Where George did have control-over the court and his household-he was an autocrat. What he wanted he got. With her husband's accession, May resolved that she must be even more deferential and acquiescent to him; she never contradicted him over anything now, even within the family. The cost, her old friends noticed, was high. Her friend Mabell, Countess of Airlie, wrote that "Her devotion22 to the Monarchy demanded the sacrifice of much of her personal happiness." She encouraged everyone else to defer too. Fritz Ponsonby, whom George took against for a while because he disagreed with him too often and too directly, felt that George's household indulged him appallingly. He described once beating the king at tennis. George sulked and refused "to try." He was used to being allowed to win. "He told us we didn't understand the game and we ought to send easy ones. I was furious as pat ball is such rot." to the Monarchy demanded the sacrifice of much of her personal happiness." She encouraged everyone else to defer too. Fritz Ponsonby, whom George took against for a while because he disagreed with him too often and too directly, felt that George's household indulged him appallingly. He described once beating the king at tennis. George sulked and refused "to try." He was used to being allowed to win. "He told us we didn't understand the game and we ought to send easy ones. I was furious as pat ball is such rot."23 It was a small example, but the lack of challenge meant that there was nothing to check his bad temper and resistance to new ideas. It was a small example, but the lack of challenge meant that there was nothing to check his bad temper and resistance to new ideas.

George's dislike of what his wife's biographer has described as "everything complex"24 led him to insist that May must choose only one of her two given names, Victoria Mary, as queen. She chose Mary. He dressed insistently in the style of the late 1890s and demanded that Mary, who secretly would have liked to wear more fashionable clothes, do so too, so she would remain for ever in the constricting toques and bustles and corsets of a late-Victorian lady. Longing for the certainties of his grandmother's world, he returned the court to the staidnesses of the 1890s. "We are back led him to insist that May must choose only one of her two given names, Victoria Mary, as queen. She chose Mary. He dressed insistently in the style of the late 1890s and demanded that Mary, who secretly would have liked to wear more fashionable clothes, do so too, so she would remain for ever in the constricting toques and bustles and corsets of a late-Victorian lady. Longing for the certainties of his grandmother's world, he returned the court to the staidnesses of the 1890s. "We are back25 in Victorian times," Viscount Esher wrote in his diary. The more open, less orthodox style of Edward's court and social life disappeared almost overnight. The new king's court was cloistered and irreproachably correct. ("We have seen in Victorian times," Viscount Esher wrote in his diary. The more open, less orthodox style of Edward's court and social life disappeared almost overnight. The new king's court was cloistered and irreproachably correct. ("We have seen26 enough of the intrigue and meddling of certain ladies, I'm not interested in any wife but my own," George said. It was the closest he ever came to criticism of his father.) It was also crashingly dull. Even Lord Esher, lover of all things royal, began to bemoan the loss of "that curious enough of the intrigue and meddling of certain ladies, I'm not interested in any wife but my own," George said. It was the closest he ever came to criticism of his father.) It was also crashingly dull. Even Lord Esher, lover of all things royal, began to bemoan the loss of "that curious27 electric current which pervaded the surroundings of King Edward." electric current which pervaded the surroundings of King Edward."

Like many anxious men, George felt put upon, the more so because "duty" was his guiding mantra. The result was a tendency to-often inappropriate-self-pity, indulged by the culture of deference of his wife and household. "Is it not hard28 on me?" he complained when mistakes were found in the ceremonial orders written up for Edward's funeral-though there was a courtier and four clerks ready to spend the day fixing them. In 1914, when the conference on Home Rule, convened at Buckingham Palace to resolve the conflict between the Irish nationalists and the Ulster loyalists, failed, he wrote, "I want sympathy on me?" he complained when mistakes were found in the ceremonial orders written up for Edward's funeral-though there was a courtier and four clerks ready to spend the day fixing them. In 1914, when the conference on Home Rule, convened at Buckingham Palace to resolve the conflict between the Irish nationalists and the Ulster loyalists, failed, he wrote, "I want sympathy29 in these days and I can't help thinking I am being badly treated." in these days and I can't help thinking I am being badly treated."

From the start it was clear George wasn't going to engineer an active role for himself in the way that his father and grandmother had. He had neither the drive, imagination or charm to do so. Nor was he a very effective intervener because-just like his cousins-he could not distinguish between the trivial and the important. Like his father he was obsessed with correct dress, and would fire off pages of complaints-or rather his private secretary, Bigge, would-about an MP's failure to appear in Parliament in the right frock coat or the correct hat, or about some minister's phrase that had offended him. When Winston Churchill wrote a report for him about a day's debate in the House of Commons and added, apropos a piece of employment legislation, that there were as many "idlers and wastrels" at the top of the social ladder as at the bottom, George complained furiously to Asquith, and anyone else who would listen, that Churchill's phrase had been "very socialistic and utterly uncalled for."30 No one corrected his own moments of tactlessness. He excoriated Lloyd George in front of the chancellor's own staff and colleagues: on one occasion because he'd made another speech attacking big landowners who kept vast uncultivated estates. What had really angered George was that Lloyd George had claimed that pheasants ate whole fields of "mangold-wurzels," No one corrected his own moments of tactlessness. He excoriated Lloyd George in front of the chancellor's own staff and colleagues: on one occasion because he'd made another speech attacking big landowners who kept vast uncultivated estates. What had really angered George was that Lloyd George had claimed that pheasants ate whole fields of "mangold-wurzels,"31 and pheasants couldn't eat mangold-wurzels. and pheasants couldn't eat mangold-wurzels.

