[Footnote 221: _Daily Conservative_, March 5, 1862.]

[Footnote 222: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 148.]

expeditionary force of two white regiments and two[223] thousand Indians, appropriately armed. To expedite matters and to obviate any difficulties that might otherwise beset the carrying out of the plan, a semi-confidential agent, on detail from the Indian Office, was sent west with despatches[224] to Halleck and with an order[225] from the Ordnance Department for the delivery, at Fort Leavenworth, of the requisite arms. The messenger was Judge James Steele, who, upon reaching St. Louis, had already discouraging news to report to Dole.

He had interviewed Halleck and had found him in anything but a helpful mood, notwithstanding that he must, by that time, have received and reflected upon the following communication from the War Department:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C, March 19, 1862.

MAJ. GEN.H.W. HALLECK,

Commanding the Department of Mississippi:

General: It is the desire of the President, on the application of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that you should detail two regiments to act in the Indian country, with a view to open the way for the friendly Indians who are now refugees in Southern Kansas to return to their homes and to protect them there.

Five thousand friendly Indians will also be armed to aid in their own protection, and you will please furnish them with necessary subsistence.

Please report your action in the premises to this Department. Prompt action is necessary.

By order of the Secretary of War:

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-general[226]

[Footnote 223: Two thousand was most certainly the number, although the communication from the War Department gives it as five.]

[Footnote 224: Dole to Halleck, March 21, 1862 [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 67, 516-517].]

[Footnote 225:--Ibid., 517-518.]

[Footnote 226: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 624-625.]

Steele inferred from what pa.s.sed at the interview with Halleck that the commanding general was decidedly opposed to arming Indians. Steele found him also non-committal as to when the auxiliary force would be available.[227] Dole's letter, with its seeming dictation as to the choice of a commander for the expedition, may not have been to Halleck's liking. He was himself at the moment most interested in the suppression of guerrillas and jayhawkers, against whom sentence of outlawry had just been pa.s.sed. As it happened, that was the work in which Dole's nominee, Colonel Robert B. Mitch.e.l.l,[228] was to render such signal service[229] and, antic.i.p.ating as much, Halleck may have objected to his being thought of for other things. Furthermore, Dole had no right to so much as cast a doubt upon Halleck's own ability to select a proper commander.

A little perplexed but not at all daunted by Halleck's lack of cordiality, Steele proceeded on his journey and, arriving at Leavenworth, presented his credentials to Captain Mc.n.u.tt, who was in charge of the a.r.s.enal. Four hundred Indian rifles were at hand, ready for him, and others expected.[230] What to do next, was the question?

Should he go on to Leroy and trust to the auxiliary force's showing up in season or wait for it? The princ.i.p.al part of his mission was yet to be executed. The Indians had to be enrolled and everything got in train for their expedition southward. Their homes

[Footnote 227: Steele to Dole, March 27, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862, S 537 of 1862].]

[Footnote 228: Robert B. Mitch.e.l.l was colonel, first of the Second Kansas Infantry, then of the Second Kansas Cavalry. He raised the former, in answer to President Lincoln's first call, 1861 [Crawford, _Kansas in the Sixties_, 20], chiefly in Linn County, and the latter in 1862.]

[Footnote 229: Connelley, _Quantrilt and the Border Wars_, 236 ff.]

[Footnote 230: Steele to Dole, March 26, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862].]

once recovered, they were to be left in such shape as to be able to "protect and defend themselves."[231]

Halleck's preoccupation, prejudice, or whatever it was that prevented him from giving any satisfaction to Steele soon yielded, as all things sooner or later must, to necessity; but not to the extent of sanctioning the employment of Indians in warfare except as against other "Indians or in defense of their own territory and homes." The Pea Ridge atrocities were probably still fresh in his mind. On the fifth of April, he instructed[232] General Denver with a view to advancing, at last, the organization of the Indian expedition and Denver, Coffin, and Steele forthwith exerted all their energies in cooperating effort[233]. Some time was spent in inspecting arms[234]

but, on the eighth, enough for two thousand Indians went forward in the direction of Leroy and Humboldt[235] and on the sixteenth were delivered to the superintendent[236]. Coffin surmised that new complications would arise as soon as the distribution began; for all the Indians, whether they intended to enlist or not, would try to secure guns. Nothing had yet been said about their pay and nothing heard of an auxiliary force[237]. Again the question was, what,

[Footnote 231: Dole to Steele, March 21, 1862, Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 67, 508-509.]

[Footnote 232: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 665.]

[Footnote 233: Dole's name might well be added to this list; for he had never lost his interest or relaxed his efforts. On the fifth of April, he communicated to Secretary Smith the intelligence that he had issued instructions to "the officers appointed to command the two Regiments of Indians to be raised as Home Guard to report at Fort Leavenworth to be mustered into service ... "--Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 12, 357.]

[Footnote 234: Steele to Dole, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, S 538 of 1862].]

[Footnote 235: Denver to Halleck, April 8, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 679].]

[Footnote 236: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 148.]

