistance to the relativity claim, to the 'just' and 'nothing but'. Compare with the following.

Probably there is a good evolutionary explanation of why we, evolutionary survivors, can distinguish shapes from colours, land from sea - yet the differences between shapes and colours, land and sea, are not just just their evolutionary utility. Our biology is required for our awareness of the world and its features; it does not follow that the world and its features depend on our biology. So, too, with beauty: just because we need a certain biology to recognize beauty it their evolutionary utility. Our biology is required for our awareness of the world and its features; it does not follow that the world and its features depend on our biology. So, too, with beauty: just because we need a certain biology to recognize beauty it does not follow that beauty depends on that biology.

As biology has some role in aesthetic appreciation, people sometimes also mistakenly conclude, not just that beauty is relative, but that the aesthetic gaze by males is really really or or nothing but nothing but a s.e.xual yearning. It is as if there is no real difference between l.u.s.ting after someone and appreciating the beauty. The a.n.a.logous mistake would be to think that there is no real difference between a burglar and window cleaner, when both are cleaning the windows. a s.e.xual yearning. It is as if there is no real difference between l.u.s.ting after someone and appreciating the beauty. The a.n.a.logous mistake would be to think that there is no real difference between a burglar and window cleaner, when both are cleaning the windows.

Differences exist between l.u.s.ting and appreciating, though differences are sometimes a matter of degree and sometimes intermingled. Artists, for example, have often seduced their models, even claiming aesthetic impulse. Yet models who sit for genuine life cla.s.ses should not be sitting as objects of l.u.s.t. If an artist's primary concern is l.u.s.t - he pretends to draw, or even draws, as a burglar pretends to clean windows and cleans windows - then he is engaged in deception as is the burglar. He is mistreating the model, even if she reclines, unaware of his intentions and desires.

None of this is to deny that muddles occur over what is really happening and what matters, when perceptions enter the fray. 'What is that man at the window, or in the artist's studio, really doing?'Think of actors: when acting their parts, they rarely pretend to walk; they walk. They are pretending, say, to cross hills, when really they cross the stage. They do not pretend to kiss and caress, for they do kiss and caress; and yet, because of the context, the kiss and caress lack the significance of kisses and caresses in reality - or often do.

Suppose an actor plays against an actress who happens to be his real-life wife with whom he is angry in real life. And, in the play, the actress plays the part of a wife and he plays that of the angry husband - then where do acting and reality separate? What is really going on depends on intentions, on context, on the bigger picture - and yet are we not also pulled towards thinking that we can tell part of what is really going on without the bigger picture?

Belief/Rationality

10.

AN OFFER YOU CAN ONLY REFUSE.

Some offers, it is quipped, The G.o.dfather The G.o.dfather in mind, are offers you cannot refuse. What may be seen as kindly offers, by those in the know, are nothing but mean and nasty threats or tricks - but no treats at all. When the gunman asks you to unlock the safe, well, were you to play for time, pondering the invitation, you know without doubt that your health is at risk. When cops solicit your company down at the station - 'A few questions, sir' - it would be foolish and pointless to decline their kindly request. in mind, are offers you cannot refuse. What may be seen as kindly offers, by those in the know, are nothing but mean and nasty threats or tricks - but no treats at all. When the gunman asks you to unlock the safe, well, were you to play for time, pondering the invitation, you know without doubt that your health is at risk. When cops solicit your company down at the station - 'A few questions, sir' - it would be foolish and pointless to decline their kindly request.

There are, though, offers that you can only refuse - or, more accurately, they cannot logically be accepted. I apologize for introducing illness again, but suppose you feel unwell, rotten, and feeble; so, off to the doctor's you go. To your surprise, she gives you a choice of cure.

There's no problem in making you better. There are two ways to health. You could either take this medicine four times a day for a week. True, it tastes nasty and may well give you headaches; but you'll definitely get better. Here's an alternative. Simply believe that you'll get better. What's wrong with you merely requires your belief that you will be well; the belief is as effective as the medicine. No need, then, for the nasty medicine.And this is not mumbo-jumbo. There's vast evidence that beliefs often aid recovery; after all, beliefs have some basis in states of the brain and brain states affect the rest of the body.

