Late on the twenty-eighth, after the Austrians had declared war, and as the roll towards European war seemed inexorable, Wilhelm and Nicholas exchanged telegrams, each appealing to the other to stop the conflict. Nicholas still hoped that, if Germany could pull Austria back from attacking Belgrade, war could be stopped: "I appeal to you23 to help me ... I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by pressure brought upon me, and forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war." to help me ... I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by pressure brought upon me, and forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war."

Wilhelm, for the last time, appealed to monarchical solidarity: "... You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest as well as all Sovereigns to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this case politics plays no part at all." He rea.s.sured Nicholas that Germany was doing its best to try to bring about an agreement between Vienna and St. Petersburg-though he would not promise that he would stop the attack on Serbia.24 I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope that you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise.500Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin w.i.l.l.y501 Wilhelm didn't know that his own Foreign Office had advised the Austrians to go to war, and that Bethmann-Hollweg had accompanied his demand to the Austrians to stop in Belgrade with a note that it wasn't to be taken seriously and was simply for propaganda purposes.

Nicholas wrote to George too, asking for support from Britain if Russia did find itself at war, and a.s.suring him that he was doing all he could to avoid it.

Austria has gone25 off upon a reckless war, which can easily end in a general conflagration. It is awful! My country is confident of its strength and of the right cause it has taken up ... Now we are compelled to take strong measures in case of emergency-for our own defence ... If a general war broke out I know that we shall have France's and England's full support. As a last resort I have written to William to ask him to bear a strong pressure upon Austria so as to enable us to discuss matters with her off upon a reckless war, which can easily end in a general conflagration. It is awful! My country is confident of its strength and of the right cause it has taken up ... Now we are compelled to take strong measures in case of emergency-for our own defence ... If a general war broke out I know that we shall have France's and England's full support. As a last resort I have written to William to ask him to bear a strong pressure upon Austria so as to enable us to discuss matters with her.

"Where will it26 end?" George wrote plaintively. "... Winston Churchill came to see me, the Navy is all ready for War, but please G.o.d it will not come. These are very anxious days for me to live in." end?" George wrote plaintively. "... Winston Churchill came to see me, the Navy is all ready for War, but please G.o.d it will not come. These are very anxious days for me to live in."

On 29 July Wilhelm summoned his military leaders. Most of the army chiefs were keen to go to the next level of preparedness for mobilization-Kriegsgefahr, the "state of impending war," the stage before mobilization-but Bethmann-Hollweg and Moltke, visited by one of his moments of anxiety, argued against it and Wilhelm eventually sided with them. He also announced he had received a message from Heinrich telling him of George's words of a few days before-that Britain would try to keep out of the conflict. He seized on this as an official a.s.surance of British neutrality. When Tirpitz suggested he might have misinterpreted it, Wilhelm said grandly, "I have the word27 of a King, and that is enough for me." But in the afternoon Lichnowsky sent the German Foreign Office a telegram describing a meeting with Sir Edward Grey, who, after suggesting that the Austrians should stop in Belgrade, added that, if Germany and France became involved in a war, Britain wouldn't be able to remain aloof. of a King, and that is enough for me." But in the afternoon Lichnowsky sent the German Foreign Office a telegram describing a meeting with Sir Edward Grey, who, after suggesting that the Austrians should stop in Belgrade, added that, if Germany and France became involved in a war, Britain wouldn't be able to remain aloof.

Grey's message was far from being an explicit threat-he couldn't know that the German response to a Balkan conflict would include attacking France-but it shocked Bethmann-Hollweg, who still hoped the war might be localized. News that the Russians were starting to mobilize, and a dressing-down from Wilhelm when he suggested that Germany should sacrifice the fleet in order to keep Britain neutral, convinced him the conflict was escalating too fast and too far. Contradicting his previous messages, he sent three increasingly desperate telegrams to Vienna asking that the Austrian army stop when they got to Belgrade. But a few hours before, Moltke had cabled Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Austrian chief of staff, and told him to go to full mobilization. The Austrians sh.e.l.led Belgrade; Bethmann-Hollweg was too late. It was a horrible instance of the German government's confusion. Even Moltke was far from delighted by what he had done. He wrote a memo to the government that day in which he described a war "which will annihilate28 the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come." the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come."

In a final effort to head off British involvement, Bethmann-Hollweg summoned the British amba.s.sador, Edward Goschen, and suggested that, if the British agreed to stay neutral, the Germans would not invade Holland and that, while perhaps invading France, the Germans wouldn't try to take any of its territories. The British were amazed that the chancellor had all but admitted that Germany was going to attack France. Grey called it "a disgrace."29 Meanwhile, still under the illusion that he could mediate between Russia and Austria, that the Austrians had heeded his message to stop at Belgrade, and certain that Russia could be deterred from getting involved, Wilhelm replied to Nicholas's telegram. He told the tsar that Russia could easily "remain a spectator30 without involving Europe in the most horrible war she has ever witnessed ... Of course military measures on the part of Russia would be looked upon by Austria as a calamity we both wish to avoid." without involving Europe in the most horrible war she has ever witnessed ... Of course military measures on the part of Russia would be looked upon by Austria as a calamity we both wish to avoid."

In St. Petersburg, the German amba.s.sador, Pourtales, had twice visited Sazonov to tell him that any partial mobilization by Russia would mean war between their two countries. His words seemed to contradict Wilhelm's "conciliatory and friendly message," and Nicholas cabled to ask for clarification and suggested that the dispute be taken to The Hague. He signed it, "Trust in your31 wisdom and friendship, Your loving Nicky." No answer came back. The Russian General Staff was pressuring him to ma.s.s Russian troops on the Austrian border in retaliation for the sh.e.l.ling of Belgrade. Nicholas sent Wilhelm another telegram explaining that he had allowed partial mobilization to go ahead-an order that originally dated from several days before. He promised that Russian troops would not take the offensive, as long as talks with Austria continued. "I hope from all wisdom and friendship, Your loving Nicky." No answer came back. The Russian General Staff was pressuring him to ma.s.s Russian troops on the Austrian border in retaliation for the sh.e.l.ling of Belgrade. Nicholas sent Wilhelm another telegram explaining that he had allowed partial mobilization to go ahead-an order that originally dated from several days before. He promised that Russian troops would not take the offensive, as long as talks with Austria continued. "I hope from all32 my heart that these measures won't interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding." my heart that these measures won't interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding."