He didn't like it when it was too clearly spelled out that his role was purely symbolic. In 1914 Viscount Esher described his outrage at "the extraordinary32 a.s.sumption of his ministers that he would agree with any proposal they might make." He felt both intimidated by his ministers and ent.i.tled to lecture them-which he did, often at length. During audiences, ministers would find themselves barely able to get a word in, while George gave them his opinions. They in turn found him a bit of a joke. "The King is a.s.sumption of his ministers that he would agree with any proposal they might make." He felt both intimidated by his ministers and ent.i.tled to lecture them-which he did, often at length. During audiences, ministers would find themselves barely able to get a word in, while George gave them his opinions. They in turn found him a bit of a joke. "The King is33 a very jolly chap," Lloyd George wrote after meeting George and Mary for the first time in the autumn of 1910, "but thank G.o.d there's not much in his head. They are simple, very, very ordinary people, and perhaps on the whole that's how it should be." "I understand that a very jolly chap," Lloyd George wrote after meeting George and Mary for the first time in the autumn of 1910, "but thank G.o.d there's not much in his head. They are simple, very, very ordinary people, and perhaps on the whole that's how it should be." "I understand that34 it is your turn to go to Balmoral next week," the prime minister, Asquith, wrote to Winston Churchill. "So I send you a word of friendly warning. You will find the Royal mind obsessed and the Royal tongue exceptionally fluid and voluble." "He is a nice it is your turn to go to Balmoral next week," the prime minister, Asquith, wrote to Winston Churchill. "So I send you a word of friendly warning. You will find the Royal mind obsessed and the Royal tongue exceptionally fluid and voluble." "He is a nice35 little man with a good heart and tries hard to be just and open-minded. It is a pity he were not better educated," Asquith told his confidante Venetia Stanley. "The King talked more stupidly about the Navy than I have ever heard him before," Churchill wrote in 1912. "Really it is little man with a good heart and tries hard to be just and open-minded. It is a pity he were not better educated," Asquith told his confidante Venetia Stanley. "The King talked more stupidly about the Navy than I have ever heard him before," Churchill wrote in 1912. "Really it is36 disheartening to hear this cheap and silly drivel with which he lets himself be filled up." disheartening to hear this cheap and silly drivel with which he lets himself be filled up."

As for foreign affairs, it never occurred to Grey that the new king would try to play the role his father had. George hated going abroad; he spoke no languages; he had no real interest in foreign affairs and sometimes expressed nostalgia for "splendid isolation."37 Moreover, the international situation had changed so much since 1901; it seemed impossible that the relationship between two people could have an effect on the relationship between two countries. The situation with Germany was impacted by vivid, deep-seated nationwide hostilities and the navy impa.s.se. George regarded the French as effeminate, and deliberately p.r.o.nounced French words incorrectly. He disapproved of republicanism and claimed to dislike Paris-which might have been because it had been the location for some of his father's most famous misdemeanours. As for Russia, George's relationship with Nicholas seemed one of the most warm and uncomplicated among the extended European royal families, but it had always been strictly apolitical. Now international affairs began to steal into the kindly, ba.n.a.l expressions of fondness, and the correspondence took on a slightly awkward, euphemistic, official tone. The king's letters also became more frequent, perhaps four or five a year rather than the desultory one or two. "I hope we shall Moreover, the international situation had changed so much since 1901; it seemed impossible that the relationship between two people could have an effect on the relationship between two countries. The situation with Germany was impacted by vivid, deep-seated nationwide hostilities and the navy impa.s.se. George regarded the French as effeminate, and deliberately p.r.o.nounced French words incorrectly. He disapproved of republicanism and claimed to dislike Paris-which might have been because it had been the location for some of his father's most famous misdemeanours. As for Russia, George's relationship with Nicholas seemed one of the most warm and uncomplicated among the extended European royal families, but it had always been strictly apolitical. Now international affairs began to steal into the kindly, ba.n.a.l expressions of fondness, and the correspondence took on a slightly awkward, euphemistic, official tone. The king's letters also became more frequent, perhaps four or five a year rather than the desultory one or two. "I hope we shall38 always continue our old friendship to one another," he wrote after Edward's funeral. "You know I never change and I have always been very fond of you ... you may be sure I shall show the same interest in Russia that He did ... there may be difficulties with Germany, but I think they can be overcome, if only England, Russia and France stick together the peace in Europe is a.s.sured. G.o.d bless you, my dear old Nicky and remember, you can always count on me as your friend." And in March 1911, "I rather fear always continue our old friendship to one another," he wrote after Edward's funeral. "You know I never change and I have always been very fond of you ... you may be sure I shall show the same interest in Russia that He did ... there may be difficulties with Germany, but I think they can be overcome, if only England, Russia and France stick together the peace in Europe is a.s.sured. G.o.d bless you, my dear old Nicky and remember, you can always count on me as your friend." And in March 1911, "I rather fear39 at the present moment that Germany is trying to isolate France, I may be wrong but that is what I think. No doubt Germany rather resents the friendly understanding which exists between England, Russia and France." at the present moment that Germany is trying to isolate France, I may be wrong but that is what I think. No doubt Germany rather resents the friendly understanding which exists between England, Russia and France."

George did have an ambition, however. A few months after his accession he told Lord Esher he wanted "to do for the Empire40 what King Edward did for the peace of Europe." Arthur Balfour had argued in 1901 that the British monarch was the one symbol with which the whole disparate, rambling empire identified. George fancied himself as the glue that bound it together-glue much needed, given new demands for self-government in Ireland and India. In the autumn of 1905 he had visited India and had loved it: the grand ceremonial gatherings; the opulence of the maharajahs who paid court with jewel-encrusted swords; the tiger-and elephant-hunting; the vast, bobbing, endlessly cheering crowds; and the sense that India, with its education system, universities and bureaucrats, was proof that the empire civilized and improved the lives of its subject peoples. The place moved him to uncharacteristic superlatives: he told Nicholas it was a "wonderful country." In fact, at the time of George's visit, the country had been in the aftermath of the disastrous part.i.tion of Bengal. He had taken against its author, the imperious outgoing viceroy, Lord Curzon. The Raj's officials a.s.sured him that the anger over part.i.tion, and the desire for self-government incarnated in the new Congress Party, had been terribly overstated. He very much wanted to believe them. "I understand the look in the eyes of the Indians," George had told Gokhale, the head of the Indian Congress Party, with breathtaking presumption. "Would the peoples of India be happier if you ran the country?" Gokhale answered: "I do not say they would be happier, but they would have more self-respect." George had returned home convinced that a closer union between "the Mother Country and her Indian Empire" what King Edward did for the peace of Europe." Arthur Balfour had argued in 1901 that the British monarch was the one symbol with which the whole disparate, rambling empire identified. George fancied himself as the glue that bound it together-glue much needed, given new demands for self-government in Ireland and India. In the autumn of 1905 he had visited India and had loved it: the grand ceremonial gatherings; the opulence of the maharajahs who paid court with jewel-encrusted swords; the tiger-and elephant-hunting; the vast, bobbing, endlessly cheering crowds; and the sense that India, with its education system, universities and bureaucrats, was proof that the empire civilized and improved the lives of its subject peoples. The place moved him to uncharacteristic superlatives: he told Nicholas it was a "wonderful country." In fact, at the time of George's visit, the country had been in the aftermath of the disastrous part.i.tion of Bengal. He had taken against its author, the imperious outgoing viceroy, Lord Curzon. The Raj's officials a.s.sured him that the anger over part.i.tion, and the desire for self-government incarnated in the new Congress Party, had been terribly overstated. He very much wanted to believe them. "I understand the look in the eyes of the Indians," George had told Gokhale, the head of the Indian Congress Party, with breathtaking presumption. "Would the peoples of India be happier if you ran the country?" Gokhale answered: "I do not say they would be happier, but they would have more self-respect." George had returned home convinced that a closer union between "the Mother Country and her Indian Empire"41 would heal everything. Being Emperor of India excited George as little else about his new role did. It was so different from the limited, hemmed-in role he played in Britain. It conjured a less complicated and circ.u.mscribed idea of kingship, where subjects were simply and smilingly loyal. would heal everything. Being Emperor of India excited George as little else about his new role did. It was so different from the limited, hemmed-in role he played in Britain. It conjured a less complicated and circ.u.mscribed idea of kingship, where subjects were simply and smilingly loyal.