The doctor smiles; she adds that the 'belief' option is surely the rational one to choose. You agree: obviously you would rather follow the recommended belief route, thereby avoiding the medicinal.Yet can you simply choose to believe something? Is not that an impossible offer to take up? Beliefs cannot just be turned on at will.

Let us, then, revise our medicinal tale a little. You accept the medicine, believing it will make you better. In fact, unbeknownst to you, it lacks all curative properties in itself - and the doctor knows this. Perhaps it is just water - with an additive that provides the nasty taste and colour. It is a placebo. Its sole role in the explanation of how patients become better is that they falsely believe its chemical composition possesses curative powers; and so they believe they will get better. It is this latter belief that then causes the recovery. Now, the doctor may truthfully murmur what she knows to be true: The medicine will make my patient better only in so far as he believes it will make him better.

If you overhear the comment, believing the doctor to be truthful, then you are now about to believe: The medicine will make me better only in so far as I believe it will make me better.

Yet, in the circ.u.mstances given, you cannot believe that - well, not rationally so. Paradoxically, the doctor can, but you cannot, believe the truth about the matter - a paradox of self- believing.

Why should learning the truth about your belief undermine that truth?

You believed that the medicine would make you better because of its pharmaceutical powers. Learning that it lacks such powers, you lack the belief that it will make you better; hence, you lack the resultant belief that you will get better. Lacking the belief, you obviously cannot get better because of the belief.

The Placebo Paradox, here on display, arises because what is true cannot survive, cannot remain true, upon your discovery. So long as you do not discover that the medicine is a placebo, your belief that you will get better is true. Upon discovery, if only you could hang onto your belief that you will get better, all would be well in your getting well; and hence your belief would be true. The discovery, though, pulls the rug from under your belief. Your belief that you would get better was grounded solely by belief in the medicine; with that grounding, that reason, now gone, your belief has gone too.

In contrast, the doctor's belief that you would get better was grounded on the efficacy of patients' believing they get better through, for example, taking placebos not believed to be placebos. Now, an optimistic patient, without placebos, may believe in any case that he will recover; but his belief that he will recover, while the reason why he does recover, cannot logically be the reason for his belief belief that he will recover. Your believing that so and so cannot be the reason for your believing that so and so. A reason needs to be different from what it is a reason for. that he will recover. Your believing that so and so cannot be the reason for your believing that so and so. A reason needs to be different from what it is a reason for.

In fact, placebo prescriptions can work even when patients learn placebos are prescribed and know what 'placebo' means. Our paradox, though, set off with you, the patient, believing that you will recover because of the efficacy of the medicine - for that reason alone.

The Placebo Paradox has something of a self-defeating air. If you learn why you will get better, then you will not get better, given the circ.u.mstances set out. The learning defeats, so to speak, what is learnt. The paradox does not involve some simple self-defeating in the way that shouting out 'No one is shouting' is self-defeating. It may be more akin to that of a schoolgirl being told that she is very bright and will pa.s.s the examination; this leads to her over-confidence, or indeed nerves, such that she subsequently fails the examination.

A reason for a belief, to be a reason, needs in some way to be independent of that belief. Religious believers sometimes justify belief on the basis of scripture. 'But why believe the scriptures?' 'Because they are G.o.d's word.' 'Why believe that?' 'Because it says so in the scriptures.'

Reasons offered in support of beliefs need to stand independently of the beliefs and not themselves be supported by those beliefs. Independence can be important in various ways. In health, for example, if told that your heart is fine, you would reasonably think that your life was not about to be cut short because of your heart - that any early death would at least be initiated by some factors not dependent on a poor heart. With that sensible thought in mind, we may spot the ambiguity and wit in a splendid W C. Fields' quip. Here it comes.

Fatalism/Free will

11.

SLOTHFUL SLOTH SPEAKS: 'WHAT WILL BE, WILL BE'.

Meeting a sloth, deep in sloth, and a b.u.t.terfly, fluttering by in a South American jungle, is no surprise, but hearing the name of a Roman orator, Cicero, dropped into the conversation - well, how could I resist listening? I had been hacking through creepers, heat, and undergrowth, perspiration pouring, so, in any case, I needed a rest.

'But, but, but,' said Flutterby, settling on Sloth's snout, 'being so slothful and lazy, why, you may starve to death, whatever you've been reading in Cicero.'

