xxii, part ii, 953]. The following communications throw some light upon Bankhead's movements [Ibid., 948, 956, 963].]

[Footnote 824: Crosby to G.M. Bryan, August 30, 1863, Ibid., 984.]

[Footnote 825: Bankhead to E.P. Turner, August 13, 1863, Ibid., 965-966.]

[Footnote 826: Bankhead to Boggs, August 10, 1863, Ibid., 966.]

[Footnote 827: There is an abundance of material in the _Confederate Records_ on the subject of desertions in the West. Note particularly pp. 167, 168, 173-174, 192-193, 198, 204-205 of chap.

2, no. 268. Note, also, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 956.]

[Footnote 828: Duval to Cabell, August 17, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii 969-970.]

contagion among the Indians, his troops were moved to more and more isolated camps[829] across the Canadian[830] and, finally, back in the direction of Fort Smith. Ostensibly they were moved to the Arkansas line to protect Fort Smith; for Steele knew well that his present hold upon that place was of the frailest. It might be threatened at any moment from the direction of Ca.s.sville and Morgan had been instructed, in the event of an attack in prospect, to cross the boundary line and proceed along the Boggy road towards Riddle's station.[831] Steele was evidently not going to make any desperate effort to hold the place that for so long had been the seat of the Confederate control over the Southern Indians.

All this time, General Blunt had been patrolling the Arkansas for some thirty miles or so of its course[832] and had been thoroughly well aware of the a.s.sembling of Steele's forces, likewise of the disaffection of the Indians, with which, by the way, he had had quite a little to do. Not knowing exactly what Steele's intentions might be but surmising that he was meditating an attack, he resolved to a.s.sume the offensive himself.[833] The full significance of his resolution can be fully appreciated only by the noting of the fact that, subsequent to the Battle of Honey Springs, he had been instructed by General Schofield, his superior officer, not only not to advance but to fall back. To obey the order was inconceivable and Blunt had deliberately disobeyed it.[834] It was now his determination to do more. Fortunately, Schofield had recently changed his mind; for word had

[Footnote 829: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 202.]

[Footnote 830: Steele to Scott, August 7, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 957.]

[Footnote 831: Steele to Morgan, August, 1863, Ibid., 951; August 8, 1863, Ibid., 957.]

[Footnote 832: Steele to Blair, August 7, 1863, Ibid., 956.]

[Footnote 833: Blunt to Schofield, July 30, 1863, Ibid., 411.]

[Footnote 834: Blunt to Lincoln, September 24, 1863, Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 572.]

come to him that Congress had decided to relieve Kansas of her Indian enc.u.mbrance by compa.s.sing the removal of all her tribes, indigenous and immigrant, to Indian Territory. It mattered not that the former had a t.i.tle to their present holdings by ancient occupation and long continued possession and the latter a t.i.tle in perpetuity, guaranteed by the treaty-making power under the United States const.i.tution. All the tribes were to be ousted from the soil of the state that had been saved to freedom; but it would be first necessary to secure the Indian Territory and the men of the Kansas tribes were to be organized as soldiers to secure it. It is difficult to imagine a more ironical proceeding. The Indians were to be induced to fight for the recovery of a section of the country that would make possible their own banishment. Blunt strenuously objected, not because he was averse to ridding Kansas of the Indians, but because he had no faith in an Indian soldiery. Said he,

There are several reasons why I do not think such a policy practicable or advisable. It would take several months under the most favorable circ.u.mstances to organize and put into the field the Indians referred to, even were they ready and willing to enlist, of which fact I am not advised, but presume they would be very slow to enlist; besides my experience thus far with Indian soldiers has convinced me that they are of little service to the Government compared with other soldiers. The Cherokees, who are far superior in every respect to the Kansas Indians, did very good service while they had a specific object in view--the possession and occupation of their own country; having accomplished that, they have become greatly demoralized and nearly worthless as troops. I would earnestly recommend that (as the best policy the Government can pursue with these Indian regiments) they be mustered out of service some time during the coming winter, and put to work raising their subsistence, with a few white troops stationed among them for their protection.

I would not exchange one regiment of negro troops for ten regiments of Indians, and they can be obtained in abundance whenever Texas is reached.