Shortly after his accession George expressed his desire to return to India, to crown himself emperor at a durbar, the old mughal celebration adopted by the British. The cabinet was sceptical, wondering where the money to pay for a coronation extravaganza was going to come from. "I think it a42 grand idea," Nicholas wrote. "... I do not doubt that it will produce a tremendous impression in the whole world!" George was persistent, and no one had a better idea about how to counter the Indian independence movement. A gesture of confidence from the mother country in the shape of a visit from its monarch, combined with some reforms, might help. It was planned that the king would have his durbar and announce the end of the part.i.tion of Bengal and the moving of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. George was, however, discouraged from his Napoleonic self-coronation-the idea was tactfully scuttled by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who suggested it might be out of place in a non-Christian country. grand idea," Nicholas wrote. "... I do not doubt that it will produce a tremendous impression in the whole world!" George was persistent, and no one had a better idea about how to counter the Indian independence movement. A gesture of confidence from the mother country in the shape of a visit from its monarch, combined with some reforms, might help. It was planned that the king would have his durbar and announce the end of the part.i.tion of Bengal and the moving of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. George was, however, discouraged from his Napoleonic self-coronation-the idea was tactfully scuttled by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who suggested it might be out of place in a non-Christian country.

One hundred thousand people came to the durbar. It was, George told Nicholas, "a magnificent43 sight and practically every Maharajah in India was present." He and Mary sat under a golden dome on silver thrones in glittering coronation robes, while bejewelled Indian maharajahs came to offer homage. George wore a new crown made for the event, covered in 6,170 cut diamonds, sapphires, emeralds and rubies and costing 60,000. Forty thousand tents were pitched on the hills around to accommodate the throng who came to see the new emperor. Afterwards he went to Nepal for two weeks, where, with the local maharajah, 600 elephants and 1,400 beaters, he personally shot twenty-one tigers, eight rhinos and one bear. He was convinced his presence in India had made a difference. But the effects of such spectacles were never long-lived, and as an effective and unifying symbol of empire George was at least a decade too late. A year later a member of the Indian independence movement dressed as a woman threw a bomb at Sir Charles Hardinge, who was now Viceroy of India, as he entered Delhi on an elephant, killing his servant and wounding him seriously. The cabinet would not be persuaded to repeat the exercise-royal trips to the far-flung empire were expensive and took months. When George began talking about a trip to South Africa, one minister remarked, "We decided he sight and practically every Maharajah in India was present." He and Mary sat under a golden dome on silver thrones in glittering coronation robes, while bejewelled Indian maharajahs came to offer homage. George wore a new crown made for the event, covered in 6,170 cut diamonds, sapphires, emeralds and rubies and costing 60,000. Forty thousand tents were pitched on the hills around to accommodate the throng who came to see the new emperor. Afterwards he went to Nepal for two weeks, where, with the local maharajah, 600 elephants and 1,400 beaters, he personally shot twenty-one tigers, eight rhinos and one bear. He was convinced his presence in India had made a difference. But the effects of such spectacles were never long-lived, and as an effective and unifying symbol of empire George was at least a decade too late. A year later a member of the Indian independence movement dressed as a woman threw a bomb at Sir Charles Hardinge, who was now Viceroy of India, as he entered Delhi on an elephant, killing his servant and wounding him seriously. The cabinet would not be persuaded to repeat the exercise-royal trips to the far-flung empire were expensive and took months. When George began talking about a trip to South Africa, one minister remarked, "We decided he44 had much better stay at home and not teach people how easily the machine worked without a king." had much better stay at home and not teach people how easily the machine worked without a king."

Edward's death would have been traumatic for George at any time. Coming as it did in May 1910, it plunged him into the middle of the most serious const.i.tutional crisis in British politics for decades, one that had parallels with the const.i.tutional struggles in Germany and Russia. The House of Commons was attempting to abolish the House of Lords' veto, the weapon the Conservative aristocracy-who sat in the Lords by virtue of its hereditary t.i.tles-had been using to block Liberal legislation and reforms already pa.s.sed in the Commons. The matter had reached crisis point in late 1909 when the Lords threw out David Lloyd George's Budget, which, because it extended death duties and land taxes, they saw as an attack on them. The Conservative aristocracy did itself no favours with public opinion by reacting with almost comic hysteria-even though, as both sides suspected, the actual amounts raised would be pretty modest. The Duke of Buccleuch,45 who owned among other things a large collection of Poussins, claimed he couldn't afford the guinea for the subscription to Dumfries Football Club. The Earl of Onslow put large parts of Surrey up for sale, and the Duke of Rutland, who like many Tories seemed to think that radical Liberals and Labour Party members were the same thing, said that all Labour MPs should be gagged. As Prince of Wales, George's sympathies had been with the Lords. The much-loathed Lloyd George had drafted his Budget and launched it with speeches which cheerily and baldly pointed out the gap between rich and poor in a way that no British statesman ever had, and with great panache and humour. "A fully equipped who owned among other things a large collection of Poussins, claimed he couldn't afford the guinea for the subscription to Dumfries Football Club. The Earl of Onslow put large parts of Surrey up for sale, and the Duke of Rutland, who like many Tories seemed to think that radical Liberals and Labour Party members were the same thing, said that all Labour MPs should be gagged. As Prince of Wales, George's sympathies had been with the Lords. The much-loathed Lloyd George had drafted his Budget and launched it with speeches which cheerily and baldly pointed out the gap between rich and poor in a way that no British statesman ever had, and with great panache and humour. "A fully equipped46 Duke costs as much to keep as two Dreadnoughts and is more difficult to sc.r.a.p," he said. The House of Lords was "five hundred ordinary men chosen at random from among the unemployed." In the Conservative press he was portrayed as a bomb-throwing anarchist or a highwayman-which he loved. Duke costs as much to keep as two Dreadnoughts and is more difficult to sc.r.a.p," he said. The House of Lords was "five hundred ordinary men chosen at random from among the unemployed." In the Conservative press he was portrayed as a bomb-throwing anarchist or a highwayman-which he loved.