When he got the telegram Wilhelm decided that Nicholas had taken a deliberately provocative step. He thought the Russians were now ahead in mobilization, or maybe he was just looking for a reason to be angry. He scribbled on it, "And these measures33 are for defence against Austria which is in no way attacking him!! I cannot agree to any more mediation since the Tsar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back." Next to Nicky's last sentences about his mediation, he wrote, "No, there is no thought of anything of that sort!!!" On the morning of 30 July Wilhelm wrote back to Nicholas: are for defence against Austria which is in no way attacking him!! I cannot agree to any more mediation since the Tsar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back." Next to Nicky's last sentences about his mediation, he wrote, "No, there is no thought of anything of that sort!!!" On the morning of 30 July Wilhelm wrote back to Nicholas: Austria has only34 mobilised against Servia [sic] & only a part of her army. If, as it is now the case, according to the communication by you & your Government, Russia mobilises against Austria, my role as mediator you kindly intrusted me with, & which I accepted at you[r] express prayer, will be endangered if not ruined. The whole weight of the decision lies solely on you[r] shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for Peace or War mobilised against Servia [sic] & only a part of her army. If, as it is now the case, according to the communication by you & your Government, Russia mobilises against Austria, my role as mediator you kindly intrusted me with, & which I accepted at you[r] express prayer, will be endangered if not ruined. The whole weight of the decision lies solely on you[r] shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for Peace or Warw.i.l.l.y.

In Tsarskoe Selo, Sazonov and the Russian generals spent hours trying to persuade Nicholas to allow the Russian army to proceed to a general mobilization. If he did it, they told him, he would reconnect with his people; if he failed, the state would be damaged abroad and at home. He would look weak, and the Russian people would never forgive him. Nicholas seemed on the verge of tears. Eventually he gave in. He sent Wilhelm another telegram: It is technically35 impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilisation. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Servia's [ impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilisation. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Servia's [sic] account are taking place my troops shall not make any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this. I put all my trust in G.o.ds mercy and hope in your successful mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe.Your affectionate, Nicky.

Wilhelm fell into a furious tantrum and shouted that Nicholas had shown himself to be a partisan of bandits and regicides. The truth was, however, that Russian mobilization was not the same as German mobilization-as the Russians explained and as everyone knew. The Russians, like the Austrians, took weeks to get ready to fight; mobilization was a posture, a warning. They could march up and down behind their border almost indefinitely, whereas for the German army, trained and organized down to the minute, mobilization meant imminent war. The Russian mobilization was a gift to the German government. "In my endeavours36 to maintain the peace of the world I have gone to the utmost limit possible," Wilhelm told Nicholas. "The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it." Bethmann-Hollweg was able to argue that Russia had made the first move. The argument brought the German press on board and even the German Left. to maintain the peace of the world I have gone to the utmost limit possible," Wilhelm told Nicholas. "The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it." Bethmann-Hollweg was able to argue that Russia had made the first move. The argument brought the German press on board and even the German Left.*

In the evening Wilhelm was finally shown Lichnowsky's telegram about Grey's warning that if France became involved Britain wouldn't be able to stand by, two days after it had arrived. He exploded with rage, accusing George of reneging on his "promise" of neutrality. On both sides of the doc.u.ment Wilhelm denounced the English as "a mean crew37 of shopkeepers revealed in their 'true colours' ... Grey proves the King a liar, and his words to Lichnowsky are the outcome of a guilty conscience, because he feels that he has deceived us. At that, it is a matter of fact a threat combined with a bluff, in order to separate us from Austria and to prevent us from mobilising, and to shift the responsibility for the war." Now there was someone else to blame if the war widened: Grey. If he "were to say one of shopkeepers revealed in their 'true colours' ... Grey proves the King a liar, and his words to Lichnowsky are the outcome of a guilty conscience, because he feels that he has deceived us. At that, it is a matter of fact a threat combined with a bluff, in order to separate us from Austria and to prevent us from mobilising, and to shift the responsibility for the war." Now there was someone else to blame if the war widened: Grey. If he "were to say one38 single, serious sharp and warning word at Paris and St. Petersburg, and were to warn them to remain neutral, that single, serious sharp and warning word at Paris and St. Petersburg, and were to warn them to remain neutral, that [sic] [sic] both would become quiet at once. But he takes care not to speak the word, and threatens us instead! Common cur! England alone bears the responsibility for peace and war, not we any longer!" both would become quiet at once. But he takes care not to speak the word, and threatens us instead! Common cur! England alone bears the responsibility for peace and war, not we any longer!"

The notion that the British could have stopped the Russians from going to war was a fantasy, and also a characteristic exaggeration of Britain's influence in Europe. The Russians were determined that their very future was in the balance if they let Austria beat the Serbs; British neutrality wasn't going to stop them. It was true, however, that for eight years Grey had made Britain the fulcrum in Europe, hinting at crucial moments that if it came to war, Britain would side with the victim of aggression. But he had always shied away from committing himself entirely, to avoid the risk that the promise of British support might actually encourage France or Russia to start a conflict. His position encouraged both sides to ask for commitments, one for help, the other for neutrality. It has sometimes been suggested that if Grey had announced on 28 or 29 July that Britain would definitely fight with France and Russia if it came to a war, Germany might have been sufficiently chastened to withdraw. He himself, after all, believed that Britain had built up an obligation to defend France if it were attacked. The problem was he couldn't make the announcement because the majority of the British cabinet were against the idea of fighting. Moreover, like the rest of the cabinet, he had no desire to support Russia on its own. It's also worth noting that though Bethmann-Hollweg and Wilhelm worried about British involvement, the German military no longer seemed to care one way or the other. They knew the war would be a land war, they calculated that British ships would be irrelevant, and the British army numbered barely 70,000 men.

