Vogelsang patrolled the Gulf of St. Lawrence for two more weeks, but it was tough going. During the day the skies were dense with Allied aircraft, many on training nights. At night fog rolled in and obscured visibility. Finally, on the afternoon of July 20, while submerged off Cap-de-la-Madeleine in the St. Lawrence estuary, Vogelsang found another Quebec-Sydney convoy (Number 19). He fired a two-torpedo fan at the 4,400-ton British freighter Frederika Lensen Frederika Lensen. One missed or malfunctioned but the other hit. Frantic efforts to salvage the ship failed; she broke amidships and foundered. Allied air and surface forces again botched the counterattack and Vogelsang ran back through the Cabot Strait to open seas. His successes in the St. Lawrence River and the gulf (four ships) were twice those of Thurmann in U-553 U-553 (two ships), and they encouraged Donitz to plan other forays to the area, regardless of the risks. (two ships), and they encouraged Donitz to plan other forays to the area, regardless of the risks.

Five VIIs patrolled the United States East Coast from Cape Cod to Cape Lookout. On the way, two skippers, Kurt Diggins, age twenty-eight, in the new U-458 U-458 and the veteran Hans Oestermann in and the veteran Hans Oestermann in U-754 U-754 sank freighters in mid-ocean. However, all five VIIs reported a dearth of traffic (now sailing in convoy) and heavy ASW measures. sank freighters in mid-ocean. However, all five VIIs reported a dearth of traffic (now sailing in convoy) and heavy ASW measures.

Patrolling off Cape Lookout in the early hours of July 11, the veteran Hans-Dieter Heinicke in U-576 U-576 found a northbound convoy. When he reported it to Kerneval, he was told to attack and to bring up any other boats in the area. A likely helping hand was the veteran Siegfried von Forstner in found a northbound convoy. When he reported it to Kerneval, he was told to attack and to bring up any other boats in the area. A likely helping hand was the veteran Siegfried von Forstner in U-402 U-402, who was just then closing on Cape Hatteras. Heinicke trailed the convoy north toward Cape Hatteras, but he later reported he had lost contact before he could shoot and therefore he could not vector in any other boats. Von Forstner in U-402 U-402 and Heinicke in and Heinicke in U-576 U-576 took up independent stations off Cape Hatteras. took up independent stations off Cape Hatteras.

Over the next forty-eight hours, July 12 to 14, four aircraft patrolling Cape Hatteras reported attacks on U-boats. On July 12 a Coast Guard plane, piloted by E. B. Ing, straddled a U-boat with two 325-pound depth charges from an altitude of 200 feet. The next day an Army Air Forces B-17 Flying Fortress, piloted by A. H. Tuttle, also flying at 200 feet, straddled a U-boat with six depth charges. On July 14 two Navy aircraft, piloted by William R. Jemison and George L. Schein, dropped four shallow-set Mark XVII depth charges on a U-boat from low altitude. All four aircraft reported probable or certain kills or heavy damage.

So far it has not been possible to ascertain which planes hit which U-boats. On July 13, Heinicke in U-576 U-576 reported to Kerneval that he had incurred damage from aircraft bombs and was "attempting repairs." The next day, July 14, Heinicke reported he could not make repairs and that he was aborting the patrol. Also on July 14, von Forstner in reported to Kerneval that he had incurred damage from aircraft bombs and was "attempting repairs." The next day, July 14, Heinicke reported he could not make repairs and that he was aborting the patrol. Also on July 14, von Forstner in U-402 U-402 reported he had been heavily bombed and depth-charged and that as a result he had had a battery explosion. In response, Kerneval ordered von Forstner to make repairs in an area 360 miles due east of Hatteras, beyond range of most ASW aircraft. reported he had been heavily bombed and depth-charged and that as a result he had had a battery explosion. In response, Kerneval ordered von Forstner to make repairs in an area 360 miles due east of Hatteras, beyond range of most ASW aircraft.

In the late afternoon of July 15, Heinicke in U-576 U-576, perhaps limping homeward, came upon another convoy off Cape Hatteras. Merely a few hours out from Norfolk Norfolk, it was the southbound KS 520, comprised of nineteen merchant ships. The convoy was escorted by seven surface craft, including the American four-stack destroyers Ellis Ellis and and McCormick McCormick, and the on-loan British corvette Spry Spry* (equipped with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar and the first Hedgehog to be developed by the British), the 165-foot Coast Guard cutter Triton, a blimp, and several aircraft. Perhaps brooding over his failure to attack the convoy he had found earlier off Cape Lookout, Heinicke elected to attack this one, even though his boat was seriously damaged and unstable. (equipped with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar and the first Hedgehog to be developed by the British), the 165-foot Coast Guard cutter Triton, a blimp, and several aircraft. Perhaps brooding over his failure to attack the convoy he had found earlier off Cape Lookout, Heinicke elected to attack this one, even though his boat was seriously damaged and unstable.

Heinicke set up on three ships and probably fired a full bow salvo. His torpedoes sank the 2,100-ton Nicaraguan freighter Bluefields Bluefields and damaged two big American ships: the 8,300-ton freighter and damaged two big American ships: the 8,300-ton freighter Chilore Chilore and the 11,100-ton tanker J. A. Mowinckel. The two damaged ships ran due west to beach, but in so doing they plowed into the Hatteras defensive minefield. and the 11,100-ton tanker J. A. Mowinckel. The two damaged ships ran due west to beach, but in so doing they plowed into the Hatteras defensive minefield. Chilore Chilore was wrecked beyond repair, but Mowinckel was salvaged and eventually returned to service. The Navy tug Keshena, attempting to rescue was wrecked beyond repair, but Mowinckel was salvaged and eventually returned to service. The Navy tug Keshena, attempting to rescue Chilore Chilore, also hit a mine and sank.

Upon firing the torpedoes, U-576 U-576 destabilized and broached close astern of the American merchant ship Unicoi. Her Armed Guard crew, commanded by M. K. Ames, on full alert at the 5" stern gun, opened fire on destabilized and broached close astern of the American merchant ship Unicoi. Her Armed Guard crew, commanded by M. K. Ames, on full alert at the 5" stern gun, opened fire on U-576 U-576 and claimed a solid hit on the conning tower. At about the same time, two Navy aircraft of Patrol Squadron 9, piloted by Frank C. Lewis and Charles D. Webb, straddled and claimed a solid hit on the conning tower. At about the same time, two Navy aircraft of Patrol Squadron 9, piloted by Frank C. Lewis and Charles D. Webb, straddled U-576 U-576 with two Mark XVII depth charges set for fifty feet. The boat sank in deep water with no survivors. with two Mark XVII depth charges set for fifty feet. The boat sank in deep water with no survivors.

There were four other VIIs then in the vicinity of or closing on Cape Hatteras: Dietrich Lohmann in the new U-89 U-89, Siegfried von Forstner in the damaged U-402 U-402, Kurt Diggins in the new U-458 U-458, and Hans Oestermann in U-754 U-754. Believing (incorrectly) that the Type VIID minelayer U-215 U-215 and (correctly) that Degen's and (correctly) that Degen's U-701 U-701 had been sunk at Hatteras, and that had been sunk at Hatteras, and that U-402 U-402 and and U-576 U-576 had been badly damaged at Hatteras (but unaware of had been badly damaged at Hatteras (but unaware of U-576 U-576's loss), Donitz concluded that the meager successes did not justify the risks and losses. Therefore, on July 19, he directed the damaged U-402 U-402 to abort to France and the to abort to France and the U-89 U-89, U-458 U-458, and U-754 U-754 to shift from American to Canadian waters, southeast of Halifax, joining Vogelsang in to shift from American to Canadian waters, southeast of Halifax, joining Vogelsang in U-132 U-132, then exiting the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

The withdrawal of these four VIIs from the United States East Coast marked the end of the intense six-month U-boat campaign in those waters.

The four VIIs that gathered in Canadian waters had mixed success. Off Halifax, Vogelsang in U-132 U-132 sank the 6,700-ton British freighter sank the 6,700-ton British freighter Pacific Pioneer Pacific Pioneer, bringing his total for the patrol to five ships for 21,400 tons, and earning him high praise. Diggins in U-458 U-458 sank the 4,900-ton British tanker sank the 4,900-ton British tanker Arletta Arletta. Oestermann in U-754 U-754 sank the 260-ton American trawler sank the 260-ton American trawler Ebb Ebb by gun, killing five fishermen and wounding seven. Lohmann in by gun, killing five fishermen and wounding seven. Lohmann in U-89 U-89 found a convoy south of Cape Sable and set up on a fat tanker, but an escort "ruined" his attack. He shot two torpedoes at the escort, a "destroyer," but they missed or malfunctioned. Several days later he sank the 54-ton Canadian fishing trawler found a convoy south of Cape Sable and set up on a fat tanker, but an escort "ruined" his attack. He shot two torpedoes at the escort, a "destroyer," but they missed or malfunctioned. Several days later he sank the 54-ton Canadian fishing trawler Lucille M Lucille M by gun. Her eleven survivors reported that Lohmann expressed regret over the sinking, but said he "was under orders and had to obey." That trawler was the only vessel Lohmann sank on his 77-day patrol to America. by gun. Her eleven survivors reported that Lohmann expressed regret over the sinking, but said he "was under orders and had to obey." That trawler was the only vessel Lohmann sank on his 77-day patrol to America.

The Canadian military historian, W.A.B. Douglas, has established that within a period of one week, July 30 to August 5, Hudsons of Canadian squadrons 11 and 113, capitalizing on a new land-based Huff Duff network, found and hit all four of these boats. Pilots W. Graham and N. E. Small attacked U-89 U-89 on July 30 and August 5, respectively. Small also attacked on July 30 and August 5, respectively. Small also attacked U-754 U-754 and and U-458 U-458 on July 31 and August 2, respectively. Pilot G. T. Sayre attacked on July 31 and August 2, respectively. Pilot G. T. Sayre attacked U-132 U-132 on July 31. on July 31.