The House of Lords' rejection of Lloyd George's Budget had forced a general election in early 1910. The Liberals, who won only a couple more seats than the Conservatives, kept power in a coalition with the Irish nationalists and the Labour Party, giving them a 113-seat majority. For different reasons each party was raring to destroy the Lords' veto, and the Commons put forward a bill to do just that. Everyone knew the Lords would reject it. Prime Minister Asquith's solution was to threaten to flood the Lords with new Liberal peers, created by the king. Edward had hated being placed in such a position. An attack on the Lords, he and his advisers felt, was perilously close to an attack on the monarchy. He'd died furious with both Asquith and the Conservative Lords for having refused to compromise. Some of the more extreme Tories went so far as to claim that the prime minister's threats had killed the king.

George's unease and lack of experience were so palpable that Asquith promised him six months' grace, in which he tried and failed to reach a compromise with the Lords. But in December 1910 he was obliged to call another election, and came to see the king to ask him for a guarantee that he would create the peers if the Liberals won. Their interaction was a comedy of errors which painfully demonstrated how little George understood politics. Asquith, aware that the king hated the idea, asked for his guarantee in such overly delicate, allusive language that George thought he'd been let off the hook, realizing the truth only three days later. When Asquith returned to ask for the guarantee in plainer terms, he brought with him another minister, Lord Crewe. Just as George had misunderstood Asquith's previous attempts at delicacy and tact, so he now thought Crewe was there because Asquith didn't trust his word-whereas Asquith meant it as a courtesy to George. Then when the prime minister suggested that the guarantee be kept secret until it was actually needed, George a.s.sumed he was being asked to do something underhand. "I have never in my life47 done anything I was ashamed to confess, and I have been accustomed to conceal nothing." He failed to understand that the prime minister was trying to keep him out of the controversy unless it was entirely necessary. George later claimed Asquith had bullied the a.s.surance out of him by threatening to resign and call a new election on the issue of the king and the peers against the people. He obsessed over it for years, imagining there might have been an alternative. When he found out in 1913 that Arthur Balfour, leader of the Lords' opposition, had offered at that moment to form a Conservative government and he hadn't been told, he fumed that he could have invited Balfour to form an administration and saved the Lords' veto. But this would have been potentially far more partisan and interventionist than what Asquith asked him to do. Balfour would automatically have lost his first Commons vote, which would have triggered yet another election on a subject the country was sick of. That election would have been a vote of confidence on the king's decision to back the Conservatives-dragging the Crown into politics as it had not been for over a century. done anything I was ashamed to confess, and I have been accustomed to conceal nothing." He failed to understand that the prime minister was trying to keep him out of the controversy unless it was entirely necessary. George later claimed Asquith had bullied the a.s.surance out of him by threatening to resign and call a new election on the issue of the king and the peers against the people. He obsessed over it for years, imagining there might have been an alternative. When he found out in 1913 that Arthur Balfour, leader of the Lords' opposition, had offered at that moment to form a Conservative government and he hadn't been told, he fumed that he could have invited Balfour to form an administration and saved the Lords' veto. But this would have been potentially far more partisan and interventionist than what Asquith asked him to do. Balfour would automatically have lost his first Commons vote, which would have triggered yet another election on a subject the country was sick of. That election would have been a vote of confidence on the king's decision to back the Conservatives-dragging the Crown into politics as it had not been for over a century.

The abolition of the veto-and the power of the Lords-was eventually, and with much bitterness, pa.s.sed in July 1911, and without George having to create the extra peers, but he worried about the process all the way through, relieving his feelings by bombarding Asquith with memos, and daily summoning ministers and Lords to air his worries.

One of Nicholas's biographers has written that "In England where a sovereign48 needed only to be a good man in order to be a good king, Nicholas II would have made an admirable monarch." Perhaps it was truer to say that in Russia George might well have been just as disastrous as Nicholas and that in Britain it didn't matter what the sovereign was like as long as he was sober and followed the rules. The Lords debacle was an inauspicious beginning to George's reign; but he would be, as it turned out, a good king. The system would make him effective almost despite himself, compelling him to do things he would never have chosen to do, for example meeting and being polite to the man he loathed, Lloyd George (and forcing the radical chancellor to do likewise). Eventually, Lloyd George would become his prime minister. It wasn't quite as if Nicholas had been forced to meet, say, Lenin, or Wilhelm had socialized with the German Marxist Rosa Luxemburg, but, in George's head at least, it wasn't far off. In September 1911 Lloyd George went to stay at Balmoral for several days. Both sides were obliged to be on their best behaviour. Lloyd George went on picnics with the royal family, and George presented him with one of his father's walking sticks. After a few days Lloyd George had had enough. "I am not cut needed only to be a good man in order to be a good king, Nicholas II would have made an admirable monarch." Perhaps it was truer to say that in Russia George might well have been just as disastrous as Nicholas and that in Britain it didn't matter what the sovereign was like as long as he was sober and followed the rules. The Lords debacle was an inauspicious beginning to George's reign; but he would be, as it turned out, a good king. The system would make him effective almost despite himself, compelling him to do things he would never have chosen to do, for example meeting and being polite to the man he loathed, Lloyd George (and forcing the radical chancellor to do likewise). Eventually, Lloyd George would become his prime minister. It wasn't quite as if Nicholas had been forced to meet, say, Lenin, or Wilhelm had socialized with the German Marxist Rosa Luxemburg, but, in George's head at least, it wasn't far off. In September 1911 Lloyd George went to stay at Balmoral for several days. Both sides were obliged to be on their best behaviour. Lloyd George went on picnics with the royal family, and George presented him with one of his father's walking sticks. After a few days Lloyd George had had enough. "I am not cut49 out for Court life," he wrote to his wife. "I detest it. The whole atmosphere reeks with Toryism. I can breathe it and it depresses and sickens me. Everybody is very civil to me as they would be to a dangerous wild animal whom they fear and perhaps just a little admire for its suppleness and strength." He was far from the only one to find the royal way of life-not just the opinions, but the arbitrary rules and rituals, the obligatory changes of clothes (at least four a day) and the hours of shooting-anachronistic and irritating. The next leader of the Conservative Party, Andrew Bonar Law, an austere Scottish businessman with nothing in common with the old aristocratic grandees, would find his obligatory weekends with the royal family at Balmoral "unendurable." out for Court life," he wrote to his wife. "I detest it. The whole atmosphere reeks with Toryism. I can breathe it and it depresses and sickens me. Everybody is very civil to me as they would be to a dangerous wild animal whom they fear and perhaps just a little admire for its suppleness and strength." He was far from the only one to find the royal way of life-not just the opinions, but the arbitrary rules and rituals, the obligatory changes of clothes (at least four a day) and the hours of shooting-anachronistic and irritating. The next leader of the Conservative Party, Andrew Bonar Law, an austere Scottish businessman with nothing in common with the old aristocratic grandees, would find his obligatory weekends with the royal family at Balmoral "unendurable."50 It took the country a while to get the hang of George. With his melancholy direct stare and unflinchingly upright deportment, a fresh white gardenia eternally in his b.u.t.tonhole, a hat (a homburg or a top hat-he would sooner have left his home naked than without one) and his immaculate old-fashioned tailoring, his deliberate, elegant figure communicated respectability, decency, steadiness and old-fashioned values. In a world that seemed to be getting faster, more confusing and more dangerous, there was something very rea.s.suring about that. As king he would be a layer of foundation stones, a visitor of schools, mining towns, railway works and occasionally workers' cottages, though his diaries reveal nothing of what he made of these places. His was an unflashy, domestic kind of monarchy-one that seemed concerned to operate with the support of its subjects and to want to be in touch with them. Under George the British monarchy really would become, as Walter Bagehot had described it in his book The English Const.i.tution The English Const.i.tution, "dignified" and "symbolic."

