IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST INDIAN EXPEDITION

Among the manifold requests put forward by the refugees, none was so insistent, none so dolefully sincere, as the one for means to return home. It is a mistake to suppose that the Indian, traditionally laconic and stoical, is without family affection and without that n.o.blest of human sentiments, love of country. The United States government has, indeed, proceeded upon the supposition that he is dest.i.tute of emotions, natural to his more highly civilized white brother, but its files are full to overflowing with evidences to the contrary. Everywhere among them the investigator finds the exile's lament. The red man has been banished so often from familiar and greatly loved scenes that it is a wonder he has taken root anywhere and yet he has. Attachment to the places where the bones of his people lie is with him the most constant of experiences and his cry for those same sacred places is all the stronger and the more sorrowful because it has been persistently ignored by the white man.

The southern Indians had not been so very many years in the Indian Territory, most of them not more than the span of one generation, but Indian Territory was none the less home. If the refugees could only get there again, they were confident all would be well with them. In Kansas, they were hungry, afflicted with disease, and dying daily by the score.[193] Once at home

[Footnote 193: And yet they did have their amus.e.m.e.nts. Their days of exile were not filled altogether with bitterness. Coffin, in a letter to the (cont.)]

all the ills of the flesh would disappear and lost friends be recovered. The exodus had separated them cruelly from each other.

There were family and tribal encampments within the one large encampment,[194] it is true, but there were also widely isolated groups, scattered indiscriminately across two hundred miles of bleak and lonely prairie, and no amount of philanthropic effort on the part of the government agents could mitigate the misery arising therefrom or bring the groups together. The task had been early abandoned as, under the circ.u.mstances, next to impossible; but the refugees went on begging for its accomplishment, notwithstanding that they had neither the physical strength nor the means to render any a.s.sistance themselves. Among them the wail of the bereaved vied in tragic cadence with the sad inquiry for the missing.

When Dole arrived at Leavenworth the latter part of January, representatives of the loyal Indians interviewed him and received a.s.surances, honest and well-meant at the time given, that an early return to Indian Territory would be made possible. Lane, likewise interviewed,[195] was similarly encouraging and had every reason to be; for was not his Indian brigade in process of formation? Much cheered and even exhilarated in spirit, the Indians went away to endure and to wait. They had great confidence in Lane's power to accomplish; but, as the days and the weeks pa.s.sed and he did not come, they grew tired of waiting. The waiting

[Footnote 193: (cont.) _Daily Conservative_, published April 16, 1862, gives, besides a rather gruesome account of their diseases, some interesting details of their camp life.]

[Footnote 194: On their division into tribal encampments, see Kile to Dole, April 10, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, K 119 of 1862].]

[Footnote 195: They had their interview with Lane at the Planters'

House while they were awaiting the arrival of Dole. Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la (Crazy Dog) and a Seminole chief, Aluktustenuke (Major Potatoes) were among them [_Daily Conservative_, January 28, February 8, 1862].]

[Ill.u.s.tration: PORTRAIT OF COLONEL W.A. PHILLIPS]

seemed so hopeless to them miserable, so endlessly long. Primitive as they were, they simply could not understand why the agents of a great government could not move more expeditiously. The political and military aspects of the undertaking, involved in their return home, were unknown to them and, if known, would have been uncomprehended.

Then, too, the vacillation of the government puzzled them. They became suspicious; for they had become acquainted, through the experience of long years, with the white man's bad faith and they had nothing to go upon that would counteract the influence of earlier distrust. And so it happened, that, as the weary days pa.s.sed and Lane's brigade did not materialize, every grievance that loomed up before them took the shape of a disappointed longing for home.

So poignant was their grief at the continued delay that they despaired of ever getting the help promised and began to consider how they could contrive a return for themselves. And yet, quite independent of Lane's brigade, there had been more than one movement initiated in their behalf. The desire to recover lost ground in Indian Territory, under the pretext of restoring the fugitives, aroused the fighting instinct of many young men in southern Kansas and several irregular expeditions were projected.[196] Needless to say they came to nothing. In point of fact, they never really developed, but died almost with the thought.

