THE BUSINESS CYCLE My analysis of the economic challenges facing GHWB owes much to David Brauer, "A Historical Perspective on the 198992 Slow Growth Period," FRBNY Quarterly Review 18, no. 2 (Summer 1993), 114.
HAD TRIPLED FROM Patterson, Restless Giant, 158-59.
BEGINNING IN 1989, THE ECONOMY GREW Brauer, "Historical Perspective on the 19891992 Slow Growth Period," 114. See also Brian Domitrovic, "Decision Points: George H. W. Bush Edition," Forbes Online, November 29, 2010, www.forbes.com/sites/briandomitrovic/2010/11/29/decision-points-george-h-w-bush-edition/2/.
A SERIES OF SAVINGS AND LOAN FAILURES Darman, Who's in Control?, 207, 211; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 307; Naftali, GHWB, 7376; Wicker, GHWB, 1079.
"I CANNOT BREAK" GHWB diary, April 2, 1989.
AS HIS FIRST BUDGET TOOK SHAPE See Darman, Who's in Control?, 21319. See also "FY 1990 Budget Revisions: Presidential Briefing," February 7, 1989, DF.
EARLY DAYS WERE CHEERY DAYS GHWB diary, February 16, 1989. Still, Bush was an obsessive consumer of opinion, often negative, about the administration. After a journey to Japan for the funeral of Hirohito, Bush returned home to a turn in opinion about the administration in the first week or so of March.
"I wake up to find the magazines dumping all over the Administration...and then a lot of these insidious inside stories," Bush remarked of Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report. According to Bush, the story line in Sunday's Washington Post and in the newsmagazines was "disarray, nothing happening, no appointments, no initiatives, no vision, weak President, kind of like Carter, and on and on it went." (Ibid., March 6, 1989.) Bush was resigned and realistic. "Predictions of gloom, doom, and disaster by the media Beltway hounds mean nothing," Bush told his diary. "They have their pack journalism to go about, but tomorrow it will be something else: another fight, another battle, another win, or another loss." (Ibid.) Nevertheless, his approval ratings with the public remained high.
AN ABC NEWSWASHINGTON POST POLL WP, February 17, 1989.
"THE HIGHEST" GHWB diary, February 16, 1989.
HE CALLED ON AN OLD FRIEND, DAN ROSTENKOWSKI Darman, Who's in Control?, 209. See also Greene, Presidency of George Bush, 80.
DARMAN WAS READING Darman, Who's in Control?, 218.
AN EIGHTY-NINE-SEAT MARGIN http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/.
A TEN-SEAT ADVANTAGE http://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.html.
DURING THE TRANSITION GHWB diary, January 2, 1989. Senator David Boren, Republican of Oklahoma, shared Bush's sense that outreach was critical, particularly on the budget. In a note to the president during a White House meeting on February 2, 1989, Boren wrote: "The key thing is regular periodic consultation with Congressional leaders so that they feel more institutional responsibility. It won't solve all the problems-but it will make the Cong{ressional] leaders feel like 'players' & it will help-If it's not somewhat formal, it won't happen-It's like family time. It must be scheduled." Bush kept a copy of the counsel. (David Boren to GHWB, February 9, 1989, DF.) "TO DEMONSTRATE THAT" GHWB diary, January 2, 1989.
HE FOUND CAPITOL HILL LESS ENGAGING Author interview with GHWB; Naftali, GHWB, 64.
INVITING LAWMAKERS TO THE RESIDENCE GHWB diary, January 25, 1989.
"BARBARA REMINDED ME" Ibid.
BUSH TOOK PICTURES Author interviews with GHWB and BPB; Cramer, What It Takes, 102223.
IN THE MIDDLE OF MARCH GHWB diary, March 13, 1989.
HE FACED AN EARLY TEST For the Tower nomination, see John G. Tower, Consequences: A Personal and Political Memoir (Boston, 1991), 4748, 159, 220, 30910, 31617; Greene, Presidency of George Bush, 5458; Naftali, GHWB, 6970; Wicker, GHWB, 13945; LSY, 358, 360, 37175, 379, 382, 383.