For Wilhelm, Grey's warning, together with Russian mobilization, brought back all the old anxieties. He saw Europe, led by England, ganging up on him, and the hand of his dead uncle: So the celebrated39 encirclement of Germany has finally become an established fact, and the purely anti-German policy which England has been pursuing all over the world has won the most spectacular victory. England stands derisive, brilliantly successful; her long-mediated purely anti-German policy, stirring to admiration even him who it will utterly destroy! The dead Edward is stronger than I who am still alive ... Our agents and all such must inflame the whole Mahommedan world to frantic rebellion against this detestable, treacherous, conscienceless nation of shopkeepers; for if we are to bleed to death, England shall at all costs lose India encirclement of Germany has finally become an established fact, and the purely anti-German policy which England has been pursuing all over the world has won the most spectacular victory. England stands derisive, brilliantly successful; her long-mediated purely anti-German policy, stirring to admiration even him who it will utterly destroy! The dead Edward is stronger than I who am still alive ... Our agents and all such must inflame the whole Mahommedan world to frantic rebellion against this detestable, treacherous, conscienceless nation of shopkeepers; for if we are to bleed to death, England shall at all costs lose India.

In Britain most people, including the cabinet and George, still believed that Britain wouldn't come into any war. The Liberal Party was still vigorously against it, the Conservatives were still undecided.

Even now, however, Wilhelm hesitated. It was Bethmann-Hollweg who insisted that war must be declared even if Russia agreed to negotiations. It was Falkenhayn, the war minister, who pressed the kaiser to authorize Kriegsgefahr Kriegsgefahr and order that a German ultimatum be delivered to Russia to halt her mobilization within twelve hours or Germany would declare war. When Pourtales, the German amba.s.sador, came to deliver the ultimatum, the head of the tsar's court chancellery, Mossolov, told him it would be impossible. "You can't stop and order that a German ultimatum be delivered to Russia to halt her mobilization within twelve hours or Germany would declare war. When Pourtales, the German amba.s.sador, came to deliver the ultimatum, the head of the tsar's court chancellery, Mossolov, told him it would be impossible. "You can't stop40 a car that is going at 60 miles an hour. It would inevitably capsize." a car that is going at 60 miles an hour. It would inevitably capsize."

The next day, 1 August, Nicholas sent a last telegram pleading with Wilhelm to continue negotiating: "Understand you are41 obliged to mobilize but wish to have the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war ... Our long proved friendship must succeed, with G.o.d's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full of confidence await your answer." German mobilization, however, obliged to mobilize but wish to have the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war ... Our long proved friendship must succeed, with G.o.d's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full of confidence await your answer." German mobilization, however, was was different. Their war mobilization led to immediate action-so this was not a guarantee the kaiser could give. But he did draft a telegram suggesting that talks might take place if Russia halted its mobilization. It was not, however, sent until late in the evening, well after Pourtales had tearfully delivered the German declaration of war to Sazonov. different. Their war mobilization led to immediate action-so this was not a guarantee the kaiser could give. But he did draft a telegram suggesting that talks might take place if Russia halted its mobilization. It was not, however, sent until late in the evening, well after Pourtales had tearfully delivered the German declaration of war to Sazonov.

Nicholas was "praying with all the fervour of his nature that G.o.d would avert the war which he felt was imminent." His son's tutor, Pierre Gilliard, was struck by "the air of weary exhaustion he wore ... The pouches which always appeared under his eyes when he was tired seemed to be markedly larger." After he got the news from Sazonov, "The Czar appeared, looking very pale, and told them that war was declared, in a voice which betrayed his agitation, notwithstanding all his efforts."42 When she heard, Alix began to weep, and all the daughters seeing her cry began to cry too. Wilhelm's delayed telegram arrived late that night. Nicholas saw it as proof of his duplicity, though it was more a sign of his powerlessness: "He was never sincere; When she heard, Alix began to weep, and all the daughters seeing her cry began to cry too. Wilhelm's delayed telegram arrived late that night. Nicholas saw it as proof of his duplicity, though it was more a sign of his powerlessness: "He was never sincere;43 not a moment," he said bitterly. not a moment," he said bitterly.

In the end he was hopelessly entangled in the net of his perfidy and lies ... it was half past one in the morning of August 2 ... There was no doubt that the object of this strange and farcical telegram was to shake my resolution, disconcert me and inspire me to some absurd and dishonourable act. It produced the opposite effect. As I left the Empress's room, I felt that all was over forever between me and William. I slept extremely well.

In the early hours of 1 August the British Foreign Office made a last attempt to close down the war. They received a telegram from Berlin, informing them that despite Wilhelm's readiness to mediate, Russia had mobilized against Austria: "We are unable to remain44 inactive ... We have therefore informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measures against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would mean war." Asquith and Grey decided to use George to get to the tsar. "The poor King inactive ... We have therefore informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measures against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would mean war." Asquith and Grey decided to use George to get to the tsar. "The poor King45 was hauled out of his bed," Asquith wrote, "and one of my strangest experiences ... was sitting with him-he in a brown dressing gown over his nightshirt with copious signs of having been aroused from his first 'beauty sleep'-while I read the message and the 'proposed' answer." George described the telegram as "a last resort was hauled out of his bed," Asquith wrote, "and one of my strangest experiences ... was sitting with him-he in a brown dressing gown over his nightshirt with copious signs of having been aroused from his first 'beauty sleep'-while I read the message and the 'proposed' answer." George described the telegram as "a last resort46 to try to prevent war." George's contribution, according to Asquith, was to add "my dear Nicky," to try to prevent war." George's contribution, according to Asquith, was to add "my dear Nicky,"47 and sign it. and sign it.

George's message forwarded the German telegram and added: I cannot help48 thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you, my dear Nicky, to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you, my dear Nicky, to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to a.s.sist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned in my power to a.s.sist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned.

The message was entrusted to Buchanan and a shorter telegram was sent to Tsarskoe Selo asking the tsar to see the British amba.s.sador as soon as possible. But the tsar was a hard man to get at. By the time Buchanan managed to see him, it was late in the evening and Germany had already declared war on Russia. "Whether we shall49 be dragged into it G.o.d only knows," George wrote, "but we shall not send an Expeditionary Force of the Army now. France is begging us to come to their a.s.sistance. At this moment public opinion here is dead against our joining in the War but I think it will be impossible to keep out of it as we cannot allow France to be smashed." be dragged into it G.o.d only knows," George wrote, "but we shall not send an Expeditionary Force of the Army now. France is begging us to come to their a.s.sistance. At this moment public opinion here is dead against our joining in the War but I think it will be impossible to keep out of it as we cannot allow France to be smashed."

