[Footnote 851: Only two of the tribes, ent.i.tled to a delegate in the Confederate Congress, seem to have availed themselves of the privilege in 1863, the (cont.)]
in May, Commissioner Scott[852] set out upon a tour of inspection, similar to the one he had made during the days of the Pike regime. On his way through Arkansas, he stopped at Little Rock to consult with General Holmes and to get his bearings before venturing again among the tribes; but Holmes was ill, too ill to attend to business,[853]
and no interview with him was likely to be deemed advisable for some time to come. Scott had, therefore, to resume his journey without instructions or advice from the district commander, not regrettable from some points of view since it enabled
[Footnote 851: (cont.) Cherokee and the Choctaw, which may account for the persistence with which, in one form or another, a measure for filling vacancies in the Indian representation came up for discussion or for reference [See _Journal_, vols. iii, vi]. It became law in January, 1864 [Ibid., vol. iii, 521]. A companion measure, for the regulation of Indian elections, had a like bearing. It became law earlier, in May, 1863 [Ibid., 420, vi, 459]. In the _Official Records_, fourth ser. vol. in, 1189, _footnote o_, the statement is made that the name of Elias C. Boudinot appeared first on the roll, January 8, 1864; but it must be erroneous, since Boudinot, as the delegate from the Cherokee Nation, was very active in Congress all through the year 1863. His colleague from the Choctaw Nation was Robert M. Jones. On December 10, when Indian affairs had become exceedingly critical, Representative Hanly moved that one of the Indian delegates should be requested to attend the sessions of the Committee on Indian Affairs (_Journal_, vol. vi, 520). This proposition eventually developed into something very much more important,
"_Resolved_, First, That each Delegate from the several Indian nations with whom treaties have been made and concluded by the Confederate States of America shall have and be ent.i.tled to a seat upon the floor of this House, may propose and introduce measures being for the benefit of his particular nation, and be heard in respect and regard thereto, or other matters in which his nation may be particularly interested.
"Second. That, furthermore, it shall be the duty of the Speaker of this House to appoint one Delegate from one of the Indian nations upon the Committee on Indian Affairs, and the Delegate so appointed shall have and possess all the rights and privileges of other members of such committee, except the right to vote on questions pending before such committee"--_Journal_, vol. vi, 529. The Speaker appointed Boudinot to the position thus created.]
[Footnote 852: In February, upon the nomination of President Davis and the recommendation of Secretary Seddon, Scott had been appointed to the position of full commissioner [Ibid., vol. iii, 69].]
[Footnote 853: During the illness of Holmes, which was protracted, Price commanded in the District of Arkansas.]
him to approach his difficult and delicate task with an open mind and with no preconceived notions derived from Holmes's prejudices.
Scott entered the Indian Territory in July and was at once beset with complaints and solicitations, individual and tribal. On his own account, he made not a few discoveries. On the eighth of August he reported[854] to Holmes upon things that have already been considered here, defective powder, deficient artillery, and the like; but not a word did he say about the Cooper[855] and Boudinot intrigues. It was too early to commit himself on matters so personal and yet so fundamental. The Indians were not so reticent. The evil influence that Cooper had over them, due largely to the fact that he professed himself to be interested in Indian Territory to the exclusion of all other parts of the country, was beginning to find expression in various communications to President Davis and others in authority.
Just how far Stand Watie was privy to Cooper's schemes and in sympathy with them, it is impossible to say. Boudinot was Cooper's able coadjutor, fellow conspirator, while Boudinot and Watie were relatives and friends.
Watie's energies, especially his intellectual, were apparently being exerted in directions far removed from the realm of selfish and petty intrigue. He was a man of vision, of deep penetration likewise, and he was a patriot. Personal ambition was not his besetting sin. If he had only had real military ability and the qualities that make for discipline and for genuine leadership
[Footnote 854: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1097.]
[Footnote 855: On August 14, Cooper complained to Smith that Steele had been given the place that rightfully should have been his [Ibid., 987]. Smith looked into the matter and made his reply, strictly non-partisan, September 1st [Ibid., 1037]. The authorities at Richmond declared against Cooper's claims and pretensions, yet, in no wise, did he abandon them.]
among men, he might have accomplished great things for Indian Territory and for the Confederacy. Almost simultaneously with the forwarding of Scott's first report to Holmes, he personally made reports[856] and issued appeals,[857] some of which, because of their grasp, because of their earnestness, and because of their spirit of n.o.ble self-reliance, call for very special mention. Watie's purpose in making and in issuing them was evidently nothing more and nothing less than to dispel despondency and to arouse to action.
Watie's appeal may have had the effect designed but it was an effect doomed to be counteracted almost at once. Blunt's offensive had more of menace to the Creeks and their southern neighbors than had Steele's defensive of hope. The amnesty to deserters,[858] that issued under authority from Richmond on the twenty-sixth of August, even though conditional upon a return to duty, was a confession of weakness and it availed little when the Choctaws protested against the failure to supply them with arms and ammunition, proper in quality and quant.i.ty, for Smith to tell them that such things, intended to meet treaty requirements but diverted, had been lost in the fall of Vicksburg.[859] Had not white men been always singularly adept at making excuses for breaking their promises to red?