Small's hit on Oestermann in U-754 U-754 on July 31 was a fatal blow. Flying at 3,000 feet in good weather, he saw on July 31 was a fatal blow. Flying at 3,000 feet in good weather, he saw U-754 U-754 running on the surface three miles distant. As Small dived to attack, Oestermann's bridge watch belatedly caught sight of the Hudson and scrambled for the conning-tower hatch, but it was too late to get deep. Small dropped four depth charges that fell close, then circled the area for almost an hour. Presently, running on the surface three miles distant. As Small dived to attack, Oestermann's bridge watch belatedly caught sight of the Hudson and scrambled for the conning-tower hatch, but it was too late to get deep. Small dropped four depth charges that fell close, then circled the area for almost an hour. Presently, U-754 U-754's conning tower reappeared and Small machine-gunned it. A still-unexplained "heavy explosion" broke the surface of the water. Later, some ships found a large oil slick and debris. The U-754 U-754 sank with the loss of all hands in 360 feet of water, the first U-boat to fall victim to a Canadian aircraft. sank with the loss of all hands in 360 feet of water, the first U-boat to fall victim to a Canadian aircraft.

While homebound on August 16 in the Bay of Biscay, Lohmann in U-89 U-89 was hit for the third time by Allied aircraft. The attacker was a B-24 Liberator of British Squadron 120, piloted by Squadron Leader Terence M. Bulloch. The depth charges fell wide and did not cause fatal damage. Although this attack failed, Bulloch went on to become the leading U-boat killer in the RAF. One of his copilots, Bryan W. Turnbull, a New Zealander, also became a noted U-boat killer. was hit for the third time by Allied aircraft. The attacker was a B-24 Liberator of British Squadron 120, piloted by Squadron Leader Terence M. Bulloch. The depth charges fell wide and did not cause fatal damage. Although this attack failed, Bulloch went on to become the leading U-boat killer in the RAF. One of his copilots, Bryan W. Turnbull, a New Zealander, also became a noted U-boat killer.

The other six VIIs that sailed to the Americas in June patrolled independently in southern areas from Florida to Trinidad. The July heat and humidity were nearly unbearable, ruining much of the food and drinking water. The men were felled by painful boils and rashes. Steadily improving Allied ASW and the initiation of convoying in the Gulf of Mexico and then the Caribbean Sea frustrated the hunters.

* Horst Uphoff in the veteran U-84 U-84, who sank a 6,600-ton Norwegian freighter while he was inbound to American waters, patrolled the Straits of Florida, opposite Havana. On July 7 he reported "strong" air and surface ASW forces day and night in the straits and speculated (correctly) that the aircraft patrolling at night were equipped with ASV radar. Urging him on, Kerneval scolded: "There is no confirmation of radar" in use anywhere on the United States coastline(I). In a spirited effort, from July 13 to July 26, Uphoff sank a 6,000-ton American freighter and a 1,600-ton Honduran freighter, damaged the 7,200-ton American freighter William Cullen Bryant William Cullen Bryant, and missed another freighter with his last two torpedoes.

* While approaching the north Florida coast on July 5, Rudolf Schendel in U-134 U-134, the recent transfer from the Arctic, met a Swedish neutral, Venezia Venezia. When he queried Kerneval for instructions, he was told to sink her. He fired a salvo of two torpedoes, but both missed and the ship got away. When he reported no traffic off Georgia or Florida, Kerneval ordered him to patrol the mouth of the Mississippi River, going there via the Straits of Florida. Harassed by "heavy" aircraft ASW patrols, Schendel prowled the Gulf Coast for a full week, July 19 to July 26, but he again saw no ships. After withdrawing from the gulf through the Straits of Florida on July 27, he came upon a convoy in the Old Bahama Channel, but air escorts forced him off, thwarting an attack. A week later, while patrolling the Windward Passage, Schendel reported sinking an American "destroyer," but it was not confirmed. Perhaps overcome by the severity of the climate, on August 6, Schendel reported himself too ill to continue and U-134 U-134 returned to France, having sunk no ships during her eighty-four-day patrol. returned to France, having sunk no ships during her eighty-four-day patrol.

* The old hand Helmut Mohlmann in U-571 U-571 also patrolled the Straits of Florida, overlapping part of the time with Uphoff in also patrolled the Straits of Florida, overlapping part of the time with Uphoff in U-84 U-84. On July 7 he found a convoy and sank the 8,100-ton British freighter Umtata Umtata. The next night Mohlmann stopped the 9,800-ton American tanker J. A. Moffett, Jr. J. A. Moffett, Jr. with two torpedoes, then demolished her with twenty rounds from his deck gun. Salvage vessels towed with two torpedoes, then demolished her with twenty rounds from his deck gun. Salvage vessels towed Moffett Moffett to port but she was beyond saving. The very next night, July 9, Mohlmann sank a 1,100-ton Honduran freighter. Six days later he shot a full bow salvo at what he claimed to be a zigzagging freighter of 15,000 tons, but which turned out to be the 11,400-ton American tanker Pennsylvania Sun. She also made it to port and eventually returned to service. Homebound on July 20, Mohlmann encountered a huge "two funnel" ocean liner, but it was moving too fast to pursue. to port but she was beyond saving. The very next night, July 9, Mohlmann sank a 1,100-ton Honduran freighter. Six days later he shot a full bow salvo at what he claimed to be a zigzagging freighter of 15,000 tons, but which turned out to be the 11,400-ton American tanker Pennsylvania Sun. She also made it to port and eventually returned to service. Homebound on July 20, Mohlmann encountered a huge "two funnel" ocean liner, but it was moving too fast to pursue.

* Werner-Karl Schulz in the U-437 U-437, embarked on his first full combat patrol, was directed to begin his hunt in the area south of the Yucatan Channel to Panama. Going via the Windward Passage and the south coast of Cuba, Schulz found no traffic. After a frustrating and useless week, Kerneval ordered Schulz to retrace his course and patrol the Windward Passage and surrounding areas. On July 17 he found a convoy but his attack was foiled by air and surface escorts. Finally he was able to shoot two torpedoes at two different large freighters from extreme range. He claimed hits on both vessels, but they could not be confirmed. On July 20 Schulz found a big "ocean liner" at which he fired three torpedoes. He claimed two hits but this success could not be confirmed either, and a Catalina thwarted a second attack. Later that same day Schulz fired four single torpedoes at a formation of ships in convoy, but all malfunctioned or missed, making a total of nine futile shots. Like Schendel in U-134 U-134, Schulz returned to France without having sunk a single ship.

* Sailing independently from France in the veteran U-203 U-203, the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Rolf Mutzelburg, who had patrolled off Cape Hatteras in April, set off for the Trinidad area. On the way there, on June 26 and 28, he sank by torpedo and gun three freighters totalling 16,000 tons. Near Trinidad on July 7 and 11, he sank a 7,000-ton British freighter by torpedo and the 10,000-ton Panamanian tanker holder Rolf Mutzelburg, who had patrolled off Cape Hatteras in April, set off for the Trinidad area. On the way there, on June 26 and 28, he sank by torpedo and gun three freighters totalling 16,000 tons. Near Trinidad on July 7 and 11, he sank a 7,000-ton British freighter by torpedo and the 10,000-ton Panamanian tanker Stanvac Palembang Stanvac Palembang by torpedo and gun. Having exhausted his torpedoes and gun ammunition to sink five confirmed ships (one tanker) for 33,000 tons, Mutzelburg set a course for France. by torpedo and gun. Having exhausted his torpedoes and gun ammunition to sink five confirmed ships (one tanker) for 33,000 tons, Mutzelburg set a course for France.

In tonnage sunk, Mutzelburg's was the third best Type VII patrol to America after Erich Topp in U-552 U-552 (40,000 tons) and Walter Flachsenberg in (40,000 tons) and Walter Flachsenberg in U-71 U-71 (39,000 tons). Furthermore, these sinkings raised Mutzelburg's total claims to 200,000 tons, qualifying him for Oak Leaves to his (39,000 tons). Furthermore, these sinkings raised Mutzelburg's total claims to 200,000 tons, qualifying him for Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz. Donitz bestowed this honor on Mutzelburg by radio on July 15.* As was the custom, Hitler was to later present Mutzelburg the Oak Leaves. Although he could have had almost any job he wanted, he elected to remain skipper of As was the custom, Hitler was to later present Mutzelburg the Oak Leaves. Although he could have had almost any job he wanted, he elected to remain skipper of U-203 U-203.

* Gunther Heydemann in the veteran U-575 U-575 also patrolled the eastern Caribbean near Trinidad. As a member of group also patrolled the eastern Caribbean near Trinidad. As a member of group Endrass Endrass he had shot four torpedoes (for no hits) in the battle with convoy Homebound Gibraltar 84, so he had to husband his weapons. He entered his area via Mona Passage, separating the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, and there sank a 2,700-ton American freighter by torpedo. Near Trinidad, on July 9, he sank a 5,300-ton British freighter by torpedo and gun. That success and a sinking by Mutzelburg in he had shot four torpedoes (for no hits) in the battle with convoy Homebound Gibraltar 84, so he had to husband his weapons. He entered his area via Mona Passage, separating the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, and there sank a 2,700-ton American freighter by torpedo. Near Trinidad, on July 9, he sank a 5,300-ton British freighter by torpedo and gun. That success and a sinking by Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 on the same day apparently froze traffic in the eastern Caribbean temporarily. Heydemann saw nothing for the next nine days. The tedium was finally relieved on July 17 when on the same day apparently froze traffic in the eastern Caribbean temporarily. Heydemann saw nothing for the next nine days. The tedium was finally relieved on July 17 when U-575 U-575 came upon a group of five freighters, but Heydemann botched the attack, wasting two more precious torpedoes. The next day, July 18, he fired his last torpedoes to damage the 13,000-ton British tanker San Gaspar, and sank two British sailing ships by gun off Caracas, Venezuela. came upon a group of five freighters, but Heydemann botched the attack, wasting two more precious torpedoes. The next day, July 18, he fired his last torpedoes to damage the 13,000-ton British tanker San Gaspar, and sank two British sailing ships by gun off Caracas, Venezuela.