Nicholas's reply to George's telegram arrived the next day. "I would gladly50 have accepted your proposals, had not the German Amba.s.sador this afternoon presented a Note to my Government declaring war," he wrote. He had done "all in my power to avert war," while Germany and Austria had rejected "every proposal." He had moved to general mobilization only, "owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia ... That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me as I had given most categorical a.s.surances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued." He hoped, he added, that Britain would support them. have accepted your proposals, had not the German Amba.s.sador this afternoon presented a Note to my Government declaring war," he wrote. He had done "all in my power to avert war," while Germany and Austria had rejected "every proposal." He had moved to general mobilization only, "owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia ... That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me as I had given most categorical a.s.surances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued." He hoped, he added, that Britain would support them.

The Russian government's justification for going to war was that the people demanded it-an extraordinary claim from an autocratic state that barely ten years before hadn't even recognized the existence of public opinion. At some level Nicholas believed it, but of course "public opinion" was not the hundreds of thousands of strikers or the people on the barricades in Moscow. It was true, however, that with only one exception-the tiny pro-German court faction-the entire government, bureaucracy, the educated cla.s.ses, the buyers of papers, demanded intervention in Austria's war with Serbia, which gave Germany an excuse to attack. If there had been no Nicholas, Russia would still have gone to war. Though he had his doubts, Nicholas was not strong enough to counter such feeling. On the other hand, in his twenty years in power, Nicholas had done so much to weaken and stunt the emergence of a properly functioning modern government, so much to ensure that it was about as chaotic as it could be, that it is possible to speculate that a more professional government might have managed to hold on to the obvious fact that war was a threat to its very existence, and that this reality ought to trump everything else.

Nicholas felt he had been forced to do it, and he blamed Germany. "The German Emperor51 knew perfectly well that Russia wanted peace," he told Buchanan bitterly, "and that her mobilisation could not be completed for another fortnight at least but he had declared war with such haste as to render all further discussion impossible." knew perfectly well that Russia wanted peace," he told Buchanan bitterly, "and that her mobilisation could not be completed for another fortnight at least but he had declared war with such haste as to render all further discussion impossible."

Even at this late stage, Wilhelm, Bethmann-Hollweg and Lichnowsky, the amba.s.sador in London, still hoped that Britain would stay out, and the war wouldn't need to spread beyond the East.

On 1 August Amba.s.sador Lichnowsky reported excitedly that Grey had asked whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would leave it alone. Lichnowsky answered yes, deciding that this was an offer to stay out if Germany stayed out of France. Wilhelm received the message just after he'd reluctantly handed Moltke the signed order for general mobilization-which meant armies would soon be pouring into France. The kaiser and the chancellor jumped at the offer. Wilhelm sent a telegram to George telling him he had just received "the communication from52 your Government, offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain." He a.s.sured George that he would not attack France if it offered neutrality and if that was guaranteed by the British army and fleet. "I hope that France will not become nervous, the troops on my frontiers are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France." The kaiser told Moltke that the soldiers could all be sent off to Russia. Moltke practically burst into tears. He insisted mobilization couldn't be halted, that it would be mad to leave Germany exposed to France. Wilhelm replied sullenly, "Your uncle would have your Government, offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain." He a.s.sured George that he would not attack France if it offered neutrality and if that was guaranteed by the British army and fleet. "I hope that France will not become nervous, the troops on my frontiers are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France." The kaiser told Moltke that the soldiers could all be sent off to Russia. Moltke practically burst into tears. He insisted mobilization couldn't be halted, that it would be mad to leave Germany exposed to France. Wilhelm replied sullenly, "Your uncle would have53 given me a different answer." He had the order to stop at the Luxembourg border phoned through to the troops. "I felt as if my heart was going to break," Moltke the warmonger sniffed as he set off miserably for general headquarters, devastated that the kaiser "still hoped for peace." given me a different answer." He had the order to stop at the Luxembourg border phoned through to the troops. "I felt as if my heart was going to break," Moltke the warmonger sniffed as he set off miserably for general headquarters, devastated that the kaiser "still hoped for peace."54*

George's reply, when it came, was not what Wilhelm had hoped. "I think there must56 be some misunderstanding of a suggestion that pa.s.sed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and British armies might be avoided." The French had refused to be neutral. Wearing a military greatcoat over his nightshirt, Wilhelm recalled Moltke. "Now you can be some misunderstanding of a suggestion that pa.s.sed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and British armies might be avoided." The French had refused to be neutral. Wearing a military greatcoat over his nightshirt, Wilhelm recalled Moltke. "Now you can57 do what you like," he growled. At 7 p.m., the German army were in Luxembourg. France was in the war by the next afternoon. The French amba.s.sador in Berlin, Paul Cambon, told Edward Goschen that there were three people in Berlin who regretted the war had started. "You, me and do what you like," he growled. At 7 p.m., the German army were in Luxembourg. France was in the war by the next afternoon. The French amba.s.sador in Berlin, Paul Cambon, told Edward Goschen that there were three people in Berlin who regretted the war had started. "You, me and58 Kaiser Wilhelm." Kaiser Wilhelm."

The next day Lichnowsky came to see Prime Minister Asquith in tears. The kaiser was no longer answering his telegrams. The Germans were now threatening to enter Belgium. The Belgian king had appealed to the British government, through George, to safeguard his country's neutrality. The German occupation created an extraordinary volte-face in British public opinion. It also provided the cabinet, which had gradually come round to Grey's argument that Britain was not only obligated to defend France, but that strategically it couldn't allow France to be invaded by Germany, with a justification for action: the defence of "plucky little Belgium." The decision to go to war was extraordinarily united. Only two cabinet members resigned, and only one MP, the Labour member Ramsay MacDonald, spoke against Grey, who told Parliament that Britain must go to war to defend Belgium out of "honour." MacDonald observed that "There has been59 no crime committed by statesmen of this character without those statesmen appealing to their nation's honour"-both the Crimean and Boer Wars had been justified for the sake of "honour." no crime committed by statesmen of this character without those statesmen appealing to their nation's honour"-both the Crimean and Boer Wars had been justified for the sake of "honour."

