(21) See L. Dindorf ad loc. (ed. Ox. 1862), {theous}; G. Sauppe, vol.

iii. "An. crit." p. xxix; R. Kuhner; C. Schenkl.

(22) i.e. "that man must walk by faith." For {upodeiknunai} cf.

"Econ." xii. 18.

(23) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Crat." 396.

(24) Or, "the co-ordinator and container of the universe."

(25) Or, "in whom all beauty and goodness is."

(26) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 22; above, I. iv. 13.

(27) {to daimonion}, the divinity.

Nay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus), there is no danger I shall turn a deaf ear to the divine influence even a little; of that I am not afraid, but I am out of heart to think that no soul of man may ever requite the kindness of the G.o.ds with fitting grat.i.tude.

Be not out of heart because of that (he said); you know what answer the G.o.d at Delphi makes to each one who comes asking "how shall I return thanks to heaven?"--"According to the law and custom of your city"; and this, I presume, is law and custom everywhere that a man should please the G.o.ds with offerings according to the ability which is in him. (28) How then should a man honour the G.o.ds with more beautiful or holier honour than by doing what they bid him? but he must in no wise slacken or fall short of his ability, for when a man so does, it is manifest, I presume, that at the moment he is not honouring the G.o.ds. You must then honour the G.o.ds, not with shortcoming but according to your ability; and having so done, be of good cheer and hope to receive the greatest blessings. For where else should a man of sober sense look to receive great blessings if not from those who are able to help him most, and how else should he hope to obtain them save by seeking to please his helper, and how may he hope to please his helper better than by yielding him the amplest obedience?

(28) Or, "and that law, I presume, is universal which says, Let a man," etc.; and for the maxim see above; "Anab." III. ii. 9.

By such words--and conduct corresponding to his words--did Socrates mould and fashion the hearts of his companions, making them at once more devout and more virtuous. (29)

(29) Or, "sounder of soul and more temperate as well as more pious."

IV

But indeed (1) with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all, (2) and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of the a.s.sembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an unconst.i.tutional vote, (3) but ventured, on the side of the laws, to resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for instance when they forbade his conversing with the young; (4) or again, when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to be put to death, (5) he stood out single-handed on the ground that the injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when he appeared as defendant in the suit inst.i.tuted by Meletus, (6) notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts to humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery and supplications contrary to the laws, (7) notwithstanding also that defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, (8) he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress them and live.

(1) L. Dindorf suspects (SS. 1-6, {'Alla men... pollakis}), ed.

Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.

(2) Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the eye of law and custom but positively helpful."

(3) See above, I. i. 18; "h.e.l.l." I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G." viii.

272.

(4) See above, I. ii. 35.

(5) Leon of Salamis. See "h.e.l.l." II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol." 32 C; Andoc. "de Myst." 46.

(6) See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol." 19 C.

(7) Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol." 4; Plat. "Apol." 38 D, E.

(8) See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 663 foll.

These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis (9) on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge. (10)

(9) For this famous person see Cob. "Pros. Xen." s.n.; Plat. "Hipp.

maj." 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H. G." viii. 524.

(10) Or, "I can personally vouch for."

Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to send him for the purpose: "People say," (11) he added, "that if a man wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, (12) the world is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find such instruction."

(11) L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence {phasi de tines... didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For the sentiment see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.

(12) Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii. 5; "Hunting," vii. 4.

Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still repeating the same old talk, (13) Socrates, which I used to hear from you long ago?

(13) This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. "Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat.

"Gorg." 490 E.

Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge, (14) never say the same thing twice over on the same subject?

(14) Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}. Cf.

Plat. "Hipp. maj."

To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all occasions.

What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and what is their order?" (15) I suppose you try to run off one string of letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic, "Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of yesterday?

(15) Cf. "Econ." viii. 14; Plat. "Alc." i. 113 A.

Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself.

However, to revert to justice (and uprightness), (16) I flatter myself I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any one else will be able to controvert.

(16) Or, "on the topic of the just I have something to say at present which," etc.

By Hera! (17) (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! (18) Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling; there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.

(17) See above, I. v. 5.

(18) Or, "what a panacea are you the inventor of"; lit. "By Hera, you have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war."

You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a single topic. (19)

(19) See Plat. "Gorg." 465 A.

What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?

Hipp. And pray what is this theory (20) of yours on the subject? Let us have it in words.

(20) {o logos}.

Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than a word? (21)