15.

CELEBRATIONS AND WARNINGS.

191114 The reality of European politics was that Anglo-German relations were as stalemated as they'd ever been-as were Russo-German relations. Nevertheless, each country, each emperor, continued to paper over the cracks with cousinly gestures, each increasingly irrelevant. In May 1911 George invited the kaiser to the unveiling of the marble memorial to Queen Victoria outside Buckingham Palace. "You are perfectly right1 in alluding to my devotion and reverence for my beloved grandmother, with whom I was on such excellent terms," Wilhelm wrote to George. "... Never in my life shall I forget the solemn hours in Osborne near her deathbed when she breathed her last in my arms! Those sacred hours have riveted my heart firmly to your house and family." It would be Wilhelm's final visit to England, and in his memoirs his account-pages on guards and Highland regiments, military colours, the family gathered round the monument, the welcome he received-was almost tender and saturated with longing. in alluding to my devotion and reverence for my beloved grandmother, with whom I was on such excellent terms," Wilhelm wrote to George. "... Never in my life shall I forget the solemn hours in Osborne near her deathbed when she breathed her last in my arms! Those sacred hours have riveted my heart firmly to your house and family." It would be Wilhelm's final visit to England, and in his memoirs his account-pages on guards and Highland regiments, military colours, the family gathered round the monument, the welcome he received-was almost tender and saturated with longing.2 At the Theatre Royal Drury Lane, where George and Wilhelm saw the play of the day, At the Theatre Royal Drury Lane, where George and Wilhelm saw the play of the day, Money Money, the audience gave them a standing ovation, and a specially designed curtain depicted the two emperors on horseback riding towards each other and saluting. The war minister and Germanophile Sir Richard Haldane gave a lunch for the kaiser and filled it with the most eminent and famous men in England: Lord Kitchener, Lord Curzon, J. A. Spender, the editor of the Manchester Guardian Manchester Guardian, the Labour MP Ramsay MacDonald, the writer Edmund Gosse, the senior general Sir Henry Wilson, the painter John Singer Sargent and Baden Powell, the hero of Mafeking and author of the recent runaway bestseller Scouting for Scouting for Boys Boys. Wilhelm was on fizzing form. "I don't think3 I ever met a man so full of the zest of life, and so eager to show it and share it with other people," said Sir John Morley. I ever met a man so full of the zest of life, and so eager to show it and share it with other people," said Sir John Morley.

It should have meant something, but actually it meant nothing. No British politician sought to b.u.t.tonhole Wilhelm or tackle him on the naval race. "His visit4 of course will be an absolutely private one and it has no political significance whatever," George wrote to Nicholas. "... I wanted to tell you this in case the newspapers should print a lot of rubbish." On his last day, the kaiser worked himself up into a fury on the subject of Britain's agreements with France and Russia in a conversation with Louis of Battenberg: "You must be of course will be an absolutely private one and it has no political significance whatever," George wrote to Nicholas. "... I wanted to tell you this in case the newspapers should print a lot of rubbish." On his last day, the kaiser worked himself up into a fury on the subject of Britain's agreements with France and Russia in a conversation with Louis of Battenberg: "You must be5 brought to understand in England that Germany is the sole arbiter of peace or war on the Continent. If we wish to fight we will do so without your leave." He seemed particularly miffed by Britain's closeness to Russia. brought to understand in England that Germany is the sole arbiter of peace or war on the Continent. If we wish to fight we will do so without your leave." He seemed particularly miffed by Britain's closeness to Russia.

It was as if each country's position had become so entrenched that there was no way to fill those deepening cracks of mistrust and tension. Germany clung to its unsatisfied need for recognition, its navy and its commitment to Austria; Britain was determined to maintain its world position and stay tied to France; Russia remained torn between knowing it couldn't afford conflict, but desperate to restore its Great Power status through some form of imperial expansion. By contrast, it took only one small, aggressive gesture on the international stage to create a full-blown European crisis. No one wanted it to be like this (except possibly the German army)-not least because by 1911 each country was facing economic depression and considerable social unrest-but no one was willing to give way. The German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, had started talks with Britain when he'd taken office in 1909, but quickly found his room for manoeuvre limited: the German Right-highly critical of the government-liked the navy, and the kaiser made it clear that if he pushed too hard for cuts he might be sacked. To placate his critics the chancellor insisted that, in return for a reduction in German ships, Britain must pledge neutrality in a European war, which the British regarded as evidence that the Germans wanted them out of the way to attack France. Asquith and Grey could see no point in further talks, though they paid lip service to the idea of rapprochement as a sop to their critics on the Liberal and Labour backbenches. Even David Lloyd George, a consistent opposer of naval expansion and critic of Grey, was beginning to question German intentions.* The German Foreign Office, meanwhile, was on the look-out for some diplomatic coup which would bring the government some much missed applause at home. The German Foreign Office, meanwhile, was on the look-out for some diplomatic coup which would bring the government some much missed applause at home.