On 2 August George wrote in his diary: "At 10:30 a crowd of about 6,000 people collected outside the Palace, cheering and singing. May and I went out onto the balcony, they gave us a great ovation."

The next day he added almost enthusiastically: "Public opinion since Grey made his statement in the House today that we should not allow Germany to pa.s.s through the English Channel or into the North Sea to attack France and that we should not allow her troops to pa.s.s through Belgium, has entirely changed ... and now everyone is for war and our helping our friends." On 4 August he continued: "Fairly warm, showers and windy ... I held a Council at 10:45 to declare war with Germany, it is a terrible catastrophe but it is not our fault ... Please G.o.d it may be soon over."60 The declaration of war included the empire; with one signature 450 million subjects were bound into the conflict. The declaration of war included the empire; with one signature 450 million subjects were bound into the conflict.

Wilhelm would spend the rest of his life apportioning blame for the First World War. He wrote to Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. president, ten days after the outbreak, claiming that George had promised neutrality and then reneged on it. Deeply stung by the accusation that he might have given a.s.surances that weren't his to give, George always maintained that he had never made any such promise. To his last breath Wilhelm would insist that Nicholas had wanted war all along, that Russia had been secretly preparing for war for months before, that the Entente had been h.o.a.rding gold since April 1913.

Neither George, nor Nicholas, nor even Alix believed that Wilhelm was personally responsible for the war. "I don't believe61 Wilhelm wanted war," George told the departing Austrian amba.s.sador. Alix told her son's tutor, Pierre Gilliard, that though she had never liked Wilhelm-"if only because he is not sincere"-she was "sure he has been won over to the war against his will." Wilhelm wanted war," George told the departing Austrian amba.s.sador. Alix told her son's tutor, Pierre Gilliard, that though she had never liked Wilhelm-"if only because he is not sincere"-she was "sure he has been won over to the war against his will."62 And it was true. When it came to it, Wilhelm had not wanted war. But he couldn't stop it. In the week before it broke out he was traduced and ignored repeatedly by his civilian and military staff. Forces beyond his power had begun to dictate the direction the country was going in. But in many respects he had brought the situation on himself. Twenty-six years of haphazard intervention had left a dangerous legacy. He had encouraged a powerful army, conscious of its own strength and convinced of the benefits and inevitability of a European war, and he had kept it beyond government control. He had initiated a shipbuilding programme which had created bitter hostility with Britain where before there had been none, and refused to temper it in any way. His insistence that his government deal only with the Right had made it a hostage to nationalist interest groups and alienated the rest of the country. His embracing and encouragement of a public rhetoric which bristled with violence, racial stereotyping and threats had helped to bolster an image abroad of a nation hungering for conflict. And finally, he had allowed chains of command and decision-making in civilian government to become chaotic and confused because it suited him for them to remain so. Virtually all his positions were the result of weakness and immaturity, the pursuit of appet.i.tes and wishes with no thought to the consequences: over-excitement at the idea of the might of the army and his notional control of it; a craving to look powerful and strong, and to identify himself with the aggressive masculine stereotypes of the German army; and above all a desire to be popular.

* The German war plan known as the Schlieffen Plan was once thought to have been formulated in 19056, and was therefore named after the then inc.u.mbent chief of staff Schlieffen. It is now known that the plan was adopted as the sole German war plan only in 1913, during Moltke's time as chief of staff. The German war plan known as the Schlieffen Plan was once thought to have been formulated in 19056, and was therefore named after the then inc.u.mbent chief of staff Schlieffen. It is now known that the plan was adopted as the sole German war plan only in 1913, during Moltke's time as chief of staff.

* The German Socialist Party had gradually become infected by the fear and antipathy towards Britain and Russia that had taken hold of almost every cla.s.s in Germany. In 1907, at an International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart, their delegation had voted against the idea of using a general strike to try to prevent a European war. In subsequent years senior members, such as August Bebel, had begun to say that patriotism was not incompatible with Socialism: that if war came, they would pick up a gun and fight for the fatherland. The German Socialist Party had gradually become infected by the fear and antipathy towards Britain and Russia that had taken hold of almost every cla.s.s in Germany. In 1907, at an International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart, their delegation had voted against the idea of using a general strike to try to prevent a European war. In subsequent years senior members, such as August Bebel, had begun to say that patriotism was not incompatible with Socialism: that if war came, they would pick up a gun and fight for the fatherland.

* Moltke later wrote, "Something in me Moltke later wrote, "Something in me55 broke and I was never the same again." Unable to take the strain of running the war, he had a breakdown almost immediately after it started and resigned his commission. broke and I was never the same again." Unable to take the strain of running the war, he had a breakdown almost immediately after it started and resigned his commission.

PART IV.

ARMAGEDDON.

17.

A WAR.

191418 In London, Berlin and St. Petersburg, the three monarchs were cheered uproariously by the people; at that moment all three seemed the epitome of nationhood and unity. "May and I1 went for a short drive in the Russian carriage down the Mall to Trafalgar Square through the Park and back by Const.i.tution Hill," George wrote on 3 August 1914. "Large crowds all the way who cheered tremendously ... We were forced to show ourselves on the balcony three different times." When Nicholas appeared on the balcony of the Winter Palace on 2 August the vast crowd went for a short drive in the Russian carriage down the Mall to Trafalgar Square through the Park and back by Const.i.tution Hill," George wrote on 3 August 1914. "Large crowds all the way who cheered tremendously ... We were forced to show ourselves on the balcony three different times." When Nicholas appeared on the balcony of the Winter Palace on 2 August the vast crowd2 fell on their knees. "Russia seemed to have fell on their knees. "Russia seemed to have3 been completely transformed," the British amba.s.sador marvelled. The Duma proclaimed its undying support and pa.s.sed a ma.s.sive war budget. The barricades disappeared and the revolutionaries melted away. The country, everyone agreed, had not felt so vibrantly alive, nor been so united, since Napoleon's invasion of 1812. And in Germany the Berlin crowds cheered Wilhelm at the Brandenburg Gate. In a gush of enthusiasm the Reichstag voted to devolve its power to the Bundesrat, the council of German princes, effectively giving Wilhelm and the army the power to do whatever they liked, including levy taxes. Even the Socialists voted for it. The Russian revolutionary Bukharin called the "betrayal of the been completely transformed," the British amba.s.sador marvelled. The Duma proclaimed its undying support and pa.s.sed a ma.s.sive war budget. The barricades disappeared and the revolutionaries melted away. The country, everyone agreed, had not felt so vibrantly alive, nor been so united, since Napoleon's invasion of 1812. And in Germany the Berlin crowds cheered Wilhelm at the Brandenburg Gate. In a gush of enthusiasm the Reichstag voted to devolve its power to the Bundesrat, the council of German princes, effectively giving Wilhelm and the army the power to do whatever they liked, including levy taxes. Even the Socialists voted for it. The Russian revolutionary Bukharin called the "betrayal of the4 Germans ... the greatest tragedy of our lives." The war promised, one German paper wrote, "a resurrection, Germans ... the greatest tragedy of our lives." The war promised, one German paper wrote, "a resurrection,5 a rebirth of a nation. Suddenly shocked out of the troubles and pleasures of everyday life, Germany stands united in the strength of moral duty." a rebirth of a nation. Suddenly shocked out of the troubles and pleasures of everyday life, Germany stands united in the strength of moral duty."