There was no adequate equipment for them and the longer the delay, the more necessary became equipment; because after the Battle of Pea Ridge, Pike's brigade had been set free to operate, if it so willed, on the Indian Territory border.

[Footnote 196: In addition to those referred to in doc.u.ments already cited, the one, projected by Coffin's son and a Captain Brooks, is noteworthy. It is described in a letter from Coffin to Dole, March 24, 1862.]

Closely following upon the Federal success of March 6 to 8, came numerous changes and readjustments in the Missouri-Kansas commands; but they were not so much the result of that success as they were a part of the general reorganization that was taking place in the Federal service incident to the more efficient war administration of Secretary Stanton. By order of March 11, three military departments were arranged for, the Department of the Potomac under McClellan, that of the Mountain under Fremont, and that of the Mississippi under Halleck. The consolidation of Hunter's Department of Kansas with Halleck's Department of Missouri was thus provided for and had long been a consummation devoutly to be wished.[197] Both were naturally parts of the same organic whole when regarded from a military point of view. Neither could be operated upon independently of the other.

Moreover, both were infested by political vultures. In both, the army discipline was, in consequence, bad; that is, if it could be said to be in existence at all. If anything, Kansas was in a worse state than Missouri. Her condition, as far as the military forces were concerned, had not much improved since Hunter first took command and it was then about the worst that could possibly be imagined. Major Halpine's description[198] of it, made by him in his capacity as a.s.sistant adjutant-general, officially to Halleck, is anything but flattering.

Hunter was probably well rid of his job and Halleck, whom Lincoln much admired because he was "wholly for the service,"[199] had asked for the entire command.[200]

[Footnote 197: Halleck, however, had not desired the inclusion of Kansas in the contemplated new department because he thought that state had only a remote connection with present operations.]

[Footnote 198: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 615-617.]

[Footnote 199: Thayer, _Life and Letters of John Hay_, vol. i, 127-128.]

[Footnote 200: Badeau, _Military History of U.S. Grant_, vol. i, 53, _footnote_.]

Halleck's plans for remodeling the const.i.tuent elements of his department were made with a thorough comprehension of the difficulties confronting him. It is not surprising that they brought General Denver again to the fore. Hunter's troubles had been bred by local politics.

That Halleck well knew; but he also knew that Indian relations were a source of perplexity and that there was no enemy actually in Kansas and no enemy worth considering that would threaten her, provided her own jay-hawking hordes could be suppressed. Her problems were chiefly administrative.[201] For the work to be done, Denver seemed the fittest man available and, on the nineteenth, he, having previously been ordered to report to Halleck for duty,[202] was a.s.signed[203] to the command of a newly-const.i.tuted District of Kansas, from which the troops,[204] who were guarding the only real danger zone, the southeastern part of the state, were expressly excluded. The hydra-headed evil of the western world then a.s.serted itself, the meddling, particularistic spoils system, with the result that Lane and Pomeroy, unceasingly vigilant whenever and wherever what they regarded as their preserves were likely to be encroached upon, went to President Lincoln and protested against the preferment of Denver.[205]

Lincoln weakly yielded and wired to Halleck to suspend

[Footnote 201: Halleck to Stanton, March 28, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. viii, 647-648.]

[Footnote 202:--Ibid., 612]

[Footnote 203:--Ibid., 832.]

[Footnote 204: Those troops, about five thousand, were left under the command of George W. Deitzler, colonel of the First Kansas (Ibid., 614), a man who had become prominent before the war in connection with the Sharpe's rifles episode (Spring, _Kansas_, 60) and whose appointment as an Indian agent, early in 1861, had been successfully opposed by Lane (Robinson, _Kansas Conflict_, 458).

There will be other occasions to refer to him in this narrative. He is believed to have held the secret that induced Lane to commit suicide in 1866 [Ibid., 457-460].]