Then, just two months after Wilhelm returned from England, on 1 July 1911, Germany sent a gunboat, the Panther Panther, to the port of Agadir, in Morocco, where the French had recently and illegally sent troops claiming they were needed to quell a local rebellion. By the terms of the Algeciras conference, Germany was ent.i.tled to compensation if the French changed the nature of their presence in Morocco. With the Panther Panther (which, somewhat ironically, was not a beautiful shiny new warship but a squat, dirty old cruiser well overdue for the sc.r.a.pyard) positioned threateningly on the coast, the German Foreign Office demanded the French hand over the whole of the French Congo, adding that if they did not respond positively Germany might be forced to extreme measures. (which, somewhat ironically, was not a beautiful shiny new warship but a squat, dirty old cruiser well overdue for the sc.r.a.pyard) positioned threateningly on the coast, the German Foreign Office demanded the French hand over the whole of the French Congo, adding that if they did not respond positively Germany might be forced to extreme measures.

That the German Foreign Office was using a warship as leverage seemed to the British Foreign Office and Asquith a dangerous precedent: not merely another swipe at France, but a direct challenge to British naval supremacy and therefore its Great Power status-gunboat diplomacy had always been a particular British speciality. Their response was bluntly aggressive. On 21 July, in a speech at the Mansion House in the City of London, David Lloyd George announced that Britain was determined to keep her "place and prestige" among the Great Powers of the world, even if it led to war. "If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated ... as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."6 The German government was astounded by the speech-that it was so direct and that Lloyd George had delivered it-but refused to back down. Within a few days both fleets were placed on alert; a colonial quarrel was transformed into an international crisis. The German press expressed outrage that Britain was dictating to Germany. In London The Times The Times claimed that the German navy had vanished from the North Sea and might be about to attack. (In fact it was on its way to Norway to take part in friendly manoeuvres with the British Atlantic fleet.) Escalation with Britain was not what the Germans had intended at all. Behind the scenes the two sides negotiated a climb-down, and plans were made for Franco-German talks. But the French, emboldened by the English threats, refused the Germans' demands for compensation. Talks and constant rumours of war dragged on through August and September. By October the German Foreign Office had run out of steam and finally agreed to take 100,000 square miles of all-but-useless equatorial jungle in the French Congo. An agreement was signed on 4 November. claimed that the German navy had vanished from the North Sea and might be about to attack. (In fact it was on its way to Norway to take part in friendly manoeuvres with the British Atlantic fleet.) Escalation with Britain was not what the Germans had intended at all. Behind the scenes the two sides negotiated a climb-down, and plans were made for Franco-German talks. But the French, emboldened by the English threats, refused the Germans' demands for compensation. Talks and constant rumours of war dragged on through August and September. By October the German Foreign Office had run out of steam and finally agreed to take 100,000 square miles of all-but-useless equatorial jungle in the French Congo. An agreement was signed on 4 November.

Once again a German provocation had ended in defeat. "Out of this7 mountain of a German-made crisis came a mouse of colonial territory," wrote Grey. The German nationalist press and the nationalist German leagues, whose hopes of colonies had been raised so high and had been so constantly dashed, howled with disappointment and anger. Wilhelm was accused of cowardice: one German paper called him mountain of a German-made crisis came a mouse of colonial territory," wrote Grey. The German nationalist press and the nationalist German leagues, whose hopes of colonies had been raised so high and had been so constantly dashed, howled with disappointment and anger. Wilhelm was accused of cowardice: one German paper called him "Guillaume le timide, le valeureux poltron!" "Guillaume le timide, le valeureux poltron!" The German Centre and Left parties poured scorn on the government's inept.i.tude and pointless aggression. Senior German army officers sighed that the All Highest was so pusillanimous about taking extreme measures-Moltke had privately hoped for a "reckoning with the The German Centre and Left parties poured scorn on the government's inept.i.tude and pointless aggression. Senior German army officers sighed that the All Highest was so pusillanimous about taking extreme measures-Moltke had privately hoped for a "reckoning with the8 English." The German colonial minister resigned. English." The German colonial minister resigned.

The kaiser himself had been extremely reluctant to send the Panther Panther and anxious about the British reaction. Predictably, when it had initially proved popular, he had rushed to identify himself as its author. Throughout the subsequent months, however, he had seesawed queasily between anxiety and martial posturing. One moment the German foreign minister, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, had to threaten resignation to keep him on-side, the next Wilhelm was publicly announcing he was prepared to use his sword and anxious about the British reaction. Predictably, when it had initially proved popular, he had rushed to identify himself as its author. Throughout the subsequent months, however, he had seesawed queasily between anxiety and martial posturing. One moment the German foreign minister, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, had to threaten resignation to keep him on-side, the next Wilhelm was publicly announcing he was prepared to use his sword9 if the French didn't acquiesce to German demands. if the French didn't acquiesce to German demands.

He also claimed that during his May visit to London he had told George of his intention to send a warship to France and that George had agreed-and thus that the British government's response was pure hypocrisy. This was familiar territory for Wilhelm-claiming an arrangement had been agreed with another monarch, then accusing them of betrayal. But it was new to George, who scrutinized his memory carefully. He said that Wilhelm had raised the subject of Morocco as he was leaving London; he might even have said something about a ship-but George had no recollection of it. "I absolutely did not express to him my own, or my Government's consent." For his own part he thought Wilhelm was "a man of peace," under pressure from "his own militarists." "No man likes to be called a coward."10 It was a depressing sign of the deadlock between the two countries that it was two international business magnates, not politicians, who initiated a final attempt to reach agreement. Albert Ballin was the director of the biggest shipping company in the world, the Hamburg-America Line, and one of Wilhelm's few Jewish friends; Ernest Ca.s.sel was one of Edward's coterie of Jewish financiers; his dealings and loans had kept several countries afloat, and he was a friend of Churchill and Asquith. Both felt that the German naval programme had gone too far and created pointless hostility. In January 1912 Ballin persuaded Wilhelm to invite a member of the British cabinet to Berlin to discuss the naval race, while Ca.s.sel encouraged the British to respond. Grey and Asquith sent Sir Richard Haldane to Berlin in the second week of February, but gave him no authority to make a deal. Everyone fell over themselves to express their hopes that agreement might be reached, but unsurprisingly the talks failed amidst recrimination and arguments over who had offered what. Once again Bethmann-Hollweg insisted on British neutrality before he would even discuss ships, and he couldn't promise any defence cuts, just a temporary slowdown.