In Moscow Nicholas told an audience at the Kremlin, "A magnificent6 impulse has gripped all Russia, without distinction for tribe or nationality." impulse has gripped all Russia, without distinction for tribe or nationality." Utro Rossii Utro Rossii, the newspaper of the Russian Centre-Left, wrote "There are now7 neither Rights nor Lefts, neither government nor society, but only one United Russian Nation." Wilhelm used almost the same words when he told the Reichstag on 4 August, "In the struggle neither Rights nor Lefts, neither government nor society, but only one United Russian Nation." Wilhelm used almost the same words when he told the Reichstag on 4 August, "In the struggle8 that lies before us I recognize no more parties among my people. There are only Germans." He called on all the party leaders to come and take his hand, and as they walked away he raised a clenched fist and brought it down, as if swiping with a sword. The kaiser, one paper breathed, was "today truly a People's Kaiser." As for George, though he wasn't required to say anything, he put on a military uniform, gave his civilian clothes away and presented himself to his people as the incarnation of the values for which they were fighting: "a good sportsman, that lies before us I recognize no more parties among my people. There are only Germans." He called on all the party leaders to come and take his hand, and as they walked away he raised a clenched fist and brought it down, as if swiping with a sword. The kaiser, one paper breathed, was "today truly a People's Kaiser." As for George, though he wasn't required to say anything, he put on a military uniform, gave his civilian clothes away and presented himself to his people as the incarnation of the values for which they were fighting: "a good sportsman,9 a hard worker, and a thoroughly good man." a hard worker, and a thoroughly good man."

The great extended royal family of Europe, however, was anything but united-national divisions had broken it. In Russia Alix was cut off from her sister Irene and her beloved brother Ernst. George and Nicky's cousin Ernest of c.u.mberland, now Duke of Brunswick, who had married w.i.l.l.y's daughter Victoria, took the German side. So did Charles Edward, the British cousin who had inherited the dukedom of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha after Affie's death in 1900, and had taken a commission in the German army. The German-born Louis of Battenberg, a naturalized Englishman since the age of fourteen, with a German wife (Alix's sister Victoria), was forced to resign as the most senior admiral in the British navy by a xenophobic campaign by the right-wing press. (He would also change his name to Mountbatten.) The British government would force George to withdraw British peerages and t.i.tles from all his German relations. When he met a couple of Greek cousins there was outrage-though Greece was neutral, cousin Constantine's twenty-five-year marriage to Wilhelm's sister Sophie raised British hackles.

Within a short s.p.a.ce of time each emperor had become almost completely irrelevant.

George and Mary threw themselves into the war effort, but their endeavours only emphasized George's inability to distinguish between the trivial and the important and in the main the results were negligible. The king forswore the theatre, closed Balmoral, put the gardens at Frogmore to potatoes, turned the lights and heating off at Buckingham Palace, used the napkins more than once to save on washing, insisted on boiling fowl and mutton instead of poussin and lamb, and at Lloyd George's request took a pledge in April 1915 to forswear alcohol for the duration of the war, in order to provide an example to the working cla.s.ses. Prime Minister Asquith privately complained of having to listen to "those infinitesimal10 problems which perplex and perturb the Court mind-whether he should drive to Westminster in the old gingerbread coach ... or ... ride on his charger with the streets lined with Khaki-men. Isn't it marvellous that such things should be read as worth 5 minutes discussion? I am to go to him [the King] early tomorrow to settle this and other equally momentous issues." When a visitor to York Cottage came to breakfast late and asked for a boiled egg, the king "accused him problems which perplex and perturb the Court mind-whether he should drive to Westminster in the old gingerbread coach ... or ... ride on his charger with the streets lined with Khaki-men. Isn't it marvellous that such things should be read as worth 5 minutes discussion? I am to go to him [the King] early tomorrow to settle this and other equally momentous issues." When a visitor to York Cottage came to breakfast late and asked for a boiled egg, the king "accused him11 of being a slave to his inside, of unpatriotic behaviour and even went so far as to hint that we should lose the war on account of his gluttony." The country at large wasn't experiencing rationing-and wouldn't until the last year of the war. As for Lloyd George's initiative, it was a total failure; virtually no other public figures agreed to take the pledge and the working cla.s.ses remained unimpressed. of being a slave to his inside, of unpatriotic behaviour and even went so far as to hint that we should lose the war on account of his gluttony." The country at large wasn't experiencing rationing-and wouldn't until the last year of the war. As for Lloyd George's initiative, it was a total failure; virtually no other public figures agreed to take the pledge and the working cla.s.ses remained unimpressed.

There were admirable gestures-the austerity drive allowed George to hand back 100,000 in savings to the Treasury; convalescing officers and their families were invited to use the grounds of Buckingham Palace-but the palace was oddly reluctant to publicize them, taking its cue from the king who called the press "filthy rags."12 The king was left alcohol-less-though the Duke of Windsor claimed that after dinner his father would retire to his study "to attend to The king was left alcohol-less-though the Duke of Windsor claimed that after dinner his father would retire to his study "to attend to13 a small matter of business," which everyone a.s.sumed was a gla.s.s of port. a small matter of business," which everyone a.s.sumed was a gla.s.s of port.