'What will be, will be,' sighed Sloth, hanging upside down from a branch.

'That may well be so,' b.u.t.tered Flutterby, 'But what will be, does not have have to be.' to be.'

Sloth sighed, slothfully of course, but the b.u.t.terfly tickled him into saying more.

'Look,' said Sloth, 'If it's fated that I shall dine this after- noon, then I shall dine, whether I go hunting for food or not. If it's fated that I shall starve, then I shall starve, whether or not I go hunting for food.'

'Ah, the Lazy Argument,' interrupted Flutterby. Sloth, though, was in full, albeit slow slothful flow.

'And either it is fated that I shall dine this afternoon or it is fated that I shall not. So, either way, it is a waste of energy to go searching for dinner.'

'You should have read more Cicero,' fluttered the b.u.t.terfly, 'for fallacy rests in your reasoning.' And in her excitement, she fluttered around, landing on Sloth's outstretched tongue. As Sloth gulped her down, I heard him murmur with a satisfied yawn, 'So, clearly it was fated I'd have at least a teeny hors-d'oeuvre.'

If it is true that things are going to happen, are we not powerless to prevent them?

When in times of distress, despair or even guilt, we may sigh, 'What will be, will be.' People sing the words, often in Spanish tongues, 'Que sera, sera.' Such sighs, such songs, such tongues, may manifest hopelessness. We cannot affect the future. Or, if we are sighing over the past, there was nothing that we could have done to have made things turn out differently. The events in question are fixed - determined by the stars or hand of fate, or some sort of divine predestination.

'Don't bother to smarten up for the interview. After all, either you'll get the job or you won't.' 'There's no need to revise for the examination. Either I'll pa.s.s or I won't. Let's party instead.' Such reasoning has, indeed, been well-named: the Lazy Argument.

Is it true that what will be will be? If it is, does it lead to fatalism, the belief that certain things are going to happen regardless of how much we try to prevent or encourage them? If or when you meet, or fail to meet, the man or woman of your dreams, was it just meant to be?

Showing fatalism to be true cannot be as easy as muttering, singing, or sighing, 'What will be, will be' - and, nodding wisely, grasping how true that is. True, if something will be, then it will be. If something will happen, then it will happen. But the b.u.t.terfly is right: it is not at all obviously true that we are all fated, that we cannot affect the future. What will be will be - true. What will be, must must be - well, that is a radically different claim, one that has not yet been justified. Sloth's Lazy Argument, though, seems to have more going for it than the weary sigh of 'what will be, will be'. Here is another example of his lazy reasoning. be - well, that is a radically different claim, one that has not yet been justified. Sloth's Lazy Argument, though, seems to have more going for it than the weary sigh of 'what will be, will be'. Here is another example of his lazy reasoning.

You are ill.Well, either it is fated that you'll recover or it is fated that you'll not recover. If it is fated that you'll recover, then there's no need to bother visiting the doctor. If it is fated that you'll not recover, then it's pointless visiting the doctor. Either it's fated that you'll recover or fated that you will not. Either way, don't waste time visiting the doctor.

As it stands, this can hardly be welcomed as a good argument for fatalism; after all, it a.s.sumes straight off that things are fated - either you are fated to recover or fated not to recover. Why believe that?

We are, though, being unfair to Sloth. Here is a modified Lazy Argument.

Either you are going to recover from the illness or you are not going to recover. If you're going to recover, then there's no need to see the doctor. If you're not going to recover, then it's pointless seeing the doctor. Either way, therefore, don't waste time seeing the doctor.

Well, what do we make of that? For a start, it does not presuppose fate.

There are many events over which we are powerless. Whatever we do, we shall not affect the orbit of Pluto, the nature of snow, and the colours of rainbows. You and I are unlikely to find a reliable plumber late at night or make the trains run on time. But surely we often do influence our recovery from an illness, getting a job, or pa.s.sing an examination.

The Lazy Argument's simple mistake is to a.s.sume that if something is going to happen, then it is going to happen regardless of what we do. Maybe it is true that we are going to recover from the illness; but this may be because we do see the doctor. Of course, some of us, sceptics that we are, think that recovery is more likely if we avoid doctors. Perhaps you are going to be offered the job after the interview, but only because you do polish your shoes, sound eager, and smile brightly at the boss's jokes. Perhaps you will find the lover of your dreams, but finding her or him is more likely if you keep your eyes open.

