What's Wrong with Eating People?

Peter Cave.

PREFACE.

Time would have pa.s.sed anyway.

There is nothing that you need to know to enjoy this book. Well, I exaggerate - but only a little. Are you able to read English? - an interesting question. After all, even though we have probably never met, you know and I know that the answer is 'yes'. That hurdle is already jumped; you have read this far. There are also the hurdles of being able and willing to think. These too are jumped; reading requires both - and you are still reading* so far.

Reading is an amazing activity. Look at any sentence in a language that you know. It is exceedingly difficult to see it solely as a set of printed shapes. You cannot help but see the shapes as words; you cannot help but see through to some meaning. Yet whatever is this thing called 'meaning? Already we are beginning to philosophize - and when, in our daily lives, we praise people, fall in love or wonder what it is rational to do, lurking within are philosophical positions about how free people are, about desires, choices, and reasoning.

Virtually every discussion, argument, reflection we have - be it in the pub, newspaper or bath - embodies some philosophical a.s.sumptions and questions. Here, I bring some to light, sometimes playfully, sometimes provocatively, be it through phantasies, dialogues or straight reports. Of course, 'enjoyment' in dipping may not be the right expression; but I am sure that the discussions are sufficiently intriguing for you to muse upon further and probably with others. I am sure because, as humans, we possess a reflective and social curiosity. And that curiosity is not just a way of pa.s.sing the time. Indeed, as has been said, time would have pa.s.sed anyway. The curiosity is about human life and our understanding of the world - including, for that matter, our understanding of time.

The puzzles, paradoxes, and perplexities presented here range across the gamut of human life, and - despite the subt.i.tle - far exceed thirty-three. Some directly concern rationality and reasoning, logic and language; but many spread way beyond, into ethics, the arts, mind, and law - into, indeed, whether eating people is wrong. They transport us from how great G.o.d may be to whether women and men are equal; from why we should save endangered species to muddles in reasoning - to what is this thing called 'love'?

Philosophy opens eyes; philosophy opens 'I's

Simply by virtue of belonging to a community of speakers, we possess materials for philosophizing. There need be no special demands for mathematical ability, erudite historical knowledge or scientific investigations - just our everyday experiences. In a way, philosophy is neither as difficult as Sudoku nor as annoyingly cryptic as some crosswords. Yet, in another way, philosophy presents hugely greater challenges and rewards - not least because we may never be sure when we have finished. The puzzles may persist; perhaps some are inescapable. Of course, philosophy is no mere matter of fun; philosophy grapples with basic understandings and misunderstandings.

Philosophy knows no bounds. Philosophers will puzzle about anything. They will puzzle - yet also aim to clarify. Well, that is how many philosophers see their task. This may challenge some recent 'postmodernists' who often appear to value obscurity. I have in mind the excesses of Derrida, Irigaray, and Kristeva - but perhaps the problem is mine, in failing to comprehend. Of course, the puzzles in this book give rise to many perplexities; but I hope they do not result from the writing's obscurity. The perplexities are present at a much deeper level - when we are reflecting on the world, humanity, and, yes, reflecting on language and reflecting on reflecting.

Philosophy opens eyes. Seneca of ancient Rome commented how things of daily occurrence, even when most worthy of amazement and admiration, pa.s.s us by unnoticed. We may be likened, on occasions, to sleepwalkers, successfully finding our way about, yet unaware of what we are doing. Philosophy opens our eyes indeed. Philosophy, it has been suggested, opens our eyes to what we already know - itself a paradoxical thought.

Philosophy also opens 'I s. Once in worldly reflection, we may soon be wondering about ourselves - or, better, our and others' selves.We selves.We use the word 'I' thousands of times each day, yet quite what is the self, or the selves, of which we speak? What makes my self a different self from yours? - puzzles found in Chapters 18 and 6, use the word 'I' thousands of times each day, yet quite what is the self, or the selves, of which we speak? What makes my self a different self from yours? - puzzles found in Chapters 18 and 6, Thebrain Thebrain and and 'Hi, I'm Sirlsaac Newton - don't mention the apples' 'Hi, I'm Sirlsaac Newton - don't mention the apples'.