The returns from the thirteen VIIs that reached the Americas in June were only so-so: twenty-seven ships for 124,000 tons, an average of two ships for 9,500 tons per boat per patrol. Two skippers, Vogelsang in U-132 U-132 off Canada and Mutzelburg in off Canada and Mutzelburg in U-203 U-203 off Trinidad, accounted for about one-third of the total: ten ships for 54,000 tons. Three of these thirteen VIIs sank no ships. Three were lost: Hoeck-ner's Type VIID minelayer off Trinidad, accounted for about one-third of the total: ten ships for 54,000 tons. Three of these thirteen VIIs sank no ships. Three were lost: Hoeck-ner's Type VIID minelayer U-215 U-215 and Oestermann's and Oestermann's U-754 U-754 in Canadian waters and Heinicke's in Canadian waters and Heinicke's U-576 U-576 off Cape Hatteras. Another boat, von Forstner's off Cape Hatteras. Another boat, von Forstner's U-402 U-402, was badly damaged and nearly lost.

SHARPLY D DIMINISHING R RETURNS FROM THE T TYPE IXS.

Eleven Type IXs sailed for the Americas in June. One of the first was the veteran IXB U-105 U-105, commanded by Heinrich Schuch. On the morning of June 11, a radar-equipped Sunderland of Australian Squadron 10, piloted by Eric B. Martin, caught the boat on the surface about 150 miles west of Cape Finisterre. Martin dropped six shallow-set Torpex depth charges and two 250-pound ASW bombs. The attack severely damaged U-105 U-105, killing or wounding about ten men. Donitz diverted four inbound and outbound boats to assist U-105 U-105, but none could find her. She limped unassisted into El Ferrol, Spain, and after makeshift repairs, the boat resailed on June 28 with a German aircraft escort and reached France. Repairs kept her out of action until late November. Pilot Martin and his copilot, Jaques Hazard, a Frenchman, as well as his navigator, A. Meaker, were killed in action during the next several weeks.

Of the ten Type IXs that reached American waters, six were new. The presence of the U-tankers enabled four of these to sail directly from Kiel to the Americas without stopping in France to replenish. The oldest and most experienced of the four veteran boats, U-66 U-66, had a new skipper, replacing the Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder Richard Zapp. Two boats-the new holder Richard Zapp. Two boats-the new U-166 U-166 and and U-66 U-66-had to carry out hated mining missions.

Three IXs sailed during the first half of the month: Wilfried Reichmann's new U-153 U-153, Walther Kolle's U-154 U-154, and Axel-Olaf Loewe's U-505 U-505. Kolle in U-154 U-154 had aborted one patrol to the Americas and completed another, sinking five confirmed ships. Loewe in had aborted one patrol to the Americas and completed another, sinking five confirmed ships. Loewe in U-505 U-505 had made one prior patrol, a long one to Freetown, sinking four ships. Kolle in had made one prior patrol, a long one to Freetown, sinking four ships. Kolle in U-154 U-154 was to patrol the Gulf of Mexico; Reichmann in was to patrol the Gulf of Mexico; Reichmann in U-153 U-153 and Loewe in and Loewe in U-505 U-505 were to patrol the western Caribbean near Panama. were to patrol the western Caribbean near Panama.

While still in the Atlantic approaching the Caribbean, all three boats encountered heavy unescorted traffic northwest of Anegada. The green skipper, Wilfried Reichmann in U-153 U-153, came upon four freighters in four days. An engine failure foiled the attack on the first, but he sank the other three (two American, one British) for 16,200 tons from June 25 to June 29. Nearby, Walther Kolle in the sister ship U-154 U-154 claimed sinking a ship of 3,200 tons on June 28, but that claim could not be confirmed. Also nearby, Axel-Olaf Loewe in claimed sinking a ship of 3,200 tons on June 28, but that claim could not be confirmed. Also nearby, Axel-Olaf Loewe in U-505 U-505 on June 28 and 29 sank two freighters for 12,600 tons, the first after an arduous seven-hour stern chase. The second was the 7,200-ton Liberty ship on June 28 and 29 sank two freighters for 12,600 tons, the first after an arduous seven-hour stern chase. The second was the 7,200-ton Liberty ship Thomas McKean Thomas McKean, on her maiden voyage to the war zone. Loewe closed the lifeboats of McKean McKean to ask if the survivors needed provisions or water and gave them a course to the nearest land. to ask if the survivors needed provisions or water and gave them a course to the nearest land.

These three IXs entered the Caribbean via the Windward and Mona passages in early July. Leading the others by several days, Kolle in U-154 U-154 sailed south of Cuba, then north through the Yucatan Channel into the Gulf of Mexico. In the Yucatan Channel on July 6, he sank the 65-ton Panamanian trawler sailed south of Cuba, then north through the Yucatan Channel into the Gulf of Mexico. In the Yucatan Channel on July 6, he sank the 65-ton Panamanian trawler Lalita Lalita by gun. While patrolling off Alabama and the west coast of Florida, Kolle shot a two-torpedo fan at a freighter but missed and, during an emergency dive, lost a man overboard, a demoralizing episode. On July 19, he reported a leak in a fuel-oil ballast tank that left a telltale trace in the water and could not be fixed. Kerneval first refused and then approved Kolle's request to abort. When Kolle arrived in France after an 81-day patrol, having sunk only the 65-ton trawler, he went to other duty and Donitz gave command of the by gun. While patrolling off Alabama and the west coast of Florida, Kolle shot a two-torpedo fan at a freighter but missed and, during an emergency dive, lost a man overboard, a demoralizing episode. On July 19, he reported a leak in a fuel-oil ballast tank that left a telltale trace in the water and could not be fixed. Kerneval first refused and then approved Kolle's request to abort. When Kolle arrived in France after an 81-day patrol, having sunk only the 65-ton trawler, he went to other duty and Donitz gave command of the U-154 U-154 to Heinrich Schuch, whose IXB to Heinrich Schuch, whose IXB U-105 U-105 had been bombed and disabled. had been bombed and disabled.

Entering the Caribbean via the Mona Passage, Reichmann in U-153 U-153 and Loewe in and Loewe in U-505 U-505 sailed westerly to Panama, passing north of Aruba and Curacao. On July 5 and 6, Army Air Forces crews of the 59th Bombardment Squadron, in three different radar-equipped B-18s, reported attacks on U-boats. Each dropped four shallow-set Mark XVII depth charges. Inasmuch as Loewe in sailed westerly to Panama, passing north of Aruba and Curacao. On July 5 and 6, Army Air Forces crews of the 59th Bombardment Squadron, in three different radar-equipped B-18s, reported attacks on U-boats. Each dropped four shallow-set Mark XVII depth charges. Inasmuch as Loewe in U-505 U-505 did not log an air attack at this time, the three B-18s probably attacked Reichmann in did not log an air attack at this time, the three B-18s probably attacked Reichmann in U-153 U-153. The airmen reported "damage" but did not claim a sinking. The extent of "damage" to U-153 U-153, if any, is not known.

While sixty miles off Almirante, on the evening of July 11, a small seaport in northern Panama,. Reichmann in U-153 U-153 encountered the 560-ton American Navy net tender encountered the 560-ton American Navy net tender Mimosa Mimosa (YN-21), which mounted a 3" gun. (YN-21), which mounted a 3" gun. Mimosa Mimosa excitedly reported to the Panama Sea Frontier that a U-boat had attacked her, firing three torpedoes, indicating that the green Reichmann mistook her for a larger warship. The first missed the bow; the other two ran under the shallow keel. excitedly reported to the Panama Sea Frontier that a U-boat had attacked her, firing three torpedoes, indicating that the green Reichmann mistook her for a larger warship. The first missed the bow; the other two ran under the shallow keel. Mimosa Mimosa boldly shot two rounds from her 3" gun at the U-boat. boldly shot two rounds from her 3" gun at the U-boat.

The commander of the Panama Sea Frontier, Clifford van Hook, issued orders to hunt this U-boat to destruction. A radar-equipped Catalina of Patrol Squadron 3 reached the scene shortly after midnight and the nearby PC-458 (also known as U.S.S. Evelyn R. Evelyn R.), mounting sonar, a 3" gun, and twelve depth charges, joined in the hunt. At about 4:00 A.M. A.M., the Catalina got a radar contact at four miles and dropped two brilliant parachute flares. These illuminated a surfaced U-boat, which the Catalina attacked, dropping four Mark XVII depth charges, two set for 25 feet and two for 50 feet. The crew reported a perfect "straddle." However, when daylight came, there was no sign of a disabled U-boat or debris. Nonetheless, van Hook directed PC-458 PC-458 to work the area with sonar and saturated the skies with Army and Navy aircraft (B-18s, Catalinas, P-39 fighters, etc.). to work the area with sonar and saturated the skies with Army and Navy aircraft (B-18s, Catalinas, P-39 fighters, etc.).

The aircraft and the PC hunted the U-boat all-out for twenty-four hours. Finally, at about 10:00 A.M. A.M. on July 13, a Catalina reported "a moving oil slick" and directed on July 13, a Catalina reported "a moving oil slick" and directed PC-458 PC-458 to the spot. After gaining sonar contact, the PC let go ten depth charges set for 150 to 300 feet. Meanwhile, the circling aircraft dropped eight bombs and twenty-four depth charges, a total of forty-two missiles. Other than the oil slick, no sign of a U-boat appeared. Toward evening, the new (1942) American destroyer to the spot. After gaining sonar contact, the PC let go ten depth charges set for 150 to 300 feet. Meanwhile, the circling aircraft dropped eight bombs and twenty-four depth charges, a total of forty-two missiles. Other than the oil slick, no sign of a U-boat appeared. Toward evening, the new (1942) American destroyer Lansdowne Lansdowne, commanded by William R. Smedberg III, relieved the PC. Lansdowne Lansdowne promptly got sonar contact and dropped four 600-pound depth charges. Nothing further was ever heard from promptly got sonar contact and dropped four 600-pound depth charges. Nothing further was ever heard from U-153 U-153. In a controversial decision, Washington gave equal credit for the kill to the Lansdowne Lansdowne and to the B-18s of Army Air Forces Squadron 59, which had supposedly bombed her off Aruba on July 5 and 6. and to the B-18s of Army Air Forces Squadron 59, which had supposedly bombed her off Aruba on July 5 and 6.