BESET BY RUMORS LSY, 372.
TOWER OFFERED TO REMOVED HIMSELF GHWB diary, February 8, 1989. See also Tower, Consequences. "Heart to heart talk with Sam Nunn and John Warner about the Tower nomination," Bush dictated on February 7. "Sam is being accused of playing a lot of politics-the staff hating Tower, etc. He made the pitch that he just was troubled by the drinking, that there was enough testimony that Tower would be 'out of it' even though he recovered easily the next morning, to concern Sam." (GHWB diary, February 7, 1989.) LED BY SAM NUNN Naftali, GHWB, 6970.
THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN HIGH-HANDED NYT, April 6, 1991.
"PULL THE RUG OUT" GHWB diary, February 8, 1989.
"WAS GOING TO STAND" Ibid., February 9, 1989.
BUT BUSH COULD NOT PULL TOGETHER NYT, April 6, 1991; Naftali, GHWB, 70.
BUSH'S FIRST THOUGHT GHWB diary, March 9, 1989.
BUSH RULED RUMSFELD OUT Ibid., March 9, 12, 1989.
THREE OTHER NAMES Ibid., March 9, 1989.
"I WORRY [BECAUSE CHENEY]" Ibid.
CHENEY CALLED ON BUSH Ibid., March 12, 1989.
"WE WENT OVER" Ibid.
GINGRICH, THEN FORTY-FIVE Dale Russakoff, "He Knew What He Wanted," WP, December 18, 1994.
(WHOM HE THOUGHT OF AS "SICK") Eve Fairbanks, "Magic Words," NYT, April 8, 2007.
GINGRICH, THE STEPSON OF A MILITARY MAN Russakoff, "He Knew What He Wanted," WP, December 18, 1999.
AS A "TRANSFORMATIONAL FIGURE" Ibid.
"THE QUESTION IS" GHWB diary, March 22, 1989.
"I DON'T THINK SO" Ibid.
"THE PRESS TAKE THE GINGRICH ELECTION" Ibid., March 27, 1989.
"HITTING ME FOR BEING" Ibid.
FOLLOWING HIS INSTINCT Author interview with Vin Weber.
"MR. PRESIDENT, YOU'VE BEEN" Ibid.
"WELL," BUSH ANSWERED Ibid.
BUSH SAT IN THE TREATY ROOM GHWB diary, April 3, 1989.
"I'M WONDERING AT" Ibid.
THIRTY-TWO: Victory in Europe, Terror in China THE LONGER I'M IN THIS JOB GHWB diary, November 8, 1989.
"COULD DO BUSINESS" Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York, 1993), 463.
BORN IN 1931 See biographical sketch of Mikhail Gorbachev at the Gorbachev Foundation website, http://www.gorby.ru/en/gorbachev/biography/.
BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD FIRST MET AWT, 34. "I made very clear to him that we want real progress," Bush wrote after that initial hour-and-twenty-five-minute conversation. "I hope he knows how true that is." GHWB, to Your Royal Highnesses Prince Sadri and Princess Catherine Sadruddin Aga Khan, Geneva, Switzerland, March 16, 1985, JB.
"HE WAS DIFFERENT" Author interview with GHWB.
"GORBACHEV WILL PACKAGE" AWT, 4.