Brain food - or or philosophy through puzzles philosophy through puzzles

Philosophy can generate light - unlike treadmills at gyms. Although ungymed myself, I recognize that exercising the body is popular and valuable. However, we also need some exercising of the mind. Philosophy provides the opportunity - and provides the opportunity about matters that matter. Philosophy does not just help to keep our minds active and alert; it involves us, as said, in some of humanity's deepest questions. It may even generate some welcome humility: must all puzzles have solutions?

The term 'paradox' is sometimes confined to apparent contradictions within logic and mathematics. Often, though, philosophers use 'paradox' more widely - as I do here - where the words 'paradoxes', 'puzzles', and 'perplexities' are more or less interchangeable. In the philosophical puzzles here - the paradoxes, the perplexities - we often start off with some comments, our beliefs or principles, which appear obviously true. These are the premisses. We do some reasoning; and so we expect to reach conclusions that we should accept. Paradox arises because the reached conclusions. .h.i.t us as manifestly false, unacceptable or undesirable. In some way they contradict our starting beliefs. Something must have gone wrong with the reasoning - or maybe our starting points are mistaken. The perplexity resides in locating the mistakes.

Some philosophical puzzles puzzle because we are unsure how far to take, or where to take, our principles or everyday beliefs. We realize that if we go so far, then we hit some crazy stances, stances that contradict other beliefs - but how can we stop ourselves from hitting such cases?

Contradictions are*? Oops - does that suggest a need to learn some new concepts? Not at all. Early on, I wrote of reading. In reading, we show awareness of contradictions and related concepts. Our grasp is part of our everyday use of language - even though we may lack formal definitions.

You come home and find two notes left by your partner. One says, 'Wait in for me,' the other says, 'Don't wait in for me.' What do you do? These are contradictory instructions - so, quite reasonably, you are baffled. Hence, we need to avoid contradictions - to avoid being contra contra in speech or diction. This avoidance applies beyond instructions. Your friend tells you, 'It will rain today,' and then adds 'It won't rain today.' Again, you are baffled - baffled concerning what she believes and what you should do umbrella-wise. Because we seek understanding we may try to explain away the contradictions: maybe the notes show a mind change; maybe the speaker of rain speaks of different places. in speech or diction. This avoidance applies beyond instructions. Your friend tells you, 'It will rain today,' and then adds 'It won't rain today.' Again, you are baffled - baffled concerning what she believes and what you should do umbrella-wise. Because we seek understanding we may try to explain away the contradictions: maybe the notes show a mind change; maybe the speaker of rain speaks of different places.

Suppose your friends hold that people ought not to harm others, but then it turns out that they often fight and hurt each other - well, we should feel some contradiction has arisen. Again, we may search for consistency. Perhaps the principle has exceptions when it comes to self-defence or consent: perhaps the fighting is consensual boxing. Many ethical puzzles, though, rarely have such simple resolutions: see Chapter 30, Ifthis bejudging* Ifthis bejudging*

Talking the sun down - and Can a Robot be Human? Can a Robot be Human?

This book is eminently dippable. It is also structured to flit you, to and fro, between different topics, if read straight through. If, instead, you follow the arrows at each chapter's end, then you will initially stay with certain themes, but be led to others.

This book can, of course, be read totally separately from my first collection of thirty-three puzzles, Can a Robot be Can a Robot be Human? Which puzzles appeared in which book was pretty arbitrary. 'All things conspire' is an ancient saw - and certainly in philosophy, one puzzle leads to another. This applies within this book as well as between the two books. Hence, I have included an appendix of main puzzle areas, referring to both books - for if a puzzle particularly intrigues here, you may want to pursue related ones in Which puzzles appeared in which book was pretty arbitrary. 'All things conspire' is an ancient saw - and certainly in philosophy, one puzzle leads to another. This applies within this book as well as between the two books. Hence, I have included an appendix of main puzzle areas, referring to both books - for if a puzzle particularly intrigues here, you may want to pursue related ones in Robot. Robot.