George's war work quickly came down to a carefully logged relentless trudge: 7 inspections14 of naval bases, 5 visits to the French front, 450 military inspections, 300 hospital visits, and 50,000 decorations and medals personally pinned on, along with an uncounted number of trips to munitions factories and bombed areas. It was a job he performed with great and gloomy diligence. "The King came of naval bases, 5 visits to the French front, 450 military inspections, 300 hospital visits, and 50,000 decorations and medals personally pinned on, along with an uncounted number of trips to munitions factories and bombed areas. It was a job he performed with great and gloomy diligence. "The King came15 to see us this morning," the prime minister's son, Raymond Asquith, wrote from France, "looking as glum and dyspeptic as ever." to see us this morning," the prime minister's son, Raymond Asquith, wrote from France, "looking as glum and dyspeptic as ever."

In December 1916 George's secretary, Stamfordham, asked the cabinet secretary if the king "ought to take16 a more active share in the government of the country." The answer was a resounding no. George, however, longed to be more than a figurehead. "I am quite ready a more active share in the government of the country." The answer was a resounding no. George, however, longed to be more than a figurehead. "I am quite ready17 to sacrifice myself if necessary, as long as we win this war," he told his mother in 1917. Quite apart from his const.i.tutional position, the king, while sincere, decent and honest, was well known to be almost obsessively resistant to all change and ruled by his own prejudices. He opposed the reappointment of Admiral Fisher in 1915 because he disliked and mistrusted him. He stayed loyal to Asquith long after everyone else in government had lost faith in the prime minister's casual, hands-off style, because he had become used to him and couldn't bear to see him go. Unable to see Lloyd George's qualities and offended by his cheerfully ruthless methods, he criticized him publicly. (Lloyd George was no less quietly dismissive: describing a memo from George in 1915 as "about as futile to sacrifice myself if necessary, as long as we win this war," he told his mother in 1917. Quite apart from his const.i.tutional position, the king, while sincere, decent and honest, was well known to be almost obsessively resistant to all change and ruled by his own prejudices. He opposed the reappointment of Admiral Fisher in 1915 because he disliked and mistrusted him. He stayed loyal to Asquith long after everyone else in government had lost faith in the prime minister's casual, hands-off style, because he had become used to him and couldn't bear to see him go. Unable to see Lloyd George's qualities and offended by his cheerfully ruthless methods, he criticized him publicly. (Lloyd George was no less quietly dismissive: describing a memo from George in 1915 as "about as futile18 a doc.u.ment as I have seen ... everything that comes from the Court is like that. But then, as Balfour said to me once, 'Whatever would you do if you had a ruler with brains?'") He fought Lloyd George's efforts to dislodge Asquith and take control of the war effort in December 1916, regarding them as an iniquitous betrayal. He ended up in a blazing row with Andrew Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, when he insisted that Lloyd George was the only man for the moment. "The King expressed a doc.u.ment as I have seen ... everything that comes from the Court is like that. But then, as Balfour said to me once, 'Whatever would you do if you had a ruler with brains?'") He fought Lloyd George's efforts to dislodge Asquith and take control of the war effort in December 1916, regarding them as an iniquitous betrayal. He ended up in a blazing row with Andrew Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, when he insisted that Lloyd George was the only man for the moment. "The King expressed19 his entire disagreement with these views," Stamfordham minuted euphemistically. But there was nothing he could do. Lloyd George ousted Asquith in what was essentially a coup; Asquith helped himself into the wilderness by refusing to serve under another prime minister. Lloyd George's new government-a new six-man war cabinet-effectively amounted to what Beatrice Webb called "a dictatorship by his entire disagreement with these views," Stamfordham minuted euphemistically. But there was nothing he could do. Lloyd George ousted Asquith in what was essentially a coup; Asquith helped himself into the wilderness by refusing to serve under another prime minister. Lloyd George's new government-a new six-man war cabinet-effectively amounted to what Beatrice Webb called "a dictatorship by20 one, or possibly three, men." He can't have been unaware of the irony that as prime minister he had more power than any British monarch had wielded for 250 years. one, or possibly three, men." He can't have been unaware of the irony that as prime minister he had more power than any British monarch had wielded for 250 years.

Where the king was able to exercise some influence, it was to potentially tragic effect. He consistently supported General Haig, chief of the General Staff, against Lloyd George. Haig and his colleague General Robertson's commitment to trench warfare-in the belief that conscripted soldiers were too untrained to do anything other than stand in a line and walk forward-had a devastating effect on the casualty lists. Lloyd George believed there must be another way to use the men Haig seemed almost blithely to pour onto the stalemated battlefields. The king, in an echo of his cousins' deference to the military, believed the professionals knew best. He liked Haig, whose wife had been lady-in-waiting to Mary. Haig energetically exploited the connection-he had used it to dislodge his predecessor, General French. When Lloyd George tried to get rid of Haig, the king explicitly told the general not to resign, and asked him to write secretly to him whenever he liked. In other circ.u.mstances George's support would have had little force, but the Conservative press and Party also supported Haig, and Lloyd George-now in a coalition of largely Conservative ministers-needed their support. George's intervention added ballast to Haig's position. Through 1916 and 1917 in the Somme and at Pa.s.schendaele, Haig sent hundreds of thousands of men into the trenches and over the top. At Pa.s.schendaele there were between 240,000 and 260,000 British casualties and barely a foot of territory was won to justify them. Haig complained he hadn't succeeded because he hadn't had enough men. The king, who believed one did not question military men, wrote to Nicholas, "The French and21 ourselves have made good progress on the Somme and we hope to continue to do so." Lloyd George never got rid of Haig and it took him several years to sideline him. ourselves have made good progress on the Somme and we hope to continue to do so." Lloyd George never got rid of Haig and it took him several years to sideline him.

In Russia and Germany, however, the aristocratic officer cla.s.s showed even less concern for their cannon fodder. The German crown prince, Little w.i.l.l.y, expended a million men trying to take the fortress at Verdun. After the terrible Russian defeats of Tannenburg and the Masurian Lakes in 1914, which cost 250,000 lives, Grand Duke Nicholas told the French, "We are happy22 to make such sacrifices for our allies." to make such sacrifices for our allies."