Not many miles away, Loewe in U-505 U-505 patrolled off Panama. A crewman wrote: "For sixteen days we moved slowly back and forth off Colon. Not a thing in sight; the sea was empty. Finally, in disgust, Loewe took the boat south [closer] to the coast.... Here on 21 July we underwent our first ordeal, a plane almost caught us on the surface and dropped two bombs before we had even fifty meters of water over us. patrolled off Panama. A crewman wrote: "For sixteen days we moved slowly back and forth off Colon. Not a thing in sight; the sea was empty. Finally, in disgust, Loewe took the boat south [closer] to the coast.... Here on 21 July we underwent our first ordeal, a plane almost caught us on the surface and dropped two bombs before we had even fifty meters of water over us. U-505 U-505 suffered no damage, however, and no further attack came." The next day, July 22, suffered no damage, however, and no further attack came." The next day, July 22, U-505 U-505 sank by gun the 110-ton Colombian sailing ship sank by gun the 110-ton Colombian sailing ship Roamar Roamar. After that, Loewe became "ill" and was relieved by his first watch officer, Herbert Nollau, who returned the boat to France. Loewe was sent to other duty.

These three Type IX patrols, mounted at such expense in resources, were unmitigated disasters. Within the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the three boats, meeting strong air patrols and convoying, sank only two sailing ships for 175 tons. One green boat, U-153 U-153, had been lost; the other two appear to have been badly mismanaged.

Another new Type IX, U-166 U-166, commanded by Hans-Gunter Kuhlmann, age twenty-eight, former merchant marine officer and first watch officer to Werner Hartmann on U-37 U-37, was assigned to lay TMB (magnetic) mines at the mouth of the Mississippi River. The U-166 U-166 was Kuhlmann's second command. His first, the new Type VII was Kuhlmann's second command. His first, the new Type VII U-580 U-580, had been rammed and sunk by a target ship in Baltic exercises in November 1941. His crew was saved and assigned to U-166 U-166. Launched November 3,1941, the U-166 U-166 had been rushed to completion and commissioned on March 23. After merely two months and nine days of workup in the Baltic, had been rushed to completion and commissioned on March 23. After merely two months and nine days of workup in the Baltic, U-166 U-166 sailed for France. She arrived June 10 and sailed on to the Americas one week later with six torpedoes in her bow and stern tubes, nine mines stowed on the deck plates in the bow compartment, and thirteen other torpedoes stowed internally and externally. sailed for France. She arrived June 10 and sailed on to the Americas one week later with six torpedoes in her bow and stern tubes, nine mines stowed on the deck plates in the bow compartment, and thirteen other torpedoes stowed internally and externally.

Approaching the Gulf of Mexico via the Old Bahama Channel and the Straits of Florida, Kuhlmann found plenty of action. On July 10, he attacked a small convoy (two freighters, two escorts) but all six torpedoes missed or malfunctioned, perhaps as a result of the rushed training in the Baltic. The next day, July 11, he sank by gun the 84-ton Dominican sailing vessel Carmen Carmen. Near the north end of the Windward Passage on July 13, he encountered a large, heavily escorted convoy of eleven ships, from which he torpedoed and sank a 2,300-ton American freighter. Passing through the Straits of Florida on July 16, he sank by gun the 16-ton American trawler Gertrude Gertrude.

Kuhlmann reported that he planted his nine mines on the night of July 24-25 at the mouth of the Mississippi River, about 650 yards off the jetty heads. The mines had delayed-action fuses to enable Kuhlmann to clear the area. Something went wrong; none of the mines ever detonated. But on July 30, Kuhlmann sank by torpedo the armed and escorted 5,200-ton American cargo-passenger vessel Robert E. Lee Robert E. Lee, jammed with men, women, and children en route from Trinidad to New Orleans. Although this ship sank in fifteen minutes, only seventeen of the 407 persons on board perished. The escort PC-566 PC-566, the SC 579 579, and a tugboat rescued the other 390 from twenty-two lifeboats and rafts.

Coast Guard seaplanes based in Houma, Louisiana, routinely patrolled the mouth of the Mississippi River. At 1:40 on the afternoon of August 1, pilot Henry C. White, flying at 1,500 feet, saw a U-boat on the surface. White dived immediately to attack, and at 250 feet he dropped his single Mark XVII depth charge, set to detonate at 25 feet. Craning out the window, his radioman, George H. Boggs, Jr., reported what appeared to be a direct hit on the starboard side. In due course, two Army observation aircraft and White's relief arrived and he flew back to Houma. The Gulf Sea Frontier credited White with "probable damage" to a U-boat, but in fact White had sunk U-166 U-166 in about 120 feet of water with the loss of all hands. Since the kill was not recognized at the time, no effort to salvage the boat was made. It was the only U-boat sunk by Coast Guard aircraft in the war. For this feat, White was belatedly awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. in about 120 feet of water with the loss of all hands. Since the kill was not recognized at the time, no effort to salvage the boat was made. It was the only U-boat sunk by Coast Guard aircraft in the war. For this feat, White was belatedly awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.*

The four new IXs that sailed from Kiel directly to the Americas in June all had miserable patrols.

The first to leave were U-171 U-171 and and U-173 U-173. The U-171 U-171 was commanded by Gunther Pfeffer, age twenty-seven, who had been first watch officer to was commanded by Gunther Pfeffer, age twenty-seven, who had been first watch officer to Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holder holder Heinrich Bleichrodt in Heinrich Bleichrodt in U-67 U-67 during that boat's assignment to R&D. The during that boat's assignment to R&D. The U-173 U-173 was commanded by Heinz-Ehler Beucke, age thirty-eight, a senior officer from the crew of 1922. As planned, on July 6 both boats refueled from the new tanker was commanded by Heinz-Ehler Beucke, age thirty-eight, a senior officer from the crew of 1922. As planned, on July 6 both boats refueled from the new tanker U-460 U-460, commanded by Friedrich Schafer, which was positioned north of Bermuda. Kerneval then assigned the boats to patrol the western end of the Gulf of Mexico, going via the Windward Passage to the waters south of Cuba, thence north through the Yucatan Channel. Gaining a few days on U-173 U-173, Pfeffer in U-171 U-171 passed through the Yucatan Channel into the Gulf of Mexico on July 22. He continued northwest to the area near Galveston, passed through the Yucatan Channel into the Gulf of Mexico on July 22. He continued northwest to the area near Galveston, Texas Texas, where he sank a 4,400-ton Mexican freighter. He then cruised easterly to the mouth of the Mississippi River, where Kuhlmann in U-166 U-166, having laid his mines, was stalking ships with torpedoes. On July 29, Pfeffer reported a double miss on the tanker Esso Richmond Esso Richmond. On July 31, he found an eleven-ship convoy hugging the shore, but a Coast Guard aircraft drove him off with a depth charge.

Pfeffer in U-171 U-171 patrolled the area from the Mississippi River west to the Mexican coastline for a full month, August 4 to September 4. Harassed by "strong" air patrols and frustrated by coast-hugging convoys, he was able to sink two tankers in that period: the 6,800-ton American patrolled the area from the Mississippi River west to the Mexican coastline for a full month, August 4 to September 4. Harassed by "strong" air patrols and frustrated by coast-hugging convoys, he was able to sink two tankers in that period: the 6,800-ton American R. M. Parker, Jr R. M. Parker, Jr. on August 13, and the 6,500-ton Mexican Amatlan Amatlan on September 4. He then set sail for France, going by way of the Yucatan Channel to the Caribbean and the Mona Passage to the Atlantic. On September 24 he refueled a second time from a tanker, the new on September 4. He then set sail for France, going by way of the Yucatan Channel to the Caribbean and the Mona Passage to the Atlantic. On September 24 he refueled a second time from a tanker, the new U-461 U-461, commanded by Wolf Stiebler.

Approaching Lorient on the afternoon of October 9 at the end of this 115-day patrol, Pfeffer in U-171 U-171 was directed to rendezvous with an escort at 4:00 was directed to rendezvous with an escort at 4:00 P.M. P.M. He arrived two hours early, strayed slightly off course, and struck a British mine. The He arrived two hours early, strayed slightly off course, and struck a British mine. The U-171 U-171 sank like a stone. The escort arrived and rescued thirty men, including Pfeffer and all of his officers, but twenty-two of the crew were killed in the sinking. sank like a stone. The escort arrived and rescued thirty men, including Pfeffer and all of his officers, but twenty-two of the crew were killed in the sinking.

Trailing U-171 U-171 by a few days, Beucke in by a few days, Beucke in U-173 U-173 went through the Windward Passage into the Caribbean on July 19. While passing westbound close to the Cayman Islands, Beucke was caught and bombed by an Allied aircraft. Reporting this mishap to Kerneval, he stated that both periscopes were out of commission and that "repairs were improbable." He requested and gained permission to withdraw to open ocean-beyond range of Caribbean-based ASW aircraft-to attempt periscope repairs. However, the crew was unable to do the job. went through the Windward Passage into the Caribbean on July 19. While passing westbound close to the Cayman Islands, Beucke was caught and bombed by an Allied aircraft. Reporting this mishap to Kerneval, he stated that both periscopes were out of commission and that "repairs were improbable." He requested and gained permission to withdraw to open ocean-beyond range of Caribbean-based ASW aircraft-to attempt periscope repairs. However, the crew was unable to do the job.

Kerneval canceled U-173 U-173's assignment to the Gulf of Mexico and directed Beucke to patrol in the open ocean south to Dutch Guiana (Surinam). Beucke complied with these orders or with minor alterations to them for a full month. In that time he reported only two ships, one on August 8 and one on August 17. He shot two torpedoes at the first ship but missed. He could not gain shooting position for the second.