[Footnote 205: Stanton to Halleck, March 26, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 516].]

the order for Denver's a.s.signment to duty until further notice.[206]

Stanton, to whom Halleck applied[207] for an explanation, deprecated[208] the political interference of the Kansas senators and the influence it had had with the chief executive, but he, too, had to give way. So effective was the Lane-Pomeroy objection to Denver that even a temporary[209] appointment of him, resorted[210] to by Halleck because of the urgent need of some sort of a commander in Kansas, was deplored by the president.[211] Denver was then sent to the place where his abilities and his experience would be better appreciated, to the southernmost part of the state, the hinterland of the whole Indian country.[212] Official indecision and personal envy pursued him even there, however, and it was not long before he was called eastward.[213] The man who succeeded him in command of the District of Kansas[214] was one who proved to be his ranking officer[215] and his rival, Brigadier-general S.D. Sturgis. Blunt succeeded him at Fort Scott.

[Footnote 206: Lincoln to Halleck, March 21, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 516.]

[Footnote 207: Halleck to Stanton, March 26, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 208: "Deprecated" is, perhaps, too mild a word to describe Stanton's feeling in the matter. Adjutant-general Hitchc.o.c.k is authority for the statement that Stanton threatened "to leave the office" should the "enforcement" of any such order, meaning the non-a.s.signment of Denver and the appointment of a man named Davis [Davies?], believed by Robinson to be a relative of Lane [_Kansas Conflict_, 446], be attempted [Hitchc.o.c.k to Halleck, March 22, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. viii, 832-833].]

[Footnote 209:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 519.]

[Footnote 210:--Ibid., vol. viii, 647-648.]

[Footnote 211:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 519.]

[Footnote 212: Concerning the work, mapped out for Denver, see Halleck to Sturgis, April 6, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 668]

and Halleck to Stanton, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., 672].]

[Footnote 213: May 14, 1862 [Ibid., vol. iii, part i, supplement, 249].]

[Footnote 214:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 520.]

[Footnote 215: "It is stated that the commission of Gen. Sturgis is dated April 10 and that of Gen. Denver Aug. 14 and consequently Gen.

Sturgis is the ranking officer in this military District."--_Daily Conservative_, April 10, 1862.]

The elimination of Kansas as a separate department marked the revival of interest in an Indian expedition. The cost of supporting so huge a body of refugees had really become a serious proposition and, as Colonel C. R. Jennison[216] had once remarked, it would be economy to enlist them.[217] Congress had provided that certain Indian annuity money might be diverted to their maintenance,[218] but that fund was practically exhausted before the middle of March.[219] As already observed, the refugees very much wished to a.s.sist in the recovery of Indian Territory.[220] In fact they were determined to go south if the army went and their disappointment was likely to be most keen in the event of its and their not going.[221] It was under circ.u.mstances such as these that Commissioner Dole recommended to Secretary Smith, March 13, 1862, that he

Procure an order from the War Department detailing two Regiment of Volunteers from Kansas to go with the Indians to their homes and to remain there for their protection as long (as) may be necessary, also to furnish two thousand stand of arms and ammunition to be placed in the hands of the loyal Indians.

Dole's unmistakable earnestness carried the day. Within less than a week there had been promised[222] him all that he had asked for and more, an

[Footnote 216: Jennison, so says the _Daily Conservative_, March 25, 1862, had been ordered with the First Cavalry to repair to Humboldt at the time the Indian Expedition was under consideration the first of the year and was brevetted acting brigadier for the purpose of furthering Dole's intentions.]

[Footnote 217: _Daily Conservative_, February 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 218: _Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second session, part i, 835, 878.]

[Footnote 219: Dole to Smith, March 13, 1862 [Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 12, 331-332].]

[Footnote 220: Coffin to Dole, March 3, 1862 [Ibid., Consolidated Files, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1544 of 1862; _Letters Registered_, no. 58].]