[Footnote 237: "... I fear we shall have trouble in regard to the guns as many will take guns that will not go and whether they will give up their arms is doubtful. I had a long talk with Opothly-Oholo on that point and told (cont.)]

in the event of its not appearing, should the Indian agents do?[238]

The time was propitious for starting the expedition; for not the shadow of an enemy had been lately seen in the West, unless count be taken of Indians returning home or small roving bands of possible marauders that the people of all parties detested[239]. But the order for the supplanting of Denver by Sturgis had already been issued, April sixth[240], and Sturgis's policy was not yet

[Footnote 237: (cont.) him you could only get 2000 guns and you wanted every one to go and an Indian with it and that if any of them got guns that did not go they must give up their guns to those that would go but I know enough of the Indian character to know that it will be next thing to an impossibility to get a gun away from one when he once gets it and I shall put off the distribution of the guns till the last moment and it would be best to send them on a day or two before being distributed but that would make them mad and they would not go at all and how we are to know how many to look out for from others than those we have here I am not able to see but we will do all that we can but you may look out for dificulty in the matter they all seem anxious now to go and make no objections as yet nor have they said anything about their pay but as they were told before when we expect them to go into the Hunter Lane expedition that they would get the same pay as white troops and set off a part of it for their families it was so indelibly impressed upon their minds that I fear we will have a blow up on that score when it comes up we hear nothing yet of any troops being ordered to this service and I very much fear they will put off the matter so long that there will be no crop raised this season ... the mortality amongst them is great more since warm weather has set in than during the cold weather they foolishly physic themselves nearly to death danc [dance] all night and then jump into the river just at daylight to make themselves bullet proof they have followed this up now every night for over two weeks and it has no doubt caused many deaths Long Tiger the Uchee Chief and one of the best amongst them died to-day--yesterday we had 7 deaths and there will not be less to-day"--Coffin to Dole, April 7, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1578 of 1862.]

[Footnote 238: This was the query put to Dole by Steele in a letter of the thirteenth of April, which acknowledged Dole's of the third and ventured the opinion that Postmaster-general Blair "must be imitating General McClellan and practicing strategy with the mails." Steele further remarked, "Gen'l Denver, Maj. Wright and I are in the dark as to the plans of the Indian Expedition. Gen. Denver thinks I should proceed at once to Leroy without waiting for your instructions."--Ibid., S 539 of 1862.]

[Footnote 239: Curtis to Halleck, April 5, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 662].]

[Footnote 240: Sturgis, upon the receipt of orders of this date, a.s.sumed command of (cont.)]

known. It soon revealed itself, however, and was hostile to the whole project that Dole had set his heart upon. Apparently that project, the moment it had been taken up by Denver, had ceased to have any interest for Lane on the score of its merits and had become identified with the Robinson faction in Kansas politics. At any rate, it was the anti-Robinson press that saw occasion for rejoicing in the complete removal of Denver from the scene, an event which soon took place[241].

The relieving of Denver from the command of the District of Kansas inaugurated[242] what contemporaries described as "Sturgis' military despotism,"[243] in amplification of which it is enough to say that it attempted the utter confounding, if not the annihilation, of the Indian Expedition, a truly n.o.ble undertaking to be sure, considering how much was hoped for from that expedition, how much of benefit and measure of justice to a helpless, homeless, impoverished people and considering, also, how much of time and thought and

[Footnote 240: (cont.) the District of Kansas; but Denver was not called east until the fourteenth of May. On the twenty-first of April, it was still expected that he would lead an expedition "down the borders of Arkansas into the Indian country." [KELTON to Curtis, April 21, 1862, Ibid., vol. xiii, 364].]

[Footnote 241: The _Daily Conservative_, for instance, rejoiced over this telegram from Sidney Clark of May 2, which gave advanced information of Denver's approaching departure: "Conservative: The Department of Kansas is reinstated. Gen. Blunt takes command. Denver reports to Halleck; Sturgis here." The newspaper comment was, "We firmly believe that a prolongation of the Denver-Sturgis political generalship, aided as it was by the corrupt Governor of this State, would have led to a revolution in Kansas ..."--_Daily Conservative_, May 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 242: General Sturgis a.s.sumed command, April 10, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 683], and Denver took temporary charge at Fort Scott [Ibid., 668].]

[Footnote 243: Quoted from the _Daily Conservative_ of May 20; but not with the idea of subscribing thereby to any verdict that would bear the implication that all of Sturgis's measures were arbitrary and wrong. Something strenuous was needed in Kansas. The arrest of Jennison and of Hoyt [Ibid., April 19, 23, 1862] because of their too radical anti-slavery actions was justifiable. Jennison had disorganized his regiment in a shameful manner [Ibid., June 3, 1862].]

energy, not to mention money, had already been expended upon it.

Sturgis's policy with reference to the Indian Expedition was initiated by an order[244], of April 25, which gained circulation as purporting to be in conformity with instructions from the headquarters of the Department of the Mississippi, although in itself emanating from those of the District of Kansas. It put a summary stop to the enlistment of Indians and threatened with arrest anyone who should disobey its mandate. Superintendent Coffin, in his inimitable illiteracy, at once entered protest[245] against it and coolly informed Sturgis that, in enrolling Indians for service, he was acting under the authority, not of the War, but of the Interior Department. At the same sitting, he applied to Commissioner Dole for new instructions[246].

[Footnote 244: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 365.]

[Footnote 245:

LE ROY COFFEE COUNTY, KANSAS, April 29th 1862.

BRIG. GENL S.D. STURGIS, Fort Leavenworth Kansas

Dear Sir: A Special Messenger arrived here last night from Fort Leavenworth with your orders No. 8 and contents noted. I would most respectfully inform you that I am acting under the controle and directions of the Interior and not of the War Department. I have been endeavoring to the best of my humble ability to carry out the instructions and wishes of that Department, all of which I hope will meet your aprobation.