ONCE IN POWER, GORBACHEV UNLEASHED For background on Gorbachev, his reforms, and their implications, see, for instance, Gaddis, Cold War; Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 214, 26566; and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 438. "When Gorbachev talked 'new thinking' in Moscow, continuing and even increased Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua became the litmus test of his sincerity and credibility," wrote Robert Gates. (Gates, From the Shadows, 410.) Gates also detailed how these conflicts came to an end (Ibid., 42736), concluding that when Gorbachev "finally moved to end Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Angola more than two years after taking power, it was the final proof that, at least in foreign policy, this was a very different Soviet leader." (Ibid., 410.) "STRANGE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV" GHWB diary, December 7, 1988. "I felt funny speaking up, and yet I knew [Gorbachev] wanted me to," Bush told his diary. "I pledged continuity." Political men, Bush and Gorbachev could be candid with each other. "I told Gorbachev, Dukakis would be sitting here if this President hadn't been out working for me, and I really think there's something to that, because if he had been laidback or did what Ike did to Nixon, I'm not sure I would have won, and I certainly wouldn't have won by the percentage that we did." (Ibid.) BUSH COULD ALWAYS TELL AWT, 7.
AT ONE POINT IN THE CONVERSATION GHWB diary, December 7, 1988.
BUSH CALLED GORBACHEV Ibid., December 8, 1988.
BECAME KNOWN AS HIS "PAUSE" Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 2829; Gates, From the Shadows, 45961; AWT, 6, 37, and 40; LSY, 384; Naftali, GHWB, 6869, 7678. See also David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York, 2009), 31516. The "pause" was controversial. "He paid a lasting price for the 'pause' in U.S.-Soviet relations in early 1989: when he belatedly began to engage with Gorbachev that May, he appeared to be doing so under pressure from public opinion, Congress, and his NATO allies," wrote Beschloss and Talbott in 1993. "The delay strengthened the lingering, damaging impression that this was a president who tended to follow rather than lead." (Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 469.)
There was no doubt that Bush was eager to chart his own path forward. "I'd like to come up with something dramatic-not just responding begrudgingly to [Gorbachev's] ideas-but something big, and if not with the Soviet Union, somewhere around the world: Middle East, the subcontinent, this hemisphere," Bush recalled after the meeting on Governors Island. (GHWB diary, December 8, 1988.)
"FROM THE POINT OF VIEW" Gaddis, Cold War, 235.
IN PRAGUE, THE TOTALITARIAN CZECH REGIME Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 14.
PLAYWRIGHT VACLAV HAVEL Ibid.
IN APRIL, GOVERNMENT TROOPS Ibid., 51.
MOSCOW ALSO CONTINUED TO SUPPORT AWT, 13435.
WHAT WAS UNCLEAR See, for instance, Naftali, GHWB, 7779.
"TO RESTORE DYNAMISM" AWT, 13.
EVEN BUSH'S ADVISERS Naftali, GHWB, 7778.
MANY BELIEVED Ibid., AWT, 15455.
ACCORDING TO THE PREVAILING WISDOM Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 7374.
HE SPRUNG ONE ON JIM BAKER Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 8283.
"WE ARE IN A HISTORIC POSITION" GHWB, "Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany," May 5, 1989, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC. Kohl also told Bush that Kohl "could not accept letting Gorbachev set himself up as the imitator of the voice of Europe." (Ibid.) See also Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 93.
"YOU NEED TO GET AHEAD" Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 93. On April 5, 1989, Baker had sent Bush a March 31, 1989, memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger outlining "Ideas for the NATO Summit." (March 31, 1989, JB.) In a covering note, Baker wrote: "I am not seeking a decision on any of these. I do not feel strongly about any of them. I do feel very strongly that NATO Summit should be a big success for you-and may not be without some concrete initiatives-which won't come unless you push it thru! JAB III." (James A. Baker III to GHWB, April 5, 1989, JB.) Bush's April 9 reply: "I am glad this kind of constructive thinking is going on....We must have NATO meet[ing] seen as big USA success." (GHWB to Baker, April 9, 1989, JB.) THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO USE AWT, 4344. See also Gates, From the Shadows, 46163.
IN A FRIDAY, MAY 19, MEETING AWT, 73; Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 9394.
"I THOUGHT THIS WAS LARGE ENOUGH" AWT, 73.
THE U.S. MILITARY Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 93.
"I WANT THIS DONE" Ibid., 94.