In ten days from this date, if I have the success I expect, the Indian Territory south of the Arkansas River will be in our possession ...[835]

Blunt's mind was made up. He was determined to go forward with the force he already had. Ill-health[836] r.e.t.a.r.ded his movements a trifle; but on the twenty-second of August, two days after the ma.s.sacre by guerrillas had occurred at Lawrence, he crossed the Arkansas. He was at length accepting General Steele's challenge but poor Steele was quite unprepared for a duel of any sort. If Blunt distrusted the Indians, how very much more did he and with greater reason! With insufficient guns and ammunition, with no troops, white or red, upon whom he could confidently rely, and with no certainty of help from any quarter, he was compelled to adopt a Fabian policy, and he moved slowly backward, inviting yet never stopping to accept a full and regular engagement. Out of the Creek country he went and into the Choctaw.[837] At Perryville, on the road[838] to

[Footnote 835: Blunt to Schofield, August 22, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 465.]

[Footnote 836:--Ibid., 466. There seems to have been a good deal of sickness at Fort Gibson and some mortality, of which report was duly made to Steele [Ibid., 956; _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 192-193].]

[Footnote 837: Steele had crossed the line between the Creeks and Choctaws, however, before Blunt crossed the Arkansas. On August sixteenth, he had his camp on Longtown Creek and was sending a detachment out as far south as within about ten miles of Boggy Depot [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 968]. A few days later, he made his camp on Brooken Creek, a little to the eastward [Ibid., 972]. By that time, Steele was evidently quite reconciled to the thought that Fort Smith might at any moment be attacked and, perhaps, in such force that it would be needless to attempt to defend it. Cabell was to move to a safe distance, in the neighborhood of Scullyville, from whence, should there be reasonable prospect of success, he might send out reenforcements. In the event of almost certain failure, he was to draw off betimes in the direction of Riddle's station, where flour was stored [Ibid.,].]

[Footnote 838: On the subject of roads and highways in Indian Territory, see Ibid., (cont.)]

Texas, his men did have a small skirmish with Blunt's and at both Perryville and North Fork, Blunt destroyed some of his stores.[839]

At North Fork, Steele had established a general hospital, which now pa.s.sed from his control.

Following the unsuccessful skirmish at Perryville, the evening of August 25, Steele was "pushed rapidly down the country,"[840] so observed the wary Bankhead to whom fresh orders to a.s.sist Steele had been communicated.[841] Boggy Depot to the Texan commander seemed the proper place to defend[842] and near there he now waited; but Steele on East Boggy, full sixty miles from Red River and from comparative safety, begged him to come forward to Middle Boggy, a battle was surely impending.[843] No battle occurred, notwithstanding; for Blunt had given up the pursuit. He had come to know that not all of Steele's command was ahead of him,[844] that McIntosh with the Creeks had gone west within the Creek country, the Creeks having refused to leave it,[845] and that Cabell had gone east,

[Footnote 838: (cont.) vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 859; vol. xii, part ii, 997; Sheridan, _Memoirs_, vol. ii, 340.]

[Footnote 839: Blunt to Schofield, August 27, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i. 597-598; Steele to Snead, September 8, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 223.]

[Footnote 840: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 983.]

[Footnote 841: W.T. Carrington to Bankhead, August 22, 1863, Ibid., 975.]

[Footnote 842: Bankhead to Turner, August 23, 1863, Ibid., 977.

Near Boggy Depot, "the Fort Gibson and Fort Smith roads" forked. At Boggy Depot, moreover, were "all the stores of the Indian Department."

With Boggy Depot in the hands of the enemy, Bankhead's whole front would be uncovered [Bankhead to Turner August 20, 1863, Ibid., 972].]

[Footnote 843: Duval to Bankhead and other commanders, August 27, 1863, Ibid., 981.]

[Footnote 844: Blunt to Schofield, August 27, 1863, Ibid., part i, 597. He thought, however, that Stand Watie was with Steele but he was not. He was absent on a scout [Steele to Boggs, August 30, 1863, Ibid., part ii, 984].]

[Footnote 845: Steele to Snead, September 11, 1863, Ibid., part ii, 1012.]

towards Fort Smith.[846] It was Fort Smith that now engaged Blunt's attention and thither he directed his steps, Colonel W.F. Cloud[847]

of the Second Kansas Cavalry, who, acting under orders from General McNeil,[848] had cooperated with him at Perryville, being sent on in advance. Fort Smith surrendered with ease, not a blow being struck in her defence;[849] but there was Cabell yet to be dealt with.