In September, when everything seemed very dark for the Confederacy on the southwestern front, desperate efforts were made to rally anew the Indians.
[Footnote 856: Watie's report to Scott, August 8, 1863 [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1104-1105] was full of very just criticism, but not at all factional.]
[Footnote 857: The appeal to the Creeks, through their governor, is to be found in _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1105-1106, and that to the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Ibid., 1106-1107.]
[Footnote 858:--Ibid., 980.]
[Footnote 859: Smith to Princ.i.p.al Chief, Choctaw Nation, August 13, 1863, Ibid., 967; Bryan to Hon. R.M. Jones, September 19, 1863, Ibid., 1021.]
Proposals[860] from Blunt were known to have reached both the Creeks and the Choctaws and were being considered, by the one, more or less secretly and, by the other, in open council. Israel G. Vore,[861]
who had become the agent of the Creeks and whose influence was considerable, was called upon to neutralize the Federal advances. In a more official way, Commissioner Scott worked with the Choctaws, among whom there was still a strong element loyal to the Confederacy, loyal enough, at all events, to recruit for a new regiment to fight in its cause.
Nothing was more likely to bring rea.s.surance to the Indians than military activity; but military activity of any account was obviously out of the question unless some combination of commands could be devised, such a combination, for example, as Magruder had in mind when he proposed that the forces of Steele, Cooper, Bankhead, and Cabell should cooperate to recover Forts Smith and Gibson, something more easily said than done. It was no sooner said than brigade transfers rendered it quite impracticable, Cabell and Bankhead both being needed to give support to Price. In charge now of the Northern Sub-district of Texas was Henry E. McCulloch. From him Steele felt he had a right to expect cooperation, since their commands were
[Footnote 860: Steele to Snead, September 11, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1013; Bankhead to Steele, September 15, 1863, Ibid., 1016.]
[Footnote 861: In the spring of 1863, Vore was engaged in disbursing funds, more particularly, in paying the Indian troops [Steele to Anderson, April 17, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no.
270, pp. 197-198]. In November, 1862, the Creeks had requested that Vore be made their agent and the appointment was conferred upon him the following May [Scott to Seddon, December 12, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1095]. The Creeks were inclined to be displeased at the delay, especially as they later had no reason to regret their choice [Moty Kanard to Davis, August 17, 1863.
Ibid., 1107]. It was Cooper, apparently, who suggested sending up Vore to have him work upon the Creeks [Ibid., 1000].]
territorially in conjunction, and to consult with him he journeyed to Bonham.[862]
Viewed in the light of subsequent events, the journey was productive of more evil than good. With Steele absent, the command in Indian Territory devolved upon Cooper[863] and Cooper employed the occasion to ingratiate himself with the Indians, to increase his influence with them, and to undermine the man who he still insisted had supplanted him. When Steele returned from Texas he noticed very evident signs of insubordination. There were times when he found it almost impossible to locate Cooper within the limits of the command or to keep in touch with him. Cooper was displaying great activity, was making plans to recover Fort Smith, and conducting himself generally in a very independent way. October had, however, brought a change in the status of Fort Smith; for General Smith had completely detached the commands of Indian Territory and Arkansas from each other.[864] It was not to Holmes that Steele reported thenceforth but to Smith direct. Taken in connection with the need that soon arose, on account of the chaos in northern Texas, for McCulloch[865] to become absorbed in home affairs, the
[Footnote 862 His destination was apparently to be Shreveport, the department headquarters [Crosby to Bankhead, September 23, 1863.
_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268. p. 251].]
[Footnote 863: Cooper's headquarters, in the interval, were to be at Fort Was.h.i.ta [Ibid.,], where a company of Ba.s.s's regiment had been placed in garrison [Duval to Cooper, July 15, 1863, Ibid., p. 145].]
[Footnote 864: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1045.]
[Footnote 865: McCulloch was being greatly embarra.s.sed by the rapid spread of unionist sentiment and by desertions from his army. The expedient of furloughing was restarted to. To his credit, be it said, that no embarra.s.sments, no dawning of the idea that he was fighting in a failing cause, could make him forget the ordinary dictates of humanity. His scornful repudiation of Quantrill and his methods was characteristic of the man. For that repudiation, see, particularly, McCulloch to Turner, October 22, 1863, Ibid., vol. xxvi. part ii, 348.]
separation from Arkansas left Indian Territory stranded.