WITH THE PENTAGON'S SUPPORT, THE PRESIDENT SETTLED AWT, 74. Even the military was not wild about Bush's proposal, but acceded to the pressure from the president. (Ibid.) "IF THEY WERE EVER USED" Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 8485.
IN MILITARY TERMS Ibid., 9091.
BUSH HAD SOLVED TWO PROBLEMS Ibid., 9496.
HE KEPT THE CFE PROPOSAL SECRET AWT, 7980.
BUSH HOSTED FRANcOIS MITTERRAND Ibid., 7478. See also GHWB, "Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France," August 26, 1989, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC.
THE YEAR BEFORE GHWB diary, May 29, 1989.
"CHIEFS OF STATE DINNER" Ibid., May 30, 1989; AWT, 82.
"MY FIRST IMPRESSION" GHWB diary, May 30, 1989.
"THAT WOMAN" AWT, 77.
BUSH'S PROPOSAL TO REDUCE CFE Ibid., 7374.
IMPORTANT ALLIED ADVANCE Ibid., 8185. "The agreement was announced, and there was almost a euphoric atmosphere," Bush dictated on May 30, 1989. (GHWB diary, May 30, 1989.) In a conversation with Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, Bush said: "The resolution of the SNF issue and the new proposal for reducing conventional forces were historic accomplishments. The conventional arms control proposal had won broad acceptance within the Alliance. U.S. generals had also certified that the proposal was militarily sound. The first tentative Soviet reaction was fairly good and upbeat. The U.S. would push forward now, challenging the Alliance to move faster....All the Allies had agreed that the Summit was a success." (GHWB, "Meeting with Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission," May 30, 1989, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC.) "WE NEED INNOVATION" Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 96.
THE NEWS WENT OVER BEAUTIFULLY GHWB diary, May 30, 1989. "I see now that I have to kick the bureaucracy to make something happen, because, if I hadn't done that, we wouldn't have had a deal; and, if Jim Baker hadn't worked hard in negotiations, we wouldn't have had a deal....So, you see, the lesson was clear, if you really want something to happen, you've really got to push it, and I will do that now with more confidence." (Ibid., May 31, 1989.) PRAISED "THE WILLINGNESS" NYT, May 31, 1989.
LEE ATWATER, NOW CHAIRMAN GHWB diary, May 30, 1989.
THE SENSE OF CHANGE In a May 28, 1989, meeting with Wilfried Martens, the prime minister of Belgium, Bush offered a candid assessment of the state of the world and particularly of East-West relations. "It should be clearly understood that [our] Administration wanted Gorbachev and perestroika to succeed," Bush said according to a memorandum of the conversation. "The West had won the battle of ideologies and the Communist model was dead. Western values were prevailing." At the same time, Bush added, "The Allies should try to capitalize on that success and reduce arms, but not be nave or base their foreign policies on one person." (GHWB, "Meeting with Wilfred Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium," May 28, 1989, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Correspondence, BSC.) "FOR 40 YEARS" Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989, 65054.
THE TROUBLE HAD BEGUN AWT, 8688. For accounts of Tiananmen and its implications, see also Naftali, GHWB, 8083, and LSY, 392, 398400.
BUSH WAS IN KENNEBUNKPORT AWT, 89.
JIM BAKER HAD HOPED Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 97. Robert Gates informed the president that about 8,800 Americans were in the country at the time; of those, 500 to 600 were in Beijing. About 100 were embassy personnel. (Robert M. Gates to GHWB, "Subject: China," Thursday, June 8, 1989: For the President-Action-James W. Cicconi, DF.) CASUALTY FIGURES Seth Faison, "The Persistent Mystery: How Many Died?" NYT, June 4, 1999. "The authorities have never made public a full accounting of the dead and injured," Faison wrote, "and they have stymied outside efforts to do so with a campaign of silence." (Ibid.) THE POLITICS OF CHINA IN AMERICA Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 108.
"NEITHER HAS ANY RESPONSIBILITY" GHWB diary, June 3, 1989.