(21) Or, "is of greater evidential value," "ubi res adsunt, quid opus est verbis?"

Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.

Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing any other unjust and wrongful act?

No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).

Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?

(22)

(22) Or, "is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous behaviour?"

Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.

Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I a.s.sert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."

Do you mean to a.s.sert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous terms?

Soc. I do.

I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful, nor what you mean by just. (23)

(23) Lit. "what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of."

Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?

Yes (he answered).

Soc. What do you take them to be?

Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.

Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be law-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?

Hipp. Certainly.

Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who does what is unjust is unjust?

Hipp. Of course.

Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the lawless unjust?

Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them, which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and altering?

Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually undertaking war and then making peace again.

Most true (he answered).

Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?

No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).

Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the Lacedaemonians, (24) and do you understand that if he succeeded in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws?

And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity.

"Concord among citizens"--that is the constant theme of exhortation emphasised by the councils of elders (25) and by the choice spirits of the community; (26) at all times and everywhere through the length and breadth of all h.e.l.las it is an established law that the citizens be bound together by an oath of concord; (27) everywhere they do actually swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players, or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well administered nor a household well organised.

(24) Cf. "Pol. Lac." viii. See Newman, op. cit. i. 396.

(25) Lit. "the Gerousiai." {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.

(26) Lit. "the best men." {S} or {X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."

(27) Cf. "h.e.l.l." II. iv. 43; Lys. xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg.

"u Leocr." 189.

And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts unbewildered, secure against defeat, a.s.sured of victory. (28) It is to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is trustworthy--he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to all alike their dues--to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace.

They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on his side. This is he to whom the allies (29) of his country will most confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to recompense kindness with grat.i.tude, and who, therefore, is more sure of kindly treatment than another whose sense of grat.i.tude is fuller. (30) The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided, clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go to war with; encompa.s.sed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before him hatred and hostility melt away.

(28) Or, "ignorant of hostile, a.s.sured of favourable verdict."

(29) Lit. "the Allies," e.g. of Sparta or of Athens, etc.

(30) Lit. "From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more confidently expect the recompense of grat.i.tude than from your lover of the law? and whom would one select as the recipient of kindness rather than a man susceptible of grat.i.tude?"

And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view, instruct us. (31)

(31) For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf. "Ages." i.

36; and for the "Socratic" reverence for law cf. Plat. "Crito."

Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice. (32)

(32) Lit. "the just and upright," {tou dikaiou}.

Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws? (33)

(33) See Soph. "Antig." "Oed. T." 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem.

"de Cor." 317, 23; Aristot. "Rhet." I. xiii.

Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the same sense.

Can you then a.s.sert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men made them?

Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech? (34)