Philosophy is usually seen as a social pursuit - people in dialogue, with some cut and some thrust - so, let me recommend that you raise these questions at home, at college, at work; in the pub, over dinner, down at the football, or when lolling on holiday hammocks. And then see how reflections and puzzlements blossom forth. You will probably find you can talk the sun down - and up again.

Wittgenstein, arguably the twentieth century's greatest philosopher, suggested that, when two philosophers meet, their greeting should be 'Take your time'. Returning us to the preface's motto, my recommended approach to reading and thinking about these matters is, indeed, Wittgenstein's.

Take your time.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

As with Can a Robot be Human? Can a Robot be Human? I am indebted to many colleagues and students, over the years, at The Open University and City University London. Instead of re-naming names from I am indebted to many colleagues and students, over the years, at The Open University and City University London. Instead of re-naming names from Robot, Robot, let me thank all who have helped me as before. I also thank again the editors of let me thank all who have helped me as before. I also thank again the editors of Philosophy Now, The Philosophers' Magazine, Philosophy Now, The Philosophers' Magazine, and and Think, Think, for publishing my light articles, two or three having been adapted here. for publishing my light articles, two or three having been adapted here.

Particular useful comments derive from Sir David Blatherwick, Laurence Goldstein, Martin Holt, Julian Mayers, Anthony Savile, Raymond Tallis, and Jerry Valberg. I thank them all - and apologize to those I have forgotten. Arnold Zuboff kindly spent much time failing to guide me along truth's path concerning Sleeping Beauty.

Much of the writing took place in the British Library; and my thanks go to its helpful staff. For additional practical help, I thank Malcolm Fleming and Debra Harris - and, for supporting my labours indirectly, Phil Smith, Sally Mitch.e.l.l, and Tony Seaton. Many thanks, too, to Juliet Mabey, Mike Harpley, Kate Smith, and all at Oneworld. As ever, for many valuable aiding ways, my special grat.i.tude goes to Angela Joy Harvey.

The philosopher who has suffered most in this enterprise is Ardon Lyon - from whom I continue to learn much. He has read all the material at draft stages, with his usual good humour, meticulous attention, astonished expressions, and outrageous laughs. I cannot help but add that he is not responsible. Did I mean that?

Peter Cave

Mind/Rationality

1.

ON THINKING TOO MUCH: HOW NOT TO WIN A PRINCESS'S HAND.

Cast ourselves into a kingdom, a kingdom ruled by the king and queen, a kingdom with jesters, princes, and princesses, with dragons, dreams, and damsels in distress. In our kingdom, there is a beautiful princess, the king and queen's daughter; yet there is stalemate: which young man should gain the princess's hand? The king wants his daughter to marry Prince Clever, who is indeed clever, though neither exactly handsome nor strong nor possessing a prince's charm.The queen backs a rival, Prince Not So Clever, who is a.s.suredly not so clever, yet is handsome, manly, and charming. Both young men are enchanted by the princess. And the princess's love concerning the young men? Well, she wisely lets it be known she could love either; she does not want to make enemies of her father or mother. Such is love in those days - and such is parental authority.

'We must set the suitors a task,' declares the queen, 'to see who displays the greatest devotion to our daughter.'

'What a good idea,' agrees the king. 'Let it be a mathematical puzzle and one that*'

'Of course not,' insists the queen, knowing Prince Not So Clever would fail any such test. 'They must slay a dragon.The first suitor to return with a dragon suitably slain shall have our daughter's hand.'

Now, that is not as impossible a task as it may sound; this is a kingdom with convenient dragons ready to be slain. Our princes, though, lack eagerness toward the proposal - after all, dragon-slaying is hard work and can be quite a heated affair - but, if it has to be done, it would be worth the effort for the princess's hand. The king is very unhappy at the proposal; his preferred candidate would be highly unlikely to win.

