64. Qu. Whether, therefore, it be possible to know the state or stock of this bank; and yet whether it be not of the greatest reputation and most established credit throughout the North?

65. Qu. Whether the success of those public banks in Venice, Amsterdam and Hamburg would not naturally produce in other States an inclination to the same methods?

66. Qu. Whether an absolute monarchy be so apt to gain credit, and whether the vivacity of some humours could so well suit with the slow steps and discreet management which a bank requires?

67. Qu. Whether the bank called the general bank of France, contrived by Mr Law, and established by letters patent in May, 1716, was not in truth a particular and not a national bank, being in the hands of a particular company privileged and protected by the Government?

68. Qu. Whether the Government did not order that the notes of this bank should pa.s.s on a par with ready money in all payments of the revenue?

69. Qu. Whether this bank was not obliged to issue only such notes as were payable at sight?

70. Qu. Whether it was not made a capital crime to forge the notes of this bank?

71. Qu. Whether this bank was not restrained from trading either by sea or land, and from taking up money upon interest?

72. Qu. Whether the original stock thereof was not six millions of livres, divided into actions of a thousand crowns each?

73. Qu. Whether the proprietors were not to hold general a.s.semblies twice in the year, for the regulating of their affairs?

74. Qu. Whether the accompts of this bank were not balanced twice every year?

75. Qu. Whether there were not two chests belonging to this bank, the one called the general chest containing their specie, their bills and their copper plates for the printing of those bills, under the custody of three locks, whereof the keys were kept by the director, the inspector and treasurer, also another called the ordinary chest, containing part of the stock not exceeding two hundred thousand crowns, under the key of the treasurer?

76. Qu. Whether out of this last mentioned sum, each particular cashier was not to be intrusted with a share not exceeding the value of twenty thousand crowns at a time, and that under good security?

77. Qu. Whether the Regent did not reserve to himself the power of calling this bank to account, so often as he should think good, and of appointing the inspector?

78. Qu. Whether in the beginning of the year 1719 the French King did not convert the general bank of France into a Banque Royale, having himself purchased the stock of the company and taken it into his own hands, and appointed the Duke of Orleans chief manager thereof?

79. Qu. Whether from that time, all matters relating to the bank were not transacted in the name, and by the sole authority, of the king?

80. Qu. Whether his Majesty did not undertake to receive and keep the cash of all particular persons, subjects, or foreigners, in his said Royale Banque, without being paid for that trouble? And whether it was not declared, that such cash should not be liable to seizure on any pretext, not even on the king's own account?

81. Qu. Whether the treasurer alone did not sign all the bills, receive all the stock paid into the bank, and keep account of all the in-goings and out-goings?

82. Qu. Whether there were not three registers for the enregistering of the bills kept in the Banque Royale, one by the inspector, another by the controller, and a third by the treasurer?

83. Qu. Whether there was not also a fourth register, containing the profits of the bank, which was visited, at least once a week, by the inspector and controller?

84. Qu. Whether, beside the general bureau or compter in the city of Paris, there were not also appointed five more in the towns of Lyons, Tours, Roch.e.l.le, Orleans, and Amiens, each whereof was provided with two chests, one of specie for discharging bills at sight, and another of bank bills to be issued as there should be demand?

85. Qu. Whether, in the above mentioned towns, it was not prohibited to make payments in silver, exceeding the sum of six hundred livres?

86. Qu. Whether all creditors were not empowered to demand payment in bank bills instead of specie?

87. Qu. Whether, in a short compa.s.s of time, this bank did not undergo many new changes and regulations by several successive acts of council?

88. Qu. Whether the untimely, repeated, and boundless fabrication of bills did not precipitate the ruin of this bank?

89. Qu. Whether it be not true, that before the end of July, 1719, they had fabricated four hundred millions of livres in bank-notes, to which they added the sum of one hundred and twenty millions more on the twelfth of September following, also the same sum of one hundred and twenty millions on the twenty-fourth of 3 October, and again on the twenty-ninth of December, in the same year, the farther sum of three hundred and sixty millions, making the whole, from an original stock of six millions, mount, within the compa.s.s of one year, to a thousand millions of livres?