Steele's conduct, his adoption of the Fabian policy, severely criticized in some quarters, in Indian Territory, in Arkansas, in Texas, had yet been condoned and, indeed, approved[850] by General Kirby Smith, the

[Footnote 846: Cabell's brigade, as already indicated, had had to be sent back "to avoid the contagion of demoralization." [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 983; Steele to Snead, September 11, 1863, Ibid., 1012].]

[Footnote 847: Cloud had arrived at Fort Gibson, August 21 [Cloud to McNeil, August 22, 1863, Ibid., 466].]

[Footnote 848: John McNeil was commanding the District of Southwestern Missouri. The orders originated with Schofield [Ibid., part i, 15].]

[Footnote 849: Cabell had taken a position on the Poteau. Steele had been much averse to his running the risk of having himself shut up in Fort Smith [Steele to Cabell, September 1, 1863, Ibid., part ii, 987].]

[Footnote 850: "The general commanding is satisfied that the Fabian policy is the true one to adopt when not well satisfied that circ.u.mstances warrant a different course..." [G.M. Bryan to Steele, September 8, 1863, Ibid., 999]. Smith believed in "abandoning a part to save the whole" [Letter to General R. Taylor, September 3, 1863, Ibid., 989]; but President Davis and men of the states interested had impressed it upon him that that would never do. It must have been with some idea of justifying Steele's procedure in mind that Smith wrote to Stand Watie, September 8th [Ibid., 999-1000].

Watie had lodged a complaint with him, August 9th, against the Confederate subordination of the Indian interests. To that Smith replied in words that must have made a powerful appeal to the Cherokee chief, who had already, in fact on the selfsame day that he wrote to Smith, made an equally powerful one to his own tribe and to other tribes. Watie's appeal will be taken up later, the n.o.ble sounding part of Smith's may as well find a place for quotation here.

"I know that your people have cause for complaint. Their sufferings and the apparent ill-faith of our Government would naturally produce dissatisfaction. That your patriotic band of followers deserve the thanks of our Government I know. They have won the respect and esteem of our people (cont.)]

person most competent to judge fairly; because he possessed a full comprehension of the situation in Steele's command. Smith knew and others might have known that the situation had been largely created by envy, hatred, and malice, by corruption in high places, by peculation in low, by desertions in white regiments and by defection in Indian.

The Confederate government was not unaware of the increasing dissatisfaction among its Indian allies. It had innumerable sources of information, the chief of which and, perhaps, not the most reliable or the least factional, were the tribal delegates[851] in Congress. Late

[Footnote 850: (cont.) by their steadfast loyalty and heroic bravery.

Tell them to remain true; encourage them in their despondency; bid them struggle on through the dark gloom which now envelops our affairs, and bid them remember the insurmountable difficulties with which our Government has been surrounded; that she has never been untrue to her engagements, though some of her agents may have been remiss and even criminally negligent. Our cause is the same--a just and holy one; we must stand and struggle on together, till that just and good Providence, who always supports the right, crowns our efforts with success. I can make you no definite promises. I have your interest at heart, and will endeavor faithfully and honestly to support you in your efforts and in those of your people to redeem their homes from an oppressor's rule...

"What might have been done and has not is with the past; it is needless to comment upon it, and I can only a.s.sure you that I feel the importance of your country to our cause..."

That Smith was no more sincere than other white men had been, when addressing Indians, goes almost without saying. It was necessary to pacify Stand Watie and promises would no longer suffice. Candor was a better means to the end sought. Had Smith only not so very recently had his interview with the governors of the southwestern states, his tone might not have been so conciliatory. In antic.i.p.ation of that interview and in advance of it, for it might come too late, some Arkansans, with R.W. Johnson among them, had impressed it upon Governor Flanagin that both Arkansas and Indian Territory were necessary to the Confederacy. In their communication, appeared these fatal admissions, fatal to any claim of disinterestedness:

"Negro slavery exists in the Indian Territory, and is profitable and desirable there, affording a practical issue of the right of expansion, for which the war began..." [July 25, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 945].]