The king and queen argue until the princess pipes up. 'Let it be that one of the men needs only only to to intend intend to slay a dragon, while the other must actually slay a dragon.' At this, Prince Clever quickly bags the 'intention only' option, thinking that would obviously be so much easier than all the messy effort of slaying. Prince Not So Clever sighs, accepting that his slow- wittedness means that he will have to do the slaying. to slay a dragon, while the other must actually slay a dragon.' At this, Prince Clever quickly bags the 'intention only' option, thinking that would obviously be so much easier than all the messy effort of slaying. Prince Not So Clever sighs, accepting that his slow- wittedness means that he will have to do the slaying.

'This is pointless and silly,' thunders the queen, then muttering, 'Prince Not So Clever is bound to lose - intending, intending, which is all Prince Clever has to do, is so much easier than actually doing.' Yet the princess kicks her, politely of course, silencing her - such is daughterly authority in those days. which is all Prince Clever has to do, is so much easier than actually doing.' Yet the princess kicks her, politely of course, silencing her - such is daughterly authority in those days.

And so, it is decided that the winner of the princess's hand will be the one who completes his task first, be it the intending only, sincerely of course, or the actual slaying, starting at sunrise tomorrow. Before readers ask, the king and queen have a court mind-reader who can easily read minds for sincere intentions. If this worries readers, we pop into the kingdom future brain scanners that readily detect psychological states such as intentions. Now, the question is:

Who is more likely to win the princess's hand?

The puzzle centres on rationality and affects our everyday lives. In our question, we have added the caveat of 'more likely' as protection from readers who rightly note that we have said nothing about how strong the local dragons are, exactly how clever the suitors are, whether they remember the task next morning, and so on. a.s.suming all is straightforward, other than the tale's oddness, the answer, as readers may have guessed, is that Prince Not So Clever wins. He gets on with his task, slays the dragon, and marries the princess. What goes wrong for Prince Clever?

Prince Clever was, of course, eager to accept the condition whereby merely intending was sufficient to win the princess's hand. As the queen thought, merely intending to do something seems so much easier than actually doing. Indeed, we may well sincerely intend to perform feats, yet fail. Prince Clever mused upon this point.

'I need only to intend to slay a dragon,' he reflected. 'The actual slaying is hard work; so it would be silly to do any slaying, once that, at sunrise, I have already intended to slay. Ah, but that means that I would not be sincerely intending to slay after all - if I know that I won't then bother to slay.'

Prince Clever thought more. 'Ah well, I'd better slay the dragon after all,' he reflected miserably, but then hesitated. 'Hold on, that would be crazy, for I don't need to do that, once I have had my sincere sunrise intention to slay. Yet as I am aware of that, once again I should have failed to have formed the required sincere intention. Okay, I had better go and slay - but hold on*'

And so Prince Clever's reasoning looped round and round - and as the sun rose he still found himself unable to form a sincere intention.Whenever he said 'I intend', trying to mean it, his reason reminded him that he would not need to do what he intended - and he would have good reason not to do it, when the time came. Of course, Prince Not So Clever lacked all such quandaries; he went out and slew the dragon. Mind you, it was a little dragon.

And so it was that Prince Not So Clever married the princess. The princess pretended surprise, while within she smiled wisely. Such was princesses' wisdom in those days.

Had the mere 'intention' requirement also been given to Prince Not So Clever, he would still have won. Being not so clever, he would not have become enmeshed in the clever reasoning of Prince Clever. The puzzle arises because, at times, it is rational to commit ourselves to doing something that, later on, it will be irrational to do. When we reflect on this, we see how rationally we should lose the motivation to do the irrational, once that 'later on' comes, thus undermining our commitment now to performing the task in question.

Had Prince Clever been cleverer, maybe he could have persuaded himself that the requirement was that he really did have to slay the dragon rather than merely intend to slay: he would have been better off having that false belief. Or perhaps he could have committed himself to behaving irrationally in the future.

