49. Qu. In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be trusted, what security can there be for trusting any one else?

50. Qu. If it be not ridiculous to question whether the pubic can find cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited value?

51. Qu. Whether the united stock of a nation be not the best security? And whether anything but the ruin of the State can produce a national bankruptcy?

52. Qu. Whether the total sum of the public treasure, power, and wisdom, all co-operating, be not most likely to establish a bank of credit, sufficient to answer the ends, relieve the wants, and satisfy the scruples of all people?

53. Qu. Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private banks can be admitted as objections against a public one?

54. Qu. Whether that which is an objection to everything be an objection to anything; and whether the possibility of an abuse be not of that kind?

55. Qu. Whether, in fact, all things are not more or less abused, and yet notwithstanding such abuse, whether many things are not upon the whole expedient and useful?

56. Qu. Whether those things that are subject to the most general inspection are not the least subject to abuse?

57. Qu. Whether, for private ends, it may not be sometimes expedient to object novelty to things that have been often tried, difficulty to the plainest things, and hazard to the safest?

58. Qu. Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question was between money and credit, and not (as in fact it is) which ought to be preferred, private credit or public credit?

59. Qu. Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt, or to be feared, on one side?

60. Qu. Whether, therefore, those that would make an impartial judgment ought not to be on their guard, keeping both prospects always in view, balancing the inconveniencies on each side and considering neither absolutely?

61. Qu. Whether wilful mistakes, examples without a likeness, and general addresses to the pa.s.sions are not often more successful than arguments?

62. Qu. Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as to explain obscure ones?

63. Qu. Whether private men are not often an over-match for the public; want of weight being made up for by activity?

64. Qu. If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or representatives, whether we are not already undone, and so have nothing further to fear?

65. Qu. Suppose a power in the government to hurt the pubic by means of a national bank, yet what should give them the will to do this?

Or supposing a will to do mischief, yet how could a national bank, modelled and administered by Parliament, put it in their power?

66. Qu. Whether even a wicked will entrusted with power can be supposed to abuse it for no end?

67. Qu. Whether it be not much more probable that those who maketh such objections do not believe them?

68. Qu. Whether it be not vain to object that our fellow-subjects of Great Britain would malign or obstruct our industry when it is exerted in a way which cannot interfere with their own?

66. Qu. Whether it is to be supposed they should take delight in the dirt and nakedness and famine of our people, or envy them shoes for their feet and beef for their belies?

70. Qu. What possible handle or inclination could our having a national bank give other people to distress us?

71. Qu. Whether it be not ridiculous to conceive that a project for cloathing and feeding our natives should give any umbrage to England?

72. Qu. Whether such unworthy surmises are not the pure effect of spleen?

73. Qu. Whether London is not to be considered as the metropolis of Ireland? And whether our wealth (such as it is) doth not circulate through London and throughout all England, as freely as that of any part of his Majesty's dominions?

74. Qu. Whether therefore it be not evidently the interest of the people of England to encourage rather than to oppose a national bank in this kingdom, as well as every other means for advancing our wealth which shall not impair their own?

75. Qu. Whether it is not our interest to be useful to them rather than rival them; and whether in that case we may not be sure of their good offices?

76. Qu. Whether we can propose to thrive so long as we entertain a wrongheaded distrust of England?

77. Qu. Whether, as a national bank would increase our industry, and that our wealth, England may not be a proportionable gainer; and whether we should not consider the gains of our mother-country as some accession to our own?

78. Qu. Whether the Protestant colony in this kingdom can ever forget what they owe to England?

79. Qu. Whether there ever was in any part of the world a country in such wretched circ.u.mstances, and which, at the same time, could be so easily remedied, and nevertheless the remedy not applied?

80. Qu. What must become of a people that can neither see the plainest things nor do the easiest?

81. Qu. Be the money lodged in the bank what it will, yet whether an Act to make good deficiencies would not remove all scruples?

82. Qu. If it be objected that a national bank must lower interest, and therefore hurt the monied man, whether the same objection would not hold as strong against multiplying our gold and silver?

83. Qu. But whether a bank that utters bills, with the sole view of promoting the public weal, may not so proportion their quant.i.ty as to avoid several inconveniencies which might attend private banks?

84. Qu. Whether there be any difficulty in comprehending that the whole wealth of the nation is in truth the stock of a national bank?

And whether any more than the right comprehension of this be necessary to make all men easy with regard to its credit?

85. Qu. Whether any Thing be more reasonable than that the pubic, which makes the whole profit of the bank, should engage to make good its credit?

86. Qu. Whether the prejudices about gold and silver are not strong, but whether they are not still prejudices?

87. Qu. Whether paper doth not by its stamp and signature acquire a local value, and become as precious and as scarce as gold? And whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and therefore preferable to gold?

88. Qu. Whether, in order to make men see and feel, it be not often necessary to inculcate the same thing, and place it in different lights?

89. Qu. Whether it doth not much import to have a right conception of money? And whether its true and just idea be not that of a ticket, ent.i.tling to power, and fitted to record and transfer such power?

90. Qu. Whether the managers and officers of a national bank ought to be considered otherwise than as the cashiers and clerks of private banks? Whether they are not in effect as little trusted, have as little power, are as much limited by rules, and as liable to inspection?

91. Qu. Whether the mistaking this point may not create some prejudice against a national bank, as if it depended on the credit, or wisdom, or honesty, of private men, rather than on the pubic, which is really the sole proprietor and director thereof, and as such obliged to support it?

92. Qu. Though the bank of Amsterdam doth very rarely, if at all, pay out money, yet whether every man possess'd of specie be not ready to convert it into paper, and act as cashier to the bank? And whether, from the same motive, every monied man throughout this kingdom would not be cashier to our national bank?

93. Qu. Whether a national bank would not be the great means and motive for employing our poor in manufactures?

94. Qu. Whether money, though lent out only to the rich, would not soon circulate among the poor? And whether any man borrows but with an intent to circulate?

95. Qu. Whether both government and people would not in the event be gainers by a national bank? And whether anything but wrong conceptions of its nature can make those that wish well to either averse from it?

96. Qu. Whether it may not be right to think, and to have it thought, that England and Ireland, prince and people, have one and the same interest?

97. Qu. Whether, if we had more means to set on foot such manufactures and such commerce as consists with the interest of England, there would not of course be less sheep-walk, and less wool exported to foreign countries? And whether a national bank would not supply such means?