Haldane was astonished by the apparent chaos in the upper echelons of the German government. The kaiser, the chancellor and Tirpitz disagreed on almost everything about foreign policy, naval expansion and what they wanted from the talks. He reckoned Bethmann-Hollweg wished to negotiate, but Tirpitz was opposed to any compromise. He was far from the first British visitor to remark on such confusion. As for Wilhelm, he seemed one minute utterly enthused, and the next cowed by Tirpitz. Haldane didn't know that on the day of his arrival, Wilhelm had published the new navy bill, and had told Metternich that he would mobilize the German navy if the British carried out their plan of concentrating their fleet in the North Sea (where they'd be on Germany's doorstep). Haldane left after three days with a bust of the kaiser, from the kaiser, tucked under his arm and a copy of the new German navy bill. The next day Wilhelm told the German industrialist Walter Rathenau that in the summer he would go to Cowes, "and then he would11 settle everything. The King trusted him. His plan was: the United States of Europe against America. The English are not unsympathetic to this." settle everything. The King trusted him. His plan was: the United States of Europe against America. The English are not unsympathetic to this."

When Haldane got back to London the British cabinet looked at the navy bill and discovered it made Bethmann-Hollweg's slowdown instantly irrelevant.12 Quite apart from asking for new battleships, the bill announced a 20 percent increase in the number of fighting men on every ship and a huge increase in submarines and smaller warships. Picking his moment during the failing negotiations with France the summer before, when the kaiser had been stung by accusations of cowardice, Tirpitz had persuaded him that a new naval bill might win back the support of the German Right, that keeping up the pressure on the Royal Navy would frighten the British into judicious neutrality in the event of a European war-a demonstrably false argument-and that any cutbacks would mean an international loss of face. As it turned out, in the January 1912 elections, the German Social Democrat Party-the Socialists-who opposed higher defence spending, received their biggest ever vote and became the largest party in the Reichstag, with one-third of the seats. Quite apart from asking for new battleships, the bill announced a 20 percent increase in the number of fighting men on every ship and a huge increase in submarines and smaller warships. Picking his moment during the failing negotiations with France the summer before, when the kaiser had been stung by accusations of cowardice, Tirpitz had persuaded him that a new naval bill might win back the support of the German Right, that keeping up the pressure on the Royal Navy would frighten the British into judicious neutrality in the event of a European war-a demonstrably false argument-and that any cutbacks would mean an international loss of face. As it turned out, in the January 1912 elections, the German Social Democrat Party-the Socialists-who opposed higher defence spending, received their biggest ever vote and became the largest party in the Reichstag, with one-third of the seats.

The talks finally died on 19 March when Grey stated categorically that Britain could not promise to remain neutral in a European war. Their failure catapulted Wilhelm into depression. Dona told Tirpitz that he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. "At heart,"13 she said, "he is enthusiastic about England and everything which is England, it is in his blood." It was as if the two opposite pulls in his character had directly caused the collapse. He denounced the British cabinet as "scoundrels," and said Grey was a "Shylock." she said, "he is enthusiastic about England and everything which is England, it is in his blood." It was as if the two opposite pulls in his character had directly caused the collapse. He denounced the British cabinet as "scoundrels," and said Grey was a "Shylock."14 He sacked Metternich, whose unvarnished explanations of why the British were hostile he could no longer bear to hear. When Grey praised Bethmann-Hollweg, whom the British had come to see as a sober and positive force in the German government, Wilhelm growled, "I have never He sacked Metternich, whose unvarnished explanations of why the British were hostile he could no longer bear to hear. When Grey praised Bethmann-Hollweg, whom the British had come to see as a sober and positive force in the German government, Wilhelm growled, "I have never15 in my life heard of an agreement being concluded with reference to one definite statesman and independently of the reigning sovereign. It is clear that Grey has no idea who is master here, namely myself. He dictates to me in advance who is to be my minister if I am to conclude an agreement with England." Tirpitz's full naval bill was put before the Reichstag days later. in my life heard of an agreement being concluded with reference to one definite statesman and independently of the reigning sovereign. It is clear that Grey has no idea who is master here, namely myself. He dictates to me in advance who is to be my minister if I am to conclude an agreement with England." Tirpitz's full naval bill was put before the Reichstag days later.

Despite left-wing opposition, it was pa.s.sed in April 1912, though in a slightly slimmer form. Paradoxically, in the long term it would prove a big setback for the German navy and Tirpitz. It prompted the British to withdraw ships from the Mediterranean and concentrate their fleet in the North Sea and the Channel, making it immediately apparent that Tirpitz's fleet was no match for the British navy, and wouldn't be for decades. And it irritated the German army, who felt that the navy had taken too much of the military budget for too long with little to show for it. It now demanded that it must get the lion's share of future defence spending; Moltke, observing that the Russian army was dramatically increasing, had plans to enlarge the army by 25 percent, 136,000 men. More worryingly, the British also agreed to defend the Channel coast of France in return for the French navy policing the Mediterranean-an arrangement that made British involvement in a European war that bit more likely.

The Russians were just as imprisoned by their own sense of priorities. Since 1905 it had been government orthodoxy that Russia must be on good terms with all the Great Powers, and that foreign wars inevitably led to revolution and must be avoided at all costs. By 1911 Nicholas's chief minister, Peter Stolypin, and the new Russian foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov-who was uncoincidentally Stolypin's brother-in-law-and even Nicholas, wanted Britain to commit to a defensive alliance. With Britain behind them they believed Germany and Austria would be reluctant to bully or threaten them. Not that Russia could afford to be on bad terms with Germany either. When Sazonov had become foreign minister in the autumn of 1910, he had taken an initially reluctant Nicholas to Potsdam ("I cannot understand16 how he is so blind to the consequences of what he is doing," the British amba.s.sador had complained gloomily) and returned with an agreement. how he is so blind to the consequences of what he is doing," the British amba.s.sador had complained gloomily) and returned with an agreement.17 "I was extremely "I was extremely18 pleased with my visit to William, who was in excellent spirits, calm and comfortable," Nicholas wrote to George. The deal allowed the Germans and their railway into northern Persia, in return for an undertaking not to support Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. A week or so later Wilhelm, in a gust of enthusiasm, pa.s.sed through Hesse, where Alix was staying with the children, bringing "heaps of presents." "To them he is 'the German Uncle,'" Nicholas wrote, "and he loves playing with them. He looks well, but has grown older and is more sedate." pleased with my visit to William, who was in excellent spirits, calm and comfortable," Nicholas wrote to George. The deal allowed the Germans and their railway into northern Persia, in return for an undertaking not to support Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. A week or so later Wilhelm, in a gust of enthusiasm, pa.s.sed through Hesse, where Alix was staying with the children, bringing "heaps of presents." "To them he is 'the German Uncle,'" Nicholas wrote, "and he loves playing with them. He looks well, but has grown older and is more sedate."19 Alix could hardly bear Wilhelm to touch her children but she knew that getting on with Germany was necessary. Communications between Berlin and St. Petersburg were as cordial as they'd been in years and Russia was noticeably silent during the international condemnation of Agadir. Alix could hardly bear Wilhelm to touch her children but she knew that getting on with Germany was necessary. Communications between Berlin and St. Petersburg were as cordial as they'd been in years and Russia was noticeably silent during the international condemnation of Agadir.