Then came a second calamity. On August 27, another ASW aircraft caught and bombed U-173 U-173. Beucke reported that the explosion knocked out five of his six torpedo tubes and smashed four topside canisters and the G7a air torpedoes they contained. Both periscopes were still out; the boat could not dive deep.

Upon receiving this message, Kerneval ordered Beucke to bring U-173 U-173 home to France. On the way, he chased a fast 20,000-ton ocean liner, but lost the race. He refueled for the second time from another tanker, the new home to France. On the way, he chased a fast 20,000-ton ocean liner, but lost the race. He refueled for the second time from another tanker, the new U-462 U-462, commanded by Bruno Vowe, age thirty-eight. He arrived in France on September 20, completing a 98-day patrol, during which he had sunk no ships. He left the boat for other duty.

The second two DCs to sail from Kiel direct to the Americas were the longer-range Type DCCs, U-508 U-508, commanded by Georg Staats, age twenty-six, and U-509 U-509, commanded by Karl-Heinz Wolff, age thirty-two. The U-508 U-508 was Staats's second command. His first, the Type VIIC was Staats's second command. His first, the Type VIIC U-80 U-80, had had a battery explosion in the Baltic and had been relegated to a school boat. The U-508 U-508 and and U-509 U-509 refueled from Friedrich Schafer's tanker refueled from Friedrich Schafer's tanker U-460 U-460. They were then directed to patrol the Straits of Florida.

Wolff in U-509 U-509 headed for his patrol area in a roundabout way, via the Mona Passage and the Yucatan Channel. Upon reaching the channel on August 2, he was depth-charged by ASW aircraft and notified Kerneval that it was necessary for headed for his patrol area in a roundabout way, via the Mona Passage and the Yucatan Channel. Upon reaching the channel on August 2, he was depth-charged by ASW aircraft and notified Kerneval that it was necessary for U-509 U-509 to withdraw for repairs. The next day he reported that it was "impossible to disperse oil trace." Slowly retracing his steps, Wolff retired through the Yucatan Channel to the Caribbean, thence to open ocean east of Trinidad. Like to withdraw for repairs. The next day he reported that it was "impossible to disperse oil trace." Slowly retracing his steps, Wolff retired through the Yucatan Channel to the Caribbean, thence to open ocean east of Trinidad. Like U-173 U-173, U-509 U-509 was bombed a second time. On August 25 Wolff reported that he was "ill" and that he was returning to France. When he arrived on September 12, having sunk nothing whatsoever, he left the boat for other duty. was bombed a second time. On August 25 Wolff reported that he was "ill" and that he was returning to France. When he arrived on September 12, having sunk nothing whatsoever, he left the boat for other duty.

Inbound to the Straits of Florida via the old Bahama Channel, Staats in U-508 U-508 encountered a "battleship" escorted by three "destroyers" with a tanker and a fast freighter. The "destroyers" thwarted his attack on the "battleship." He fired three torpedoes at the tanker and four at the freighter, but all seven missiles missed or malfunctioned. He then patrolled the Straits of Florida close to Havana and the north coast of Cuba. encountered a "battleship" escorted by three "destroyers" with a tanker and a fast freighter. The "destroyers" thwarted his attack on the "battleship." He fired three torpedoes at the tanker and four at the freighter, but all seven missiles missed or malfunctioned. He then patrolled the Straits of Florida close to Havana and the north coast of Cuba.

In the two-week period from August 5 to 18, Staats scarcely slept. On August 5 and 6, he found separate convoys, heavily escorted by aircraft. He attacked the second of these, claiming one certain and one probable hit, but the hits could not be confirmed. Aircraft attacking with bombs and depth charges forced him off before he could mount a second attack. On August 12 he charged into another convoy, escorted by three "destroyers" and two Catalinas. Two of four torpedoes missed or malfunctioned, but the other two hit, sinking two small Cuban coasters for 2,700 tons. While evading the "destroyers," Staats reported, he employed sonar-deceiving Bolde (bubble targets or noisemakers) with "good" results. On August 17, he expended his last torpedoes on yet another convoy, claiming two hits but these could not be confirmed either. Homebound to France, Staats met the outbound Type IXC U-163 U-163 from which he obtained fuel in exchange for drinking water. from which he obtained fuel in exchange for drinking water.

These four new IXs sailing direct from Kiel turned in the worst Type IX performances of the war to then: five confirmed ships sunk for 20,300 tons. This was an average of about 1.25 ships for 4,000 tons per boat per patrol. Beucke in U-173 U-173 and Wolff in and Wolff in U-509 U-509 sank no ships whatsoever. Pfeffer in sank no ships whatsoever. Pfeffer in U-171 U-171 lost his boat and twenty-two men. lost his boat and twenty-two men.*

The other two IXs of the June group, U-66 U-66 and and U-160 U-160, patrolled near Trinidad.

Georg Lassen in U-160 U-160, who had made one prior patrol to the Cape Hatteras-Cape Lookout area, sinking five ships for about 37,000 tons, reached Trinidad about July 11. Patrolling the main shipping route in the narrow passage between the islands of Trinidad and Tobago, Lassen encountered "heavy" ASW air patrols. He got off to a wobbly start, missing two big freighters with a two-torpedo fan, but he soon compensated. In the period from July 16 to 21, he sank three ships: a 5,500-ton freighter and two tankers, the 7,000-ton Panamanian Beaconlight Beaconlight and the 8,100-ton British and the 8,100-ton British Donovania Donovania. Moving around to the east of Trinidad, in the ten days from July 25 to August 4, he sank three more freighters for 8,700 tons and savaged the 6,200-ton Norwegian tanker Havsten Havsten with torpedoes and gunfire. Total confirmed sinkings: six ships (two tankers) for about 29,000 tons. Claiming seven ships, including with torpedoes and gunfire. Total confirmed sinkings: six ships (two tankers) for about 29,000 tons. Claiming seven ships, including Havsten Havsten, sunk for 61,568 tons, Lassen qualified for a Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz, which was awarded by radio while he was en route to France.

The new skipper of the veteran U-66 U-66 was Friedrich Markworth, age twenty-seven, who had been first watch officer on Werner Winter's was Friedrich Markworth, age twenty-seven, who had been first watch officer on Werner Winter's U-103 U-103 during two highly successful patrols to the Americas. One important task he had to carry out was to lay six TMB (magnetic) mines in the port of Castries, on the island of St. Lucia, where the Americans had established a naval base to keep watch on adjacent Vichy Martinique. during two highly successful patrols to the Americas. One important task he had to carry out was to lay six TMB (magnetic) mines in the port of Castries, on the island of St. Lucia, where the Americans had established a naval base to keep watch on adjacent Vichy Martinique.

In addition to the six mines, U-66 U-66 carried nineteen torpedoes, thirteen internally and six in topside canisters. In case he should encounter shipping en route to the Caribbean, Markworth sailed with all six torpedo tubes loaded and the six mines stored above the floor plates in the bow compartment. As it happened, on July 9, during the voyage out, Markworth did encounter a ship, the 6,400-ton Yugoslavian freighter carried nineteen torpedoes, thirteen internally and six in topside canisters. In case he should encounter shipping en route to the Caribbean, Markworth sailed with all six torpedo tubes loaded and the six mines stored above the floor plates in the bow compartment. As it happened, on July 9, during the voyage out, Markworth did encounter a ship, the 6,400-ton Yugoslavian freighter Triglav Triglav, which he sank with two torpedoes. He then loaded each of those empty tubes with three TMB mines.

Markworth stood off the port of Castries submerged at about noon on July 20. When the net boom opened to permit entry of a small craft, he boldly took U-66 U-66 inside. Cruising at periscope depth, he quickly laid the six mines. He then inside. Cruising at periscope depth, he quickly laid the six mines. He then backed backed out as the net boom was closing. Equipped with delayed-action fuses, the mines activated later. Nine days after they were sown, on July 29, a small, fast-moving launch triggered one mine. No one was hurt, but local authorities immediately closed the port to shipping and sent for a minesweeper. On August 2, two fast British motor launches from Trinidad triggered three more mines, but neither boat was damaged. Minesweepers cleared the other two mines and Castries reopened to traffic on about August 9. out as the net boom was closing. Equipped with delayed-action fuses, the mines activated later. Nine days after they were sown, on July 29, a small, fast-moving launch triggered one mine. No one was hurt, but local authorities immediately closed the port to shipping and sent for a minesweeper. On August 2, two fast British motor launches from Trinidad triggered three more mines, but neither boat was damaged. Minesweepers cleared the other two mines and Castries reopened to traffic on about August 9.

Markworth's mines caused no harm-other than frayed nerves-but he went on to conduct a notable first patrol. He sank three more freighters near Trinidad between July 26 and August 6. Then came a frustrating lull of three weeks during which he saw nothing. Doggedly patrolling east of Trinidad in the open Atlantic, on August 28 he apparently discovered a new shipping lane between Trinidad and Cape Town, South Africa. In three days he sank four more ships: three freighters laden with war materiel for the British forces in Egypt, and the 8,600-ton British tanker Winamac Winamac. Homebound on September 9, he sank the 6,400-ton Swede Peiping Peiping, en route from Buenos Aires to New York, bringing his total for the patrol to nine ships sunk for about 49,000 tons. The celebration was muted by the death of a crewman, who was buried at sea on September 13.

Per plan, U-66 U-66 rendezvoused with Schafer's tanker rendezvoused with Schafer's tanker U-460 U-460. Markworth requested a routine refueling of 25 cubic meters, and Schafer obliged-or so both skippers believed. But Schafer's crew made a mistake and delivered 16 cubic meters of oil and 9 cubic meters of seawater to U-66 U-66. When the mistake was later discovered, Markworth was forced to sneak into El Ferrol, Spain, and refuel a second time from the "interned" German tanker Max Albrecht Max Albrecht, to which he transferred a sailor who was seriously ill. The boat finally arrived in France on September 29, after ninety-six days at sea. The sailor who was left in Spain recovered and returned to France in time for the boat's next patrol.