'What will be, will be' does not logically lead to 'what will be, will be, whatever you or I do'. Concerning many factors that affect our lives, we cannot pa.s.s the responsibility buck to fate. We do have inputs, though it is true that few inputs guarantee desired outcomes.

If we want to avoid responsibility for what happens, we should have more success turning to the unexpected events that hit us in life - the chances, the contingencies, the good or bad luck - rather than to some mysterious notion of fate. Indeed, your chancing upon the Lazy Argument may tempt you to try it out, when looking into his or her eyes, declaring that your getting together was simply fated to be - and so all resistance is futile.

Politics/Ethics

12.

'WOMEN AND MEN ARE EQUAL' - REALLY?.

Where is the equality? The female differs from the male, the average woman differs from the average man - and individual women differ from individual men. They differ biologically, differing in their genes, reproductive features, and likely lifespans. True, individual men and women have features in common simply because they are human. True, although the average woman and man vary in height, weight, and shoe size -in tearful propensities, s.e.xual preferences, and shopping desires - in these respects some individual women and men are equal. In view of the biology, it should be no surprise that the average woman and man differ emotionally, intellectually, and perceptually in many respects. Individual men differ from individual men, women from women, and women from men -in numerous ways.

Talk of s.e.xual equality is typically shorthand, or short- talk, for saying that women and men should should be treated equally be treated equally -that equal treatment is justified.Yet equal treatment should no more be dished out to women and men than to the healthy and unhealthy. Individuals with broken legs rightly need treatment, but those with unbroken legs do not; if they demand it, they may need a different treatment - from psychiatrists. It would be crazy to screen men for cervical cancer or women for prostate cancer. These are but reminders that treating the s.e.xes differently is often the right thing to do.

The puzzle is quite what const.i.tutes s.e.xual equality and what justifies the demand for it? Another way of raising the matter, with both a general and a particular question, is to ask:

Which differences between women and men should be retained?

Should men receive preferential treatment to equalize female/male average lifespans?

The call for s.e.xual equality is probably for an equal concern for both males and females, and their roles in society. That equal concern is often restricted to some sort of equality in opportunities rather than outcome, yet they are sometimes entangled.

Typically, there is no good reason to promote the lives of one s.e.x over the other - though occasionally there is. In a declining population, encouraging women to bear children may be a high priority, suggesting more resources for females than males. If couples are reluctant to have children, then there may be good reason to provide incentives for child- bearing. These are not thereby examples of equal concern for both women and men. They would justify inequalities in treatment on the basis of a value such as society's continuance or requiring sufficient people of working age to support others. Also, they would not necessarily benefit women; they may be pressurizing some women who would prefer childless lives. In some countries, we witness opposite pressures, with childbearing being restricted.

A simple point here is that s.e.xual equality, quite whatever it is, does not always merit highest priority. Further, equal concern for lives faring well does not mean that lives should fare well in the same way. Some men want children; some do not. Some women do; some do not. We still have not, then, discovered the heart of the 's.e.xual equality' demand, if intended to be more than equal concern for lives, regardless of gender.

Sometimes the equality demand is linked to proportions: things are wrong when the female-male ratio in the same occupation or college course radically differs from fifty-fifty. Many feminist-minded women rail at societies where more women than men typically stay at home, raising children, without paid careers. Yet why ever a.s.sume that numerical equality is how things should be? Perhaps there is something in the biology that accounts for such differences; and perhaps there is nothing wrong in that.

Perhaps there is nothing wrong, but there could be something wrong. The numerical differences may result, not from biology, but from unfairness or coercion.

Unfairness first. Whatever the exact biological differences, there is no obvious good reason why, for example, one s.e.x should have the vote but not the other. However, whether there should be numerical equality between the s.e.xes in parliaments, congresses, and senates is a different matter. If representative bodies should reflect citizens represented, should we not ensure the 'right' parliamentary proportions of philosophers, h.o.m.os.e.xuals, ballet lovers, even criminals - and, indeed, regardless of people's votes? The call for equality between the s.e.xes among representatives suggests that women and men, as groups, possess some significantly different concerns. Paradoxically, this particular call for s.e.xual equality is probably justified by some important s.e.xual inequalities, inequalities not needing eradication.