Where George didn't follow his people was in his repulsion at the surge of xenophobia expressed in Britain-due not least to the extraordinarily effective anti-German propaganda purveyed in posters and the ma.s.s-market press. The invasion of Belgium produced monstrous stories in newspapers such as the Daily Mail Daily Mail of women raped, children's hands cut off, priests murdered, libraries burned, and even a Canadian soldier crucified by German troops. None of the accounts were verified. Wilhelm, who had so longed for the British to love him, was turned into a hate figure, portrayed as the incarnation of the evils of German militarism and widely regarded as responsible for the war. Propaganda posters showed him blood-soaked and hunched over the corpses of Belgian women, or goose-stepping in front of burning libraries. In 1900 he'd made an over-excited, ill-advised speech as he saw off a squadron of German soldiers going to quell the Boxer rebellion in China, telling them to put the rebels to the sword, "like the Huns of women raped, children's hands cut off, priests murdered, libraries burned, and even a Canadian soldier crucified by German troops. None of the accounts were verified. Wilhelm, who had so longed for the British to love him, was turned into a hate figure, portrayed as the incarnation of the evils of German militarism and widely regarded as responsible for the war. Propaganda posters showed him blood-soaked and hunched over the corpses of Belgian women, or goose-stepping in front of burning libraries. In 1900 he'd made an over-excited, ill-advised speech as he saw off a squadron of German soldiers going to quell the Boxer rebellion in China, telling them to put the rebels to the sword, "like the Huns23 under their King Attila a thousand years ago ... pardon will not be given, prisoners will not be taken. Whoever falls into your hands will fall to your sword." The speech was disinterred by British war propagandists who characterized the Germans as "dirty Huns," the barbaric enemies of civilization-a historic nonsense; it was the Germanic tribes who had beaten back the Huns. under their King Attila a thousand years ago ... pardon will not be given, prisoners will not be taken. Whoever falls into your hands will fall to your sword." The speech was disinterred by British war propagandists who characterized the Germans as "dirty Huns," the barbaric enemies of civilization-a historic nonsense; it was the Germanic tribes who had beaten back the Huns.

George tried to resist when the War Office-responding to a campaign by the Daily Mail Daily Mail-asked him to deprive Wilhelm and the German relatives of their honorary military commands, and remove their banners from St. George's Chapel at Windsor Castle. When Sir Richard Haldane, former war minister, founder of the London School of Economics and well-known Germanophile, was hounded out of office by a hysterical campaign in the right-wing press, George awarded him the Order of Merit. He was offended by the mistreatment of German prisoners of war and the internment of alleged enemy "aliens." And when, on a visit to the front, Ponsonby regretted the sympathy he'd shown for a ga.s.sed soldier who turned out to be German, the king rebuked him, "after all he was24 only a poor dying human being." As the war went on, however, George found it hard not to hate the Germans. "These zeppelin raids," only a poor dying human being." As the war went on, however, George found it hard not to hate the Germans. "These zeppelin raids,"25 he wrote to Nicholas, "... murder women and children and have done no harm to any workshop or military establishment; they show that they are simply brutes and barbarians." he wrote to Nicholas, "... murder women and children and have done no harm to any workshop or military establishment; they show that they are simply brutes and barbarians."

Wilhelm's eclipse was more dramatic. Within days of the war's beginning, he joined the army at military headquarters, as his grandfather had in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, then promptly collapsed and took to his bed. For years he had let rip teeth-baring rhetoric, and claimed that in a war he would be his own chief of staff. He had talked of leading his troops into battle as if it were a genuine possibility. A week after the war started, the Supreme Warlord, the Oberster Kriegsherr Oberster Kriegsherr, told the German General Staff that the war was their responsibility, not his, and handed over to Moltke permission to issue orders in his name, while promising not to interfere in operations. He seemed entirely unable to cope. What must it look like, wondered Admiral Muller, who ran his naval cabinet, "inside the head26 of this man to whom war is, at base, repulsive." From German army HQ, the Prince of Pless wrote to his English wife, Daisy, in October 1914, "He is extremely nervous of this man to whom war is, at base, repulsive." From German army HQ, the Prince of Pless wrote to his English wife, Daisy, in October 1914, "He is extremely nervous27 and it gets worse, the longer the war drags on. It is difficult to find another topic of conversation, because he seldom listens to anything else. If we could only persuade him to play Bridge ..." and it gets worse, the longer the war drags on. It is difficult to find another topic of conversation, because he seldom listens to anything else. If we could only persuade him to play Bridge ..."

He veered between euphoria, fury and dramatic lows. One moment he would demand that his soldiers take no prisoners; the next he would declaim with his old grandiosity that if one German family starved as a result of the British naval blockade, he would "send a Zeppelin28 over Windsor castle and blow up the whole royal family of England." Then he would be plunged into depression and knock back sleeping pills. The entourage and Dona, committed to protecting the kaiser and the senior generals, determined to stop him interfering and colluded to shield him from bad news and keep his faux pas to a minimum. Generals briefed him each day but, as the war minister, Falkenhayn, observed only weeks after the war started, "Now he is no over Windsor castle and blow up the whole royal family of England." Then he would be plunged into depression and knock back sleeping pills. The entourage and Dona, committed to protecting the kaiser and the senior generals, determined to stop him interfering and colluded to shield him from bad news and keep his faux pas to a minimum. Generals briefed him each day but, as the war minister, Falkenhayn, observed only weeks after the war started, "Now he is no29 longer told about anything that is at the planning stage, all he hears about is what had already happened, and only the favourable events." By 1916 the war was barely mentioned at government meetings when he was present: "the Conference longer told about anything that is at the planning stage, all he hears about is what had already happened, and only the favourable events." By 1916 the war was barely mentioned at government meetings when he was present: "the Conference30 ... was confined to stories of the harvesting at Pless, the birth of a zebra calf at Cadinen and the instructions he had given to Hindenburg," Muller observed. His entourage shuffled him between the fronts and army headquarters to a.s.suage his endless restlessness, and let him stride before the troops in his splendid uniforms and make encouraging speeches. He pinned on medals and shook hands. He was found pointless projects to occupy him-the building of an extravagant fountain at Homburg for which a war contractor gave the m