The returns of the ten Type IXs that sailed to the Americas in June were disappointing: thirty-one ships for about 135,000 tons, including four trawlers or sailing ships. This was an average of 3.1 ships of 13,500 tons per boat per patrol, a drastic drop from the results of the IXs that sailed in May. Two boats, Markworth in U-66 U-66 and Lassen in and Lassen in U-160 U-160, sank well over half the total: fifteen ships for 78,200 tons. Two boats, Beucke's U-173 U-173 and Wolff's and Wolff's U-509 U-509, sank no ships at all. Three Type IXs were lost: Reichmann's U-153 U-153 and Kuhlmann's and Kuhlmann's U-166 U-166 in American waters to American forces, and in American waters to American forces, and U-171 U-171 to a British mine off Lorient. to a British mine off Lorient.

In view of the so-so returns of the VIIs, the combined results of the twenty-three boats that reached the Americas in June were likewise disappointing: fifty-eight ships (including all the trawlers and sailing vessels) sunk for about 259,000 tons. This was an average of about 2.5 ships for about 11,260 tons sunk per boat per patrol. Altogether, six boats (three VIIs and three IXs) of this group had been lost (five with all hands), a casualty rate of 26 percent. Clearly the U-boat campaign in American waters was returning less and less for greater and greater risk and losses, but Donitz was not yet ready to give up that campaign.

THE A ARCTIC: CONVOY PQ 17 PQ 17.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1942, Hitler remained convinced that the Allies intended to invade Norway. In compliance with his specific orders, big ships of the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine were kept on alert in that region to repel invaders: were kept on alert in that region to repel invaders: Tirpitz Tirpitz, the heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper, and the "pocket" battleships Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer and and Lutzow Lutzow (ex- (ex-Deutschland), the latter back in action after a year of repairs and workup. None was to sail until Hitler gave a direct order.

Also in compliance with Hitler's specific orders, a force of twenty to twenty-five U-boats were based in Norway. The primary task of this force was to help repel Allied invaders. Secondarily they patrolled Arctic waters to attack PQ and QP convoys en route to and from Murmansk, respectively. On any given day about half the force was at sea hunting convoys, the other half in ports undergoing voyage or battle-damage repairs or on anti-invasion alert.

The U-boats operated under numerous handicaps. In contrast to the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, there was no single U-boat commander or headquarters in Norway at this time. Command of and responsibility for the Norway U-boat forces shifted between the admiral commanding Group North (in Kiel), the admiral commanding Norway, and the admiral commanding Arctic waters, A. D. Hubert Schmundt, in Narvik. The newly assigned U-boat specialists and Ritterkreuz Ritterkreuz holders Jurgen Oesten and Herbert Schultze could advise the admirals on U-boat operations, but they were not empowered to issue direct orders. There were as yet no U-boat flotillas or staffs to provide shore-based backup. holders Jurgen Oesten and Herbert Schultze could advise the admirals on U-boat operations, but they were not empowered to issue direct orders. There were as yet no U-boat flotillas or staffs to provide shore-based backup.* Since base facilities were primitive, U-boats requiring extensive battle-damage repairs or overhauls had to return to Germany. Coordination and communications between the Since base facilities were primitive, U-boats requiring extensive battle-damage repairs or overhauls had to return to Germany. Coordination and communications between the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine and and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe in Norway left much to be desired. in Norway left much to be desired.

Inasmuch as British codebreakers were reading Luftwaffe Luftwaffe Red Enigma as well as the three-rotor naval Enigma employed by the admiral commanding Norway, the Admiralty was the beneficiary of superb intelligence on German plans and operations in Norway and the Arctic. The British closely watched the movements of the big ships, the dispositions of the U-boats, and the Red Enigma as well as the three-rotor naval Enigma employed by the admiral commanding Norway, the Admiralty was the beneficiary of superb intelligence on German plans and operations in Norway and the Arctic. The British closely watched the movements of the big ships, the dispositions of the U-boats, and the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe buildup in northern Norway. The Enigma intelligence enabled the British to anticipate attacks on PQ and the opposite-sailing QP sister convoys, but owing to the lack of maneuvering room in the Barents Sea and saturation buildup in northern Norway. The Enigma intelligence enabled the British to anticipate attacks on PQ and the opposite-sailing QP sister convoys, but owing to the lack of maneuvering room in the Barents Sea and saturation Luftwaffe Luftwaffe aerial reconnaissance, they were rarely able to escape detection or to divert convoys around known U-boat patrol lines. aerial reconnaissance, they were rarely able to escape detection or to divert convoys around known U-boat patrol lines.

In the midst of the battle with PQ 16, Hitler suddenly became convinced that an Allied invasion of Norway might come at any hour. Accordingly he flashed alerts to his military commanders in Norway and on May 27, for the second time in 1942, directed that all all Type VII U-boats outbound from Germany to the Atlantic be diverted to the defense of Norway. The OKM calculated that if this order stood, eight new Type VIIs could reach Norway by June 10. Further diversions of new Type VIIs to Norway in June and July, the OKM diarist noted, could raise the total number of U-boats diverted to that area to "forty or fifty," a terrible blow to the Atlantic U-boat force. Type VII U-boats outbound from Germany to the Atlantic be diverted to the defense of Norway. The OKM calculated that if this order stood, eight new Type VIIs could reach Norway by June 10. Further diversions of new Type VIIs to Norway in June and July, the OKM diarist noted, could raise the total number of U-boats diverted to that area to "forty or fifty," a terrible blow to the Atlantic U-boat force.

Hitler's order provoked another heated debate over deployment of U-boats to Arctic waters. Donitz again forcefully stated his view that no boats whatever should be deployed there. The U-boat force had not been able to prevent the British invasion of Norway in April 1940; the returns from U-boat operations against PQ and QP convoys did not come close to justifying the effort expended. To then, all the Norway-based U-boats had sunk only eight confirmed merchant ships plus the destroyer Matabele Matabele from the several hundred that had sailed in sixteen PQ convoys to Murmansk, and only one merchant ship from the twelve home-bound QP convoys. Three U-boats had been lost with all hands ( from the several hundred that had sailed in sixteen PQ convoys to Murmansk, and only one merchant ship from the twelve home-bound QP convoys. Three U-boats had been lost with all hands (U-655, U-585 U-585, and U-702 U-702), a high price to pay for nine merchant ships and a destroyer. Several other U-boats had incurred heavy battle damage.

Admiral Raeder and the OKM again calmed Hitler's fear of an invasion and persuaded him to rescind the order diverting all new Type VIIs to Norway. But Raeder did not agree with Donitz that all U-boats should be withdrawn from the Arctic. Notwithstanding the disappointing level of sinkings and the increased risk posed by the absence of darkness in the summer months, Raeder believed the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine should be in position to deploy "about eight" U-boats against each and every PQ convoy. These were to find and shadow the convoys for the benefit of the should be in position to deploy "about eight" U-boats against each and every PQ convoy. These were to find and shadow the convoys for the benefit of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, lie in wait on patrol lines to intercept the ships, polish off cripples left behind by the airmen, and rescue Germans who had to ditch in damaged aircraft.

Raeder and the OKM calculated that to send "about eight" U-boats against every PQ convoy, a total force of twenty-three boats would be required. Inasmuch as three boats had been lost and by prior agreement three Norway-based boats had been transferred to the Atlantic force in May (U-134, U-454 U-454, and U-584 U-584), it was necessary to divert six more Type VIIs to Norway* in order to maintain the force at twenty-three boats. Donitz again protested the diversions, but to no avail. Admiral Raeder replied that in view of the importance of stopping the flow of war materiel to the Soviet Union, a force level of twenty-three boats in Norway was not unreasonable. in order to maintain the force at twenty-three boats. Donitz again protested the diversions, but to no avail. Admiral Raeder replied that in view of the importance of stopping the flow of war materiel to the Soviet Union, a force level of twenty-three boats in Norway was not unreasonable.

There was another factor of importance. To stress the Allied military assistance to the Soviet Union and uphold morale in Moscow and in the ranks of the besieged Red armies, President Roosevelt directed that Murmansk convoys receive maximum publicity. Thus these convoys for a time became much more prominent than others. To have permitted these high-profile convoys to pass to Murmansk unchallenged would have been a setback, psychological and otherwise, for the Germans.

Encouraged by the wild Luftwaffe Luftwaffe overclaims of damage to PQ 16, Admiral Raeder and the OKM conceived an elaborate plan, Rosselsprung (Knight's Move), to utterly destroy PQ 17 and thereby force the Allies to close down the Murmansk run. A pack of U-boats, overclaims of damage to PQ 16, Admiral Raeder and the OKM conceived an elaborate plan, Rosselsprung (Knight's Move), to utterly destroy PQ 17 and thereby force the Allies to close down the Murmansk run. A pack of U-boats, Eisteufel Eisteufel (Ice Devil), was to form a patrol line across the path of the oncoming convoy northeast of Jan Mayen Island. The four big surface ships, (Ice Devil), was to form a patrol line across the path of the oncoming convoy northeast of Jan Mayen Island. The four big surface ships, Tirpitz Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Lutzow Lutzow, and Hipper Hipper, with destroyer screens, were to stage northward through Narvik and Altenfiord. If the circumstances proved to be favorable for the big surface ships-and if Hitler authorized their sailing-they were to converge on the convoy at about the same time the U-boat pack and the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe got there. got there.

The Germans did not know when PQ 17 was to leave Iceland. To detect the departure as early as possible, Hubert Schmundt in Narvik, temporarily commanding the U-boat force, sent three boats to patrol the north end of the Denmark Strait in early June. These were Heinrich Timm in U-251 U-251, Friedrich-Karl Marks in U-376 U-376, and Reinhard von Hymmen in the newly arrived U-408 U-408. Marks in U-376 U-376 spotted a "cruiser," but by the time he got permission to attack it, the warship was gone. On Schmundt's order, Marks reconnoitered the boundary of the ice pack to make certain PQ 17 had not found an open passage to the north of Jan Mayen Island. It had not. spotted a "cruiser," but by the time he got permission to attack it, the warship was gone. On Schmundt's order, Marks reconnoitered the boundary of the ice pack to make certain PQ 17 had not found an open passage to the north of Jan Mayen Island. It had not.