Returning to employment, if women are rejected for jobs simply 'because they are women', then that is usually unfair. However, it is not unfair if, for example, the drama requires male actors. It is not unfair to men if beauty salons prefer employing women, conscious of clients preferring the female touch. Of course, if women and men do the same work, then they deserve equal pay. If - if - society, though, has customs, even legislation, whereby it is far more likely that women, rather than men, will disrupt their employed careers for child-rearing, then it is not obviously unfair for employers to prefer equally good candidates lacking such future disruption dangers. Or is it?

Such discriminatory practices may be unfair if women are forced or customarily expected to have children; coercion is touched on below. The practices may be unfair if it is simply a.s.sumed that 'because they are women' the individuals concerned are bound therefore to want children and disrupt careers. They may not; and perhaps this could be established. However - at least on the surface - many women and men, without coercion, simply want to have children. Further, as a matter of biology, women will, therefore, usually have more time away from work than men, which, but for special provision, is likely to affect their careers. So, it would seem, many are arguing that fairness in such cases requires that special allowances be made for women in such circ.u.mstances.

Once we enter the arena of justifying allowances - an arena we are bound to enter - it is pretty difficult to find firm groundings. Here is a silly example. Some people may really want to be fire-fighters, yet seriously lack the appropriate stamina. Presumably no one truly believes that such individuals should be specially catered for, perhaps by providing special fitness training, drugs, and reduced duties. However, some people are more p.r.o.ne to illnesses than others - and here we often do make special allowances. The puzzle here concerns which special allowances can be justified.

'Coercion!' alerts us to another important factor concerning s.e.xual equality - and one that can lead to special compensatory allowances. A rhetorical reference is to the 'tame housewife': she has been brainwashed, 'tamed', into preferring to look after the family. It is not what she truly desires. Maybe she is akin to the slave who, brought up in slavery, knows of no better. In some societies, women clearly are not free to realize themselves, being denied proper education, subjected to veils, and much worse. In liberal societies, pressures and customs can still inhibit various free choices. Another puzzle is then: which inhibitions matter? After all, should we be distressed by male bank employees being banned from wearing dresses?

When freedoms are present, if different outcomes persist, why should that lead us to think that something has gone wrong? Some argue that numerical differences between the s.e.xes - more males are company directors, mathematicians, members of parliament - do just show that the freedoms clearly were lacking. Inappropriate nurturing or cultural pressures must be the explanation; and so special arrangements should be made for those who have suffered. But how is it known that such pressures must be the explanation of the differences? Yes, on many occasions - in some countries, on a vast number of occasions - we can spot the coercions, the pressures; but it is an unjustified and curious leap to conclude that when none can be spotted, they must still be lurking somewhere, if numerical differences are present.

A curiosity is the seeming a.s.sumption that, were numerical differences to result from what is 'natural' and biological, then they would be acceptable. It is as if it is a.s.sumed that nurturing and cultures do not ultimately result from nature; yet, from where else can they result? Further, why is the alleged nature-nurture distinction thought relevant in determining how things should should be? We often rightly want to interfere with what is natural. be? We often rightly want to interfere with what is natural.

These comments should not blind us to those millions of women, throughout the world, who are treated badly just because they are women. That horrendous fact should not blind us to another: namely, the millions of both women and men who are treated badly because of wars, highly corrupt governments, and uncaring others.

Living dangerously, here is Arthur Schopenhauer.

Women are directly adapted to act as the nurses and educators of our early childhood, for the simple reason that they themselves are childish, foolish, and short-sighted - in a word, are big children all their lives* Consider how a young girl will toy day after day with a child, dance with it, and sing to it; and then consider what a man, with the very best intentions in the world, could do in her place.

Unsurprisingly, Schopenhauer gets it in the neck from women. Quite what is the evidence he wants us to a.s.sess? And what is his reasoning? Rejecting Schopenhauer, though, should not lead us to insist, against all evidence, that typically there are no female-male differences in outlooks and emotions. Genuine free choices of women and men may well generate very different lifestyles, different numbers in occupations - and, in some cases, they seem to do so.