90. Qu. Whether on the twenty-eighth of February, 1720, the king did not make an union of the bank with the united company of the East and West Indies, which from that time had the administration and profits of the Banque Royale?

91. Qu. Whether the king did not still profess himself responsible for the value of the bank bills, and whether the company were not responsible to his Majesty for their management?

92. Qu. Whether sixteen hundred millions of livres, lent to his majesty by the company, was not a sufficient pledge to indemnify the king?

93. Qu. Whether the new directors were not prohibited to make any more bills without an act of council?

94. Qu. Whether the chests and books of the Banque were not subjected to the joint inspection of a Counsellor of State, and the Prevot des Marchands, a.s.sisted by two Echevins, a judge, and a consul, who had power to visit when they would and without warning?

95. Qu. Whether in less than two years the actions or shares of the Indian Company (first established for Mississippi, and afterwards increased by the addition of other compares and further? and whether this privileges) did not rise to near 2000 per cent must be ascribed to real advantages of trade, or to mere frenzy?

96. Qu. Whether, from first to last, there were not fabricated bank bills, of one kind or other, to the value of more than two thousand and six hundred millions of livres, or one hundred and thirty millions sterling?

97. Qu. Whether the credit of the bank did not decline from its union with the Indian Company?

98. Qu. Whether, notwithstanding all the above-mentioned extraordinary measures, the bank bills did not still pa.s.s at par with gold and silver to May, 1720, when the French king thought fit, by a new act of council, to make a reduction of their value, which proved a fatal blow, the effects whereof, though soon retracted, no subsequent skill or management could ever repair?

99. Qu. Whether, what no reason, reflexion, or foresight could do, this simple matter of fact (the most powerful argument with the mult.i.tude) did not do at once, to wit, open the eyes of the people?

100. Qu. Whether the dealers in that sort of ware had ever troubled their heads with the nature of credit, or the true use and end of banks, but only considered their bills and actions as things, to which the general demand gave a price?

101. Qu. Whether the Government was not in great perplexity to contrive expedients for the getting rid of those bank bills, which had been lately multiplied with such an unlimited pa.s.sion?

102. Qu. Whether notes to the value of about ninety millions were not sunk by being paid off in specie, with the cash of the Compagnie des Indes, with that of the bank, and that of the Hotels des Monnoyes? Whether five hundred and thirty millions were not converted into annuities at the royal treasury? Whether several hundred millions more in bank bills were not extinguished and replaced by annuities on the City of Paris, on taxes throughout the provinces, &c., &c?

103. Qu. Whether, after all other shifts, the last and grand resource for exhausting that ocean, was not the erecting of a compte en banc in several towns of France?

104. Qu. Whether, when the imagination of a people is thoroughly wrought upon and heated by their own example, and the arts of designing men, this doth not produce a sort of enthusiasm which takes place of reason, and is the most dangerous distemper in a State?

105. Qu. Whether this epidemical madness should not be always before the eyes of a legislature, in the framing of a national bank?

106. Qu. Whether, therefore, it may not be fatal to engraft trade on a national bank, or to propose dividends on the stock thereof?

107. Qu. Whether it be possible for a national bank to subsist and maintain its credit under a French government?

108. Qu. Whether it may not be as useful a lesson to consider the bad management of some as the good management of others?

109. Qu. Whether the rapid and surprising success of the schemes of those who directed the French bank did not turn their brains?

110. Qu. Whether the best inst.i.tutions may not be made subservient to bad ends?

111. Qu. Whether, as the aim of industry is power, and the aim of a bank is to circulate and secure this power to each individual, it doth not follow that absolute power in one hand is inconsistent with a lasting and a flourishing bank?

112. Qu. Whether our natural appet.i.tes, as well as powers, are not limited to their respective ends and uses? But whether artificial appet.i.tes may not be infinite?

113. Qu. Whether the simple getting of money, or pa.s.sing it from hand to hand without industry, be an object worthy of a wise government?