The British reluctantly sailed PQ 17 to Murmansk and its reverse, QP 13, from Murmansk, on June 27. The largest convoy to Murmansk yet, PQ 17, numbered forty ships: thirty-five big, heavily laden freighters (one of them, Empire Tide Empire Tide, with a catapult), three rescue vessels, and two tankers for refueling escorts. The convoy was guarded by sixty-two Allied warships: twenty-one British close escorts;* seven Allied warships in a cruiser covering force; seven Allied warships in a cruiser covering force; nineteen Allied warships in a distant covering force; nineteen Allied warships in a distant covering force; and fifteen Allied submarines placed ahead. and fifteen Allied submarines placed ahead.

None of the three U-boats on lookout in the Denmark Strait detected the sailing of PQ 17 or any of its massive escort. Almost immediately after sailing, the convoy "lost" three of its forty ships. The American freighter Richard Bland Richard Bland grounded on rocks and was forced to abort. The American freighter grounded on rocks and was forced to abort. The American freighter Exford Exford and the 3,300-ton British tanker and the 3,300-ton British tanker Grey Ranger Grey Ranger ran into floating ice and incurred damage. ran into floating ice and incurred damage. Exford Exford aborted to Iceland. Owing to her damage, aborted to Iceland. Owing to her damage, Grey Ranger Grey Ranger, which was to refuel escorts, would go only part way, then rendezvous with and refuel the escorts of QP 13. The 8,400-ton tanker Aldersdale Aldersdale would go all the way to Murmansk, refueling PQ 17 escorts. would go all the way to Murmansk, refueling PQ 17 escorts.

Schmundt established the U-boat patrol line Eisteufel Eisteufel (Ice Devils) across the expected path of PQ 17 near Jan Mayen Island. As U-boats arrived, Schmundt added to the line until it consisted of six boats. On July 1, one of these skippers, Max-Martin Teichert in (Ice Devils) across the expected path of PQ 17 near Jan Mayen Island. As U-boats arrived, Schmundt added to the line until it consisted of six boats. On July 1, one of these skippers, Max-Martin Teichert in U-456 U-456, found PQ 17 and flashed the alarm, but the fourstack destroyer Leamington Leamington drove him off. Two other boats, von Hymmen in drove him off. Two other boats, von Hymmen in U-408 U-408 of the Denmark Strait patrol, low on fuel, and a new boat from Germany, of the Denmark Strait patrol, low on fuel, and a new boat from Germany, U-255 U-255, commanded by Reinhardt Reche, age twenty-seven, came up in the fog patches to confirm Teichert's sighting. From Narvik, Schmundt directed these three boats, plus Heinz Bielfeld in U-703 U-703, to shadow and to make beacons for the benefit of all German forces.

On the following day, July 2, the U-boat shadowers and the Ice Devils merged at about the same time that PQ 17 and QP 13 passed, sailing in opposite directions. One of the Ice Devils, Heino Bohmann in U-88 U-88, spotted and reported QP 13. It consisted of thirty-five ships and fifteen escorts, but the German aim was to sink ships laden with armaments for the Soviet Union, not the returning empty ships. Schmundt therefore specifically ordered Bohmann-and all other U-boat skippers-to ignore the Iceland-bound QP 13 and concentrate on the Murmansk-bound PQ 17.*

Although Hitler had yet to authorize attacks by the big surface ships, upon discovery of the convoys, the German admirals deployed them northward to the most favorable jumping-off position in Altenfiord near the North Cape of Norway. During these movements, the newly-arrived "pocket" battleship Lutzow Lutzow and three destroyers ran onto rocks in the fog and incurred such heavy damage that they had to be withdrawn from the operation. That humiliating accident left only the super-battleship and three destroyers ran onto rocks in the fog and incurred such heavy damage that they had to be withdrawn from the operation. That humiliating accident left only the super-battleship Tirpitz Tirpitz, the "pocket" battleship Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, the heavy cruiser Hipper Hipper, and their screens (seven destroyers, two torpedo boats) to mount the surface-ship attack on PQ 17. Hitler finally authorized them to sail, but only if there was no risk of a loss to Allied carrier-based aircraft or submarines, which would embarrass Germany and jeopardize the defense of Norway. These restrictions led the German admirals in charge of surface-ship operations to proceed with utmost caution.

During that day and the next, July 3, all eleven U-boats in the area closed on convoy PQ 17 or took up positions along its track. As Schmundt wrote later, "conditions for U-boat warfare were the most unfavorable imaginable." Dense fog patches lay over a sea of mushy, crushed ice. The fog hid the U-boats, but from time to time the convoy ran out of it without warning, leaving the U-boats naked in bright sunlight and in full view of the ships and escorts. In the open areas, the seas were flat, glassy calm, making it dangerous to use periscopes for submerged attacks. Reinhardt Reche in the new U-255 U-255 got close enough submerged to shoot a two-torpedo fan at a "destroyer," but both torpedoes missed. Escorts counterattacked and dropped forty depth charges near got close enough submerged to shoot a two-torpedo fan at a "destroyer," but both torpedoes missed. Escorts counterattacked and dropped forty depth charges near U-255 U-255 but none was close enough to do real harm. At least six other boats attempted attacks, but the veteran escorts beat them off, and one by one the U-boats fell behind and lost contact. German aircraft, homing on U-boat beacons, assumed the shadower role. Contemptuous of the difficulties the U-boats faced or the inexperience of the crews, German admirals conducting the action were furious at the failure of the U-boats to get close and attack. but none was close enough to do real harm. At least six other boats attempted attacks, but the veteran escorts beat them off, and one by one the U-boats fell behind and lost contact. German aircraft, homing on U-boat beacons, assumed the shadower role. Contemptuous of the difficulties the U-boats faced or the inexperience of the crews, German admirals conducting the action were furious at the failure of the U-boats to get close and attack.

Luftwaffe dive bombers and torpedo planes attacked PQ 17 and elements of the cruiser support force that had closed up to protect it on July 4. The escorts threw up dense walls of ack-ack but the aircraft, staging from bases in northern Norway, had sufficient fuel to mount several attacks. Even so, they achieved little. In the early morning, a torpedo bomber hit and savaged the 7,200-ton American freighter dive bombers and torpedo planes attacked PQ 17 and elements of the cruiser support force that had closed up to protect it on July 4. The escorts threw up dense walls of ack-ack but the aircraft, staging from bases in northern Norway, had sufficient fuel to mount several attacks. Even so, they achieved little. In the early morning, a torpedo bomber hit and savaged the 7,200-ton American freighter Christopher Christopher Newport Newport. After her crew abandoned ship, two British escorts tried to put the hulk under, but both attempts failed. Later in the day, Karl Brandenburg in the new U-457 U-457 found the ravaged, abandoned hulk and sank it with a torpedo. found the ravaged, abandoned hulk and sank it with a torpedo.

During this action, Brandenburg got a periscope glimpse of some elements of the cruiser force. In his report, he stated that he had seen heavy units with the convoy, including a "battleship." On the basis of this incorrect report, Admiral Raeder, assuming these heavy units to be the distant covering force, which included an aircraft carrier, and mindful of Hitler's restriction, refused to authorize the sailing of Tirpitz Tirpitz until the supposed carrier had been sunk. Since the U-boats had the best chance of sinking the carrier, Schmundt directed Brandenburg in until the supposed carrier had been sunk. Since the U-boats had the best chance of sinking the carrier, Schmundt directed Brandenburg in U-457 U-457 to ignore PQ 17 and to shadow the "battleship" (and presumably the carrier) and to bring up other boats. Inasmuch as three of the eleven boats that had sailed in early June to serve as lookouts in the Denmark Strait had to refuel in Narvik or Kirkenes, and two boats had to shadow the convoy in behalf of the to ignore PQ 17 and to shadow the "battleship" (and presumably the carrier) and to bring up other boats. Inasmuch as three of the eleven boats that had sailed in early June to serve as lookouts in the Denmark Strait had to refuel in Narvik or Kirkenes, and two boats had to shadow the convoy in behalf of the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, only five other boats were available to join Brandenburg in U-457 U-457 to hunt down the "battleship." So that there could be no mistake or confusion, Schmundt advised all U-boats that their "main targets" were the Allied heavy units. to hunt down the "battleship." So that there could be no mistake or confusion, Schmundt advised all U-boats that their "main targets" were the Allied heavy units.

Later on July 4, large flights of Luftwaffe Luftwaffe aircraft attacked PQ 17 twice. A group of dive bombers and torpedo planes in the second attack hit three ships: the 4,800-ton British freighter aircraft attacked PQ 17 twice. A group of dive bombers and torpedo planes in the second attack hit three ships: the 4,800-ton British freighter Navarino Navarino, the 7,200-ton American freighter William Hooper, and the Soviet tanker Azerbaijan. After taking off the crew, British escorts sank Navarino Navarino. Hilmar Siemon in U-334 U-334 happened upon the abandoned hulk of happened upon the abandoned hulk of William Hooper William Hooper and put her under with torpedoes. and put her under with torpedoes. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan made temporary repairs and sailed on. made temporary repairs and sailed on.

In London, First Sea Lord Dudley Pound fretted. He knew from various intelligence sources, including Enigma, that Tirpitz Tirpitz and the other big German ships had staged to northern Norway, doubtless to attack PQ 17. However, he was unaware of the restriction Hitler had placed on the sailing of the German surface forces or of the accident to and the other big German ships had staged to northern Norway, doubtless to attack PQ 17. However, he was unaware of the restriction Hitler had placed on the sailing of the German surface forces or of the accident to Lutzow Lutzow. Contrary to all advice, he wrongly assumed that Tirpitz Tirpitz and the other big ships had sailed late on July 4 to attack the Allied forces. Pound calculated that the Germans could reach PQ 17 and the covering cruiser force by the afternoon of July 5. Combined with the power of the U-boats and and the other big ships had sailed late on July 4 to attack the Allied forces. Pound calculated that the Germans could reach PQ 17 and the covering cruiser force by the afternoon of July 5. Combined with the power of the U-boats and Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, the German surface ships might sink the whole of PQ 17 and the cruiser force as well. To avoid this possible catastrophe, Pound issued fateful-and controversial-orders for the convoy to "scatter" and for the cruiser force to reverse course and withdraw to the southwest. Although no orders had been issued to them, the six destroyers in the close escort joined the withdrawing cruiser force. Like the merchant ships, the remaining fifteen close escorts scattered in all directions.