The general puzzle here concerns binding ourselves over the future. Prince Clever needed to bind himself to carrying out his intention, blocking his ears from reason's nagging little voice, reminding him that he would not need to do the slaying, if only he could intend to slay. In more everyday scenarios, things are a little different. Reason may tell us that we should arrange circ.u.mstances to prevent ourselves from yielding to future temptations; yet paradoxically we may know that, when faced with those temptations, we shall see things differently and fully favour succ.u.mbing.

There is the ancient Greek tale according to which Odysseus knew that, unrestrained, he would yield to the sirens when he heard their melodious and beguiling song. Hence, he told his sailors to bind him to the mast and stop their ears with beeswax, ensuring that they would not hear his orders to be released, when tempted by the song. Thus it was that, paradoxically, Odysseus intentionally prevented himself from doing what he would later want to do.

These days we rarely encounter sirens seeking to sing us to the grave. We may, though, somewhat more prosaically, be aware that, as the evening draws on, we are likely to eat too many chocolates or drink too much wine; so we deliberately avoid buying these goods of delight on the way home.Yet we know that we shall soon be regretting that earlier decision.

Did our past selves, so to speak, have a right to bind us to this sober, chocolate-less evening?

And as we puzzle that question, we may more urgently puzzle whether the local supermarket is still open - or whether, hold on. Isn't there some whisky tucked away upstairs?

Ethics

2.ON THE RUN: ALL'S FAIR WITH BEARS?.

Here are two explorers. Let them be Penelope Pessimist and Ophelia Optimist. They are exploring some mountainous regions, when they become suddenly aware of a bear in the distance, a bear big and hungry and intent upon feeding - feeding upon them. The bear heads in their direction, picking up speed, antic.i.p.ating a tasty explorer breakfast. 'We'd better run for it,' urges Ophelia Optimist. 'What's the point?' sighs Penelope Pessimist in despair at the bear. 'There's no way we can outrun a bear.'

'No need to do that,' smirks Ophelia Optimist. 'No need for us us to outrun the bear - just for to outrun the bear - just for me me to outrun to outrun you.' you.' And And with that, she was off.

What are we morally allowed to do to save our lives? a.s.suming the bear needs to breakfast on only one, eithercould sacrifice herself. But does morality demand such self- sacrifice? And who should do the sacrificing? Before readers ask, let us a.s.sume that both women know that they cannot overpower the bear. Running is the only answer. In such circ.u.mstances, looking after oneself seems, at the very least, morally permissible.

Let us delete Ophelia's smirk. Both explorers recognize the tragedy of their plight. They recognize that it would be beyond the call of morality for Ophelia to have to sacrifice herself - or, indeed, for Penelope to do so. They both race away from the bear, not knowing who is faster or more skilled at twists and turns; they are letting fortune determine which one escapes - and which one dies.

The outcome, though, could be certain. They may know that Ophelia is the faster runner and will escape; so Penelope will provide the bear's breakfast. If so, then Ophelia is letting the weaker, Penelope, go to the wall - more accurately, to the bear's digestion.Yet that is no good reason for Ophelia to sacrifice herself. After all, were she to make such a sacrifice, we could wonder why Penelope ought not to be sacrificing herself instead. And what value exists in their both yielding to the bear? They are not lovers who cannot live without each other.

Let us modify the tale: the only way one can be sure of escape is by tripping up the other. We probably think that doing that would be morally wrong. Maybe it is unfair; it is unfair for one woman deliberately to interfere with the other. Yet how is it fair in the first place that one woman runs faster than the other?

Is it morally permissible for you to save your life, if an innocent individual's death results?

We swim in murky waters here. Let us focus. Consider only cases in which the life of solely one innocent person is lost through saving your own life. To avoid complexities of families, lifespan, and so on, we a.s.sume that the individuals involved have similar responsibilities and potential for happiness and contributions to society.