Fort Smith, moreover, was about to become Blunt's headquarters and it was while he was engaged in transferring his effects from Fort Scott to that place that the ma.s.sacre of Baxter Springs occurred, Blunt arriving upon the scene too late to prevent the murderous surprise having its full effect. The Baxter Springs ma.s.sacre was another guerrilla outrage, perpetrated by Quantrill and his band[866] who, their b.l.o.o.d.y work accomplished at the Federal outpost, pa.s.sed on down through the Cherokee Nation, killing outright whatever Indians or negroes they fell in with. It was their boast that they never burdened themselves with prisoners. The gang crossed the Arkansas about eighteen miles above Fort Gibson[867] and arrived at Cooper's camp on the Canadian, October twelfth.[868]
Scarcely had Blunt established his headquarters at Fort Smith, when political influences long hostile to him, Schofield at their head,[869] had acc.u.mulated force
[Footnote 866: Quantrill's bold dash from the Missouri to the Canadian had been projected in a spirit of bravado, deviltry, and downright savagery, and had undoubtedly been incited by the execution of Ewing's notorious order, _Number Eleven_ [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 473]. That order, as modified by Schofield, had authorized the depopulating of those counties of Missouri, Jackson, Ca.s.s, Bates, and a part of Vernon, where the guerrillas were believed to have their chief recruiting stations and where secessionist feeling had always been dominant. It was at once retaliatory and precautionary and on a par with the instructions for the removal of the Acadians on the eve of the breaking out of the French and Indian War. The banished Missourians have, however, as yet found no Longfellow to sentimentalize over them or to idealize, in a story of _Evangeline_, their misfortunes and their character. History has been spared the consequent and inevitable distortion.]
[Footnote 867: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 224.]
[Footnote 868: Quantrill to Price, October 13, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 700-701.]
[Footnote 869: In the matter of domestic politics in Kansas, particularly as they were shaped by the excitement over the guerrilla outrages, Schofield belonged to the party of _Moderates_, "Paw Paws" as its members were called in derision, (cont.)]
sufficient to effect his removal. He was relieved, under Schofield's orders of October 19, and Brigadier-general John McNeil then a.s.sumed command of the District of the Frontier.[870] Colonel Phillips continued in charge at Fort Gibson,[871] his presence being somewhat of a rea.s.surance to the Cherokees, who, appreciating Blunt's energetic administration, regretted his recall.[872]
Had the Federal Cherokees been authoritatively apprised of the real situation in the Indian Territory farther south, they need never have been anxious as to the safety of Fort Gibson. Steele's situation was peculiarly complex. As private personage and as commander he elicits commiseration. Small and incapable was his force,[873] intriguing and intractable were his
[Footnote 869: (cont.) and Blunt, like Lane, Wilder, and others, to that of the _Extremists_, or _Radicals_. Of the Extremists the "Red Legs" were the active wing, those who indulged in retaliatory and provocative outrages. Schofield's animosity against Blunt, to some extent richly deserved, amounted almost to a persecution. He inst.i.tuted an investigation of the District of the Frontier and it was upon the basis of the findings of the committee of investigation that he ordered Blunt's retirement [Schofield to Townsend, October 3, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 595-597; Blunt to Curtis, November 30, 1864, Ibid., vol. xli, part iv, 727-729]. For evidence of continued animosity see the correspondence of Champion Vaughan, Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 738, 742.]
[Footnote 870: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 666.]
[Footnote 871: For the condition and movements of the Indian Brigade from November 20, 1863, to December 20, 1863, see _Daily Conservative_, January 3, 1864.]
[Footnote 872: The resolutions, commendatory of his work, to which Blunt refers in his letter to Curtis of November 30, were pa.s.sed by the Cherokee National Council, October 20, 1863. The text of them is to be found, as also Chief Christie's letter of transmittal, in _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 790-791.]
[Footnote 873: Steele reported that on October first he had "Seminoles, 106; Chickasaws, 208; Creeks, 305; Choctaws, 1,024; Choctaw militia, 200, and whites, 999" [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part i, 34]. Concerning the condition of his entire command, the best understanding can be obtained from the inspection report of Smith's a.s.sistant inspector-general, W.C. Schaumburg, [Ibid., part ii, 1049-1053], October 26, 1863. Schaumburg exhibits conditions as simply deplorable, Indians poorly mounted, ignorant of drill, dest.i.tute of suitable (cont.)]
subordinates. Of the white force Magruder[874] was doing his utmost to deprive him, and of the Indian Steele found it next to impossible to keep account. Insignificant as it was, it was yet scattered here, there, and everywhere,[875] Cooper conniving at its desultory dispersion. Instead of strengthening his superior's hands, Cooper was, in fact, steadily weakening them and all for his own advancement. He disparaged Steele's work, discredited it with the Indians,[876] and, whenever possible, allowed a false construction to be put upon his acts. In connection with the movements of the white troops, is a case in point to be found. Rumor had it that Bankhead's brigade, now Gano's,[877] was to be called away for coast defence. Cooper knew perfectly well that such was not Steele's intention and yet he suffered
[Footnote 873: (cont.) arms; posts dilapidated; and prominent tribesmen, like Colonel Tandy Walker, indulging in petty graft, drawing government rations for members of their families and for their negro slaves. McCulloch was also of the opinion that conditions in Indian Territory were pretty bad [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part i, 1065], and that the red men were absolutely unreliable [Ibid., vol. xxvi, part ii, 378].]
[Footnote 874: For Magruder's insolent and overbearing att.i.tude towards Steele, see his correspondence in Ibid., part ii.