It was also still orthodoxy in Russia, however, that the country's wounded Great Power status must be restored, and the only way to do that was by extending the empire and by a.s.serting Russia's claims to imperial influence in the Balkans. Not surprisingly, the latter imperative constantly threatened to derail the need for peace. In 1912 the Russian minister to Serbia, a militant Pan-Slavist called Nicholas Hartwig, brokered a secret pact between the Balkan states of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro. Hartwig was a rogue operator whose aim was to bring the Slav nations together so they could start a war to wrest back the Ottoman empire's last European territories, and in so doing allow Russia to take control of the Bosphorus and open the Turkish Straits. His efforts to bring together the Balkan states-no small feat as they were all extremely quarrelsome and compet.i.tive with each other-were half-hidden from the Russian government, and what they could see, Nicholas and his ministers treated with a kind of wilful blindness because they couldn't help feeling pleased that Russian influence had been re-established in the Balkans. Everyone knew that a war in the region would be exceptionally dangerous because Austria and Russia, both acutely aware of the vulnerability of their Great Power status, would feel compelled to intervene, and that Germany would almost certainly come in with Austria if it came to military conflict.

In June 1912 the Russian and German emperors and their chief ministers met on their yachts at Swinemunde in the Baltic on a blazing hot day. Wilhelm lavished gifts on Nicky's children and claimed to be vastly amused when the Russian officers got through sixty bottles of his champagne. "Everything went off20 very well and quite informally," Nicholas told his mother. "He was very gay and affable and would have his joke with Anastasia." But perhaps the most significant conversation that day took place between Nicholas's new chief minister, Vladimir Kokovtsov, and Bethmann-Hollweg, which Kokovtsov later recounted in his memoirs. Both men expressed a feeling of being trapped by an arms race they had no power to halt. Kokovtsov complained that Germany seemed to be "arming herself at a feverish pace." He explained it would be impossible for him to oppose demands for equivalent increases in the Russian army. Bethmann-Hollweg answered equally frankly that "his own position was far from being as influential and independent as it might seem ... He, too, had to consider the personal views of the Emperor ... and especially the peculiar organization of the War Ministry, whose att.i.tude was a very troublesome one." The Duma would indeed vote vast sums for the Russian army in 1913, raising the number of troops from 1.3 million to 1.75 million. And this in turn would prompt the Reichstag to vote even more money to the German army in 1913. very well and quite informally," Nicholas told his mother. "He was very gay and affable and would have his joke with Anastasia." But perhaps the most significant conversation that day took place between Nicholas's new chief minister, Vladimir Kokovtsov, and Bethmann-Hollweg, which Kokovtsov later recounted in his memoirs. Both men expressed a feeling of being trapped by an arms race they had no power to halt. Kokovtsov complained that Germany seemed to be "arming herself at a feverish pace." He explained it would be impossible for him to oppose demands for equivalent increases in the Russian army. Bethmann-Hollweg answered equally frankly that "his own position was far from being as influential and independent as it might seem ... He, too, had to consider the personal views of the Emperor ... and especially the peculiar organization of the War Ministry, whose att.i.tude was a very troublesome one." The Duma would indeed vote vast sums for the Russian army in 1913, raising the number of troops from 1.3 million to 1.75 million. And this in turn would prompt the Reichstag to vote even more money to the German army in 1913.

After Wilhelm left, Nicholas told his chief minister, "Thank heaven! Now one does not have to watch one's every word lest it be construed in a way one had not even dreamed." Like Edward he had learned to avoid talking politics too directly with Wilhelm, but he also told Kokovtsov several times, betraying considerable anxiety about the Balkans, "that the Emperor William had a.s.sured him positively that he would not permit the Balkan complications to become a world conflagration."21 Three months later, in September, Sergei Sazonov came to Balmoral to try to persuade Sir Edward Grey to agree to military and naval "discussions"-as the euphemism went-just like the ones Britain had with France. Stolypin thought Britain's backing would persuade Germany and Austria to stay out of the war that was now brewing in the Balkans. He neglected to mention that it was the Russians who had secretly helped to set up the conditions for war. "He [Sazonov] is a straightforward22 and honest man and I appreciate him highly," Nicholas wrote to George, adding, "I always read the 'Daily Graphic' and therefore follow closely all your movements and all you have to do. It astonishes me often how enduring ... you and May are both!" This was a courtesy to George because he took no role in the negotiations. and honest man and I appreciate him highly," Nicholas wrote to George, adding, "I always read the 'Daily Graphic' and therefore follow closely all your movements and all you have to do. It astonishes me often how enduring ... you and May are both!" This was a courtesy to George because he took no role in the negotiations.

Sazonov evidently felt optimistic. British att.i.tudes to Russia had shifted. By 1912 the country had become fascinated by its would-be ally. In January 1912 The Times The Times published a "Russian number," and a group of Liberal MPs visited Russia, a trip which Sir Charles Hardinge described as "the pilgrimage of published a "Russian number," and a group of Liberal MPs visited Russia, a trip which Sir Charles Hardinge described as "the pilgrimage of23 love." Russian literature was everywhere-not just Tolstoy but Dostoevsky, Chekhov and Turgenev had all been recently translated into English. Beef Stroganov had insinuated itself onto fashionable British menus. The Ballets Russes had brought a fantasy of Russian exoticism, wildness and modernity to London; George went to see them on the eve of his coronation in 1911. But cultural fascination was not matched by political sympathy. British journalists reported the same old ugly Russian repressions and, most provocatively, Russian troops had moved into Persia's neutral sphere, where the shah, an old Russian client, was fighting a civil war against the British-sponsored democratic parliament, the Majlis. This was bad enough, but the British Foreign Office, which despite this would have liked to