Here are some different scenarios to test what we sense is permissible. Suppose that Ophelia and Penelope are in a queue, Ophelia at the front. A crazed individual is facing the queue, firing a revolver. Ophelia ducks to avoid being shot; as a result, the bullet kills Penelope. Ophelia, in defending herself, helps to bring about Penelope's death.Yet even if she foresees that Penelope will be shot - perhaps Ophelia lacks time to warn her - Ophelia does not intend Penelope's death. Her death is not the means whereby Ophelia saves herself. Had everyone in the queue ducked, maybe no one would have been killed. Penelope was an innocent and unlucky bystander.

Contrast the above with a different 'queue' example where Ophelia, to avoid being shot, pushes Penelope in front of her. Here, Ophelia is using Penelope as a shield - without informed consent. Surely, Ophelia is not morally permitted to do that. This suggests that an important, morally relevant feature is whether a person is being endangered through being used as a means of defence. We see this in another contrast: A run-away tram hurtles towards you.You are trapped on the tracks, but you have a wireless points' control, so you are able to divert the tram onto a siding, thus saving yourself. Unfortunately, you know that there is a worker lying unconscious on the siding's tracks. By diverting, you save your life, yet bring about the worker's death. That may or may not be morally permissible, but it certainly is not as bad as what you do in the next scenario.

Once again, the run-away tram is hurtling towards you. The only means of saving your life is by firing a rubber bullet at a pa.s.ser-by near the track. The pa.s.ser-by, stunned, falls onto the track and is killed by the tram, bringing it to a halt. Thus, you are saved, saved by using the pa.s.ser-by as a shield. The pa.s.ser-by's death is the means means whereby you are saved, unlike the worker's death. whereby you are saved, unlike the worker's death.

When we use someone as a shield, we are transferring our misfortune to someone else who is required to suffer. There are, then, two morally relevant factors.

One factor concerns the misfortune transferred and its significance for the recipient. If the only way to save my life is by causing an innocent person 'as a shield' to have her nail varnish tarnished - well, that is morally acceptable; and if the shield protests, then she displays selfishness, lacking a sense of proportion. If I grab the fine silk scarf from a gentleman, the scarf needed to stem arterial blood flowing from my thigh, I have doubtless invaded his property; but saving a life at the cost of a silk scarf is a good deal, even if he complains about my violation of his property rights.

The second factor concerns the transference itself. In the shield examples it is deliberate and required. In the other examples, the life would be saved, even if no misfortunes were to occur to others. We may, though, question this distinction's relevance, if we know the misfortunes will in fact occur. You have a right to defend yourself from the tram by diverting it; but if you foresee that the worker's death will result, are you not behaving cruelly in pa.s.sing that misfortune buck onto him? Of course, morally things are different, if you know that he is conscious and could leap free to safety, with or without his nail varnish tarnished. However, in the case set out, you are surely not morally justified in pa.s.sing the deadly tram onto him.The unconscious worker is, so to speak, an innocent threat to you - a threat in that his presence morally prevents you from doing what would otherwise be permissible to save your life, namely, diverting the tram.

Returning to the bear, where does this leave the morality, or otherwise, of Ophelia taking to her heels, knowing that Penelope is likely to be eaten? After all, Penelope does need to be caught and feasted upon, to ensure that the bear does not continue to chase Ophelia. It may appear as if Ophelia is pa.s.sing her misfortune onto Penelope - and hence it is as morally bad as your diverting the tram onto the unconscious worker. Yet we may feel that here 'every woman for herself' is morally acceptable.

Perhaps the relevant difference between the shield and bear examples concerns the tales' starting points. With the bear, the two explorers are in it together from the start; both are exposed to the bear's hungry eye.With the tram example, you alone are initially exposed to the danger. If you take no action, the worker is safe. If Ophelia takes no action regarding the bear, Penelope may still be exposed to the bear's dining desires. If the crazed gunman is out to shoot anyone, then again we may think that all in the queue are party to the misfortune. Suppose, though, that the gunman is specifically after Ophelia at the front of the queue. By diving down, avoiding the bullets, has she unfairly transferred a misfortune buck to others?