The U-boats were first to report and benefit from the scatter. Teichert in U-456 U-456 and Brandenburg in and Brandenburg in U-457 U-457 signaled that the cruiser force (wrongly believed to be the battleship-carrier covering force) had reversed course at very high speed. Unable to pursue at that speed, they and other skippers requested permission to attack the many unescorted merchant ships all around them. Schmundt authorized this shift in targets and amid the repeated signaled that the cruiser force (wrongly believed to be the battleship-carrier covering force) had reversed course at very high speed. Unable to pursue at that speed, they and other skippers requested permission to attack the many unescorted merchant ships all around them. Schmundt authorized this shift in targets and amid the repeated Luftwaffe Luftwaffe attacks, the U-boats had a field day. attacks, the U-boats had a field day.

* Heinz Bielfeld in U-703 U-703 sank the 6,600-ton British freighter Empire Byron, which had been damaged by the sank the 6,600-ton British freighter Empire Byron, which had been damaged by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, and the 5,500-ton British freighter River Afton River Afton. Bielfeld captured a British Army officer from Empire Byron and the captain of River Afton River Afton, and gave the survivors in lifeboats food and water.

* Heino Bohmann in U-88 U-88 sank the 5,100-ton American freighter Carlton and the 7,200-ton American freighter sank the 5,100-ton American freighter Carlton and the 7,200-ton American freighter Daniel Morgan Daniel Morgan, which had been damaged by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe.

* Hilmar Siemon in U-334 U-334 sank the 7,200-ton British freighter Earlston, which had been damaged by German aircraft, and captured her captain. sank the 7,200-ton British freighter Earlston, which had been damaged by German aircraft, and captured her captain.

* Max-Martin Teichert in U-456 U-456 sank the 7,000-ton American freighter sank the 7,000-ton American freighter Honomu Honomu and captured her captain. and captured her captain.

Also enjoying a field day, the German airmen had difficulty distinguishing friend from foe. One dive bomber hit Siemon in U-334 U-334. Another hit Brandenburg in U-457 U-457. The two bombs that fell near U-334 U-334 caused such heavy damage that Siemon was forced to abort. At Siemon's request, Schmundt directed Teichert in caused such heavy damage that Siemon was forced to abort. At Siemon's request, Schmundt directed Teichert in U-456 U-456 to escort to escort U-334 U-334 into Kirkenes. At about the same time, Heinrich Gollnitz in into Kirkenes. At about the same time, Heinrich Gollnitz in U-657 U-657, who had sunk no ships, aborted owing to a leak in an external fuel-oil tank that was leaving an oil trace. These three withdrawals reduced the U-boat force to five, but the three boats that refueled in Narvik and Kirkenes (U-251, U-376 U-376, U-408 U-408) resailed immediately, again raising the Arctic force to eight U-boats.

Upon learning that the Allied covering force, the cruiser force, and the destroyers of the close escort had fled and that the convoy had scattered, Admiral Raeder persuaded Hitler that Tirpitz Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer, and Hipper Hipper could sail without undue risk. Thereupon the Fuhrer approved could sail without undue risk. Thereupon the Fuhrer approved Rosselsprung Rosselsprung (Knight's Move). Raeder relayed the approval to the forces at sea, stressing that every precaution must be taken to prevent the loss or severe damage to any of the three big ships, especially (Knight's Move). Raeder relayed the approval to the forces at sea, stressing that every precaution must be taken to prevent the loss or severe damage to any of the three big ships, especially Tirpitz Tirpitz.

Escorted by seven destroyers and two motor torpedo boats, the three big German ships sailed from Altenfiord at 3:00 P.M. P.M., July 5. As the force emerged from protected waters to open sea, the Soviet submarine K-21 K-21 saw it and attacked saw it and attacked Tirpitz Tirpitz, claiming two hits, which were, however, not confirmed. An hour later, a Coastal Command Catalina also saw and reported the force. Two hours after that the British submarine Unshaken Unshaken, commanded by H. P. Westmacott, saw and radioed an exact description of the force.

Hearing of these Allied sightings from B-dienst B-dienst, Admiral Raeder deemed the sortie to be too risky and on his own authority he canceled Rosselsprung Rosselsprung, merely six and a half hours after it commenced. For the second- time, Tirpitz Tirpitz returned to port without having achieved anything with her massive armament. However, her mere presence in the area had persuaded Admiral Pound to scatter PQ 17, leaving all its surviving ships and close escorts vulnerable to aircraft and U-boat attack. returned to port without having achieved anything with her massive armament. However, her mere presence in the area had persuaded Admiral Pound to scatter PQ 17, leaving all its surviving ships and close escorts vulnerable to aircraft and U-boat attack.

Over the next ten days, German aircraft and U-boats scoured the Barents Sea in search of ships from the scattered convoy. One German aircraft sank one more freighter, the 5,400-ton American Pan Atlantic; other aircraft damaged a half dozen other ships. Reinhardt Reche in U-255 U-255 was the most successful of the U-boat skippers. He sank three American freighters for about 18,400 tons, plus the 7,200-ton Dutchman was the most successful of the U-boat skippers. He sank three American freighters for about 18,400 tons, plus the 7,200-ton Dutchman Paulus Potter Paulus Potter, which had been hit by the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe and abandoned in such haste that "secret papers" had been left behind. and abandoned in such haste that "secret papers" had been left behind.* Gunter La Baume in Gunter La Baume in U-355 U-355 sank one British freighter for 5,100 tons. Three other boats sank one ship each that had been damaged by the sank one British freighter for 5,100 tons. Three other boats sank one ship each that had been damaged by the Luftwaffe: Luftwaffe: Heinrich Timm in Heinrich Timm in U-251 U-251, Friedrich-Karl Marks in U-376 U-376, and Karl Brandenburg in U-457 U-457, who barely avoided an attack by a Soviet submarine.

When the final sinking reports reached Berlin, the German high command was exultant. It believed that for the first time in the war an entire Allied convoy had been wiped out. The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe claimed sinking twenty ships for 131,000 tons. The U-boats claimed sinking sixteen ships for 113,963 tons, a combined total of thirty-six ships for 245,000 tons. In reality, fourteen of the thirty-eight merchant and rescue ships that confronted the German air and U-boat attacks survived to reach Soviet ports and none of the warships was lost. In part the huge overclaims resulted from aircraft and submarines "sinking" the same ships. The results, as calculated by Jurgen Rohwer and other students of the battle: claimed sinking twenty ships for 131,000 tons. The U-boats claimed sinking sixteen ships for 113,963 tons, a combined total of thirty-six ships for 245,000 tons. In reality, fourteen of the thirty-eight merchant and rescue ships that confronted the German air and U-boat attacks survived to reach Soviet ports and none of the warships was lost. In part the huge overclaims resulted from aircraft and submarines "sinking" the same ships. The results, as calculated by Jurgen Rohwer and other students of the battle: Ships sunk by aircraft alone: 8 for 40,425 tons 8 for 40,425 tons Ships sunk by U-boats alone: 7 for 41,041 tons 7 for 41,041 tons Ships sunk by aircraft and U-boats: 9 for 61,255 tons 9 for 61,255 tons Totals: 24 for 142,721 tons 24 for 142,721 tons

Until the battle of PQ 17 there was a possibility that Donitz might persuade Berlin to release some or all of the twenty-three Type VII boats in Norway and the Arctic for duty in the Atlantic. In view of the inflated-and credited-U-boat sinking claims and the convoy detection and shadow service U-boats provided for the Luftwaffe Luftwaffe, any prospect of transfers evaporated.

The destruction of PQ 17 led the British to suspend the Murmansk run until the Arctic days had some hours of darkness and steps could be taken to greatly improve the defense of the merchant ships. These steps included the establishment of RAF Hampden and Catalina squadrons on airfields near Murmansk and an Allied refueling facility for escorts and warships on the island of Spitzbergen, the adaptation of the Royal Navy's American-built "jeep" carrier Avenger for temporary Arctic service,* the fitting of merchant ships with more flak guns and tethered blimps, and the return of numerous Home Fleet warships temporarily assigned to the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Notwithstanding the intense political pressures from Washington and Moscow, London held firm and no PQ or QP convoys set sail in July or August. the fitting of merchant ships with more flak guns and tethered blimps, and the return of numerous Home Fleet warships temporarily assigned to the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Notwithstanding the intense political pressures from Washington and Moscow, London held firm and no PQ or QP convoys set sail in July or August.

THE M MEDITERRANEAN: SUPPORTING SUPPORTING R ROMMEL.

The twenty Type VII U-boats based in the Mediterranean on April 1, 1942, to support Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps Afrika Korps continued to operate under extremely difficult conditions. The patrols were still brief but nerve-shattering and risky. Some skippers cracked from the strain. Others rotated back to Germany to command larger U-boats under construction. Notwithstanding pressures from Berlin and Rome and the new Mediterranean U-boat commander, Leo Kreisch, the Italian-run shore facilities at La Spezia, Pola, and Salamis remained slow and slovenly. When on April 1, an Allied aircraft hit Helmut Rosenbaum in continued to operate under extremely difficult conditions. The patrols were still brief but nerve-shattering and risky. Some skippers cracked from the strain. Others rotated back to Germany to command larger U-boats under construction. Notwithstanding pressures from Berlin and Rome and the new Mediterranean U-boat commander, Leo Kreisch, the Italian-run shore facilities at La Spezia, Pola, and Salamis remained slow and slovenly. When on April 1, an Allied aircraft hit Helmut Rosenbaum in U-73 U-73 with four bombs or depth charges, repairs at La Spezia required four full months. with four bombs or depth charges, repairs at La Spezia required four full months.